THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ROLL No. C 5165
DATE FILMED 3-12-75
OPERATOR C.C
LOCATION Maxwell AFB, Ala.
REDUCTION 26:1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

This microfilm was created from the record copy of unit histories and related historical material of the United States Air Force stored in the Archives Branch of The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. This facility is the official repository for these records in accordance with AF Regulation 210-3 and AF Manual 12-50. This microfilm was created in accordance with the provisions of AF Regulation 12-40 as AU Project AU-1B-67. The microfilming was completed under AF Contract FO 1600 74 90383 under the supervision of the Technical Systems Branch of The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center.

Billie H. Hix

BILLIE H. HIX
Chief, Technical Systems Branch
The Albert F. Simpson Historical
Research Center

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

6th ARMY GROUP

RECORD of PROGRESS

6th Army Gp

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

VOLUME I
COPY NO. 59

31 MARCH 1945

[redacted]

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

MICROFILMED

0004

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD OF PROGRESS
6TH ARMY GROUP
MARCH 1945

DECLASSIFIED EO 11652

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RECORD OF PROGRESS	1
PERSONNEL	2
MONTH END STRENGTH OF COMMAND	3
MONTH END STRENGTH STATUS OF COMMANDS	4
MONTH END PERSONNEL SITUATION, 7TH U.S. ARMY	5
MONTH END PERSONNEL SITUATION, 1ST FR. ARMY	6
PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED BY 6TH ARMY GROUP	7
PERSONNEL LIBERATED BY 6TH ARMY GROUP	8
GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL ACTIVITY	9
CASUALTIES	10
BATTLE CASUALTY TRENDS, 6TH ARMY GROUP	11
BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTY RATES, COMPARISON BY DIVISIONS	12
SUMMARY OF BATTLE & NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, 7TH U.S. ARMY	13
SUMMARY OF BATTLE & NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, 1ST FR. ARMY	14
BATTLE CASUALTIES BY ARM & SERVICE AND GRADE	15
REINFORCEMENTS	16
ANALYSIS OF CASUALTIES AND REINFORCEMENTS	17
ANALYSIS OF CASUALTIES AND HOSPITAL EVACUEES RETURNED	18
MEDICAL STATISTICS	19
HEALTH OF COMMAND, 7TH U.S. ARMY	20
STATUS OF HOSPITAL BEDS	21
LOGISTICS	22
DRAGOON PLANNING AND BUILD-UP	23
AMMUNITION STATUS, 6TH ARMY GROUP	24
USE OF RAILROAD CAPACITIES	25
MONTHLY FREIGHT ALLOCATIONS AND DELIVERIES	26
CARGO VEHICLE AVAILABILITY	27
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS BY CARGO VEHICLES	28
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS	29
MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF AWARDS & DECORATIONS TO MAJOR ECHELONS	30
SUMMARY OF AWARDS AND DECORATIONS TO MAJOR ECHELONS	31
AIR FORCE COOPERATION	32
AIR FORCE COOPERATION, FIGHTERS & FIGHTER-BOMBERS	33
AIR FORCE COOPERATION, MEDIUM BOMBERS	34
SUMMARY OF EFFORT BY TYPE MISSION	35

DECLASSIFIED EO 11652

31 MARCH 1945

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONNEL

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SIXTH ARMY GROUP
MONTH END STRENGTH OF COMMAND

SECRET

	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AMERICAN	130,023	159,458	201,430	225,358	278,261	336,062 *	292,147	335,405			
FRENCH	95,416	133,230	249,004	258,197	309,928	364,653	347,746	373,549			
TOTAL	225,439	292,688	450,434	483,555	588,189	700,715	639,893	708,954			

* 39,305 ATTACHED FROM OTHER COMMANDS

SOURCE -
G-1 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SIXTH ARMY GROUP
MONTH END STRENGTH STATUS OF COMMANDS

SEVENTH U.S. ARMY



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
T/O	119,754	145,077	173,847	213,811	277,991	343,370	280,809	336,477			
ASSIGNED	119,855	146,717	171,518	209,083	264,428	321,573	278,114	330,619			
EFFECTIVE	113,173	141,984	165,628	202,610	253,114	308,709	267,883	318,379			

-·-·- T/O ---- ASSIGNED —— EFFECTIVE

FIRST FRENCH ARMY



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
T/O	99,439	173,585	214,148	213,410	219,232	256,346	269,178	253,013			
ASSIGNED	95,416	177,687	221,427	226,663	234,141	267,371	279,408	278,235			
EFFECTIVE	95,152	169,248	215,292	213,961	212,860	250,251	254,136	248,407			

-·-·- T/O ----- ASSIGNED —— EFFECTIVE

ALPINE FRONT COMMAND



	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
T/O	12,390	12,707	12,667	9,862	13,082	12,162	50,308			
ASSIGNED	12,969	13,461	13,192	10,089	13,983	13,719	50,174			
EFFECTIVE	11,955	12,331	11,911	9,412	13,348	12,137	41,936			

-·-·- T/O ------ ASSIGNED —— EFFECTIVE

ARMY DETACHMENT OF THE ATLANTIC



	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
TROOP LIST PERS'L	9,089	7,507	7,415	7,547			
NON TROOP LIST PERSONNEL	41,000	38,300	41,627	45,831			
TOTAL STRENGTH	50,089	45,807	49,042	53,378			

----- TROOP LIST PERSONNEL —— TOTAL STRENGTH

SOURCE:-
G-1 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5

SECRET

SEVENTH ARMY
MONTH END PERSONNEL SITUATION

SECRET

CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES AND REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
RTU †	1,220	9,069	18,613	30,996	41,576	55,181	69,202	79,485			
REINFORCEMENTS	2,328	7,681	16,923	23,956	31,339	49,586	65,011	72,305			
TOTAL	3,548	16,750	35,536	54,952	72,915	104,767	134,213	151,790			
TOTAL CASUALTIES	9,955	25,171	48,428	72,832	97,792	130,405	148,968	173,840			

R T U † REINFORCEMENTS ---- TOTAL CASUALTIES

PERSONNEL OVERAGES AND SHORTAGES



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
INFANTRY	-2,602	-4,031	-10,341	-17,445	- 644	-5,135			
OTHER GEN ASGM'T	—	- 697	-3,222	-4,352	-2,051	- 723			
TOTAL	-2,602	-4,728	-13,563	-21,797	-2,695	-5,858			

INFANTRY OTHER GEN. ASGM'T

REINFORCEMENTS ON HAND



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
INFANTRY	2,720	3,045	1,566	2,884	1,092	3,818			
OTHER GEN ASGM'T	7,804	6,704	2,666	2,049	1,558	2,614			
TOTAL	10,524	9,749	4,232	4,933	2,650	6,432			

— INFANTRY ----OTHER GEN. ASGM'T.

PERCENT NON-EFFECTIVE OF ASSIGNED STRENGTH OVERALL AND COMBAT



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
OVERALL	5.6	3.3	3.4	3.0	4.2	3.7	3.6	3.6			
COMBAT	4.2	3.0	3.8	3.1	3.4	3.6	2.7	3.3			

— OVERALL ---- COMBAT

SOURCE
20TH MRU
G-1, 7TH ARMY
HQ 2ND REINFORCEMENT DEPOT

† RTU AS USED HERE AND ON FOLLOWING PAGES DENOTES HOSPITAL EVACUEES RETURNED TO UNITS.

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

FIRST FRENCH ARMY
MONTH END PERSONNEL SITUATION

SECRET

CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES AND REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
R.T.U.	0	4,558	11,709	19,528	26,539	34,680	45,052	58,502			
REINFORCEMENTS	7,848	9,244	28,347	42,348	61,676	80,018	102,115	127,024			
TOTAL	7,848	13,802	40,056	61,876	88,215	114,698	147,167	185,526			
TOTAL CASUALTIES	5,085	11,034	32,385	59,300	85,248	118,921	156,061	195,711			

R.T.U. REINFORCEMENTS ---- TOTAL CASUALTIES

PERSONNEL OVERAGES AND SHORTAGES



	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
INFANTRY	-4,892	-7,282	-7,459	-3,569	-2,211			
OTHER BRANCHES	18,145	22,191	18,484	13,799	27,433			
TOTAL	13,253	14,909	11,025	10,230	25,222			

INFANTRY OTHER BRANCHES

MONTHLY CASUALTIES AND REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
R.T.U.	0	4,558	7,151	7,819	7,011	8,141	10,372	13,450			
REINFORCEMENTS	7,848	1,396	19,103	14,001	19,328	18,342	22,097	24,909			
TOTAL	7,848	5,954	26,254	21,820	26,339	26,483	32,469	38,359			
TOTAL CASUALTIES	5,085	5,949	21,351	26,915	25,948	33,673	37,140	39,650			

R.T.U. REINFORCEMENTS TOTAL CASUALTIES

PERCENT NON-EFFECTIVE OF ASSIGNED STRENGTH OVERALL AND COMBAT



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
OVERALL	3	4.7	2.8	5.6	9.1	6.4	9.0	10.7			
COMBAT	3	6.7	3.6	7.8	12.6	9.9	14.2	13.8			

OVERALL ---- COMBAT

SOURCE:-
G-1 FR ARMY
G-1 7TH U.S. ARMY

NOTE:- ALL STATISTICS INCLUDE 2ND FRENCH ARMORED DIVISION.

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED BY SIXTH ARMY GROUP





		AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
CAPTURED CUMULATIVELY BY	AMERICAN	23,197	40,761	47,624	64,482	76,887	85,597	94,390	146,108			
	FRENCH	34,800	53,395	58,313	70,705	75,256	78,196	85,832	86,752			
	TOTAL	57,997	94,156	105,937	135,187	152,143	163,793	180,222	232,860			
CAPTURED MONTHLY BY	AMERICAN	23,197	17,564	6,863	16,858	12,405	8,710	8,793	51,718			
	FRENCH	34,800	18,595	4,918	12,392	4,551	2,940	7,636	920			
	TOTAL	57,997	36,159	11,781	29,250	16,956	11,650	16,429	52,638			

PRISONERS TAKEN BY AMERICANS

PRISONERS TAKEN BY FRENCH

SOURCE:-
G-1 7TH U.S ARMY
G-1 1ST FR ARMY

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONNEL LIBERATED BY SIXTH ARMY GROUP SINCE FORCES ENTERED GERMANY



RUSSIAN	YUGOSLAV	OTHERS	FRENCH	BRITISH	U.S.	BELGIANS	ITALIANS	POLES
8,665	4,313	3,555	1,399	1,359	974	291	269	129



	RUSSIAN	POLES	FRENCH	OTHERS
LIBERATED	47,803	20,077	18,165	9,561
REPATRIATED			20,000	300

SOURCE:
G-1, G-5, 6TH ARMY GROUP (REPORTING PERIOD COVERS 15 MAR '45 TO 21 APRIL '45)

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SEVENTH ARMY
GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL
ACTIVITY

SECRET

MONTLY AVERAGE TRIALS BY UNITS
AUG '44 THRU MAR '45

UNIT	TOTAL CASES	MONTHLY AVERAGE
3 INF DIV	281	37
36 INF DIV	208	28
45 INF DIV	118	16
7 TH ARMY	116	15
79 INF DIV	57	13
VI CORPS	70	10
XV CORPS	50	8
6 TH ARMY GROUP	47	7
103 INF DIV	30	6
44 INF DIV	27	5
10 ARM'D DIV	8	4
100 INF DIV	11	2
14 ARM'D	7	2
42 INF DIV	6	2
XXI CORPS	6	2
12 ARM'D	2	04
63 INF DIV	—	—
70 INF DIV	—	—
TOTAL	1,044	

TYPES OF OFFENSES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
DESERTION	88	88	135			
OTHER MIL OFFENSES	70	92	198			
WILFUL DISOBEDIENCE	24	40	40			
MISBEHAVIOR BEFORE ENEMY	9	13	17			
CIVIL TYPES	1	3	6			
TOTAL	192	236	396			

ACTION TAKEN



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
CONVICTIONS	128	158	249			
ACQUITTALS	1	10	15			

SOURCE
JAG 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CASUALTIES

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SIXTH ARMY GROUP
MONTHLY BATTLE CASUALTY TRENDS
SEVENTH U. S. ARMY AND FIRST FRENCH ARMY

SECRET



KILLED	1,749	1,674	2,802	3,712	3,523	3,418	2,109	1,799			
WOUNDED	7,279	6,123	11,489	14,633	16,221	15,566	8,038	9,075			
MISSING	343	820	760	880	2,309	6,975	761	998			
TOTAL	9,371	8,617	15,051	19,225	22,053	25,959	10,908	11,872			

† NOTE SHARP INCREASE IN THIS TOTAL IS DUE TO THE UNPRECEDENTED LOSSES IN THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

42 ND INF DIV – 1303
79 TH INF DIV – 936
12 TH ARMD DIV – 545
45 TH INF DIV – 459
3 RD INF DIV – 446

SOURCE:
20 TH MRU
G-1 1ST FR ARMY

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTY RATE COMPARISON BY COMBAT DIVISIONS

SECRET



	45 INF	36 INF	79 INF	3 INF	70 INF	42 INF	100 INF	44 INF	63 INF	103 INF	12 ARMD	14 ARMD
BATTLE	76.5	91.8	110.7	98.1	102.3	78.6	46.8	59.1	72.3	57.6	49.5	49.5
NON-BATTLE	117.0	112.5	54.3	107.4	57.6	43.8	74.4	72.0	62.4	51.6	39.9	35.4



	1 DMI	9 DIC	3 DIA	2 DIM	5 DB	4 DMM	1 DB	2 DB
BATTLE	59.1	37.9	61.0	45.5	31.4	32.8	30.0	30.4
NON-BATTLE	170.4	154.6	144.1	125.5	117.3	101.0	52.9	18.1

BATTLE CASUALTIES

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

SOURCE
G-1 7TH US ARMY
G-1 1ST FRENCH ARMY

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SEVENTH ARMY
SUMMARY OF BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

SECRET

CUMULATIVELY



MONTHLY



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
KILLED	872	1,109	1,796	1,943	1,698	2,257	1,079	1,471			
WOUNDED	3,304	4,353	7,535	7,628	7,322	8,926	4,128	7,718			
MISSING	246	758	649	573	1,236	5,468	494	944			
TOTAL BATTLE	4,422	6,220	9,980	10,144	10,256	16,651	5,701	10,133			
NON-BATTLE	5,533	8,996	13,277	14,260	14,704	15,962	12,862	14,739			
TOTAL	9,955	15,216	23,257	24,404	24,960	32,613	18,563	24,872			

KILLED WOUNDED MISSING NON-BATTLE

SOURCE: G-1 7TH U.S. ARMY
20TH MRU

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FIRST FRENCH ARMY
SUMMARY OF BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES





	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
KILLED	877	565	1,006	1,769	1,825	1,161	1,030	328			
WOUNDED	3,975	1,770	3,954	7,005	8,899	6,640	3,910	1,357			
MISSING	97	62	111	307	1,073	1,507	267	54			
TOTAL BATTLE	4,949	2,397	5,071	9,081	11,797	9,308	5,207	1,739			
NON-BATTLE	136	3,552	16,280	17,834	14,151	24,365	31,933	37,911			
TOTAL	5,085	5,949	21,351	26,915	25,948	33,673	37,140	39,650			

KILLED WOUNDED MISSING NON-BATTLE

SOURCE-
G-1 1ST FR ARMY

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SEVENTH ARMY
BATTLE CASUALTIES BY ARM & SERVICE AND GRADE
15 AUG 44 THRU 31 MAR 45

RECAPITULATION BY ARM AND SERVICE

ARM AND SERVICE	CASUALTIES	PERCENT K	W	M	TOTAL
INFANTRY	64,374	14.4	60.4	12.8	87.6
ARTILLERY	3,109	.8	3.1	.3	4.2
ENGINEERS	2,091	.6	2.0	.2	2.8
MEDICAL DEPT	1,804	.4	1.7	.4	2.5
CAVALRY	1,458	.4	1.3	.3	2.0
ALL OTHERS	373	.1	.4	—	.5
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE	298	.05	.3	.05	.4
TOTAL	73,507	16.75	69.20	14.05	100.0

RECAPITULATION BY GRADE

OFFICERS	CASUALTIES	PERCENT K	W	M	TOTAL
GENERAL AND FIELD OFFICERS	125	.5	2.4	.3	3.2
CAPTAINS	463	2.5	8.1	1.2	11.8
1ST LIEUTENANTS	1,685	8.3	30.0	4.6	42.9
2ND LIEUTENANTS	1,645	7.6	29.0	5.3	41.9
WARRANT OFFICERS	7	—	.2	—	.2
TOTAL OFFICERS	3,925	18.9	69.7	11.4	100.0
ENLISTED MEN	**CASUALTIES**	**PERCENT K**	**W**	**M**	**TOTAL**
FIRST THREE GRADES	6,704	1.6	6.8	1.2	9.6
SERGEANTS	6,640	1.7	6.6	1.2	9.5
CORPORALS	4,730	1.2	4.7	.9	6.8
PRIVATES 1ST CLASS	29,308	6.8	28.9	6.5	42.2
PRIVATES	22,200	5.2	22.2	4.5	31.9
TOTAL ENLISTED MEN	69,582	16.5	69.2	14.3	100.0
TOTAL OFFICERS	73,507	1.0	3.7	.6	5.3
TOTAL ENLISTED MEN		15.6	65.6	13.5	94.7

KILLED WOUNDED MISSING

SOURCE
20TH MRU

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REINFORCEMENTS

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SEVENTH U.S. ARMY
CASUALTY AND REINFORCEMENT ANALYSIS

CUMULATIVE AND MONTHLY CASUALTIES AND REINFORCEMENTS



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
CASUALTIES	9,955	15,216	23,257	24,404	24,960	32,613	18,563	24,872			
REINFORCEMENTS	3,548	13,202	18,786	19,416	17,963	31,852	29,446	17,577			

CUMULATIVE AND MONTHLY BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
BATTLE CAS	4,422	6,220	9,980	10,144	10,256	16,651	5,701	10,133			
NON-BAT CAS	5,533	8,996	13,277	14,260	14,704	15,962	12,862	14,739			

PERCENT OF CASUALTIES REPLACED AND RETURNED



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
CAS REPLACED	23.3	35.2	39.8	28.9	29.6	56.0	83.1	29.4			
CAS RETURNED	12.3	51.6	41.0	50.7	42.4	41.7	75.5	41.3			
TOTAL REINF	35.6	86.8	80.8	79.6	72.0	97.7	158.6	70.7			

CUMULATIVE AND MONTHLY REINFORCEMENTS AND RTU'S



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
RTU'S	1,220	7,849	9,544	12,383	10,580	13,605	14,021	10,283			
REINF	2,328	5,353	9,242	7,033	7,383	18,247	5,425	7,294			

† INCOMPLETE REPLACEMENT OF CASUALTIES IS DUE TO PLANNED ATTRITION OF AUTHORIZED ASSAULT OVERSTRENGTH.

SOURCE
20 MRU

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SEVENTH U.S. ARMY
ANALYSIS OF CASUALTIES AND HOSPITAL EVACUEES RETURNED

CUMULATIVE AND MONTHLY BATTLE CASUALTIES AND RETURNS



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
BATTLE CASUALTIES	4,422	6,220	9,980	10,144	10,256	16,6[illegible]		5,70[illegible]	10,133		
BATTLE RETURNS	42[illegible]	,372	3,303	3,423	5,325	5,744	4,36[illegible]		3,899		

CUMULATIVE AND MONTHLY NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES AND RETURNS



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES	5,533	8,996	13,277	14,260	14,704	15,962	12,862	14,739			
NON-BATTLE RETURNS	799	6,477	6,241	8,960	5,255	7,861	9,660	6,384			

PERCENT BATTLE CASUALTIES RETURNED



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% BAT CAS RETURNED	9.4	22.1	33.1	33.7	51.9	34.5	76.5	38.5			

PERCENT NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES RETURNED



	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% NON-BAT CAS RETURNED	14.4	71.9	47.0	62.8	35.7	49.2	75.0	43.3			

SOURCE
G-1, 7TH ARMY
20 MRU

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MEDICAL STATISTICS

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SEVENTH ARMY
HEALTH OF COMMAND

SECRET

HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS BY CAUSE



DISEASE	686	728	678	659	543	592	540			
INJURY	134	129	244	221	199	176	121			
BATTLE CASUALTY	341	519	500	486	394	225	279			

DISEASE RATES FOR SELECTED TYPES



RESPIRATORY	53	101	77	161	127	176	126			
INTESTINAL	40	40	27	96	37	30	21			
VENEREAL	48	32	19	41	22	28	26			

SOURCE
G-4, MEDICAL SECTION 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

STATUS OF HOSPITAL BEDS
DAILY AVERAGES



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
BEDS OPERATING	5,100	4,766	5,285	6,394	7,134	7,020	6,849	6,391			
BEDS OCCUPIED	2,609	2,946	2,009	3,818	3,322	3,839	3,315	2,690			
BEDS VACANT	2,491	1,820	3,276	2,576	3,812	3,181	3,534	3,701			
T/O BEDS	5,000	5,000	5,400	6,600	7,900	7,000	8,600	9,000			



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
BEDS OPERATING		1,479	4,158	6,024	7,463	6,543	6,956	7,174			
BEDS OCCUPIED		791	3,088	3,928	4,569	4,749	5,093	3,874			
BEDS VACANT		688	1,070	2,096	2,894	1,794	1,863	3,300			
T/O BEDS		5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800			

——— T/O BEDS IN ARMIES TOTAL BEDS OPERATING - - - - BEDS OCCUPIED

SOURCE
G-4 MEDICAL SECTION 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LOGISTICS

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DRAGOON PLANNING AND BUILD-UP

PROJECTED AND ACTUAL STRENGTH BUILD-UP — AS OF D+65

ACTUAL BUILD-UP TO D+65 = 555,642

PROJECTED BUILD-UP TO D+65 = 576,833

PROJECTED PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS AND ACTUAL TONNAGE DISCHARGED — AS OF D+50

PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS TO D+50 = 224,061

ACTUAL DISCHARGE TO D+50 = 229,420

PROJECTED VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS AND ACTUAL VEHICLES DELIVERED — AS OF D+65



PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS TO D+65 = 91,341

ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS TO D+65 = 102,034

PROJECTED AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS AND ACTUAL TONS DELIVERED — AS OF D+30



ACTUAL DELIVERIES TO D+30 = 113,170

PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS TO D+30 = 115,510

PROJECTED AND ACTUAL OVERALL CARGO TONNAGE BUILD-UP — AS OF D+65



PROJECTED BUILD-UP TO D+65 = 730,500

ACTUAL BUILD-UP TO D+65 = 738,913

= 58,000

= 23,000

= 17,000

= 20,000

 = 124,000

SOURCE:
G-4 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SOS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SIXTH ARMY GROUP
AMMUNITION STATUS

SEVENTH U.S. ARMY



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
RECEIPTS		43,921	35,711	41,310	51,623	52,045
ISSUES		30,907	39,773	42,023	29,560	59,729
BALANCE	17,800	30,814	26,752	26,039	48,102	40,418

FIRST FRENCH ARMY



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
RECEIPTS		27,551	15,546	25,376	17,727	13,835
ISSUES		27,056	18,249	23,118	18,876	6,941
BALANCE	20,174	20,669	17,966	20,224	19,075	25,969

RECEIVED AT ARMY SUPPLY POINTS

ISSUED TO TROOPS

BALANCE IN ARMY SUPPLY POINTS

SOURCE:-
ORDNANCE SECTION 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

USE OF RAILROAD CAPACITIES



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
7TH U.S. ARMY	113,047	133,000	116,712	133,110	172,424	173,787			
1ST FR. ARMY	107,975	102,000	68,034	80,950	89,980	89,473			
OTHERS *	53,738	121,790	217,687	222,813	143,296	175,212			
AIR CORPS	27,814	28,000	31,567	28,127	14,300	26,528			
CAPACITY	302,574	384,790	434,000	465,000	420,000	465,000			

7TH U.S. ARMY | 1ST FR ARMY | OTHERS * | AIR CORPS | CAPACITY



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ALLOCATIONS	113,047	133,000	116,712	133,110	172,424	173,787			
DELIVERIES	90,161	125,080	101,160	136,707	187,228	191,319			



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ALLOCATIONS	107,975	102,000	68,034	80,950	89,980	89,473			
DELIVERIES	86,240	66,898	57,149	71,981	70,981	79,450			

DELIVERIES ---- ALLOCATIONS

SOURCE:- G-4 6TH ARMY GROUP

* OTHERS INCLUDE ALLOCATIONS TO DELTA BASE, CONAD, CIVIL AFFAIRS, U.S. MAIL, RED CROSS, PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS, ETC.

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MONTHLY FREIGHT ALLOCATIONS AND DELIVERIES TO SEVENTH U.S. AND FIRST FR. ARMIES BY RAIL



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ALLOCATIONS	221,022	235,000	184,746	214,060	262,404	263,260			
CLASS I		31,793	31,641	50,658	54,148	49,613			
CLASS II & IV		32,144	35,054	27,064	43,209	77,925			
CLASS III		55,355	47,042	76,748	100,723	63,017			
CLASS V		72,686	44,572	54,218	60,129	80,214			
TOTAL DELIVERIES	176,401	191,978	158,309	208,688	258,209	270,769			

SOURCE - G-4 6TH ARMY GROUP

* CLASS BREAKDOWN FOR OCTOBER NOT AVAILABLE.

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CARGO VEHICLE AVAILABILITY
DAILY AVERAGES

SECRET



	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVAILABLE	518	786	920	1,100	1,255			
PREVENT. MAINT.	31	42	47	84	95			
TOTAL SERVICEABLE	549	828	967	1,184	1,350			
2ND ECHELON	54	130	89	76	73			
3RD ECHELON	101	170	129	81	83			
TOTAL UNSERV.	155	300	218	157	156			
TOTAL VEHICLES	704	1,128	1,185	1,341	1,506			



	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVAILABLE	785	837	791	804	838			
PREVENT. MAINT.	112	51	50	176	242			
TOTAL SERVICEABLE	897	888	841	980	1,080			
2ND ECHELON	192	354	505	425	252			
3RD ECHELON	45	20	59	114	114			
TOTAL UNSERV.	237	374	564	539	366			
TOTAL VEHICLES	1,136	1,262	1,405	1,519	1,446			

VEHICLES AVAILABLE — IN PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE — IN 2ND ECHELON MAINTENANCE — IN 3RD ECHELON MAINTENANCE

NOTE: FEWER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND GREATER MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS IN CAPACITY USE OF SMALLER VEHICLES TEND TO DECREASE PERCENTAGE OF SERVICEABLE VEHICLES IN FIRST FRENCH ARMY.

SOURCE - G-4 6TH ARMY GROUP

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FREIGHT MOVEMENTS BY CARGO VEHICLES

CONAD DELIVERIES TO ARMIES



	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
CLASS I				593	2,669	1,359			
CLASS II & IV				3,559	13,493	4,939			
CLASS III				7,474	3,373	5,371			
CLASS V				237	2,924	2,944			
TOTAL	1,700	1,050	1,872	11,863	22,489 *	14,613			

† CLASS BREAKDOWN NOT AVAILABLE FOR OCT, NOV, & DEC.
* DURING THIS PERIOD THE "GREEN DIAMOND" TRUCKING OPERATION WAS IN EFFECT

SEVENTH ARMY TRUCKING OPERATIONS



	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVER. TRUCKS DAILY	486	715	864	857	1,108			
AVER. LONG TONS DAILY	3,677	3,171	4,004	4,258	6,726			

FIRST FRENCH ARMY TRUCKING OPERATIONS



	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVER. TRUCKS DAILY	593	767	737	739	806			
AVER LONG TONS DAILY	2,260	2,466	2,398	2,558	2,739			

AVERAGE LONG TONS MOVED DAILY

AVERAGE NUMBER TRUCKS USED DAILY

SOURCE:
G-4 6TH ARMY GROUP
STAT SECTION CONAD

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF AWARDS AND DECORATIONS TO MAJOR ECHELONS

		HQ 6 AG	HQ 7 ARMY	VI CORPS	XV CORPS	XXI CORPS	3 INF DIV	36 INF DIV	42 INF DIV	44 INF DIV	45 INF DIV	63 INF DIV	70 INF DIV	79 INF DIV	100 INF DIV	103 INF DIV	12 ARMD DIV	14 ARMD DIV	GRAND TOTAL
AUG	DSC	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
	SS	-	19	-	-	-	49	133	-	-	38	-	-	52	-	-	-	-	291
	SM	-	5	-	-	-	4	6	-	-	9	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	26
	BS	-	29	3	-	-	10	645	-	-	115	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	827
SEPT	DSC	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
	SS	-	23	-	2	-	99	48	-	-	17	-	-	67	-	-	-	-	256
	SM	-	13	-	-	-	3	4	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	25
	BS	-	33	9	7	-	111	190	-	-	49	-	-	143	-	-	-	-	542
OCT	DSC	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	SS	-	4	2	10	-	77	42	-	-	78	-	-	69	-	-	-	-	282
	SM	-	8	2	-	-	7	20	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41
	BS	-	59	70	43	-	279	66	-	-	471	-	-	325	-	-	-	-	1,313
NOV	DSC	-	1	3	-	-	11	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
	SS	-	9	3	5	-	55	45	-	11	88	-	-	57	13	5	-	-	291
	SM	-	13	1	2	-	3	1	-	1	-2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
	BS	-	97	25	24	-	280	168	-	78	298	-	-	140	10	21	-	-	1,141
DEC	DSC	9	3	1	-	-	5	3	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
	SS	11	12	-	8	-	88	106	-	33	59	-	-	42	52	63	4	3	481
	SM	1	2	-	12	-	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	27
	BS	33	66	28	36	-	198	244	-	114	198	-	-	142	203	364	15	37	1,678
JAN	DSC	3	1	-	-	-	14	10	1	1	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	39
	SS	35	12	-	6	-	131	16	-	53	51	-	-	57	75	12	19	6	473
	SM	-	4	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	1	-	11
	BS	75	89	17	37	-	93	193	-	100	140	-	-	140	799	214	48	142	2,087
FEB	DSC	-	4	-	-	-	7	6	-	2	-	-	-	2	2	1	-	1	25
	SS	37	20	1	7	-	202	109	34	51	37	16	19	23	36	35	29	16	672
	SM	4	4	1	-	1	4	8	-	-	-	3	-	2	3	2	2	2	36
	BS	82	81	21	58	122	469	212	14	377	137	58	69	17	297	142	82	136	2,374
MAR	DSC	2	5	-	-	-	12	13	1	4	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	42
	SS	25	3	4	9	8	171	304	*	42	66	60	45	77	41	26	9	10	900
	SM	1	1	-	8	5	2	-	*	1	0	1	1	-	2	1	-	-	23
	BS	90	86	42	44	36	338	271	*	368	74	381	180	224	298	42	39	89	2,602
TOTAL	DSC	14	15	4	-	-	53	40	2	7	23	-	-	7	3	1	-	2	171
	SS	108	102	10	47	8	872	803	34	190	434	76	64	444	217	141	61	35	3,646
	SM	6	50	4	22	6	29	44	-	2	16	4	1	5	13	5	3	2	212
	BS	280	540	215	249	158	1,778	1,989	14	1,037	1,482	439	249	1,156	1,607	783	184	404	12,564
	TOTAL	408	707	233	318	172	2,732	2,876	50	1,236	1,955	519	314	1,612	1,840	930	248	443	16,593

NOTE: EXCLUDES 19 METALS OF HONOR, 6 DISTINGUISHED SERVICE METALS, AND 37 LEGIONS OF MERIT.

* NO REPORT RECEIVED

SOURCE:
INDIVIDUAL UNITS

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SUMMARY OF AWARDS AND DECORATIONS RECEIVED BY MAJOR ECHELONS

AUGUST 1944 THRU FEBRUARY 1945

SECRET

		HQ 6 AG	HQ 7ARMY	VI CORPS	XV CORPS	XXI CORPS	3 INF DIV	36 INF DIV	42 INF DIV	44 INF DIV	45 INF DIV	63 INF DIV	70 INF DIV	79 INF DIV	100 INF DIV	103 INF DIV	12 ARMD DIV	14 ARMD DIV	GRAND TOTAL
MH	OFF	-	1	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
	EM	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	12
	TOTAL	-	1	-	-	-	13	2	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	19
DSC	OFF	4	11	2	-	-	23	18	1	3	10	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	76
	EM	10	4	2	-	-	30	22	1	4	13	-	-	4	2	1	-	2	95
	TOTAL	14	15	4	-	-	53	40	2	7	23	-	-	7	3	1	-	2	171
DSM	OFF	1	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
	EM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL	1	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
LM	OFF	-	7	-	8	1	5	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	26
	EM	1	6	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
	TOTAL	1	13	-	11	1	5	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	37
SS	OFF	23	23	5	21	3	195	158	16	50	130	18	22	120	52	41	13	9	899
	EM	85	79	5	26	5	677	645	18	140	304	58	42	324	165	100	48	26	2,747
	TOTAL	108	102	10	47	8	872	803	34	190	434	76	64	444	217	141	61	35	3,646
SM	OFF	-	8	-	2	-	2	6	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	23
	EM	6	42	4	20	6	27	38	-	2	15	4	1	4	12	3	3	2	189
	TOTAL	6	50	4	22	6	29	44	-	2	16	4	1	5	13	5	3	2	212
BS	OFF	48	198	87	118	73	333	250	8	239	197	116	43	317	251	163	61	79	2,581
	EM	232	342	128	131	85	1,445	1,739	6	798	1,285	323	206	839	1,356	620	123	325	9,983
	TOTAL	280	540	215	249	158	1,778	1,989	14	1,037	1,482	439	249	1,156	1,607	783	184	404	12,564
TOTAL	OFF	76	251	94	150	77	562	432	25	294	342	134	65	441	306	206	75	88	3,618
	EM	334	473	139	180	96	2,188	2,446	25	944	1,618	385	249	1,172	1,535	724	174	355	13,037
	TOTAL	410	724	233	330	173	2,750	2,878	50	1,238	1,960	519	314	1,613	1,841	930	249	443	16,655

NOTE: ONLY ETOUSA AWARDS OF LEGION OF MERIT INCLUDED.

SOURCE:
INDIVIDUAL UNIT

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AIR FORCE COOPERATION

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

I TAC — AF
AIR COOPERATION

SECRET

FIGHTERS AND FIGHTER BOMBERS
DAILY AVERAGE STATUS AND OPERATIONS



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
COMBAT CREWS ASSIGNED	767	765	683	570	868	781	782	991			
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED	537	418	358	340	505	423	498	657			
EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	391	297	242	237	329	286	337	476			
SORTIES	329	91	110	113	227	171	331	566			
INEFFECTIVE SORTIES			14	19	15	2	10	11			
BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED	47	7	22	33	78	79	159	213			

SOURCE-
XII TAC
I TAC-AF

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SOS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

I TAC-AF
AIR COOPERATION

MEDIUM BOMBERS
DAILY AVERAGE STATUS AND OPERATIONS



	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
COMBAT CREWS ASSIGNED	193	280	269	297	33
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED	161	260	254	276	253
EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	119	175	175	202	233
SORTIES		37	21	58	90
INEFFECTIVE SORTIES		16	11	12	20
BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED		32	22	84	118

---- COMBAT CREWS ASSIGNED
---- AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
—— EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

SORTIES
INEFFECTIVE SORTIES
BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SOS 6TH ARMY GROUP

SOURCE -
I TAC-AF

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

I TAC-AF
SUMMARY OF EFFORT BY TYPE MISSION

SECRET



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ARMED RECON	858	1,333	528	344	2,230	581	1,039	5,753			
DIVE BOMBING	2,215	325	1,956	1,729	2,909	2,025	3,681	1,606			
BOMBING & STRAFING	1,179	603	476	566	536	696	602	9,222			
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING					1,147	646	1,634	2,783			
OTHER	5,944	460	460	751	1,362	2,001	3,923	962			
TOTAL	10,196	2,721	3,420	3,390	8,184	5,949	10,879	20,326			

ARMED RECON
DIVE BOMBING
BOMBING & STRAFING
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING
OTHER

SOURCE: XII TAC
I TAC-AF

STAT DIVISION
OFFICE SGS 6TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

...TTERS OF INSTRUCTION, SIXTH ARMY GROUP

587.183 X
AUG 1944 - APR 1945
RETURN TO
RESEARCH STUDIES
INSTITUTE
U.S.A.F.
HISTORICAL DIVISION
AIR UNIVERSITY BRANCH
CATALOGED
DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

7641-37

MICROFILMED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

TOP SECRET

B 179

[redacted]
: Auth: CG
: Initials: [redacted]
: 28 October 1944
: Copy No: ____

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

28 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : First French Army.
Seventh Army.
First Airborne Task Force.

1. a. See current intelligence summary.

b. Twenty First Army Group is clearing the enemy from West of the MEUSE in the VENLO area and from the sea approaches to ANTWERP. Upon completion, it will attack Southward between the RHINE and MEUSE.

c. (1) Twelfth Army Group is regrouping, upon completion of which it advances to the RHINE with all three armies. Target date later.

(2) 2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in zone and advances to the RHINE; first phase, capture of STRASBOURG and clearing the area West of the RHINE. Directive (see x (6)) for subsequent phases will issue later. Sixth Army Group will protect the South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (G-9311) (to Twelfth AG) - CHAUMONT (Z-0850) (to Sixth AG) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) (to Twelfth AG) - DAMELEVIERES (V-0096) to HUDIVILLER (Q-0100) (both to Sixth AG) - RHIN-MARNE CANAL to GONDREXANGE (Q-4011) - SARRE-KOHLEN Canal (HOULLERIES de SARRE) to ALBERSCHHINN (Q-4021) (both to Twelfth AG) - FINSTINGEN (Q-4828) (to Sixth AG) - WALDHAMBOCH (Q-6237) (to Twelfth AG) - LEMBERG (Q-7445) (to Sixth AG) - EPPENBRUNN (Q-8757) (to Twelfth AG) - MUNCHI-VEILER (Q-9869) - RJ at Q-9771 - RJ at R-0682 - WALDLEININJEN (R-1189) - FRANKENSTEIN (R-1894) - WISENHEIM (M-3703) - FRANKENTHAL (M-4504) - SANDHOFEN (M-5205) (all to Sixth AG) - WEINHEIM (M-6706) (to be agreed later).

b. Between Armies: JUSSEY (J-6721) (to Communication Zone) - LE THOLY (V-2743) - GERARDMER (V-3642) - LE VALTIN (V-4744) - LAPOUTROIE (V-5850) - a point at V-6260 (all to the First French Army) - ERSTEIN (V-2480) - OFFENBURG (M-1586) (both to the Seventh Army). (All points South of the line JUSSEY - LE THOLY are to First French Army).

c. South: Swiss border.

d. Between flank security elements on Franco-Italian border: No change.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

[redacted]

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. a. First French Army.

(1) Continue current operations. No later than 1 November launch strong effort on the left, passing to the South of GERARDMER, and assist Seventh Army in capture of high ground along army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER, coordinating with Seventh Army.

(2) On D day (see x (1)) exert maximum pressure along entire front and hold enemy in position; launch strong attack in an effort to breach BELFORT GAP and destroy enemy in zone.

(3) Protect South flank of Seventh Army and South flank of Sixth Army Group. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

b. Seventh Army.

(1) Continue current operations. Secure a suitable line of departure not later than 5 November for an all out offensive, capturing in this period the high ground along the army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER. This latter operation will be assisted by First French Army (see 3 a (1)).

(2) On D day (see x (1)) launch an all out offensive on entire front, with main effort on general axis EPINAL - STRASBOURG; capture STRASBOURG and destroy enemy in zone West of the RHINE.

(3) Protect South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

c. First Airborne Task Force. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

d. Air.

(1) In support of this operation, air operations are being conducted against RHINE river communications targets as 1st priority and against enemy installations and communications between the RHINE and the front line as 2nd priority.

(2) On or about D day and thereafter maximum close support will be given to the main effort of the advance as 1st priority and continuation of interdiction on the RHINE, and between the RHINE and the front lines in 2nd priority.

(3) Tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment as required.

X. (1) D day will be announced in separate instructions. H hour will be as prescribed by Army Commanders.

(2) CG First French Army will be responsible for coordination of his effort against high ground East of GERARDMER with the CG of Seventh Army.

(3) Army Commanders will submit their outline plans for the D day attack to this headquarters not later than 4 November.

(4) Lateral contact will be established and maintained as mutually agreed by Army Commanders.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(5) CG Seventh Army will arrange with CG First French Army for suitable French participation in capture of STRASBOURG.

(6) Armies will exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the RHINE or breach the WESTWALL without waiting for instructions.

4. No change in current Administrative Instructions.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1)

TOP SECRET

B 179

: [redacted]SECRET :
: Auth: CG :
: Initials: _____ :
: 28 October 1944 :
: Copy No: _____ :

75

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

28 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : First French Army.
Seventh Army.
First Airborne Task Force.

1. a. See current intelligence summary.

b. Twenty First Army Group is clearing the enemy from West of the MEUSE in the VENLO area and from the sea approaches to ANTWERP. Upon completion, it will attack Southward between the RHINE and MEUSE.

c. Twelfth Army Group is regrouping, upon completion of which it advances to the RHINE with all three armies. Target date later.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in zone and advances to the RHINE; first phase, capture of STRASBOURG and clearing the area West of the RHINE. Directive (see x (6)) for subsequent phases will issue later. Sixth Army Group will protect the South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (G-9311) (to Twelfth AG) - CHAUMONT (Z-0850) (to Sixth AG) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) (to Twelfth AG) - DAMELEVIERES (V-0096) to HUDIVILLER (Q-0100) (both to Sixth AG) - RHIN-MARNE CANAL to GONDREXANGE (Q-4011) - SARRE-KOHLEN Canal (HOULLERIES de SARRE) to ALBERSCHHINN (Q-4021) (both to Twelfth AG) - FINSTINGEN (Q-4828) (to Sixth AG) - WALDHAMBOCH (Q-6237) (to Twelfth AG) - LEMBERG (Q-7445) (to Sixth AG) - EPPENBRUNN (Q-8757) (to Twelfth AG) - MUNCHI-VEILER (Q-9869) - RJ at Q-9771 - RJ at R-0682 - WALDLEININJEN (R-1189) - FRANKENSTEIN (R-1894) - WISENHEIM (M-3703) - FRANKENTHAL (M-4504) - SANDHOFEN (M-5205) (all to Sixth AG) - WEINHEIM (M-6706) (to be agreed later).

b. Between Armies: JUSSEY (J-6721) (to Communication Zone) - LE THOLY (V-2743) - GERARDMER (V-3642) - LE VALTIN (V-4744) - LAPOUTROIE (V-5850) - a point at V-6260 (all to the First French Army) - ERSTEIN (V-2480) - OFFENBURG (M-1586) (both to the Seventh Army). (All points South of the line JUSSEY - LE THOLY are to First French Army).

c. South: Swiss border.

d. Between flank security elements on Franco-Italian border: No change.

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. a. First French Army.

(1) Continue current operations. No later than 1 November launch strong effort on the left, passing to the South of GERARDMER, and assist Seventh Army in capture of high ground along army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER, coordinating with Seventh Army.

(2) On D day (see x (1)) exert maximum pressure along entire front and hold enemy in position; launch strong attack in an effort to breach BELFORT GAP and destroy enemy in zone.

(3) Protect South flank of Seventh Army and South flank of Sixth Army Group. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

b. Seventh Army.

(1) Continue current operations. Secure a suitable line of departure not later than 5 November for an all out offensive, capturing in this period the high ground along the army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER. This latter operation will be assisted by First French Army (see 3 a (1)).

(2) On D day (see x (1)) launch an all out offensive on entire front, with main effort on general axis EPINAL - STRASBOURG; capture STRASBOURG and destroy enemy in zone West of the RHINE.

(3) Protect South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

c. First Airborne Task Force. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

d. Air.

(1) In support of this operation, air operations are being conducted against RHINE river communications targets as 1st priority and against enemy installations and communications between the RHINE and the front line as 2nd priority.

(2) On or about D day and thereafter maximum close support will be given to the main effort of the advance as 1st priority and continuation of interdiction on the RHINE, and between the RHINE and the front lines in 2nd priority.

(3) Tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment as required.

X a. (1) D day will be announced in separate instructions. H hour will be as prescribed by Army Commanders.

(2) CG First French Army will be responsible for coordination of his effort against high ground East of GERARDMER with the CG of Seventh Army.

(3) Army Commanders will submit their outline plans for the D day attack to this headquarters not later than 4 November.

(4) Lateral contact will be established and maintained as mutually agreed by Army Commanders.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(5) CG Seventh Army will arrange with CG First French Army for suitable French participation in capture of STRASBOURG.

(6) Armies will exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the RHINE or breach the WESTWALL without waiting for instructions.

4. No change in current Administrative Instructions.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

B 179

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG
Initials:
28 October 1944
Copy No: ____

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

28 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : First French Army.
Seventh Army.
First Airborne Task Force.

1. a. See current intelligence summary.

b. Twenty First Army Group is clearing the enemy from West of the MEUSE in the VENLO area and from the sea approaches to ANTWERP. Upon completion, it will attack Southward between the RHINE and MEUSE.

c. Twelfth Army Group is regrouping, upon completion of which it advances to the RHINE with all three armies. Target date later.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in zone and advances to the RHINE; first phase, capture of STRASBOURG and clearing the area West of the RHINE. Directive (see x (6)) for subsequent phases will issue later. Sixth Army Group will protect the South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (G-9311) (to Twelfth AG) - CHAUMONT (Z-0850) (to Sixth AG) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) (to Twelfth AG) - DAMELEVIERES (V-0096) to HUDIVILLER (Q-0100) (both to Sixth AG) - RHIN-MARNE CANAL to GONDREXANGE (Q-4011) - SARRE-KOHLEN Canal (HOULLERIES de SARRE) to ALBERSCHHINN (Q-4021) (both to Twelfth AG) - FINSTINGEN (Q-4828) (to Sixth AG) - WALDHAMBOCH (Q-6237) (to Twelfth AG) - LEMBERG (Q-7445) (to Sixth AG) - EPPENBRUNN (Q-8757) (to Twelfth AG) - MUNCHI-VEILER (Q-9869) - RJ at Q-9771 - RJ at R-0682 - WALDLEININJEN (R-1189) - FRANKENSTEIN (R-1894) - WISENHEIM (M-3703) - FRANKENTHAL (M-4504) - SANDHOFEN (M-5205) (all to Sixth AG) - WEINHEIM (M-6706) (to be agreed later).

b. Between Armies: JUSSEY (J-6721) (to Communication Zone) - LE THOLY (V-2743) - GERARDMER (V-3642) - LE VALTIN (V-4744) - LAPOUTROIE (V-5850) - a point at V-6260 (all to the First French Army) - ERSTEIN (V-2480) - OFFENBURG (M-1586) (both to the Seventh Army). (All points South of the line JUSSEY - LE THOLY are to First French Army).

c. South: Swiss border.

d. Between flank security elements on Franco-Italian border: No change.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

3. a. First French Army.

(1) Continue current operations. No later than 1 November launch strong effort on the left, passing to the South of GERARDMER, and assist Seventh Army in capture of high ground along army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER, coordinating with Seventh Army.

(2) On D day (see x (1)) exert maximum pressure along entire front and hold enemy in position; launch strong attack in an effort to breach BELFORT GAP and destroy enemy in zone.

(3) Protect South flank of Seventh Army and South flank of Sixth Army Group. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

b. Seventh Army.

(1) Continue current operations. Secure a suitable line of departure not later than 5 November for an all out offensive, capturing in this period the high ground along the army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER. This latter operation will be assisted by First French Army (see 3 a (1)).

(2) On D day (see x (1)) launch an all out offensive on entire front, with main effort on general axis EPINAL - STRASBOURG; capture STRASBOURG and destroy enemy in zone West of the RHINE.

(3) Protect South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

c. First Airborne Task Force. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

d. Air.

(1) In support of this operation, air operations are being conducted against RHINE river communications targets as 1st priority and against enemy installations and communications between the RHINE and the front line as 2nd priority.

(2) On or about D day and thereafter maximum close support will be given to the main effort of the advance as 1st priority and continuation of interdiction on the RHINE, and between the RHINE and the front lines in 2nd priority.

(3) Tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment as required.

x. (1) D day will be announced in separate instructions. H hour will be as prescribed by Army Commanders.

(2) CG First French Army will be responsible for coordination of his effort against high ground East of GERARDMER with the CG of Seventh Army.

(3) Army Commanders will submit their outline plans for the D day attack to this headquarters not later than 4 November.

(4) Lateral contact will be established and maintained as mutually agreed by Army Commanders.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

(5) CG Seventh Army will arrange with CG First French Army for suitable French participation in capture of STRASBOURG.

(6) Armies will exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the RHINE or breach the WESTWALL without waiting for instructions.

4. No change in current Administrative Instructions.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

B 179

: [redacted]P SECRET :
: Auth: CG :
: Initials: _____ :
: 28 October 1944 :
: Copy No: _____ :

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

28 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : First French Army.
Seventh Army.
First Airborne Task Force.

1. a. See current intelligence summary.

b. Twenty First Army Group is clearing the enemy from West of the MEUSE in the VENLO area and from the sea approaches to ANTWERP. Upon completion, it will attack Southward between the RHINE and MEUSE.

c. Twelfth Army Group is regrouping, upon completion of which it advances to the RHINE with all three armies. Target date later.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in zone and advances to the RHINE; first phase, capture of STRASBOURG and clearing the area West of the RHINE. Directive (see X (6)) for subsequent phases will issue later. Sixth Army Group will protect the South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (G-9311) (to Twelfth AG) - CHAUMONT (Z-0850) (to Sixth AG) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) (to Twelfth AG) - DAMELEVIERES (V-0096) to HUDIVILLER (Q-0100) (both to Sixth AG) - RHIN-MARNE CANAL to GONDREXANGE (Q-4011) - SARRE-KOHLEN Canal (HOULLERIES de SARRE) to ALBERSCHHINN (Q-4021) (both to Twelfth AG) - FINSTINGEN (Q-4828) (to Sixth AG) - WALDHAMBOCH (Q-6237) (to Twelfth AG) - BEMBERG (Q-7445) (to Sixth AG) - EPPENBRUNN (Q-8757) (to Twelfth AG) - MUNCHI-VEILER (Q-9869) - RJ at Q-9771 - RJ at R-0682 - WALDLEININJEN (R-1189) - FRANKENSTEIN (R-1894) - WISENHEIM (M-3703) - FRANKENTHAL (M-4504) - SANDHOFEN (M-5205) (all to Sixth AG) - WEINHEIM (M-6706) (to be agreed later).

b. Between Armies: JUSSEY (J-6721) (to Communication Zone) - LE THOLY (V-2743) - GERARDMER (V-3642) - LE VALTIN (V-4744) - LAPOUTROIE (V-5850) - a point at V-6260 (all to the First French Army) - ERSTEIN (V-2480) - OFFENBURG (M-1586) (both to the Seventh Army). (All points South of the line JUSSEY - LE THOLY are to First French Army).

c. South: Swiss border.

d. Between flank security elements on Franco-Italian border: No change.

[redacted]SECRET

[redacted]P SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. a. First French Army.

(1) Continue current operations. No later than 1 November launch strong effort on the left, passing to the South of GERARDMER, and assist Seventh Army in capture of high ground along army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER, coordinating with Seventh Army.

(2) On D day (see x (1)) exert maximum pressure along entire front and hold enemy in position; launch strong attack in an effort to breach BELFORT GAP and destroy enemy in zone.

(3) Protect South flank of Seventh Army and South flank of Sixth Army Group. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

b. Seventh Army.

(1) Continue current operations. Secure a suitable line of departure not later than 5 November for an all out offensive, capturing in this period the high ground along the army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER. This latter operation will be assisted by First French Army (see 3 a (1)).

(2). On D day (see x (1)) launch an all out offensive on entire front, with main effort on general axis EPINAL - STRASBOURG; capture STRASBOURG and destroy enemy in zone West of the RHINE.

(3) Protect South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

c. First Airborne Task Force. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

d. Air.

(1) In support of this operation, air operations are being conducted against RHINE river communications targets as 1st priority and against enemy installations and communications between the RHINE and the front line as 2nd priority.

(2) On or about D day and thereafter maximum close support will be given to the main effort of the advance as 1st priority and continuation of interdiction on the RHINE, and between the RHINE and the front lines in 2nd priority.

(3) Tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment as required.

x. (1) D day will be announced in separate instructions. H hour will be as prescribed by Army Commanders.

(2) CG First French Army will be responsible for coordination of his effort against high ground East of GERARDMER with the CG of Seventh Army.

(3) Army Commanders will submit their outline plans for the D day attack to this headquarters not later than 4 November.

(4) Lateral contact will be established and maintained as mutually agreed by Army Commanders.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(5) CG Seventh Army will arrange with CG First French Army for suitable French participation in capture of STRASBOURG.

(6) Armies will exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the RHINE or breach the WESTWALL without waiting for instructions.

4. No change in current Administrative Instructions.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials:
26 November 1944
Copy No: ____

36

26 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Three.

TO : First French Army.
Seventh Army.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. 21st and 12th Army Groups continue the offensive.

2. Sixth Army Group will continue the offensive, breach SIEGFRIED LINE West of the RHINE, destroy the enemy in zone and deploy in strength across the RHINE, South of MANNHEIM.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups:

West of FINSTINGEN (Q-4828) (inclusive) no change - THAL (Q-5735) (to 6 AG) - LORENZEN (Q-5939) (to 12 AG) - ROHRBACH (Q-6649) (to 12 AG) - WEISKIRCHEN (Q-7157) (to 12 AG) - WINTERBACH (Q-8178) (to 12 AG) - RAMSTEIN (Q-8794) (to 6 AG) - Road Junction (R-0196) (to 6 AG) - MEHLINGEN (R-0899) (to 12 AG) - EISENBERG (M-2407) (to 6 AG) - GRUNSTADT (M-3107) (to 6 AG) - GR (M-4208) (to 6 AG) - LAMPERTHEIM (M-5311) (to 12 AG).

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army:

No change for the present. New boundary will be announced on or about 29 November which will place STRASSBOURG in the zone of action of the First French Army.

c. South Flank:

SWISS Frontier.

3. a. First French Army.

(1) Continue destruction of enemy in zone West of the RHINE. See Paras. 3 b (2), 3 b (3) and 3 x.

(2) Protect South flank of Sixth Army Group.

(3) When destruction of enemy in zone West of RHINE has been completed:

(a) Protect East flank of Sixth Army Group along West bank of RHINE in assigned zone.

(b) Not later than 0600 hours 30 November, relieve U.S. units committed by Seventh Army in First French Army zone. (See 3 b (3)).

(c) Assemble 1 DMI in VESOUL area by 2 December 1944 and refit the division for movement to Operation INDEPENDENCE by 7 December.

100 83
~~Dlcys (Sept 45)~~ A-3

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
- 1 -

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(d) Assemble 1 DB in VESOUL area by 5 December 1944 and refit the division for movement to Operation INDEPENDENCE by 10 December 1944.

(e) Move other units of First French Army scheduled for Operation INDEPENDENCE in accordance with instructions to be issued separately.

(f) Assemble First French Army (less forces indicated in Paras. (3) (a), (c), (d) and (e) for rest and refit. Prepare these forces for further offensive action by 15 December 1944.

(4) Take advantage of any opportunity to seize and exploit a bridgehead across the RHINE at STRASSBOURG with minimum forces.

(5) Protect flank on Franco-Italian frontier in currently assigned sector.

(6) Release and move the U.S. 240 mm How Bn with attached 8" gun sections and one U.S. 4.2" Chemical Mortar Bn currently operating with the First French Army to Seventh Army at once, including available ammunition for these weapons.

b. Seventh Army.

(1) Destroy enemy in zone West of RHINE, South of SIEGFRIED LINE, and complete regrouping rapidly.

(2) Direct the action of 2nd French Armored Division South, West of the RHINE, at once. Pass it to command of C.G. First French Army on arrival in First French Army zone.

(3) Assist First French Army in destroying enemy in its zone by committing not less than one RCT and not more than one Infantry Division into the First French Army zone on the axis: MOLSHEIM - COLMAR. Withdraw these forces into own zone of action by 0600 hours 30 November 1944.

(4) Attack North with least possible delay, making main effort initially on the left and assist Third Army in breaching the SIEGFRIED LINE. Timing and exact location of attack will be coordinated by Seventh Army with Third Army and reported promptly to Sixth Army Group.

(5) After breaching the SIEGFRIED LINE, prompt advantage will be taken of any opportunity to seize and exploit any unopposed bridgehead South of MANNHEIM. Failing to seize an unopposed bridgehead across the RHINE, South of MANNHEIM, be prepared to launch a coordinated attack across the RHINE in zone of action and deploy in strength East of the RHINE.

(6) See Para. 3 a (6). Arrange details with First French Army at once.

x. (1) Passage of command of 2nd French Armored Division from the Seventh Army to First French Army will be mutually arranged between Army Commanders. It will be accomplished promptly.

(2) Action of U.S. Forces exploiting in zone of action of First French Army will be as directed by C.G. Seventh Army. They will be withdrawn from zone of action of First French Army when exploitation has been completed or as directed in Paras. 3 a (3) (b) and [redacted] (3), whichever is earliest.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

(3) Lateral contact will be established and maintained as mutually arranged between Army Commanders.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"G-3 A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(23)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

62

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

595

LFC/rhh
TOP SECRET
CG, SIXAG
Init: A.J.
23 Dec 44

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER)
NUMBER 6)

(to accompany letter of Instruction No. 5)

23 December 1944

1. Responsibility for the Supply and Evacuation of the 87th Division, elements of the 42d Division, and other army units transferred from operational control of Third Army to Seventh Army is fixed as follows:

a. Supplies

(1) Initially, all units continue to be a supply and evacuation responsibility of Third Army.

(2) At a time to be agreed between the army commanders concerned, the responsibility for supply and evacuation will pass from Third Army to Seventh Army.

b. Installations

(1) During the period the troops involved are maintained by Third Army as stated in paragraph 1a (1) above, Third Army will retain control of existing army installations in area transferred from Third Army to Seventh Army.

(2) When Seventh Army assumes responsibility for support of the units involved, as stated in paragraph 1a (2) above, Seventh Army will assume control of army installations in its area. Third Army will arrange direct with Seventh Army for continued use of army installations or stockage in the area transferred to Seventh Army.

c. Line of Communications Support

(1) COMZONE ETOUSA has been made responsible for Line of Communications support for all U.S. and French Armies and units thereof in this theater. Seventh Army will continue to place its requirements on CONAD in accordance with existing procedure.

(2) Seventh Army will notify CONAD the time and place of opening of Seventh Army installations in the area involved.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

(244) A-3 copy to PC ops

J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - SHAEF	3 - SGS	
2 - ETOUSA	1 - G-1	
2 - Twelfth Army Group	1 - G-2	- 1 -
5 - SOLOC	10 - G-3	
3 - Third Army	3 - G-4	
4 - CONAD	1 - G-5	2 - First TACAF
12 - Seventh Army	1 - Signal	2 - AG Records
2 - IX Air Force	1 - Engr	13 - Spares
1 - "A" Force	1 - Historical Section	

(12)

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

P-152

file

SECRET
Auth: CG SIXAG
Initials: [illegible]
8 November 1944
Copy No: _____

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

25

8 November 1944.

OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 3)

1. Amendment No. 1 to Letter of Instructions Number One, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 13 October 1944, is rescinded.

2. a. The following units of the First Airborne Task Force will be relieved from present assigned mission by troops made available by CG, 44th AAA Brigade:

Hq/Hq Co, 1st ABTF
517th Para Inf Regt
509th Para Inf Bn
1st Bn, 551st Para Inf Regt
550 AB Inf Bn
460th Para FA Bn
463rd Para FA Bn
887th AB Engr Co
596th Para Engr Co
512th AB Sig Co

b. CG, FABTF will effect the relief of the above-mentioned units in a deliberate manner, in increments and on a phased schedule to insure that the relieving troops are thoroughly familiar with the situation and their mission before the troops being relieved are withdrawn.

c. Relief will be accomplished by 1800A hours 21 November, at which time command of the sector currently assigned CG, FABTF, will pass to CG, 44th AAA Brigade, now established as a separate command under this headquarters.

d. As relieved, First Airborne Task Force units will be assembled in the NICE area to await further orders.

3. a. After passage of command, the 44th AAA Brigade will protect right (East) flank along FRANCO-ITALIAN Border South of line ALLOS-ST ETIENNE DE TINEE, both exclusive - CUNEO inclusive. Establish contact patrols with First French Army elements on the North. Rear Boundary will be announced in administrative letter to be issued later.

b. Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will establish contact with First Airborne Task Force without delay to effect relief of all elements of First Airborne Task Force listed in paragraph 2 a.

SECRET

- 1 -

(20)

(see over (6Y))

(3 - 6AG Corr (5))

(34)

(See attached letter [illegible] SECRET)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

c. The Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will submit to this headquarters for approval a list of the necessary personnel and equipment, and the justification thereof, that he desires to utilize, on a loan basis, from the 1st, 8th, 9th, 74th, 106th or 505th AAA Group Hq and Hq Batteries. This list will be kept to a minimum.

d. Separate orders will be issued attaching units currently under operational control of First Airborne Task Force, except units listed in paragraph 2 a., to 44th AAA Brigade.

e. Separate orders will be issued attaching the 899th AAA AW Bn (SM), the 19th, 62nd and 68th Armored Infantry Battalions of the 14th Armored Division and detachment Combat Command, 14th Armored Division, to 44th AAA Brigade.

4. Airborne Task Force will render last Operations Report as of 1200A hours, 21 November 1944. Thereafter, 44th AAA Brigade will render Intelligence Reports, Operations Reports, and periodic reports to this headquarters in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5, Operational Memorandum Number 2, this headquarters.

5. Instructions for relief and movement of First Special Service Force will be issued by this headquarters at a later date.

6. Upon assuming command of the sector, the Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade, is subject to all previous instructions issued by this headquarters to the First Airborne Task Force. No change in current supply procedure.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"G-3 A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Operations
Intra-Office
Communication

Date 11/

Colonel Fisher
Executive
Administration
Troop Movements
Personal Equip.
Combat Ops.
Photo Recon.
AAA
Air Defense
French Liaison O.

Remarks

Lay to D/Ops

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

A-3

10-7645

LFG/ajp

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

AG 380.01/2-O

9 November 1944

SUBJECT: Upgrading of Classified Document

TO : All Concerned

It is desired that all copies of OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM NUMBER 3, this headquarters, dated 8 November 1944 which were forwarded to you, be upgraded to classification TOP SECRET.

For the Commanding General:

Leo F. Garvey

LEO F. GARVEY
Major, A.G.D.
Asst.Adj.Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
G-3 "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

received 3 copies
D/C Ops has one copy #24
1 copies, attached #23425 { 1 cy to AS Files / 1 cy to File #3. TS.

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Two of Instruction 6th AG

TOP SECRET

: TOP SECRET :
: A[redacted]: CG :
: Initials: [illegible]: B 335
: 19 Nov. 44 :
: Copy No._____ :

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. Army

19 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No. 1 to Operational Memorandum Number Three, dated 8 November 1944.

TO : All concerned.

1. Paragraph 3 a of Operational Memorandum Number Three, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 8 November 1944 is amended to provide that ALLOS and ST. ETIENNE DE TINEE are both inclusive to the 44th AAA Brigade.

2. This confirms and makes of record oral understanding.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

G-3 A -- Distribution.

55

A-3 copy to A-2

62

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

36

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
2 December 1944
Initials: DCA
Copy No: _____

2 December 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Four.

TO : CG, First French Army
CG, Seventh Army

1. a. See current intelligence summary.

b. Twelfth and Twenty-First Army Groups, no change.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive as outlined in Letter of Instructions Number Three, with modifications as indicated herein.

Boundaries:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change.

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army:

West of CLERJUS (J-9837) no change - JARMENIL (V-1446) - BRUYERES (V-2557) - ST. DIE (V-4266) - GRANDFONTAINE (V-5789) - OBERHASLACH (V-7095) - MOLSHEIM (V-8294) - PLOBSHEIM (V-9986) - OFFENBURG (W-1686) all to First French Army; effective upon completion of the maneuver indicated in paragraph 3 a below.

c. South flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Capture SELESTAT (V-8063). Clear area North of SELESTAT and West of L'ILL RIVER by converging action of the 2nd French Armored Division and the 36th U.S. Infantry Division and pinch out all elements of 103rd Division and 14th Armored Division committed on this front no later than 1800 hours 3 December 1944. Notify Sixth Army Group when accomplished.

(2) Pass 2nd French Armored Division and 36th U.S. Infantry Division (with all its current attachments) to the operational control of Commanding General, First French Army as soon as 103rd U.S. Infantry Division and elements of 14th U.S. Armored Division have been pinched out.

b. First French Army:

(1) Increase at once present efforts to destroy the enemy West of the RHINE by accelerating especially the advance of the North flank of the 3rd DIA and of the elements between MULHOUSE and the RHINE.

(2) Assume operational control of 2nd French Armored Division and of the 36th U.S. Infantry Division (with present attachments) promptly upon completion of the maneuver indicated in 3 a above. Thereafter, renew strong effort on this flank and complete the destruction of the enemy West of the RHINE in your zone of action.

x. (1) When pinched out, 103rd U.S. Infantry Division and elements of 14th U.S. Armored Division will be moved North of new boundary between Armies promptly.

128

1 copy OK'd
1 copy A-3

95

SECRET

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Details of passage of operational control of 2nd French Armored Division and 36th U.S. Infantry Division from Seventh Army to First French Army will be determined by Army Commanders at once.

(3) 2nd French Armored Division will remain a supply, maintenance and evacuation responsibility of Seventh Army until progress of operations permits First French Army to assume them, at which time the division will pass to full command of First French Army.

(4) 36th U.S. Infantry Division will remain a supply, maintenance and evacuation responsibility of Seventh Army. It will be employed by the First French Army in such a manner as will make the efficient discharge of these responsibilities by the Seventh Army feasible. This division will be returned to the operational control of Seventh Army by First French Army on orders of Sixth Army Group.

(5) Service installations of Seventh Army South of the new boundary between Armies will be moved North of the boundary without delay, except those required for the support of the 36th and 103rd U.S. Infantry Divisions and the 2nd French Armored Division which will be moved North of this boundary at the appropriate time.

(6) When operations permit First French Army to provide troops made necessary thereby, the East end of boundary between Armies will be moved North to give STRASSBOURG to First French Army.

(7) The imperative necessity for completing with the least possible delay the operations described herein cannot be over emphasized.

4. No change in administrative instructions.

5. No change in signal instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"G-3 A"

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

B 519 LFG/af

[redacted] SECRET
CG, SIXAG
Init:
9 Dec 44

AMENDMENT)
NUMBER 2)

9 December 1944

OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM NUMBER 1
DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1944

Effective upon receipt, SECTION I - INTELLIGENCE of Appendix "A" to Operational Memorandum No. 1, dated 15 September 1944, is amended by adding the following paragraphs:

"6. Enemy Casualties
a. Prisoners of War processed.
b. Estimated enemy killed
c. Estimated enemy (long-term) wounded.
d. Enemy tanks destroyed.

7. Captured Enemy Materiel
a. Number of artillery pieces, mortars and tanks.
b. Major quantities of ammunition by type and calibre.
c. Location and type of dumps, specifying coordinates and supply service."

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. B. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - SHAEF
2 - AFHQ
2 - MTOUSA
5 - CG, Seventh Army
5 - CG, First French Army
2 - CONAD
2 - SOLOC
2 - IX Air Force
2 - 1st TACAF
1 - SGS 1 - G-5
1 - G-1 2 - AG
1 - G-2 1 - Signals
1 - G-3 1 - Engineer
1 - G-4 1 - IG
1 - Historical 10 - Spares

(157) A-3 Copy to A-2 -

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

T-8

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials:
21 December 1944
Copy No: 26

21 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 5.

TO : CG, Seventh Army.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. Twenty First Army Group: No change.

c. Twelfth Army Group is conducting operations to halt the current German offensive on its front.

2. Sixth Army Group assumes the defensive and relieves certain elements of the Twelfth Army Group westward to SAARLAUTERN, exclusive. Subject to securing essential lines of communication, Sixth Army Group will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups:

No change in current boundary West of DOMBASLE (exclusive) - DOMBASLE (U-9803) - CHATEAU SALINS (Q-1025) - BARONVILLE (Q-1738) - FALQUEMONT (Q-1750) - ST AVOLD (Q-2556) - CARLING (Q-2663) - BUSS (SAAR) (Q-3276) (all to Twelfth Army Group) - NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) - LANDSTUHL (Q-8791) - KAISERLAUTERN (R-0294) (all to Sixth Army Group).

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: No change.

3. Seventh Army:

a. Abandon present offensive operations at once and defend in zone against any major hostile penetration. Be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of the command.

b. Initiate at once and complete with the least practicable delay the relief of elements of Third Army in the Western section of the new area of responsibility, except the following: 87th Inf Div with attachments agreed by Third Army; all elements of 42 Div present; Engineer elements agreed by Third Army, heavy artillery elements left in position by Third Army and service installations belonging to Third Army. The 87th Div with attachments, all elements of 42 Div present, Engineer elements, and heavy field artillery elements left in position by Third Army will pass to operational control of Seventh Army at a time and place to be agreed between CG'S Seventh and Third Armies. Service installations and the necessary operating personnel belonging to Third Army in Seventh Army's new area of responsibility will remain under the operational control of Third Army until installations are passed to Seventh Army by Third Army. Arrangements will be made by Seventh Army

(138)
(233) A-3 copy to G/C ops

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

directly with Third Army to effect this relief. Passage of command of the new area of responsibility from Third Army to Seventh Army will be as agreed between CG'S Seventh and Third Armies.

c. Protect flank along West bank of RHINE. Disposition of troops along the West bank of RHINE and of bridging material will be such that they can be readily employed in an attack across the RHINE North of STRASBOURG.

d. All positions will be completely wired in, and all avenues of approach, especially those suitable for armor, will be extensively mined. In addition, all roads will be covered by road blocks. Tactical wire, mine fields, roadblocks and other tactical obstacles (natural and artificial) will be defended by fire.

e. A reserve consisting of at least one RCT (or its equivalent) (less Arty component), one Tk Bn, and one TD Bn will be held in vicinity of SAVERNE, prepared to move by motor on six hours' notice. The Artillery component will be so disposed that it can join the RCT on four hours' notice. This reserve will be committed only on Sixth Army Group authority.

f. An overlay showing the defensive organization of the Army area by regimental sub-sectors and the proposed garrisons, including the disposition of all artillery and reserves, will be forwarded to this headquarters with the least possible delay.

g. Protect Northwest flank of Sixth Army Group.

h. Third and Seventh Armies have joint use of the highway paralleling and immediately west of the new Army Group boundary between DOMBASLE and BUSS. Third Army will have joint use, with Seventh Army, of roads in the old Third Army area of responsibility now passed to Seventh Army, until service installations of Third Army in this area either have been passed to control of Seventh Army or have been evacuated.

i. Reconnaissance will be initiated at once for suitable rearward positions on which to meet hostile penetrations from either flank or the center.

j. Be prepared to release one Infantry Division for movement to Twelfth Army Group any time after 23 December, on short notice.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: See next page.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:	COPY NO.
Seventh Army	1-12
SHAEF	13-17
Twelfth Army Group	18-19
SOLOC	20-24
1st TACAF	25-26
IX Air Force	27-28
SGS	29-31
G-1	32
G-2	33
G-3	34-43
G-4	44-46
G-5	47
Signals	48
AG	49-50
Engineers	51
Historical	52
"A" Force	53
ETOUSA	54-55
Spares	56-65

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

138

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U. S. ARMY

T-16

: [redacted] SECRET :
: Auth: CG 6th AG :
: Initials: [illegible] :
: 22 December 1944 :
: Copy No: 19 :

22 December 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 6.

TO : CG, First French Army.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. Twenty First Army Group: No change.

c. Twelfth Army Group is conducting operations to halt the current German offensive on its front.

2. Sixth Army Group assumes the defensive and relieves certain elements of the Twelfth Army Group westward to SAARLAUTERN, exclusive. Subject to securing essential lines of communication, Sixth Army Group will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. Sixth Army Group will continue the offensive on the South to reduce the COLMAR pocket, destroy the Germans West of the RHINE and defend that line.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups:

No change in current boundary West of DOMBASLE (exclusive) - DOMBASLE (U-9803) - CHATEAU SALINS (Q-1025) - BARONVILLE (Q-1738) - FALQUEMONT (Q-1750) - ST AVOLD (Q-2556) - CARLING (Q-2663) - BUSS (SAAR) (Q-3276) (all to Twelfth Army Group) - NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) - LANDSTUHL (Q-8791) - KAISERLAUTERN (R-0294) (all to Sixth Army Group).

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: No change.

c. South flank: No change.

3. First French Army:

a. Launch a coordinated attack along the entire front no later than January 5, 1945, and destroy the Germans West of the RHINE.

b. A main effort from the North will be directed so as to capture COLMAR, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridge.

c. A main effort from the South will be so directed as to capture CERNAY and cut the road net in the GUEBWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH Bridge.

d. All areas in which offensive operations are not being immediately conducted will be completely wired in and protected by mine fields without delay. All avenues of approach in these areas, especially those suitable for armor will be extensively mined. In addition all roads in these areas will be covered by road blocks. Tactical wire, mine fields, road blocks and other tactical

(246) A-3
Cy to DC Ops

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

obstacles (natural and artificial) will be defended by fire. Immediately upon completion of the destruction of the Germans West of the RHINE all approaches leading from West bank of the RHINE will be wired in and mined. In addition all roads leading to the West Bank of the RHINE will be protected by road blocks. These wired in localities, mine fields and road blocks will be defended by fire.

e. All bridges across the RHINE will be destroyed.

f. Upon completion of the destruction of the Germans West of the RHINE, be prepared to take over immediately the STRASSBOURG area and defend the line of the RHINE as far South as the Swiss border.

g. Protect South flank of Sixth Army Group and Franco-Italian frontier in currently assigned sector.

4. No change in current Administrative Instructions.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:	COPY NO.
First French Army	1-5
SHAEF	6-10
Twelfth Army Group	11-12
SOLOC	13-17
1st TACAF	18-19
IX Air Force	20-21
SGS	22-24
G-1	25
G-2	26
G-3	27-36
G-4	37-39
G-5	40
Signals	41
AG	42-43
Engineers	44
Historical	45
"A" Force	46
ETOUSA	47-48
Spares	49-58

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

36

B 618

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials:
28 December 1944
Copy No: _____

28 December 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 7.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. XXI Army Group continues to block current German thrust in the North and prepares for a counter offensive.

c. ~~Twelfth Army Group continues the defensive south of the MOSELLE,~~ blocks the current German offensive in the north and prepares for a counter offensive from the south in conjunction with XXI Army Group.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the defensive and will be prepared to give ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. West of the general area of BITCHE the main position will follow the general trace of the MAGINOT Line. South of BITCHE the main position will follow the eastern slopes of the VOSGES as far south as the area west* of COLMAR from where it will follow the general trace of the present front line to the vicinity of THANN (W-5313); thence, along the southeast slope of the VOSGES to the area north of BELFORT (A-3493), thence, across the BELFORT GAP to the general vicinity of DELLE (A-4579).

* See Amend. No.1 T.S. #156

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change.

b. Between Seventh and First French Armies: West of JARMENIL (V-1446) no change. JARMENIL - BRUYERES (V-2557) - ROUGES EAUX (V-3163) - ST DIE (V-4266) - point (V-5484) - ROTHAU (V-6184) (all to First French Army) - OBERNAI (V-8184) (to Seventh Army) - PLOBSHEIM (V-9986) - OFFENBURG (W-1686), both to First French Army.

c. South flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army.

(1) Defend assigned sector. (See para 2 for main positions).

First intermediate position east of BITCHE: The general line; MAGINOT Line - West bank of RHINE.

Second intermediate position east of BITCHE: The general line; BITCHE (Q-7750) - NIEDERBRONN (Q-9339) - BISCHWEILER (R-0919) - West bank of RHINE.

Third intermediate position: The general line: BITCHE (Q-7750) - INGWILLER (Q-8130) - STRASSBOURG (W-0198) - West bank of RHINE.

(2) Assemble in SARREBOURG area without delay, prepared to move on short notice, SHAEF reserves as follows:

XXI Corps Hq/Hq Co and Corps troops currently earmarked by SHAEF for this Corps.

One Infantry Division with one TD, one Tk and one AAA AW Bn attached.

One Armored Division with one TD and one AAA AW Bn attached.

258 17-3 Cpy to D/C Ops

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) A reserve of not less than 1 RCT and 1 Armored Combat Command will be held mobile in SARREBOURG area prepared to move on six hours notice. This reserve will only be committed on the authority of the Army Group Commander. Exact location and unit designations of this reserve will be reported.

(4) Be prepared to receive and coordinate movement of Second French Armored Division and US artillery units upon their relief from present mission by First French Army. Coordinate movement with First French Army.

(5) Protect northwest flank Sixth Army Group.

(6) See paragraphs 3 b (3) and (4) and 3 x.

b. First French Army.

(1) Defend assigned sector (see para 2 for main positions).

Intermediate position on the north flank: generally along present front line to SELESTAT (V-7563) - RHINE-RHONE CANAL.

Intermediate positions on the south flank:

First position; generally along present front line from the VOSGES to SWISS border.

Second position; along present front line from the VOSGES - HELMSBRUNN (V-6203) - ALTKIRCH (A-6292) - RIESPACH (A-6683) - WOLSCHWIN (A-7673).

Third position; along the general line MASMUNSTER (V-4408) - MURBACH (A-5193) - PFETTERHAUSEN (A-5778).

(2) A reserve of not less than one RCT and one Armored Combat Command will be held mobile in the vicinity of LUXEUIL (K-0321) prepared to move on six hours notice. This reserve will be committed only on the authority of the Army Group Commander. Exact locations and unit designations of this reserve will be reported.

(3) Relieve Second French Armored Division and pass it to control of Seventh Army at a point agreed with Seventh Army Commander. One Combat Command will arrive in the SARREBOURG area no later than 0700A hours 31 December and remainder of division no later than 0700A hours 3 January. See also paragraphs 3 a (4) and 3 x.

(4) By 0700A hours 31 December, relieve and pass to control of Seventh Army Commander at a point agreed by Seventh Army Commander the following US units:

Hq & Hq Btry 17 FA Group
93d FA Bn; 105 mm How (SP)
975 FA Bn, 155 mm How
977th FA Bn, 155 mm Gun

(5) 1 DMI passes to command of the First French Army upon arrival in the detraining area.

(6) Protect south flank Seventh Army, south flank Sixth Army Group, and Franco-Italian border in currently assigned zone.

x. (1) Efforts compatible with integrity of forces will be made to hold STRASSBOURG and MULHOUSE. These must be such as will not jeopardize the integrity of forces in a withdrawal to a rearward position.

(2) Lateral contact and limiting (coordinating) points along the boundary for the defensive position will be as agreed by Army Commanders. In the organization of the ground, first intermediate positions and the main position will be developed simultaneously with bulk of effort and materiel being assigned to the main position; second intermediate positions will have next priority; third intermediate positions will have last priority.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) All intermediate positions mentioned herein will be in the nature of outposts. In the fact of heavy attack withdrawal of outpost troops will be conducted so as to preserve integrity of units. Conduct of the defense throughout shall be such as to insure the integrity of the command forward of the main battle position and the integrity of the command on the main battle position. Principal counter attacks will be planned as follows:

(a) By Seventh Army: against German penetrations along the general axes: HOMBURG - NANCY; HOMBURG - SARREBOURG; COLMAR - REMIREMONT; COLMAR - ST. DIE.

(b) By First French Army: Against German penetrations along the general axes: COLMAR - REMIREMONT; COLMAR - ST DIE; and against a German penetration of the BELFORT G/P.

(4) Army Commanders will take advantage of every opportunity to rotate units between forward and reserve defense areas in order to accomplish a maximum of re-training and re-fitting.

(5) All areas in which intermediate and final defensive positions are established will be without delay completely wired in and protected by mine fields and other suitable defensive installations. All avenues of approach in these areas, especially those suitable for armor will be extensively mined. All roads will be adequately protected by road blocks. All bastacles, natural and artificial, will be defended by fire.

(6) All culverts, road and rail bridges, trestles, canal locks and installations, rail yards, switching and signal systems and similar installations will be prepared for demolition and will be destroyed if in danger of capture.

(7) All dumps, stocks of construction timber, saw mills, utilities, machine shops and repair facilities, factories, and all similar installations will be destroyed if in danger of capture.

(8) All rail rolling stocks and motor transport will be destroyed as soon as it is proved impracticable to insure their removal.

(9) All equipment, our own and hostile, which cannot be removed will be destroyed beyond repair if threatened with capture.

(10) Maximum use will be made of deceptive measures: false dumps, dummy installations, roving guns etc. The operation of radio nets to conceal displacement will be utilized.

(11) The movement of combat vehicles such as armor, artillery, etc., will be accomplished under cover of darkness, without lights. All convoy movements will be similarly conducted. Daylight movements will be limited to movement of single vehicles, by infiltration, in such numbers as will not exceed a normally expected amount of daylight traffic in a given area.

(12) Detailed plans of armies showing defensive organization will be forwarded to this headquarters as a matter of urgency. Weekly progress reports will be submitted so as to reach this headquarters by 1200A hours each Monday as of 1200A hours Saturday.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

BY Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

EDWIN W. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
"G-3 A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

36

B-620 BDM/jwa

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

:TOP SECRET:
:CG, SIXAG :
:Init: :
: :
:29 Dec 44:

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER)(to accompany Letter
: of Instruction No. 7)
NUMBER 7)

29 December 1944

1. The Supply and Evacuation of the 2nd D.B. (French) will continue to be a responsibility of the Seventh Army.

2. Upon reaching the detraining area (see paragraph 3 b (5) of Letter of Instruction #7, this Headquarters, dated 28 December 1944) the responsibility for movement and evacuation of the 1st D.M.I. will be assumed by First French Army. At the same time, supply responsibility will pass to Seventh Army. Special shipments of supplies, now set up by SOLOC (CONAD) for refitting the 1st D.M.I. will be delivered to the division through Seventh Army. Further supplies to re-equip this division will be furnished by Seventh Army to the extent of availability and within priorities fixed by the Seventh Army pending normal replacement.

3. Movement of supplies east of the main defensive positions, as defined in paragraph 2 of Letter of Instruction #7, this Headquarters, dated 28 December 1944, will be limited to the minimum essential for accomplishment of the assigned missions of the Armies. Army reserves in excess of one day of supply will not be maintained east of the main defensive positions.

4. Depots, supply installations, and usable captured equipment will be withdrawn, under cover of darkness where feasible, west of the main defensive positions, except as provided in paragraph 3 above. All supply dumps, equipment and installations (both allied and enemy) remaining east of the main defensive positions will be prepared without delay for complete destruction.

5. Armies will arrange direct with CONAD for the use of areas and installations in CONAD area which are required by reason of the re-adjustment of army supply and evacuation installations. If changes in the army rear boundaries are desired, appropriate recommendations will be made to this Headquarters.

6. SOLOC (DGMRS) will assist the armies in movement of supplies and installations as required. Armies will assist in the removal of rolling stock and locomotives west of the main defensive positions and will insure the complete destruction of all railroad equipment and facilities if threatened with capture.

270 A-3
cpy to DC ops

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

7. During such time as Seventh Army is responsible for the supply and evacuation of any units operating in the area of the First French Army, adequate line of communications facilities and any other necessary installations along the supply axis will be made available for the exclusive use of the Seventh Army.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

J. L. Tarr

J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

"G-3 A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

36

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

B 619

[redacted] SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials:
29 December 1944
Copy No: _____

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number 1 to Letter of Instructions Number 7, 28 December 1944.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

1. Letter of Instructions Number 7, this headquarters, 28 December 1944, is amended as follows: Paragraph 2, line 5 should read "slopes of the VOSGES as far south as the area west of COLMAR from where it".

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
"G-3 A"

(268) A-3
(136) copy to D/C ops

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TJB/eb

:::::::::::::
:TOP SECRET :
: CG, SIXAG :
:Init: [illegible] :
: 2 Jan 45 :
:::::::::::::

36

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

B-648

AG 300/2 D-O

2 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment Number 1 to Administrative Letter Number 7.

TO : All Concerned.

Paragraph 2 of Administrative Letter Number 7, this headquarters, dated 29 December 1944, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"2. Upon reaching the detraining area (see paragraph 3 b (5) of Letter of Instruction Number 7, this headquarters, dated 28 December 1944), the responsibility for movement, maintenance of equipment, supply of Class II and IV, and evacuation of the 1st D.M.I. will be assumed by First French Army. At the same time, responsibility for supply of Class I (French ration scales), III, and V will pass to Seventh Army."

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

J. L. TARR
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"X" (G-3A)

(283) A-3
cpy to Pk ops

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

36

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

B 666 TJB/jwa
TOP SECRET
CG, SIXAG
Init:
5 Jan 45

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER)
:
NUMBER 8)

5 January 1945

1. The responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 3d DIA remains with the First French Army, who will also assume responsibility for supply of Class I, III, and V for the 1st DMI on a date to be agreed between the Army Commanders which will be not later than 14 January. Thereafter, Seventh Army will not be responsible for supply and evacuation of any French units outside of Seventh Army area. In order to support the French troops in the STRASBOURG area and south thereof, SOLOC (CONAD) will load and deliver appropriate tonnage of supplies via rail over the LUNEVILLE-SAVERNE Line. If the tactical situation precludes use of railheads in the area of First French Army, arrangements will be made between the respective Army Commanders for the use of railheads in the Seventh Army area east of SAVERNE.

2. The responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 3d Division (U.S.), and its attached U.S. troops or any other U.S. units that may be placed under the operational control of First French Army, will remain a responsibility of Seventh Army. In order to meet this responsibility Seventh Army will have exclusive or joint use of adequate Line of Communication facilities and other necessary installations in the area of the First French Army as may be required, under arrangements to be made between the respective Army Commanders.

3. The provisions of Paragraphs 1, 5, and 6 of Administrative Letter No. 7, dated 29 December 1944, remain in effect. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 7 of Administrative Letter No. 7 are rescinded.

4. The main supply depots and other installations of both Armies will be located west of the VOSGES MOUNTAINS. Only the minimum supplies and equipment essential to accomplishment of the assigned missions of the Armies will be maintained east of the main defensive positions (see Paragraph 2 of Letter of Instruction No. 7, this Headquarters, dated 28 December 1944). All supply dumps, equipment, and installations (both allied and enemy) remaining east of the main defensive positions will be prepared for destruction. Armies will insure complete destruction of such supplies and equipment if threatened with capture.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"X"
(299) A-3 (copy to J/C ops)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

36

B 675

: TOP SECRET :
: [redacted] G 6th AG :
: Initials: _____ :
: 7 January 1945 :
: Copy No: _____ :

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

7 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 8.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

NOTE: This Letter of Instructions is to confirm supplementary and fragmentary instructions issued orally and by radio since publication of Letter of Instructions Number 7.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. Twenty First and Twelfth Army Groups are continuing operations to reduce the German salient in the central front.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the defense in accordance with the provisions of Letter of Instructions Number 7 as modified by instructions contained herein.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change.

b. Between Seventh and First French Armies: West of point V-5484, no change - GRANDFONTAINE (V-5783) - OBERHASLACH (V-6995) - MARLENHEIM (Q-8202) - TRUCHTERSHEIM (Q-9007) - OLWISHEIM (Q-9611) - HOERDT (R-0311) - GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) - ACHERN (R-2403) (all to First French Army). (See paras 3 b (1) and 3 x (1)).

c. South Flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army

(1) Organize reserve battle position on the general line: LANDROFF (Q-1841) - RENESTROFF (Q-2934) - SARRE UNION (Q-5338) - INGWILLER (Q-8130). Coordinate with Third Army.

(2) Organize switch position between second and third intermediate positions along general line of MODER River between INGWILLER and HAGENAU.

(3) Pass to operational control of First French Army for employment in STRASBOURG sector one FA Bn (4.5 gun) at point agreed by CG First French Army. Notify Sixth AG of designation of Bn selected. Insofar as tactical situation permits, deploy heavy field artillery elements with VI Corps in such manner that incidental support from these weapons will be available to STRASBOURG defenses.

(4) 12th Armd Div and 36th Inf Div (recently released from SHAEF reserve to Sixth Army Group) are released to Seventh Army but will be committed only on authority of CG Sixth Army Group. XXI Corps Hq and Hq Co and Corps troops are released to Seventh Army.

(5) Withdrawal from the first and second intermediate positions and from the switch position between INGWILLER and HAGENAU will only be executed in the face of strong enemy pressure.

(6) See paras 3 b (1) and 3 x.

(806) A-3
cpy to D/Cops

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. First French Army

(1) Relieve US elements in STRASBOURG sector.

(2) Post in reserve in MOLSHEIM area approximately one infantry regiment and one armored combat command (less field artillery element) prepared to move by motor on short notice.

(3) 10 DI (BILLOTE Div) is assigned upon arrival.

(4) See paras 3 a (3) and 3 x.

x. (1) Relief of US elements in STRASBOURG area and control of defenses will be under CG Seventh Army until relief is completed, at which time command of sector will pass to CG First French Army and new boundary become effective.

(2) Final positions for defense of the STRASBOURG area, along the general line: BITCHE area - INGWILLER - MARNE RHINE CANAL - RHINE RIVER - intermediate positions of First French Army Northeast of SELESTAT. Withdrawal from this line to the main VOSGES positions will only be executed in face of enemy pressure requiring it.

(3) Limiting points on boundary between Armies for the coordination of defenses: MARLESHEIM (Q-8202); OLWISHEIM (Q-9611); GAMBERSHEIM (R-1110).

(4) Liaison between Armies will be as agreed by Army Commanders. Constant liaison will be maintained between US and French Corps, between US and French divisions, and between all US and French subordinate units responsible for defenses along the boundary between Armies.

(5) Defensive organization of the main VOSGES position and other positions, and other defensive measures mentioned in para 3 x of Letter of Instructions Number 7, will be pressed forward with all energy.

(6) The defense will be conducted along highly aggressive lines. It will be characterized by frequent raids on all parts of the front to secure identifications and information and to create doubt as to our situation and intentions. This subject will be given personal attention by front line Corps and Division Commanders. Aggressive action along the COLMAR pocket will be conducted along lines which will facilitate rapid passage to a general offensive on that front.

(7) Administrative instructions applicable are contained in Administrative Letter No. 8 dated 5 January 1945. No change in Army Rear Boundaries. First French Army is given joint use of the road GRANDFONTAINE to PAON LETAPE and roads south thereof and connecting therewith. Traffic control of these roads remain responsibility of Seventh Army.

(8) No other change in Letter of Instructions Number 7.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

4. See Administrative Letter Number 8.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" (except that 44 AAA Bde will be sent copy No. 1 only, copies 2,3,4, and 5 will not be published).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

B-33

: [redacted] SECRET :
: Auth: CG 6th AG :
: Initials: [illegible] :
: 6 February 1945 :
: Copy No: ____ :

35

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

18 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 9.

TO : CG First French Army
CG Seventh Army

Note: This Letter of Instructions is to confirm fragmentary instructions previously issued orally and by cable.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups continue offensive. The flank of Twelfth Army Group adjacent to Northwest flank of Sixth Army Group remains on the defensive.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the defensive North and West of the STRASBOURG area, inclusive, and passes to the offensive South of the STRASBOURG area for the purpose of eliminating the COLMAR pocket and destroying the German forces West of the RHINE in that area.

BOUNDARIES: No change from Letter of Instructions Number 8.

3. a. First French Army

(1) Attack on South flank on 20 January 1945 with main effort so directed as to cut the road net in CERNAY - GUEBWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH Bridge.

(2) Attack on North flank on 22 January 1945 with main effort between COLMAR and SELESTAT, bypassing COLMAR, and exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridge.

(3) Continue defense of STRASBOURG area in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters.

(4) Protect South flank of Seventh Army; protect South flank of Sixth Army Group; protect FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier in currently assigned sector.

(5) See paras 3 b (2) and 3 x.

b. Seventh Army

(1) Continue defense in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters.

(2) Pass 2 DB to operational control of First French Army in sufficient time to take part in First French Army offensive. Times and places of passage of units to operational control of First French Army will be as agreed between CG First French Army and CG Seventh Army (Par 3 a (2)).

(3) Be prepared to assemble one armd div generally South of SAVERNE by daybreak 22 January 1945 for movement to North flank attack of First French Army and passage to operational control of CG First French Army on order (Par 3 a (2)).

(4) 10 Armd Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, is attached to Seventh Army on arrival in SARREBOURG area. Movement of 10 Armd Div to SARREBOURG area will be accomplished with radio

(423)

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

silence imposed; this restriction will not be lifted unless and until it becomes necessary to commit 10 Armd Div and its attachments to combat. This div and attachments will be prepared for return to SHAEF control at 1800 hours 27 January 1945.

(5) Protect Northwest flank Sixth Army Group.

(6) See para 3 x.

x. (1) 28 Inf Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached; one Bn 105mm How; one Bn 155mm How; and one Bn 4.5 gun, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, are attached to Seventh Army and are passed to operational control of CG First French Army upon arrival in the ST DIE area. All of these units will be so deployed that they can be withdrawn from action for reversion to SHAEF at 1800 hours 27 January 1945. All of these units will enter Sixth Army Group area with silence imposed upon all radios; this restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to the opening of the main attack in the COLMAR - SELESTAT area.

(2) Movement of all units East of a North and South line through LUNEVILLE will be accomplished under cover of darkness, or by infiltration of small groups in such a manner that normal traffic activity on roads will not be apparently increased.

(3) Upon initiating movement to First French Army complete radio silence will be imposed upon 2 DB. This restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to commission of this unit to the attack.

(4) The importance of preserving the utmost secrecy in preparation for the attack cannot be over emphasized. Armored vehicles, and transport of units in attack positions, will be concealed in buildings and in woods and by other camouflage expedients. All visible activity prior to the attack must be such as to indicate purely defensive intentions.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Following distribution made on 18 Jan 1945:

Copy No. 1 - CG First French Army
2 - CG Seventh Army
3 - G-3 SHAEF
4 - File

Regular distribution "X" of copies No. 5-90 made as of 6 Feb 1945 except that 44 AAA Brig to receive copy 5 only.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B-33

SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials: [illegible]
6 February 1945
Copy No: ____

36

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

18 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 9.

TO : CG First French Army
CG Seventh Army

Note: This Letter of Instructions is to confirm fragmentary instructions previously issued orally and by cable.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups continue offensive. The flank of Twelfth Army Group adjacent to Northwest flank of Sixth Army Group remains on the defensive.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the defensive North and West of the STRASBOURG area, inclusive, and passes to the offensive South of the STRASBOURG area for the purpose of eliminating the COLMAR pocket and destroying the German forces West of the RHINE in that area.

BOUNDARIES: No change from Letter of Instructions Number 8.

3. a. First French Army

(1) Attack on South flank on 20 January 1945 with main effort so directed as to cut the road net in CERNAY - GUEBWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH Bridge.

(2) Attack on North flank on 22 January 1945 with main effort between COLMAR and SELESTAT, bypassing COLMAR, and exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridge.

(3) Continue defense of STRASBOURG area in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters.

(4) Protect South flank of Seventh Army; protect South flank of Sixth Army Group; protect FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier in currently assigned sector.

(5) See paras 3 b (2) and 3 x.

b. Seventh Army

(1) Continue defense in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters.

(2) Pass 2 DB to operational control of First French Army in sufficient time to take part in First French Army offensive. Times and places of passage of units to operational control of First French Army will be as agreed between CG First French Army and CG Seventh Army (Par 3 a (2)).

(3) Be prepared to assemble one armd div generally South of SAVERNE by daybreak 22 January 1945 for movement to North flank attack of First French Army and passage to operational control of CG First French Army on order (Par 3 a (2)).

(4) 10 Armd Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, is attached to Seventh Army on arrival in SARREBOURG area. Movement of 10 Armd Div to SARREBOURG area will be accomplished with radio

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

220
A-3
(423) Cy D/c opn.

SECRET

silence imposed; this restriction will not be lifted unless and until it becomes necessary to commit 10 Armd Div and its attachments to combat. This div and attachments will be prepared for return to SHAEF control at 1800 hours 27 January 1945.

(5) Protect Northwest flank Sixth Army Group.

(6) See para 3 x.

x. (1) 28 Inf Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached; one Bn 105mm How; one Bn 155mm How; and one Bn 4.5 gun, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, are attached to Seventh Army and are passed to operational control of CG First French Army upon arrival in the ST DIE area. All of these units will be so deployed that they can be withdrawn from action for reversion to SHAEF at 1800 hours 27 January 1945. All of these units will enter Sixth Army Group area with silence imposed upon all radios; this restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to the opening of the main attack in the COLMAR - SELESTAT area.

(2) Movement of all units East of a North and South line through LUNEVILLE will be accomplished under cover of darkness, or by infiltration of small groups in such a manner that normal traffic activity on roads will not be apparently increased.

(3) Upon initiating movement to First French Army complete radio silence will be imposed upon 2 DB. This restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to commission of this unit to the attack.

(4) The importance of preserving the utmost secrecy in preparation for the attack cannot be over emphasized. Armored vehicles, and transport of units in attack positions, will be concealed in buildings and in woods and by other camouflage expedients. All visible activity prior to the attack must be such as to indicate purely defensive intentions.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Following distribution made on 18 Jan 1945:

Copy No. 1 - CG First French Army
2 - CG Seventh Army
3 - G-3 SHAEF
4 - File

Regular distribution "X" of copies No. 5-90 made as of 6 Feb 1945 except that 44 AAA Brig to receive copy 5 only.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

36

18 January 1945

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER) (To accompany letter of
: Instruction No. 9)
NUMBER 9)

1. Responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 2nd DB and the units presently attached thereto, remains with Seventh Army. The responsibility for supply and maintenance and evacuation of U. S. units that are, or may be placed, under the operational control of the First French Army will remain a direct U. S. responsibility. See also paragraph 2, Administrative Letter Number 8, 5 January 1945.

2. Necessary supply and evacuation movements in the area of the First French Army to accomplish paragraph 1 above will be closely co-ordinated between the respective Army Commanders.

DEVERS
Comdg.

OFFICIAL:

Adcock
ADCOCK
G-4

WEL/hf

Distr:
"X"

221
422
A.3
Cy S/C apps.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B 93

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials
12 February 1945

36

12 February 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 10

TO : CG, Seventh Army
CG, First French Army
CG, 44th AAA Brigade

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. 12th and 21st Army Groups continue their current operations.

2. 6th Army Group continues the defensive.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: No change.

b. Between armies: West of RAON-SUR-PLAINE (V5291) no change - RAON-SUR-PLAINE (V5291)(to First French Army) - WASSELONNE (Q7904) (to First French Army) - DURNINGEN (Q8809) (to First French Army) - BRUMATH (Q9814) (to Seventh Army) - WEITBRUCH (R-0317) (to Seventh Army) - OBERHOFFEN-SUR-MODER (R0920) (to First French Army) - SOUFFLENHEIM (R1726) (to First French Army) - LAUTERBOURG (R3242) (to First French Army) - effective when relief indicated in Para 3b (2) is completed.

c. South flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army

(1) Continue defense in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, except that forward defensive positions will coincide generally with the present front line, with minor adjustments.

(2) Be prepared to receive and move units passed from operational control of First French Army to Seventh Army as provided for in separate instructions.

(3) Make formations available for employment elsewhere as provided for in separate instructions.

(4) Protect Northwest flank 6th Army Group.

(5) See Paras 3b (2) and 3 x.

b. First French Army

(1) Establish First French Army firmly on the line of the RHINE and defend assigned sector in accordance with the provisions of Letters of Instructions Number 7 and 8, except that the forward positions will coincide with the present Seventh Army front line and the West bank of the RHINE, and the main position will follow the Eastern slope of the VOSGES as far South as BELFORT, thence to DELLE. The West bank of the RHINE will be wired in and organized for defense throughout its length. All exits from the river bank will be mined and blocked. A switch position will be organized

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(447) A-3
(229) Cpy to A-2

[redacted] SECRET

generally along the ILL River between STRASBOURG and SELESTAT. Full advantage will be taken of canals in the ALSACE Plain for the organization of intermediate and switch positions between the line of the RHINE and the main VOSGES position. These positions on the South will be suitably tied in with the intermediate positions previously organized South and Southwest of the MULHOUSE area. In addition to counter attack plans prepared in accordance with previous instructions, counter attack plans will be drawn to meet an enemy thrust between BASLE and MULHOUSE, an enemy attack directed on COLMAR, an enemy attack directed on SELESTAT, and enemy attacks directed against the North and South flanks of the STRASBOURG area. One armored division will be stationed generally West of STRASBOURG and one armored division generally in the MULHOUSE area. One infantry division will be held in reserve in the MULHOUSE-BELFORT area, prepared to move by motor on 24 hours notice.

(2) Seventh Army elements now deployed for defense between the RHINE and the new boundary between armies will be relieved by First French Army by 2400 hours 20 February, at which time command of the sector will pass to First French Army. Conduct of the relief will be as directed by the senior commander of troops being relieved. Prompt liaison will be established with Seventh Army by First French Army for the purpose of planning and conducting the relief.

(3) Pass to the operational control of Seventh Army for disposition formations as provided in separate instructions.

(4) No later than 15 March, be prepared to release one infantry division, reinforced by appropriate supporting combat and service troops, for employment elsewhere.

(5) Protect the South flank of Seventh Army, South flank of 6th Army Group, and FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier in assigned sector.

(6) See Para 3 x.

x. (1) First priority in defensive organization will be given forward positions. The main VOSGES position and switch positions will have second priority jointly. Limiting points on boundary between armies for coordination of defenses: On forward position, OBERHOFFEN (R0920); on intermediate position Northwest of STRASBOURG, bridge over canal at Q965128; on main VOSGES position, WASSELONNE (Q7904).

(2) Commanders will take full advantage of this inactive period to conduct intensive retraining and refitting programs. Separate instructions are being issued in this regard.

(3) Lateral liaison will be established by the French and US units along the boundary between armies by all echelons of command, up to and including the corps. Liaison between armies will be as agreed between the army commanders.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) The attention of commanders of all echelons will be called to the compelling necessity for exercising utmost economy in artillery and mortar ammunition expenditures in order that an appropriate reserve may be constituted at the earliest possible date for a resumption of the offensive.

(5) Plans for defensive organization of sectors will be submitted to this headquarters promptly. Progress reports will continue to be forwarded as required by previous letters of instructions.

4. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in signal instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" except that 44th AAA Brigade will receive copy No. 5 only; copies Nos. 1 to 4, G-3 file.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B 539

TOP SECRET
Auth [redacted] G 6th AG
Initials: [illegible]
10 March 1945
Copy No: _____

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 11

TO : Commanding General, First French Army.
Commanding General, Seventh Army.

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. 12th and 21st Army Groups continue current operations. 12th Army Group protects northwest flank of 6th Army Group and assists attack of Seventh Army with an offensive launched southeast from the MOSELLE.

c. 1st TACAF (Prov) supports and cooperates with 6th Army Group and will publish details of organization for combat and of air operations separately.

2. 6th Army Group continues the defensive along the line of the RHINE; passes to the offensive west of DRUSENHEIM, breaches the SIEGFRIED Line, destroys the enemy in zone west of the RHINE and seizes a bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORMS area. Target date will be announced later.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: CONFLANS (U-6564) to 6th Army Group - BUSS (Q-3276) - LEBACH (Q-4091) - THOLEY (Q-4998) - NOHFELDEN (L-5710), thence along railroad along the NAHE River to BINGEN (M-1152) (inclusive) all to 12th Army Group.

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: West of OBERHOFFEN - SUR-MODER (R-0920) inclusive, no change - SCHIRRHEIN (R-125224) - SONFFLENHEIM (R-165255) - KOENIGSBRUCK (R-202292) - Road Junction 126 (R-222301) - NIEDERROEDERN (R-229344) - WINTZENBACH (R-270373) - Road Junction 125 (R-309417) - LAUTERBOURG (R-328420) - LAUTER River to confluence with RHINE River at R-382425 (all to First French Army). (See also 3a(1), 3b(1) and 3x(1)).

c. South Flank: SWISS Border.

3. a. Seventh Army

(1) At 0600A hours 13 March assume operational control of north (left) flank division of First French Army, with certain attachments and supporting troops (see 3b(1)), until it closes on RHINE in zone as far north as LAUTER River, at which time the division with attachments and supporting troops will revert to First French Army.

(2) Attack, making main effort in the general direction: valley of the BLIES - HOMBURG - KAISERLAUTERN - WORMS. Breach the SIEGFRIED Line, destroy enemy in zone, close on the RHINE and seize bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORMS area. Plans for seizing the bridgehead will envisage launching of operation "CHOKER TWO" but will not be dependent upon success of this assault.

(3) See sub-para 3x.

[redacted] SECRET

(794)

A-3

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. First French Army

(1) Pass north (left) flank division of First French Army with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn attached, supported by one combat command of 5 DB, one Bn of 155mm Hows and one Bn of 155mm guns (M-1) to operational control of Seventh Army at 0600A hours 13 March for participation in the offensive with right flank of Seventh Army in French zone of action west of the RHINE. When this division closes on RHINE in zone of action as far north as LAUTER River it, with attachments and supporting troops, will be passed by Seventh Army back to operational control of First French Army.

(2) Except as noted in (1) continue defense along RHINE in sector. When attack has closed on RHINE as far north as LAUTER River, thereafter defend line of the RHINE.

(3) Protect right (east) flank Seventh Army and south flank 6th Army Group.

(4) Beginning at once and until further orders, conduct strong raids each night across RHINE at selected points between BASLE and DRUSENHEIM to test enemy strength and verify identifications of hostile units. Concentrate this effort in the BRISACH area.

(5) 5 DB, less one armored combat command, will be held in 6th Army Group reserve in the vicinity of WASSELONNE prepared to move on 8 hours notice. Artillery of the reserve may be employed in an active role provided it can be displaced to join the remainder of the division in reserve on 4 hours notice.

(6) See sub-para 3a(1) and 3x.

x. (1) To avoid administrative difficulties during the preparation phase and during initial operations subsequent to closing on the LAUTER River, the boundary between armies now existing has been more clearly defined. However, tactical operations to close on the LAUTER in the zone of First French Army will, for the sake of simplicity and coordination, be under command of Seventh Army.

(2) Regrouping for the offensive and other detailed arrangements will be completed so as to enable the offensive to be launched any time after 0001A hours 15 March.

(3) After First French Army has closed on the RHINE to the mouth of the LAUTER River, it will deploy artillery in such a way that at least one battalion of 155mm howitzers and two batteries of 155mm guns (M-1) can bring fire to bear in the zone of Seventh Army as far north as the line: BERGZABERN - KANDEL - railroad bridge west of KARLSRUHE.

(4) Army commanders are responsible for the prompt establishment of such liaison as is essential to the accomplishment of intent of subparagraphs 3a(1), 3b(1) and 3x(1).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" less following which were previously distributed:

Copy No. 1: CG First French Army
2: CG Seventh Army
3: G-3 SHAEF
4: 1st TACAF
5: G-3 File

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U S ARMY

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 10 Mar 1945
Copy No. 4

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 11

TO : Commanding General, First French Army.
Commanding General, Seventh Army.

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b (1) b. 12th and 21st Army Groups continue current operations. 12th Army Group protects northwest flank of 6th Army Group and assists attack of Seventh Army with an offensive launched southeast from the MOSELLE.

c. 1st TACAF (Prov) supports and cooperates with 6th Army Group and will publish details of organization for combat and of air operations separately.

2. 6th Army Group continues the defensive along the line of the RHINE; passes to the offensive west of DRUSENHEIM, breaches the SIEGFRIED Line, destroys the enemy in zone west of the RHINE and seizes a bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORMS area. Target date will be announced later.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: CONFLANS (U-6564) to 6th Army Group - HUSS (U-3276) - IEBACH (U-4091) - THOLEY (U-4998) - NOHFELDEN (I-5710), thence along railroad along the NAHE River to BINGEN (N-1152) (inclusive) all to 12th Army Group.

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: West of OBERHOFFEN - SUR-MODER (R-0920) inclusive, no change - SCHIRRHEIN (R-125224) - SONFFLENHEIM (R-165255) - KONNIGSBRUCK (R-202292) - Road Junction 126 (R-222301) - NIEDERROEDERN (R-229344) - WINTZENBACH (R-270373) - Road Junction 125 (R-309417) - LAUTERBOURG (R-328420) - LAUTER River to confluence with RHINE River at R-382425 (all to First French Army). (See also 3a(1), 3b(1) and 3x(1)). leave out

c. South Flank: SWISS Border.

3. a. Seventh Army

(1) At 0600A hours 13 March assume operational control of north (left) flank division of First French Army, with certain attachments and supporting troops (see 3b(1)), until it closes on RHINE in zone as far north as LAUTER River, at which time the division with attachments and supporting troops will revert to ~~First~~ French Army.

(2) Attack, making main effort in the general direction: valley of the BLIES - HOMBURG - KAISERLAUTERN - WORMS. Breach the SIEGFRIED Line, destroy enemy in zone, close on the RHINE and seize bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORMS area. Plans for seizing the bridgehead will envisage launching of operation "CHOKER TWO" but will not be dependent upon success of this assault.

(3) See sub-para 3x.

640

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. First French Army

(1) Pass north (left) flank division of First French Army with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn attached, supported by one combat command of 5 DB, one Bn of 155mm Howz and one Bn of 155mm guns (M-1) to operational control of Seventh Army at 0600A hours 15 March for participation in the offensive with right flank of Seventh Army in French zone of action west of the RHINE. When this division closes on RHINE in zone of action as far north as LAUTER River it, with attachments and supporting troops, will be passed by Seventh Army back to operational control of First French Army.

(2) Except as noted in (1) continue defense along RHINE in sector. When attack has closed on RHINE as far north as LAUTER River, thereafter defend line of the RHINE.

(3) Protect right (east) flank Seventh Army and south flank 6th Army Group.

(4) Beginning at once and until further orders, conduct strong raids each night across RHINE at selected points between BASLE and DAUSENHEIM to test enemy strength and verify identifications of hostile units. Concentrate this effort in the BRISACH area.

(5) 5 DB, less one armored combat command, will be held in 6th Army Group reserve in the vicinity of MASMUNSTER prepared to move on 8 hours notice. Artillery of the reserve may be employed in an active role provided it can be displaced to join the remainder of the division in reserve on 4 hours notice.

(6) See sub-para 3a(1) and 3x.

x. (1) To avoid administrative difficulties during the preparation phase and during initial operations subsequent to closing on the LAUTER River, the boundary between armies now existing has been more clearly defined. However, tactical operations to close on the LAUTER in the zone of First French Army will, for the sake of simplicity and coordination, be under command of Seventh Army.

(2) Regrouping for the offensive and other detailed arrangements will be completed so as to enable the offensive to be launched any time after 0001A hours 15 March.

(3) After First French Army has closed on the RHINE to the mouth of the LAUTER River, it will deploy artillery in such a way that at least one battalion of 155mm howitzers and two batteries of 155mm guns (M-1) can bring fire to bear in the zone of Seventh Army as far north as the line: BURGZABERN - KANDEL - railroad bridge west of KARLSRUHE.

(4) Army commanders are responsible for the prompt establishment of such liaison as is essential to the accomplishment of intent of subparagraphs 3a(1), 3b(1) and 3x(1).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, GSC.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, GSC.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No 1: CG First French Army
2: CG Seventh Army
3: G-3 SHAEF
4: 1st TACAF
5: File

Normal distribution after operation is launched.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23 U. S. ARMY

7 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 11.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army.
Commanding General, First French Army.

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. 12th and 21st Army Groups continue current operations. 12th Army Group protects northwest flank of 6th Army Group and assists attack of Seventh Army with an offensive launched east from the ~~THIONVILLE area prior to~~ Marville, D day.

2. 6th Army Group continues the defensive along the line of the RHINE; passes to the offensive west of DRUSENHEIM, breaches the SIEGFRIED Line, destroys the enemy in zone west of the RHINE and seizes a bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORMS area. Target date will be announced later.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: MARS-LA-TOUR (U-6557) - NOMPY (U-8462) - BOUZONVILLE (U-1277) - DILLINGEN (U-2784) - NALBACH (U-3187) - LEBACH (U-4091) - THOLEY (U-4998) - SELBACH (L-4904) - TURKISMUHLE (L-5509) - BIRKENFELD (L-5917) - IDAR (L-6825) - KIRN (L-8032) (all to 6th Army Group) - BINGEN (to 12th Army Group).

b. Between Seventh Army and First French Army: West of OBERHOFFEN - SUR-MODER (R-0920) inclusive, no change - SCHIRRHEIN (R-125224) - SONTHEIM (R-165255) - KOENIGSBRUCK (R-202292) - Road Junction 126 (R-222301) - NIEDERROEDERN (R-229344) - WINTZENBACH (R-270373) - Road Junction 125 (R-309417) - LAUTERBOURG (R-328420) - LAUTER River to confluence with RHINE River at R-382425 (all to First French Army).

c. South Flank: SWISS Border.

3. a. Seventh Army.

(1) Attack, making main effort in the general direction: valley of the BLIES - HOMBURG - KAISERLAUTERN - WORMS. Breach the SIEGFRIED Line, destroy enemy in zone, close on the RHINE and seize bridgehead east of the RHINE in the WORMS area. Plans for seizing the bridgehead will envisage launching of operation "CHOKER TWO" but will not be dependent upon success of this assault.

SECRET

-1-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) See sub-para 3 x.

b. First French Army.

(1) Continue defense along RHINE south of DRUSENHEIM. Attack on OBERHOFFEN - DRUSENHEIM front in conjunction with right flank Seventh Army, destroy enemy in zone and close on RHINE as far north as LAUTER River, thereafter defend line of the RHINE.

(2) Protect right (east) flank Seventh Army and south flank 6th Army Group.

(3) Conduct strong raids nightly across RHINE at selected points between BASLE and DRUSENHEIM to test enemy strength and verify identifications of hostile units. Concentrate this effort in the BRISACH area.

(4) 5 DB, less one armored combat command, will be held in 6th Army Group reserve in the vicinity of WASSELONNE prepared to move on 8 hours notice. Artillery of the reserve may be employed in an active role provided it can be displaced to join the remainder of the division in reserve on 4 hours notice.

Move to Par 4

(5) See sub-para 3 x.

c. Air Support.

Details of air support will be issued separately by First Tactical Air Force (Provisional).

x. (1) Regrouping for the offensive and other detailed arrangements will be completed so as to enable the offensive to be launched any time after 0001A hours 15 March upon 12 hours notice.

(2) Artillery Coordination along boundary between Armies.

(a) First French Army will deploy and displace artillery behind its offensive front in such a way that at least one battalion of 155 mm howitzers and two batteries of 155 mm guns (M-1) can bring fire to bear in the zone of Seventh Army as far west as the road: HAGUENAU - SURBOURG - WISSEMBOURG - BERGZABERN, during the advance to the north, and as far as the line: BERGZABERN - LANDAU - railroad bridge west of KARLSRUHE, after First French Army has closed on the RHINE to the mouth of the LAUTER River.

(b) Seventh Army will deploy and displace artillery in such a manner that the fire of at least one battalion of 155 mm howitzers and two

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B 54

35

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, US ARMY

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials: RLV
18 March 1945
Copy No: _____

18 March 1945

SUBJECT: Creation of Groupement MONTSABERT and Modification of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment A - see FAX 25342 of 18 March 1945)

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army
Commanding General, First French Army

1. Effective immediately, elements of 5th DB now in Army Group Reserve are released to First French Army.

2. That part of Letter of Instructions No 11 which directs that 3rd DIA with its attachments and supporting troops will revert to control of First French Army upon reaching the line of the LAUTER River, is revoked.

3. A special task force under command of General d'Armee Corps MONTSABERT is created, and is designated as Groupement MONTSABERT. This task force will be composed of 3rd DIA with its current attachments and supporting troops and 5th DP with one AAA AW Bn and one TD Bn attached. Effective 1800A hours 19 March 1945, Groupement MONTSABERT passes to operational control of Seventh Army. Prior to this time, 3rd DIA with its present supporting troops and attachments will continue to operate under the direction of Seventh Army

4. Until Groupement MONTSABERT reaches the line of the ERLEN River, at which time all elements of this groupement will revert to command of First French Army, Groupement MONTSAPERT will remain under the operational control of Seventh Army.

5. The defense of the line of the RHINE south of DRUSENHEIM (inclusive) will be the responsibility of First French Army. Until Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to command of Commanding General, First French Army, Seventh Army will be responsible for the defense of the line of the RHINE North of DRUSENHEIM. When Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to command of Commanding General, First French Army, responsibility for defense of the line of the RHINE South of the ERLEN River will be passed to Commanding General, First French Army.

6. First French Army will be responsible for the maintenance, supply, and evacuation of the Groupement MONTSABERT.

7. Upon completion of current operations, a new boundary will be announced. Pending completion of present operations, no change in boundary between Armies Southwest of OBERHOFFEN. Armies will submit recommendations for new boundary.

8. In order to expedite carrying out this directive, II French Corps and VI US Corps will be directed by their respective Army Commanders to establish liaison immediately.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" (792) A-3

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B 54

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials: RLV
18 March 1945
Copy No: _____

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, US ARMY

18 March 1945

SUBJECT: Creation of Groupement MONTSABERT and Modification of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment A - see BAX 25342 of 18 March 1945)

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army
Commanding General, First French Army

1. Effective immediately, elements of 5th DB now in Army Group Reserve are released to First French Army.

2. That part of Letter of Instructions No 11 which directs that 3rd DIA with its attachments and supporting troops will revert to control of First French Army upon reaching the line of the LAUTER River, is revoked.

3. A special task force under command of General d'Armee Corps MONTSABERT is created, and is designated as Groupement MONTSABERT. This task force will be composed of 3rd DIA with its current attachments and supporting troops and 5th DP with one AAA AW Bn and one TD Bn attached. Effective 1800A hours 19 March 1945, Groupement MONTSABERT passes to operational control of Seventh Army. Prior to this time, 3rd DIA with its present supporting troops and attachments will continue to operate under the direction of Seventh Army

4. Until Groupement MONTSABERT reaches the line of the ERLEN River, at which time all elements of this groupement will revert to command of First French Army, Groupement MONTSABERT will remain under the operational control of Seventh Army.

5. The defense of the line of the RHINE south of DRUSENHEIM (inclusive) will be the responsibility of First French Army. Until Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to command of Commanding General, First French Army, Seventh Army will be responsible for the defense of the line of the RHINE North of DRUSENHEIM. When Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to command of Commanding General, First French Army, responsibility for defense of the line of the RHINE South of the ERLEN River will be passed to Commanding General, First French Army.

6. First French Army will be responsible for the maintenance, supply, and evacuation of the Groupement MONTSABERT.

7. Upon completion of current operations, a new boundary will be announced. Pending completion of present operations, no change in boundary between Armies Southwest of OBERHOFFEN. Armies will submit recommendations for new boundary.

8. In order to expedite carrying out this directive, II French Corps and VI US Corps will be directed by their respective Army Commanders to establish liaison immediately.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" (792)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

B 486 LFG/jwa
TOP SECRET
:CG, 6th AG:
:Init: L.F.G.:
: 21 Mar 45:
21 March 1945

35

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER)
: (To accompany Letter of Instruction No. 11).
NUMBER 15)

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

Pursuant to Section III, Administrative Instruction No. 6, 3 December 1944, and letter from this Headquarters to Commanding General, ComZone, dated 4 March 1945, subject: "Railway Communications - 6th Army Group", file AG 531/3 D-O (copy furnished to Seventh Army), the following priorities for rehabilitation of railway lines in 6th Army Group area have been agreed by all concerned and are announced:

1. First Priortiy:

a. One main railway line passing through HOMBURG to the vicinity of WORMS. ("B" route).

b. One main railway line to the vicinity of KREUZNACH which may also pass through HOMBURG. ("A" route).

c. One main railway line from HAGUENAU through LANDAU to the vicinity of LUDWIGSHAFEN. ("C" route).

Note: While three are shown, the completion of two lines will fulfill minimum requirements.

2. Second Priority:

a. MULHOUSE - COLMAR - MOLSHEIM.

b. ST. DIE - SAALES.

DEVERS
Comdg.

OFFICIAL:

Adcock

ADCOCK
G-4

DISTRIBUTION:
"X" plus
20 - G-4
5 - ComZone
5 - 1st MRS

123 A-3 H4 349

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP (TAC)

APO 23, US ARMY

:::::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG 6th AG:
:Initials RLO :
:22 March 1945 :
:Copy No:_____ :
:::::::::::::::::::

22 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Amendment of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment B).

TO : CG Seventh Army.

1. In accordance with SHAEF message FWD 18052 of 21 March 1945, a copy of which was furnished you this date, Operation "UNDERTONE" will be pushed vigorously with the object of establishing a firm bridgehead across the RHINE from which your command will be able at a later date to initiate an advance in strength in the general direction of KASSEL. Operation "VOYAGE", launched by 12th Army Group, will be pushed vigorously with the same object. The combined bridgeheads of Operations "UNDERTONE" and "VOYAGE" will be in the general area: NECKAR River to EBERBACH - AMORBACH - MAIN River to HANAU - GIESSEN - SIEGEN River to its junction with the RHINE.

2. While it has been agreed between the Commanding Generals of 12th and 6th Army Groups that full advantage will be taken by both Third and Seventh Armies of any opportunity for crossing the RHINE between MAINZ and MANNHEIM, Seventh Army will ultimately be responsible for that area of the bridgehead South of the MAIN River. To this end you will be prepared to relieve or replace promptly elements of Third Army which may establish themselves in that part of the bridgehead assigned Seventh Army.

3. The present boundary between 6th and 12th Army Groups will be changed as soon as the tactical situation permits to the following, subject to later adjustment between the Commanding Generals 12th and 6th Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - NEUNKIRCHEN - HOHFELDEN - thence along railroad following NAHE River to BAD KREUZNACH - MAINZ - MAIN River to HANAU - FRIEDBURG - GIESSEN (all to 12th Army Group).

4. Operation "CHOKER 2" continues a responsibility of First Allied Airborne Army in conjunction with First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) and 6th Army Group and will be employed in support of your bridgehead operations in accordance with present plans. However, prompt advantage will be taken of any opportunity for a successful seizure of a bridgehead in the WORMS area before Operation "CHOKER 2" becomes available.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" less the following which were previously distributed:

Copy No. 1: Seventh Army
2: 12th Army Group
3: Third Army
4: G-3 SHAEF
5: G-3 File

(393)

(793)

A-3

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

B [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP (TAC)

APO 23, US ARMY

:::::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG 6th AG:
:Initials RLO :
:22 March 1945 :
:Copy No: _____ :
:::::::::::::::::::

22 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Amendment of Letter of Instructions Number 11 (Amendment B).

TO : CG Seventh Army.

1. In accordance with SHAEF message FWD 18052 of 21 March 1945, a copy of which was furnished you this date, Operation "UNDERTONE" will be pushed vigorously with the object of establishing a firm bridgehead across the RHINE from which your command will be able at a later date to initiate an advance in strength in the general direction of KASSEL. Operation "VOYAGE", launched by 12th Army Group, will be pushed vigorously with the same object. The combined bridgeheads of Operations "UNDERTONE" and "VOYAGE" will be in the general area: NECKAR River to EPPELBACH - AMORBACH - MAIN River to HANAU - GIESSEN - SIEGEN River to its junction with the RHINE.

2. While it has been agreed between the Commanding Generals of 12th and 6th Army Groups that full advantage will be taken by both Third and Seventh Armies of any opportunity for crossing the RHINE between MAINZ and MANNHEIM, Seventh Army will ultimately be responsible for that area of the bridgehead South of the MAIN River. To this end you will be prepared to relieve or replace promptly elements of Third Army which may establish themselves in that part of the bridgehead assigned Seventh Army.

3. The present boundary between 6th and 12th Army Groups will be changed as soon as the tactical situation permits to the following, subject to later adjustment between the Commanding Generals 12th and 6th Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - NEUNKIRCHEN - HOMBURG - thence along railroad following NAHE River to BAD KREUZNACH - MAINZ - MAIN River to HANAU - FRIEDBURG - GIESSEN (all to 12th Army Group).

4. Operation "CHOKER 2" continues a responsibility of First Allied Airborne Army in conjunction with First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) and 6th Army Group and will be employed in support of your bridgehead operations in accordance with present plans. However, prompt advantage will be taken of any opportunity for a successful seizure of a bridgehead in the WORMS area before Operation "CHOKER 2" becomes available.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" less the following which were previously distributed:

Copy No. 1: Seventh Army
2: 12th Army Group
3: Third Army
4: G-3 SHAEF
5: G-3 File

(396)

(793)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] SECRET

TOP SECRET

B 540

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials: RBD
24 March 1945
Copy No

35

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, US ARMY

24 March 1945

SUBJECT: Modification Letter of Instructions Number 11
(Amendment C - see BAX 25395 of 24 March 1945)

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army
Commanding General, First French Army

1. As soon as Groupement MONTSABERT closes to the line of the FRIEN River it will, in accordance with previous instructions, revert to the command of First French Army.

2. a. The following boundary between First French Army and Seventh Army will become effective when Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to control of First French Army: West of BRUMATH (exclusive) no change - BRUMATH (to First French Army) - HAGUENAU - thence along Highway 63 to SOULTZ (R110375) - thence along railroad from SOULTZ to ALTENSTADT (R1748) - thence along railroad to junction RR and ERLEN River at R 284360 - thence along ERIEN River to its junction with the RHINE at R 4658 (all to Seventh Army). Passage of command will be facilitated by the prompt withdrawal of all units and installations of Seventh Army from the new zone of action of First French Army as soon as hostile resistance in the zone of Groupement MONTSABERT has been reduced.

b. Running rights of not to exceed 200 vehicle trips one way, daily, along HighwayN63 between BRUMATH and WISSEMBOURG and on the road between WISSEMBOURG and the Army Boundary (R-244510) will be granted by Seventh Army to First French Army.

3. Seventh Army will make such arrangements as are necessary to insure prompt implementation of this directive and will advise First French Army, Groupement MONTSABERT and this headquarters, by the most expeditious means of the effective date and hour of passage of command.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

391

791

A-3

[redacted] SECRET

TOP SECRET

B 540

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials: RLD
24 March 1945
Copy No

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, US ARMY

24 March 1945

SUBJECT: Modification Letter of Instructions Number 11
(Amendment C - see BAX 25395 of 24 March 1945)

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army
Commanding General, First French Army

1. As soon as Groupement MONTSABERT closes to the line of the ERIEN River it will, in accordance with previous instructions, revert to the command of First French Army.

2. a. The following boundary between First French Army and Seventh Army will become effective when Groupement MONTSABERT reverts to control of First French Army: West of BRUMATH (exclusive) no change - BRUMATH (to First French Army) - HAGUENAU - thence along Highway 63 to SOULTZ (R110375) - thence along railroad from SOULTZ to ALTENSTADT (R1748) - thence along railroad to junction RR and ERLEN River at R 284360 - thence along ERIEN River to its junction with the RHINE at R 4658 (all to Seventh Army). Passage of command will be facilitated by the prompt withdrawal of all units and installations of Seventh Army from the new zone of action of First French Army as soon as hostile resistance in the zone of Groupement MONTSABERT has been reduced.

b. Running rights of not to exceed 200 vehicle trips one way, daily, along HighwayN63 between BRUMATH and WISSEMBOURG and on the road between WISSEMBOURG and the Army Boundary (R-244510) will be granted by Seventh Army to First French Army.

3. Seventh Army will make such arrangements as are necessary to insure prompt implementation of this directive and will advise First French Army, Groupement MONTSABERT and this headquarters, by the most expeditious means of the effective date and hour of passage of command.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X"

(396)
(791)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

: Auth: CG 6th AG :
: Initials: [illegible] :
HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP (TAC) : 27 March 1945 :
: Copy No: 5 :
APO 23, U.S. ARMY ::::::::::::::::::::

27 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 12.

TO : CG Seventh Army.
CG First French Army.

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. Operations of the Allied Armies have as their object the isolation of the RUHR. To this end the 21st and 12th Groups of Armies will effect a junction in the general area KASSEL - PADERBORN. Having effected a junction, 21st and 12th Army Groups will mop up and occupy the area isolated by their advances and will prepare for a further advance into GERMANY.

c. 1st TACAF (Prov) cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and plan of operations will be issued separately.

2. 6th Army Group will protect the right flank of 12th Army Group as far north as the HOHE RHON hill mass and will be prepared to release one or two divisions to 12th Army Group on SHARP order.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - HEIDELBERG - HEIDELBERG - thence along the railroad along the MAIN River to OBERURSEL - HOMBURG - ALZEY - OPPENHEIM - GR. GERAU - FRANKFURT (all to 12th Army Group) railroad north of MAIN River to HANAU - FULDA - MEININGEN (all to 6th Army Group).

b. Between Armies: Effective 30 March 1945, PHALSBURG - SAVERNE (both to First French Army) - HAGENAU - thence along highway N-63 from HAGENAU to SOULTZ - thence along railroad from SOULTZ to WISSEMBURG - thence along railroad to LANDAU - thence along railroad to EDENKOBEN (B-2076) (all to Seventh Army) - GERMERSHEIM (B-3078) - HANDSCHUH (B-4480) - SPEYER (B-5180) - HEILBRONN (B-0862) (all to First French Army). Seventh Army will have unrestricted running rights over highway N-4 from PHALSBURG to SAVERNE, over highway N-421 from SAVERNE to BRUMATH and over highway N-63 from BRUMATH to HAGENAU. First French Army will be granted sufficient running rights to support a corps of three divisions along highway N-63 from BRUMATH to its junction with highway N-272 north of LANDAU.

c. South flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Advance rapidly Northeast in zone of action, seize HOHE RHON hill mass and protect right flank of Third Army.

(2) Extend ground reconnaissance to the line: CRAILSHEIM (B-7063) - ROTTENBURG (B-7889) - HEILBRONN (B-0862) - HEILBRONN (B-0862) - BUCHEN (B-5462) - HEUSTADT (B-0813) - BAMBERG (B-2648) - COBURG (B-3090) - ILMENAU (J-2537). Coordinate this reconnaissance with First French Army in its zone east of RHINE until First French Army crosses RHINE. (see 3 b (2)).

(3) Maintain maximum possible freedom of action within each corps and within the Army through utilization of strong, aggressive and highly mobile reconnaissance and security elements and by retention of strong reserves as mobile striking forces prepared to exploit to the Northeast, the East or Southeast or to meet a hostile threat from any of these directions.

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Maintain two divisions in SHAEF reserve in accordance with current instructions and be prepared to release one or two additional divisions to 12th Army Group on order.

b. First French Army:

(1) Defend the line of the RHINE within zone of action and protect south flank of 6th Army Group.

(2) Regroup rapidly so as to provide a corps of at least one armored and two infantry divisions for a crossing of the RHINE in the [redacted] area to seize KARLSRUHE, PFORZHEIM and STUTTGART. Inform 6th Army Group when all is in readiness for this crossing, for which D-day will be announced in a later directive.

X. See para 2 b. First French Army will contact Seventh Army promptly and complete relief of Seventh Army troops along RHINE in new zone by 2400 A hours 30 March 1945. Seventh Army will move all its troops and installations from new zone of action of First French Army.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID C. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. C. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 1: CG Seventh Army
2: CG First French Army
3: G-3 File
4: SHAEF
5: 1st TACAF (Prov)
6: 12th Army Group

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6th ARMY GROUP

APO #23, US ARMY

32

:::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG 6th AG:
:Inits: ___ :
:Date: 3 Apr 45:
:Copy Number: ___ :B 714
:::::::::::::::::

3 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 13.

TO : CG Seventh Army, CG First French Army.

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. The Allied Armies have as their objective the division and destruction of the enemy forces by a thrust on the axis KASSEL - LEIPZIG, making a junction with the Russian forces in the vicinity of LEIPZIG. To accomplish this the 21st Army Group continues its advance without pause to the general line River LEINE and BREMEN and will thereafter advance to take the River ELBE and be prepared to carry out further operations beyond the ELBE. 12th Army Group, after completing the mop up of encircled enemy forces in the RUHR, will, in conjunction with 21st Army Group, attack toward LEIPZIG to reach the River ELBE and be prepared to conduct operations beyond the River ELBE.

c. First TACAF (Provisional) cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and plan for operation will be issued separately.

2. 6th Army Group will protect the right flank of 12th Army Group West of the BAYREUTH (0-7556) area where it will connect with 12th Army Group and be prepared to advance on the axis NUREMBURG - REGENSBURG - LINZ to prevent the consolidation of German resistance in Southern GERMANY.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: Present boundary extended from MEININGEN - COBURG - BAYREUTH (all to 12th Army Group).

b. Between Armies: Present boundary West of SPEYER - SPEYER (to First French Army) - MICHELFELD (R-7670) - HILSBACH (R-8627) - LAUFFEN (S-0454) (all to Seventh Army) - thence along NECKAR River to STRUTTGART (to First French Army).

c. South Flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Advance rapidly in zone to the line LUDWIGSBERG - CRAILSHEIM - NUREMBURG - BAYREUTH; cut the Autobahn between BAYREUTH and NUREMBURG; and capture NUREMBURG. Protect right flank of Third Army, making connection with Third Army in BAYREUTH area.

(2) Extend ground reconnaissance to the line: STUTTGART (exclusive) - AALEN (S-7329) - WEIFZENBURG (T-3653) - SULZBACH-ROSENBERG (T-9008) - MARKTREDWEITZ (T-1265).

(3) After capturing NUREMBURG, be prepared to advance to the Southeast on the axis NUREMBURG - REGENSBURG - LINZ.

(4) Maintain two divisions in SHAEF reserve in accordance with current instructions.

(5) Protect North flank of 6th Army Group.

b. First French Army

Admin L
Col J
Col S

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Advance bridgehead force to the line LICHTENAU (R-2014) - PFORZHEIM - LUDWIGSBERG (S-0734), capture KARLSRUHE and PFORZHEIM.

(2) Extend ground reconnaissance to the line KEHL (W-0697) - STUTTGART.

(3) Defend the line of the RHINE within zone of action and protect the South flank of 6th Army Group.

(4) Protect right, South flank of Seventh Army.

(5) Be prepared to continue the advance to the Southeast and South in order to seize the BLACK FOREST and free the right (East) bank of the RHINE.

x. Lateral contact will be established and maintained between main forces and reconnaissance forces of armies as agreed between army commanders.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in Current Signal Instructions.

By Command of General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

DISTRIBUTION: "X" less ADALP

Previously distributed:
Copy No. 1 - Seventh Army
2 - First French Army
3 - G-3 File
4 - SHAEF
5 - 1st TACAF (Prov)
6 - 12th Army Group

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO #23, US ARMY

:::::::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG 6th AG :
:Inits: [redacted] :
:Date: 3 Apr 45 :
:Copy Number: 5 :
:::::::::::::::::::::

3 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 13

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. The Allied Armies have as their objective the division and destruction of the enemy forces by a thrust on the axis KASSEL - LEIPZIG, making a junction with the Russian forces in the vicinity of LEIPZIG. To accomplish this the 21st Army Group continues its advance without pause to the general line River LEINE and BREMEN and will thereafter advance to take the River ELBE and be prepared to carry out further operations beyond the ELBE. 12th Army Group, after completing the mop up of encircled enemy forces in the RUHR, will, in conjunction with 21st Army Group, attack toward LEIPZIG to reach the River ELBE and be prepared to conduct operations beyond the River ELBE.

c. First TACAF (Provisional) cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and plan of operation will be issued separately.

2. 6th Army Group will protect the right flank of 12th Army Group West of the BAYREUTH (C-7556) area where it will connect with 12th Army Group and be prepared to advance on the axis NURNBURG - REGENSBURG - LINZ to prevent the consolidation of German resistance in Southern GERMANY.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: Present boundary extended from MEININGEN - COBURG - BAYREUTH (all to 12th Army Group).

b. Between Armies: Present boundary West of SPEYER - SPEYER (to First French Army) - MICHELFELD (R-7670) - HILSBACH (R-8627) - LAUFFEN (S-0454) (all to Seventh Army) - thence along NECKAR River to STUTTGART. (to First Fr A)

c. South Flank: no change.

3. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Advance rapidly in zone to the line LUDWIGSBERG - CRAILSHEIM - NUREMBURG - BAYREUTH; cut the Autobahn between BAYREUTH and NUREMBURG; and capture NUREMBURG. Protect right flank of Third Army, making connection with Third Army in BAYREUTH area.

(2) Extend ground reconnaissance to the line: STUTTGART (exclusive) - [redacted] (T-3653) - AALEN (S-7329) - SULZBACH-ROSENBERG (T-9008) - MARKTREDWITZ (T-1265).

(3) After capturing NUREMBERG, be prepared to advance to the Southeast on the axis NUREMBURG - REGENSBURG - LINZ.

(4) Maintain two divisions in SHAEF reserve in accordance with current instructions.

(5) Protect North flank of 6th Army Group.

b. First French Army

(1) Advance bridgehead force to the line LICHTENAU (R-2014) -

(1) [redacted]

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PFORZHEIM - LUDWIGSBURG (S-0734), capture KARLSRUHE and PFORZHEIM.

(2) Extend ground reconnaissance to the line KEHL (N-0697) - STUTTGART.

(3) Defend the line of the RHINE within zone of action and protect the South flank of 6th Army Group.

(4) Protect right, South flank of Seventh Army.

(5) Be prepared to continue the advance to the Southeast and South in order to seize the BLACK FOREST and free the right (East) bank of the RHINE.

X. Lateral contact will be established and maintained between main forces and reconnaissance forces of armies as agreed between army commanders.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in Current Signal Instructions.

By Command of General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

RUBEN E. JENKINS
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No 1 - Seventh Army
2 - First French Army
3 - File
4 - SHAEF, G-3
5 - First TACAF
6 - 12th Army Group

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SCHWEITZER/ HB

INCOMING MESSAGE

Msg/Center No 106

From: 6TH ARMY GROUP TAC
To: 1STTAC AF PROV.

APR. 041245B
Time OF Origin
APR. 041505A
Rec'D Message Center

Ref BAX 355 78
Precedence: URGENT
Security: [redacted] SECRET PD

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY
OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

FROV SIXTH ARVY GROUP TAC SIGNED DEVERS

REF NO BAKER ABLE XRAY TWO FIVE FIVE SEVEN EIGHT

VULTIPLE ADDRESS PD

SUBJECT CLN VODIFICATION OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUVBER ONE THREE PD

PARA ONE PD

UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS CLN SUBPARA

ABLE PD VAIN BRIDGEHEAD FORCES OF ARVIES WILL NOT ~~RPT NOT~~ ADVANCE BEYOND THE LINE CLN KARLSRUHE DASH HEILBRONN DASH BITZINGEN NAN SEVEN FOUR TWO NINE DASH SCHWEINFURT NAN SEVEN EIGHT SIX THREE DASH KONIGSHOFEN NAN NINE FIVE NINE THREE DASH VEININGEN CVA ALL POINTS INCLUSIVE TO ARVIES IN THEIR ZONES OF ACTION PD

830

[redacted]

Copies by 923RD ENGRS - ENGR. COMMAND

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) URGENT

SUBPARA BAKER PD GROUND RECONNAISSANCE WILL BE PUSHED IN ~~EADXXXRPT~~ EACH ARVY ZONE TO THE LINE CLN LICHTENAU ROGER TWO XERO ONE FOUR DASH LUDWIGSBERG SUGAR XERO SEVEN THREE FOUR DASH ROTHENBURG DASH NEUSTADT DASH BAYBERG DASH COBURG DASH EISFELD JIG TWO FIVE XERO EIGHT PD

SUBPARA CHARLIE PD LATERAL CONTACT BETWEEN VAIN FORCES AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE FORCES OF ARVIES WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND VAINTAINED AS AGREED BETWEEN ARVIES PD

PARA TWO PD

THE ADVANCE FROV THE LINES INDICATED IN ONE ABLE AND ONE BAKER ABOVE TO THE LINES SET OUT IN PARA THREE ABLE PAREN ONE UNPAREN AND PAREN TWO UNPAREN ANS THREE BAKER PAREN ONE UNPAREN AND PAREN TWO UNPAREN OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUVBER ONE THREE WILL BE INITIATED ONLY ON ARVY GROUP ORDER PD

URGENT

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3)

PARA THREE PD

EFFECTIVE IVVEDIATELY BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST FRENCH ARVY AND SEVENTH ARVY AS ANNOUNCED IN LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUVBER ONE THREE IS VODIFIED AS FOLLOWS ~~LXXXRPT~~ CLN EAST OF THE RHINE CLN NO ~~RPT NO~~ CHANGE DASH WEST OF THE RHINE SVCLN BITCHE DASH EDENKOBEN DASH SPEYER PAREN ALL TO FIRST FRENCH ARVY UNPAREN PD/SEVENTH ARVY WILL HAVE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE VAIN RAILROAD LINE FROV WEST OF THE VOSGES RPT VOSGES LEADING THROUGH HAGENAU AND LANDAU AND SHALL HAVE UNRESTRICTED RUNNING RIGHTS ON THE VAIN HIGHWAY PFALXBURG DASH SAVERNE DASH BRUVATH DASH HAGENAU DASH WISSEVBURG DASH LANDAU DASH EDENKOBE RPT EDENKOBEN PD

PARA FOUR PD

SEVENTH ARVY WILL BE PREPARED TO RELEASE ONE OR TWO DIVISIONS FOR EVPLOYVENT ELSEWHERE ON SHORT NOTICE PD FLANK SECURITY VISSIONS ASSIGNED ARVIES IN ~~LXXXRPT~~ LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUVBER ONE THREE REVAIN UNCHANGED PD

PARA FIVE PD PLEASE ACXNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS VESSAGE/URGENTLY PD

URGENT

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
AG MESSAGE CENTER

URGENT

TOP SECRET

File

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO FOR ACTION: CG SEVENTH ARMY: CG FIRST FRENCH ARMY

FOR INFO : SHAEF FWD: 12TH ARMY GP TAC, FIRST TACAF

FROM : 6TH ARMY GP TAC

SIGNED : DEVERS

REF NO : BAX 25761

Immediate action will be taken to implement paragraphs 3 a and b of Letter of Instructions Number 13, dated 3 Apr 45, Hq, 6th Army Gp.

lines of advance + reconnaissance

D

APPROVED BY C/S

ORIG: G-3 LTH/acc)

AUTH: R. E. JENKINS
Brig. Gen.

INFO: SGS
G-2
G-4
FR MISS
LSN

12 Apr 45 1555B Ref No BAX 25761 GK/sl

876 481

TOP SECRET

COPY No. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

:::::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG 6th AG:
:Initials:
:16 April 1945 :
:Copy No:_____ :
:::::::::::::::::::;

45

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

16 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 14.

B 774

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

PART I

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. 21st Army Group continues its operations to defeat the Germans to the North.

c. 12th Army Group will launch a powerful thrust with the Third Army to join hands with Russians in the DANUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG.

d. First TACAF cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and tactical plan will be issued separately.

2. 6th Army Group initiates strong offensive action up the valley of the NECKAR River at the earliest possible date for the purpose of destroying the German 19th Army in the STUTTGART - BLACK FOREST area and preventing its escape to the East. Its advance on the left will conform to that of the main offensive of the 12th Army Group. It will protect the South (right) flank of 12th Army Group and occupy Western AUSTRIA and that part of GERMANY within its zone of action.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: West of OPPENHEIM (inclusive) no change - DARMSTADT - WURZBURG - ANSBACH - FREISING - DORFEN - ROSENHEIM (all to 12th Army Group). This boundary becomes effective as soon as Third Army can complete relief of forward elements of Seventh Army Northeast of the new boundary and as soon as Seventh Army can remove its installations now northeast of the new boundary. Seventh Army will have unrestricted running rights on that part of the main highway: ANSBACH - WEISZENBURG - INGOLSTADT - MUNICH, within 12th Army Group's zone of action.

b. Between First French Army and Seventh Army: West of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change - WALDENBUCH (S-0305) - TUBINGEN (W-9792) - thence along NECKAR River to ROTTWELL (W-6752) - BLUMMENFELD (W-7212), thence due south to Swiss Border (all to Seventh Army). As soon as STUTTGART is captured Seventh Army will have unrestricted runnimg rights on the main highway through STUTTGART, running south to TUBINGEN. In order that First French Army may continue its advance to the southeast in strength this boundary will be subject to change immediately upon defeat of the 19th German Army in the BLACK FOREST area.

3. a. Seventh Army.

(1) Complete regrouping rapidly and launch initial main effort on right, southwest up the Valley of the NECKAR River with a corps strong in armor and of high mobility. Seize the communication center formed by the triangle TUBINGEN - BALLINGEN - SIGMARINGEN, thereafter exploiting to the West, and south as far as the SWISS Border and assist First French Army in destroying that portion of the German 19th Army in the BLACK FOREST area. 13th Aibborne Division is available for employment in this operation in accordance with previous plans and instructions. If 13th Airborne Division is used in an airborne role prior to 23 April First Allied Airborne Army will be given 72 hours prior notice; thereafter First Allied Airborne Army will be given a minimum of 48 hours prior notice.

(2) Establish contact with Third Army without delay and arrange for relief of elements of Seventh Army by Third Army Northeast of the new boundary between Army Groups.

64-A ~~Dir~~ ~~Dis~~ A-3 (5)-1-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Conform the advance of the left flank with the advance of Third Army and protect right (south) flank of 12th Army Group. Maintain contact with CG Third Army for the purpose of coordinating this action.

(4) Isolate AUGSBURG and MUNICH and thereafter advance rapidly south blocking the exits of the BRENNER PASS leading north from the INNSBRUCK area in zone of action.

(5) See sub-paragraph x.

b. First French Army.

(1) Continue strong action between the RHINE and the BLACK FOREST and clear East bank of the RHINE.

(2) Conform action in the STUTTGART area to the advance of the right of Seventh Army, enveloping STUTTGART and capturing it from the west; coordinate this action with Seventh Army.

(3) Destroy elements of the German 19th Army in the BLACK FOREST area, seal the SWISS Border in zone in accordance with previous instructions, complete regrouping rapidly and be prepared for further advance to the southeast in a new zone of action.

(4) Protect right (south) flank of Seventh Army and right (south) flank 6th Army Group.

(5) See sub-paragraph x.

x. (1) Success in destruction of the German 19th Army in the STUTTGART-BLACK FOREST area before it can escape to the SCHWABISHER JURA will depend in a large measure on:

(a) Close timing of the advance by First French Army to capture STUTTGART with the launching by Seventh Army of its main effort up the Valley of the NECKAR River. A premature advance by First French Army in the STUTTGART area will be prevented by the Commanding General, First French Army, who will maintain close liaison with Seventh Army in order to accomplish the proper timing.

(b) The speed and weight with which the main effort up the valley of the NECKAR River is launched by Seventh Army and the maintenance of close liaison between this effort and the attack of First French Army to capture STUTTGART. The Commanding General Seventh Army will be responsible for keeping First French Army fully informed in this regard.

(2) Seventh Army will assist First French Army in the capture of STUTTGART by a blocking action from the east within its zone of action.

(3) A new directive will issue upon completion of clearing of the BLACK FOREST area.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in Current Signal Instructions.

PART II

1. After the distribution of Part I to limited addressees, the following messages were dispatched as modifications:

a. Message BX-13135 dated 20 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) Seventh Army - First French Army boundary is changed as follows: West and north of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change - thence along the NECKAR River to junction with FILS River and thence along NECKAR River to ROTWELL (W-6652)(all to Seventh Army exclusive of ROTWELL) - ROTWELL - SIGMARINGEN (X-1144)(both to First French Army).

(2) Instructions in basic letter directing Seventh Army to exploit south of the boundary set forth in par. (1) above between the points of ROTWELL - SIGMARINGEN are revoked.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

B. Message BX-13260 dated 22 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) The following temporary boundary change agreed upon between the Seventh Army and the First French Army is confirmed:

North of REUTLINGEN no change - from REUTLINGEN (X-0989) thence along RR to BAMMERTINGEN (X-1062) and SIGMARINGEN (X-1043) (all to First French Army).

(2) The following boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army will become effective on a date to be announced after the capture of STUTTGART:

West of LAUFFEN no change - from LAUFFEN along RR to ASPERG (S-0235) - RJ (Autobahn) at (R-938211 thence along autobahn to RJ at (S-0911)(all to Seventh Army) METZINGEN - DETTINGEN (X-1993) - MUNSINGEN - EHINGEN - REINSTETTEN (X-6448) (all to First French Army) - KEMPTEN - HOFFEN (D-2279) (to Seventh Army). Seventh Army will have equal running rights on all roads north of the KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART autobahn inclusive and will have joint use of KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN and KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART railroads. On the autobahn between the autobahn junction west of STUTTGART and BERNHAUSEN the First French Army will have equal running rights.

(3) Paragraph 3a (1) of Letter of Instructions Number 14 assigning mission to Seventh Army is cancelled.

(4) Advancing southeast the First French Army will occupy that part of GERMANY in Zone, block the passes in Western AUSTRIA between LAKE CONSTANCE and HOFEN and seal the SWISS border in accordance with previous instructions.

(5) Armies will expedite necessary action to establish boundary set forth in par. (2) above, and will promptly effect liaison with each other for this purpose.

C. Message BX-13351 dated 24 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) First French Army will advance with strong mobile forces to rapidly seize BREGENZ-FELDKIRCH area sealing the AUSTRIAN-SWISS border and thereafter be prepared to continue the advance to capture LANDECK (V-4144).

(2) The Seventh Army will advance rapidly with the main effort on the right, with strong mobile forces to block the passes into AUSTRIA along the GERMAN border in zone preventing the escape of the withdrawing enemy from the north, and thereafter dispatch strong mobile forces to seize the INNSBRUK-BRENNER PASS area and thereafter be prepared to assist in the capture of LANDECK by First French Army.

(3) Armies will prepare plans for resupply by air. At 251100B April (Wednesday) Army Commanders will report to Commanding General, 6th AG Hq to discuss this operation.

D. Message BX-13610 dated 28 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) Effective 272400 B April 1945 the following boundary is established between 12th/6th Army Groups:

(2) Beginning at a point on the FRANCO-GERMAN International Boundary at (WQ8555) to a point at (WR0866) - thence along the Western and Northern LANDKRIESE boundaries of BERGZABERN, LANDAU and SPEYER to a point on the RHINE River at (WR5591)(all inclusive to First French Army) thence north along the east bank of the RHINE River to (WM4640) a point on the present 6th/12th Army Groups boundary - thence as before.

E. Message BX-13629 dated 28 April 1945, paraphrased as follows:

(1) 12th/6th Army Group boundary is: OPENHEIM-DARMSTADT-WURZBURG-ANSBACH-FREISING (all to 12th Army Group) - EDLING-PRIEN (to 6th Army Group) - ST JOHANN - thence along road to KETZBUHEL - BRAMBURG - LIENZ (to 12th Army Group). Boundary is subject to adjustment in detail between Third and Seventh Armies.

(2) Armies concerned are authorized to communicate direct for boundary detailed adjustments. Final adjustment will be reported to this headquarters. Boundary changes necessary to take advantage of the tactical situation in order that major objectives in southern Redoubt be seized quickly are also authorized between Seventh and Third Army. This headquarters will be notified promptly of such changes.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

F. Message BX-13676 dated 28 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:

Effective at once the boundary between the Seventh Army and First French Army is modified as follows:

(1) No change west of LAUFFEN (S-0353) from LAUFFEN thence along RR to LUDWIGSBURG (S-0633) and KORNWESTHEIM (S-0630)(with marshalling yards inclusive) - MULHAUSEN (S-0928) - WALBLINGEN (S-1526)(all to Seventh Army) - PLOCHINGEN (S-2313)(to First French Army* - thence southwest along the NECKAR River to its junction with the present boundary at (S-125020) - thence as before.

(2) The following will be for the unrestricted use of Seventh Army:

Autobahn from ASPERG at (S-0235) to RJ (R-9321) to stream crossing at (S (S-2009).

RR from KORNWESTHEIM to PLOCHINGEN and WALBLINGEN.

From junction with autobahn at S-0129 Highway No. 10 to PLOCHINGEN.

From KORNWESTHEIM Highway No. 27 to RJ with Highway No. 10 at (S-0526).

From RJ with Highway No. 10, Highway Number 14 at (S-0824) to WALBLINGEN.

From RJ at (S-098240 Highway east of and parallel to NECKAR River to PLOCHINGEN.

(3) As prescribed in message BX-13260 dated 22 April, Seventh Army will retain joint use of railroads and roads north of and including autobahn from STUTTGART to KARLSRUHE.

G. Message BX-13776 dated 30 April 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) The present boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is extended forward of HOFEN (D-2279) as follows:

HOFEN - HORNBACH (D-0666) - HAGENAU (C-9553) - KAPP (V-2536) - NAUDERS (V-3317) all inclusive Seventh Army.

(2) In addition to the INNSBRUCK - BRENNER PASS area, Seventh Army will capture the LANDECK (V-3944) area.

(3) When assigned objectives are seized, reconnaissance forward will be made immediately and rapidly, and contact between armies on their interior flanks will be made within the Redoubt area.

(4) The Seventh Army will be prepared to move to the east with its east Corps, and assist Third Army after capture of the INNSBRUCK - BRENNER PASS area and clearing the valley of the INN southwest of RUFSTEIN (E-3497).

H. Message BX-13823 dated 1 May 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) The coordinates of HOFEN contained in paragraph 1 of BX-13776 should read: HOFEN (D-1081).

I. Message BX-13946 dated 3 May 1945 paraphrased as follows:

(1) The 6th Army Group will capture SALZBURG and seize the BRUCK (E-86) - RADSTADT area and occupy that part of AUSTRIA in its zone in addition to its previous mission. The boundary between 6th and 12th Army Groups follows:

No change northwest of FREISING (inclusive) - MUHLDORF - thence along the INN River to its confluence with the SALZACH River (to 6th Army Group) - SRTASZWALCHEREN (to 12th Army Group) - BAD ISCH - SCHLADMING - MAUTERNDORFVILLACH (all to 6th Army Group). Boundary between armies no change.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) In addition to previous missions and confirming oral instructions Seventh Army will capture SALZBURG, seize the BRUCK (E-86) - RADSTADT area and occupy that part of AUSTRIA within its new zone of actions.

By Command of General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

for
REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

PREVIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF PART I:	Copy No.
First French Army	1
Seventh Army	2
G-3 Files	3
SHAEF	4
12th Army Gp	5
1st TACAF	6
G-4	7
G-2	8
C/S	9

DISTRIBUTION: (Special)	
SGS	10-12
G-1	13
G-2	14
G-3	15-24
G-4	25-27
G-5	28
AG Library	29-30
Sigs	31
Engrs	32
Lsn	33
Hist	34
A Force	35
Fr Msn	36
SHAEF	37-40
CZ ETO	41
12th AG	42
CONAD	43
IX Air Force	44
TAC AF	45
Seventh Army	46-57
First French Army	58-62
6851 Hq Det, AIS	63

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials_____
16 April 1945
Copy No:_____

16 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction Number 14.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG first French Army

1. a. See Current Intelligence Summary.

b. 21st Army Group continues its operations to defeat the Germans to the North.

c. 12th Army Group will launch a powerful thrust with the Third Army to join hands with the Russians in the DANUBE Valley and sieze SALZBURG.

d. First TACAF cooperates with and supports 6th Army Group. Its organization for combat and tactical plan will be issued separately.

2. 6th Army Group initiates strong offensive action up the valley of the NECKAR River at the earliest possible date for the purpose of destroying the German 19th Army in the STUTTGART - BLACK FOREST area and preventing its escape to the East. Its advance on the left will conform to that of the main offensive of the 12th Army Group. It will protect the South (right) flank of 12th Army Group and occupy Western AUSTRIA and that part of GERMANY within its zone of action.

BOUNDARIES:

a. Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: West of OPPENHEIM (inclusive) no change - DARMSTADT - WURZBURG - ANSBACH - FREISING - DORFEN - ROSENHEIM (all to 12th Army Group). This boundary becomes effective as soon as Third Army can complete relief of forward elements of Seventh Army Northeast of the new boundary and as soon as Seventh Army can remove its installations now Northeast of the new boundary. Seventh Army will have unrestricted running rights on that part of the main highway: ANSBACH - WEISZENBURG - INGOLSTADT - MUNICH. within 12th Army Group's zone of action.

b. Between First French Army and Seventh Army: West of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change - WALDENBUCH (S-0305) - TUBINGEN (W9792) - thence along NECKAR River to ROTTWELL (W-6752) - BLUMENFELD (W-7212), thence due South to Swiss Border (all to Seventh Army). As soon as STUTTGART is captured Seventh Army will have unrestricted running rights on the main highway through STUTTGART, running South to TUBINGEN. In order that First French Army may continue it's advance to the Southeast in strength this boundary will be subject to change immediately upon defeat of the 19th German Army in the BLACK FOREST area.

3. a. Seventh Army.

(1) Complete regrouping rapidly and launch initial main effort on right, Southwest up the Valley of the NECKAR River with a corps strong in armor and of high mobility. Sieze the communication center formed by the triangle TUBINGEN - BALLINGEN - SIGMARINGEN, thereafter exploiting to the West, and South as far as the Swiss Border and assist First French Army in destroying that portion of the German 19th Army in the BLACK FOREST area. 13th Airborne Division is available for employment in this operation in accordance with previous plans and instructions. If 13th Airborne Division is used in an Airborne role prior to 23 April First Allied Airborne Army will be given 72 hours prior notice; thereafter First Allied Airborne Army will be given a minimum

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of 48 hours prior notice.

(2) Establish contact with Third Army without delay and arrange for relief of elements of Seventh Army by Third Army North-East of the new boundary between Army Groups.

(3) Conform the advance of the left flank with the advance of Third Army and protect right (south) flank of 12th Army Group. Maintain contact with CG Third Army for the purpose of coordinating this action.

(4) Isolate AUGSBURG and MUNICH and therafter advance rapidly South blocking the exits of the BRENNER Pass leading North from the INNSBRUCK area in zone of action.

(5) See sub-paragraph x.

b. First French Army.

(1) Continue strong action between the RHINE and the BLACK FOREST and clear East bank of the RHINE.

(2) Conform action in the STUTTGART area to the advance of the right of Seventh Army, enveloping STUTTGART and capturing it from the West; coordinate this action with Seventh Army.

(3) Destroy elements of the German 19th Army in the BLACK FOREST area, seal the Swiss Border in zone in accordance with previous instructions, complete regrouping rapidly and be prepared for further advance to the Southeast in a new zone of action.

(4) Protect right (south) flank of Seventh Army and right (south) flank of Sixth Army Group.

(5) See sub-paragraph x.

x. (1) Success in destruction of the German 19th Army in the STUTTGART-BLACK FOREST area before it can escape to the SCHWABISCHER JURA will depend in a large measure on:

(a) Close timing of the advance by First French Army to capture STUTTGART with the launching by Seventh Army of it's main effort up the Valley of the NECKAR River. A premature advance by First French Army in the STUTTGART area will be prevented by the Commanding General, First French Army, who will maintain close liaison with Seventh Army in order to accomplish the proper timing.

(b) The speed and weight with which the main effort up the Valley of the NECKAR River is launched by Seventh Army and the maintenance of close liaison between this effort and the attack of First French Army to capture STUTTGART. The Commanding General Seventh Army will be responsible for keeping First French Army fully informed in this regard.

(2) Seventh Army will assist First French Army in the capture of STUTTGART by blocking from the East within it's zone of action.

(3) A new directive will be issued upon completion of clearing of the BLACK FOREST area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By command of General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
AG MESSAGE CENTER

URGENT

C. Op. 230636

TOP SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO FOR ACTION: CG FIRST FRENCH ARMY, CG SEVENTH ARMY

INFO : SHAEF FWD, 12TH ARMY GROUP

FROM : 6TH ARMY GROUP

SIGNED : DEVERS

REF NO : BX-13260

Subject: Modification of Letter of Instructions Number 14.

1. The agreed temporary change in boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is confirmed as follows: north of REUTLINGEN-no change-REUTLINGEN (X-0989)-thence along railroad to BALLENTINGEN (X-1062)-thence along railroad to SIGMARINGEN (X-1043) (all to First French Army).

2. Effective on a date to be announced after STUTTGART is captured the following boundary will be established between Seventh and First French Armies: west of LAUFFEN, no change-railroad to ASPERG (S-0235)-autobahn junction at R-938211-autobahn to RJ at S-0911 (all to Seventh Army)-METZINGEN-DETTINGEN (X-1993) - MUNSINGEN - EHINGEN & REINSTETTEN -(X-6448) (all to First French Army)-KEMPTEN-HOFEN (D-2279) (to Seventh Army). Seventh Army will have joint use of the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN and KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART railroads and equal running rights on all roads north of the KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART autobahn inclusive. First French Army will have equal running rights on the autobahn between the autobahn junction west of STUTTGART and BERNHAUSEN.

3. The mission assigned Seventh Army by paragraph 3 a (1) of letter of instructions number 14 is cancelled.

4. First French Army will advance South east, occupy that part of GERMANY in its zone, seal the SWISS Border in accordance with previous instructions and block the passes in Western AUSTRIA between LAKE CONSTANCE and HOFEN.

-1-

A3- cys A2 G5

(463)

TOP SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

5. Armies will expedite action necessary to the establishment of the boundary mentioned in par 2, effecting prompt liaison with each other to this end.

ORIGINATOR: G-3

INFO : SGS
G-1
G-2
G-4
G-5
FIRST TAC AF
FR NISS
LSN

AUTH: R E JENKINS
Brig Gen

G-3 (REJ/db)

CONCURRENCE: G-4

APPROVED : C/S

22 April 45 16423 Ref No. BX 13260 GK/gjc

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
AG MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JEGX
FILED 091450A

SC N 142/09
091847A
wk

PRIORITY [redacted] SECRET

FROM: 12TH ARMY GROUP TAC SIGNED BRADLEY

TO : FIRST US ARMY COMMAND, THIRD US ARMY MAIN, INFO TO SHAEF MAIN, INFO 21 ARMY GROUP MAIN, 6TH ARMY GROUP, 12TH ARMY GROUP MAIN, COMZONE, NINTH AIR FORCE, FIFTEENTH ARMY, NINTH US ARMY, ADVANCE SECTION COMZONE

REF NO THIS MSG: QX-31149, 09 Feb 1945

Effective 110001A February, the boundary between First and Third Armies prescribed in letter of instructions number fifteen, this Headquarters, is changed as follows: CHAMPLON CR (P3870) - LA ROCHE (P4573) - SAMREE (P5081) (all to Third Army) - VIELSALM (P7089) (to First Army, running rights to Third Army) POTEAU (P7791) - ST VITH (P 8588) (both to Third Army).

ACTION: G-3

INFO : SGS
G-2
G-4
FIRST TACAF
AG RECORDS

MC IN 2286 09 Feb 45 1939A Ref No QX 31149 JHL/ps

A-3
Cys D/c op

(438)

[redacted] SECRET COPY No. 23

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

283

TOP SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

OPERATION MEMORANDUM) 30 August, 1944
:
NUMBER 34)

AIR SUPPORT

1. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to prescribe the general policy for air support during operations when Army Groups together with their associated Tactical Air Forces are established on the Continent.

2. GENERAL

The principal air tasks are:-

a. To attain and maintain an air situation whereby the GERMAN Air Force is rendered incapable of effective interference with Allied operations.

b. To provide continuous reconnaissance of the enemy's dispositions and movements.

c. To disrupt enemy communications and channels of supply by air attack.

d. To support the operations of the Allied Armies.

e. To attack enemy Naval forces.

f. To provide air lift for airborne forces.

g. To provide air lift for the movement of supplies.

3. PLANNED AIR SUPPORT

a. Subject to approval by the Supreme Commander, the details of direct air support of ground and naval forces in assault operations will be as agreed between the Air C-in-C and the commanders concerned.

b. In all phases of proposed land operations, the greater proportion of direct air support will normally be pre-arranged between Army Groups and their associated Air Commanders, to accord with Ground Force operational plans. Such operations of a major character will, however, require prior consultation with the Air C-in-C, AEAF, in the event of the employment of Strategic Air Forces being involved.

4. IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT

In order to meet the developments of the military situation which cannot be foreseen, a proportion of available direct air support units will be reserved to provide immediate support to a designated Army. Information upon which immediate support missions are based will normally be obtained from air reconnaissance and from forward Army elements. Commanders of both Air and Ground formations/units are responsible that necessary procedures and communications are set up on a high priority to insure promptness in the despatch of this information, and in the initiation of action resulting therefrom.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. The Allied Air Forces allotted for direct participation in the Operations will be commanded by the Air Commander-in-Chief, AEAF.

b. The Second Tactical Air Force and Ninth Air Force, through their

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

appropriate Groups/Tactical Air Commands will provide air support to the BRITISH and US Field Armies in accordance with overall directives from AEAF. Normal day to day coordination will be mutually achieved by the two Tactical Air Force Commanders within the resources allotted to them from time to time by the Air C-in-C.

c. The Air C-in-C, AEAF will generally coordinate, directly or through an advanced operational echelon, the overall activities of the two Tactical Air Forces. He may retain under his immediate operational control a portion or the whole of the tactical day and night bombers as a general reserve for employment in a tactical role on either or both battle fronts, or as a strategical bombing force.

d. In addition, the Strategic Air Forces, including both Eighth US Air Force and RAF Bomber Command, will assist this air effort as directed by the Supreme Commander, operating under the general direction of the Air C-in-C, AEAF.

e. Control of direct or close air support will normally be at the Army-Group/Tactical Air Command level.

6. LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS

a. Parallel echelons of main Ground and Air Headquarters (Army Groups and Tactical Air Forces) will be located in close proximity for planning and operations during all phases of the operations.

b. Group/Tactical Air Command Headquarters will be with its supported Army Headquarters during all stages, whatever the level of the main or Central Control may be. This rule is inviolable.

c. In certain phases of specific operations and for limited periods, as pre-arranged by Army and Air Commanders, control of air formations will be decentralized to air force officers with Tentacles/Air Support Parties. In these cases, air formations will answer calls directly from the air force representatives with the Tentacle/Air Support Party, at units subordinate to the Army. Where possible, the air force representative exercising this control should be, either from the air unit furnishing the air formation, or from the operations section of the Tactical Air Command.

7. MEASURES FOR COORDINATION

a. In order to ensure efficient and uniform joint Air/Ground policies, planning, operations and methods, an Air sub-section will be appointed on the G-3 (Ops) and G-2 (Intelligence) staffs of Army Groups, Armies and Corps. The Air sub-section will consist of a specially selected officer or officers and necessary enlisted personnel, whose primary function will be to assist the Chief of their staff section in dealing with the Army aspect of all Air matters, including support, reconnaissance and photography and, when applicable, air transportation and supply.

b. This will in no way preclude or decrease the necessary direct contacts between Army and Air Force Commanders and their staffs at all levels.

8. AIR SUPPORT CONTROL

a. An Air Support Control will be established at each joint Army-Group/Tactical Air Command Headquarters. While US Forces and BRITISH forces differ in organisation of Air Support Control, its purpose and function remain the same. In the BRITISH Forces the Air Support Control is a ground force agency which presents filtered requests to the associated Group. In the US forces, the Air Support Control is a joint Ground Force - Air Force agency consisting of representatives of G-3 (Ops) Air of Army, and A-3 (Ops) of the Air Support Command. The US Air

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Support Control filters requests and prepares action on approved requests.

b. Requests for pre-arranged missions for air support will be forwarded through Army Headquarters in all phases of operations.

c. Requests for air support beyond the resources of Tactical Air Forces will be referred to Headquarters, AEAF, by the commander of the Tactical Air Force concerned.

d. Tentacles/Air Support Parties will be with their supported Corps and Division headquarters continuously throughout operations.

e. The principles enunciated above and those contained in NJC/00/74/41, dated 23/4/44, as approved by this Headquarters, will, if applicable, be employed to govern the conduct of Air Support Control during subsequent amphibious assaults.

9. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

a. Airborne operations will be launched as directed by the Supreme Commander.

b. The launching of airborne operations and any diversionary bombing and air support to cover these operations will be as specified by the Air C-in-C, AEAF, who may delegate any of these responsibilities to the air commanders of subordinate formations.

c. Standing Operation Procedure for Airborne Forces to include Troop Carrier Commands is covered in SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 12.

10. AIR LIAISON

a. Air Liaison Officers (ALOs)/Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) will normally be carried. Selected army ground force officers [illegible] Army at the subordinate headquarters and airfields of the supporting air forces. They will work directly under the supervision of the G-3 (Ops) Air and G-2 (Int) Air of Army Group and Army and should be considered a part of these sub-sections. They will be used to report information on, and results of air missions, to maintain up-to-date information on the ground situation for the air unit to which attached, to explain the ground force tactics and plans to air personnel, and to assist in the briefing and interrogation of combat crews. They will be afforded a separate channel of communication to joint Army/Air Headquarters, and will be issued transportation to permit frequent visits to that Headquarters. Their posting will be as follows:-

(i) From Army Groups: Air Liaison Officers with appropriate higher Air Headquarters.

(ii) From Armies: Air Liaison Officers with each Group (Br)/Tactical Air Command (US) and each Static Fighter Sector (Br)/Wing (US), Wing (Br)/Group (US) or airfield (Br or US) of supporting Group/Tactical Air Command.

b. Fighter, reconnaissance and bomber pilots will be encouraged to visit the front lines personally so as to familiarise themselves with the situation of ground elements which they are supporting.

11. DESIGNATION OF TARGETS

a. The transmission of requests will continue to be submitted in the form specified in Part I of the AEF Assault Signal Book. The advisability of submitting requests in clear under specified conditions, is now in course of investigation and separate instructions will be issued as appropriate.

b. The reply to a target request, giving the details of the air effort and the time of attack, will always be encoded.

12. ARTIFICIAL LANDMARKS

Artificial landmarks will be as specified in Appendix 'A'.

13. BOMBLINES

Bomblines are defined in Appendix 'A'.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

14. AIR RECONNAISSANCE

a. Instructions relative to requests for Air Reconnaissance, to include artillery spotting and air photography and prints, are contained in SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 16.

b. Fighter and Photographic Reconnaissance will be given in support of Armies as detailed in AJC Memorandum No. 7, Air Reconnaissance.

15. EMPLOYMENT OF AIR TRANSPORT

The use of air transport for the movement of personnel and supplies will be as specified in SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 29.

16. CODES AND CYPHERS

Instructions regarding the use of codes and cyphers in communications between Ground and Air elements are as specified in SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDA NOS. 10 and 21.

17. RECOGNITION SIGNALS

Ground/Air and Air/Ground recognition signals are specified in SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 19.

18. SMOKE

a. Smoke missions to be carried out by the Air Force will normally be planned in advance, and alternate plans prepared for various weather and wind contingencies. Smoke missions on call in support of any ground unit will be executed only with the approval of the Ground Commander who commands both the unit to be supported and such adjacent units as are likely to be affected by the smoke. Commanders of all echelons of the Army, Navy and Air Force requesting aircraft smoke missions are charged with responsibility for the prior warning of and co-ordination with all ground, naval and air units that the smoke may affect.

b. The use of smoke as indicators for air attacks on ground targets is specified in SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 19.

19. COMMUNICATION

Efficient air support depends on direct communications from Air Support Control (at Army/Air Headquarters) forward to Tentacles/Air Support Parties and back to ALOs/GLOs with the organisations specified in paragraph 10a (ii); also on direct communications from Army Group G-2 (Air)/Int (Air) to its GLOs at Air Reconnaissance Units and to each Army G-2 (Air)/Int (Air), and in turn from each Army G-2 (Air)/Int (Air) to their GLOs at Air Reconnaissance Units. Responsibilit for providing these special communications will rest with Tactical Air Commands in US forces, and the Army concerned in BRITISH forces. These communication channels are not routed through command or unit signal/message centres, and are not normally available for other tactical or administrative traffic.

By Command of General EISENHOWER:

W.B. SMITH,
Lieutenant-General, US Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H.R. BULL,
Major-General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
"Z"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

Appendix 'A'
to Operation Memorandum No 34
dated 30 August, 1944

BOMBLINES AND ARTIFICIAL LANDMARKS

1. BOMBLINE

a. There are two types of Bomblines, viz; Army Bombline and Local Bombline.

b. In conditions of field warfare, the Army Bombline is the anticipated front line of our own troops two hours hence, with slight adjustment so as to use geographical features for identification purposes by the Air. In static warfare the Army Bombline is virtually the front line of our troops, and in mobile warfare allowance is made for the rate of advance or retirement. If the Army Bombline is too far in advance it automatically gives protection from air attack to the enemy troops in contact with our Ground Forces. Regulations in this regard follow:

(1) Our Air Forces are free to attack any target beyond the Army Bombline, but will attack targets on the friendly side only by special arrangement with our Ground Forces.

(2) The responsibility for fixing the Army Bombline will rest jointly with appropriate Ground/Air Headquarters.

(3) The Army Bombline will be fixed on the information passed back by forward formations giving the position of forward troops. This information may be required at stated intervals or may have to be predicted for varying periods of time. This information will be passed by any available means, but the ASCU/Air Support channels provide the quickest and usually the most effective method.

(4) When the Army Bombline is fixed, the information will be passed to all Ground and Air Force formations concerned. Once fixed the Army Bombline will never be brought nearer to our own troops without reference to the forward Commanders concerned.

(5) If an air attack is required against a target on the near side of the Army Bombline it will be necessary to designate a Local Bombline.

c. Local Bombline. Throughout various phases of the battle, situations will arise where air attacks are required on unexpected targets on the nearside of the Army Bombline. In such cases a Special Bombline for each individual target will be provided by delimiting the target area. This Bombline will be known as the Local Bombline. The following procedure will be followed in such cases:

(1) The originator of the request will give a Local Bombline as described above, and will also define the times during which attack may take place.

(2) Such targets, if accepted, will be attacked by the followin types of aircraft only:

Fighters, Fighter Bombers and Light Bombers.

(3) The estimated margin of safety between target and our own troops is 500 yards, but a few bombs may fall within the Local Bombline.

(4) Where practicable, forward troops nearest the target will be directed to employ yellow coloured smoke from the expected time of arrival (ETA) until the attack takes place. Special beacons of yellow coloured smoke and/or ground strips including target

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

direction arrows will be provided on instructions issued by the G(Air) Staff concerned, over ASSU/Air Support channels. (See Operation Memorandum No 19).

(5) Whenever possible, the target will be marked by red coloured smoke shell from guns/mortars. (See Operation Memorandum No 19).

(6) The foregoing procedure is only applicable to one attack on one target. If repeat attacks are called for, the whole procedure will be repeated in full.

(7) The Commander making the request will be responsible that his troops are held back from the target area for the time, and at the distance which will provide the safety/risk factor considered necessary.

d. The detailed methods by which Bomblines are fixed for special operations, such as a landing assault, or other carefully preplanned operations will be decided by Army and Air Commanders concerned and will form a part of the combined operational plan.

e. It is essential that Naval Forces concerned with Fire Support of the land forces ashore be informed of the position of the bombline. Wireless broadcasts from UXBRIDGE concerning bomblines received by ASSU/Air Support Wireless Stations aboard Assault Force Headquarter Ships will be passed to Naval Assault Force Commanders, who will be responsible for passing the information to Task Force Flagships and to their subordinate Commanders.

2. ARTIFICIAL LANDMARKS

a. Ground formations will be trained and prepared to put out Artificial Landmarks in their areas by day or night. Such landmarks assist in orientating aircraft assigned to attack close in ground targets but they are not necessarily placed close to target areas. They must be so located that they may be easily maintained, are not interfered with by the enemy and can be spotted readily from the air. The type, location and use of Artificial Landmarks will be as agreed between Ground and Air Commanders.

b. The artificial landmark will be a letter of the alphabet as ordered by Army-Group/Tactical Air Command, and should be at least one hundred yards long. The width of the strips forming the landmarks should be at least three yards. Day landmarks may be made from petrol tins opened out and blackened if necessary, blankets, ground strips or other improvised materials. In suitable terrain the letters can be hand-dug or bulldozed out of the ground. Night landmarks may consist of light tins or gasoline and sand, small flares, tow soaked in oil or electric bulbs spaced twenty five yards apart. Arrangements must be made for illuminating a night landmark throughout the whole period of darkness if necessary. Searchlights may also be employed both by day and by night as artificial landmarks.

c. The Air Force Commander will be responsible for coordinating the time of illumination of night landmarks.

d. The Ground Force Commander will be responsible for reconnoitring the site and for reporting accurately the map reference of the landmark. Landmarks may be moved from time to time provided all concerned are given sufficient warning.

e. The use of coloured smokes as an indicator for use with Artificial Landmarks is laid down in SHAEF Operation Memorandum No 19.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

36

B 676 [redacted] SECRET
Auth: CG 6th AG
Initials
Copy No. R&S

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

APO 23 U.S. ARMY

7 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Memorandum Number 7.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army
CG 44th AAA Brigade

RSS

1. SHAEF Message S-71908, dated 21 December 1944, defines the responsibility for coordination of defensive measures by the Army Group and Communications Zone as follows:

a. Coordination of all defensive measures will be the responsibility of the Field Force Commander, where field forces operate in Communications Zone Areas. Operational control of local Communications Zone and other troops will automatically pass for this purpose to the Field Force Commander.

b. The Field Force Commander to whom responsibility for coordination of defensive measures is delegated by the Army Group concerned will make the decision to execute major demolitions.

2. The Commanding Generals, Seventh Army, First French Army and 44th AAA Brigade are designated as the coordinating Field Force Commanders referred to in paragraph 1 b. When actual operations are conducted in Communication Zone area, in rear of currently assigned sectors, the Field Force Commander will be responsible for the coordination of all defensive measures. They will initiate plans relative to possible operations involving the Communications Zone. Commanding General, SOLOC has advised this headquarters that such planning should be coordinated directly with CONAD and DELTA BASE. The Army Commanders and Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will keep this headquarters and Commanding General, SOLOC, fully advised on arrangements made and defensive measures taken within the scope of paragraph 1. Appropriate sections regarding this planning will be included in the weekly progress reports to be submitted to this headquarters in accordance with paragraph 3 x (12) of Letter of Instructions Number 7, 28 December 1944. Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will also submit the weekly progress report.

3. The Commanding General, Seventh Army and Commanding General First French Army will maintain close coordination in all plans relative to defensive measures in areas in rear of army rear boundaries. Similar coordination will be maintained between First French Army and 44th AAA Brigade.

4. Army Commanders and Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will keep themselves fully informed of the location of vital Communications Zone installations and of defensive measures planned or taken by CONAD or DELTA BASE to include:

A-3
(312) Cpy to D/C ops

[redacted] SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. Demolitions.

b. Headquarters which could be used for grouping Communications Zone troops for tactical employment.

c. Troops available for tactical employment.

d. Troops to be employed primarily for evacuation.

e. Troops available for preparation of defensive areas.

f. Critical areas which must be defended.

5. Attached overlay (Annex 1) shows possible general defensive lines of Sixth Army Group.

6. Seventh Army will be provided necessary information reference Twelfth Army Group Area by this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X"

1 Incl. - Overlay

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

TOP SECRET

P-152

SECRET
Auth: CG SIXAG
Initials:
8 November 1944
Copy No: ____

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

23.27

8 November 1944.

9 NOV 1944
IN

OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 3)

1. Amendment No. 1 to Letter of Instructions Number One, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 13 October 1944, is rescinded.

2. a. The following units of the First Airborne Task Force will be relieved from present assigned mission by troops made available by CG, 44th AAA Brigade:

Hq/Hq Co, 1st ABTF
517th Para Inf Regt
509th Para Inf Bn
1st Bn, 551st Para Inf Regt
550 AB Inf Bn
460th Para FA Bn
463rd Para FA Bn
807th AB Engr Co
596th Para Engr Co
512th AB Sig Co

b. CG, FABTF will effect the relief of the above-mentioned units in a deliberate manner, in increments and on a phased schedule to insure that the relieving troops are thoroughly familiar with the situation and their mission before the troops being relieved are withdrawn.

c. Relief will be accomplished by 1800A hours 21 November, at which time command of the sector currently assigned CG, FABTF, will pass to CG, 44th AAA Brigade, now established as a separate command under this headquarters.

d. As relieved, First Airborne Task Force units will be assembled in the NICE area to await further orders.

3. a. After passage of command, the 44th AAA Brigade will protect right (East) flank along FRANCO-ITALIAN Border South of line ALLOS-ST ETIENNE DE TINEE, both exclusive - CUNEO inclusive. Establish contact patrols with First French Army elements on the North. Rear Boundary will be announced in administrative letter to be issued later.

b. Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will establish contact with First Airborne Task Force without delay to effect relief of all elements of First Airborne Task Force listed in paragraph 2 a.

20

6 AG CARR (S)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

c. The Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will submit to this headquarters for approval a list of the necessary personnel and equipment, and the justification thereof, that he desires to utilize, on a loan basis, from the 1st, 8th, 9th, 74th, 106th or 505th AAA Group Hq and Hq Batteries. This list will be kept to a minimum.

d. Separate orders will be issued attaching units currently under operational control of First Airborne Task Force, except units listed in paragraph 2 a., to 44th AAA Brigade.

e. Separate orders will be issued attaching the 899th AAA AW Bn (SM), the 19th, 62nd and 68th Armored Infantry Battalions of the 14th Armored Division and detachment Combat Command, 14th Armored Division, to 44th AAA Brigade.

4. Airborne Task Force will render last Operations Report as of 1200A hours, 21 November 1944. Thereafter, 44th AAA Brigade will render Intelligence Reports, Operations Reports, and periodic reports to this headquarters in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5, Operational Memorandum Number 2, this headquarters.

5. Instructions for relief and movement of First Special Service Force will be issued by this headquarters at a later date.

6. Upon assuming command of the sector, the Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade, is subject to all previous instructions issued by this headquarters to the First Airborne Task Force. No change in current supply procedure.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"G-3 A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Copy No 31

Ref No X-1169

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO 758

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 7th Army:
Initials FR
Date: 5 Nov 1944

5 November 1944

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : Commanding General, VI Corps
Commanding General, XV Corps.

1. Seventh Army attacks on D Day; destroys enemy in zone East of the RHINE; captures STRASBOURG and maintains contact with right (South) flank of Twelfth Army Group.

2. a. Boundaries: See letter, this Headquarters, dated 25 October 1944, subject: "Directive; General Plan for Future Operations".

b. D Day, H Hour later.

3. a. VI Corps:

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Not later than D + 2, attack on the axis: (ST DIE - STRASBOURG).

(3) Receive and introduce into combat the 100th Inf Div and the 103rd Inf Div, upon arrival and attachment to VI Corps.

(4) Relieve and move the 45th Inf Div (with 191st Tk Bn, 645th TD Bn and 106th AAA AW Bn attached) to the EPINAL - BAINS LES BAINS Army rest area on or before 10 November. These units revert to Army reserve on arrival in rest areas.

b. XV Corps:

(1) Maintain active and close contact with enemy in zone.

(2) Attack on D Day; capture and secure SARREBOURG; thereafter force SAVERNE GAP, and be prepared to exploit East of the VOSGES.

(3) Be prepared to employ the 45th Inf Div, Reinf, when released by this Headquarters.

c. Troops:

(1) Field Artillery:

(a) The following units are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XV Corps effective as indicated:

17 FA Bn (155 How), 0600A, 7 November 1944
976 FA Bn (155 Gun), 0600A, 7 November 1944
59 Armd FA Bn, 0600A, 9 November 1944.

Movement of units by direct arrangement between CG VI Corps and CG XV Corps.

(b) The following units, on arrival in Army area, are attached to XV Corps:

939 FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
698 FA Bn (240mm How)(+ Det Btry B, 575 FA Bn (8" Gun)).

Exact time and place of arrival later.

(16)
A-3

TOP SECRET

6-11-34

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Chemical:

CG VI Corps will release 83rd Chemical Bn (less Co B) for attachment to XV Corps after arrival in Corps area of 99th Chem Bn. Exact time and place of arrival later.

d. Air Support:

(1) Preparatory phase: No change.

(2) Operational Phase: Augmented air forces will give maximum close support to ground force actions, through present existing agencies. It will also be prepared to interdict enemy movements.

x. All units will make every effort to capture RR and highway bridges and tunnels intact.

4. Administration:

For administrative details see Administrative Order No 12, dated 1 Nov and letter this Headquarters dated 4 Nov, subject: "Ammunition Allocation".

By Command of Lieutenant General PATCH:

A. A. WHITE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

JOHN S. GUTHRIE,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy No
CG	1
C/S	2
G-1	3
G-2	4
G-3	5 - 7
G-4	8
Arty	9
AAA	10
Engr	11
CWS	12
Sig	13
ASC	14
French Mission	15
VI Corps	16 - 21
XV Corps	22 - 27
First French Army	28
Third Army	29
XII TAC	30 - 33
Sixth Army Group	34 - 39
AG (Extra copies)	40 - 45

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. ARMY

: TOP SECRET :
: Auth: CG 6th A Gp :
: Initials: [illegible] :
: 16 November 1944 :
: Copy No: B 316 :

23

16 November 1944.

OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM)
:
NUMBER 4)

ATTACHMENT OF TROOPS TO "T" FORCE, SIXTH ARMY GROUP FOR OPERATIONS (STRASSBOURG).

1. The Commanding General Seventh Army will issue the necessary orders attaching the following units to the "T" Force Sixth Army Group for operations in the city of STRASSBOURG on the dates indicated:

Type Unit	Date of Attachment
10 - C.I.C. Officers and/or agents	16 Nov 1944
1 - Infantry Rifle Company	16 Nov 1944
1 - Mechanized Recon Troop (Co)	D - 3
1 - Infantry Rifle Bn	D - 2
1 - Engineer Combat Co	D - 1

D-Day = date of planned attack on city of STRASSBOURG.

2. Supply, maintenance and evacuation of the above units will continue to be the responsibility of the Seventh Army.

3. Units will be released from this attachment by the "T" Force Commander immediately upon termination of the mission, but not later than seven (7) days after occupation of the city has been completed.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

"G-3 A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(36)
267 Ltr
H-3 - 1
H - 1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

1st Airborne Task Force, 6th Army Group
General summary of operations
15 July - 30 Sept. 1944

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

MICROFILMED
43340-13011

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

FIRST AIRBORNE TASK FORCE

GENERAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS - From 1 Sept to 30 Sept 44

During the period 1 September 44 to 30 September 44, the 1st Airborne Task Force continued operations in the role of ground troops following participation in the airborne phase of the invasion of Southern France on 15 August 44. Operating on the right flank of the Seventh Army, the Task Force, during the period, moved by progressive steps from a general line ST JEAN CAP FERRAT-DRAP-CONTES-COARAZE-DURANUS to take and occupy defensive positions west of a general line along the France-Italian border extending from the Mediterranean Sea to LARCHE PASS.

The advance along the entire front was characterized by a series of local actions with relatively small, but determined enemy forces. Because of the extremely rugged nature of the terrain the enemy apparently elected to defend vantage points covering routes of approach into his positions. It was therefore, necessary to overcome local enemy prepared strong points well covered by artillery and automatic weapons fire. As the advance into mountainous terrain progressed the increased problem of maintaining supply routes was met by combined efforts of the Engineer units of the Task Force.

The period was marked by an increase in enemy artillery fire. In response to requests to higher headquarters for heavier caliber artillery for use in counter-battery, the 69th AAA Gun Battalion was attached to the 1st Airborne Task Force, and assigned a terrestrial mission as general support artillery.

At 1200A, 26 September 44, the 1st Airborne Task Force was relieved from Seventh Army and established as a separate command under Sixth Army Group with the mission of protecting the right flank of the Sixth Army Group sector.

107-11.0

191-37

DEC 20 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

G-3 SECTION

OPERATIONS

1 Sept 44 - 30 Sept 44

0122350B Sept 44 to 0212350B Sept 44: 1st ARMY continued advance to the east approximately 16 KM in center of sector. Defensive positions organized in north of sector. 509 Pm CT sent patrols into LA TURBIE which were fired upon by enemy artillery. 1st SSF moved forward to occupy positions along the central line LANGARINE to BEAUSOLEIL. 517 RCT sent patrols as far north as the Italian border. Enemy artillery believed to be well emplaced on MT AGEL. Reports from patrols tend to confirm information obtained from captured German Field order. 550 Pm CT closed in positions northeast of BARDLONNETTE and sent patrols to observe enemy activities vicinity of LARCHE PASS. All units ordered to establish defensive positions along present lines, to patrol vigorously to maintain contact with the enemy, and to establish outposts well forward of defensive positions to prevent enemy movement into our positions.

0212350B to 0222350B Sept 44: All units occupied and consolidated defensive positions. Air bombardment missions arranged for through Seventh Army on bridges vicinity LARCHE PASS, enemy fort on MT AGEL, and enemy troop barracks at (702970). Artillery and naval fire coordinated to fire on all known enemy positions not being attacked by air. Patrols moved back to within BSL established for Air, Naval, and Artillery missions. 550 Pm CT reported improving OP's vicinity CONDAMINE.

0222350B to 0232350B Sept 44: Patrolling during period restricted by BSL. Generally good effect obtained from naval and artillery fire during period, but air effort reported to be of doubtful value. Air bombardment attack on MT AGEL reported to have missed the target completely. FO #8 issued organizing 509 Pm CT composed of following elements:

509 Prcht Inf Bn
551 Prcht Inf Bn (- 46 MM and 1 officer on MP detail in NICE)
Co B, 645 TD Bn (- 1 plat)
Rem Plat, 645 TD Bn.

509 Pm CT to occupy sector on TF left flank between 550 Pm CT and 517 RCT with mission of maintaining contact and protecting left flank of TF. 1st SSF ordered to take over newly assigned sector on TF right flank and relieve elements of 509 Pm CT in that sector. All units to hold defensive lines in new sectors of responsibility and maintain patrol contact with enemy.

0232350B to 0412350B Sept 44: 517 RCT occupied LUCERAM with one company. Positions of other forward elements unchanged as all units began movement to take over newly assigned sectors of responsibility. 509 Pm CT moved to general area from LEVENS to PUGET - THENIER. 517 RCT sent one Battalion each to occupy ST JEAN, LUCERAM, and CONTES. 1st SSF relieved 509 Pm CT and took over TF right sector from MT FARQUET to the coast. All units closed in new zones of responsibility by 0412005B. 550 Pm CT reported enemy artillery received in JAUSIERS. Further reported experiencing difficulty in obtaining and holding suitable artillery OP's.

SECRET

2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

242359A to 242359A Sept 44: Defensive positions improved. Patrols active in all sectors to maintain flank contact and contact with the enemy.

242359A to 252359A Sept 44: 1st SSF sent one company on combat raid and destroyed two enemy pillboxes vicinity (731951). Navy and 68 AAA Gun Bn fired on enemy supply train east of VENTAMIGLIA with good results observed. 390 Med Coll Co attached to 1st ABTF.

252359A to 262359A Sept 44: 550 Bn CT contacted enemy by patrol vicinity CAMP DES FOURCHES and disrupted enemy mule pack train vicinity ST CURS by artillery fire. 509 Bn CT concentrated patrol activity in area east of BELVEDERE and LANTOSQUE and harassed enemy positions by mortar fire. 1st SSF raiding party and combat patrols struck enemy at several points during night and caused considerable damage to installations and communications. An undetermined number of enemy advancing against 517 RCT were driven off by hand grenades. 517 RCT replaced companies holding ground on TETE DE LA VAVINA and CIME DE VENTABREN with reserve companies. Enemy artillery and mortar fire reported by all units.

262359 to 272359A Sept 44: 517 RCT repulsed enemy combat patrol after fire fight. Patrols reported all approaches to enemy positions mined and booby-trapped. 509 Bn CT sent patrols to area east of ROQUEBILLIERE to locate enemy positions harassing our troops. Enemy appeared to be increasing his artillery fire with better effect on our positions. Unidentified plane over our lines at night believed to be adjusting artillery fire.

272359A to 282359A Sept 44: No material change in positions. Efforts of all units directed toward patrolling well forward of our main positions. Contact with the enemy maintained.

282359A to 292359A Sept 44: 550 Bn CT relieved Co B at JAUSIERS by A Co. Elements of 1st SSF moved to new positions vicinity (760930). Other units maintained positions and patrolled vigorously along entire front. Heavy enemy artillery reported by all units. Enemy plane, believed to be directing artillery fire, reported over our front lines during daylight hours.

5

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE

SECTION III - SUPPLY

SECTION IV - PERSONNEL

SECTION VI - MEDICAL

ANNEX NO 1 - G-3 Reports

ANNEX NO 2 - G-2 Reports

ANNEX NO 3 - G-4 Reports

107-81.2

Incl 1

SECRET

6

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

SUMMARY OF OUR OPERATIONS

15 July to 31 August 1944

1. General: The 1st Airborne Task Force was activated by General Order No. 1, Headquarters Seventh Army, 15 July 1944. The troop list comprised airborne units and units which were to be converted to airborne operations. The mission of the Task Force having been determined and D-Day having been set, the immediate objectives of the operations section were:

a. Training of ground units in airborne operations.

b. Amalgamation of all units into the 1st Airborne Task Force.

c. Preparation of plans for the mission assigned.

d. Preparation of plans for the rehearsal.

e. Coordination of plans for the airborne operation with the troop carrier command.

2. Training of ground units in airborne operations: The following ground units received glider training at Marcigliano, Italy:

602d Pack Howitzer Battalion
Co D, 83d Chemical Battalion
Co A, 2d Chemical Battalion
AT Co, 442d Infantry Regiment
887th Engineer Company
512th Signal Company
676th Medical Collecting Company
Hq & Hq Co, 1st Airborne Task Force
Det, 3d Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

The training team was provided by the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion and the course of instruction consisted of loading and lashing of equipment and two operational flights. This course of instruction began on 20 July 1944 and was completed 5 August 1944. Upon the completion of this course of training, the above units were thoroughly familiar with loading and lashing of their equipment, had received orientation and operational flights in gliders, and had received basic training in the technique of assembly after landing under simulated battle conditions. The accomplishment of this conversion of normal ground units to gliderborne units within the time specified was due to the availability of the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion instructional team which had conducted glider training at Maxton Airbase, North Carolina, prior to its departure for Italy.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0151

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. Amalgamation of all units of the 1st Airborne Task Force: The troop list of the 1st Airborne Task Force was made up of units which, prior to 15 July 1944, had operated entirely as separate forces. It was, therefore necessary to organize these independent units into tactical units under combat team command and to train them in all matters of command and coordination.

The 2d Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) was designated as one combat team. To this combat team was attached Company "A", 2d Chemical Battalion.

The 517th Regimental Combat Team consisting of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and the 596th Parachute Engineer Company composed the second combat team. To this combat team the following attachments were made: Company "D", 83d Chemical Battalion and the Anti-Tank Company, 442d Infantry Regiment.

The 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and the 463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion constituted the third combat team.

The 550th Glider Infantry Battalion had attached one platoon of the 887th Engineer Company.

The 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion had attached one platoon of the 887th Engineer Company.

The 602d Pack Howitzer Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion.

The organization of the combat team, as outlined above, was predicated upon the mission assigned to each. Operations under Task Force control, communications, liaison, and coordination between all units were a matter of prime consideration in the training program outlined and accomplished.

4. Preparation of plans for the mission assigned: The operations section of the Task Force arrived in Naples, Italy, on 10 July 1944 and immediately received all pertinent information incidental to the mission assigned to the 1st Airborne Task Force. Initial planning was accomplished between airborne advisors to Seventh Army and AFHQ. The initial planning was limited in scope and was vague in detail. The first step undertaken by the operations section was to become thoroughly acquainted with the mission assigned and the number of aircraft and gliders requisitioned. It was determined at an early date that insufficient transport planes and gliders had been requisitioned. Also, it was found that the parachute drop zones and glider landing areas were tentatively selected without proper study of terrain, the accomplishment of the mission, and the capability of the tactical troops. By 15 July 1944, plans were prepared in detail which were approved by the Commanding General, 1st Airborne Task Force, and submitted to Seventh Army. Immediate approval was obtained. These plans were never changed.

5. Preparation of plans for rehearsal: The rehearsal was divided into two phases: ground and air. The ground rehearsal consisted of a ground operation on terrain carefully selected to resemble, as nearly as possible, the terrain which each combat team would occupy upon arrival in Southern France. A time schedule was prepared in keeping with the time

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

schedule for the operation itself. All communication personnel of each combat team, with all of its attachments, engaged in this ground operation. The air phase consisted of the actual loading and lashing of all personnel and equipment on the same time schedule as provided in the operation plan. Token key personnel were flown in C-47's and in gliders over a route commensurate with that of the operation itself. Pathfinder teams were placed at selected PDZ's and GLA's to lead in the parachute and glider elements. Coordination with air support and Navy was accomplished.

6. Coordination of plans for the airborne operation with the Troop Carrier Command: The 1st Troop Carrier Air Division (Prov) established headquarters at Lido di Roma, Italy, near the headquarters of the 1st Airborne Task Force. Contact between the two headquarters was established on 15 July 1944 and maintained constantly until D-Day. All matters of parachute and glider training were coordinated with this headquarters. Plans for transport of the 1st Airborne Task Force from designated departure airdromes in Italy to selected PDZ's and GLZ's in the vicinity of LeMuy, France, were accomplished by complete and careful coordination with the A-3 Section of the 1st Troop Carrier Air Division (Prov). The operations section, 1st Airborne Task Force, prepared the troop list to be transported and designated the PDZ's and GLZ's for each. The allocation of aircraft and gliders was determined by the 1st Troop Carrier Air Division (Prov). It was mutually agreed in the initial phases of planning the air movement that no major changes in the allocation of aircraft or gliders would be considered after the air movement table had been completed and agreed upon. This policy was adherred to throughout the planning and operation itself. Commanders of all units were ordered to submit their requirements for both C-47's and gliders. The requirements of unit commanders were considered and met with only minor exceptions. The 1st Troop Carrier Air Division (Prov) conducted the course of instruction for pathfinder teams at Marcigliano, Italy. Three pathfinder groups were trained, each consisting of three teams. Each team consisted of one officer and nine enlisted men. Plans for moving of troops to departure airdromes, loading and lashing, and actual departure were accomplished through careful coordination with the A-3 Section of the 1st Troop Carrier Air Division (Prov). Airborne liaison officers and assistants were designated for each departure airdrome. These airborne liaison officers were thoroughly oriented by the 1st Airborne Task Force and the 1st Troop Carrier Air Division (Prov), and were thoroughly familiar with all plans of operations.

7. Operations D-5 to D-Day: Movement to departure airdromes began on D-5 in accordance with plans, and all units had closed at designated departure airdromes by 1800 hours D-1. Prior to departure for airdromes all officers were completely oriented in complete detail regarding the operation. Enlisted personnel were oriented as to the mission with the exception of the time of departure and place of invasion. This information was transmitted to all personnel after departure to airdromes and complete security obtained. At 1800 hours D-1 all unit commanders reported to headquarters, 1st Airborne Task Force, and all preparations were completed for the scheduled operation.

8. Chronology:

142359B Aug to 152359B Aug: The 1st Airborne Task Force moved by air from departure airdromes in Italy and landed at PDZ's and GLA's in Southern France. At approximately 0430 hours, 15 August 1944, the 509th

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0153

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Combat Team dropped in PDZ-C. At approximately 0435 hours, 15 August 1944, the 517th Combat Team dropped in PDZ-A. At approximately 0510 hours, 15 August 1944, the 2d Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) dropped in GLA-O. Contact with the enemy in all areas was obtained immediately upon landing. Resistance in the areas of Le Muy, Le Mitan, and La Motte was overcome and defensive lines established within zones of responsibility by all combat teams. Enemy forces were driven out of all zones with the exception of Le Muy. At approximately 0930 hours the first glider serial landed in GLA-O. The 36 horse gliders of this serial did not land but returned to departure airdromes in Italy. By 1800 hours contact with all combat teams had been made and the Task Force CP established. At 1810 hours the second lift began to arrive over the PDZ's and GLA's and by 1930 hours the entire Task Force had landed. The Second Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) having failed to take Le Muy, the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion upon landing was ordered to attack and occupy Le Muy. For this mission Company "A", 2d Chemical Company, was attached to the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion. 103 Prisoners of War taken. At the close of the period the 1st Airborne Task Force occupied La Mitan, La Motte, and Castron, and Les Serres. Contact had been established with the rear echelon at Lido di Roma, Italy, 45th Division Artillery, 36th Division Artillery, Six Corps Artillery, and Air Support. Enemy counter-attacks in the vicinity of Les Arcs had been repulsed by the 517th RCT. Seven gliders were unaccounted for. The 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion had reported twelve howitzers in position.

152359B Aug to 162359B Aug: The attack of the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion was launched at 0230 hours on 16 August 1944, and, having failed to accomplish its mission, the battalion was withdrawn at 0600 hours. A second attack was launched at 1130 hours 16 August. The battalion met determined resistance but obtained its objective at approximately 1455. At 1130 hours the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion with the 602d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion in direct support was ordered to attack and hold Draguignan. At 1500 hours the 2d Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) was ordered to move one battalion toward Trans-en-Provence to contact elements of the Sixth Corps reported moving over the Frejus-Le Muy road. Elements of the 45th Division established contact with the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion at 1835 hours. At the end of the period enemy resistance within the zone of responsibility of the 1st Airborne Task Force was broken and the Task Force occupied the general areas of Le Muy, La Mitan, Trans-en-Provence and Les Arcs. Task Force CP located at (425421); CP 517th (378390); CP 509th (432374); CP 550th (419395); CP 551st (371406); CP 2d Brigade (425421). Total number of Prisoners of War 493.

162359B Aug to 172359B Aug: At approximately 0640 hours the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion with the 602d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion in direct support captured Draguignan despite determined enemy resistance. By 1000 hours the town was completely occupied. During this period the 517th PCT completed the occupation of Les Arcs. At 0017 hours patrols from the 2d Independent Brigade (Br) reported elements of the 142d Infantry Regiment halted for the night along the road west of Puget (525341).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0154

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The 1st Airborne Task Force, having passed to control of the Sixty Corps upon contact, received orders to hold area Draguignan-LesArcs-Le Muy until relieved by the 36th Infantry Division, and upon completion of relief to assemble vicinity of Le Muy in Corps reserve. Remainder of period devoted to reorganization and regrouping of Task Force. 210 Prisoners of War taken.

172359B Aug to 182359B Aug: At 0125 the 1st Airborne Task Force received the following order from Headquarters Sixth Corps. "The 1st Airborne Task Force will, without delay, assume full responsibility including defensive and police of the area bounded by coordinates U4045, U5445, U5335 and U4035. All other units will remove troops and installations from this area without delay." At 1000 hours, 18 Aug 44, Field Order No. 2 was issued to accomplish this mission. At 1400 hours the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion was still holding Draguignan awaiting relief by the 142d Regiment, 36th Infantry Division. The 2d Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) engaged an enemy force southeast of Callas and destroyed the entire force, capturing 105 Prisoners of War. The 602d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion supported the attack of the 142d Regiment (Inf) on enemy installations one and one half miles northwest of Draguignan. 148 Prisoners of War taken.

182359B Aug to 192359B Aug: All elements of the 1st Airborne Task Force prepared to complete defensive and police zones outlined in Field Order No. 2. The 2d Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) assigned vicinity Le Mitan assuming defensive and police Le Muy area. The 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion withdrew from Draguignan and assumed defensive area Le Puget. The 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion Combat Team assumed defensive sector south of Le Muy. The 550th Glider Battalion assumed defensive sector southwest of Le Muy. The assembly and consolidation of all elements of the Task Force as outlined above was completed by 1400 hours this date. At 2030 hours Seventh Army Field Order No. 2 was received. Extract applicable to 1st Airborne Task Force is quoted.

c. "1st Airborne Task Force:

Attached: 1st Special Service Force (Par 2, x (5))
One (1) Hq Hq Btry, FA Group (Annex 3)
One (1) FA Bn (155 How, M1) (Annex 3)
One (1) TD Company (with Recn Plat Atchd) (Annex 3)

(1) Relieve VI Corps units in zone by 2000B, 20 August.

(2) Establish and hold defensive flank along the general line FAYENCE - LA NAPOULE; protect Army right (East) flank.

(3) Reconnoiter to the general line SERANON - GRASSE - CANNES.

(4) Prepare to release 2d (Br) Prcht Bde to Army control on Army order.

x. (1) Anti-aircraft - Annex 2.

(2) Artillery - Annex 3.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(3) Effective at once the French Groupe de Commandos is released from attachment to VI Corps and is attached II French Corps.

(4) Effective 2400B, 19 August, the 1st Airborne Task Force is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army control.

(5) Upon arrival in ALGIERS area 1st SSF is assigned 1st Airborne Task Force.

(6) Upon Army order, 2d British Prcht Brigade will assemble for shipment to Italy.

4. Army assumes supply responsibilities at 2400B, 20 August. See Administrative Order #2.

5. a. Command Posts.

Seventh Army	- ST TROPEZ
VI Corps	- To be reported
II Fr Corps	- To be reported
1st A/B Task Force	- ST RAPHAEL

b. Axes of signal communications:

Seventh Army	- ST TROPEZ - BRIGNOLES - AIX
II (Fr) Corps	- COGOLIN - TOULON - MARSEILLES
VI Corps	- BRIGNOLES - AIX.

PATCH
Commanding."

At 2200 hours Field Order No. 3 was issued to accomplish mission assigned 1st Airborne Task Force. 4 Prisoners of War taken.

192359B Aug to 202359B Aug: The 1st Airborne Task Force completed the occupation of the line FAYENCE - NAPOULE, relieving elements of the 36th Infantry Division in that sector. Task Force CP opened at Hotel Courier, St. Raphael, (595365) at 1530 hours. At 1200 hours, Sixth Corps order was received attaching to 1st Airborne Task Force the following units: Hq and Hq Battery, 36th Field Artillery Group, 937th Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm How M1). Commanders ordered to report to CG, 1st Airborne Task Force, without delay. One TD Company, 645th TD Battalion, with one platoon Recn Company 645th TD Battalion attached. Commanding Officer report to CG, 1st Airborne Task Force without delay. 7 Prisoners of War taken.

202359B Aug to 212359B Aug: By 1200 hours the following units had joined the 1st Airborne Task Force: Hq and Hq Btry 36th FA Group, 937th FA Bn, Co "C", 645th TD Bn (plus Recn Plat). During the morning of 21 August 44 the 1st Special Service Force moved from bivouac in the vicinity of Cheateau-Aurelan. The 1st Regiment relieved the 2nd Independent Parachute

12

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Brigade (Br) in the sector (608476) to (257629). Two Prisoners of War were captured by the 1st SSF during the period. The relief of the 2d Independent Para Brig (Br) was completed by the 1st SSF by 1600 hours. The 2d Indep Para Brig (Br) moved into bivouac area vicinity of St. Raphael in Task Force reserve, preparing to be evacuated. The 509th CT prepared to attack enemy positions on high ground in vicinity (299625) to secure favorable outposts and OP's. The attack was ordered for 0600 hours, 22 Aug. The 509th positions, vicinity Napoule, were shelled by enemy artillery from 2100 hours to 2200 hours. Enemy artillery located west of Cannes. Naval support requested. Frejus air strip made available for landing of C-47's at 1600 hours. Patrol activity conducted along entire front throughout the period. 212 Prisoners of War taken.

212359 Aug to 222359 Aug: 509 CT siezed high ground along line (286630) - (284622) - (298626). 517 RCT occupied Fayence, Callian, and Montroux, and advance elements siezed bridge at (568615). 1st SSF ordered to sieze and hold bridge at (298698) in order to assist advance of Task Force. Seventh Army requested to furnish observation aviation on enemy artillery positions northwest of Cannes. 517th RCT assigned responsibility of patrolling roads on left of Task Force sector and maintaining contact with Sixth Corps at Digne. Recn Plat 645th TD Bn attached to 517th RCT to assist in mission. Orders received from Seventh Army relieved 2d Independent Parachute Brigade (Br) from attachment to 1st ABTF. 60 Prisoners of War taken.

222359 Aug to 232359 Aug: 509th CT held positions on high ground north and northwest of La Napoule and pushed patrols out toward Cannes. Naval air observation reported Free French flags flying from buildings in Cannes. 1st SSF siezed bridge at (298698) and advanced across Siagne River toward Grasse, Speracedes, and Peymeinade. 517th RCT occupied St. Cezaire with one battalion and moved remainder of CT across Siagne River. Naval gun fire called on to supress heavy enemy artillery fire in 509th CT sector. 509th CT prepared plans to attack St. Cassien. 62 Prisoners of War taken.

232359 Aug to 242359 Aug: 517th RCT moved from the vicinity St. Cezaire, passed through St. Vallier, thence to Grasse. Two battalions advanced northeast toward Le Bar. 1st SSF occupied Grasse without resistence and moved forward toward Opio, Valbonne, and Mouans-Sartoux. 509th CT attacked St. Cassien successfully. Further advance held up by anti-tank fire from vicinity Cannes. 2 Prisoners of War taken.

242359 Aug to 252359 Aug: 517th RCT moved into Le Bar and advanced one battalion north along Loup River. First SSF occupied Chateauneuf and Valbonne, and continued advance to the east. Enemy resistence west of Cannes neutralized. 509th CT occupied Cannes and proceeded eastward to Antibes. First ABTF CP opened at Grasse, (304779) at 1000 hours. 550th Inf. Bn assigned mission of patrolling Grasse and protecting Task Force CP. FO #5 issued, assigning 509th CT mission of patrolling and police of Cannes and area along coast to the east. Other elements of Task Force to continue the advance to Var River. 129 Prisoners of War taken.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0157

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

252359 Aug to 262359 Aug: First ABTF continued advance to the east. 517th RCT moved to positions along line Coursegoules, Vence, and Bezaudun. 1st SSF met enemy opposition at Villeneuve-Loubet. Remainder of force held up along west bank of Loup River. Enemy artillery fire encountered from vicinity Vence. 509th CT patrols operating along coast road reported road and adjacent area heavily mined. Positions in Antibes shelled by enemy artillery from vicinity Cagnes. Guns located by Navy and silenced. 550th Bn on Task Force order, sent reconnaisance elements to reconnoiter road to Larche Pass. Seventh Army requested to furnish air attack missions on enemy movements along road from Cuneo to Larche Pass and road from Cuneo to Nice. Elements of D plus 10 convoy arrived at beaches. 136 prisoners of war taken.

262359 Aug to 272359 Aug: Task Force continued advance with greatest gains in left of sector against light enemy opposition. 517th RCT occupied Begaudun, Bouyon, and La Broc with one battalion each. Strong combat patrol sent out to sieze and hold bridge across Var River at (535955). 1st SSF occupied Villeneuve-Loubet after overcoming strong enemy resistence. One battalion crossed Loup River and occupied high ground northwest of La Colle. 509th CT continued patrol activity along coast road toward Var River. Artillery air observation reported Free French flag flying at Cagnes. 80 Prisoners of War taken.

272359 Aug to 282359 Aug: Force of approximately one company from 517th RCT crossed Var River and occupied high ground north and northwest of La Roquette. 1st SSF continued general advance along entire front of sector and occupied towns of Vance and Cagnes. 509th CT attacked from positions southwest of Loup River and advanced to the west bank of the Var River. 550th Inf. Bn ordered by FO #6 to organize combat team consisting of 550th Inf Bn (less Company "A"), 463d Field Artillery Bn., one platoon 4.2" mortars, one platoon TDs, and one platoon combat engineers. CT assigned mission of proceeding to vicinity Larche Pass and preventing enemy movement through Larche Pass. Artillery and Naval fire concentrated on enemy troops withdrawing across Var River. Company "A" 40th Engineer Combat Regiment attached to 1st ABTF during period. 39 Prisoners of War taken.

282359 Aug to 292359 Aug: 517th RCT consolidated positions already held and occupied Toudon with force of one company. 1st SSF reached west bank of Var River in right part of sector. Elements of 509th CT crossed Var River and patrolled toward Nice. FFI reported Nice held by them and the Free French flag flying over the city. Initial elements of 550th CT departed for Larche Pass at 0600 hours. 51 Prisoners of War taken.

292359 Aug to 302359 Aug: 1st ABTF continued advance to the east and occupied positions along line "A" established by FO #7. 517th RCT occupied Levens with one company. 1st SST advanced toward Aspremont and Falicon against determined enemy resistence. 509th CT occupied Nice and proceeded eastward to establish positions along Line "A". Advance Echelon of 550th CT closed at Barcelonnette and established base of operations there. Rear Echelon cleared Grasse at 0300 hours. All units directed to disregard Line "B" established by FO #7 and push reconnaisance vigorously to establish contact with the enemy. 277 prisoners of war taken.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0158

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

302359 Aug to 312359 Aug: All elements of Task Force held positions along Line 'A' and pushed reconnaissance patrols forward to contact enemy. Enemy appeared to be withdrawing to defensive positions along Italian border. 550th CT reported Larche Pass in enemy hands and road from Condamine to St. Paul controlled by enemy artillery fire. Enemy patrols active in Condamine and Jausiers. Air bombardment mission requested on enemy road block along Larche Pass-Guneo road. Elements of D plus 15 convoy arrived at beach. 19 prisoners of war taken.

15

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

HQ 1ST A/B TASK FORCE
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 758 US ARMY

12 October 1944

SUMMARY OF ENEMY OPERATIONS
Period 1 - 30 September 1944

Situation on 1st ABTF front fluid at beginning of period. For 6 days prior to Sept. 1st ABTF had been engaged in successfully routing Ky from positions ST RAPHAEL - FAYENCE eastward. By beginning of period the Task Force had advanced to a line running generally along the Var River. Period opened with Ky withdrawing east and north east, from NICE to defend a line: generally LUCETON, SOSPEL, ST MARTIN VESUBIE as was indicated in captured divisional Field Order during previous period. Units opposing 1st ABTF: 148th Res. Div., including elements of 8th and 239th Regts. plus some Corps Artillery and a special detachment of German SS troops in limited number. Following principles as outlined in captured 148th Res. Div. Field Order, the enemy, suffering considerable casualties and losses by capture, were able to effect a defense line along the line: GRIMALDI, CASTILLON, SOSPEL, MOULINET, and ST MARTIN VESUBIE. On left flank at start of period elements of 200 Gren. Regt., 90th Pz. Div. (Dismounted) occupied well defended strong points vicinity LARCHE Pass. Our left boundry having been extended by Seventh Army Field Order to include LARCHE Pass, elements of the Task Force were disposed at the end of August to counteract any enemy activity in that area. By 4 Sept occupation and organization of enemy defense line appeared complete. From 4 September to 19 September 148th Res. Div. continued to actively defend main line of resistance, using many patrols and heavy concentrations of artillery fire.

Having been greatly depleted in numerical strength the preceding over 30 day period the 148th Div. was relieved in the line on or about 19 September by the 34th Gren. Div; consisting of 253rd Regt, 80th Gren. Regt, and 107th Gren. Regt. Regimental boundaries included: for the 253rd Regt, area GRIMALDI - CASTILLON; for the 80th Regt, CASTILLON - north of SOSPEL; for the 107th Regt, north of SOSPEL to north of MOULINET.

Elements opposing our central sector consisted of a task force "Meeralpen" Regt; composition and strength unknown. These enemy units continued to actively defend main line of resistance outlined above throughout period. On or about 28th Sept. elements of 200th Regt. were relieved by 3rd Bn., high Mt Chasseurs, 5th Mt. Div. in LARCHE Pass sector.

Total PW's taken during period:
Total PW's taken since D-Day:

16

SECRET

0160

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CHRONOLOGY

1 September 1944

Enemy withdrawing north and east from NICE, supporting movements with small forces covering local points. Utilization of mines and demolitions throughout area. Enemy partial occupation of organized defense line CAP MARTIN - SOSPEL believed to be complete.

2 September 1944

Enemy continues withdrawal to main defense line SOSPEL - MT BARBONNET - CASTILLON - ST AGNES - MT AGEL. Progression of enemy defenses noted via LARCHE Pass. By attached town of ISOLA 1845E, withdrawing shortly afterward. Concentrated Fy Artillery fire received on forward elements. Mine fields encountered on right flank.

3 September 1944

Active patrols in front of main line of resistance were employed by enemy along entire front. Defensive operations continue via LARCHE Pass. 517th RCT patrol reports enemy in unknown strength via M7203. German MLR generally along line MT AGEL - ST AGNES - CASTILLON - MT BARBONNET - MT ESCONET - COL DE LARCHE.

4 September 1944

Generally no change in enemy front lines. Defenses are series of strong points MT AGEL - COL DE BRAME - MT BARBONNET - MT AGEL - CAP MARTIN. Enemy patrols active during period. Germans sensitive to friendly activity within approaches of enemy strong points.

5 September 1944

ST AGNES and CORRIO appear to be well defended. By patrols active in vic PIERA CAVA (82.0-84.6) and MT CHEVALET (71.6-82.8) and east to (78.6-85.8). FSSW OP and supply points harassed by fire from mobile 75mm gun east of MT AGEL and heavy caliber fire from ST AGNES. By also laying communications lines between ST AGNES and MENTON. Germans occupying strong outposts on MT CROS (72.0-85.0). 517th units shelled by arty and mortar fire from enemy strong point. 550 CT reports enemy in their sector not observing light discipline and visibly congregating.

6 September 1944

Reports from all sectors indicate decrease in enemy heavy Arty fire. Enemy continuing defensive tactics along 1st ARTY front chiefly employing MG and mortar fire. FSSW patrols report enemy occupying heights NW CASTILLON (74.1-85.9) in considerable strength. By patrols active in MT CROS and MT MERAS areas. Abundance of German supplies reported at SOSPEL.

SECRET

-1-

17

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

2 September 1944

Enemy continues withdrawal while attempting to defend SOSPEL focal point. German fighter craft active over MENTON--SOSPEL front during morning. Enemy demolition activity increased during hours of darkness via SOSPEL.

3 September 1944

Continued resistance in the SOSPEL--CASTILLON--MT. OURS areas. SOSPEL strongly defended by 88mm's, heavy Arty and automatic weapons. MT AGAISEN reported strongly fortified, also strong German forces in organized positions around CIME DE LA LAVINA. FEF repulsed small scale counterattack in CASTILLON -- MT OURS sector. Enemy patrols active throughout period.

4 September 1944

Enemy continues determined resistance in CASTILLON and SOSPEL areas. Defenses of CASTILLON fortress includes three mortar positions NE of town; well camouflauged MG's covering mined approaches; and SP gung along SOSPEL--CASTILLON road. Enemy possesses very strong defensive positions in SOSPEL with series of outposts North and South of town. Enemy front extends generally along line LARCHE--ST ETIENNE--ST ASURZUR--ST MARTIN VESUBIE--SOSPEL--CASTILLON--LE GROTTE.

10 September 1944

Determined resistance in SOSPEL and CASTILLON areas continues. During period positions guarding approaches to STURA VALLEY, via LARCHE PASS, were strengthened by enemy. Garrison at ST OURS reported to be approximately 3 Companies. One SS Company armed with machine pistols and supporting armor active via MT BARBONNET. Enemy attack 0800E on ST MARTIN VESUBIE repulsed by elements of 509 CT.

11 September 1944

1st BEF repulsed enemy attack at beginning of period via (79.0-99.0). German 200th Gren Regt of 90th Pz. Gren Div. (dismounted) reported in COL DE LARCHE area. Elements of 90th Regt. 34th Infantry Division identified in CASTILLON area. PW information reveals German labor Bn operating along coastal area near Italian border improving fortifications.

12 September 1944

General increase in enemy Arty activity. Enemy attack to regain heights North of ST VINCENT repulsed. Another German counter-attack in 517th RCT sector strongly supported by increased Arty and mortar fire regained positions on hill 1522 DE LA LAVINA. Fortifications East of Italian border consists of casemates for Arty and

0 1 0 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] (cont'd).

emplacements for MG's, automatic weapons and AT guns along commanding points on roads and trails.

14 September 1944

Continued heavy enemy artillery activity. German Bn attack supported by heavy Arty during morning against 2nd Bngt 75RF, repulsed. Defensive organization of strong points on commanding terrain continues. Harrasing sniper fire received along entire front with strong enemy patrolling in ST CURS area.

15 September 1944

Enemy operations consisted of local patrol activity, ambushing and heavy concentrations of Arty fire at scattered points along the entire front.

16 September 1944

Enemy operations limited to combat patrolling and intermittent Arty fire. Ridge west of CAMP DES FOURCHES strongly held by enemy. Heavy traffic on LARCHE-VAMADIO road during period.

16 September 1944

Light enemy patrolling encountered along entire front. Sporadic Arty fire received in 1st SSF and 517th RCT sectors. German patrol attacked bridge (62.9-16.5) in 509th CT sector. 550th CT reports by strengthening positions at PAS LA PETITE CAVALE (87.0-65.0).

17 September 1944

Enemy patrolling decreased along entire front. Arty concentrations and long range small arms fire received in 1st SSF and 517th RCT sectors. German use of mines and booby traps reported in 517th RCT sector. Traffic on SOMPEL-CASTILLON road during night reported.

18 September 1944.

Active enemy patrols and Arty fire continued during period. Intermittent mortar fire fell along entire front in support of strong points. 1st SSF reports tanks operating singly at vic (73.0-97.8) and (73.8-97.9).

19 September 1944

Enemy Arty active during period. Local patrols encountered along front. Mines and booby traps encountered by 550 CT vic MEYRONNES. German attack against forward elements of 517th RCT

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(cont'd).

[illegible] by 1st Mtn.

[illegible] September 44

Enemy relief of units and reorganization of front lines reported during period. Elements of 157th Regt. relieved 5th [illegible] in MENTON sector, and 4th Mtn. Regt. relieved elements [illegible] on extreme right flank 90th Regt. in SOSPEL sector. This movement reflects essentially a complete relief of 148th Res. Div., now badly battered and understrength, by the 34th Inf. Div. Interrogations of PW's by 157th RCT and 1st SMF indicates all three regiments of 34th Div. are to be employed on line. Usual patrolling and harrassing Arty fire continued throughout period. Local German patrol activity reported in SOP OT sector.

[illegible] September 44

Movement of enemy supplies, motor transportation, and troops observed during period. Movement further indicates coordination in the relief of 148th Res. Div. by 34th Inf. Div. Arty bombardment of our troops continued throughout period. Ly patrol activity light.

[illegible] September 44

My activity consisted of usual harrassing Artillery fire throughout period. Slight increase of activity in CASTILLON Portrons observed. Local enemy patrol activity encountered by all units. My front extends generally along line: LARCHE - ST [illegible] - point east of ST MARTIN VESUBIE - MONTINET - SOSPEL - CASTILLON - GRIMALDI.

[illegible] September 44

Mortar and Arty activity continued throughout period. Usual enemy patrolling encountered. Increased counterbattery fire noted in CAP MARTIN area.

[illegible] September 44

Light German counterbattery fire on right flank sector. Active patrolling encountered by 509th CT. Enemy continues to employ his 80mm mortars on our front line positions. Light patrolling with Arty concentrations received on 509th CT positions during period reported.

0164

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

25 September 44

Enemy withdrawal from several strong points effected on right flank in FSSF zone of action. Local patrolling encountered during period along front. Several rounds of unidentified arty fire vic I5CL4 during period. Sporadic arty fire received along entire front during period. During night unidentified enemy twin-engined aircraft dropped two personnel-type bombs on 1st Airborne Task Force landing strip (55.2-75.5). No damage incurred.

26 September 44

Enemy attitude continues defensive. Arty and mortar fire continues to harrass 1st ABTF front line positions. German troop movement along highway east from BOSPEL railway station observed by 517th RCT at end of period. One unidentified enemy aircraft observed over area at beginning of period. Enemy continues extensive work on laying of mine fields to 1st ABTF front. MENTON shelled by enemy heavy arty during night.

27 September 44

Enemy continues defense of his positions with increased arty support. Local enemy patrol activity encountered along front. [redacted] heavily shelled during period with high casualties to civilians. Enemy twin engine plane over FSSF sector appears to be directing arty fire.

28 September 44

Enemy defensive attitude continues while employing stronger Arty support. Enemy patrols encountered along entire front. BOSPEL and MOULINET Anti-aircraft fires (88mm) increased on our Arty observation planes. Enemy ordered town of MOULINET to be evacuated of all civilians by 26 Sept, according to civilian report.

29 September 44

Very little activity reported 1st BE sector. Approximately 150 rounds of enemy arty received during period. Four enemy tanks or anti-propelled guns observed vic (61.9-66.8). Slight increase in patrol activity reported by 509th CT. Civilians evacuated from MOULINET in accordance with German order. Enemy now utilizing teller mines with anti-handling fuse along 1st ABTF front. Relief of 200th RG Regt., 90th PG Div. by 3rd Bn., High Mt. Chasseurs, 5th Mt. Div. in effect L[redacted] Pass area.

30 September 44

Marked decrease in Ey activity. MENTON heavily shelled again

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

during night. Light German patrol activity reported along entire front with scattered arty bombardments. Enemy Aircraft in G17th RCT sector appears to have signal light communications with ground units.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF ENEMY OPERATIONS

27 July 1944 - 31 August 1944

MAP REFERENCES:

1:25,000
XXXIV-44, Sheets 1 & 2, 3 & 4, 5 & 6, 7 & 8, XXXV-44, Sheets 1 & 2, 3 & 4, 5 & 6, 7 & 8. XXXVI-44, Sheets 1 & 2, 3 & 4, & 5. XXV-43, 5 & 6, 7 & 8.

1:50,000
XXXVI-43, XXXVI-42, XXXVI-41, XXXVI-40, XXXVI-39, XXXV-39, XXXVII-41, XXXVII-42, XXXVII-43.

1:100,000
Sheet Numbers: 154 & 160.

Preliminary planning of the Airborne attack on Southern FRANCE included detailed intelligence studies of enemy troop dispositions and defensive organization.

1st Airborne Task Force Order of Battle revealed the following disposition of enemy troops located within area adjoining Task Force objective:

1 Battalion, 745th Infantry
242d AT Battalion
1048th Assault Gun Unit
One unidentified Armored Battalion
One thousand OCS Candidates
Five hundred labor troops
Some line of communication troops

Preliminary study of critical terrain depicted enemy efforts to prepare well his anti-air landing defenses, consisting of wire, land mines, anti-tank obstacles, tetrahedra, etc. Intelligence reports that the enemy had placed glider landing obstacles in fields and vineyards within the selected landing area were substantiated during glider landing operations on D-Day.

Counterintelligence efforts contributed largely to the successful parachute drops and glider landing in the vicinity of LE MUY, FRANCE on D Day. By dawn parachute elements had secured selected drop zones and landing zones east and northeast of LE MUY for subsequent glider landings and parachute drops during the day (see photo encl., annex 2).

The initial enemy reaction to the airborne operation was one of complete surprise. Prisoner of War sources revealed that the German XXI Corps command

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0167

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

had expected an airborne thrust within the MARSEILLES sector on D Day. The LE MUY effort completely disrupted enemy communications and possessed the vital element of surprise. Only disorganized resistance was encountered and by noon on D Day the intial objectives of the 2d Brigade (British) and 517th Parachute RCT were taken. The towns of LE MITAN and LA MOTTE were taken in face of light resistance. On the following day LE MUY fell and the 1st Airborne Task Force mission was completed. Hostilities ceased 1630B 16 August, 1944. Total prisoners of war captured during first two days of operations were six hundred.

Reverting to Seventh Army reserve, the 1st Airborne Task Force went into assembly area vicinity of LE MUY where reorganization was promptly accomplished.

The 1st Airborne Task Force was assigned on D plus four the mission to protect the right flank of the Seventh Army, now advancing to the north. Enemy forces now included identified elements of the 148th Reserve Division.

1st Airborne Task Force advanced to the East capturing VALBONNE, GRASSE, FAYENCE, CANNES, VILLENEUVE LOUBET, CAGNES, NICE, and neighboring villages. The enmy employed all forms of delaying tactics by defending successive positions. Good observation served the enemy well in this line of action.

A captured divisional field order of the 148th Reserve Division indicated enemy plans to withdraw under pressure to the East, attempting to consolidate and maintain a line of defense in the mountainous country generally from SOSPEL to MOULINET.

CHRONOLOGY

15 August 1944

Enemy reaction to our landing one of surprise. Disorganized resistance met throughtout period. LE MITAN and LA MOTTE captured. Enemy efforts to effect prearranged defense plans indicated.

16 August 1944

Enemy resistance stiffened vicinity of LE MUY. Enemy reorganization continued with indications to defend LE MUY noted. Our first attack 0230B hours repulsed. Second attack 1630 hours was successful. Enemy garrison surrendered in force, with a total of 504 prisoners taken.

17 August 1944

Our troops operating vicinity DRAGUIGNAN captured Brigadier General Neuling commanding LXII German Corps. The prisoner indicated airborne operation had successfully disrupted all enemy communications and prevented his contact with subordinate units or higher echelons.

18 August 1944

1st Airborne Task Force reverted to Seventh Army reserve. Not in contact with enemy.

24

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

19 August 1944

1st Airborne Task Force in Seventh Army reserve. No contact with enemy.

20 August 1944

1st Airborne Task Force in Seventh Army reserve. No contact with enemy.

21 August 1944

Enemy on 1st Airborne Task Force front fighting withdrawal actions. Enemy road block encountered Northwest of PONT DE SANER. Prisoner of War information indicates 3d Battalion, 239th Infantry Regiment in MANNEVILLE (3066) with one battalion in the vicinity of TANNERON (2670). Identifications in the FAYENCE sector reveal 327th Reserve Battalion, 1036th AT Company, components of 242d Division. 144th Reserve Regiment and 8th Engineer Battalion identified in the CORBEROL and GAILLAN sectors respectively. 2d Brigade (British) in the vicinity of PLANESTEL received heavy artillery concentrations during the night. 517th RCT captured FAYENCE with a total of 212 prisoners. FSSF received harrassing small arms fire throughout period. 509th CT in contact with the enemy along the high ground Northwest of LA NAPOULE.

22 August 1944

Contact with enemy troops two km's West of TANNERON, ST CEZAIRE, LA NAPOULE and high ground Northwest of LA NAPOULE. Remnants of the 765th Infantry Regiment and 242d Infantry Division contacted North of TANNERON. Enemy units in contact are 7th Company, 8th Infantry Reserve Regiment, 9th Company, 765th Infantry Regiment, 327th Infantry Battalion and 38th Infantry Battalion.

23 August 1944

Enemy resistance along front of 1st ABTF generally light with MG and small arms fire at scattered points. Road blocks covered by mines contributed a major part of enemy defense. A counter-attack by the enemy at 2200B to recapture LE CASSIEN repulsed.

24 August 1944

Enemy withdrawal during the period continues. Isolated points of resistance supported by artillery and mortar fire. Local rear guard action encountered in the FSSF sector. Enemy following plan of defending successive positions. 1st and 3d Regiments, FSSF advanced through VALBONNE to BIOT with little resistance.

25 August 1944

Resistance increased within central sector and our right flank. Contact with enemy broken on left flank. During period enemy employed delaying tactics along LOUP River where his defenses were supported by artillery. Harrassing fire from snipers and MG's encountered along with scattered mine fields. Heavy enemy artillery continued vicinity VILLENEUVE - LOUBET at close of period.

25

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

26 August 1944

Left flank sector of 1st ABN fluid. Enemy employed local counter-attacks in defense of strong points throughout central sector during period. [illegible] fire fights by FFI reported in vicinity of ST [illegible]. Contact with elements of 148th Infantry Division, 329th Res. Gren. Regt, 760th Res. Gren. Bn. and the 372d Res. Gren. Bn. Enemy defense pattern [illegible] system of MG and mortar strongpoints located on commanding terrain overlooking east banks of LOUP River. Total of five MG's emplaced on Hill 218 (A8775) manned by approximately one platoon of 4th Co, 372d Res Gren Bn. Balance of 4th Co along with 5th and 7th Cos hold line west of LA COLLE/VILLENEUVE-LOUBET road, with 6th Co (heavy weapons) in support East of VILLENEUVE-LOUBET.

27 August 1944

Enemy continues to employ local counterattacks in defense of strong points throughout central sector. On our right flank enemy is effecting a withdrawal across the VAR River. Left flank in a fluid state. Reconnaissance reveals system of MG and mortar strong points on high ground East of VAR River. Extensive mine fields throughout right flank sector on both sides of VAR River. Heavy artillery concentration received in central sector. PW's identified Res Gren Bn 372, 239th Gren Regiment on Task Force right flank.

28 August 1944

German withdrawal in central sector and our left flank continues. Enemy in some strength found emplaced on high ground East of VAR River. Enemy reconnaissance patrols active on our right flank. Enemy reported evacuating NICE, utilizing LA TRINITE - VICTOR - SOSPEL highway. German light artillery active throughout Task Force sector.

29 August 1944

NICE evacuated by enemy. Contact broken. Harrassing sniper fire encountered at isolated points. Thirty-six prisoners transferred by FFI to PWEF in ST ISIDORE-ST ANTOINE area. Road VENCE - COURSEC - OULES heavily mined.

30 August 1944

No organized defenses encountered during period. Germans continue withdrawal toward organized line ST MARTIN VESUBIE - ROCHEBILLIERE - PEGOIA - SOSPEL - CASTILLON - MENTON position. Light rear guard action encountered. Motorized reconnaissance reported no contact ASPREMONT-TOURRETTE-CHATEAUNEUF CONTES-CONTES. 148th Infantry Division Field Order captured NICE shows enemy plan to withdraw to organized defense W Alp position to MEDITERRANEAN SEA along the FRENCH-ITALIAN Boundary thence along LIGURIAN COAST TO ST LORENZO AL MARE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0170

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



27

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. [redacted]

a. The period 1 August - 15 August 1944, involved the preparation of supply and evacuation plans for operation "Dragoon"; obtaining shortages in T/E equipment of all units and special equipment necessary for operations for those units not originally airborne; and the assembly, preparation, and packing of supplies to be dropped by parachute. Utmost difficulty was encountered in securing authorization from MAFOUBA for those units assigned to this Force which were not previously organized and equipped for airborne operations. Normal supply during this period was by individual unit direct or supply depots.

b. During the period 15 August 1944 - 17 August 1944, this Force was supplied by parachute from the Resupply Airbase at Galera, Italy operated by this Force. A total of 287 tons of supplies of all classes were delivered in 147 sorties, flying a round trip distance of approximately six hundred (600) miles. The scattering of supplies over a wide area due to excessive altitudes from which dropped and lack of transportation and personnel for assembly and distribution resulted in loss of about sixty per cent (60%) of supplies dropped.

c. During the period 18 August 1944 - 31 August 1944 supply and evacuation procedure normal to any ground unit was followed; although lack of the normal service units found in an Infantry Division and in sufficient transportation in the combat units made such extremely difficult at times.

2. [redacted]

During the period 1 August 1944 - 14 August 1944 basic loads of Chemical class II, IV and V were issued. Parachute packs were loaded for aerial re-supply. Company 'A', 2nd Chemical Battalion, and Company "B", 83rd Chemical Battalion, were trained for glider operations; normal loads were changed; ¼ ton trucks and trailers were modified to increase ammunition capacities.

On 15 August 1944 the glider borne Chemical companies landed with basic loads intact. In the entire Task Force Twenty-five percent of the smoke grenades were not recovered; approximately fifty percent of class II and IV items carried on the individual were lost.

On 16 August 1944 seventy-five percent of the 4.2" mortar ammunition dropped by aerial re-supply was recovered.

During the period 15 August 1944 - 31 August 1944 a large percentage of the 4.2" mortars fired from positions on rock and hard ground and, consequently, the failure of parts was considerably above normal. The supply of spare parts during this period was critical. Repair and maintenance was provided by a Detachment of the 3rd Ordnance MM Company.

28.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. Engineer.

a. Engineer supply was handled without any unexpected trouble while preparing for the mission. Each unit submitted the requirements for its basic load and for its air resupply. Units drew their basic loads direct from the depots in Naples. Equipment and supplies needed for the resupply was drawn by the Engineer Section and arranged into type bundles which could be called for by a code name as the units needed the shipment.

b. After the landing the supply problem became more difficult due to the lack of transportation and the fact that the 596th Parachute Engineer Company lost approximately seventy-five percent (75%) of its equipment. Fortunately the demand for Engineer supplies was very low at the beginning, so that there was little need for an Engineer dump to be established.

c. However, as the Force advanced the need for Engineer supplies increased. The 596th A/B Engineer Company and the 887th A/B Engineer Company were required to repair roads, construct bridges and bypass blown bridges. This increased the demand for building materials. The 596th A/B Engineer Company established an Engineer dump in the vicinity of Valbonne on the 25th of August. The necessary building materials were obtained without much difficulty at the Beach Dumps, but the lack of transportation in this command made it very difficult to keep supplies on hand. Company "A" 40th Engineer Combat Regiment took over the dump on the 28th of August and because of organic transportation were able to meet demands for Engineer supplies.

4. Ordnance.

a. During the period 1 August to 15 August 1944, Detachment 3rd Ord. MM Company completed inspections of ordnance materiel in the hands of Task Force troops, made such [redacted] as were necessary, and handled ordnance supply. The latter function was considerably complicated by the 125 mile distance between troops and sources of supply in Naples. During this period twenty-five (25) enlisted men and two (2) officers were given glider training in anticipation of active operations.

b. The airborne portion of the ordnance detachment landed in France at approximately 1900 on D Day in seven (7) gliders, all in the same group and using the same landing zone. Four (4) 1/4-ton trucks and three (3) 1/4-ton trailers were used. Assembly was effected prior to darkness and there were no casualties. On the morning of D + 1 two of three organized contact parties joined the combat teams in their vicinity. The third was prevented from joining the third combat team because routes of approach were held by the enemy. This team was employed in salvaging equipment from wrecked gliders and in repairing captured enemy vehicles until D + 2, when it was able to carry out its original mission. Ammunition personnel operated distributing points near each of the two resupply drop zones.

c. On D + 4 the airborne detachment moved into a building and insofar as possible, carried out maintenance activities as a body.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. Ordnance. (Cont'd).

d. Sources of ammunition supply on the beaches were located and liaison was made with ordnance of higher headquarters. Shortages of equipment due to battle loss were tabulated and a demand for replacement was forwarded to higher headquarters. Since the quantities were in excess of stocks available on the beaches, the decision was made to fly most of the items from the aerial resupply base. This flight was finally made on D + 10 and was only about fifty percent (50%) complete. Such material as was received was segregated and immediately distributed to using units.

e. During the period 15 August to 1 September 1944 ordnance contact teams were in constant operation. This was particularly necessary during this period because of lack of unit transportation for evacuation of unserviceable material to the ordnance shop.

f. Ammunition supply during the period was in general satisfactory. The following expenditures of artillery ammunition were recorded:

155 mm howitzer, M1	1294 rds.
75 mm howitzer, pack	6875 rds.
3" S.P. gun	133 rds.

Due to lack of organic transportation with units, it was necessary to establish a task force ammunition distributing point on about D + 12. Personnel to operate the DP came from the Ordnance Detachment.

5. Quartermaster.

a. A Division Quartermaster Officer was assigned to the First Airborne Task Force on 1 August 1944, but no quartermaster company was provided. All units drew their supplies direct from base depots. This continued until D Day, 15th August 1944.

b. On the 15th and 16th August 1944 the Force was supplied by air on all classes of supplies. There was considerable difficulty encountered in reclaiming the supplies due to lack of transportation and personnel. In addition, the supplies were dropped over a wider area than anticipated. Consequently around sixty percent (60%) of the supplies were never reclaimed.

c. A Quartermaster Class I and III Dump was established at Le May, France, on the 17th of August 1944. At the time the dump was opened there was no Quartermaster personnel with the Force and labor was supplied from Headquarters Company, First Airborne Task Force. Transportation was borrowed from the Quartermaster of the 36th Division. The Class I supplies were inadequate. They were drawn from the beaches on the basis of one-half ration per day.

30

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

5. Quartermaster, (illegible)

a. On the 20th of August, the 339th Quartermaster Truck Company was equipped and transportation difficulties were relieved. The Quartermaster Dump was moved to a point four miles north of San Raphael. Class I supplies were still drawn on the basis of one-half ration per day. Allotment of gasoline drums from the beaches was inadequate to meet the existing transportation requirements for the Force.

b. On the 21st of August 1944 one (1) Officer and seventy-five (75) enlisted men from the 334th Quartermaster Depot Company (Aerial Resupply) reported to the Force to act in the capacity of an Airborne Quartermaster Company. Class I and III supplies were drawn from the beaches and issued daily to the units of the Force. The Quartermaster dump was moved to Valbonne, the evening of the 24th of August 1944. While at this location, Class I, II, III, and IV supplies were drawn from the beaches and issued daily to units of the Force. Considerable difficulty was encountered when drawing supplies from the beaches at this time. The reasons were that supplies arriving were not stable at any one beach to fill the daily requirements of the Force. There were no communications with the beaches, therefore it was necessary to have transportation go from one beach dump to another for supplies, to meet the requirements of the Force.

6. Signal.

a. Period 1 August 1944 - 15 August 1944 was spent in equipping units with proper communication equipment which would integrate in a Task Force communication plan. Since half of the units of the Task Force had never been organized or equipped for airborne operations, and part of the Task Force was British, considerable re-equipping was necessary. Considerable difficulty was met due to lack of authorization for such re-equipment and shortage of theater stocks of critical items. Numerous items were flown from Corsica and Oran by direct arrangement between this Headquarters and PTOAD. Some modifications of equipment was necessary in order to function in an airborne operation. Three radio sets SCR 499 were mounted on 1/4-ton trucks and trailers.

b. Considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining communication during period 15 August 1944 - 18 August 1944 due to losses of equipment from damage and scattering of dropped supplies. Contact was made with Beach Signal DP on 18 August 1944 and replacement batteries and wire secured.

c. Upon assignment of ground mission to this Force, immediate communication difficulties arose since airborne units are not prepared to lay and maintain amount of wire communication necessary for ground operations on a wide front, nor had amounts of signal supplies necessary for this type of operation been placed into Beach DP. A Task Force Signal DP was established by 512th Signal Company. As the period closed signal Supply situation had improved and most of critical equipment was on hand.

31.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION IV - PERSONNEL

SECRET

PERSONNEL STRENGTH STATUS

Unit	1 August 44				15 August 44				21 August 44			
	Assigned		Effective		Assigned		Effective		Assigned		Effective	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
517th Inf	166	1764	145	1344	139	1518	135	1213	138	1773	115	1537
509th Inf	44	696	43	644	46	697	41	664	41	629	30	411
550th Inf	30	587	30	552	25	576	24	538	26	589	27	510
551st Inf	46	809	46	780	41	809	38	730	43	664	43	683
Artillery	109	1974	107	1828	105	1611	103	1554	103	1611	89	1318
Others	77	844	89	1210	100	1573	109	1570	97	1185	94	1039
2d British Brigade	141	1912	134	1892	142	1916	136	1904				
1st SSF *									174	2929	150	2288
	585	8186	562	8345	612	9120	586	8563	632	9380	538	7786

*First Special Service Force was not assigned to 1st Airborne Task Force until 21 August 1944 when the 2nd Independent British Brigade was relieved.

LOSSES

	KIA		DOW		WOUNDED		SICK & INJURED		MISSING		TOTAL	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
517th Inf Regt	3	22	0	2	17	160	8	147	1	83	29	434
509th Inf Bn	3	25	0	2	8	82	1	19	1	30	13	148
550th Inf Bn	0	1	1	7	1	33	0	2	0	0	2	43
551st Inf Bn	0	11	0	1	2	73	1	19	0	3	3	107
Artillery	1	5	0	2	4	105	2	25	0	2	7	139
Others	0	8	0	1	6	71	3	42	0	0	9	122
1st SSF	1	19	1	2	6	114	10	254	0	0	18	389
TOTAL	8	91	2	17	44	638	25	508	2	108	81	1362

GAINS

	Return to Unit		Replacements Received	
	Off	EM	Off	EM
517th Inf Regt	6	109	0	50
509th Inf Bn	0	0	0	0
550th Inf Bn	0	0	0	0
551st Inf Bn	0	0	0	0
Artillery	1	12	0	0
Others	0	1	0	0
1st SSF	13	407	0	9
	20	529	12	261
			12	320

32

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECTION V - MEDICAL

The following report is a consolidated medical report for the First Airborne Task Force for the month of August, 1944.

A. Total admissions to Hospital for Month of Aug. 1086
1. Disease 435
2. Injury 112
3. Battle Casualty 539

B. Period 1 Aug 44 to 15 Aug 44 (Training period).
1. Admissions, all cases 182
2. Disease 110
Common respiratory disease 4
Vincentis angina 1
Common diarrhea 10
Dysentery, bacillary 15
F U O 36
Gonorrhea (new) 19
Other V D 5
3. Injuries 22
Fractures 11
Contusions 2
Sprains 6
Others 3
4. Battle Casualties 0
5. Hospital.
Cases during the training phase were sent to the 33rd General Hospital in Rome. Hospital facilities were not operated by the A/B TF during the period.

C. Period 15 Aug 44 to 31 Aug 44. (Combat).
1. Admissions, all cases 904
2. Disease 365
Common respiratory disease 23
Common diarrhea 25
Pneumonia, primary atypical 2
Dysentery, bacillary 1
Dysentery, amoebic 6
Malaria, acquired outside US 20
Hepatitis 4
Scabies 8
F U O 52
Gonorrhea 28
Other V D 15
Vincent [illegible]
3. Injuries 90
4. Battle Casualties 539

SECRET

- 1 -

33

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) Classification

Psychosis	12
Neurotic	28
Mental Deficiency	14
Neurologic	
Head	17
Spine	4
Nerves	1
Extremities	
Upper	134
Lower	247
Other	36
TOTAL	593

(d) Battle Casualties, Battle Duty

Bullets	
Unclassified	48
Rifle	76
Machine gun	44
High Explosives	
Unclassified	95
Rifle	45
Mine	22
Booby traps	5
Blast (concussion type injuries)	54
Glider casualties	148
TOTAL	537

D. Number of Patients admitted with multiple wounds 88

E. Number of Patients with self-inflicted wounds 1

F. Number Killed in Action 86

G. During the period from "D" to "D plus 5", many casualties were evacuated directly from units in the 1st A/B TF to the beaches by Port Battalions, the 36th and 45th Divisions.

H. Dental History. There is no dental surgeon assigned to this Task Force. This organization has never operated a clinic. Prior to August 22, only the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion had dental officers. Due to the pending operation these officers were acting as assistant surgeons for their units. However, an extensive program was carried on by all units to have necessary dental work accomplished. This work was completed by the 33rd General Hospital in Rome, Italy, prior to departure from Italy.

August 22 the Special Service Force was attached to the Airborne Task Force. They had two dental officers assigned to that organization.

SECRET

34

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

August 27, one platoon of the 638th Medical Clearing Company was attached to this Task Force. The dental surgeon of the Clearing Company submitted a negative report for the last three days of the month.

I. The following list of units with attached medical personnel were assigned to the First Airborne Task Force as of 1 August 1944.

1. 508 Parachute Infantary Battalion,
   551 Parachute Infantry Battalion,
   550 Airborne Infantry Battalion,
   517 Parachute Infantry Regiment,
   460 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion,
   [illegible] Parachute Field Artillery Battalion,
   80[illegible] Field Artillery Battalion.

2. The 6[illegible] Medical Collecting Company was attached to the Task Force to perform second echelon medical service in combat.

3. The 987 Field Artillery Battalion with attached medical personnel were attached to the First Airborne Task Force on the 21 August 1944.

4. The First Special Service Force with medical personnel were attached to the First Airborne Task Force on 22 August 1944.

5. The Headquarters Section and first platoon of 638 Clearing Company was attached to this Task Force on the 27 August 1944.

J. During the Airborne phase of the operations, the period "D" to "D plus 5", the following casualties were reported to the A/B TF Surgeon.

1.	Total casualties		300
	(a)	Killed in action	6
	(b)	Gunshot Wounds	40
	(c)	Shrapnel Wounds	28
	(d)	Fracture of Extremities	94
	(e)	Sprains	64
	(f)	Other injuries	70

2. Casualties classified as landing casualties due to parachute landings and glider crashes totalled 228. Of this total, 148 were classified as glider casualties, and 80 were parachute casualties.

3. Fifty-three glider pilots were reported as casualties due to glider crashes. Four deaths of glider pilots were reported due to glider landings.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

587.3069

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

6th Army Group

587.306A
20 JAN-9 FEB
1945

RETURN TO
RESEARCH STUDIES
INSTITUTE
U.S.A.F.
HISTORICAL DIVISION
ARCHIVES BRANCH

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

4340-644

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER VI

Reduction of the COLMAR Pocket

Part I Background and Logistics

II Photographs, Situation Maps

III I French Corps

IV II French Corps

V XXI U. S. Corps

VI Air Participation

VII Attack on Jebsheim (Typical small unit action)

VIII Enemy Order of Battle

IX Awards, Citations and Commendations

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The material from which the History of the Reduction of the Colmar Pocket was compiled was obtained from the following sources:

Part I - Public Relations Section, 6th Army Group; G-4, 6th Army Group.

Part II - Headquarters Historian, 6th Army Group

Part III - First French Army

Part IV - First French Army

Part V - XXI U. S. Corps

Part VI - 1st T.A.C.

Part VII - Seventh Army Historical Section

Part VIII - G-2, XXI U. S. Corps

Part IX - Public Relations Section, 6th Army Group

* * * * * *

Compiled and written by Sergeant Timothy ... Pasma, Press Department, Public Relations Section, 6th Army Group.

NOTE: Paragraph numbers have been omitted from this chapter and pages numbered beginning with Page 1 because it is a special chapter inserted between the regular January and February chapters.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Chapter VI

THE REDUCTION OF THE COLMAR POCKET

Part I - Background and Logistics

BACKGROUND:

The COLMAR Pocket, approximately 850 square miles, came into existance at the end of November 1944, when the 6th Army Group, commanded by Lt. General JACOB L. DEVERS, performed an outstanding military feat by fighting through the VOSGES Mountains in winter weather. At that time Lt. General ALEXANDER PATCH'S Seventh Army reached the RHINE at STRASBOURG and General de LATTRE DE TASSIGNY'S First French Army broke through the BELFORT GAP and advanced to the RHINE River beyond MULHOUSE. It was at first decided that the enemy forces left in the VOSGES Mountains and on the ALSACE plain would be dealt with by the First French Army, while the American Seventh Army turned north to attack the SIEGFRIED positions. However, the heavy officer casualties suffered by General de LATTRE's forces during the long drive from the MEDITERRANEAN up through FRANCE and in the BELFORT GAP fighting, combined with the worst weather in ten years, assisted the enemy in holding and reinforcing his bridgehead around COLMAR.

What should have been a straight and simple 70 mile front along the Rhine when the army boundary lay south of STRASBOURG became instead a winding, flooded and mountainous battle-line totaling 130 miles. The pocket was wiped out by an offensive whose most amazing factor was its starting date--the time when the full weight of the GERMAN offensive was hammering at the Americans in Northern ALSACE.

Eight enemy divisional formations had controlled approximately 15,000 combat effectives in the VOSGES pocket. Two divisions had been out of contact for sufficient time to be refitted with the replacements coming into the area from across the RHINE. Tanks had also been noted, with an increase in Jagdrpanzers. The relatively short interior lines of communications had permitted the enemy to mass his forces with extreme rapidity to meet attempted attacks by our forces. His position in the plain below the high slopes of the mountains and in the dense HARTH FOREST area made his intentions difficult to discern, with possibility of regrouping and attacking in any sector always a threat.

During the months of November, December, and the greater part of January, the Germans had steadily reinforced the pocket. It was growing then as an irritant to the American Seventh Army in Northern ALSACE, and when the enemy began his offensive New Year's Eve against the Seventh Army, he had hoped to catch us in a mighty pincer and destroy us or drive us backward into the VOSGES. That would have given him ALSACE and a great propaganda and psychological victory as well as a military one. So much did he want ALSACE that HEINRICH HIMMLER, Deputy Fuehrer of GERMANY had been directing the operations in the COLMAR Pocket. HIMMLER had made the boast that he would regain ALSACE and give STRASBOURG to HITLER for a gift on January 30th, the anniversary of the rise of National Socialism in GERMANY.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

General DEVERS' coordinated attack was launched January 20, 1945, by the French in the south and on the 23d by the Americans and French in the North. The strategy which he employed for wiping out the pocket was a double envelopment directed at the RHINE bridges in the BRISACH area.

The plan called for the French I Corps under the command of General BETHOUART to attack on the south flank on January 20th, with the main effort so directed as to cut the road net in the CERNAY-GUEBWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridges. The French II Corps under the command of General de MONTSABERT was to attack on the north flank on 22d of January, with the main effort between COLMAR and SELESTAT, by-passing COLMAR to the northeast and east, and exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridges.

The main effort on the north flank was taken over subsequently by the United States XXI Corps, commanded by Major General FRANK W. MILBURN. This corps contained the 3d, 28th, and 75th U. S. Infantry Divisions, and the 5th French Armored Division. Later, the 12th U. S. Armored and the 2d French Armored Divisions were also used in the XXI Corps zone.

In a previous plan, the offensive was to have begun in the middle of February, employing the same strategy. However, it was decided to begin earlier, in view of weather and terrain conditions that would have made the operation a great deal more difficult if begun later on. The innumerable streams and small rivers traversing the Alsacian Plain, where most of the fighting would take place, are generally at their lowest stage toward the end of January. The earlier part of February has less rain, is less cold and is slightly less cloudy than in January. Therefore it was imperative to begin operations as soon as possible, before the plain became a vast quagmire that would bog down the contemplated swift reduction of the pocket.

SUPPLY:

When the tactical decision was reached to mount and carry out the operation to eliminate the COLMAR Pocket, supply objectives were of equal importance to the tactical considerations. 6th Army Group was faced with the problem of diminishing reserves in January and numerous shortages in such items as field wire, ammunition, radios, tanks, and combat vehicles which were beginning to curtail the operations of front line troops. While the COLMAR pocket existed, it not only constituted a threat to our line of communication to the north, but it took the entire First French Army plus the 3d American Infantry Division to contain it. The attrition in equipment and supplies belonging to these forces at a time when the entire Army Group was attempting to conserve supplies so that the offensive might be resumed, was out of proportion to the forces opposed and the mission at hand.

Because of the large number of streams and canals in the terrain to be covered and the expected high water stage of many of these streams, the amount of bridging equipment required was considerable. Despite the fact that nearly all Engineer troops were engaged in constructing fortification works, the French Army, in the week directly preceding the COLMAR operation, removed all possible Bailey Bridges in their area and replaced them with timber bridges. Twenty standard fixed Bailey Bridges were assembled in this manner for the operation. In addition, the 998th Treadway Bridge Company was secured from the 3d Army to assist the French 2d Armored Division

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and the American units attacking from the North. All T/E floating bridge equipment was used to the fullest extent. As the operation developed, ten additional Bailey Bridge sets were made available from CONAD and four units of M-2 Treadway Bridge from a reserve held by Seventh Army.

AMMUNITION:

Ammunition expenditures during the operation were extremely heavy, especially in French units during the first few days of the action. While exact figures on actual rounds fired per weapon are not available, on 26 January the First French Army sent an urgent message requesting additional ammunition be allocated to them. This message included figures which indicated that the average daily expenditure of 105mm Howitzer, M2, and 155mm Howitzer ammunition for the first six days of the attack had been 105 rounds and 58 rounds respectively. The amounts requested were released from stocks already available in First French Army ASP's with the admonition that high expenditures of artillery ammunition without appreciable gain in ground were not warranted and should be reduced.

The tabulation shown on the opposite page shows the number of gun days of the French and American Forces engaged from 17 January to 9 February, the number of rounds issued from Army ASP's to these forces during the period, and the average number of rounds per weapon per day issued to troops. The last column of the tabulation shows the SHAEF maintenance rate for each weapon for comparison. The date of 17 January is used to include three days build-up before the start of the operation. The combined forces were issued approximately 24000 long tons of mortar and artillery ammunition alone, exclusive of small arms, grenades, mines, etc. during the period.

Only one special item of equipment was furnished 1st French Army for the operation. 400 "R" Type Drifting Contact Mines, for use in mining the RHINE River were secured from British sources through SHAEF and were delivered to First French Army by air at the start of the operation. These mines were to be used against pontoon bridges, barges and other targets. It is definitely known that 200 were launched but their degree of effectiveness has not yet been determined.

ORDNANCE

Investigation revealed that just prior to the opening of the offensive only 61% of the authorized armored vehicle strength of the 5th DB was effective. As an emergency measure both vehicles and spare parts were shipped to the 5th DB against actual deficiency lists from all sources available to SOLOC. By 22 January 10% of Division Armored vehicle strength was either in transit to them or had already been resupplied. This pipe line of vehicles and a correspondingly large supply of spare parts continued throughout the operation. The 5th DB was thus enabled to maintain itself at effective strength and to contribute to the success of this operation as an effective fighting unit.

QUARTERMASTER:

During the mounting period for the operation, and in order that the troops would be properly equipped, it was necessary to issue certain items of equipment and clothing from Seventh Army reserve maintenance stocks to

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

fill the shortages of arriving new units. 8,000 pair trousers, cotton field, OD, were allocated to the 28th Division and the same quantity to the 75th Division.

Due to the attachment of the above divisions and supporting service troops, the Seventh Army stocks of American Type "B" rations were almost exhausted. Reserve Army stocks continued to remain at low levels until truck transportation from CONAD was used to supplement the overloaded railways.

The reserve supply of gasoline in the First French Army was reduced to one days supply on hand as of 20 January 1945. Reason for such a low level of gasoline at this time was due to rail transportation difficulties. It was necessary to establish sufficient reserve stocks of gasoline in the forward dumps to support the operations during the closing of the COLMAR pocket, and a redistribution of stocks on hand in the army as well as emergency shipments from the base had to be made. Complete reserve stocks required on the northern flank had to be moved to the area around ST. DIE during the first days of the operation. To accomplish this, CONAD was required to draw upon its reserve stocks in the DIJON area and make emergency shipment by truck overland. It was not until about the 3d day of the operation that Class III supply for the operation was assured and secure. This condition arose due to delay on the part of Army in requesting Class III shipments to this area, and due to delays in redistributing Army reserves on hand.

As an operational emergency existed it was necessary to issue equipment for 500 snowshoe-men and 100 skiers on the 11th of January to the 3d Division which was attached to the First French Army and was operating in mountainous snow-covered terrain. On the 22d of January 1945 it was necessary to issue 300 pair Mersey lined trousers to the First French Army. 1000 pair of snowshoes were issued to the 28th Division on 24 January 1945. The above equipment was issued from operational reserve stocks of 6th Army Group, and held in depots at CONAD. The required quantities of Ice Creepers were not available from theater stocks and 3500 pair were manufactured by local concerns.

EVACUATION:

Although the U. S. XXI Corps was attached to the First French Army for this operation, the medical support for the Corps remained the responsibility of the Seventh Army. To accomplish the task, three platoons of the 11th Field Hospital were dispatched to operate in the vicinity of division clearing stations for care of non-transportables, the 188th Medical Battalion was attached to the Corps for medical service of Corps Troops, and the 56th Medical Battalion with collecting, clearing and ambulance companies attached provided the Army evacuation service. Hospitalization service was provided by the 51st Evacuation Hospital at ST. DIE, the 9th at RAMBERVILLERS, and the 27th at BACCARAT. These hospitals were already in proper position to support the XXI Corps.

In order to provide medical service for the II French Corps, the First French Army moved to the north flank the 2d and 3d Mobile Surgical Formation, Provisional Surgical Group No. 1, 45 1/3 Medical Depot, and the 442d Field Hospital.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0188

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

During this offensive, the First French Army experienced its highest casualty rate to date. Admissions of battle casualties to Army hospitals exceeded 1,000 per day on five separate days. The total for the period amounted to 10,034.

XXI Corps suffered the following casualties:

Killed in Action.....	493
Total Battle Casualties.....	3,467
Disease.....	2,788
Injury.....	1,699
Total Casualties	7,954*

* Figures approximate.

The deep snow and freezing temperatures in the VOSGES Mountains had a noticeable effect upon the health of the command. In the First French Army the sick rate increased from .743 per thousand per day to 1.343 per thousand per day. A marked increase in the number of trench foot cases occurred during the first week. In the Seventh Army, the sick rate showed no appreciable variation from previous weeks.

The bed status of the French hospitals was not satisfactory because of a failure to evacuate excess patients from Army hospitals in preparation for the offensive even though hospital trains were awaiting call. About the time the offensive was launched, the First French Army decided to move the 413th and 414th evacuation hospitals. This resulted in creation of a critical temporary shortage of hospital beds in the Army at a time when they were most needed. When all French Evacuation Hospitals were filled, approximately 500 French patients were admitted to the 46th U. S. General Hospital as an emergency measure. The emergency was relieved only upon completion of the tactical operation. Hospitalization produced no unusual difficulties in the Seventh Army.

Evacuation taking place forward of the Army rear boundaries was accomplished by ambulances. Patients evacuated to the rear of the Armies were transported by hospital trains from railheads at SARREBOURG for Seventh Army and SHIRMECK and BESANCON for First French Army. Although the severe weather reduced the tempo of the evacuation in both Armies, all casualties were adequately cared for.

An evacuation bottleneck was created in First French Army due to failure to increase the evacuation rate from Army to Territorial hospitals during the heavy casualty period. Only one hospital train was called forward daily to BESANCON even though an average of 3 or 4 train loads were always awaiting evacuation. In this connection, the impetus for such evacuation originates with First French Army and not CONAD. This situation has developed by mutual agreement between the First French Army and the French War Department.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TROOPS: *

To bolster the troop strength of the 6th Army Group and to assist the COLMAR offensive SHAEF transferred five U. S. divisions to the Seventh Army and later attached approximately 12,000 service troops for support of the new divisions.

As operations developed with the attendant lengthening of supply and evacuation lines, and increased maintenance problems, it also became necessary to secure additional service units for the First French Army. Accordingly, the 901st French Base was contacted and every possible unit that could be spared was moved into the First French Army area.

COMMUNICATION:

For the XXI Corps main supply routes were established to extend from dumps in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE-EPINAL on highways leading south and east to ST. DIE. At ST. DIE the main French supply route from BRUYERES North and East to ST. BLAISE and SCHIRMECK was crossed. From ST. DIE toward the front, two main supply routes were used: ST. DIE - ST. MARIE AUX MINES - RIBEAUVILLE, and ST. DIE - FRAISE - KAYSERBERG.

As the attack progressed, the 28th Infantry Division and the 12th Armored Division on the right of XXI Corps were supplied from ST. DIE by way of FRAISE and KAYSERBERG to the vicinity of COLMAR; while the 3d Infantry Division and 75th Infantry Division on the left of XXI Corps were supplied from ST. DIE by way of ST. MARIE AUX MINES and RIBEAUVILLE to the vicinity of NEUF BRISACH.

Severe snow storms occurred before and during the operation which handicapped both troop movements and supply to a great extent, particularly in the mountains. Troop movements and supply moves were successfully completed by means of the greatest exertion on the part of truck units and Engineers to clear snow and ice from the roads.

In order to place them in position on the North side of the pocket to support the First DMI when their attack bogged down, the 126th French Infantry Regiment was transported from ROUGEMONT to MOLSHEIM by U. S. trucks in the emergency. This move was conducted with great speed and secrecy with trucks furnished by Seventh Army and the 6th Army Group between 30 January and 1 February 1945.

French supply was conducted over three main supply routes from dumps in separate locations: from CLERVAL, BAUME LES DAMES, CREVENCY and RONCHAMP by way of BELFORT and MULHOUSE; from BRUYERES by way of ST. DIE to ST. BLAISE: and from MOLSHEIM to SELESTAT.

The general locations of the various supply routes involved are shown on the map opposite this page.

* XXI Corps Troop List follows the account of its operations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Item	FRENCH FORCES Gun Days 17 Jan-9 Feb	Rds Expended 17 Jan-9 Feb	R/G/D	AMERICAN FORCES Gun Days 17 Jan-9 Feb	Rds Expended 17 Jan-9 Feb	R/G/D	TOTAL FORCES Gun Days 17 Jan-9 Feb	Rds Expended 17 Jan-9 Feb	R/G/D	SPARE RATE R/G/D
155mm Gun	1728	20055	11.6	0	0	0.0	1728	20055	11.6	15.1
8" Gun	0	0	0.0	18	300	16.6	18	300	16.6	11.9
8" How	288	2486	8.6	288	2130	7.4	576	4616	8.0	5.5
240mm How	0	0	0.0	54	324	6.0	54	324	6.0	4.5
m AA Gun	0	0	0.0	1152	1270	1.1	1152	1270	1.1	-
40mm AA Gun	12288	3344	.27	2368	724	.3	14656	4068	.28	-
3" Gun	5184	14563	2.8	3096	6656	2.1	8280	21219	2.56	19.0
90mm Gun	2304	16448	7.1	0	0	0.0	2304	16448	7.1	6.5
37mm T & AT Gun	14376	3400	.24	5940	5120	.86	20316	8520	.42	-
57mm AT Gun	13344	1473	.11	5910	2598	.44	19254	4071	.21	4.3
75mm Gun	8352	10254	1.2	5894	10860	1.8	14246	21114	1.5	6.9
75mm How	3960	14740	3.7	1308	8185	6.2	5268	22925	4.4	27.7
m Gun	0	0	0.0	1270	7488	5.9	1270	7488	5.9	13.4
105mm How M2	6912	252871	36.6	4876	178953	36.7	11788	431824	36.6	30.0
105mm How M3	2160	25016	11.6	1116	26480	23.7	3276	51424	15.7	19.7
155mm How 17-18 & M1	3744	76582	20.5	1320	36732	27.8	5064	113314	22.4	23.2
4.5" Gun	0	0	0.0	288	11450	39.7	288	11450	39.7	17.2
60mm Mortar	17400	30741	1.8	7524	27214	3.6	24924	57955	2.4	4.76
81mm Mortar	10224	79167	7.7	5082	44021	8.7	15306	123118	8.0	11.2

0203


SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP
6 FEB. 1945
TIME: 1330A
SOUTH FLANK ONLY
KILOMETRES
MILES
ST DIE
LINE YESTERDAY
BOMB LINE
NOV 14
GERMANY
V
VI
VII
VIII
XV
XXI
XXII
XXIV
XXXIII
XXXIV
XXXV
XXXVI
XXXVII
XXXVIII
XXXIX
XLII
XLIII
XLIV
XLV
XLVI
XLVII
XLVIII
LIII
LIV
LV
LVI
LVII
LVIII
LIX
LX
LXI
LXII
LXIII
LXIV
LXV
LXVI
LXVII
LXVIII
LXIX
LXX
LXXI
LXXII
LXXIII
LXXIV
LXXV
LXXVI
LXXVII
LXXVIII
LXXIX
LXXX
LXXXI
LXXXII
LXXXIII
LXXXIV
LXXXV
LXXXVI
LXXXVII
LXXXVIII
LXXXIX
XC
XCI
XCII
XCIII
XCIV
XCV
XCVI
XCVII
XCVIII
XCIX
C
CI
CII
CIII
CIV
CV
CVI
CVII
CVIII
CIX
CX
CXI
CXII
CXIII
CXIV
CXV
CXVI
CXVII
CXVIII
CXIX
CXX
CXXI
CXXII
CXXIII
CXXIV
CXXV
CXXVI
CXXVII
CXXVIII
CXXIX
CXXX
CXXXI
CXXXII
CXXXIII
CXXXIV
CXXXV
CXXXVI
CXXXVII
CXXXVIII
CXXXIX
CXL
CXLI
CXLII
CXLIII
CXLIV
CXLV
CXLVI
CXLVII
CXLVIII
CXLIX
CL
CLI
CLII
CLIII
CLIV
CLV
CLVI
CLVII
CLVIII
CLIX
CLX
CLXI
CLXII
CLXIII
CLXIV
CLXV
CLXVI
CLXVII
CLXVIII
CLXIX
CLXX
CLXXI
CLXXII
CLXXIII
CLXXIV
CLXXV
CLXXVI
CLXXVII
CLXXVIII
CLXXIX
CLXXX
CLXXXI
CLXXXII
CLXXXIII
CLXXXIV
CLXXXV
CLXXXVI
CLXXXVII
CLXXXVIII
CLXXXIX
CXC
CXCI
CXCII
CXCIII
CXCIV
CXCV
CXCVI
CXCVII
CXCVIII
CXCIX
CC
CCI
CCII
CCIII
CCIV
CCV
CCVI
CCVII
CCVIII
CCIX
CCX
CCXI
CCXII
CCXIII
CCXIV
CCXV
CCXVI
CCXVII
CCXVIII
CCXIX
CCXX
CCXXI
CCXXII
CCXXIII
CCXXIV
CCXXV
CCXXVI
CCXXVII
CCXXVIII
CCXXIX
CCXXX
CCXXXI
CCXXXII
CCXXXIII
CCXXXIV
CCXXXV
CCXXXVI
CCXXXVII
CCXXXVIII
CCXXXIX
CCXL
CCXLI
CCXLII
CCXLIII
CCXLIV
CCXLV
CCXLVI
CCXLVII
CCXLVIII
CCXLIX
CCL
CCLI
CCLII
CCLIII
CCLIV
CCLV
CCLVI
CCLVII
CCLVIII
CCLIX
CCLX
CCLXI
CCLXII
CCLXIII
CCLXIV
CCLXV
CCLXVI
CCLXVII
CCLXVIII
CCLXIX
CCLXX
CCLXXI
CCLXXII
CCLXXIII
CCLXXIV
CCLXXV
CCLXXVI
CCLXXVII
CCLXXVIII
CCLXXIX
CCLXXX
CCLXXXI
CCLXXXII
CCLXXXIII
CCLXXXIV
CCLXXXV
CCLXXXVI
CCLXXXVII
CCLXXXVIII
CCLXXXIX
CCXC
CCXCI
CCXCII
CCXCIII
CCXCIV
CCXCV
CCXCVI
CCXCVII
CCXCVIII
CCXCIX
CCC
CCCI
CCCII
CCCIII
CCCIV
CCCV
CCCVI
CCCVII
CCCVIII
CCCIX
CCCX
CCCXI
CCCXII
CCCXIII
CCCXIV
CCCXV
CCCXVI
CCCXVII
CCCXVIII
CCCXIX
CCCXX
CCCXXI
CCCXXII
CCCXXIII
CCCXXIV
CCCXXV
CCCXXVI
CCCXXVII
CCCXXVIII
CCCXXIX
CCCXXX
CCCXXXI
CCCXXXII
CCCXXXIII
CCCXXXIV
CCCXXXV
CCCXXXVI
CCCXXXVII
CCCXXXVIII
CCCXXXIX
CCCXL
CCCXLI
CCCXLII
CCCXLIII
CCCXLIV
CCCXLV
CCCXLVI
CCCXLVII
CCCXLVIII
CCCXLIX
CCCL
CCCLI
CCCLII
CCCLIII
CCCLIV
CCCLV
CCCLVI
CCCLVII
CCCLVIII
CCCLIX
CCCLX
CCCLXI
CCCLXII
CCCLXIII
CCCLXIV
CCCLXV
CCCLXVI
CCCLXVII
CCCLXVIII
CCCLXIX
CCCLXX
CCCLXXI
CCCLXXII
CCCLXXIII
CCCLXXIV
CCCLXXV
CCCLXXVI
CCCLXXVII
CCCLXXVIII
CCCLXXIX
CCCLXXX
CCCLXXXI
CCCLXXXII
CCCLXXXIII
CCCLXXXIV
CCCLXXXV
CCCLXXXVI
CCCLXXXVII
CCCLXXXVIII
CCCLXXXIX
CCCXC
CCCXCI
CCCXCII
CCCXCIII
CCCXCIV
CCCXCV
CCCXCVI
CCCXCVII
CCCXCVIII
CCCXCIX
CD
CDI
CDII
CDIII
CDIV
CDV
CDVI
CDVII
CDVIII
CDIX
CDX
CDXI
CDXII
CDXIII
CDXIV
CDXV
CDXVI
CDXVII
CDXVIII
CDXIX
CDXX
CDXXI
CDXXII
CDXXIII
CDXXIV
CDXXV
CDXXVI
CDXXVII
CDXXVIII
CDXXIX
CDXXX
CDXXXI
CDXXXII
CDXXXIII
CDXXXIV
CDXXXV
CDXXXVI
CDXXXVII
CDXXXVIII
CDXXXIX
CDXL
CDXLI
CDXLII
CDXLIII
CDXLIV
CDXLV
CDXLVI
CDXLVII
CDXLVIII
CDXLIX
CDL
CDLI
CDLII
CDLIII
CDLIV
CDLV
CDLVI
CDLVII
CDLVIII
CDLIX
CDLX
CDLXI
CDLXII
CDLXIII
CDLXIV
CDLXV
CDLXVI
CDLXVII
CDLXVIII
CDLXIX
CDLXX
CDLXXI
CDLXXII
CDLXXIII
CDLXXIV
CDLXXV
CDLXXVI
CDLXXVII
CDLXXVIII
CDLXXIX
CDLXXX
CDLXXXI
CDLXXXII
CDLXXXIII
CDLXXXIV
CDLXXXV
CDLXXXVI
CDLXXXVII
CDLXXXVIII
CDLXXXIX
CDXC
CDXCI
CDXCII
CDXCIII
CDXCIV
CDXCV
CDXCVI
CDXCVII
CDXCVIII
CDXCIX
D
DI
DII
DIII
DIV
DV
DVI
DVII
DVIII
DIX
DX
DXI
DXII
DXIII
DXIV
DXV
DXVI
DXVII
DXVIII
DXIX
DXX
DXXI
DXXII
DXXIII
DXXIV
DXXV
DXXVI
DXXVII
DXXVIII
DXXIX
DXXX
DXXXI
DXXXII
DXXXIII
DXXXIV
DXXXV
DXXXVI
DXXXVII
DXXXVIII
DXXXIX
DXL
DXLI
DXLII
DXLIII
DXLIV
DXLV
DXLVI
DXLVII
DXLVIII
DXLIX
DL
DLI
DLII
DLIII
DLIV
DLV
DLVI
DLVII
DLVIII
DLIX
DLX
DLXI
DLXII
DLXIII
DLXIV
DLXV
DLXVI
DLXVII
DLXVIII
DLXIX
DLXX
DLXXI
DLXXII
DLXXIII
DLXXIV
DLXXV
DLXXVI
DLXXVII
DLXXVIII
DLXXIX
DLXXX
DLXXXI
DLXXXII
DLXXXIII
DLXXXIV
DLXXXV
DLXXXVI
DLXXXVII
DLXXXVIII
DLXXXIX
DXC
DXCI
DXCII
DXCIII
DXCIV
DXCV
DXCVI
DXCVII
DXCVIII
DXCIX
DC
DCI
DCII
DCIII
DCIV
DCV
DCVI
DCVII
DCVIII
DCIX
DCX
DCXI
DCXII
DCXIII
DCXIV
DCXV
DCXVI
DCXVII
DCXVIII
DCXIX
DCXX
DCXXI
DCXXII
DCXXIII
DCXXIV
DCXXV
DCXXVI
DCXXVII
DCXXVIII
DCXXIX
DCXXX
DCXXXI
DCXXXII
DCXXXIII
DCXXXIV
DCXXXV
DCXXXVI
DCXXXVII
DCXXXVIII
DCXXXIX
DCXL
DCXLI
DCXLII
DCXLIII
DCXLIV
DCXLV
DCXLVI
DCXLVII
DCXLVIII
DCXLIX
DCL
DCLI
DCLII
DCLIII
DCLIV
DCLV
DCLVI
DCLVII
DCLVIII
DCLIX
DCLX
DCLXI
DCLXII
DCLXIII
DCLXIV
DCLXV
DCLXVI
DCLXVII
DCLXVIII
DCLXIX
DCLXX
DCLXXI
DCLXXII
DCLXXIII
DCLXXIV
DCLXXV
DCLXXVI
DCLXXVII
DCLXXVIII
DCLXXIX
DCLXXX
DCLXXXI
DCLXXXII
DCLXXXIII
DCLXXXIV
DCLXXXV
DCLXXXVI
DCLXXXVII
DCLXXXVIII
DCLXXXIX
DCXC
DCXCI
DCXCII
DCXCIII
DCXCIV
DCXCV
DCXCVI
DCXCVII
DCXCVIII
DCXCIX
DCC
DCCI
DCCII
DCCIII
DCCIV
DCCV
DCCVI
DCCVII
DCCVIII
DCCIX
DCCX
DCCXI
DCCXII
DCCXIII
DCCXIV
DCCXV
DCCXVI
DCCXVII
DCCXVIII
DCCXIX
DCCXX
DCCXXI
DCCXXII
DCCXXIII
DCCXXIV
DCCXXV
DCCXXVI
DCCXXVII
DCCXXVIII
DCCXXIX
DCCXXX
DCCXXXI
DCCXXXII
DCCXXXIII
DCCXXXIV
DCCXXXV
DCCXXXVI
DCCXXXVII
DCCXXXVIII
DCCXXXIX
DCCXL
DCCXLI
DCCXLII
DCCXLIII
DCCXLIV
DCCXLV
DCCXLVI
DCCXLVII
DCCXLVIII
DCCXLIX
DCCL
DCCLI
DCCLII
DCCLIII
DCCLIV
DCCLV
DCCLVI
DCCLVII
DCCLVIII
DCCLIX
DCCLX
DCCLXI
DCCLXII
DCCLXIII
DCCLXIV
DCCLXV
DCCLXVI
DCCLXVII
DCCLXVIII
DCCLXIX
DCCLXX
DCCLXXI
DCCLXXII
DCCLXXIII
DCCLXXIV
DCCLXXV
DCCLXXVI
DCCLXXVII
DCCLXXVIII
DCCLXXIX
DCCLXXX
DCCLXXXI
DCCLXXXII
DCCLXXXIII
DCCLXXXIV
DCCLXXXV
DCCLXXXVI
DCCLXXXVII
DCCLXXXVIII
DCCLXXXIX
DCCXC
DCCXCI
DCCXCII
DCCXCIII
DCCXCIV
DCCXCV
DCCXCVI
DCCXCVII
DCCXCVIII
DCCXCIX
DCCC
DCCCI
DCCCII
DCCCIII
DCCCIV
DCCCV
DCCCVI
DCCCVII
DCCCVIII
DCCCIX
DCCCX
DCCCXI
DCCCXII
DCCCXIII
DCCCXIV
DCCCXV
DCCCXVI
DCCCXVII
DCCCXVIII
DCCCXIX
DCCCXX
DCCCXXI
DCCCXXII
DCCCXXIII
DCCCXXIV
DCCCXXV
DCCCXXVI
DCCCXXVII
DCCCXXVIII
DCCCXXIX
DCCCXXX
DCCCXXXI
DCCCXXXII
DCCCXXXIII
DCCCXXXIV
DCCCXXXV
DCCCXXXVI
DCCCXXXVII
DCCCXXXVIII
DCCCXXXIX
DCCCXL
DCCCXLI
DCCCXLII
DCCCXLIII
DCCCXLIV
DCCCXLV
DCCCXLVI
DCCCXLVII
DCCCXLVIII
DCCCXLIX
DCCCL
DCCCLI
DCCCLII
DCCCLIII
DCCCLIV
DCCCLV
DCCCLVI
DCCCLVII
DCCCLVIII
DCCCLIX
DCCCLX
DCCCLXI
DCCCLXII
DCCCLXIII
DCCCLXIV
DCCCLXV
DCCCLXVI
DCCCLXVII
DCCCLXVIII
DCCCLXIX
DCCCLXX
DCCCLXXI
DCCCLXXII
DCCCLXXIII
DCCCLXXIV
DCCCLXXV
DCCCLXXVI
DCCCLXXVII
DCCCLXXVIII
DCCCLXXIX
DCCCLXXX
DCCCLXXXI
DCCCLXXXII
DCCCLXXXIII
DCCCLXXXIV
DCCCLXXXV
DCCCLXXXVI
DCCCLXXXVII
DCCCLXXXVIII
DCCCLXXXIX
DCCCXC
DCCCXCI
DCCCXCII
DCCCXCIII
DCCCXCIV
DCCCXCV
DCCCXCVI
DCCCXCVII
DCCCXCVIII
DCCCXCIX
CM
CMI
CMII
CMIII
CMIV
CMV
CMVI
CMVII
CMVIII
CMIX
CMX
CMXI
CMXII
CMXIII
CMXIV
CMXV
CMXVI
CMXVII
CMXVIII
CMXIX
CMXX
CMXXI
CMXXII
CMXXIII
CMXXIV
CMXXV
CMXXVI
CMXXVII
CMXXVIII
CMXXIX
CMXXX
CMXXXI
CMXXXII
CMXXXIII
CMXXXIV
CMXXXV
CMXXXVI
CMXXXVII
CMXXXVIII
CMXXXIX
CMXL
CMXLI
CMXLII
CMXLIII
CMXLIV
CMXLV
CMXLVI
CMXLVII
CMXLVIII
CMXLIX
CML
CMLI
CMLII
CMLIII
CMLIV
CMLV
CMLVI
CMLVII
CMLVIII
CMLIX
CMLX
CMLXI
CMLXII
CMLXIII
CMLXIV
CMLXV
CMLXVI
CMLXVII
CMLXVIII
CMLXIX
CMLXX
CMLXXI
CMLXXII
CMLXXIII
CMLXXIV
CMLXXV
CMLXXVI
CMLXXVII
CMLXXVIII
CMLXXIX
CMLXXX
CMLXXXI
CMLXXXII
CMLXXXIII
CMLXXXIV
CMLXXXV
CMLXXXVI
CMLXXXVII
CMLXXXVIII
CMLXXXIX
CMXC
CMXCI
CMXCII
CMXCIII
CMXCIV
CMXCV
CMXCVI
CMXCVII
CMXCVIII
CMXCIX
MC
MCI
MCII
MCIII
MCIV
MCV
MCVI
MCVII
MCVIII
MCIX
MCX
MCXI
MCXII
MCXIII
MCXIV
MCXV
MCXVI
MCXVII
MCXVIII
MCXIX
MCXX
MCXXI
MCXXII
MCXXIII
MCXXIV
MCXXV
MCXXVI
MCXXVII
MCXXVIII
MCXXIX
MCXXX
MCXXXI
MCXXXII
MCXXXIII
MCXXXIV
MCXXXV
MCXXXVI
MCXXXVII
MCXXXVIII
MCXXXIX
MCXL
MCXLI
MCXLII
MCXLIII
MCXLIV
MCXLV
MCXLVI
MCXLVII
MCXLVIII
MCXLIX
MCL
MCLI
MCLII
MCLIII
MCLIV
MCLV
MCLVI
MCLVII
MCLVIII
MCLIX
MCLX
MCLXI
MCLXII
MCLXIII
MCLXIV
MCLXV
MCLXVI
MCLXVII
MCLXVIII
MCLXIX
MCLXX
MCLXXI
MCLXXII
MCLXXIII
MCLXXIV
MCLXXV
MCLXXVI
MCLXXVII
MCLXXVIII
MCLXXIX
MCLXXX
MCLXXXI
MCLXXXII
MCLXXXIII
MCLXXXIV
MCLXXXV
MCLXXXVI
MCLXXXVII
MCLXXXVIII
MCLXXXIX
MCXC
MCXCI
MCXCII
MCXCIII
MCXCIV
MCXCV
MCXCVI
MCXCVII
MCXCVIII
MCXCIX
MM
MMI
MMII
MMIII
MMIV
MMV
MMVI
MMVII
MMVIII
MMIX
MMX
MMXI
MMXII
MMXIII
MMXIV
MMXV
MMXVI
MMXVII
MMXVIII
MMXIX
MMXX
MMXXI
MMXXII
MMXXIII
MMXXIV
MMXXV
MMXXVI
MMXXVII
MMXXVIII
MMXXIX
MMXXX
MMXXXI
MMXXXII
MMXXXIII
MMXXXIV
MMXXXV
MMXXXVI
MMXXXVII
MMXXXVIII
MMXXXIX
MMXL
MMXLI
MMXLII
MMXLIII
MMXLIV
MMXLV
MMXLVI
MMXLVII
MMXLVIII
MMXLIX
MML
MMLI
MMLII
MMLIII
MMLIV
MMLV
MMLVI
MMLVII
MMLVIII
MMLIX
MMLX
MMLXI
MMLXII
MMLXIII
MMLXIV
MMLXV
MMLXVI
MMLXVII
MMLXVIII
MMLXIX
MMLXX
MMLXXI
MMLXXII
MMLXXIII
MMLXXIV
MMLXXV
MMLXXVI
MMLXXVII
MMLXXVIII
MMLXXIX
MMLXXX
MMLXXXI
MMLXXXII
MMLXXXIII
MMLXXXIV
MMLXXXV
MMLXXXVI
MMLXXXVII
MMLXXXVIII
MMLXXXIX
MMXC
MMXCI
MMXCII
MMXCIII
MMXCIV
MMXCV
MMXCVI
MMXCVII
MMXCVIII
MMXCIX

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART III

Participation of the French I Corps

THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH BY I FRENCH CORPS

The First French Army's offensive, ordered by General de LATTRE for the reduction of the COLMAR pocket, was launched in the South by I French Corps on 20 January 1945, and in the north by II French Corps on 23 January.

The offensive of the I Corps consisted of three basic phases:

First Phase: (20 January to 3 February)

THE BREAKTHROUGH

This occurred south of the THUR River, between CERNAY and ENSISHEIM.

Second Phase: (4th and 5th of February)

THE PUSH NORTHWARD

To aid the United States XXI Corps coming down from COLMAR, and for a junction of the two Corps on the 5th of February at ROUFFACH, completing the encirclement of enemy elements still holding out in the VOSGES Mountains.

Third Phase: (6th to the 9th of February)

THE PUSH TURNS EASTWARD

To drive the enemy across the RHINE River and to establish positions along the river.

First Phase

THE BREAKTHROUGH

(20 January - 3 February)

The offensive of the I French Corps, as it was initially conceived, consisted basically of a crushing attack in depth to break through enemy dispositions. The surprise attack was to be launched with all the means at its disposal and along a narrow front. By throwing a quick blow on the CERNAY - ENSISHEIM axis, the I Corps hoped to establish a bridgehead across the ILL River between ENSISHEIM and MUNTZHEIM before the enemy recovered, to pave the way for an armored thrust in the direction of NEUF BRISACH.

Protection for this main action from the corridor between the VOSGES Mountains and the ILL River would be accomplished by establishing a large bridgehead North of the THUR River. Protection from the sector opposite the HARTH Forest would be brought about by reducing the defenses of the NONNENBRUCH Woods and strong points North of MULHOUSE by pivoting

0208

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

elements of the I Corps upon ILE NAPOLEON on the ILL River, from MULHOUSE to ENSISHEIM. With the breakthrough and the ILL River crossings at ENSISHEIM successfully completed, exploitation would be undertaken in force in the direction of NEUF BRISACH, to secure crossing points and to contact the II French Corps coming down from the North.

The I French Corps' overall strength was as follows: the three attacking divisions, from East to West (THAN to MULHOUSE) were the 4th MOROCCAN Mountain Division (4th DMM), the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division (2d DIM) and the 9th Algerian Infantry Division (9th DIC), reinforced by armor from the 1st French Armored Division (1st DB). In Corps reserve was the 1st DB (less elements supporting the attack divisions, and the 2d and 8th Dragoons).

The breakthrough was to be effected on the Corps left between the AMSELKOPF (heights North of VIEUX THANN) and the CERNAY Insane Asylum, by the 4th DMM and the 2d DIM. The 2d DIM would attack on the WITTELSHEIM - ENSISHEIM axis, and the 4th DMM on the UFFHOLTZ - REGUISHEIM axis.

After attacking ILE NAPOLEON and pivoting upon that point, the 9th DIC would be able to establish itself upon the ILL River to the right of 2d DIM, between ENSISHEIM and MULHOUSE.

Subsequent exploitation in the direction of NEUF BRISACH was to be assigned to the 1st DB, reinforced by artillery and supported by the 2d DIM.

THE ATTACK

20 January:

After an artillery preparation which lasted for 30 minutes, the attack began. At 0745 the 9th DIC jumped off and ten minutes later, the 4th DMM and the 2d DIM followed. The weather was extremely unfavorable, although the snow storm at that time undoubtedly helped to achieve the desired surprise.

Fighting on the left flank, the 4th DMM was operating in mountainous terrain, where the snow and ice greatly hampered its movements. This, coupled with the fact that the enemy was counter-attacking furiously, made it obvious that the originally planned objective for the day--the capture of VIEUX THANN and CERNAY--would not be accomplished. However, the 4th DMM, with the 2d DIM, managed to enter VIEUX THANN and reached a point 1520 meters Southwest of the CERNAY Bridge on the THUR River.

On the right flank of the 4th DMM, the 2d DIM took the CERNAY Insane Asylum and penetrated into the NONNENBRUCH Woods, reaching the THAN-MULHOUSE road and the CERNAY - LUTTERBACH railway. Despite strong enemy resistance, it advanced four kilometers.

In the Northern suburbs of MULHOUSE, where the well-organized enemy had been opposing the I Corps' attempts to clear the city for over

RESTRICTED

0209

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE VOSGES MOUNTAINS

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

two months, the 9th DIC launched its attack at 0745. An intense artillery preparation on enemy strong points in the villages in the Northern suburbs proceeded the attack.

Although the enemy offered stubborn resistance, the elements of these divisions captured the villages of BOURTZWILLER, PFASTATT, ILLZACH, KINGERSHEIM, and at the end of the day, began mopping-up operations in LUTTERBACH. Approximately 400 prisoners were taken on the Corps front.

The 4th DMM and the 2d DIM, assigned to the main effort and experiencing difficulties in the bad weather and on the snow-covered terrain, did not obtain the results the Corps expected. Although advanced enemy positions had been captured in pitched battles, the breakthrough in depth by the 2d DIM as originally planned was unsuccessful. On the Corps left, the enemy held VIEUX THANN and CERNAY in strength, and in the center was ferociously defending the Cites covering WITTELSHEIM.

By the end of the day, the most striking results were obtained by the 9th DIC. It had established positions between the NONNENBRUCH woods and the ILL River in an area covered with villages and worker settlements which offered great defensive positions for the enemy. The rapid advance by the 9th DIC could be counted upon in the direction of ENSISHEIM on the morning of the 21st, if this resistance could be overcome. The Corps Commander, General BETHOUART, directed the 9th DIC to bring its principal effort to bear upon ENSISHEIM, while the 4th DMM and the 2d DIM were assigned the same missions and objectives as before. The main effort of the 9th DIC would be reinforced by armor - one Combat Command from the 1st DB, for exploitation Northward in the event of a breakthrough.

A bridge had been built over the DOLLER River north of MULHOUSE, and tanks of the 1st DB had begun to move across to support the attack.

21 January:

Early in the morning, the enemy threw in vigorous counter-attacks South of CERNAY and at KINGERSHEIM and ILLZACH, using tanks and self-propelled guns for support. They were repulsed at all points. These savage counterattacks and the continued bad weather limited the resumption of the advance to local operations which could not be exploited.

The 4th DMM launched an attack in the heavy snow-fall but was unable to make headway after it was heavily counterattacked on its left.

The 2d DIM re-established its front along the general line of the CROISIERE crossroads of the CERNAY - MULHOUSE road, after fighting off a counterattack launched from the Southeastern suburbs of CERNAY. Violent fighting in the GRAFFENWALD against infiltration groups continued most of the day. In the 9th DIC sector, two enemy counterattacks were repulsed in the vicinity of KINGERSHEIM and ILLZAC. Fighting continued in RICHWILLER with the Eastern part of the village taken.

In view of the unsuccessful efforts on the part of the I Corps' left flank, and to exploit the results obtained in the 9th DIC zone, General BETHOUART decided that provisionally the main effort would be

28

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

brought to bear on the REININGUE - WITTELSHEIM axis, with the capture of REININGUE as the first objective. By a joint effort of the 2d DIM and 9th DIC, an attempt would be made to clear the wooded area of Cites ELSE - AMELIE II and GRASSAEGERSTE to open up the WITTELSHEIM gap. Temporarily on the defensive, the 4th DMR would relieve the left flank of the 2d DIM as far as LUTZELHOF Farm. The boundry between the 2d DIM and the 9th DIC was extended Eastward as far as Cite RICHWILLER.

22 January:

The offensive of the I Corps in its third day met with stiff resistance, repulsing numerous counterattacks. Since the beginning of the morning, the Germans opposing the 9th DIC struck violently back at KINGERSHEIM, using self-propelled guns. Enemy infantry elements succeeded in establishing a foothold in the village, but were thrown back later in the day by the 9th DIC. Using Bazookas, it destroyed three of the enemy's self-propelled guns. Elements of this division, having contacted the 2d DIM on the afternoon before, continued to press forward on the outskirts of the NONNENBRUCH Woods. After hard fighting, it conquered all of RICHWILLER, and then proceeded to clear the LUTTERBACH Woods. The 2d DIM reached the western edges of REININGUE, and succeeded in capturing the village. 100 prisoners were taken, including eight officers. The OLLENGERG Convent, where the enemy resisted stubbornly, was encircled.

23 January:

Very little progress was made on the 23d of January. In the morning, after artillery preparations, the 9th DIC employed tanks and infantry on attacks against MEYERS HOF, Cite ANNA and Cite KULLMANN. The first houses of Cite ANNA were reached. In the afternoon, a combined tank-infantry group occupied Cite RICHWILLER, clearing the THANN-LUTTERBACH road.

These actions cost the I Corps severe losses in personnel and material. Nine tanks were hit, five of which were salvageable. The 2d DIM, after taking the OLLENBERG convent at daybreak, were aligned fronting the THANN-LUTTERBACH road.

The heavy snowfall did not allow further advance in the direction of WITTELSHEIM for the rest of the day.

24 January:

At daybreak, the 9th DIC repulsed an enemy attack which had been revealed the evening before by a prisoner and confirmed during the night by an ALSATIAN deserter. This attack was led in force by elements of the armored FELDHERRHALL Brigade, and developed as expected at RICHWILLER and MEYERS HOF. After a bitter all-day fight, the enemy was stopped and beaten back, suffering many casualties. Seventy-five prisoners were taken, including the Brigade Commander. Tanks and several armored vehicles were also captured.

In the afternoon, 1st DB armored formations (CC 1), acting as

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0212

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

reinforcement to the 9th DIC, left RICHWILLER to advance in the direction of WITTELSHEIM, taking the MAX well and then Cite AMERLIE II. There, contact was made at the end of the day with elements of the 2d DIM's right flank. In the course of these actions, one Jagerpanther and three Mark IV tanks were destroyed. Attacking Northward toward WITTELSHEIM, THE 2d DIM captured Cite ELSE and the potash mines at GRAFFENWALD. Holding its newly acquired positions in the face of numerous counterattacks, it counterattacked in turn, capturing an entire mortar battalion headquarters.

For the next day, General BETHOUART decided to continue the advance as soon after daybreak as possible along the axis: Cite ELSE-WITTELSHEIM; Cite ANNA - PULVERSHEIM. The advance would be supported by tanks and infantry, and backed by artillery. A careful watch would be kept against enemy reactions, particularly in the direction of CERNAY.

In an order from Army Headquarters, the boundary between I Corps and the VOSGES Sector (10th DI) had been extended southward, and as of 1200 hours 24 January, was placed on the line BITSCHWEILLER - RILBACH near GUEBWILLER, and GUEBERSCHWIHR (these points are in the VOSGES Sector).

The 4th Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs (1st and 5th BCP) which occupied the KOOSCH - BITSCHWILLER zone, while remaining in the same location, passed to the command of the Commanding General, VOSGES Sector.

25 January:

Only local advances were made by the I Corps. The 9th DIC continued its advance on WETTENHEIM, reaching a point 1 kilometer North of KINGERSHEIM. West of WETTENHEIM Cite FERRAND was reached, where powerful counterattacks vainly tried to slow down the advance. About one hundred prisoners were taken. At Cite KULLMANN, half way between KINGERSHEIM and WITTENHEIM, the Germans held stubbornly to their positions.

The 2d DIM, moving towards WITTELSHEIM, reach a point 1 kilometer south of the village. Delayed at first by a severe artillery barrage, it succeeded during the course of the day in completely occupying Cite GRASSAEGERSTE and retaking the AMELIE I well. It had been momentarily abandoned in the face of a vigorous tank-suppored counterattack. In this action, approximately one hundred prisoners were taken.

Although the offensive as a whole was moving a great deal slower than planned, the 9th DIC and the 2d DIM were deep into the interior of the industrial region North of MULHOUSE. The southwestern portion of the NONNENBRUCH - rugged and wooded terrain between WITTELSHEIM and WITTENHEIM - was cleared.

By the end of the sixth day of the offensive, a shortage of ammunition for artillery and mortars was felt, necessitating future actions to be reduced in scope.

An intensification of effort upon WITTELSHEIM by the 2d DIM, and upon WITTENSHEIM by the 9th DIC was planned for the next day. The two

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

divisions were still protected on their left flank by the 4th DMa, which stood poised on the outskirts of CERNAY for a drive to the Southern banks of the THUR River.

26 January:

Still fighting over snow-covered terrain, the three divisions of the I French Corps continued their pressure Northward toward ENSISHEIM. Most of the day was confined to small operations. The 9th DIC continued its mopping-up of enemy strong-points among the wells west and east of Cite KANA and sent reconnaissance elements to the enemy strong-hold of Cite KULLMANN. The 2d DIM repulsed a heavy counterattack on Cite GRASSWEGERSTE, a short distance South of WITTELSHEIM. In the event this village was taken, the 4th DMa - to the West of WITTELSHEIM and South of CERNAY - stood ready to attack Northward and cross the THUR River.

27 January:

During the morning of the 27th, the 9th DIC launched an attack on Cite KULLMANN. Stubborn enemy resistance was met, but after a house-to-house struggle - in which flame-throwers and Bazookas were used - the Cite was cleared. On its left flank the 2d DIM fought in the wooded area lying between Cite BLOC and Cite LANGENZUG, capturing about fifty prisoners.

The 4th DMa launched a surprise attack on FAUBOURG de BELFORT - on the Southern outskirts of CERNAY - during the night of 26th - 27th. Before daybreak, it had reached the bridge site over the THUR River. The bridge had been destroyed by the enemy. The day of the 27th was spent in mopping up small pockets of resistance that had been by-passed. About thirty prisoners were captured, as well as large amounts of equipment which the Germans were forced to abandon in face of the surprise attack.

28 January:

On the Corps left, VIEUX THANN was occupied by elements of the 4th DMa after the enemy withdrew, leaving behind numerous booby-traps and mines and destroying the THUR Bridge East of the town. Patrols were sent along the VIEUX THANN - CERNAY road, one patrol reaching the Western outskirts of CERNAY. The heights North of VIEUX THANN were still in enemy possession.

Supported by elements from CC 2, the 2d DIM attacked Cite LANGENZUG, Cite AMELIE I, and the potash mines East of the Cite and South of WITTELSHEIM. The enemy fought fiercely to hold his positions at Cite LANGENZUG, yielding his ground foot-by-foot in the face of French infantry, tanks, and tank destroyers. A portion of the Cite was cleared. One kilometer to East, Cite AMELIE I and the potash mines were occupied by elements of the 2d DIM.

On the right flank, the 9th DIC was still fighting in the direction of WITTELSHEIM, clearing Cite KULLMANN on the edges of the village and capturing about sixty prisoners.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ENSISHEIM still remained the Corps primary objective. From East to West, the 4th DMM fought on the outskirts of CERNAY, the 2d DIM was to the South of WITTELSHEIM, and the 9th DIC was nearing WITTENHEIM. The ammunition for artillery was still critically short, causing the Corp Commander to direct his Div. C.O.'s to exercise the greatest economy in its use.

29 January:

A heavy enemy counterattack in the Northern part of Cite LANGENZUG, with tanks supporting the thrust, halted the advancing 2d DIM in the direction of WITTLESHEIM. The German's attempt to regain the Cite LANGENZUG was repulsed, with loss to him of one heavy tank and a self-propelled gun.

The 4th DMM, on the left flank of the 2d DIM, fought in the factory districts on the Southern suburbs of CERNAY, North of the THUR River. One battalion from the 6th RTM (4th DMM) crossed the THUR River in the vicinity of the industrial buildings Southeast of CERNAY, but were forced to retire when the enemy halted them with heavy automatic weapon fire.

On the right flank of the Corps front, the 9th DIC kept in close contact with the enemy on the outer edges of WITTENHEIM. Elements of the right flank were fighting in the Forests of NUMMENBRUCH, and abreast of the 2d DIM.

For the next day, the Corps objective was still ENSISHEIM, with the division's immediate objectives WITTENHEIM, WITTELSHEIM, and CERNAY.

30 January:

The entire I Corps launched an attack on a front from CERNAY to WITTENHEIM. The 4th DMM jumped off at 0700 hours, attacking CERNAY from the West with the 1st RTA, and from the East with the 6th RTM, supported by tanks. The attack was covered on the Northwest by the 5th BCP, which had occupied the high ground between ENCHENBERG and STEINBACK. The coordinated attack was only partly carried out, however. Despite three consecutive assaults, the 6th RTM was obliged to withdraw to its starting point. To the West of CERNAY, the 1st RTA fought to enter Cite BANDRY, on the western outskirts of the town. It met with no further success, and by the end of the day, elements in the Cite struggled to hold its own against vicious enemy thrusts. Two French tanks were put out of action when they hit mines.

The 9th DIC succeeded in taking WITTENHEIM, and after advancing with armored elements along the Cite FERNAND - PULVERSHEIM axis in a mine-infested area, took the Chateau of HOHROEDERHUBEL.

The 2d DIM's attack on WITTELSHEIM met with stiff opposition, but it managed to enter the town with some of its elements.

General de HESDIN, Commanding Officer of the 4th DMM, was seriously wounded in the hills above CERNAY. His command was taken over by General BONDIS.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0215

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

After fighting bitterly for eleven days in unfavorable weather, the I French Corps had suffered heavy casualties in armor, with its infantrymen nearing the point of exhaustion. The CC 1 had only 18 tanks left in working condition, which was about one-third of its normal number. CC 2, with 36 of its medium tanks destroyed by mines, was now operating with only 16 tanks. Repair crews worked day and night to repair the ones that were salvageable. Without declaring a total rest period, which circumstances could not grant at this time, the Commanding General of the I Corps decided to use the next day to complete mopping-up operations in newly acquired areas, and in organizing conquered terrain. His units, however, would keep in close contact with the enemy, exploiting any possible weakness in the line. The day would also be employed to rest the maximum number of infantry and tank crews, economize ammunition, and prepare to resume the offensive on February 1st.

31 January:

On the last day of the month, armored elements supporting the 9th DIC advanced on PULVERSHEIM - Northwest of WITTENHEIM - with only mines and booby-traps to hinder its progress. Heavy fighting flared up in WITTELSHEIM, as the 2d DIM steadily broke down the enemy's resistance. On the left flank, fighting continued in the South and Eastern outskirts of CERNAY. Armor and tank destroyer elements were brought over the THUR River, a bridge having been built at VIEUX THANN.

The Corps mission remained the same for these operations. Its principal objective was still ENSISHEIM, the key to the offensive. The Corps Commander decided to extend the Corps effort on the right for the early capture of PULVERSHEIM and CITE SATINE BARBE. This main action would be protected in the West by an attack on WITTELSHEIM and Cite de la Gare, aimed at drawing the maximum number of troops into this area. The main action would be carried out by the CC 3, launching its initial attack along the Cite ANNA - PULVERHSEIM axis. The 9th DIC would follow immediately, protected on its left by the 2d DIM. With PULVERSHEIM captured, the 1st DB would have a chance to strike at ENSISHEIM. On the left flank the 4th DAM would proceed to organize its front solidly, with a minimum of expenditure, so as to conserve strength and thereby constitute a strong corps reserve. At the same time, it would be able to profit by its favorable positions acquired North of the THUR River by harassing the enemy in the Southern area of CERNAY, and keeping the enemy garrison of that locality fully occupied.

1 February:

The attempt of the 9th DIC and the 1st DB to advance in the direction of PULVERSHEIM was met with heavy artillery fire. Thickly-laid mine fields were also encountered as the attack progressed. The 1st DB, after suffering casualties and heavy losses in armor, reached the outskirts of SCHOENENSTEINBACH, about midway from WITTENSHEIM. The JUNGHOLZ Woods which was in the pathway of the advancing armor, was cleared of the enemy. Other sectors of the front were quiet. The 4th DIM was held back by stiff enemy resistance in the South and western suburbs of CERNAY.

Plans for the next day gave the main action once again to the 1st

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0216

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DB, which was to maintain its pressure in the direction of PULVERSHEIM. Its right flank was to be protected by the 9th DIC, which would attack Cite SAINTE BARBE on the Southwest of PULVERSHEIM. Its left flank was to be protected by the 2d DIM, which would continue to engage the enemy in WITTELSHEIM.

2 February:

The attacks of the 1st DB and the 9th DIC developed favorably during the 2d of February, despite fierce enemy resistance. After severe fighting, an element of the CC 3 took SCHOENENSTEINBACK by attacking it simultaneously from the west and South. The 9th DIC and 1st DB captured Cite Sainte BARBE in a surprise attack and succeeded in gaining a foothold. The THEODORE well, on the Western outskirts of Cite Sainte BARBE was taken but relinquished when the Germans counterattacked. Elements of the two divisions counterattacked in turn, and by the end of the day the whole Cite was recaptured. Fighting in this sector was rapidly becoming more difficult, with the enemy fighting from house-to-house and launching numerous counterattacks. The 1st DB and the 9th DIC captured over 100 prisoners during the day's action.

The 2d DIM, in an effort to by-pass WITTELSHEIM, advanced through the NONNENBRUCH woods on the East side of the village.

3 February:

The 9th DIC and 1st DB broke through to capture PULVERSHEIM and Cite Sainte THERESE on the Southwestern edge of ENSISHEIM. By the end of the day they were sending reconnaissance elements to the ILL and THUR River crossings. Meanwhile, the 2d DIM on the 9th DIC's left flank captured WITTELSHEIM and eliminated resistance in the NONNEBRUCH Woods and advanced in the direction of STAFFELFELDEN. There the enemy had withdrawn after blowing up the THUR River Bridge. The 4th DMM kept close contact with the enemy in the CERNAY area. The Germans continued to send in a harassing artillery fire on FAUBOURG de BELFORT along the CERNAY - WITTELSHEIM road South of the THUR River.

As a result of the day's operations, the I French Corps now held the ILL River from MULHOUSE to ENSISHEIM and the THUR River from CERNAY to ENSISHEIM. The ILL - THUR Triangle had been completely cleared with the capture of RUELISHEIM, PULVERSHEIM, WITTELSHEIM, and the early fall of ENSISHEIM was anticipated. All of the bridges over the rivers had been destroyed but new ones were being set up to enable the 1st DB to pass over the river and contact elements of the 5th DB moving down from the North from CROIX-en-PLAINE. During the day, over 200 prisoners were taken, and some enemy equipment was captured.

At the end of February 3d, after two weeks of fighting under difficult conditions, the I Corps had finally reached its primary objective. This ended the first phase - the breakthrough - which would enable the Corps to use ENSISHEIM as a pivot that would swing the divisions East toward the final objective - the RHINE River.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0217

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Second Phase

THE PUSH NORTHWARD

4 February:

In a message from General de LATTRE, Commanding General of the First French Army, it was directed that contact be made as soon as possible with the elements of the U. S. XXI Corps which were coming down from COLMAR and had reached SAINTE CROIX EN PLAINE. A general withdrawal of enemy troops in the VOSGES Mountains had been noted, therefore a swift thrust to the north would cut off the German retreat west of the ILL River. In view of these developments, the principal effort of the I Corps was thus directed along the ENSISHEIM - SAINTE CROIX EN PLAINE line. The 2d DIM would push toward ROUFFACH and SAINTE CROIX EN PLAINE, while the 1st DB would continue along the BOLLWILLER - ENSISHEIM axis and exploit in the direction of SAINTE CROIX EN PLAINE.

The 4th DMM's mission was still the capture of CERNAY, and the 9th DIC would attempt to eliminate the resistance in ENSISHEIM.

During the night of the 3d - 4th, patrols verified that there was little activity along the 4th DMM front. At 4 o'clock in the morning, the high ground Northwest of CERNAY which the enemy had been holding tenaciously, was found to be abandoned. A short time later, 1st RTM elements discovered that there was no enemy opposition along the VIEUX THANN - CERNAY highway. To the North in this sector, the 4th Demi-Brigade was no longer in contact with the enemy.

On the right flank of the 4th DMM, patrols of the 2d DIM which had crossed the THUR River at dawn, found that the Germans had evacuated the village of STAFFELFELDEN, just North of the river.

New directives were then issued by General BETHOUART, ordering the 4th DMM to strike Northward to block of the VOSGES valleys at SOULTZ and ROUFFACH, and to send out advance patrols to meet the 10th DI which was moving in that direction. The 1st DB, leaving one combat command in support of the 9th DIC, was directed to continue its main effort along the STAFFELFELDEN - SAINTE CROIX EN PLAINE axis so as to make the earliest possible junction with the 5th DB which was coming down from COLMAR. This effort was to be supported by the 2d DIM. After the bridges on the ILL River had been taken, the divisions would then fan out in the direction of NEUF BRISACH.

On the 3d of February, the 4th DMM had been ordered to make up a group under the command of Colonel DELEUZE, which was to capitalize on the capture of WITTELSHEIM by the 2d DIM. The group was to cross the THUR River to the North of WITTELSHEIM and be prepared to reduce CERNAY from the East by a flanking movement. In the event of an enemy withdrawal from CERNAY, it was to advance upon HARTMANNSWILLER and SOULTZ to cut off the German retreat through the LAUCH Valley.

The DELEUZE Group, made up of the 1st RTM, elements of the 4th RSM, tank destroyers and Engineer units, assembled on the evening of the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0218

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3d in the SCHWEIGHOUSE area. During the night it crossed the THUR River. After probing for enemy activity, it found that CERNAY had already been evacuated by the enemy. According to statements of prisoners taken in that area, the Germans had probably fallen back on SOULTZ and BOLLWILLER, to the North in the direction of ROUFFACH. The Group then advanced North and occupied the Villages of BERRWILLER, BERTSCHWILLER, and HARTMANSWILLER without serious opposition. Reaching SOULTZ at about 1500 hours, it soon became evident that stiff resistance would be met in the attempt to take the village. According to information received from captured prisoners, the Germans had been ordered to hold SOULTZ for at least three days. However, after a sharp clash, the village was taken, with over 100 prisoners captured.

Late in the evening, the BOUVET Group of the 4th DMM which arrived in the afternoon, entered GUEBWILLER without opposition, while elements of the 4th RSM supported by infantry, continued to advance Northward and reached the Southern outskirts of ROUFFACH during the night. They were stopped by German armor which actively resisted in the Northern part of the village.

In the early dawn of February 5th, armored vehicles of the XXI Corps (U.S.) coming down from the North reached the Northern edges of ROUFFACH. The Germans began a withdrawal toward the East, leaving many casualties in the area.

On the left of the 4th DMM front, the general advance had been resumed during the morning of the 4th. CERNAY, UFFHOLTZ and STEINBACH had been occupied without a struggle. The 1st RTA had taken WATTWILLER and captured 400 prisoners. The 4th Demi-Brigade had reached the MOSKENRAIN, in the VOSGES Mountains.

The advance had been less rapid between WITTELSHEIM and ENSISHEIM. The flooded THUR River made crossings slow and difficult for the infantry, and even more so for the armor. The enemy still clung to his most favorable defensive points and formed stubborn lines of resistance between BOLLWILLER and ENSISHEIM. However, the 2d DLM, supported by CC 2 which had crossed the flooded THUR with great difficulty, reached BOLLWILLER at the beginning of the afternoon and captured it. Striking northeastward, it also captured the Village of FELDKIRCH and pushed as far ahead as the UNGERSHEIM well. At the close of the day, it had occupied RAEDERSHEIM, which is to the North of FELDKIRCH and directly East of SOULTZ. To the East of RAEDERSHEIM, it had contacted the 9th DIC at the RODOLPHE well, which had been taken by the 21st RIC.

Combat Command I, supported by one battalion of the 9th DIC (6 RIC), mopped up the zone between the ILL and the THUR Rivers, despite heavy enemy resistance at the station of ENSISHEIM and at Cite SAINTE THERESE II. After reducing the last of the enemy bridgeheads West of ENSISHEIM, troops of the I Corps were up to the ILL and THRU River junction.

5 February:

At 0525 the 43d Tank Battalion of the 12th U.S. Armored Division made contact with elements of the 1st DB in ROUFFACH. Meanwhile, during the

36

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0219


AMERICAN FORCES
12
CCA
VOSGES MOUNTAINS
ROUFFACH
RHINE RHONE CANAL
RHINE RIVER
1
DB
FRENCH FORCES
5 FEB. 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Lt Newell(163) 5 February 1945
The Commanding Officer Major Meditte, Commanding Officer of 5th RCA, 1st French D.B. and Brigadier General Riley F. Ennis, Commanding Officer CCA which took this town, confer on missions to be followed after they have met from the North and South to cut off the Germans in the VOSGES Pocket. In center is an interpreter, as they confer over a map. CCA 12th Armored Division, ROUFFACH, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

morning, CC 2 took GUNDOLSHEIM and MERXHEIM, clearing the enemy rear guards who were left to hold up the advance.

CC 3 of the 1st DB occupied UNGERSHEIM and reached the ILL River at REGUISHEIM and MEYENHEIM, while another element went ahead without opposition into the XXI Corps zone as far as SAINTE CROIX EN PLAINE. It reached there about 1100 hours and found it to be unoccupied. Upon request of the 12th U. S. Armored Division, the detachment retired from the village and began to clear the THUR Forest Northeast of ROUFFACH, taking numerous prisoners.

The 2d DIA followed the 1st DB Combat Commands with the 5th and 8th RTs, and by the end of the day were along the banks of the ILL from OBERENTZEN South to REGUISHEIM. The enemy was entrenched on the East bank of the ILL, defending his positions with automatic weapon and mortar fire.

The 9th DIC continued preparations for its attack upon ENSISHEIM, which was still held by strong enemy forces. The Germans were reacting sharply to any attempts to cross the ILL at this point, fighting from well-entrenched positions.

Moving up the LAUCH Valley, the BRUYeT Group reached HOHFIRN, where it made contact with the 10th DI Elements which were coming down from the Crest-line of the VOSGES Mountains.

At the day's end on February 5th, a complete junction had been made between the I French Corps and the XXI U. S. Corps. Enemy units West of the ILL River had been cut off, with only sporadic resistance continuing in the VOSGES Mountains.

6 February:

In a message from General de LATTRE on the afternoon of the 5th, it was directed that the final mission of the I Corps was the capture of the Village of CHALAMPE on the Rhine (one of the main escape exits fro the withdrawing Germans). As soon as possible, the Corps was to get its armor across the ILL River and advance toward the objective by the way of REGUISHEIM (two miles North of ENSISHEIM) and through MUNCHHOUSE (approximately five miles Southeast of REGUISHEIM and on the East side of the RHONE - RHINE Canal). The main effort would be taken by the 1st DB, supported by the 2d DIA. They were to skirt the Northern part of the HARTH Forest after taking MUNCHHOUSE, and strike South and East to CHALAMPE. The 9th DIC, after crossing the ILL River and taking ENSISHEIM, would exploit Eastward through the HARTH Forest to CHALAMPE.

Late in the afternoon of February 5th, the operation to outflank ENSISHEIM from the North began. The thawing of the ILL River during the previous days had raised its water level considerably, causing the river to flow with increasing swiftness. As an added defense, the enemy had blown up all of the bridges and solidly held the line of villages situated East of the river.

Attempts to cross had been made at the end of the day (February 5th)

0223

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

at MAYENHEIM, several miles up the river from ENSISHEIM, but stubborn resistance was met. The greater part of the German defenses were at ENSISHEIM, however, where he had well-prepared positions and a large portion of his troops. In spite of harassing fire from German artillery, the 9th DIC got more than a battalion of the 21st RIC across the ILL a mile North of ENSISHEIM, using six rubber boats. Two were destroyed in the crossing, one by artillery fire and the other by the rushing current. Throughout the night these elements fought their way into the village, and by dawn it was captured.

Two miles North of ENSISHEIM, the 5th RTM of the 2d DIM succeeded in crossing the ILL at REGUISHEIM, and by daybreak found that the Germans had withdrawn. By the middle of the afternoon, bridges were constructed over the river, allowing armor to cross to the East bank. Taking advantage of the German withdrawal in this sector, and not waiting for tank support, the infantry continued its push to the East. The 5th RTM, followed by the 8th RTM, reduced numerous enemy pockets of resistance in the ROTHLEIBLE Woods which faced HIRTZFELDEN on the RHONE-RHINE Canal. At the end of the day, the village was occupied, and elements pushed South down the canal toward ROGGENHOUSE and MUNCHHOUSE.

The 21st RIM of the 9th DIC, after clearing ENSISHEIM, arrived in sight of the HARTH Forest. It was passed at nightfall by supporting armor, which reached the RHONE-RHINE Canal to find three of the lock crossings destroyed and held by the enemy.

Stepping up his operation between the ILL and the HARTH, General MORLIERE began advancing the QUINCHE Group (2d Battalion de Choc, 9th DIC) Northward from MODENHEIM, on the Northeastern outskirts of MULHOUSE. Despite dense minefields, SAUSHEIM and BALDERSHEIM were occupied.

During this time, the 4th DMM was continuing its mopping-up operations in the VOSGES Mountains. The 1st RTM, by coordinating with 1st REC (5th DB) which was still coming down from the North, took SOULTZMATT, with advance elements overrunning SOULTZBACH LES BAINS in the MUNSTER Valley and making contact with elements of the 10th DI.

The BOUVET Group (4th DMM) crossed the PETIT BALLON Range and reached WASSERBOURG. The 1st RTA established contact with the BOUVET Group at BUHL, after having crossed the PETERNIT Pass, and with the 10th DI reached the HARTMANNS-WILLERKOPF and the ROUTE DES CROTES without meeting enemy opposition.

At the close of the day, the last organized resistance in the VOSGES Mountains had been reduced. Only scattered elements were still holding out, with only the possibility of their infiltrating across the French lines or waging guerilla warfare in the rear.

The Commanding General of the I Corps ordered the 4th DMM to reinforce the line it had established facing the VOSGES as far as ROUFFACH. Liaison with the XXI U. S. Corps was to be made by a mixed detachment. He also directed that mopping-up operations begin in the wooded areas and small villages. The 4th DMM was to work in conjunction with the 10th DI and civilian groups. To his elements that faced the RHINE River,

0224

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ne ordered that they maintain active surveillance day and night to prevent enemy units from rejoining the ones withdrawing towards Germany.

7 February:

On the 7th of February, the divisions of the I French Crops continued their advances, meeting fresh resistance along in the RHONE-RHINE Canal. The enemy had blown all of the bridges crossing the canal, and were firmly entrenched on the Eastern bank.

To the north, the 2d DIM reached the canal in the morning along its entire front, and was rejoined by Combat Command 2, which had succeeded by various means in crossing the ILL River. Elements of the command had made use of the bridge constructed in the 9th DIC sector at ENSISHEIM; others, after arrangements were made with adjacent divisions in the American zone, crossed the river at OBERHERGHEIM. Still other elemtns had crossed by makeshift devices at REGUISHEIM. Arriving at the canal, they gave support to the attacks of the 2d DIM to the East of the canal.

The 8th RTM (2d DIM) succeeded in breaching the canal about noon, and after taking the SCHAEFERHOF Farm, reacned the vicinity of FESSENHEIM at the end of the day. At that point it made contact with the 2d DB, which had come down from the NEUF BRISACH area, taking BALGAU and continuing South to reach the western edges of FESSENHEIM early in the afternoon.

Farther to the South, attempts to cross the canal were running into stiff opposition, mostly from artillery and mortar fire. By the end of the day, tne 5th RTM (2d DIM) crossed the canal and took ROGGENHOUSE, reducing the enemy defenses during the process.

The 9th DIC occupied BATTENHEIM in the morning and reached the Canal along its entire front. Its efforts in crossing - made with insufficient material - encountered vigorous enemy resistance by mortar and artillery fire directed against the principal crossing points. Repeated attempts to bridge the canal in the MUNCHHOUSE area were all repulsed.

At the end of the day, General BETHOUART again repeated his instructions for pressure to be maintained in the direction of the RHINE and CHALAMPE. The 2d DIM and the 1st DB, in conjunction with the 2d DB, were to reach the RHINE at BLODELSHEIM, and at the same time, while swinging to the right, were to flank the HARTH Forest in the direction of CHALAMPE and mop up the Northern part of the woods.

The 9th DIC, penetrating the HARTH Forest, was to push on toward CHALAMPE. Farther to the South the BRUNOT Group, in conjunction with operations in the North and Northwest, was to work along the general axis of Beluse de HOLBOURG - HOLBOURG, and then push on toward OTTMARSHEIM and PETIT LANDAU in order to reach the RHINE South of OTTMARSHEIM.

8 February:

In spite of mines and other obstacles which the enemy had left in villages and at important crossroads, the general advance continued up to

41

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the outer line of the CHALAMPE Bridgehead, where the enemy had a well organized defense.

To the North, CC3 crossed the canal on bridges which had been constructed during the night. They gave support to the 2d DIM in the attack on FESSENHEIM, which was occupied in the morning. At that point, the Colonel commanding the 2d RCA made contact with General LECLERC, thus completing the General's mission.

Pushing to the East, the 8th RTM reached the RHINE East of FESSENHEIM, while CC 3 captured BLODELSHEIM, which is two miles South of FESSENHEIM.

Farther South, the 5th RTM, supported by elements of CC 1, took MUNCHHOUSE from which the enemy had withdrawn. After overcoming numerous obstacles and mines, it penetrated into the dense HARTH Forest. Advancing three miles through the forest to its outer edges, it ran into the strongly defended village of RUMERSHEIM. The enemy there was well organized and using numerous anti-tank weapons.

On the 9th DIC front, the enemy had abandoned the line of the Canal, and the division passed through the HARTH Forest without serious opposition. It was unable to emerge from the Eastern edge because of violent fire from enemy positions in BLANTZENHEIM, and from the village of OTTMARSHEIM.

The BRUNOT Group crossed the forest without enemy resistance and captured HOMBOURG, which was still held by enemy rear guards. In the night it reached the RHINE River near the MAJORENGOT Farm and occupied PETIT LANDAU.

Elements of the RHINE Sector coming from KEMBS over terrain which was heavily mined and raked by enemy artillery, advanced to the North and occupied NIFFER, South of PETIT LANDAU.

At the end of the day, the I Corps had made contact with the last of the enemy's bridgeheads. His strong points were at RUMERSHEIM, BANTZENHEIM, and OTTMARSHEIM. At these places the enemy was withdrawing the last of his elements.

9 February:

Contact was maintained with the enemy throughout the night. However, when it became light on the morning of the 9th, it became apparent that the enemy had withdrawn most of his units.

The 2d DIM occupied RUMERSHEIM without a struggle, while the 9th DIC captured OTTMARSHEIM and BANTZENHEIM, taking about 20 prisoners. It reached the RHINE River at CHALAMPE, where the enemy blew up the bridge at 0800 hours. By the end of the morning the I French Corps was along the Rhine on the entire corps front, thus reaching its final objective.

0226

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Participation of the French II Corps in the Reduction of the Colmar Pocket

BACKGROUND:

In the Northern sector of the COLMAR Pocket, the French II Corps' zone of action extended as far as the GAMBSHEIM bridgehead and the Southern boundary of the U. S. VI Corps. Units of the II Corps holding the front from North to South were: the 3d DIA, as far as the Northern boundary of the COLMAR Pocket, the 2d DB, 1st DMI, 3d U. S. Infantry Division, and the 28th U. S. Infantry Division.

Units of the 2d DB had been reduced by the operations at MARCKOLSHEIM in December, and KILSTETT on the 22d of January. Its ranks had more or less been replaced by young volunteers who were aggressive but who had little training. Equipment was available only in a 60 percent proportion.

The 1st DMI had been exhausted by almost continual operation since the beginning of October to the end of November, and in particular by the attack of the 198th German Division from the 7th to the 15th of January. The equivalent of two battalions were lacking.

The 5th DB sustained heavy losses in the course of the battles of BELFORT and SONDGAU, and operations in the ORBEY and KAYSERSBERG areas in the latter half of December. Although tank units had undergone heavy losses in trained personnel and equipment, with only about half of its armor in running condition, the morale was excellent.

The 3d U.S. Infantry Division was in its usual high state of combat efficiency. The Division had fought with the 2d French DB in the operations liberating STRASBOURG, and had since fought in the RIBEAUVILLE area. Relieved for reorganization, it had returned to II Corps refreshed and reinforced by the 254th Infantry Regiment of the 63d U. S. Infantry Division. Despite severe losses in the last six months of almost continual fighting, experienced officers and enlisted men constituted a framework for trained replacements.

The 28th U. S. Infantry Division, just before fighting in the COLMAR sector, had been in the battle of the ARDENNES, where it sustained heavy losses. Hastily replenished, with not enough time to assimilate reinforcements, it was not counted on to take the brunt of the offensive operation.

Opposing the II Corps, the Germans had at their disposal the equivalent of twenty-five 500-men battalions. These units varied greatly. In general, the troops were wearied by the severe campaigns which lasted several months, and were partially demoralized by their defeats. Good cadre and old soldiers who were weary but who had superior training still maintained an agressive spirit. Aged or foreign recruits were worth very little, but when imbued with the trained cadre, were capable of conducting an energetic defense.

The only enemy units which were still aggressive at the beginning of the offensive, in addition to companies of the FELDHERNHALLE Panzer Brigade, were the NCO and SS training units which could be counted upon to be where the critical points of the battle took place.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

On several occasions, especially in the beginning of January, 1945, following their reverses on other fronts, the Germans appeared to be attempting to restore their prestige in Alsace by launching converging, fairly large offensive attacks upon STRASBOURG. They seemed to place considerable emphasis upon maintaining their bridgeheads, particularly that of COLMAR.

In the middle of January, VON RUNSTEDT'S forces engaged in the ARDENNES found themselves in a difficult situation. At the same time, the attack in LORRAINE had failed, along with large scale retreats in the face of the Russian winter offensive. As a result of this, the movement seemed favorable for the First French Army to resume offensive operations in its sector.

The Commanding General of the First French Army therefore decided to employ all the means at his disposal - without delay and by surprise - in a powerful offensive action that would envelop the pocket from the South and from the North. The 1 French Corps, on the South Flank of the Pocket, was to begin the offensive with its final objective the village of CHALAMPE, on the RHINE River. The II Corps was to push South to NEUF-BRISACH.

The point selected for the break-through by the II Corps was between the ILLWALD Forest and the village of OSTHEIM. Enemy resistance was know to be passive at that point. Relying upon the natural defense afforded him by the terrain, he had reinforced this defense by a network of mines, traps, and abatis. Patrols, information from observers, and prisoners all pointed to the weakest portion of enemy strength as lying between the ST. HIPPOLYTE Mill and GUEMAR. Between SELESTAT and GUEMAR, the sector was held only by the German 56th Pioneer Battalion (which was of mediocre quality) and by two weak infantry battalions: the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 748th VG Regiment.

The I French Corps, beginning the offensive from the South on 20th of January, was to have as its primary objective the capture of CERNAY, so as to open the Northern entrance of the THUR Valley and reach the ILL River at ENSISHEIM.*

Two days later, the II Corps was to launch its attack in the directions of the GUEMAR-MARCKOLSHEIM and OSTHEIM-JEBSHEIM axis, crossing the COLMAR Canal in the WICKERSCHWIHR area.

Subsequently, these two attacks would be completed by general exploitation toward NEUF-BRISACH, to cut off the COLMAR Pocket and destroy or capture the enemy forces which had been surrounded. At the same time, the I and II Corps would seek to make a junction at ROUFFACH, ENSISHEIM and BLODELSHEIM.

In the first part of this maneuver, the Commanding General of the CENTRAL VOSGES SECTOR would attempt to pin down enemy forces on his front, thereby preventing their premature disengagement and resultant threat to the flank of the I and II Corps' attack. The Central VOSGES Sector would also pursue disengaging hostile forces, and later, would proceed to mop up the PETIT BALLON and the BUEBWILLER BALLON.

* (See I French Corps Offensive, Part III)

0228

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The offensive as conceived by the Commanding General, II Corps, consisted of the following three phases:

1. Following a breakthrough of enemy positions along the determined axis, a bridgehead across the ILL River would be established to permit tanks to cross, securing enough ground on the other side to enable the armored forces to deploy in the direction of the II Corps' border.

2. After crossing the ILL River, the main effort would be brought to bear upon the ILLHAUSERN-NEUF BRISACH axis to reach Army Objective Number 1 and attain complete control of the COLMAR Canal crossings.

3. Exploitation in the NEUF BRISACH direction toward the RHINE Crossings, with protection in the East and opposite COLMAR.

The number one priority for this operation would be to push toward the objectives determined upon by Army. The second priority would be the encirclement of COLMAR and the blocking of the FECHT Valley.

The beginning of the attack would be conducted by two infantry divisions: the Ist French DMI (less the 4th Brigade) and the 3d U. S. Infantry Division. The 3d Division was reinforced with the first part of Combat Command V of the 2d DB, the second part of CC4 of the 5th DB, and the 254th Infantry Regiment (US). They would attempt to break through in the zone where the enemy dispositions offered the least resistance. This would take place between ST. HIPPOLYTE Hill and the woods of the CHATEAU DE SCHOPPENWHIR, along the GUEMAR-ILLHAUESERN-MARCKOLSHEIM and OSTHEIM-MAISON ROUGE axis, in order to secure the crossings of the ILL River at ILLHAUESERN and MAISON ROUGE, and to protect them from the Corps' Number one objective.

In the second part of the maneuver, these two divisions would advance in strength upon the Army's number one objective, so as to secure the crossings of the RHONE-RHINE Canals, bringing their effort to bear along the ILLHAUESERN-MARCKOLSHEIM and MAISON ROUGE - WICKERSCHWIHR axis.

At the same time, the 5th DB (less CC4, but reinforced by the 1st Groupement de Choc and the 1st Regiment de Parachutistes) would emerge from both ILLHAUESERN and MAISON ROUGE, exerting pressure upon the JEBSHEIM-DURRENNENTZEN axis, in order to capture the Canal bridges between WICKERSCHWIHR and ARTZENHEIM.

The 5th DB operation would have solid protection to the North by operations of the 1st DMI, which would attempt to establish itself in the North in the OHNENHEIM area. To the West, protection would be assured by the 3d U. S. Infantry Division opposite COLMAR.

In the third part of the operation, the 1st DMI would attempt to gain the bank of the RHINE, from the MARCKOLSHEIM bridge to the ARTZENHEIM bridge. Its active participation in the maneuver would consist of offering protection to the North. Together with the 2d DB, it would hold itself in readiness for subsequent mopping-up of what would remain of the pocket from MARCKOLSHEIM to ERSTEIM.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0229

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

During this time the 3d Division would continue to operate with a maximum force to support action by the 5th DB in the NEUF BRISACH direction. This would be done with one RCT to support action by CC4 from 5th DB along the WICKERSCHWIHR-ANDOLSHEIM axis, by taking the bridge over the ILL River East of COLMAR. In the event of favorable exploitation, it would capture the city by encircling it and blocking the entrance to the FECHT Valley West of TURCKHEIM.

The attack by the 1st DMI and 3d U.S. Infantry Division would begin during the night of the 22d-23d of January, in a surprise move toward OSTHEIM East of the FECHT. These two divisions would attempt to gain the greatest amount of terrain possible toward the ILL River in order to strike at the crossings at dawn.

Tactical armored groups would have to cross four successive waterlines: the FECHT River, the ILL River, the RIEDWIHR Brook and the COLMAR Canal. The road network in the attack zone was not very dense. There were only two main routes which were not practicable: one near BUEMAR, the other by OSTHEIM. Combat Commands, therefore, by protecting the flanks opposite OHNENHEIM and COLMAR, would allow CC5 and CC6 of the 5th DB to reach the turning point of RIEDWIHR-JEBSHEIM to align themselves along the COLMAR Canal in the direction of NEUF-BRISACH.

Subsequently, CCV of the 2d DB, upon receiving orders from the Commanding General of the 1st DMI, would emerge on the ST. HIPPOLYTE-OHNENHEIM road, crossing the ILL River near the Southwestern corner of the ILLWALD.

CC4 of the 5th DB, coming from RIBEAUBILLE via OSTHEIM and GUEMAR, would cross the ILL River at MAISON ROUGE, when ordered by the Commanding General of the 3d U. S. Division.

CC6 of the 5th DB, coming from VAL DE VILLE, would cross the ILL River at ILLHAUSERN when ordered by the Commanding General of the 5th DB, and would take JEBSHEIM and the canal crossing between Hill 188 and SLUICE Channel #6.

CC5 of the 5th DB, coming from BARR, would follow the rear of CC6, crossing the ILL River either at ILLHAUSERN or at MAISON ROUGE, or at both points simultaneously.

Both sides of the main attack sector would be under the command of General de MONTSABERT, Commanding General of the French II Corps (with General du VIGIER as assistant). The RHINE-SELESTAT Sector in the North was placed under the command of General LECLERC, with the 2d DB (less CCV). His assignment would be to protect the Northeast but to hold his division in readiness for the first favorable opportunity of mopping up what remained of the pocket North of the attack sector and to work with the 2d DB in its exploitation to the South.

The Southern sector of the II Corps front was placed under the command of Major General COTA, Commanding General of the 28th U. S. Infantry Division. It was committed to protect the South by pinning down German formations engaged in the VOSGES Mountains. It would undertake the

46

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

mopping-up operations in its sector only upon order from the II Corps and only when the attack had made progress.

THE OPERATION:

Noon 22 January to noon 23 January: The attack began with the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments of the 3d Division crossing the FECHT River at COLMAR on a front of less than 1000 yards at 2100 hours, with a near-full moon to assist the attack. The 7th Infantry on the right had the mission of advancing South, capturing OSTHEIM, clearing the woods in its sector, and attacking and capturing the CHATEAU, HOSSEN, and ROSENKRANZ. The 30th Infantry Regiment had the mission of clearing the woods in its sector East to the ILL River, crossing the ILL, and proceeding to attack South and Southeast with objectives at RIEDWIHR, HOLTZWIHR and WICKERSCHWIHR. There was virtually no enemy reaction until the two leading battalions of both regiments were almost across the foot bridges, when enemy mortar and artillery fire began falling in the foot-bridge area, causing several casualties. The 7th Regiment advanced with the 3d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. The 3d Battalion encountered only minor opposition before reaching the East-West road in the COLMAR Forest, but the 1st Battalion moved through the enemy's outpost line from the flank to reach OSTHEIM, encountering wire, mines, and machine gun fire enroute. OSTHEIM was entered before daylight the 23d of January, and the battalion was still fighting in the town as the period closed. The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, had been counterattacked by enemy infantry and tanks North of the woods Southeast of the BOIS DIT DE ROTHLEIBLE, but broke up the attack with artillery and mortar fire. The battalion continued to advance, and seized the woods. The 2d Battalion, initially in reserve, was committed before daylight and in moving toward BOIS DE ROTHLEIBLE fought a surprise engagement with an enemy counterattack battalion, dispersing the enemy battalion and driving it into the woods. The 2d Battalion was somewhat disorganized but entered the North end of the woods and continued to advance to the South. The 30th Infantry crossed the FECHT River with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right. The 1st Bn encountered little opposition in advancing to the ILL River, reaching it early in the morning and crossing Company A on foot bridges at 0637. The remainder of the battalion followed at 0900, and began moving South along the East bank of the river, reaching the bridge at MAISON ROUGE just after noon. The 3d Battalion encountered a schu-mine field and two or three enemy strongpoints during its advance, but eliminated the strongpoints, including the one at NIEDERWALD. During the morning the battalion attacked and captured intact the wooden bridge over the ILL River at the Southeastern corner of the COLMAR Forest, defeating about 60 enemy who were dug in west of the bridge. The 1st Battalion of the 254th Infantry attacked Hill 216 at daylight and by noon had reached the top of the hill. Well-entrenched positions protected by schu-mines and booby-traps were encountered in this attack.*

Noon 23 January to noon 24 January: During the afternoon forward elements of the 3d Division reached the outskirts of RIEDWIHR and HOLTZWIHR. The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry, which made the attack on RIEDWIHR, met no opposition until it reached point 100 yards from

* (See small action report, "Attack on JEBSHEIM").

47

0231

Photog-T/5 Brazle J. McCrobey(163) 8 February 1945
Men of Engineers rebuild bridge on supply road leading through COLMAR. Tank went through the bridge and supplies were re-routed.
11th Engineers, COLMAR area FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the Northern edge of the town, where enemy tanks and automatic weapons opened with grazing fire. The battalion was forced to withdraw and partially re-organize, after which it went into reserve positions. The 2d Battalion of the 30th Infantry, following its relief by 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, moved East and followed the East side of the COLMAR Forest to the South, crossing the ILL River at the Forest's Southeastern corner. At 1800 the battalion was forced to withdraw west of the ILL River following a strong enemy counterattack of armor and infantry, and set up temporary positions, reverting to Division reserve. Companies I and K, of the 30th Infantry, had moved into the Northern end of HOLTZWIHR when an unknown number of enemy tanks, supported by infantry, counterattacked from the South and forced the 3d Battalion to withdraw west of the ILL River. At 1730 one of the 3d Division's medium tanks broke through the MAISON ROUGE bridge, thus effectively preventing any friendly armor from crossing. Meanwhile in the 7th Infantry zone, the 1st Battalion completed the clearance of enemy in OSTHEIM by 1730, maneuvered through 2d Battalion, and at 0200 attacked toward Chateau de SCHOPPENWIHR. The enemy counterattacked the 1st Battalion's leading elements in the early morning and as the period closed the battalion continued the fight in the Chateau area. The 2d Battalion reorganized during the first part of the period in BOIS DIT DE ROTHLEIBLE, then moved forward against light opposition. At 1630 Battalion elements were at the objective in the vicinity of the BOIS DIT DE ROTHLEIBLE. The 3d Battalion was located on its objective in the vicinity of the BRUNNWALD. Using all supporting weapons and artillery the 2d and 3d Battalions repulsed strong enemy counterattacks, destroyed six enemy tanks in the HOUSSEN area. The enemy counterattacks were stopped before the 1st Battalion positions. During the period the 254th Infantry, less its 2d battalion, continued its attack on Hill 216 and South to the WEISS River, with the 1st Battalion as the assault element. Toward the end of the previous period Company B had been pinned down, in consequence of which Company C was committed around Company B's left flank at 1210 hours. By 1230 hours the 3d Battalion had seized all of Hill 216. The 1st Battalion continued South to the road, where enemy fire from the vicinity of the WEISS River halted the advance. The 3d Battalion was committed around the 1st Battalion's flank at 1800 hours, and by 2010 had reached the WEISS and held the river line to the juncture of the FECHT. At 0940 one company started out with the mission to mop up along the FECHT River from its juncture with the WEISS a mile up stream. The 2d Battalion was relieved during the night from position by passage through its lines by the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments.

The 1st DMI reached the ILL River at dawn on the 23d of January. The 22d BMNA* crossed at about 0930 East of the ST HIPPOLYTE Mill, and then continued to JUNGHURST and Hill 176. Its patrols advanced Eastward.

Patrols reported that there were numerous plastic mines along the entire strip of occupied terrain, particularly along the roads and paths which were covered with snow and ice. Mine-clearance therefore had to be undertaken before vehicles carrying bridge-building equipment could move into position.

Artillery support was strong during the day. In the afternoon, air support was given in the JEBSHEIM, ELSENHEIM, and OHNENHEIM areas, and

* BMNA - Battalion Marche North African

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

German batteries west of JEBSHEIM. RESTRICTED

The enemy had reacted vigorously to the day's fighting, employing local counterattacks, artillery and mortar fire. Sniper and anti-tank fire in the Northeastern edges of the ILLWALD hampered traffic as far as the SELESTAT-COLMAR road.

At the end of the day, the II Corps' objective number one had been reached only in the South. The ILL River crossings had been secured, but the bridges were not covered adequately enough in the 1st DMI sector and in the GARDET Brigade sub-sector to allow the Combat Commands to deploy on the Eastern shore.

Noon 24 January to noon 25 January: Slow, stubborn advance continued in the 3d Division's 7th Infantry zone. Company A rejoined the 1st Battalion at about 1430 in the vicinity of the Chateau, having crossed from BOIS DIT DE ROTHLEIBLE across the intervening open flats under smoke-fog cover. The 1st Battalion finally dug persistent enemy out of the Chateau area by 1850, and likewise had by then cleared the woods between the railroad tracks and west to the FECHT River. Enemy infiltrated into the neck of the BRUNNWALD woods, and were engaged with fire by the 3d Battalion. At the opening of the period the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, began attacking through the 3d Battalion at the MAISON ROUGE bridge toward the woods Northeast of RIEDWIHR. The advance progressed rapidly to the edge of the woods, where enemy tanks and infantry were encountered. Elements of the 1st Battalion entered the woods but were forced to withdraw. The 2d Battalion attacked at 0300 toward RIEDWIHR, and encountered enemy machine gun, 20mm, tank, and mortar fire approximately 500 yards Northwest of RIEDWIHR. Two of our tanks and one tank destroyer became stuck in the mud and the battalion withdrew approximately 700 yards. The 3d Battalion attacked at 0300 hours and encountered enemy just North of RIEDWIHR and JEBSHEIM. Company K was badly disorganized and withdrew. Company L succeeded in driving the enemy from the buildings and established a block in the vicinity of the road junction. At the close of the period the 3d Battalion was awaiting relief by French elements, preparatory to attacking RIEDWIHR. During the night enemy reinforced his elements in the neck of the BRUNNWALD woods, and offered stiff resistance to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry raid over the night. At 0555, following heavy artillery and mortar concentrations on HOUSSEN and adjacent areas, the 7th Infantry (less Company L, left to contain enemy in BRUNNWALD woods) with its attached armor made an all-out assault to the South, with the three battalions abreast. The 1st Battalion reached its objective just West of HOUSSEN at 0630. The 3d Battalion entered HOUSSEN at 0745 catching the enemy by surprise, and the 2d Battalion was reported in the town at 0800. At the close of the period STATION DE BENNWIHR had been captured, Company G was located between ROSENKRANZ and HOUSSEN; 2d Battalion (-) and 3d Battalion (-) were in HOUSSEN, and fighting to clear it. During the period the 30th Infantry regrouped and organized defensive positions. The 254th Regiment less the 2d Battalion continued to hold the WEISS River line from power line to the junction with FECHT River. The enemy position at the bridge was knocked out at 1415, with ten emeny killed and 1 captured. Elements of the regiment were relieved on position by the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry (28th U. S. Division); relief was completed by 0700 and command of sector assumed by the Commanding Officer

50

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of the 3d Battali , 112th Infantry. The 2d Batt. on was released from attachement to 15th Infantry at 1030 and reverted to regimental control.

To exploit the crossing of the ILL River by the DELANGE Brigade, GENERAL DE MONTSABERT ordered the Commanding General of the 1st DMI to employ as rapidly as possible the CCV of the 2d DB to advance along the ILLHAUESERN-ELSENHEIM axis, where it would proceed to attack MARCK-OLSHEIM and OHNEHEIM. At the same time, the 5th DB received orders to hold itself in readiness to advance as quickly as possible along the ILLHAUESERN-JEBSHEIM- NEUF BRISACH AXIS.

The greater part of this period was taken by the 1st DMI to clear the terrain gained the previous day. Mopping-up of GEMEINMARK by the 22d BMNA began, and the BM XI and the Legion began clearing the ILLHAUESERN of the enemy.

Attempts to extend the 1st Brigade bridgehead were resumed in the morning. The 3d BLE* crossed the BENNWASSER, while the 2d BLE took the RIED Mill after a pitched battle. The battalion then advanced toward the ERLEN and ELSENHEIM woods. The BM XI* entered these woods, and upon arriving at the Southwest edges, it was counterattacked by mixed formations coming from JEBSHEIM and GROSSENHEIM.

After being reinforced, the ILLHAUSERN bridge was opened to traffic at 0400 hours. The bridge over the ORCHBACH was opened at 0700 hours.

At 1235, the Legion launched an attack in the ERLEN woods and took them at 1430. CCV reconnaissance elements attempted to advance along the ELSENHEIM road. Immediately, the enemy counterattacked and revealed heavy tanks concealed in the Southern edges of the woods. One tank destroyer was destroyed. The platoon withdrew to the RIED Mill.

The 9-ton boat bridges installed at JUGHURST and the Bailey Bridges thrown over the ILL River at point 176 were opened to traffic in the early part of the afternoon. However, the bridgehead was still too small for armor to operate freely.

There were few aerial sorties, but support was effective upon the HOUSSEN-WICKERSCHWIHR area, and even more so on the OHNENHEIM-ELSENSHEIM and GRUSSENHEIM areas.

The main opposition the enemy offered was in a constant watch over the bridgeheads, throwing in many counterattacks with infantry and tanks. From the BENFELD sector, the enemy had withdrawn the 198th Rife Battalion, the 2d Battalion of the 308th Infantry Regiment, the 235th Pioneer Battalion, as well as some elements of the VOLKSGRENADIERS then resting in the MARCKOLSHEIM area. Lastly, some elements arrived from the VOSGES Sector (Elemer K. G. and the 67th Rcn. Bn., 2d Mountain Division).

The Corps objective Number 1 had been completely attained and slightly passed in the South. The FLOSS crossing at KATZENTANGENBRUCK had fallen into our hands. To the East, in the American sector, the bridgehead was not very deep but fairly wide. General de MONTSABERT

*BLE--Battalion Legion Etranger. BM XI--11th Bn. de Marche

51

0235

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ordered General du IGIER to coordinate action by t two participating divisions and to direct activities of CCV and CC6 in these sectors.

Noon 25 January to noon 26 January: On the 25th of January, the Commanding General of the First French Army ordered Commanding General of the French II Corps to operate in the direction of RIEDWIHR-BRISACH with the maximum of infantry and to increase the density of his tanks in accordance with progress into enemy dispositions.

The 3d Division would move up at least two RCT's on the RIEDWIHR-BRISACH axis. Its zone of action was therefore slightly extended towards the East, starting from the 28th Infantry Division's boundary. On the other hand, it was reduced at the course of the ILL River South of HOUSSEN.

The 28th Infantry Division (US) would hold the sector between the ILL River and the VOSGES Mountains. It would operate in the direction of COLMAR in conjunction with the 3d Infantry Division.

Operations: In spite of all its efforts, the 1st DMI was not able to open the Cross-roads 177 to armor. The 2d Brigade was also unsuccessful in aligning itself on the 1st Brigade.

BM 4 moved up two companies to the Southeastern corner of the ILLWALD, while the 22nd BMM attacked the SPECK woods. It was stopped by violent fire from mortars, tanks, and automatic arms and suffered heavy losses which forced it to retire.

The 1st Brigade resumed its advance. BM XI and the Legion penetrated deeply into the ELSENHEIM woods without succeeding in dislodging the German tanks deployed there, which were protected by well-entrenched infantry.

At the beginning of the period, elements of the 3d U. S. Infantry Division cleared and captured HOUSSEN, ROSENKRANZ, and RIEDWIHR. The 7th Infantry inflicted heavy casualties on the counterattacking enemy, and repulsed them. The 1st Battalion then continued to attack against stiff resistance, and established a line from a point just west of the RHONE-RHINE Canal along the East-west road leading into ROSENKRANZ. The enemy counterattacked the 3d Battalion positions with tanks and infantry at 0200, and was repulsed. At 1600 hours, the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion on its flank, attacked, and by 1700 had advanced approximately 600 yards into the woods. The battalion then held up in order to be re-supplied with ammunition, and at 0200 the attack was resumed. By 0450 the battalion was consolidating in the Southern edge of the woods between the ILL River and RIEDWIHR. The 2d Battalion, on the 1st Battalion's left flank attacked the woods from positions Northwest of RIEDWIHR, halted to be re-supplied at 1930, and then resumed the attack. By 0930 of the 26th January, the 2d Battalion had reached its objective on the southern edge of the woods. The 3d Bn attacked toward RIEDWIHR at 2100 and reached the edge of the town by 2335, entered it by 0020, and the town was reported completely cleared of the enemy by 0130. Company L outposted the woods South and East of RIEDWIHR and patrols were sent toward WICKERSCHWIHR.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0236

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

The 254th Infantry attacked toward JEBSHEIM at 1600. The attack was temporarily halted by intense enemy small arm and machine gun fire from the woods and from the Northwest tip of JEBSHEIM. Hasty defensive positions were prepared along the stream line to the vicinity of JEBSHEIM Mill. The 254th Infantry then re-organized and prepared to continue the attack.

Armored units had begun to move across the ILL River during the morning of the 25th. CCV and CC6 began to cross the bridge built by Americans at HILL 178 at LINDMATTEN, this being the only region where the II French Corps possessed a bridgehead of any depth.

The SARRAZAC Sub-Groupement of the Combat Command V (CCV) proceeded again in the direction of Cross-roads 177 South of the ELSENHEIM Woods, while other elements moved towards 177 in the direction of GRUSSENHEIM. It was finally stopped, however, by well-emplaced German armor in the ELSENHEIM Woods.

CC6 of the 5th DB turned to the South in the direction of the JEBSHEIM Mill and of RIEDWIHR, which was in the general direction of NEUF BRISACH.

The CHAYLA Sub-Groupement, reinforced by a battalion from the 1st Parachute Regiment, attacked at 0800 hours the cross-roads 180 to the West of the Mill, in conjunction with the 15th Infantry's (3d Division) push on RIEDWIHR. Passing the 15th Infantry, it attacked the mill and occupied it, then following up by reaching the woods situated to the Northeast.

Sub-Groupement BOULANGER, covering the left flank and the rear of the CHAYLA sub-groupement, moved its main effort toward Hill 178.

The Vieville Sub-Groupement followed it during the afternoon, moving into the RIEDWIHR woods to take positions for the next morning's attack.

These operations had been heavily supported by Allied Artillery, which partly made up for the lack of aerial support, temporarily grounded because of bad weather. The enemy had reacted vigorously throughout the day, counterattacking at ROSENKRANZ, inflicting heavy casualties on infantry units by mortar fire. HUTTENHEIM was severely bombarded and a great deal of harassing fire was taken by HOUSSEN and the region Northwest of RIEDWIHR. The enemy had thrown in fresh reserves, and by the end of the 25th of January, the units had been identified.

Noon 26 January to noon 27 January: In accordance with orders given the evening of the 25th, the 28th U. S. Infantry introduced a RCT between its former Eastern limit and the course of the ILL River. The Commanding General decided that the 1st DMI would be given the mission of opening the ILLHAUSERN-GRUSSENHEIM-JEBSHEIM route and covering its entire length without aid from the 5th DB. All of the efforts of the 5th DB would be directed towards the completion of its mission in the BRISACH direction. The CC5 of the 5th DB was alerted, ready to exploit in that direction if possibe. CC6 would continue along the JEBSHEIM-DURRENENTZEN axis in conjunction with the 3d U. S. Infantry Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0237

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Operations: During the afternoon of January 26th to noon of the 27th, the 3d U. S. Infantry Division continued its attack toward the COLMAR Canal. HOLTZWIHR and WICKERSCHWIHR were cleared, and JEBSHEIM was partly captured. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th Infantry made local attacks and improved their positions. The 3d Battalion, following artillery preparations, attacked South from the BRUNNWALD woods, B/P* attacked East of HOUSSEN, and Company L attacked from the South. The attack, launched at 1300, was made for the purpose of clearing the enemy who was well entrenched between the dyke and the ILL River on the left flank. Company I advanced, then fought and reduced enemy strongpoints in the area South of ROSENKRANZ. Artillery continued to fire at enemy personnel. The 109th Infantry (28th U. S. Infantry Division) relieved the 7th Infantry (3d Division) during the night. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 15th Infantry were counterattacked at 1430 hours in their positions in the Southern edges of LE SCHWALHOLTZ and LE MOENCHWALD woods. Enemy infantry supported by two tanks counterattacked the 1st Battalion positions on the west side of the woods, knocking out one of its tank destroyers, and one enemy tank overrunning Company B positions. The Germans who had simultaneously attacked the 2d Battalion were dispersed by artillery and friendly fighter-bombers. Some enemy entered the woods from the East to infiltrate behind the 2d Battalion positions; a task force of infantry supported by one flakwagon attacked South through the Eastern half of the woods to clear it of the enemy. The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry moved forward and cleared the road leading Southwest from RIEDWIHR to the west of WICKERSCHWIHR at 0510, while the 2d Battalion left its assembly area at 0445 in an attack toward the COLMAR Canal, co-ordinating with French units on its flank. By the end of the period, the 1st Battalion reported that WICKERSCHWIHR had been cleared of the enemy. Company E reported the East side of HOLTZWIHR clear by 0950.

The 254th Infantry resumed its attack to seize JEBSHEIM and BOIS DE JEBSHEIM and to secure crossings over the COLMAR Canal in its zone. Beginning the attack at 1630, the 1st Battalion on the right encountered heavy enemy resistance 500 yards North of JEBSHEIM (from a pillbox which was 7 feet in height and manned by 12 men). The pillbox was reduced and the advance continued. The 2d Battalion entered JEBSHEIM at 2355, following a 15-minute artillery barrage, with the 1st Battalion following. House-to-house fighting continued throughout the night and during the following morning. By the end of the period all but the Southern tip of the town was cleared. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion of the 254th Regiment had attacked at 1750 on the 26th of January, with the mission of advancing Southeast and clearing BOIS DE JEBSHEIM from the South. Prepared enemy positions were encountered along the stream line west of JEBSHEIM. By 1200 hours the battalion had reached the Southern tip of the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM, and had by-passed many of the enemy strong points. Preparations were under way to reduce them.

In the 1st DMI sector, efforts to enlarge the breach in its bridgehead was met with furious resistance. It was not able to clear the enemy from the ELSENHEIM woods, and to open the crossroads of the ELSENHEIM and GROSSENHEIM roads at Hill 177.

* B/P--Parachute Battalion.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0238

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

CC5, coming from the South, succeeded in taking the cross-roads 177, the enemy losing two panther tanks and tracked vehicles, along with two self-propelled guns in this action. Elements of the 1st DMI and of CC5, separated by the ELSENHEIM road, could not make a junction. German infantry supported by armor, and protected by a network of mines, traps, and abatis, succeeded in holding them back during the day of the 26th.

Farther to the North the BM5 which had moved up to the Northeast corner of the ILLWALD on the 25th of January, fell back on BENNWASSER as a result of enemy counterattack.

Artillery was less active than on the previous days. Air support was given in the operations around HOLTZWIHR and WICKERSCHWIHR.

The enemy was observed to be re-grouping in the zone North of COLMAR all of his units that were not indispensible elsewhere. He moved up the KAMPFGRUPPE ELLENWANGER and the 1523d Artillery Battalion, which he was using as infantry. He also threw into the same zone units of his 2d Mountain Division (3d Bn of the 136th Regt; 2d Bn of the 137th Regt; 55th Antitank Bn; 3d Artillery Regt; 82d Pioneer Bn). Some of these units were incomplete. Enemy artillery was not very active.

The Corps objective number 1 was almost entirely reached on the whole front of attack South of the ELSENHEIM woods. On the Southern front, the American elements were a short distance away from the First Army objective. The German resistance was weakening, with dispositions breaking up at all points. The II Corps' armor was ready to exploit at the opportune time.

Noon 27 January to noon 28 January: Elements of the 3d U. S. Infantry Division continued to clear the area in the vicinity of the ILL River-Colmar Canal junction East to WICKERSCHWIHR. Numerous reconnaissance patrols were maintained along the North bank of the COLMAR Canal in preparation for the impending crossing operations. Several of the Division's patrols drew enemy machine gun fire from the Southern banks of the Canal. At 1715 hours Company G of the 30th Infantry attacked to clear the area North of the Canal. The Company moved rapidly through the area on the western outskirts of WICKERSCHWIHR, and at 1745, was engaged in a firefight. At 1915 two enemy tanks pulled up on the South side of the canal and fired directly into a Company G platoon position, forcing it to withdraw toward HOLTZWIHR. Between 2000 and 0130 accurate enemy tank fire prevented patrols from approaching the canal bridge. At the end of the period Company G was preparing to resume the attack South toward the canal. At 1620 Company L moved to sweep the 3d Battalion's right flank as far East as the ILL River and South to the COLMAR Canal. By 2000 Company L had reached its objective at the Canal- ILL River junction, having progressed against enemy artillery and small arm fire. At 2015 the company was relieved and moved back to its former position in the vicinity of RIEDWIHR.

The 254th Infantry continued mopping up in the Southern part of JEBSHEIM and began to establish defensive postions in its sector. Heavy enemy self-propelled fire from BOIS DE LA HARDT East of JEBSHEIM prevented

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0239

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

supporting tank destroyers from reducing enemy strongpoints. By the end of the period mopping up still continued in this sector. The 3d Battalion completed its mission of clearing BOIS DE JEBSHEIM and South in its Zone to the COLMAR Canal. Enemy strong-points along the stream line on the western outskirts of JEBSHEIM, by-passed during the initial attack, were reduced. Aggressive patrols were maintained throughout the 3d Battalion zone to check possible enemy infiltration from the direction of JEBSHEIM.

CC4 of the 5th DB extended its zone of operations on the 27th of January toward the right of the 3d Division's 30th Infantry. CC5 sent out sub-groupements in the region of JEBSHEIM Mill, in order to cover the Northern flank of the 3d Division's operation and to assure contact with the 1st DMI.

In the 1st DMI sector, the efforts to expand the bridgehead at ILLHAUESERN partly succeeded, giving CC5 a chance to deploy. Supported by the PUTZ Sub-Groupement of CC5, the 1st BLE crossed the BLIND at the bridge emplacement of the ILLHAUESERN-GRUSSENHEIM road by cross-road 177, reaching within 400 meters of the edge of this last village.

Sub-Groupement SARRAZAC established contact with BM XI of the 1st DMI to the East of the ELSENHEIM woods. The enemy still resisted at the ELSENHEIM Mill, but the road was finally cleared and the woods mopped up. In the RCT 2 sector there was no advance. The enemy harassed BM 4 and BM5 with artillery fire.

Artillery support was not very active. Bad weather again kept the air corps from supporting ground troops.

During the day the Germans showed signs of disorganization. Enemy artillery was fairly active in the 1st DMI sector. The GUEMAR and ILLHAUESERN area received harassing and concentrated fire, as did the 3d Division sector of RIEDWIHR, WICKERSCHWIHR, and HOLTZWIHR.

28 January to noon 29 January: The Commanding General of the 6th Army Group placed at the disposal of the Commanding General First French Army the XXI U. S. Corps including the 75th Infantry Division (US). The II French Corps released at 2100 hours the 3d and the 28th U. S. Infantry Divisions, the 5th French DB and attached infantry (1st Parachute Chasseurs Regiment, Schock Groupement GAMBIEZ), which were turned over to the XXI Corps for operational control.

The Southern boundary of the II French Corps on the 28th of January at 2100 hours, ran through ARTZENHEIM-JEBSHEIM-BERGHEIM-BOERSCH. As its mission the Corps would carry on along the GUEMAR-MARCKOLSHEIM-SASBACH axis, and to the North wouldcover the advance of the XXI U. S. Corps heading South. The II Corps was thus withdrawn from its original mission - exploitation in the direction of NEUF BRISACH. The Corps was nevertheless to participate as an active spectator and cover the advance of the XXI Corps. A mixed liaison detachement of the II Corps was created, comprised of the 1st Battalion of the 1st DMI, and an armored element from the 5th DB in the strength of a sub-groupement. This detachment, while operating along the GUEMAR-GRUSSENHEIM axis, was to be constantly in a position to aid the advance of the left flank of the XXI Corps by enveloping points of resistance which would possibly hold up this advance.

56

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0240

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The II French Corps would cover the XXI Corps by taking ELSENHEIM and the woods North of the ELSENHEIM Mill, working along the North corner of the OHNENHEIM woods to OHNENHEIM - MARCKOLSHEIM and the RHONE-RHINE Canal. The Corps would proceed as soon as possible with the mopping up of the regions North of KRAFFT and from SALESTAT to the East and to the South. When this was accomplished, it would push East to the RHINE River between KRAFFT and ARTZENHEIM.

The 1st DMI was to retain its offensive mission along the ILLHAUESERN-ELSENHEIM-GRUSSENHEIM axis.

General du VIGIER, co-ordinating the action of the 1st DMI and the 5th DB, estimated that it would be necessary to establish a solid covering between ARTZENHEIM and the ELSENHEIM Mill, before making an attack in strength to the South of the COLMAR Canal. The 1st DMI, with CC5 of the 5th DB, were ordered to seize ELSENHEIM and block the canal crossing west of MARCKOLSHEIM as a first priority measure. As soon as possible it was to complete mopping up the woods North of the ELSENHEIM Mill and begin an advance toward OHNENHEIM.

The 5th DB, using its parachute troops and CC6, was to capture GRUSSENHEIM by an operation launched in the first half of the night with the idea of disorganizing enemy attempts to reinforce. CC6 would be reinforced for this attack by the PUTZ Detachment from CC5, which was in the immediate sector.

Operations: The day's main action took place at GRUSSENHEIM. It was anticipated by the II Corps that CC6 would take the village by a night action in support of the 2d DB's PUTZ Sub-Groupement. The 1st BLE was to furnish the infantry support.

The 1st BLE crossed the BLIND River on the evening of the 27th, and approached the outskirts of GRUSSENHEIM. Two companies and two tanks of CC5 gave it protection for the construction of a bridge, after crossing to the East bank. At midnight the enemy poured from GRUSSENHEIM and counterattacked with self-propelled weapons. The 1st BLE and the Engineer elements succeeded in blocking the counterattack at the price of heavy losses. They reorganized during the night, and in the early morning, the 1st BLE finished crossing the BLIND over the bridge which had been pounded by artillery fire. A Tank Destroyer caught on fire on the bridge, obstructing other armored elements of the CC5. They subsequently moved toward JEBSHEIM and then moved again to the North. During this movement, Colonel PUTZ and Commandant PUIG (Chief of Staff, CC5) were killed.

At 1400 hours, the armored groupement reached GRUSSENHEIM from the south, after crossing the BLIND at JEBSHEIM. Despite losses, the 1st BLE advanced toward the Northwest of the strongly defended village. The first houses were taken by an assault at 1500 hours. Mopping-up operations continued until 1800. In the meantime, a counterattack by enemy infantry and tanks was stopped at the exit from ELSENHEIM by friendly protective fire and that of Corps heavy artillery. Two enemy tanks were destroyed.

Combat Command 6, recalled to clean up JEBSHEIM, was not successful in carrying out the anticipated operation upon GRUSSENHEIM. At JEBSHEIM the enemy put up fierce resistance. After violent fighting, in which the

RESTRICTED

57

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0241

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Regiment de Parachutistes particularly distinguished itself, the village was entirely cleared by 1800.*

To the South, CC4 supported mopping-up operations of the 3d Infantry Division on ground taken the 27th of January.

Enemy artillery had shown less and less activity. It laid down some harassing fire upon ILLHAUSERN and across the ILL River upon OSTHEIM and BEBLENHEIM. The enemy had thrown in reinforcements in the JEBSHEIM area, using a new battalion of the K. G. HURSTH, with a troop strength of about 500 which had come from HAGUENAU.

At the end of the day (the 28th of January) the COLMAR Canal was reached along its entire length between the FECHT and the HARDT Woods. Operational forces were ready and well covered to the North. But beginning at 2100 hours the II Corps zone was bounded on the South by the North boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. The entire activity of the II Corps was redirected to the East.

29 January: In the morning, the 1st DMI resumed its attack. The 2d RCT attacked in the direction of the OHNENHEIM Woods. At 1235 hours the 1st RFM and two companies of the 22d BMNA were at the edge of the woods. At 1330 hours, mopping-up of enemy units was completed, but the SPECK Woods remained in the hands of the enemy. The Germans held on until they were half-encircled.

The 3d BLE cleared out the woods Southwest of OHNENHEIM. At 1600 hours the SARRAZAC Groupment of CC5 from the 2d DB attacked the MUSMATTEN Woods and succeeded in clearing it as far as the BLIND River. By the end of the day, the river was reached along its entire length between the ENSISHEIM Mill, which was still in the enemy's hands, and Hill 175 in the MUSMATTEN Woods.

Everywhere in the sector the enemy was apparently withdrawing the main body of his troops, leaving only a system of outposts which were fairly powerful and active.

The primary objective was attained. In the evening the order was given to maintain contact in anticipation of a general enemy withdrawal.

31 January: On the 9th day of the offensive, the enemy was incapable of offering organized resistance, and began a withdrawal along the entire II Corps front. At daybreak, the Corps units were no longer able to maintain contact.

The 22d BMNA completed mopping up the OHNENHEIM Woods. During the afternoon the BM 4 occupied this woods, as well as the SPECK Woods. The 15th Tabor occupied HEIDOLSHEIM.

With the RCT 1, BM 21 found ELSENHEIM to be unoccupied, while one element of the 1st RFM, accompanied by one company from BM 21, reconnoitered the OHNENHEIM Mill. BM 4 and the 15th GTM** occupied OHNENHEIM

*For action of 254th Inf (US) at JEBSHEIM see Chapter V, page 2 and Small Unit Action "Attack on Jebsheim".

**GTM--Group Tabor Morrocan

RESTRICTED

58

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and HEIDOLSHEIM by evening.

RESTRICTED

In the 2d DB sector, it was retarded only by deep snow and mine fields. It reached OBENHEIM and GERSTHEIM and advanced toward MUTTERHOLZ.

1 February: The enemy withdrawal continued during the day of February 1st. The operations of the II Corps were limited to consolidating and occupying territory abandoned by the Germans. The Corps reached the RHINE, which it occupied along its entire front.

The 1st RFM*, in a reconnaissance of the RHINE, found that the MARCKOLSHEIM Bridge had been destroyed. The 4th Troop met only sporadic resistance when it reconnoitered the SPONECK Inn. The 2d Troop patrols contact the enemy at ARTZENHEIM, but after an attack by armored elements from CC5, the village was taken at 1630.

The 8th RCA mopped up the remaining enemy units in the HARDT Woods.

To the north, the 1st RFM made contact with the 2d DB at SUNDHOUSE. It cleared KRAFFT and occupied all the area west of the RHONE-RHINE Canal. In the course of the afternoon it crossed the canal to the North and took GERSTHEIM, OBENHEIM and BOOFZHEIM. It moved toward SCHOENAU and at the end of the evening reached the RHINE along all of its sector.

* * * * * *

During the 10 days operation for the reduction of the Colmar Pocket, Allied units of the II French Corps lost 347 men killed in action, 1843 wounded, and 608 missing. It captured 2171 prisoners.

* RFM - Reg. Fusillens Marin

59

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0243

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



COLMAR POCKET
ZONE of XXI CORPS
JANUARY 28•1945
MAP: CENTRAL EUROPE 1:100,000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Part V

PARTICIPATION OF THE XXI U. S. CORPS
in the Reduction of the COLMAR Pocket
26 January 45 to 7 February 45

BACKGROUND:

The XXI U. S. Corps, commanded by Major General FRANK W. MILBURN, assumed command of the sector occupied by the 3rd U. S. Infantry Division and the 28th U. S. Infantry Division at 2100 hours, 28 January 1945. At that time the 28th Infantry Division was holding a line on the VOSGES Mountains with three regiments plus the 290th Engineer Combat Battalion. Activity in this sector was limited to strong and aggressive patrol action to contain the enemy. The 3rd Infantry Division with the 254th Infantry (63rd Infantry Division (US)) attached was continuing an attack begun the 22 of January, where stiff resistance was met by the 254th Infantry in clearing JEBSHEIM and the 30th Infantry (3rd Division) encountered a stubborn enemy in the area Southwest of HOLTZWIHR between the ILL River and the COLMAR Canal.

In accordance with instructions issued by the Army Commander at a conference held the night of January 26th at the CP of the 3rd Division in RIBEAUVILLE and attended by the Corps and Division Commanders, plans were made and orders issued for the attack to secure the Army objective line in Zone of the XXI Corps.

The plan called for the 3rd Infantry Division to secure a bridgehead across the COLMAR Canal and continue the attack assisted by the 5th French DB toward NEUF BRISACH. After crossing had been secured the 75th Infantry Division (US), which was assembling in the Corps area, was to pass through the right of the 3rd Infantry Division and attack to secure the East bank of the ILL River to the Army objective line. The 28th Infantry Division was to make strong demonstrations in its Zone and follow closely any enemy withdrawal.

THE OPERATION:

Noon January 28 to noon 29 January: Strong reconnaissance patrols were sent along the COLMAR Canal during the period in search of possible enemy installations and possible bridge sites for the coming operation.

The 254th Infantry continued fighting in its effort to clear the town of JEBSHEIM. * Other units of the division made prep-

* For French action at JEBSHEIM see Chapter IV, Page 25, and "Small Unit Action, Attack on JEBSHEIM", Page 17, fifth line from bottom.

0245

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

arations for the forthcoming operation. At the close of the period fighting continued in JEBSHEIM. At 2100 the 3rd U. S. Infantry Division, with attached units, and the 28th U. S. Infantry Division passed from control of the II French Corps to the XXI U. S. Corps.

Noon January 29 to noon 30 January: The operation "KRAUT BUSTER" began with crossings of the COLMAR Canal. By 2205 hours the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Infantry (3rd Division), had completed crossing, and by 2400 the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry (3rd Division) had also crossed, with each regiment crossing its reserve battalion immediately after. The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry engaged the enemy in a small arms firefight on the Southern bank of the canal opposite WICKERSCHWIHR. Company B engaged the enemy while the remainder of the battalion moved into BISCHWIHR at 2245 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry, moving fast, was approaching WIHR-EN-PLAINE in the face of enemy tank and small arms fire by 0130. Companies F and G entered the town at 0205 as enemy armor penetrated between the two companies and the Battalion OP group. At 0630 the battalion received a strong enemy counterattack composed of armor and infantry, and fierce fighting ensued. The 3rd Battalion encountered some enemy resistance in BISCHWIHR. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry, reorganized after crossing the canal and attacked MUNTZENHEIM from the West, with the 3rd Battalion on the left. Company K was reported on its objective at 0110 and the first elements of the 2nd Battalion were reported in the town by 0130. After clearing MUNTZENHEIM, the 3rd Battalion remained in the town and the 2nd Battalion attacked FORTSCHWIHR from the Northeast in conjunction with the 1st Battalion (-), which attacked South to the town from its assembly areas.

The 254th Infantry Regiment continued its attack during the period South from the Southern edge of JEBSHEIM to the COLMAR Canal and East to the junction of the COLMAR - RHONE-RHINE Canal. In JEBSHEIM fierce house-to-house and street fighting continued throughout the 29th of January. By 2100 all enemy resistance South to the COLMAR Canal had been cleared, and an area approximately 800 yards East of JEBSHEIM. At that time the 254th Infantry prepared defensive positions for the night preparatory to continuing the attack to the East. At 0930 the 1st Battalion with Company F in reserve attacked East toward the COLMAR - RHONE-RHINE Canal junction. By 1200 slight progress had been made. At the close of the period the following results had been accomplished during the 24 hours: JEBSHEIM, BISCHWIHR, FORSCHWIHR, and MUNTZENHEIM had been cleared and fighting was being carried on for the remainder of WIHR-EN-PLAINE. Approximately 800 prisoners were taken during this period, about 400 of them in the JEBSHEIM area. The 5th French DB was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division as of 1635, 29th of January.

On January 29th, the 28th Infantry Division launched an attack in the zone of the 109th Infantry to shorten the gap along the ILL River. This attack made moderate progress against strong enemy resistance.

63

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0247

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



COLMAR POCKET
ZONE of XXI CORPS
JANUARY 30·1945
MAP: CENTRAL EUROPE 1:100,000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The 75th U. S. Infantry Division closed in the Corps area and reconnaissance was begun for commitment of the division.

Enemy resistance to the 3rd Infantry Division's crossing of the COLMAR Canal was not strong. The enemy was driven from the villages of BISCHWIHR, MUNTZENHEIM, FORTSCHWIHR, and WIHR-EN-PLAINE with no great effort and more than 400 prisoners taken. At the end of the 29/30 period elements of the 3rd Division had lost contact with the enemy. His resistance in JEBSHEIM was finally broken and more than 500 prisoners were taken. Enemy infantry and armor East of JEBSHEIM fought fiercely against our advance toward the RHINE-RHONE Canal--attached French armor was engaged by enemy armored elements, and a violent battle took place there. Enemy West of the ILL River about a mile North of the COLMAR Canal - ILL River junction engaged in a fire fight with our forces on the opposite bank of the river.

Noon 30 January to noon 31 January: The attack of the 3rd Division to the South and East continued. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry, and Company L repulsed an enemy counterattack in WIHR-EN-PLAINE early in the afternoon of the 30th, and at 1430, with the Regimental Battle Patrol attached, attacked the enemy in the Southern half of the town which was cleared of all the enemy after a hard, close-in fight. The enemy again counterattacked at 1830, and was repulsed with losses. The 2nd Battalion attacked enemy in the Southwestern edge of the town at 2230, followed by French Armored Infantry force of CC4 with the intention of passing through after the road junction had been taken. A fierce fight ensued. By 2345 the 2nd Battalion had reached the Eastern outskirts of HORBOURG against stiff opposition, but were held up by an enemy anti-tank ditch 250 yards East of the road junction leading into the town. The enemy counterattacked at 0700, and was repulsed only after a bitter fight. By the end of the period the road junction had been seized against fanatical resistance, and the 2nd Battalion pushed on toward HORBOURG, still against heavy opposition.

The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry crossed the highway just East of ANDOLSHEIM and took up positions. Two hundred enemy forming for counterattack in the woods to the Northwest were taken under artillery fire. The 1st Battalion at the end of the period was scouring the NIEDERWALD woods for isolated enemy groups. The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Infantry, moving out of BISCHWIHR at 0930 for the woods, encountered strong small arms resistance, killing many of the Germans.

The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of FORTSCHWIHR at 1640 and attacked the woods to the Southeast. Little or no resistance was encountered. Elements of French Armored CC5 attacked URSCHENHEIM from MUNTZENHEIM at 1700. The town was reported clear of the enemy at 2000. At 0500 the French attacked DURRENENTZEN, entering the town from the West and South with tanks. As points were taken, elements of the 15th Infantry occupied them.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The 30th Infantry spent the period re-grouping and preparing for forthcoming operations.

The 1st Battalion of the 254th Infantry continued its attack East from JEBSHEIM toward the RHONE-RHINE Canal in conjunction with the French CC6. Heavy enemy automatic fire was received from the COLMAR Canal and the HARDT Woods East of DURRENENTZEN. An enemy countertacck was repulsed and by 1200 hours our troops were on a line facing the COLMAR-Canal - RHONE-RHINE Canal junction. The 3rd Battalion of the 254th Infantry established a defensive position on the left of the 1st Battalion extending North around BEGSHEIM to and including the JEBSHEIM-GRUSSENHEIM road. At 1900 hours the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on position.

In the Zone of the 28th U. S. Infantry Division, small advances were made against intensive small arms and machine gun fire. The 9th Zouaves Regiment (French) relieved the 110th Infantry (28th Division).

Noon 31 January to noon 1 February: The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry (3rd Division) continued to clean out the NEIDERWALD Forest. French armor operating with the 1st Battalion was North of ANDOLSHEIM, and at 1833 hours, reported heavy enemy movements East of WIDENSOLEN. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry, Company L, and CC4 elements attacked HORBOURG at the beginning of the period and by 1435 were in the town fighting a strong enemy. By 1535 half the town was in friendly hands, with infantry fighting house-to-house as French armor drove on through. Artillery was directed on enemy withdrawing from the town. By the end of the period HORBOURG had been completely cleared. The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Infantry (-Company L) fought to clear the enemy from the woods Southwest of FORTSCHWIHR, and by 1555 hours, reported it cleared. The 7th Infantry was relieved by elements of the 289th Infantry (75th Infantry Division) during the night.

The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry (3rd Division) attacked East from URSCHENHEIM at 0100 to clear the woods and secure a bridge across the RHONE-RHINE Canal in the vicinity of KUNHEIM. At the close of the period, it had reached positions along the edge of the woods and was covering the bridge with fire. Tank Destroyer and artillery fire were effectively adjusted on enemy crossing the bridge, and to the East of the Canal. At the beginning of the period the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry, was in MUNTZENHEIM, with Company I in URSCHENHEIM and Company L in the outskirts of DURRENENTZEN. The French were having difficulty in clearing this village. Company L was pulled back at 2345 and the French at 0015. Artillery concentrations were fired on the town from 0025 to 0033, following which the French re-entered and continued to clear it.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry (3rd Division) attacked toward the RHONE-RHINE Canal at 0100. Company A reached

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0251

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

its objective at 0625 and fired on enemy vehicles with its Cannon Company and artillery fire. Companies B and C reached the Canal's East bank at 0637. At 0717 Company C was in the process of crossing the canal in the vicinity of the locks on the Eastern edge of the BIESHEIM Woods. An enemy personnel column in the vicinity of KUNHEIM, on the Eastern bank of the Canal, was fired upon by our artillery at 0745. Two enemy tanks attacked Company A at 0722, but were driven off.

The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry moved from its assembly area, and at 0100 attacked to the Southeast. At 0158 the leading elements drew enemy mortar and artillery fire; at 0400 the battalion was moving toward the WIDENSOLEN-BIESHEIM road which crossed the Southern edge of the BIESHEIM Woods, receiving enemy small arms fire. By 0900 Company I was heading South along the West bank of the RHONE-RHINE Canal, drawing self-propelled fire. Companies K and L were in the Southern edge of the BIESHEIM Woods, and defending to the South and West against enemy infiltration.

The 3rd Battalion of the 254th Infantry, reinforced with armor, attacked East to seize and hold the Western edge of the BOIS DE LA HARDT. The Battalion attacked in column of companies and drew heavy enemy small arms fire 200 yards West of the woods. It reached its objective at 0730 and the enemy immediately launched a counterattack which was repulsed by Company K. 161 prisoners, including 4 officers, were captured during the operation. Strong combat patrols were sent to seize the ARTZENHEIM bridge and clean out an enemy pocket at the junction of the COLMAR - RHONE-RHINE Canals.

At the end of February 1st, the 75th Infantry Division occupied GORTONY and ANDOLSHEIM, all against moderate resistance by isolated pockets of enemy.

The 28th Infantry Division advanced approximately 1000 yards against strong resistance.

During the 31 January/1 February period, enemy infantry resistance in HORBOURG was broken and the village was occupied by elements of the 3rd Division. Groups of enemy in the BOIS DE LA HARDT East of DURRENENTZEN offered sporadic resistance and were cleared from the area; the woods to the South were also cleared of the enemy. He was ejected from DURRENENTZEN after a brief fire fight. Withdrawing slowly in front of the 3rd Division's attack Eastwards toward the RHONE-RHINE Canal, he retarded our advances with small arm and machine gun fire. Friendly forces reached the water line Northwest of BIESHEIM but withdrew to better cover because of the enemy fire from the East side of the Canal. Small groups of enemy were encountered in the BOIS DE BIESHEIM and enemy small arm and machine gun fire engaged our troops North of the COLMAR Canal near its junction with the RHONE-RHINE Canal. Resistance was generally ill-organized and sporadic.

Noon 1 February to noon 2 February: The 3rd Division and

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0252

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

attached units continued to attack to the South. The 7th Infantry foot elements moved to the RHONE-RHINE Canal, crossing on foot-bridges to the vicinity of ARTZENHEIM. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were abreast, the 3rd on the right. They attacked South through French forces holding the Southern edge of the town at 0500 and by 0615 Company I had penetrated to the Northern edge of KUNHEIM. The 2nd Battalion became engaged in a small arm and machine gun fight for BALTZENHEIM at 0800, while the 3rd was still fighting to clear KUNHEIM. Both towns were reported clear by 0900. The 1st Battalion moved South from ARTZENHEIM at 0800 and reached the woods East of KUNHEIM against light enemy opposition.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 15th Infantry (3rd Division) remained in position West of the RHONE-RHINE Canal throughout the period. The 3rd Battalion advanced from assembly in rear of the 1st Battalion to the Northwest, clearing the woods between the 1st and 2nd Battalions, and took up positions along the canal between the two bridges. Company K remained in Battalion reserve.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry spent most of the period in preparing positions and in making ready for supporting the attack of the 7th Infantry. A patrol from the battalion reached the RHONE-RHINE Canal West of KUNHEIM without making contact with the enemy. Artillery fired on enemy barges in the RHONE-RHINE Canal and on enemy personnel firing automatic weapons at our troops. Many of the barges were hit and sunk. The 2nd Battalion of the 30th Infantry continued to advance in the face of heavy enemy artillery, taking successive objectives. At 0415 CC5 passed through Company F, attacking to the South. At 0945 Companies E and F moved South to relieve elements of CC5 in positions on the Southern edge of the BOIS DE BIESHEIM, and at the end of the period companies were engaged in improving defensive positions. The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry repulsed enemy counterattack of two tanks and approximately 40 men, and moved on to its objective at the Southeastern corner of the BOIS DE BEISHEIM and RHONE-RHINE Canal. At 1600 the battalion captured intact a 105mm enemy artillery battery. At the end of the period the battalion was shifting its companies to relieve elements of the French on the Southern edge of the BOIS DE BEISHEIM.

The 254th Infantry continued to hold and improve defensive positions East of JEBSHEIM. Platoon-strength combat patrols patrolled the BOIS DE LA HARDT North of the JEBSHEIM-ARTZENHEIM road. Its 1st Battalion assembled and left for BALTZENHEIM at 0930 to protect the flank of the 7th Infantry by outposting the RHINE River from BALTZENHEIM to the East of KUNHEIM. The 2nd Battalion was assembled in position at 2100 hours prepared to follow the 7th Infantry to ARTZENHEIM and protect the flank and rear of the 7th Infantry in the attack South. The 3rd Battalion was assembled and prepared to move to KUNHEIM on order.

In the Zone of the 75th Infantry Division the WENDERSOLEN-KASTENWALD Woods were cleared but a strong enemy counterattack forced withdrawal from APPENWIHR to the woods Northeast of the town.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0254

Photog-T/5 R. F. Stubenrauch(163) 1 February 1945
Infantrymen and supporting tanks advance across a bridge, in the snow-covered COLMAR Plain on the drive to break open the German pocket.
75th Div, REIDWHIHR area, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Photog-T/5 Robert F. Stubenrauch(163) 31 January 1945
Infantrymen of 75th Division trudge down road on COLMAR Plain, FRANCE, heading for new positions on COLMAR battlefront.
75th Division, OSTHEIM area, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The 28th Infantry Division reached the COLMAR Canal against very strong opposition and CC4 and the 109th Infantry attacking through COLMAR began mopping up the town and continued the advance to the South.

In an eye witness account of the liberation of COLMAR, Richard Johnston of the New York Times writes:

"U. S. troops blasted aside the formidable German defense to enter the city of COLMAR, last large French city to be liberated from the Nazi grasp, at four o'clock this morning. Driving down from the North three battalions of doughboys overran the heavily mined and open stretches of the city's Northern fringe, blasted away the defending German troops from strongly defended positions and slugged their way into the city which has been in German hands for more than five years. Between seven and eight hundred Nazis defending it were unable to stem the tide of our attack which was supported by French armored units. The French tanks this afternoon had reached the railroad station. Driven in from the perimeter defenses by the avalanche of our advance the Germans were fighting from house to house. Tank destroyers and bazookas hammered away at the barricades set up by the Nazis in the city streets. The oddest thing about this battle was the virtual absence of artillery fire in the city itself. A senior officer told me this afternoon that we had no intention of shelling the city, but that artillery was being used sparingly on 'targets where other means fail'. Our attack on the city came in the form roughly of a horseshoe from the North. Two battalions hit from the Northeast and Northwest of the city while the third hammered onto the heart of the defenses on the main route from the North into the city's suburbs. The breakthrough of the COLMAR outer defenses was accomplished by sheer courage. Our infantrymen, crossing an open stretch covered by murderous fire, pressed forward into the city. The elaborate Nazi defensive positions were unable to hold up under the vicious U. S. attacks."

The successful attack on COLMAR and the stubborn resistance by the enemy in the NEUF-BRISACH region, coupled with successes by the I French Corps in the South, influenced the decision to push with all possible speed on the COLMAR-ROUFFACH axis to join with the I French Corps. To accomplish this the 12 U. S. Armored Division was ordered to move from BLAESHEIM to the COLMAR area prepared to attack to the South. The 28th U. S. Infantry Division was to continue the attack to the Southern exits of COLMAR, and the 3rd and 75th Infantry Divisions were to continue toward the original Army objective line.

Noon 2 February to noon 3 February: The 3rd Division's attack South against strong enemy resistance continued, and by the close of the period 2/3, BIESHEIM had been occupied by our troops, and reconnaissance patrols were sent to the outer walls of NEUF-BRISACH to locate bridge crossings for the forthcoming attack on the town. The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry was located in the Southern part of the woods East of KUNHEIM at the beginning of the period, from which point it moved South, clearing the woods enroute and locating

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0257

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Pfc Lowery(163) · 2 February 1945
French infantrymen stay scattered as they advance into the town of COLMAR, FRANCE, to avoid sniper fire. At right a French camouflaged tank moves up to a corner where it will attempt to blast the German snipers out. First French Army, COLMAR, FRANCE.

754

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

numerous enemy ferries operating along the RHINE. The battalion became engaged with an estimated 100 enemy and two tanks at 2100 in the BOIS BOULAY area. At 0230 the 1st Battalion was placed in reserve as the 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked South from KUNHEIM, with the 3rd on the right. The 2nd Battalion received heavy enemy artillery, mortar and flak[illegible] fire toward the end of the period as it fought to clear the remainder of BIESHEIM. Company I entered BIESHEIM at 0345 as the remaining units of the 3rd Battalion engaged the enemy in a firefight. In the morning of the 3rd of February, the 15th Infantry (3rd Division) assembled preparatory to continuing the offensive. The 1st Battalion assembled in the woods Northwest of KUNHEIM on the West bank of the RHONE-RHINE Canal; the 2nd and 3rd Battalions assembled in KUNHEIM.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry remained in blocking positions to the East until 0915 hours, at which time Company A attacked South along the West side of the RHONE-RHINE Canal. By 1145 Company A had reached its objective approximately one mile North of NEUF BRISACH. A Company B patrol had a firefight on the Northern outskirts of BIESHEIM, while Company B was on its objective by 1143. The 2nd Battalion of the 30th Infantry remained in position on the Southern edge of BOIS DE BIESHEIM during the period, blocking to the South and Southwest. Company E sent a patrol to the North wall of NEUF BRISACH, while Company F sent a patrol to the Northwest of the town. The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry was in the process of shifting its positions at the beginning of the period. At 0330 Company I was attacked by an unknown number of enemy, but they were repulsed by 0400.

The 254th Infantry continued establishing outposts along the RHINE from ARTZENHEIM South to protect the rear and flank of the 7th Infantry.

The 28th Infantry Division continued mopping up enemy, bypassed in COLMAR. The 112 Infantry advanced to TURCKHEIM against light resistance. CC4 occupied the towns of EQUESHEIM, WETTOLSHEIM, WINTZENHEIM, VOEGTLINSHOFEN, and OBERMORSCHWIHR. Elements of CC4 (5th DB) encountered strong resistance near HURLISHEIM and ST. CROIX EN PLAINE.

The 75th Infantry Division made small gains in the KASTENWALD woods and toward WOLFGANTZEN.

The CCB of the 12th Armored Division (US) began relief of CC4 South of COLMAR, the remainder of the division was assembling in the area North of the city.

The 2nd French DB was attached to XXI Corps and CCL relieved CC6 of the 5th French DB in the JEBSHEIM area. CC6 of the 5th DB moved North to STRASBOURG and was attached to the II French Corps. Plans were made for employment of the 2nd DB in the zone of the 3rd Infantry Division to attack to the South following the fall of NEUF BRISACH.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Pvt Joseph A. Bowen(163) 2 February 1945
At 0200 February 2 the 3rd Bn., 109th Inf. Regt., 28th Div., assaulted and took the Northern roads leading into COLMAR and advanced into the town itself with the support of French tanks. Major General Norman D. Cota, Commanding General, 28th Division, congratulates Major Jim H. McCoy, Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn., 109th Inf. Regt. in attack of COLMAR. Major McCoy led the attack.
3rd Bn., 109th Inf. Regt., 28th Division, COLMAR, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Noon 3 February to noon 4 February: The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry, 3rd Division engaged the enemy in the CIMITIERE DES JUIFS at the beginning of the period. At 1800 hours it received enemy machine gun fire from the rear. The 254th Infantry was notified to wipe out resistance in that area. The 1st Battalion attacked again at 0200 and at 0305 reported the cemetery clear. The battalion withdrew to KUNHEIM and assembled in reserve. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Infantry fought continuously in BIESHEIM, the enemy having infiltrated back into the Northern part of the town and causing a fluid situation to exist there. The 2nd Battalion repulsed an estimated company strength enemy counter-attack at 1600. Isolated Company K forces were contacted where they had been surrounded for the previous 24 hours. The road from the North into BIESHEIM was reported clear at 1020.

The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry was committed to clear the area North of the 7th Infantry in BIESHEIM at 0050. The battalion crossed the BIESHEIM-KUNHEIM Road at 0107 without making contact with the enemy, and advanced until drawing fire about 200 yards North of the town. Prior to daylight Companies A and C were moved into BIESHEIM and Company B occupied the cemetery North of the town. During the morning of the 4th, a 15th Infantry special task force, supported by armor, attacked North from BIESHEIM and cleared the road. At the close of the period the entire area North of the town and West of the canal was cleared of the enemy. Toward the end of the period the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry began movement in preparation for passing through the 254th Infantry and continuing the advance South along the RHINE River.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry continued to apply pressure on the enemy in NEUF BRISACH with small combat patrols throughout the period. At 2100 a small patrol knocked out two enemy pillboxes with bazookas while receiving heavy enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire from the East side of the RHONE-RHINE Canal. At 0435 a patrol of Company A captured 24 prisoners just North of NEUF BRISACH along the canal. The 2nd Battalion of the 30th Infantry conducted aggressive combat patrols during the period and maintained contact patrols with adjacent units during the hours of darkness. The Germans continuously reacted to patrolling activities with mortar, artillery and self-propelled weapon fire. The 3rd Battalion maintained positions, sending numerous combat patrols to the front.

In the 254th Infantry area, its 2nd Battalion maintained positions along the RHINE River, and maintained an outpost in the vicinity of RHEINMUHL to protect the Northern flank. Its 3rd Battalion, with Company C attached, continued cleaning out enemy resistance between the East branch of the RHONE-RHINE Canal and RHINE River South to the vicinity of BIESHEIM. At 2100 hours the battalion skirted enemy minefields which extended along the Western edges of the BOIS BOULAY, and attacked South with Companies L and C on the left. Company L was held up at 2220 by enemy heavy machine gun and mortar fire. The attack halted at 0630 and the two companies dug in to the East of BIESHEIM.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0264

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

The 75th Infantry Division reached the Southern edge of the KASTENWALD Woods and cut the WOLFGANTZEN-APPENWIHR Road. Heavy mortar, artillery and small arms fire made the advance very slow. The 109th Infantry with CCB of the 12th U. S. Armored Division cleared the COLMAR Woods and advanced on SUNDHOFFEN against moderate resistance. In the right of the 28th Division zone the 112 Infantry captured TROIS-EPIS and LABAROCHE.

Instructions were received by the 12th U. S. Armored Division from the XXI Corps at 1400 on the 3rd of February giving the entire division the mission of attacking South from COLMAR, combat commands abreast, between the ILL River and the VOSGES Mountains on the axis COLMAR-HATTSTATT-ROUFFACH, coordinating the advance with the 28th Infantry Division.

Instructions were issued ordering Combat Commands B and R to attack to the South abreast, with CCB on the left. The mission was for CCB to continue the attack to seize SUNDHOFFEN and ST. CROIX, and upon relief by elements of the 109th Infantry, exploit to the South. CCR was to relieve French elements in the zone, exploiting to the South and seizing HERRLISHEIM (near COLMAR).

Major General RODERICK R. ALLEN, the division commander, set up an advance commandpost consisting of the Chief of Staff, G-2, and G-3 sections in COLMAR the night of 3 February. The balance of the Forward Echelon closed in COLMAR at 1200 on the 4th. CCA was in an alerted reserve status at HOUSSEN.

Combat Command B and elements of CCR jumped off simultaneously at 0700 on the 4th of February, but due to enemy artillery fire, made slow progress throughout the morning. CCR's 23rd Tank Battalion, however, reached the North edge of HERRLISHEIM and the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion was regrouping in the vicinity of EGUISHEIM.

Acting on verbal orders from the Commanding General, CCA attacked the afternoon of February 4th astride the COLMAR-ROUFFACH-ISSENHEIM Highway, passing through CCR, and by-passing possible strong points.

Company A, 66th Armored Infantry Battalion, attacked to the Southwest at 1600 to clear the enemy from dug-in hill defenses and seize OBERMORSCHWIHR. As soon as A/66 had cleared the hill positions, B/66 and Company A, 43rd Tank Battalion, attacked to the South to seize and hold HATTSTATT. Anti-tank fire from the edge of the woods East of HERRLISHEIM destroyed three tanks and moderate infantry resistance was encountered, but both objectives were taken by 1915.

Three task forces from Combat Command B continued the attack during the afternoon, taking subordinate objectives in conjunction with the 109th Infantry Regiment.

CCR's troops occupied OBERMORSCHWIHR and part of VOEGTLINSHOFFEN by 1225. After gaining about one-third of HERRLISHEIM, the troops withdrew to the Northern outskirts of the town where they remained

 RESTRICTED 80

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

during the night.

The 5th French DB (-) was relieved from attachment to the XXI Corps. The 5th DB (-CC6) relieved elements of the 28th Infantry Division in the vicinity of COLMAR and the Commanding General of the French Armored Division assumed responsibility for the defense of COLMAR. CC5 assembled for the move to that vicinity.

Noon 4 February to noon 5 February: The 3rd Division continued to advance in its zone of action, clearing the towns of BIESHEIM, VOGELSHEIM, and the BOIS BOULAY. The 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry infiltrated into BIESHEIM by motor. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions continued to fight in the town, but had completely cleared it by 1400. The Regiment attacked South with three battalions at 0015, with the 1st Battalion moving rapidly on the left and entering VOGELSHEIM at 0210 against moderate resistance. By the end of the period the town was completely under our control. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry followed to the right rear of the 1st Battalion and at 0240 neared its objective, receiving enemy tank fire. Companies E and G turned West for their objective in the area Southeast of NEUF BRISACH at 0415. At the end of the period the 2nd Battalion was on this objective and fighting to control it. The 3rd Battalion on the right encountered the enemy South of BIESHEIM and by-passed enemy groups. The remainder of the battalion fought its way South to the Tobacco Factory, railroad tracks, and electric plant East to NEUF BRISACH. At the close of the period mopping-up operations continued.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry passed through the 254th Infantry to clear the area West of the RHINE River, East and Northeast of BIESHEIM. The 3rd Battalion cleared the BOULAY Woods with Companies L and I, and Company K was moved by truck to attack an enemy strongpoint at the junction of the creek and canal. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry attacked to secure the crossroads to the Southeast of BIEISHEIM.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry remained in support of the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiment. A platoon attack was made on enemy-held pillboxes along the RHONE-RHINE Canal West of BIESHEIM. Combat patrols contacted stubborn enemy in this area, which resulted in several firefights. At 1500, the 2nd Battalion was alerted for a possible movement to KUNHEIM. At 1900 hours elements of the 1st Battalion began relief of Company F outpost, and the 2nd Battalion (-) began movement by marching East to cross the RHONE-Rhino Canal ~~a mile Southwest of KUNHEIM. The 3rd Battalion of the 30th In-~~ fantry remained in defensive positions until 0600, when it moved to assembly area in the vicinity of the 2nd Battalion's Canal crossing.

The 1st Battalion of the 254th Infantry maintained outpost along the RHINE River, along a front East of KUNHEIM. The 2nd Battalion, less Company G, maintained outposts along the RHINE about two miles long and North of the 1st Battalion, and an outpost

52

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

in the vicinity of RHEINMUHL to protect the North flank. The 3rd Battalion with Company G attached continued establishing outposts along the RHINE from the BOIS BOULAY South to the vicinity of BIESHEIM. Companies A, C and L were relieved from their defensive position by passing of the 15th Infantry at 0015. Extensive patrolling was conducted throughout the night and contact maintained with adjacent units.

By the end of February 5th, the 75th Division had captured APPENWIHR and HETTENSCHLAG after heavy fighting and were fighting in WOLFGANTEEN at the end of the day. CCL captured HORBOURG and LOGELHEIM.

Orders were issued directing that the 12th U. S. Armored Division's attack be continued to the South to effect junction with I French Corps. Missions were designated as follows:

CC-A: Reorganize and move immediately to the South on COLMAR-ROUFFACH-ISSENHEIM and parallel routes to effect junction with elements of the I French Corps moving up from the South.

CC-B: Withdraw through COLMAR and follow CC-A, mopping up and containing the enemy to the West.

CC-R: Attack to complete occupation of HERRLISHEIM. Upon relief by elements of 110th Infantry (28th Division), reorganize and move South or Southwest on division order.

Division Artillery was to support the attack.

At 0730 on the 5th of February, troops of CC-R jumped off to attack HERRLISHEIM and completely occupied the town at 0907 hours. The 110th Infantry Regiment relieved the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion at HERRLISHEIM at 0930.

CC-A's Task Force Scott, consisting of the 43rd Tank Battalion (-A) and Company C, 66th Armored Infantry Battalion, started attacking in the early morning of February 5th, by-passing enemy resistance. Road blocks were encountered on the outskirts of ROUFFACH, but infantry elements passed through and entered the town at 0512. Other infantry elements moved around the town to seal off exits and to contact French forces. Numerous prisoners of war were taken in the town. Other elements of CC-A also were successful in their attack and reported at 0835 that GUEBERSCHWIHR and PFAFFENHEIM were clear of the enemy.

CC-B meanwhile was moving Southward and passing through CC-A, moving East towards the ST. CROIX-GEGUISHEIM road with the mission of attacking South on that road to seize ENSISHEIM and make contact with the French.

After CC-R had cleared HERRLISHEIM of the enemy and the town was turned over to a battalion of the 110th Infantry Regiment, the command was regrouped and proceeded Southeast to a road junction

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

where they were to gain contact with CC-B to the South and, in coordination with the 109th Infantry Regiment, attack ST. CROIX. Orders later were issued to CC-R to support the 109th's attack by fire only and to seize bridges at NIEDERHERGHEIM and OBERHIERGHEIM; also, to establish bridgeheads on the East side of the ILL River.

CC-B took OBERHERGHEIM at 1620 and CC-R occupied NIEDERHERGHEIM at 1606.

Instructions concerning the establishment of bridgeheads and construction of bridges at the two towns were cancelled. The 28th Infantry Division established the bridgeheads, elements being ferried across the ILL River by the 119th Armored Engineer Battalion.

Noon 5 February to 6 February: The 3rd U. S. Infantry Division continued to advance towards its final phase line South of NEUF BRISACH, liberating the towns of NEUF-BRISACH, ALGOLSHEIM, VOGELGRUN, and FORT MORTIER enroute. The 7th Infantry consolidated and improved positions at the road junction on the Northern edge of NEUF BRISACH and near the RHONE-RHINE Canal, in the VANF DE TABAC and CAS ABATUCCI just East of NEUF BRISACH and VOGELSHEIM. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry established a road block during the night and thus completed sealing NEUF BRISACH off from the North, East and South. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion seized the railroad bridge over the RHONE-RHINE Canal at the Eastern edge of NEUF BRISACH during the night.

At the beginning of the period, the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry was in the vicinity of the cross roads Southeast of BIESHEIM, continuing the advance toward FORT MORTIER. The Fort was completely cleared by 2100 hours. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry was in the vicinity of the STROHSTADT-Farm, clearing the area between the creek and canal. Upon completion of this mission the 2nd assembled at BIESHEIM as regimental reserve. After clearing the BOULAY Woods, the 3rd Battalion continued advancing South along the RHINE River. At 1730 Company K, with four tanks and a platoon of anti-tank guns had reached the main highway bridge across the RHINE and reported that both bridges were destroyed. Company I (-1 platoon) advanced to the railroad bridge. Company L reached the vicinity of the bridges, with three tank destroyers.

Company B of the 30th Infantry attacked South through Company A outpost at 1500. At 1630 enemy machine gun fire was received from houses. After fire from friendly tanks was placed on the houses Company B occupied them, taking 76 prisoners. One Company B platoon entered NEUF BRISACH at 1101. Company C platoon attacked down the East side of the WIDENSOLEN Canal and drove out two enemy tanks, and at about 1100 a platoon from Company C entered NEUF BRISACH. The town was reported clear of the enemy at 1125. The 2nd Battalion of the 30th attacked at 2030 toward VOGELGRUN from VOGELSHEIM. Light opposition was encountered and the town was reported clear at 2315. Company F continued East and

84

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0270

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

was reported in a firefight with enemy in the vicinity Southeast of VOGELSHEIM at the end of the period. The 3d Battalion of the 30th was in its assembly area at the beginning of the period, from which point it moved at 1700 by marching to the BIESHEIM area. It attacked South of VOGELSHEIM in the face of enemy small arms fire.

The 1st Battalion of the 254th Infantry maintained outposts along the RHINE in the same area as the day previous, as did the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion with Company G attached completed establishing outposts along the RHINE from the BASIN BOULEVARD South to the vicinity East of BIESHEIM.

The 75th U. S. Infantry Division seized NECKOLSHEIM and advanced to the North bank of the VAUBAN Canal.

The 28th U. S. Infantry Division turned to the East, crossed the ILL River and advanced to the West bank of the RHONE-RHINE Canal.

Elements of the 2d French DB attacked through the 3d Division and captured OBERSAASHEIM and reached HILTERLN where strong resistance was met.

CC-A of the 12th U.S. Armored Division completed mopping-up operations in ROUFFACH the 6th of February and maintained a screen to the West of ROUFFACH, GUEBERSCHWIHR, and PFAFFENHEIM, blocking exits from the VOSGES Mountains.

With security provided by elements of the 92d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion, the 119th Armored Engineer Battalion constructed a foot bridge and a Bailey Bridge at OBERHERGHEIM, over which a battalion of the 28th Infantry Division crossed the ILL River. Construction of a steel treadway bridge at NEIDERMONTZEN was halted to concentrate efforts on the BAILEY BRIDGE at OBERHERGHEIM.

The attack of the 28th Infantry Division progressed satisfactorily after crossing the ILL River. As a result, the 12th Armored Division was advised that it would not be committed further in this action and was ordered to block the passes leading out of the VOSGES Mountains. Troops were relocated to accomplish this mission. The Division CP was moved from COLMAR to HUNTZENHEIM.

With the junction of forces from the I Corps (French) from the South and XXI U. S. Corps from the North at ROUFFACH and the area between the VOSGES Mountains and the ILL River cleared of the enemy, only mopping up action remained to clear the COLMAR Pocket to the West bank of the RHINE River.

6 February to noon 7 February: The 3d U. S. Infantry Division continued to eliminate scattered enemy resistance in the Division zone, and operated strong combat patrols to the South and Southeast. Strong outposts were placed at vital points along the RHINE River and contact was maintained with adjacent units.

On February 7th the 75th U. S. Infantry Division reached the RHINE after overcoming light resistance.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0273

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The 28th Infantry Division cleared DESSENHEIM and BALZAU and reached the West bank of the RHINE.

Elements of CCL of the 2d DB (French) continued to drive South from HEITEREN, captured FESSENHEIM and established contact with the 1st French DB, completing the wiping out of the COLMAR pocket in the zone of the XXI Corps.

58

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0274



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XXI US CORPS

RESTRICTED

THE CAPTURE OF NEUF BRISACH

I - Introduction:

When fighting soldiers of the 3rd U. S. Infantry Division's 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments began filing across secretly-constructed footbridges over the FECHT River below GUEMAR on the evening of 22 January, most of them knew their final objective. To others would befall a triumphant entry into the city of COLMAR. Men of the Third Infantry Division visualized another task - that of taking the fortified town of NEUF BRISACH.

Ostensably our attack was designed to liberate the larger city, which more than a month before had given its name to the Allied-surrounded pocket on the lower RHINE. COLMAR was the only inland French inhabited locality of any size still remaining in German hands, and as such represented virtually the last milepost in the wresting of FRENCH territory from its Teutonic "protectors". As such it was the heart of the bridgehead. NEUF-BRISACH and territory to the East was, therefore, its principal artery, representing a strongpoint to be reduced with which would come into our possession the main COLMAR-VIEUX-BRISACH railroad and highway bridges across the RHINE.

In 1870 the German peoples, under BISMARCK, first unleashed their armies upon ALSACE and LORRAINE - the first of three times they were to attempt to bring into reality their favorite dream of Lebenstaum (living space). In doing so they managed to smash NEUF BRISACH, a small medieval walled city lying about 3000 meters generally West of the RHINE between STRASBOURG and MULHOUSE. NEUF BRISACH had been founded in 1472, and had withstood the test of war before. This visitation did no more than destroy the town's buildings. The outer moats and walls remained intact.

Under the hammer blows of superior artillery, this time American, many of the town's houses have again been destroyed, and even the stout walls show the marks of high explosive shells from American and French bombs.

Third Division commanders, viewing aerial photographs and maps of NEUF-BRISACH, foresaw the assault and capture of the town as a tough assignment. It was so. But so complete was the groundwork of previous attacks, that capture became inevitable.

The shape of the town reminded some who studied its shape on a map of the symmetrical grid of a waffle iron. To all who were to have a part to play in its reduction as an enemy stronghold, it looked extremely forbidding. Its very shape suggested an unbroken outer peripher bristling with hostile rifles, machine pistols, and machine guns.

RESTRICTED

90

0276

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

It must be emphasized that the battle for NEUF-BRISACH was actually fought in such towns as ARTZENHEIM (by the French), BIESHEIM, and in the Jewish Cemetery North of BIESHEIM, just as the battle for COLMAR was in reality fought in HOUSSEN, WIHR-EN-PLAINE, and HORBOURG and more than a dozen other such localities.

Due to the action of the RTM (Regiment Tirailleurs Marocain), which had cleared ARTZENHEIM by 2 February, another difficult canal crossing by the Third Infantry Division was avoided and the Southern edge of ARTZENHEIM was used as a line of departure for its attack South.

Capture of URSCHENHEIM and DURRENENTZEN and WIDENSOLEN by elements of the 5th French DB had immeasurably smoothed our progress south toward NEUF-BRISACH.

II - <u>The Investment:</u>

KUNHEIM had been taken by the 7th Infantry. The next step was the big objective itself. At the same time leading elements of the 30th Infantry were clearing out the Southern edges of the SCHAEFER-WALD Woods, which were a Southwestern projection of BOIS DE BIESHEIM, directly East of WIDENSOLEN. To the South, the 30th Infantry's path, clearly outlined and guided by the converging lines of the WIDENSOLEN and the RHONE-RHINE Canals, were the Northern moats and city wall. The 15th Infantry was moving into position behind the 7th Infantry in KUNHEIM, ready to follow that regiment and then move through, branch-out to the bend of the RHINE in the vicinity of FORT MORTIER.

At 0230, 3 February, the 7th Infantry crossed a line of departure at KUNHEIM, moving South with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast, the 3rd on the right adjacent of the RHONE-RHINE canal; the 1st Battalion was in reserve, and followed at 0600.

The 2nd Battalion lanced through enemy trenches North of BIESHEIM and entered at 0400. Hardest fight was encountered in those trenches, but those enemy were quickly overrun, and most of them killed or made prisoner. The 3rd Battalion, on the other hand, became involved with the enemy along the KUNHEIM PONT DU RHIN canal and in the Jewish Cemetery on its East flank; only one company initially succeeded in entering BIESHEIM. The 1st Battalion, following the 2nd, discovered when daylight came that the hardest enemy opposition had actually been by-passed, and that a very determined group of enemy held out in the Jewish Cemetery and in pillboxes echeloned in depth between that point and the RHINE. The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry attacked East during the early morning hours of February 4th to assist, and by 0400 the cemetery and surrounding area had finally been reported clear and the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, ordered to return to KUNHEIM.

Enemy artillery located in Germany fired heavy concentrations on BIESHEIM during the day, but the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Infantry, continued clearing the town and completed this task by 1700. The 3rd Battalion captured 250 prisoners and the 2nd Battalion

71

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Pvt Joseph A. Bowden(163) 9 February 1945
As NEUF-BRISACH fell to the Allied drive to clear up the COLMAR Pocket in FRANCE. These Yanks were stationed in a former German manned pill box as protection against possible counter attack. Ramp above leads across the river.
30th Inf Regt, 3rd Division NEUF-BRISACH, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

took about 150.

Meanwhile, the 30th Infantry had attacked South along the West bank of the RHONE-RHINE Canal on 3 February and elements of the 1st Battalion had reached the canal bridge East of BIESHEIM, where enemy fire was received.

During the night of 3/4 and 4/5 February, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 30th Infantry sent patrols toward NEUF-BRISACH. Elements of the 1st Battalion encountered some enemy pillboxes at 1925, 3 February, and succeeded in knocking out two of them by 2100. At 2340 it sent a force to occupy the pillboxes.

At 0435 a five-man patrol from Company A, 30th Infantry, went to a point approximately 500 meters North of NEUF-BRISACH and succeeded in returning with 24 German prisoners. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 30th Infantry maintained aggressive combat patrols to the front and flanks during the 24 hour period between 1201 3 February and 1200 4 February.

At 0015, 5 February, the 7th Infantry left the line of departure at BIESHEIM. The 1st Battalion's mission was to seize the crossroads North of VOLGELSHEIM; the 3rd Battalion on the right had the mission of seizing the railroad station and to seal the Northeast and East entrances of NEUF-BRISACH. The 2nd Battalion was then to pass through the 3rd Battalion and seize the hospital and factory area and cut the road Southeast of NEUF-BRISACH.

The 15th Infantry had already moved to the Southeast of BIESHEIM, where elements of the 1st Battalion had seized a crossroads. The 3rd Battalion cleared the BOULAY Woods along the banks of the RHINE and then moved by truck to continue clearing the woods to the South. The 2nd Battalion also worked on the territory along the banks of the RHINE, operating South of the 3rd Battalion.

The 7th Infantry cleared VOLGELSHEIM by 0630, 5th of February, and the 2nd Battalion moved through on schedule, clearing out the hospital and factory area with little trouble, taking approximately 40 prisoners. During the night of 5/6 February a patrol from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, reconnoitered to the East and Northeast of NEUF BRISACH, and succeeded in reaching the Northeast wall without being fired upon.

FORT MORTIER gave the 15th Infantry considerable trouble on the afternoon of 5 February, but the fort was cleared by the 1st Battalion by 2100. The 3rd Battalion continued to move South. By 1730 one company had cut the main highway bridge approach and another company had moved even further South and cut the railway bridge approach.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry, during the night 4/5 February, had assigned one company the mission of ascertaining the condition of a bridge across the WIDENSOLEN canal just East of PETIT HOLLANDE FERME. At 0430, 5 February, leading elements were fired upon by enemy machine guns in the vicinity of the bridge and from

93

0280

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

machine guns at the farm. The platoon thereupon dug in along the East bank of the canal.

Shortly after 1500, 5th of February, one company attacked through another company of the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, along the West bank of the RHONE-RHINE Canal. The enemy had established a defensive line between the two canals, centering on PETITE HOLLAND FARM, and the company's objective was to take this line in the flank and roll it up. In successive stages, that is what the company did. When one platoon had reached a point shortly North of the East-West line, it attacked West, supported by two tanks. The two platoons following did likewise, and the attack was successful. 78 prisoners were taken and four enemy were killed.

The company established an outpost line between the canals, reinforced with additional troops to cover the broad (1000 yard) front, and shortly thereafter another 30th Infantry company, moving South along the WIDENSOLEN canal, contacted this company's right elements, and the two companies co-ordinated a defense.

The same night, 5th February, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 30th Infantry moved by marching to VOLGELSHEIM. At 2030, the Battalion attacked toward VOLGELGRUN in column of companies. The 3rd Battalion attacked South in column of companies on ALGOLSHEIM at 2045. The areas East and South of VOGELSHEIM was interdicted as the Battalion advanced. Light opposition was encountered, and VOGELGRUN was reported clear by 2315 hours. The 3rd Battalion gained the Northern outskirts of VOGELSHEIM against moderate opposition, but a small force of determined enemy resisted stubbornly through the remainder of the night and throughout the day and night of 6 February. The last resistance was overcome in two pillboxes on the Southeastern outskirts of the town at 1200 hours of the 7th. The 2nd Battalion, following its capture of BOLGELSHEIM, pushed strong combat patrols East and Southeast of the banks of the RHINE River and established outposts along the river during the day of February 6th.

The actions described above sealed off NEUF-BRISACH during the night of 5/6 February - the investment was complete.

III - The Capture:

A patrol from the 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry, visited the site of the railroad bridge on the Northeast side of town during the night of 5/6 February, with the mission of determining its condition. The patrol found strong charges laid but the bridge was intact. The patrol drew 4-5 rounds of single shot sniper fire from the town and observed several enemy in a nearby grape vineyard who stole off toward the West. These were captured sometime during the early morning by other elements of the 1st Battalion.

The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry, anticipating the job of scaling the town walls, had gone to work to secure equipment for this purpose and had stored in a house ladders and a quantity of rope. The Battalion Commander ordered this equipment secured and

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0281

BRISACH BRIDGE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Pvt Joseph A. Bowen(163) 8 February 1945
Entrance to NEUF-BRISACH showing wall of city which 3rd Division infantrymen scaled, bridge leading down main street and town gate.
3rd Division, NEUF-BRISACH area, FRANCE.

296

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

brought to PETITE HOLLANDE FARME.

At 0800 a four-man patrol from Company C visited the Northwest wall of the town and was fired upon by enemy machine guns. The patrol leader returned to his company and guided it to the moat near the entrance. Here there were two bridges. The one furtherest to the West was destroyed, but the moat was dry. The inner one was intact.

At about 0930, a platoon from Company B moved south along the RHONE-RHINE Canal. As the platoon neared the railroad bridge, soldiers observed a civilian who, after some persuasion, jumped down into the dry moat and led the platoon to a narrow, low-ceilinged 60-foot tunnel which led through the wall into the town.

In one building in the north part of town 38 prisoners were taken. The others were brought in groups of three and four, until a total of 76 had been accounted for. By 1115 it was radioed that the town was clear of the enemy. The Company B platoon entered shortly after and took two more prisoners.

The remainder of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry was then ordered to occupy the town and to set up a perimeter defense in bunkers which lined the top of the town wall.

Civilian casualties from our bombing and shelling were treated in a hospital within the town itself. These had not been extremely heavy, owing to a well-constructed system of bunkers within the town, offering good shelter to the populace.

Most interesting commentary was offered by several prisoner statements (there were no officers captured) to the effect that their officers exhorted them thus: "You must defend NEUF-BRISACH to the last man". This doctrine having been expounded at 1930, 5th of February, the German officers then decamped en masse.

Thus, with the capture of NEUF-BRISACH, the Battle of COLMAR Pocket entered its final stage. The Third U. S. Infantry Division's decisive part had been played and the neutralization of the COLMAR Pocket assured.

0285

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS XXI CORPS
APO 101 U S Army

****
* SECRET *
Auth: CG XXI C
Date: 6 Feb 45
*Init: W.B. *
****

TROOP LIST AS OF 060001A FEBRUARY 1945

I. COMBAT TROOPS

Hq & Hq Co XXI Corps

3 Infantry Division

7 Inf
15 Inf
30 Inf
9 FA Bn (155mm How)
10 FA Bn (105mm How)
39 FA Bn (105mm How)
41 FA Bn (105mm How)
10 Engr C Bn
3 Cav Recn Tr
Attached:
254 Inf
141 FA Bn (155mm How)
802 FA Bn (105mm How)
756 Tk Bn
601 TD Bn (SP)
99 Cml Mort Bn (-)

28 Infantry Division

109 Inf
110 Inf
112 Inf
107 FA Bn (105mm How)
108 FA Bn (155mm How)
109 FA Bn (105mm How)
229 FA Bn (105mm How)
103 Engr C Bn
28 Cav Recn Tr
Attached:
283 FA Bn (105mm How)
630 TD Bn (T)
290 Engr C Bn

75 Infantry Division

289 Inf
290 Inf
291 Inf
730 FA Bn (155mm How)

12 Armored Division

17 Armd Inf Bn
56 Armd Inf Bn
66 Armd Inf Bn
23 Tk Bn
43 Tk Bn
714 Tk Bn
493 Armd FA Bn
494 Armd FA Bn
495 Armd FA Bn
119 Armd Engr Bn
92 Cav Recn Sq
Attached:
572 AAA AW Bn (SP)
827 TD Bn (SP)

2 French Armored Division

1 (RMT) Armd Inf Bn
2 (RMT) Armd Inf Bn
3 (RMT) Armd Inf Bn
501 (RCC) Tk Bn
12 (RCA) Tk Bn
12 (CUIR) Tk Bn
64 (RA) Armd FA Regt
13 Armd Engr Bn
1 (RMSM) Cav Recn Sq

ANTIAIRCRAFT

5 AAA Gp
62 AAA Gun Bn (M-1)
440 AAA AW Bn
441 AAA AW Bn (SP)
447 AAA AW Bn
569 AAA AW Bn (M)
2 Plat Btry A 353 AAA S/L Bn

ENGINEERS

1145 Engr C Gp
11 Engr C Bn

SECRET

98

0286

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

75 Infantry Division (Cont'd)

897 FA Bn (105mm How)
898 FA Bn (105mm How)
899 FA Bn (105mm How)
275 Engr C Bn
75 Cav Ron Tr
Attached:
709 Tk Bn
772 TD Bn (T)
969 FA Bn (155mm How)
Co 99 Cml Mort Bn

ENGINEERS (Cont'd)

256 Engr C Bn
286 Engr C Bn
1271 Engr C Bn

FIELD ARTILLERY

40 FA Gp
278 FA Bn (240mm How)
575 FA Bn (-) (8" Gun)
773 FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
*999 FA Bn (8" How)
101 FA O Bn (Fr)
II RACL (155mm Gun)(Fr)

II. OTHER TROOPS

AIR

2 TAC Sq Rad Party
64 Fighter Wing Fwd Control Unit
Seventh Army Ln O & Party

CHEMICAL

168 Cml SG Co(75 Inf Div)
@Det 21 Cml Decon Co (75 Inf Div)

ENGINEERS

677 Engr L Equip Co(1145)
998 Engr Treadway Br Co (1145)
@Co B 1553 Engr Hvy Pon Bn (1145)
*Det C Co 378 Engr C Bn (Sep)(Bailey Br)(1145)

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

221 CIC Det
OB Team 68
PI Team 133
PI Team 134
PI Team 135
PI Team 136
@IPW Team 164
@IPW Team 165

QUARTERMASTER

*661 QM Trk Co
*4 Plat 4223 QM Car Co
3 QM Co (3 Inf Div)
28 QM Co (28 Inf Div)
75 QM CO (75 Inf Div)
2659 QM Trk Co (3 Inf Div)
3673 QM Trk Co(12 Armd Div)
3699 QM Trk Co (75 Inf Div)
4270 QM Trk Co (28 Inf Div)

ORDNANCE

15 Ord Maint Bn (2 Fr Armd Div)
134 Ord Bn (12 Armd Div)
703 Ord Co (3 Inf Div)
728 Ord Co (28 Inf Div)
775 Ord Co (75 Inf Div)

SIGNAL

65 Sig Bn
Det C 209 Sig Pgn Co
@5 Sig Con Team
7 Sig Con Team
@3261 Sig Sv Co
Det Co A 28 Sig Hvy Constr Bn
C-3 Plat 3151 SIAM Co
Sp Mission Sig Det 6 A Gp
Det 72 Ln Sq

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0287

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES (Cont'd)

IPW Team 166
IPW Team 478
IPW Team 480-G
3 CIC Det(3 Inf Div)

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Det I7F2
Det I1F2 (3 Inf Div)
Det I7E2 (3 Inf Div)
#3 Det I3G3

MEDICAL

Hq & Hq Det 188 Med Bn
620 Med Clr Co (Sep)
463 Med Coll Co (Sep)
481 Med Coll Co (Sep)
3 Med Bn (3 Inf Div)
103 Med Bn (28 Inf Div)
375 Med Bn (75 Inf Div)
13 Armd Med Bn (2 Fr Armd Div)
82 Armd Med Bn (12 Armd Div)

SIGNAL (Cont'd)

Sig Det 163 Sig Photo Co
Fr Cipher Team
3 Sig Co (3 Inf Div)
28 Sig Co (28 Inf Div)
75 Sig Co (75 Inf Div)
97-84 Sig Co (2 Fr Armd Div)
152 Sig Bn (12 Armd Div)

MISCELLANEOUS

80 Fin Disb Sec
449 MP Co
575 APU
20 Mule Co (Fr) (28 Inf Div)

MILBURN
Comdg

@ Upon arrival
* Negro personnel
# Atchd for supply only

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Buck/IB
/t/ BUCK
G-3

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 13 TO REPORT OF OPERATIONS
XXI CORPS
28 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

UNITS IN ACTION

28 January 45 to 7 February 45

3 Inf Div

7 Inf: Div Res 28 Jan 45
In action 29 Jan 45 to 31 Jan 45
In reserve 1 Feb 45
In action 2 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

15 Inf: Div Res 28 Jan 45
In action 29 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

30 Inf: In action 28 Jan 45 to 30 Jan 45
In Div Res 31 Jan 45 to 1 Feb 45
In action 2 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

254 Inf: In action 28 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

28 Inf Div

109 Inf: In action 28 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

110 Inf: In action 28 Jan 45 to 31 Jan 45
In Corps Res 1 Feb 45 to 3 Feb 45
In action 4 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

112 Inf: In action 28 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

290 Engr C Bn: In action 28 Jan 45 to 5 Feb 45
Relieved and reverted to Corps control 5 Feb 45

5 DB (Armored Division) French

CC4: In reserve 28 Jan 45 to 30 Jan 45
In action 31 Jan 45 to 3 Feb 45
In 1st French Army Res 4 Feb 45

CC5: In reserve 28 Jan 45 to 30 Jan 45
In action 31 Jan 45 to 3 Feb 45
In 1st French Army Res 4 Feb 45

SECRET

101

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5 DB (Armored Division) French (Cont'd)

CCB: In reserve 28 Jan 45 to 31 Jan 45
In action 31 Jan 45 to 2 Feb 45
Attached II Fr Corps 3 Feb 45

75 Inf Div

289 Inf: In Corps Res 29 Jan 45 to 30 Jan 45
In action 31 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

290 Inf: In Corps Res 29 Jan 45 to 30 Jan 45
In Div Res 31 Jan 45 to 2 Feb 45
In action 3 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

291 Inf: In Corps Res 29 Jan 45 to 30 Jan 45
In action 31 Jan 45 to 7 Feb 45

12 Armd Div

CCA: In Corps Res 2 Feb 45 to 3 Feb 45
In Div Res 3 Feb 45 to 4 Feb 45
In action 5 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

CCB: In Corps Res 2 Feb 45
In action 3 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

CCR: In Corps Res 2 Feb 45 to 3 Feb 45
In action 4 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

2 DB (Armored Division) French

CCL: In Corps Res 3 Feb 45
In action 4 Feb 45 to 7 Feb 45

NOTE: Other CCIs of 2 DB not employed in Zone of XXI Corps.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

Part VI

AIR CORPS PARTICIPATION

SITUATION:

During the period just prior to 20 January 1945, the German Air effort in the ALSACE area had been limited to reconnaissance and defensive patrols with an occasional armed reconnaissance in insignificant numbers.

The enemy lines of communication leading into the COLMAR Pocket, including the bridges across the RHINE as well as the rail and road nets on both sides of the river, had been under air attack intermittently for several weeks. The two road bridges, one at BRISACH and the other at NEUENBURG, were damaged and unserviceable. The rail bridges at those two points, however, were still usable and the enemy was known to have at least fifteen ferry sites in operation, together with an considerable amount of pontoon bridging equipment. Air operations had hampered the flow of supplies and reinforcements into the pocket but there was no indication that the enemy had been seriously embarrassed.

PLANS:

The general plan for air participation in the reduction of the COLMAR Pocket was based upon army cooperation missions against field fortifications, guns and troop concentrations to facilitate the advance of the ground forces, and interdiction of lines of communication to prevent reinforcements from reaching the pocket, movement within the pocket or withdrawal from the pocket. During the latter phases of the operation and for several days after the final evacuation, the air effort included measures to delay and reduce the redeployment of those troops which were successful in escaping across the RHINE.

PREPARATION:

In conjunction with 6th Army Group, wire facilities, both speech and teletype were constructed to French Army Headquarters and to Headquarters First French Air Corps from Headquarters 6th Army Group and Headquarters First Tactical Air Force.

An American cryptographic team was provided for Advance Headquarters First French Air Corps. A small French Signal Center team operated the switch-board, teletype machines, and one French point to point radio station.

Two American radio stations were installed at First French Air Corps (Advanced) to work with XII Tactical Air Command and Headquarters First Tactical Air Force.

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Existing XII TAC Control Centers, Main Fighter Controls, and their wire and VHF/FM intercommunication links all functioned normally and effectively.

OPERATIONS:

During the period 20 January to 9 February, a total of 217 missions involving 1980 sorties were flown by the XXI TAC and the First French Air Corps in connection with the reduction of the COLMAR Pocket. Although there were several days during this period when weather seriously curtailed air operations, respectable results were achieved. Enemy movements by road and rail were seriously hamperod on both sides of the RHINE. Seven bridges were claimed destroyed and 13 damaged. Nineteen marshalling yards were attacked and 98 rail cuts effected, as well as 36 road blocks. 254 railway cars were destroyed and 472 damaged by bombing and strafing. 114 motor vehicles were claimed destroyed and 143 damaged. On army cooperation missions 2 gun positions were claimed destroyed and 10 damaged. 18 tanks were destroyed and 6 were damaged. In attacks against defended villages, 403 buildings were claimed destroyed and 64 damaged.

On the basis of prisoner of war interrogation and examination of captured targets it is evident that the effect of the air operations reduced the effectiveness of enemy resistance, contributed to the toll of prisoners by disrupting the withdrawal and materially reduced the combat effectiveness of the troops who succeeded in crossing the RHINE.

During the 21 days of this operation from 20 January through 9 February, generally poor weather conditions prevailed and thus limited the utilization of the air power available. On only seven days was it possible to fly over 150 sorties due to the weather but on each day an effort was made to fly as many sorties as possible. The best day was 8th of February when 389 sorties were flown against communications East of the RHINE and against troop concentrations. Weather was such on seven of the days that only a few reconnaissance planes were airborne.

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

REDUCTION OF COLMAR POCKET

SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945

	XII TAC		1ST TAC		TOTAL	
	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged
1. Rail Cuts		86		12		98
2. Marshalling Yards		19				19
3. Tunnels		1				1
4. Road Blocks		15		21		36
5. Locomotives.	9	39			9	39
6. RR Cars	180	354	74	118	254	472
7. Barges	2	0	1	0	3	0
8. Motor Transport	101	99	13	44	114	143
9. Tanks	18	6			18	6
10. Horse-drawn Vehicles	4	35			4	35
11. Gun Positions	2	9		1	2	10
12. Buildings	340	55	63	9	403	64
13. Enemy Aircraft			1	1	1	1
MISSIONS	113		104		217	
SORTIES	1,083		987		1,980	

RESTRICTED

0293

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF DAILY MISSIONS

XII TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
20 Jan	1-Arm Recce	V-8513	12	12.6	Bldg 1-0-1 M/T 6-0-3 Barge 2-0-0 Pier 1-0-0 Gun Position 0-0-1
	1-Pre-Briefed	Bridge V-7218	8	8.4	Bldg 8-0-0
22 Jan	1-Pre-Briefed	RR Bridge W-029391	16	7.1	RR Bridge 0-0-1 2 Rail Cuts
	1-Army Co-op	Crossroad at Mulhouse		nil	11 a/c non-effective due to weather.
	1- " "	Crossroad at V-7910	8	4.2	Loco 0-0-1
	1- " "	Railroad at V-9012	12	12.5	Loco 0-0-2 RR Cars 12-0-18 Bldg 2-0-0 3 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Sasback Area	4	2.1	Unobserved 1 a/c lost to unknown
	1- " "	Gun Position V-8146	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	RR Bridge at W-029390	11	5.9	Bridge 0-0-1
23 Jan	1-Arm Recce	Fischbach Area	9	4.4	Bldg 11-0-2 M/T 11-0-2 1 Rd Block
	1-Army Co-op	Woods V-8049	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	Buildings V-7034	10	5.0	Unobserved
24 Jan	1-Pre-Briefed	Bridge W-015417	15	6.1	Bridge 1-0-0 1 Rd Block
	1-Arm Recce	V-9445	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1-Army Co-op	Winden	12	9.0	Bldg 1-0-2 1 Rail Cut
	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	
26 Jan	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	
9 Jan	1-Arm Recce	Herrlesheim	7	2.0	Tanks 1-0-6 Bldg 10-0-0 M/T 0-0-2 1 Rd Block
	1-Pre-Briefed	Offenburg M/Y	6	3.0	Bldg 1-0-0 RR Cars 0-0-20 M/Y attacked - 1
	1-Arm Recce	Troops V-832469	9	4.5	Unobserved

- 64 -

RESTRICTED

0294

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
29 Jan (Cont)	1-Arm Recce	Munzenheim Area	8	4.0	Bldg 1-0-0
	1- " "	Gun Position V-834474	7	3.5	Unobserved
	1- " "	M/Y W-770873	10	5.3	M/T 1-0-0 RR Cars 4-0-0 Loco 1-0-0 Bldg 1-0-0
	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	M/Y attacked - 1
	1-Army Co-op	W-0055	7	3.5	Unobserved
	1- " "	Tanks V-835458	11	5.5	Bldg 2-0-0. 2 Rd Blocks
	1- " "	Woods V-783448	8	4.0	M/T 1-0-4
	1- " "	Woods V-803535	12	6.0	M/T 1-0-1
	1- " "	Freiburg Area	11	5.8	Unobserved
	2-Tactical Recce	Colmar Area	4	nil	
	1-Photo Recce	Freiburg M/Y	1	nil	
30 Jan	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	
1 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Beisheim Area	7	3.7	Bldg 2-0-0
	1- " "	Balzenheim Area	9	4.7	Bldg 10-0-0
2 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Town W-205872	8	4.0	Loco 0-0-2 Gun Pos 1-0-0 M/T 1-0-0 2 Rail Cuts
	1-Arm Recce	Neustadt M/Y	14	5.5	Bldg 1-0-0 Loco 2-0-0 AFV 15-0-0 RR Cars 0-0-50 M/T 5-0-7 1 Rd Block 1 M/Y attacked
	1-Arm Recce	Neuf Breisach	8	3.0	Unobserved
	1-Arm Recce	Bresheim Area	14	5.9	Unobserved
	1-Arm Recce	Train W-113423	12	6.4	Bridge 0-0-1 RR Cars 0-0-24 Loco 0-0-3 2 Rail Cuts 1 a/c lost to flak
	1-Arm Recce	M/Y W-325652	11	5.9	Bldg 1-0-0 RR Cars 10-0-15 2 Rail Cuts M/Y attacked - 1
	1-Arm Recce	Oberasheim Area	10	5.4	Bldg 5-0-4 M/T 0-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-12 2 Rd Blocks
	1-Arm Recce	Road Junction V-8536	8	4.2	M/T 4-0-0 HDV 0-0-27 10 horses killed
	1-Arm Recce	Breisheim Area	10	5.3	Bldg 2-0-0

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3 - Summary of Daily Missions - XII Tactical Air Command - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET (24 rockets)	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
2 Feb (Cont)	1-Arm Recce	Fort V850387	12	1.0	MT 7-0-27 Bldg 0-0-1 HDV 1-0-7 RR Cars 0-0-30
	1-Arm Recce	Railroad V-6878	12	9.0	12 Rail Cuts M/T 3-0-0
	1-Arm Recce	Railroad V-6462	11	8.0	5 Rail Cuts RR Cars 2-0-0 Bldg 5-0-2
	1-Arm Recce	Neustadt M/Y	12	12.0	RR Cars 40-0-0 Bldg 0-0-2 Gun Pos 0-0-2 M/Y attacked-1
3 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Neuf Breisach Area	11	5.9	Bldg 20-0-0
	1- " "	V-1077	12	6.3	RR Cars 7-0-6 Loco 0-0-2 Bldg 3-0-0 2 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Freiburg M/Y	10	10.0	Bldg 15-0-0 M/T 0-0-11 1 Rd Block M/Y attacked - 2 1 a/c lost to flak
	1-Army Co-op	Breisach M/Y	12	6.5	1 Rail Cut M/Y attacked - 1
	1- " "	M/Y V-1281	2	1.0	M/Y attacked - 1
	1- " "	Neuf Breisach Area	12	6.5	Unobserved
	1-Photo Recce	Breisach Area	2	nil	
4 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Railroad V-940212	14	5.0	Bldg 4-0-3
	1- " "	Railroad V2664	15	6.0	Bldg 2-0-0 1 Rail Cut
	1-Pre-Briefed	Breisach Bridge	12	6.4	Bridge 0-0-1 Bldg 0-0-2 2 Rail Cuts 1 Rd Block
	1- " "	RR Bridge V251244	8	8.0	RR Cars 0-0-10 Loco 0-0-1 Bldg 0-0-1 Bridge 0-0-1 3 Rail Cuts
	1-Arm Recce	Offenburg M/Y	11	11.0	Loco 1-0-1 RR Cars 20-0-0 M/Y attacked - 1
	1-Pre-Briefed	Breisach Bridge	12	6.5	Bridge 0-0-1 1 Rd Block
	1-Army Co-op	Neuf Breisach M/Y	12	6.5	RR Cars 16-0-10 Bldg 1-0-1 M/Y attacked - 1
	1- " "	V-849360	10	5.4	2 Rd Blocks
6 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Breisach M/Y	14	4.0	Bldg 4-0-0 M/T 6-0-0 RR Cars 12-0-0 AFV 1-0-0 M/Y attacked - 1

- 66 -

RESTRICTED

102

0286

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
6 Feb (Cont)	1-Arm Recce	Bridge W-149849	12	12.0	RR Cars 0-0-52 Loco 0-0-9 Bldg 0-0-1 Tank 1-0-0 L/T 1-0-0 1 Rd Block 1 Rail Cut M/Y attacked-1
	1-Army Co-op	W-2275	12	6.0	Bldg 0-0-1 Bridge 0-0-1 Loco 1-0-5 8 Rail Cuts
	2-Tactical Recce	Colmar Area	4	nil	
8 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Staufen	16	6.0	Bldg 8-0-0 L/T 0-0-8 1 a/c lost to unknown
	1- " "	W-025505	16	6.0	RR Cars 16-0-0 Bldg 3-0-0 L/T 9-0-0 6 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Staufen	16	6.0	Bldg 50-0-30 RR Cars 3-0-29 Loco 1-0-0 L/T 2-0-12
	1- " "	Krozingen	16	5.7	Bldg 10-0-0 L/T 4-0-16 2 Rail Cuts
	2- " "	RR Bridge W-251244	23	22.5	Bldg 1-0-0 Tunnel 0-0-1 5 Rail Cuts 1 Rd Block
	2-Pre-Briefed	RR Bridge W527863	24	24.0	Bridge 0-0-1 1 Rail Cut
	1-Army Co-op	L/Y W-0872	12	12.0	RR Cars 21-0-30 Bldg 0-0-1 L/Y attacked - 1
	2-Pre-Briefed	RR Bridge WD49848	27	18.2	Bridge 2-0-1 L/T 1-0-0 Loco 0-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-19 Gun Pos 0-0-1 Bldg 4-0-1 M/Y attacked - 1
	1-Army Co-op	RR Junction W-025505	11	5.5	Loco 1-0-1 6 Rail Cuts
	1-Medium Bomber	RR Bridge W-492216	27	53.2	
	1-Army Co-op	RR Bridge V-858128	12	6.0	Bridge 1-0-0 1 Rail Cut
	1-Medium Bomber	RR Bridge W-368573	24	48.0	
	1-Tactical Recce	Muenburg Area	2	nil	
	1-Photo Recce	Radofzell L/Y	1	nil	

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Page 5 - Summary of Daily Missions - XII Tactical Air Command - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
9 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Railroad at Kenzingen	16	6.0	Gun Pos 1-0-0 HDV 2-0-0 Bldg 14-0-0 M/T 9-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-6 1 Rail Cut
	1-Arm Recce	M/Y V-975248	16	6.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	Breisach	13	5.0	Bldg 45-0-0 Dump 0-1-0 1 RC
	1- " "	Railroad at V-922180	6	3.2	Loco 1-0-4 M/T 22-0-0 RR Cars 13-0-3 1 Rail Cut
	1- " "	Railroad at V-940211	9	4.9	Loco 0-0-1 RR Cars 0-0-5 2 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Railroad W-030620	12	6.3 (14 rockets)	5 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Railroad W-2564	12	6.3	2 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Rottweil M/Y	12	12.0	Loco 1-0-1 Bldg 1-0-0 4 Rail Cuts M/Y Attacked-1
	1- " "	Tuttlingin M/Y	12	8.5	Loco 0-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-14 Bldg 5-0-0 M/Y Attacked-1
	1- " "	Villingen M/Y	12	12.0	Bldg 5-0-0 RR Cars 4-0-0 M/Y Attacked - 1
	1- " "	Bridge W-251244	11	10.5	M/T 4-0-0 HDV 1-0-0 RR Cars 0-0-1
	1- " "	RR Bridge W-149849	12	7.2	Bridge 0-0-1 Bldg 9-0-0 M/T 3-0-0 Gun Pos 0-0-5 2 Rail Cuts M/Y Attacked-1
	1-Medium Bomber	Railroad at Freudenstadt		nil	22 a/c non-effective-weather
	1- " "	RR Bridge W-251244		nil	19 " " " " "
	1- " "	RR Bridge W-368573	31	61.5	
	1-Tactical Recce	Nuenburg Area	2	nil	

RESTRICTED

0208

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF DAILY MISSIONS - FIRST FRENCH AIR CORPS

20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
21 Jan	1-Tactical Recce	Mulhausen Area	2	nil	
22 Jan	1-Medium Bomber	Neurnberg RR Bridge	34	66.5	
	1- " "	Bridge V-859132	20	34.5	2 Aircraft Lost to Flak
	1-Fighter Sweep	Mulhouse Area	10	nil	
	1-Army Co-op	Battenheim	8	6.0	
	1- " "	Road Junction V-7715	7	2.5	
	1- " "	" " V-760124	8	3.8	
	1-Arm Recce	Bridge V-6616	8	4.0	1 Rail Cut 2 Rd Blocks
	1- " "	Canal V-7512	8	4.0	3 Rd Blocks
	1- " "	Vehicles near Muschausen	6	2.5	Unobserved
23 Jan	1-Fighter Sweep	Freiburg Area	8	nil	
	1- " "	Breisach Area	4	nil	RR Cars 0-0-50 Bldgs 0-0-3 2 Rd Blocks
	1-Tactical Recce	Colmar Area	2	nil	
24 Jan	2-Fighter Sweeps	Colmar-Freiburg Area	24	nil	
	4-Army Co-op	V-765460 City-V-880230 Dpt.	31	12.1	Unobserved
	2- " "	Houssen	16	7.5	Unobserved. 1 a/c lost-flak
25 Jan	2-Tactical Recce	Breisach-Colmar Area	4	nil	
26 Jan	2-Fighter Sweeps	Bollweiler	19	nil	
29 Jan	7-Fighter Sweeps	Colmar-Offenburg Area	54	nil	M/T 2-0-22. RR Cars 0-0-20 15 Troops Killed
30 Jan	3-Army Co-op	Sennheim, Urschenheim	20	3.5	Bldgs 2-0-0 Pontoon Bridge 0-0-1
1 Feb	3-Arm Recce	Donaueschingen	17	7.2	Unobserved
2 Feb	1-Fighter Sweep	Colmar Area	14	nil	
	8-Arm Recce	V-687238 V-6461 Ammo Dumps	74	25.0	Dump 1-0-0
	5-Pre-Briefed	V-867227 V-720312 " "	33	16.0	Unobserved

RESTRICTED

02999

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 - Summary of Daily Missions--First FAC - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
4 Feb	1-Pre-Briefed	Pontoon Bridge V-868202	11	3.6	Bridge 1-0-0
	1- " "	" " V-896272	11	3.9	Bridge 0-0-1 M/T 6-0-0 Gun Position 0-0-1
	1- " "	" " V-870170	8	3.0	Unobserved M/T 0-0-1
	1-Arm Recce	Biengarton - City	8	5.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	Village at V-892194	11	4.3	1 Rail Cut - Fires Started
	1-Army Co-op	Road at V-634194	10	4.0	Unobserved
	1-Tactical Recce	Hardt Forest Area	2	nil	
6 Feb	2-Fighter Sweep	Strasbourg Area	25	nil	Uneventful
	6-Arm Recce	Schwingen Area	47	10.0	Bldg 17-0-0 2 Rail Cuts 2 Rd Blocks
	5-Arm Recce	Kenzingen Area	35	8.0	RR Cars 24-0-10 M/T 1-0-20 Factory 1-0-0
	2-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	4	nil	
7 Feb	1-Tactical Recce	Hardt Forest Area	2	nil	
8 Feb	2-Medium Bomber	Freiburg M/Y	36	61.8	1 a/c lost to flak
	1-Escort	" "	11	nil	E/A 1-0-1
	5-Army Co-op	Lahr-Freiburg Area	42	16.6	M/T 2-0-1 Bldg 1-0-1 1 Rail Cut 1 Rd Block
	1-Pre-Briefed	RR Station Stauffen	12	6.0	Bldg 1-0-0
	1- " "	" " Freiburg	12	12.0	Bridge 1-0-0 RR Cars 50-0-0 1 Rail Cut
	1- " "	" " West of Freiburg	11	11.0	Bldg 0-0-2 RR Cars 0-0-38 3 Rail Cuts
	4-Arm Recce	Freiburg-Mulhousen Areas	38	17.5	Bridge 1-0-1 Bldg 0-0-2 M/T 2-0-0 5 Rd Blocks
9 Feb	1-Fighter Sweep	Mulhouse Area	13	nil	
	2-Army Co-op	Reidlingen & Rutzen	63	22.0	Bldg 41-0-1 Barges 1-0-0 3 Rail Cuts 3 Rd Blocks

RESTRICTED

- 70 -

RESTRICTED

1/2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

Part VII

THE ATTACK ON JEBSHEIM

(Typical Small unit action)

by the 254th Inf. Regt., 63d Inf. Div.

(Prepared by Historical Section, Seventh Army)

In the latter stages of the battle for the COLMAR Pocket, the 254th Infantry Regiment - attached at the time to the 3d Infantry Division - played an important role. Although most of its operations were conducted in close cooperation with other units, two battles, the engagement on Hill 216 and the taking of JEBESHEIM, were fought almost exclusively by the regiment and its attached units.

Hill 216 (V699486) is located Southwest of the Alsatian town of BENNWIHR, about four miles North of COLMAR. It was on high ground and provided strong defensive positions for the enemy. When the 254th had reduced the enemy on the hill, it was to move Eastward, assault and capture the town of JEBSHEIM, thence proceed on to the RHONE Canal.

Field Order No. 1 of 20 January 1945 indicated the plans of the Regimental Commander for the taking of Hill 216. The 1st Battalion was designated assault battalion and assigned a 1000 yard front extending from a point South of MITTELWIHR Eastward from the easterly power line. The battalion, two companies in line, was to push forward to the North bank of the WEISS River and establish defensive positions from the junction of the river-power line Eastward to the FECHT River, thence Northward to the highway bridge at V716483. An outpost line was to be pushed forward from the WEISS River to a distance of some 1000 yards South of the main line, while the bridge over the river at V702472 was to be secured by not less than one platoon.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion was to continue to hold its defensive position facing Eastward along the FECHT River.

The 3rd Battalion, less some elements, was to stand by in regimental reserve. To Company L was assigned the mission of patrolling and outposting to the front upon the taking of the WEISS River line.

In operations coordinated with the attack of the 254th Infantry, other forces too were to strike the enemy. Coming from the West through an area held by the 1st DMI (Fr) the 7th Infantry Regiment was to turn South by pivoting at GUEMAR and push down between the FECHT and ILL Rivers to a line between the two rivers running approximately through HOUSSEN. This operation would clear out

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0301

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

the area in front of the 2nd Battalion. Striking Southwesterly from GUEMAR, initially through the area cleared by the 7th Infantry, the 30th Infantry was to clear the area East of the ILL River around RIEDWIHR.

Two days training of the 1st and 2nd Battalions preceded the attack on Hill 216. On 20 January the 1st Battalion was released from defensive positions extending Northeast from AMMERSCHWIHR, its place being taken in the line by a battalion from the 28th Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion, which had been attached to the 7th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of KAYSERSBERG, was returned to the control of the 254th Infantry. Both battalions were moved to an assembly area West of MITTELWIHR.

The regiment had been augmented by the attachment of certain supporting units. A platoon of tanks from the 756th Tank Battalion and a platoon of tank destroyers from the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion were available for mechanized support while one platoon of Company A, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion was emplaced near KAYSERSBERG in position to cover the regimental front. A platoon from the 441st AAA/AT Battalion gave anti-aircraft protection.

The terrain and the nature of the enemy's prepared defenses on Hill 216 were known to the men of the 254th. Before being withdrawn from the line to go to its training area, the 1st Battalion had held a portion of the line directly to the West of the hill and, pushing out along the road leading almost East from the Southern end of BENNWIHR, had taken and held a concrete shelter located at V700492. Other prepared defenses were seen higher on the flanks of the hill and a line of prepared positions ran generally parallel to the BENNWIHR-INGERSHEIM Road.

Across the PECHT River and endangering the flank of the planned zone of advance was the Chateau de SCHOPPENWIHR (V7248) which, with its surrounding grounds and woodlands, had been made into a very powerful strong point by the Germans. But, in planning the attack, it was considered that the Chateau's advance of the 7th Infantry would command the attention of the defenders.

D-day for the taking of Hill 216 was 23 January and H-hour was 0700. The line of departure was an east-west track running just South of the 50 grid line.

During the early morning hours, the 1st Battalion (less Company C in reserve) marched from the assembly area near BEBLENHEIM down to the line of departure. Company B led the column and proceeded to the Eastern half of the battalion front. The 1st platoon took up a position on the left flank, the 3rd on the right in contact with Company A while the 2nd platoon was placed to be rear as company reserve. Company A organized its front line in the same manner, the 2nd platoon on the left, 1st on the right guiding along the eastern power line, the 3rd in reserve.

At fifteen minutes before H-hour, 3rd Division artillery as

RESTRICTED

114

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0302

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

well as the organic and attached artillery of the regiment began an artillery preparation. The area was heavily pounded.

At 0700 hours the two companies abreast pushed off in the direction of Hill 216. The first few yards of the attack went well. Men moved silently through the deep snow, protected by poor visibility. It was still quite dark and the white snow capes offered little contrast. But after the troops had advanced about 100 yards, they began to encounter shu-mines.

The Germans had sown these little wooden mines profusely. The intermittent snowfalls of the few preceding days had covered both the mines and the footprints of the soldiers laying them. So profusely and indiscriminately had the mines been spread that captured German soldiers could not go to the aid of their wounded.

The exploding shu-mines alerted the Germans and mortar fire began to fall upon the men of the 1st Battalion. Increasing light brought rifle fire from fox holes on the northern slopes of the hill and machine gun fire from the road near the base of the hill. The mortar fire was clearly directed from the top of Hill 216, and came from weapons in the woods South of the WEISS River.

On the battalion right flank, Company A made good progress. Mortar shells consistenly hit the ground behind the advancing unit. Our forces vigorously returned the rifle fire from the German foxholes. It was from mines that Company A sustained the greater part of its casualties as it pushed forward. Machine gun and machine pistol fire increased in intensity when the unit neared the top of the hill, this fire coming from the prepared defenses running parallel to the BENNWIHR-INGERSHEIM road. But the direction of our attack was such as to reduce the effectiveness of this line to a considerable degree. Heavy small arms fire poured into the German positions on the North slope of the hill cleared the way and by 0900 Company A had reached the top of the hill, the 1st platoon in the lead, the 2nd in echelon to the left rear and the 3rd bringing up the rear.

Like that of Company A, Company B's progress was easy until troops ran into shu-mines. But the exploding mines and increasing light brought Company B into very heavy fire. Along the road at the base of Hill 216 machine gun positions were revealed. Snipers on the northern slopes of the hill poured a brisk fire on our troops picking their way across the mine field. As a means of avoiding a direct frontal assault on the machine guns at the base of the hill, the company 'gave way' to the East and started working Southward with its left flank about 500 yards West of the river. Fire now came in increasing intensity from the Chateau de SCHOPPERWIHR and from the woods along the FECHT River--small arms, machine guns and 88's.

Company B was pinned down and from 0800 hours on, the company's advance was very slow. By 1000 hours B Company was confronted with such heavy resistance that it was decided to employ Company C on the

 RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

left flank.

At 1000 hours Company C in reserve at MITTELWIHR, was alerted. The company was ordered to come in laterally behind Company B on a line with the road passing the base of Hill 216, and with that company form a line extending East to the river. The fire-power of the two companies together with attached mortars was believed to be sufficient to relieve pressure on the left of the battalion and to enable it to push down to the river on a straight front.

By noon Company C had crossed the line of departure used by the other companies earlier in the morning. Sniper and machine gun fire from the Chateau and the woods below it were received almost at once. But the company advance Southward toward the point where it should make contact with the left flank of Company B.

But by the time Company C had worked down to Company B's old position along the road, the latter company had pushed forward. An assault by riflemen had eliminated the machine guns at the bottom of the hill and Company B had worked its way Southward to the east-west crest of the hill. The fire of the enemy across the river, however, had not diminished and Company C came in for a very heavy concentration from the wooded area South of the Chateau. Machine guns and automatic weapons in the vineyard on the West bank of the river added to the fire on Company C. At about 1345 Company C was stopped at a point about V706490. Mortar fire was then called for by the company; the 4.2 mortars laid down fire in the vineyard and into the woods on the East bank of the FECHT River. Company C moved forward again, turned South and proceeded in the direction of the junction of the WEISS and FECHT Rivers.

When Company A had crossed the crest of the hill, it found the enemy dug in on the South slope. Enemy troops were more numerous here than on the Northern slope and mines and booby traps were very thickly sown.

Further, direct fire was received small arms and machine guns in the wooded area directly South of the WEISS River, but the company continued its advance and by 1230 had reached the east-west road on the Southern face of Hill 216. The company moved West as it crossed the top of the hill to reduce casualties from mines, deploying in the field just North of the road. Between it and the river lay an open field, probably mined and swept by direct fire from the woods along the WEISS River.

Now considerably depleted by casualties, Company A found further advance impossible, and the unit commenced digging in.

Company B meanwhile had engaged in a heavy fire fight with riflemen in the Northern slopes of Hill 216 and with machine gun nests in the vineyards to the left flank. A group of riflemen from the company inched forward to the machine gun positions and silenced the guns; by 1230 hours the company was moving forward again. Striking RJ 187, the 2nd platoon spread to the right along

116

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0304

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the east-west road to make contact with Company A; while a small group from one of the other platoons following the edge of a vineyard pushed toward the WEISS River. This group returned to the road junction after running into mines and heavy fire. By 1430 contact had been made with Company A by Company B's 2nd platoon. The other platoons pulled to the West of the north-south road and, using an abandoned enemy CP at V706486, formed a defensive line facing East.

The leading elements of Company C had not proceeded far along the north-south road before it met Company B's elements returning from the river. Still under small arms fire, Company C started digging in a defensive line East of the north-south road facing the FECHT River.

At about 1400 hours it was obvious that the 1st Battalion unassisted would be unable to reach the WEISS River before dark. The decision was therefore made to use the 3rd Battalion. Companies A and C were ordered to dig in on the southern slopes of the hill in the positions then held. Company A was ordered to extend Eastward to relieve the 2nd platoon of Company B, and Company B was ordered to withdraw to the vicinity of BENNWIHR to become Regimental reserve. The 3rd Battalion moved off at 1650.

Two rifle companies, I and K, were available to the 3rd Battalion for its WEISS River operations. Company L remained in Regimental reserve. Company K was short one platoon, which had been employed since early morning on the 1st Battalion left flank and was still pinned down by fire from the Chateau.

Leaving the assembly area near BEBLENHEIM, Companies I and K, the former leading, proceeded along the east side of the BENNWIHR-INGERSHEIM road between the two power lines. The plan called for Company I taking the Western sector of the WEISS River line while Company K, when Company I had cleared sufficiently below the road which Company A was in position, was to come into the Eastern sector of the line at the junction of the WEISS and FECHT Rivers.

Probing into the area, Company A had already revealed the existence of a very thickly-sown mine field--estimated to be from 200 ~~-400 yards wide and extending over 1000 yards in an east-west direction~~. However, enemy riflemen, earlier reported to be in foxholes within this area, had been withdrawn across the WEISS River by the time of the 3rd Battalion's arrival.

The advance of Company I to its objective was conducted without much opposition. The mine field slowed the rate of movement, and small arms fire was received from the South bank of the WEISS River, but by 1840 hours, the company had come in along the river bank and extended Eastward from the junction of the eastern power line and river. Here the troops began to dig in.

After Company I had cleared from in front of Company A, Company K moved out Eastward along the road. But on turning South,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0303

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Company K came under heavy machine gun and mortar fire from below the Chateau and from the woods in the vicinity of CR-194 (V702490). Slow progress was made by Company K toward its objective; the mine field had to be crossed cautiously.

By 2010 hours K Company, supported by mortar fire, had reached the WEISS River at its junction with the FECHT. On reaching the WEISS River, the company deployed West along the bank towards Company I. The lack of the detached platoon was felt here, however, and at midnight a platoon of Company B was inserted between Companies I and K.

Both 3rd Battalion Companies on this line were harrassed during the night, Company I by small arms fire from dug-in positions across the river East of the bridge. Company K received attention from mortar and machine guns in the woods to the Left front. Artillery directed on these woods by an Artillery Forward Observer with Company K reduced the enemy's fire, but mortar rounds continued to fall in the company area. Next morning Company I sent a two-squad patrol around its right flank and across the river. These men found six foxholes which they assaulted, taking one prisoner and killing ten Germans. Company K discovered that the mortar fire coming from its front was being directed from an OP at CR194. Artillery drove the enemy from this OP.

By morning a report from the 7th Infantry put that organization on a wide front extending Eastward from the Chateau, the regiment having fought its way slowly Southward from around GUEMAR. The mission of the 254th had not yet been accomplished, since mopping up the West bank of the FECHT River down to its junction with the WEISS remained to be done. At 0940 hours Company C jumped off from its defensive position of the night before with the mission of contacting the right flank of the 7th Infantry just South of the chateau, and of clearing the remaining enemy from the West bank of the FECHT River.

But the 7th Infantry had not yet gotten control of the woods to the West and South of the chateau. Open fields separated Company C from a thin strip of woods on the West bank of the river, and as the company started moving across this field toward the river it came under fire from weapons in the woods and on both sides of the river. A combination of machine gun and self-propelled gun fire pinned the company down about 800 yards from the river. Friendly artillery laid down smoke, and, with this cover, the company was able to gain the edge of the narrow strip of woods along the river by 1400 hours. The enemy continued in control of the woods across the stream all that day, and at nightfall Company C withdrew to its positions of the preceding night.

While the 1st and 3rd Battalions were fighting for the WEISS River line on the 23rd, the 2nd Battalion held its line along the FECHT River. During the day, however the Southward advance of the 7th Infantry cleared the enemy to its front, making a defense line there unnecessary. The battalion was withdrawn during the night

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0308

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and upon its arrival at RIBEAUVILLE Station at 24-0220 was attached to the 15th Infantry Regiment.

A total of forty-four prisoners of war were taken by the 1st and 3rd Battalions in their operations around Hill 216 and the WEISS River. Interrogation revealed that these soldiers were from the 760th Volks Grenadier Regiment.

In the successful taking and holding of the WEISS River line the regiment had accomplished its primary mission. On the morning of 24 January instructions were received at the Regimental Headquarters relative to the relief of the battalions on the line. That night elements of the 28th Division were to take over and the 254th was to move to an assembly area.

No further changes took place in the Regimental sector during the night until relief began to arrive. The first elements of the 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry began arriving at the 254th positions shortly after midnight, and by noon of the 25th, the regiment had closed in an assembly area in the Colmar Forest Northeast of OSTHEIM.

The stay in the Colmar Forest was to be a short one, however, for another mission lay before the regiment. The 15th Infantry had pretty well cleared the area East of the ILL River, pushing toward REIDWIHR in its Southward drive and leaving isolated groups of the enemy behind. The route from the West toward the town of JEBSHEIM was now clear.

The capture of JEBSHEIM was of particular importance to the Allied Forces. The town was heavily fortified and strongly held; the Germans considered it a key strongpoint in the defenses of the RHINE River crossings. The town itself was laid out in a way highly advantageous to the defender. The principle artery of the town is a north-south street with stone buildings on either side. Branching off at either end of the main street are two parallel streets leading West. Weapons located in the houses along these streets can cover effectively with cross-fire almost all the area to the West of the town. Between the town and the open fields to the West lie a small stream and wooded areas.

The Germans had skillfully supplemented JEBSHEIM's natural defensive virtues. Along the street and road leading Northwest, heavy concrete bunkers had been built. In an arc extending above the Northwest street, a row of pill-boxes defended to the North. Pill-boxes around the Southern end completed a strong defensive system. The bitter fight which the Germans put up to hold JEBSHEIM lends credence to the P/W statement that the town was being used as a corps headquarters.

Operation Instructions No. 8 outlined the tactical plans of the Regimental Commander for the assault on JEBSHEIM. From the line of departure just West of the BLIND River, the regiment was to attack on a two-battalion front. After taking JEBSHEIM, the regiment was to push on and hold the bridges across the Colmar Canal

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

from the crossing North of MUNTZENHEIM to the junction of the COLMAR and RHINE Canals. MUNTZENHEIM was to be entered. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were to be employed initially. The 1st Battalion on the Right was to maintain contact with the 15th Infantry driving South below RIEDWIHR, while the 2nd Battalion on the left was to be linked with the 1st DMI by reconnaissance elements. The 3rd Battalion was in regimental reserve, to be used on 3rd Division order only.

On the night of 23 January, while the attack on Hill 216 was still going on, tanks and tank destroyers attached to the 254th Infantry had been released. For the JEBSHEIM operation tanks and tank destroyers were again attached to the regiment. Operation Instruction No. 8 specified that elements of the Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of Company C, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion were to maintain contact with the 1st DMI, bring up the rear of the 2nd Battalion, and stand ready to reduce such strong points as might be encountered. A light tank platoon of Company C, 756th Tank Battalion was to follow the tank destroyers, protecting the rear and assisting battalions by fire. The chemical mortar platoon and the AAA/AW platoon remained attached as before.

Units of the 254th were still at work in the Colmar Forest on 25 January when the order for the launching of the attack came down. At 1600 the 1st and 2nd Battalions left the woods in column of companies and moved Eastward toward the BLIND River. The road leading Southeast from the Colmar Forest to JEBSHEIM was the boundary between the two battalions.

Based on Operation Instructions No. 8, the Battalion Commanders had coordinated their plans for the taking of JEBSHEIM. The 1st Battalion on the right was to concentrate on the southern part of the town. Company B on the battalion left was to move along the South side of the Northwest road, then, by-passing the north-south street, hit the lower square (V807467). Company A on the right was to sweep through the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM and, working with Company B, take the Southern part of the town. Following behind Company A, Company C was to push farther South and establish a road block between JEBSHEIM and the COLMAR Canal. The 2nd Battalion was to advance along the Northwest road and seize the northern square (V810476) using Company G on the right, Company F on the left and Company E in reserve.

It was expected that the operations of the 15th Infantry had insured an easy approach to the line of departure, but this proved otherwise. Shortly after crossing the ILL River the battalions were subjected to fire. Machine guns and small arms in the Northern end of the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM and in the area just East of the line of departure slowed the units down. Fire was returned and the advance continued slowly. Both battalions reached the line of departure shortly after 2100. Here they reorganized and prepared to push on to their objectives. The resistance which they had met West of the town necessitated a change in the attack plan. It was decided that the formation for the crossing of the BLIND River would be a column of companies in each battalion rather than a two-company front. After the river crossing, the plan as originally worked out could be

120

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0308

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

used, except that Company A would not go through the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM but farther to the East.

After the crossing of the road West of the BLIND River, the advance became more difficult against machine gun, pistol, and rifle fire. A detachment of French troops had taken the buildings of JEBSHEIM Mill (V798489). Passing this point at about 2230 hours, Company G, leading the 2nd Battalion, crossed the river. With two platoons abreast, one on either side of the road, the company moved toward the town. After advancing a few hundred yards the company lost contact with the 1st Battalion on the right and stopped.

The 1st Battalion for its part was running into difficult obstacles. Company A, leading, waded across the ice-cold, shallow BLIND River at about 2300 hours. (This night is said to have been one of the coldest of the winter.) Emerging on the West bank, the company was pinned down by heavy machine gun fire and contact with the 2nd Battalion was lost. Company B then came up from behind and, by-passing Company A, inched forward to contact Company G.

Both Companies B and G now moved along the Northwestern approach to the town. But enemy defenses, coupled with the frozen condition of the men, made progress difficult. The numerous pill-boxes formed an arc defending the town from the Northwest. A large concrete bunker located at V802480 delivered an especially intense volume of fire. Pinned down about 400 yards from the bunker, attacking troops were under machine gun fire from the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM and from the bunker as well as from the Northeast. Mortar fire was laid down on the bunker, but was ineffective. A patrol sent Westward into the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM to silence the machine guns there met failure.

During the early morning strong measures were taken to cut down enemy resistance. At 0245 hours four battalions of artillery placed a 15 minute preparation on the town. Strong resistance continued, and at about 0430 hours the two leading infantry companies began a withdrawal toward the BLIND River. Company G formed a defensive arc just East of JEBSHEIM Mill while the rest of the two battalions formed an all-ground defensive at CR180. These positions were maintained the rest of the night and most of the next day.

The volume of fire which had come from the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM indicated that the clearing of this forest would require considerable strength. At noon on 26 January regiment issued new instructions. While the 1st and 2nd Battalion continued their attacks on JEBSHEIM, the 3rd Battalion was to pass through RIEDWIHR and clear the enemy holding in the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM. This done, the 3rd Battalion was to advance Eastward and assist in the taking of JEBSHEIM by an attack from the South, subsequently sending out strong patrols to the South to secure the bridges North and Northwest of MUNTZENHEIM.

It was just getting dark on the evening of 26 January when the 3rd Battalion moved out of RIEDWIHR in the attack on the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM. Company I was in the lead as the troops crossed the little stream just East of RIEDWIHR. The mission of Company I was

121

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to clear the patch of woods just North of the RIEDWIHR-JEBSHEIM road. Company L was to run off the road to the South, and clear the upper half of the forest South of the road, while Company K was to keep to the right of Company L and sweep the Southern half of the woods.

Company I sent its three rifle platoons forward at 1700, two platoons abreast, one to the rear. The two leading platoons came under mortar and small arms fire, but were able to reach the Eastern edge of the woods. The reserve platoon was fired on and pinned down, while still in the field West of the woods, by a well dug-in machine gun at a stream junction to the North at V790480. Two squads were detached from the platoon, made their way to the rear, and North along the stream but were unable to close in on the weapon. Mortar fire finally silenced the machine gun. Company I then prepared defensive positions along the East edge of the woods where, though subjected to counter attacks from the front, it held its ground until withdrawn on the next day.

Company L, on the left of Company K, attacked at 2100. Meeting little resistance, the company turned South off the road, then pushed Eastward, intending to advance to the eastern edge of the forest. But a large clearing in the center of the forest was mistaken in the darkness for the fields beyond. When the company arrived at this clearing, it went into defensive positions.

When Company L had cleared into the woods, Company K jumped off and pushed due South through the western portion of the forest. The advance was successful until the company was within a short distance of the clearing. At this point it encountered heavy fire from the Southern edge of the wood, mostly artillery. Unable to proceed and in danger of being wiped out, the company fell back to RIEDWIHR, leaving one platoon in defensive positions at the point of its greatest advance.

Companies I and L remained in their defensive positions throughout the night and next morning, while Company K in RIEDWIHR was designated mobile reserve. On the afternoon of 27 January, the final step for the clearing of the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM got under way. Company K with two tanks moved north out of RIEDWIHR along the stream. Arriving at the Northern tip of the forest, the company turned South and swept the woods before Company L. By 1730 Company K had arrived at the Southern end of the woods, having met no enemy. Joining the platoon left there the previous night, the company organized defensive positions facing East and South.

On the evening of 26 January, while the 3rd Battalion was attacking the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM, the 1st and 2nd Battalions were resuming their operations against JEBSHEIM. Objective for the two battalions remained the same--the Northern half of the town to the 2nd Battalion, the Southern half to the 1st.

The attack got off slowly as night fell. Company F passed through Company G and led off for the 2nd Battalion. Company G was

122

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to follow behind and protect the battalion left flank while Company E stayed at CR180 as battalion reserve. Company C, with Company A following, launched the 1st Battalion attack. Company B, initially to the rear of the other 1st Battalion companies, was to stand by until the other companies had cleared, then strike the Southern part of the town.

Companies F and C moved along the Northwest road toward the road junction (V802479) at the Western approach of the town. When within about 500 yards of the defending emplacements, the two companies met heavy automatic fire. The particularly well-constructed bunker at V802480 presented the greatest problem. Fire from this bunker pinned down Companies A and C and held up Company F until the tank destroyers with Company F, braving 88mm fire from East of the town, fired point blank through the thick (two feet) walls of the bunker and rendered its capture possible.

At this point, Companies A and C, much understrength from the battles of the last four days, joined with Company F for the final push into town.

At 2400 hours, the concentrated fire of eight field artillery battalions was laid on JEBSHEIM for a period of 15 minutes. By 0100 hours on 27 Jan. Companies F, A and C, together with Company B, which has been unable to proceed on its mission, were on the Northwest street of the town. By 0400 hrs the street was cleared to the upper square. Company G worked parallel to Company F as the latter came along the Northwest street. Company F now organized defensive positions in houses while Company G set up a defensive arc North of the town facing GRUSSENHEIM. Since little activity was observed in the as yet unoccupied Southern part of the town, it was believed that JEBSHEIM was clear except for snipers.

On 27 January, Company G took over the attack and after an all-day fight, reached the lower square of the town. A counter-attack of about 75 Germans supported by one SP gun, hit the Company from the southeast, but was beaten off. The Company withdrew to the North half of the town and took up a defensive position for the night. The French desired to pass through the town, so the relief of Company G by Company E was cancelled. The French failed to go through the town, so Company E started out at 1400 on 28 January to clear the village of snipers and reduce the resistance in the South end. At 1500 they were across the southern intersection and about five houses down on the left side of the street. By this time Company E had taken 115 prisoners at a cost of 26 killed or wounded. The Company was down to two officers. At about 1700 a desperate counter-attack was thrown off and the Krauts driven out of their houses by fire. Company G came to assist Company E at 1800. Plans were made to continue the attack at 0400 on 29 January. At 0415 three Germans came in and tried to get Company E to surrender by saying, "We know you only have a Company here and we have a Battalion." The Company opened fire on them, and fighting broke out. The Germans burned down the houses occupied by our troops, so they dropped back carrying their wounded. Failing to gain his objectives, the enemy retired to bunkers to the South and East edges of the town. One American tank greatly assisted the clearing of the buildings, by braving heavy SP fire to shoot at point blank range into the houses used as forts by the enemy.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The enemy in JEBSHEIM were being supplied and reinforced by the road leading North into JEBSHEIM from MUNTZENHEIM. To cut this road and to assist the other two battalions by hitting JEBSHEIM from the South, the 3rd Battalion left its positions in the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM at 1130 hours on 29 January. Companies I and L were used in this operation, with Company K in reserve.

Company I followed by Company L moved out of the BOIS DE JEBSHEIM along the road. Arriving at a bridge (V801464) over a small creek, Company L turned South along the West bank. With Company L providing a base of fire, Company I was to move Southeast, by-pass the Southern tip of JEBSHEIM and, turning sharply North, strike at the enemy in the vineyards just to the East of the enemy-occupied houses.

Heavy fire from the houses caused a change in Company I's operation. A flank attack was decided upon. Accordingly, Company I moved in by the road leading West from the Southern end of the town. A French tank encountered just before entering town was persuaded to assist Company I and the infantry tank team began attacking enemy strong points on the West side of the north-south street.

At the time of Company I's arrival at the edge of the town, the fight between the 2nd Battalion and the enemy in his remaining houses was particularly violent. Compressing the enemy into a few houses below the lower square had been a difficult task in which all three of the battalions' rifle companies and all remaining elements of the 1st Battalion had taken part. From the houses and from foxholes in the vineyards Southeast of the street crossing, the enemy resisted fiercely with automatic weapons while 88mm guns from the woods to the East poured fire on our troops. Liberal use was being made of bazookas and automatic weapons by Company G, now on line against the enemy, while a tank destroyer at V810467 was hammering at the unreduced houses.

The attack of Company I, coupled with the blows being delivered by the 2nd Battalion, broke the enemy's desire to resist further. At about 1630 the Germans began to march out of their strong-points--first in small groups of five or ten, then in larger groups--and surrendered to the men of the 264th. The total bag was about 450. Interrogation of these prisoners indicated they were members of the 136th Mountain Regiment.

While the battle for JEBSHEIM was in its final stages, Company L, still on the banks of the little stream, was under heavy fire from the road leading South out of the town. The company found itself in terrain that offered little concealment. Smoke was called for and this together with strafing operations of U. S. aircraft along the road, released the company. A very small counter attack which developed from the direction of MUNTZENHEIM was beaten off, after which the company crossed the stream and entered the now-cleared JEBSHEIM.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

While Company L was occupying the Southern end of JEBSHEIM, Company K was assigned the mission of pushing South from JEBSHEIM down the MULTZENHEIM road and securing the canal crossing (V802452) just North of MUNTZENHEIM. The enemy still held out below JEBSHEIM and South of the canal. The company pushed on and late that night succeeded in securing the bridge. Company F had been sent Southeast of town after its fall and now held a line extending Northwest from the canal crossing at V821453.

For the night of 29 January, with Company K along the canal and Company F extending North from the canal, the remainder of the regiment assumed defensive positions to the East and Northeast of the town.

On the morning of 30 January, the 1st Battalion moved to the line which Company F had held during the night. From this point the 1st Battalion, in conjunction with French armor on the left flank, attacked East toward the BOIS DE LA HARDT. Company F remained in position as reserve. After advancing to the edge of the woods under small arms fire, the French tanks were fired on by 88mm guns in the woods. Not wishing to risk their armor, the French withdrew and requested that the 1st Battalion withdraw with them. The battalion returned to the line of departure and went into defensive positions extending North from the canal.

The attack on the BOIS DE LA HARDT and Eastward toward the canal junction was resumed on 1 February. Having replaced the 1st Battalion on the line of departure, the 3rd Battalion moved off at 0100 hours and advanced slowly against strong resistance. By 0730 the leading elements of the battalion were through the forest and on the West bank of the RHONE Canal.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

Part VIII

THE GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

During the Reduction of the COLMAR Pocket.

INTRODUCTION:

The action which led to the reduction of the COLMAR Pocket was swift and effective. The shell which the enemy presented in opposition, once pierced, speedily crumbled. The German High Command had been forced to gamble because of the military exigencies of the moment. With a heterogeneous collection of troops in units sometimes activated almost on the spot, they bolstered their defenses. Their positions were strong, if sometimes too lightly held, and they may well have figured that the Allies were too intent upon other projects to mount an attack in this area at this time. In any event, they had succeeded in holding at bay for several months the entire First French Army as well as various United States units and had thus accomplished one objective.

Enemy strategy before and during the operation indicates an unwillingness to hold the COLMAR Pocket in the face of aggressive action on our part. By the latter part of January, 269 Infantry Division, rated by the 6th Army Group as one of the best units in the area, was withdrawn and dispatched to the Eastern Front. It is true that the 2d Mountain Division was brought into the pocket, but this unit was hardly an adequate substitute. Composed ninety percent of Austrians, from whom no great enthusiasm for the present fight could be expected, it was thrown into the line directly following an 1800 kilometer march through NORWAY. The division was never employed as a unit, but was used piecemeal to stem our advance.

The Designation of parts of other divisions for a similar function leads to the conclusion that German strategy was aimed primarily at holding so that the maximum force might be withdrawn to the other side of the RHINE. The lack of reinforcements brought in during the period is further evidence that this was the enemy's intention. Some 1500 Mountain troops transferred from ITALY were the only reinforcements encountered during the entire period and these were brought in before our attack.

The salvaging operation proved much more difficult than expected. The surprise element in our tactics plus the power and rapidity of our advance forced the enemy to commit under emergency conditions much of what it had hoped to withdraw. What finally he was able to pull out of the pocket and deposit across the RHINE by no means signifies a successful withdrawal manouvor. The following pages indicate strength and disposition of enemy forces at the beginning of the operation, [illegible] were reached during the operation, and what was left at the end of the period.

RESTRICTED

126

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0314



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

PERIOD FROM 22d - to - 31st of JAN. '45

The initial attack on 22 January by the 3d U. S. Infantry Division brought about the following countermoves by enemy divisions:

16 VG Division: On the 22d - 23d of January elements were shifted from the ORBEY sector to HOLTZWIHR against the 3d U. S. Infantry Division's right flank.

189 VG Division: By the 26th of January the 1213th Regiment had been removed from its original position in the LAB.ROCHE-TROIS EPIS area to the West bank of the ILL River North of COLMAR.

708 VG Division: This division was split in two by our attack with 748th Regiment on our left and 728th and 760th Regiments on our right. 748th Regiment was not contacted after the 31st of January and early in February was reported on the East bank of the Rhine.

2 Mountain Division: This Division seems to have been selected for a sacrifice holding role. On paper it had a sector facing the 3d U. S. Infantry Division's center, but elements were committed on both flanks as well. One battalion of the 137th Mountain Regiment was sent to MULHOUSE against the I French Corps on 15th of January, but by the 29th of January it was brought North and thrown in at JEBSHEIM. During the period from 23d to the 29th of January all other battalions of both the 137th and 136th Mountain Regiments were committed against the salient.

198th Infantry Division: By the 31st of January this Division had shown definite indications of moving against our left flank.

PERIOD 1 - 2 FEBRUARY

16 VG Division: Additional elements from the ORBEY area were committed at WIDENSOLEN by the 2d of February.

189 VG Division: The 1213 Regiment moved to WIRH-EN-PLAINE when we crossed the COLMAR Canal; it was destroyed in part. Elements of the 1214 Regiment had moved into COLMAR by the 2d of February.

708 VG Division: The 760th Regiment took part in the defense of COLMAR, where it was reported destroyed.

2 Mountain Division: All elements were contacted daily at center and both flanks of the salient.

198 Infantry Division: By the 2d of February elements of the 305th and 308th Regiments were brought South from their original sector in the ERSTEIN area and were committed against our center at WIDENSOLEN.

338 Infantry Division: A contact with the 757th Regiment made on the Corps right flank was the first indication that the Division was on the point of moving out of the Central VOSGES sector.

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS: Numerous miscellaneous units organized from stragglers, convalescents, and Home Guard units were contacted in the defense of COLMAR.

RESTRICTED

131

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PERIOD 3 - 4 FEBRUARY

16 VG Division: Still additional elements were sent to APPENWIHR as reinforcements against our salient. Covering forces remaining in the Division's original sector were contacted in our advance along the boundary between I French Corps and XXI U. S. Corps.

189 VG Division: Stragglers from the 1212 Regiment, hitherto unidentified, were taken during this period. The Regiment may have been used for replacements or more probably was withdrawn across the RHINE. Elements of 1214 Regiment, left as covering forces in its original sector, were contacted as the new advance on the Corps right flank was begun.

708 VG Division: Only stragglers were contacted during and after this period. What had not been destroyed presumably escaped across the RHINE.

2 Mountain Division: Contacts were made regularly with remants and other elements gathered together in miscellaneous battle groups, the bulk of which were concentrated in the BIESHEIM - NEUF BRISACH area.

198 Infantry Division: In addition to 305 and 308 Regiments, 326 Regiment was contacted after it had moved South for the defense of WOLFGANTZEN.

338 Infantry Division: Both battalions of the 759th Regiment were rushed from the HOHNECK region in the VOSGES Mountains to NEUF BRISACH area and were committed on arrival.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

PERIOD 5 - 8 FEBRUARY

During the last several days of the operation disorder and confusion characterized the enemy's order of battle. Contacts made were almost entirely with stragglers or small groups trying to make their way across the RHINE. This was particularly true of units from the Western part of the pocket, which had been cut off when the U.S. and French forces joined at ROUFFACH. An attempt at organization was made around the bridgehead area near NEUF BRISACH, where two battle groups were hastily thrown together out of remnants of 2nd Mountain Division, 16th VG Division, elements of the 198th Infantry Division, and other miscellaneous groups.

The 189th and 708th VG Divisions seem to be out of the picture by this time, except for stragglers. What remained of their forces had apparently been able to cross the RHINE. The remaining elements of the 16th VG Division (as part of a battle group) bore the brunt of the defense of FORT HEITEREN and were practically wiped out. A substantial part of the 198th Infantry Division seems to have escaped. The elements remaining behind were covering forces. Of the 338th Infantry Division, the 758th Regiment was reported destroyed by I French Corps where the THUR and ILL Rivers join, while parts of the 757th and 759th presumably escaped.

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

Part IX

Awards
Citations
Commendations

3 February 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation.

THROUGH: Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758.

TO : Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division.

On January twenty-third your Division launched an attack on the enemy with the ultimate objective of reducing the Colmar Pocket. With the 254th Infantry of the 63rd Division attached, by a night operation you forced a crossing of the Ill River and established a bridgehead south of Ilhaeusern. You held this bridgehead in spite of heavy armored counterattacks from the rear and flanks. Later, you succeeded in capturing Riedwihr and then drove south, crossed the Colmar Canal and by swift maneuvers secured two bridge sites and captured six towns in eight hours. You built bridges with great rapidity and, driving with your armor, you outflanked Colmar and cut off the retreat of the enemy by way of Neuf-Brisach in the north sector of the pocket. Your successes enabled the II French Corps to push eastward to the Rhine and forced the enemy south to his only route of escape. Throughout this hard fighting, opposed by a fanatical Hun and terrible weather, you killed many of the enemy, captured large numbers of prisoners and seized large quantities of materiel.

This commendable operation was carried out in the best tradition of the 3rd Infantry Division and has added another glorious chapter to your outstanding record which includes almost three hundred sixty-five combat days and sixteen Medals of Honor. I congratulate each Officer and man in this fine organization of which you should all be justly proud.

JACOB L. DEVERS,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding.

RESTRICTED

135

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Public Relations Office
APO 758 US Army

16 February 1945

SPECIAL RELEASE No. 303.

For Immediate Release:

AWARD OF CROIX DE GUERRE and LEGION OF HONOR

Major General Frank W. Milburn, CO, XXI Corps.

On 10 February 1945, at an impressive ceremony in the newly liberated City of Colmar in Southern Alsace, Major General Frank W. Milburn, Commanding General of the XXI Corps was decorated by General Charles De Gaulle with the "Croix De Guerre Avec Palme" and the "Commandeur De La Legion d'Honnour". These awards were made to General Milburn in recognition of his skillful command and strategic employment of American troops in the "Colmar Pocket" who in conjunction with the troops of the 1st French Army effected the decisive defeat of the enemy and his total elimination from Southern Alsace.

RESTRICTED

PASSED FOR PUBLICATION BY THE FIELD PRESS CENSOR--DDS--16 FEB 1945

136

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

16 February 1945

SPECIAL RELEASE

For Immediate Release:

AWARD OF CROIX DE GUERRE and LEGION OF HONOR

Col. Rinaldo Van Brunt, Chief of Staff, XXI Corps

On 10 February 1945, at an impressive ceremony in the newly liberated City of Colmar in Southern Alsace, Colonel Rinaldo Van Brunt, Chief of Staff of the XXI Corps was decorated by General Charles de Gaulle with the "Croix De Guerre Avec Palme" and the "Officier De La Legion d'Honneur".

RESTRICTED

PASSED FOR PUBLICATION BY THE FIELD PRESS CENSOR--DDS--16 FEB 1945

137

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

General de LATTRE de TASSIGNY has sent the following message (paraphrased, due to the fact that it was received in code) to Lieutenant General JACOB L. DEVERS, Commanding, 6th Army Group:

Information has just been received by me to the effect that the troops of General O'DANIEL have taken NEUF BRISACH in a valiant and vigorous manner. The ardor for battle, the energy, and the skill with which you have so ably lead and inspired the fighting of the magnificent XXI Corps is well known to me. It is my intention to propose that the French Government cite in orders of the French Army the 3rd U. S. Infantry Division and its Commanding General, who is a splendid warrior, and may I congratulate you for the decisive manner in which you have sent forward American armored units in order that they could reach, at the earliest possible time, the RHINE River at CHALAMPE, the ultimate rendezvous of the French and American comrades-in-arms of the First French Army.

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

ORDER OF THE DAY)
NUMBER 2)

9 February 1945

TO: The Troops of the First French Army.

Striking out boldly in the face of violent snow storms and over difficult terrain, you have by your force and determination, driven the enemy from the lower Alsace Plain. Though he was determined, at enormous cost in men and material, to cling to his last hope of reconquest of this land so steeped in tradition, you have driven him out of his prepared positions and back across the Rhine. You have liberated the imperial city of Colmar; a city the name of which has studded the pages of French history and is dear to the heart of every Frenchman. You have again brought freedom to thousands of liberty loving citizens of a noble country.

During this difficult operation you have captured over fifteen thousand prisoners, you have killed and wounded many of his soldiers, and have captured and destroyed vast amounts of material. By your combined efforts you again demonstrated to the world an unequaled solidarity between the French and American soldier. You have every right to be proud of the manner in which you have completed this difficult job.

I say to the officers and men of the I and II French Corps, the XXI U.S. Corps and the Corps and Army Supporting and Service Troops, "Well Done". Let us all go forward to our new task with a greater determination to destroy the forces of evil.

Only Germany and the German Army lie before you. You have decisively defeated the enemy West of the Rhine and driven him from the soil of France. He is dazed, wounded and confused but he is not yet finished. That job remains. My charge to you is--On to Germany.

JACOB L. DEVERS
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding.

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

ORDER OF THE DAY #6

7 February 1945

FROM: General de LATTRE de TASSIGNY

Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers, American and French of the First French Army: I do not want to wait until the end of this rugged and victorious fight before telling you of my joy and my gratefullness.

For nearly three weeks I have been granting you no respite, and night and day I called out to you relentlessly and increasingly, "Forward!"

It was necessary.

No task was more important and more beautiful than that of saving Strasbourg and definitely liberating Alsace. No task was more fruitful in it's results, military and political. No task more deserving of your generosity and your sacrifices.

You have all understood this, and covered with mud, cold and exhausted, you have found in yourselves the extreme energy necessary to overcome the desperate energy of the enemy.

I thank you, my dear American Comrades, who have brought us your valor and who have spared neither your arms nor your blood in order to help us.

And for you, my dear French Comrades, you can claim with justifiable pride that you have been artisans of a great national event, of which our children will speak with emotion and respect.

All divisions of the Army of Liberation were present and all of them, each with its particular genius, and each with an equal love for the Mother Country, have gloriously consecrated their part of the battlefield.

The German is being completely pushed from the sacred soil of France. He will not return!

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0328

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Lt Newell(163) 8 February 1945
28th Infantry Division leads color guards at COLMAR victory parade.
American flag brought many cheers.
12th Armored Division, 28th Infantry Division, COLMAR, FRANCE.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-Lt Newell(163) 8 February 1945
Left to Right, Major General Norman D. Cota, Commanding General 28th Infantry Division; and General de Lattre de Tassigny, Commanding General First French Army in the COLMAR victory parade pass vehicles of the reconnaissance squadron of the 5th D.B., First French Army.
28th Inf. Div., First French Army, COLMAR, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-T/4 Todd(163) 10 February 1945
During liberation celebration in COLMAR, FRANCE, General Charles de Gaulle presented General de Lattre de Tassigny, Commanding General First French Army with the Grand Croix. From left to right General de Gaulle, General de Lattre, General Milburn, General O'Daniel, General Leclerc, General Valluy.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Photog-T/5 McCrobey(163) 10 February 1945
American and French Officers salute during the playing of the National Anthem at COLMAR Liberation Celebration.
First French Army and 28th Division, COLMAR, FRANCE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2728 DGER 6 AG Investigation Reports 1-25

587.323-1
X
1944-45

2728

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

nvestigation Reports 1-25

0728 4341-888

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I ~~XXVII-28 CLX-05~~ P/H 2728/1 ~~15000~~ cy 1.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

D.C.A.R.
D.S.I.
S.H.A.E. (6th Army Group

Source Value c/3

Date Up to 15-11-44

Underground repair depot for aircraft in the region of Freiburg.

Map Reference Germany 1/50,000, Sheet no. 6H4 Freiburg.

An underground repair workshop for aircraft was constructed 3 kms. East of [redacted] in the region of SCHAUINSLAND (at X = 512,500 : Y = 123,250)

This workshop measures 30 X 40 metres and its entry is camouflaged in the forest.

An airstrip allows the landing of aircraft.

All aircraft repair material for FREIBURG airfield is at this workshop.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28

P/H. 2728/2
cy 1.

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.O. (6 Army Group)

Source Val. C 3

Date 1.1.45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

BOMBING RESULTS

The Panzer Kaserne which is located on the road from STUTTGART going to BOBLINGEN was bombed on a night towards the end of November 1944.

The building and materiel sufferred great damage.

In January 1945 a building was rapidly reconstructed with wood from COLMAR . There was not enough wood to complete the work and construction was interrupted.

30 to 40 Tiger tanks stay inside the Casrne where they are camouflaged against the surrounding walls.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28, 2728/3, P/H ~~1505~~ Cy 1.

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.O.(6Army Group)

Source Value C 3

Date See Text

GERMAN RAILROADS AND MARSHALLING YARD FLAK.

Map Ref: 1:100,000, Sheet V3.

1. The marshalling yard at MANNHEIM extending from 969 x 545 to 936 x 604, was functioning normally at the beginning of January 1945 in spite of bombing.

2. The locomotive depot at 960 x 561 containes 100 locomotives.

3. Retween the marshalling yard and the cross-roads of the Reichsautobahn at 962 x 381 are 3 batteries of 88 mm Flak.

4. At the beginning of January 1945 HEIDELBURG marshalling yard was intact.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 P/H 2728/4 Cy 1.

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C 3

Date: Beginning of January 1945.

Airfield in Saxony.

The airfield situated 5 km 500 South of EILENBURG (Saxony) was never bombed during December 1944.

It is occupied by 100 single seat fighters as well as 5 or 6 twin engine and 4 or 5 jet aircraft.

The hangars are round the airfield.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXOLL-24 T/H 2728/5 91.

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Sourde value X/3

Date: Beginning of February 1945

Depots in the Patalinat.

Map reference: 1/100,000 Sheet U2
KAISERLAUTEN

1. A munition and gasoline depot is camouflaged in the woods near the railroad at 922-059.

2. A large food supply depot for troops and civilians in the SAARBRUCKEN area is located at DITTWEILER at 717-935.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY NOTE XXVII-28 2728 TJH [redacted] cy 1.

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C A

Date: February 1945

Liquidation of silk stocks for parachutes.

Up to the present time fabrication of silk for parachutes enjoyed priority.

Now without the fabrication of BADEN all production has stopped and directors and technicians of these plants have been requested to use their stocks of costume material, tent material, etc.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I [redacted] P/H [redacted]

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C 2

Date: 22/2/45

Bombing of SINGEN.

Two bombs hit the locomotive depot, put eight engines out of use.

Four bombs fell on the "NAGGI" food production plant.

The aluminum plant was only superficially damaged.

The station and tracks were seriously hit. A two ton bomb which fell on the station square has not yet exploded.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 T/I 2728/8
91.

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value B/3

Date: 22/2/45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

A New Aircraft for Adolf HITLER.

At POCKING (lower Bavaria, between BRAUNAU and PASSAU) a part of the Adolf Hitler Squadron is located.

1. The spot can be recognised by 2 vaulted halls and a large flying field. It is located in an area of wooded hills.

2. Work continues night and day in the halls on the transformation of a 4 engined JU 290.
The very luxurious equipment will comprise;

a. Armour plates, bullet proof windows machine guns, fire extinguishers, etc.

b. A bar, running water, heating, etc.

It will be able to transport 20 to 22 persons.

3. Date of delivery at BERCHTESGADEN was fixed for 28-2-45, but had to be pushed back to the middle of March, to the great fury of the FUHRER, owing to difficulty of material.

4. Originally 3 machines of this type were to be constructed, but due to lack of raw material only one could be made.

5. General BAUER, the Fuhrer's pilot directs the work, assisted by assembler ZINTEL. He himself is being instructed by specialists in piloting this aircraft.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 P/H 2728/9 cy 1.

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.C. (6 Army Group)

Source Value C/3

Date 24-2-45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

"PROGRESS-WERKE" PLANT AT STADELHOFEN

DESCRIPTION

The plant has the appearance of a large building, having a clock towers at each end, and a small house adjoining on the left hand side.

It has never been bombed.

MANUFACTURE

The plant makes apparatus for submarines and for VI. It works also for the Air Force (Jäger-program)

PERSONNEL

150 employees work day and night. In September 1944 the plant was enlarged by the construction of small wooden buildings between the pland and the mountain.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 T/H 2728/15 ag 1.

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

SECRET

Source Value C 3

Date: 25/2/45

Railroads.

In the whole of Northern Germany, the railroad telephone and telegraph network has been put completely out of use by Allied bombing.

The Signal Service of the Wehrmacht are at the present time employed in setting up a radio network equipped with field posts allowing liaison between the most important stations.

All the marshalling yards have already been equipped in this manner.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-21 T/H 3728/11 cy 1.

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.O. (6 Army Group)

Value X O

Date 26 February 1945

NEW SECRET WEAPON

Form and Characteristic of the Weapon

The form is cylindrical and is composed of 4 parts:

1) Gas Container.
2) Container of control and propulsion mechanisms.
3) Container of propulsion and balancing control gear.
4) Container of the two stabilising and sustaining wings.

The First part is of super light material (duralumin and special metals and of truncated conical form.

The second part containing the control and propulsion mechanisms, is of a heavier material, it is also of a truncated conical form.

The third part of circular form, has holes of different demensions. The holes in the centre release the exhaust gases, there on the periphery serve to receive the hertzian control waves.

The fourth part of verylight material has been adapted to the machine, after experiments, to give it greater stability.

The new weapon is integraley controlled by hertzian waves which allow it reach considerable altitudes (40,000 metres and more) at a very high speed (8 to 900 km per hour).

Absolutely silent it is also very accurate, and above all preceding weapons, it has a very special characteristic, it is "magnetic."

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Value X O , Date 26 Feb. 1945
(Continued)

Essential characteristic of the new bomb

This is its "magnetisation". By virtue of this characteristic, having arrived at the zone of the objective, it directs itself automatically against the metallic masses on the ground: tanks, trains, iron bridges, munition dumps, etc.

Contents of the bomb

Concerning the contents, two types of bombs have been constructed:

a) One, containing liquid gas (of which the formula is strictly secret) easily inflammable, either spontaneously or on contact. This type of bomb is destinied particularly for the destruction of material, depots, factories, houses, etc.

b) The other, containing a special explosive gas, with high potential & giving forth toxic gases. (for the immunity of German front line tropps. Special masks are to be prepared in large numbers in Germany as well as in Italy, by M.A.S. at SARONNO.)

Dimensions of the Two types of Bombs

For launching, the bombs of one type will alternate with the bombs of the other type or even be launched simultaneously during a military operation. It is to be denoted that they are being prepared in series of two sizes on a large scale, as follows:

a) Large type: Maximum length 2.55 m, circumference Max. 0.90, thickness 0.25
b) Small Type: length Max. 1.53m, circumference Max. 0.55, thickness 0.15.

For the large type radius of action varies between 200 and 800 metres, for the others between 50 and 300 metres.

Launching sites

West: PFORZHEIM-CALW.ROTTWEIL-TUTTLINGIEN-SIGMARINGEN-REUTLINGEN-STUTTGART.

South: KEMPTEN- TIVANO -BOLZANO-LIENZ-EPITAL-AUSSEE-SALZBURG-LAUFEN-ROSENHEIM-TOOLZ.

South East: LINZ-STEYR -WEIDHOFEN-ST POLTEN-STOCKERAU-KREMSGREIN-URFAHEW.

Central Zone: PILSEN-KIATTAU-TANNUS-WEIDEN-TACHAU-MARIENBAD-PLAU-MIES-PLAUEN-KAADEN-BRUX-BODENBACH-CHEMNITZ-SWICKAUERFURT-WEIMAR-COBURG-MEINGEN-RISENACH.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Characteristics of Launching sites

These launching stations all have as characteristic a special system of antennae which are totally different from the others: these are metal masts always in pairs of which the dimensions vary between 2 and 30 metres high (even on the same station). These antennae are disposed in the form of a crown or Sinusoidal. They are spaced 15 to 25 metres apart. Near each Station (which has a specialist crew commanded by a subalter) there are bomb dumps very well concealed.

Each station, for daily use, will have a mixed quota of bombs, sufficient for a week's launching (one day of launching envisages 250 to 300 bombs) and 3 days' reserves.

Each station and each group of stations has one Sector as objective to hit against which it pilots its bombs, the trajectory of which, it appears, is sufficiently controllable. The length of the different trajectories already established and at a very high altitude are disposed special small balloons; not much is known about these at the moment. It would appear that these small balloons should serve as a liaison between the departure station and the navigation of the bomb.

Production Plants of the New Machine

This new secret weapon is constructed almost entirely in Germany, but some precision parts are made in Italy, in particular in the following plants:- F.I.M.I. at SARONNE, C.E.M.S.A. at SARONNE (nearly 1,800 workers work in this factory night and day), MUDA Radio at COMO.

Employment Program

It is stated that the weapon will be used next spring, when ten stations will all be ready plus all the materiel, a formidable offensive will be unloosed, relying principally on this weapon and on still others to follow.

It is possible that this date—the spring—will be changed suddenly, if the 6th, 7th, 1st, 19th and 5th Armoured Armies and the reserves under Von Runstedt's Command do not succeed, as ordered, in stopping the allied advance in the West to allow the large preparation of the new German offensive.

It is reported that in Technical circles they already call this attack "Victory Rain". It is to be constituted by a simultaneous and uninterrupted launching from all stations of these bombs against the immediate rear of the allied front; its object being to form an insurmountable barrier between this front and its supply bases.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

As soon as this interruption of communications and supplies has been achieved, an attach will be laid on by the Wermacht and German Air Force, which at present is being reorganised on very modern technical and military principals and which will be completed by this time.

If this plan of attack has the desired results and all the front line allied units are destroyed, the launching of the bombs will be carried out against a new zone behind the new front, which can be isolated and successively destroyed.

It is anticipated that this attack will produce a savage battle and a clear victory in all the countries occupied by the opposing Army.

In the REICH, so much hope is placed in this new weapon, that a new secret method of use is already being studied, destined to be employed the day the allies will be obliged to reembark for the English Coast.

The new secret method will allow almost the entire destruction of all the transport, the soldiers and material of the enemy.

This last method, has been tried out on a small scale in the waters of POLA-TRIESTE-VENICE. The results are reported to have been satisfactory.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-25 T/H 2-720/12 cy 1.

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value B/3

Date: 26/2/45

Manufacture of Aircraft in the Austrian Tyrole.

The manufacture of DUESENJAEGER in the HEINKEL plant at JENBACH has been stopped.

All the same component parts are still being made for different types of German fighters.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-5 2728.13 TP/H 9/.

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.O. (6 Army Group)

Source Value C 3

Date 27-2-45

INDUSTRY IN THE BADEN AREA

BROMBACH: The TEWES armament factory was very seriously damaged during the bombing of Saturday February 24th.

LOERRACH: Closing of factories and several bakeries as a result of lack of coal.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28

P/H 2724/14
cy 1.

SECRET

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C 3

Date: 28-2-45

(Extract) German Railroads.

Concerning the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line, it is used particularly at the present time owing to the fact that it serves numbrous factories in the forest and some underground factories.

To neutralize the line it must be cut equally at the two following branch lines;

26. Line VILLINGEN-ROTTWEIL and

27. Line HAUSACH-HORCHDF,

and attack the interesting region of tunnels between HORNBERG and TRIBERG.

Numerous galleries have been excavated into the EISENBERG running into the EISENBERG tunnel with a length of nearly 800 metres. It is the same in the SEELENWALD running into the GREMMELSBERG tunnel with a length of almost one kilometre.

These galleries serve at the present time as depots.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 T/H 2728/15

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.O.(6 Army Group)

Source Value B 2

Date March 1 1945

EFFECT OF BOMBING ON THE RAILROAD STATIONS IN BADEN AREA

PFORZHEIM

The railroad station and installations have sufferred much damage. 6 locomotives and numerous passenger and freight wagons have been destroyed.

Railroad traffic was only able to be re-established 3 days after the recent raid.

Several plants working for the Luft-Waffe have been seriously damaged.

FREIBURG-HAITINGEN

Since the beginning of February, railroad circulation on the FREIBURG-HAITINGEN has dropped more than 50%, by reason of the destruction caused by French Artillery and air raids.

As soon as a break in the line is repaired, damage is caused in another place. The rail track at ISTEIN is in course of repair. It will be open to traffic on the evening of March 3.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/1 XXVII-28 T/H 2728/K
cy 1.

D.G.E.R.

D.S.R.

S.R.O. ((Army Group)

Source Value B/3

Date 1.3.45

ARRIVAL OF AIRBORNE TROOPS AND PARACHUTE UNITS

Air borne troops and formations of paratroops have been, these last days, from the interior of Germany to the Western front.

A regiment of airborne troops arrived at MARIENHEIDE about 50 Kms. NE of COLOGNE.

A regiment of paratroops arrived at LANGENSCHWALBACH (or BADSCHWALBACH) not far from WIESBADEN

Formations of paratroops estimated battalion strength, arrived at BRETTEN and WALDKIRCH.

Small elements of paratroops, at the maximum a company have been seen at ZELL AND WEHR .

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-25
SECRET

P/H 2728/1-1
ajl.

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C 3

Date: March 3, 1945

Military Activity.

Region of Lake Constance and Southwest.

I. A.A.

1. CONSTANCE. The town is not protected by AA.

2. FRIEDRICHSHAFEN and IMMENSTAAD. Both these towns are protected by numerous pieces of AA and installations for artificial fog.

II. AVIATION.

1. BIBERACH (Sheet X 3 - 570 - 124) 500 m. NE of the town lies an airfield with wooden aircraft.

2. LUDWIGSHAFEN. Six seaplanes with Spanish colours are moored in the port.

III. INDUSTRY.

1. IMMENSTAAD. The Dornier plants are working full time. They are surrounded by electrified barbed wire.

2. FRIEDRICHSHAFEN. Work at the Dornier plants has ceased.

3. OBER RADERACH. (Sheet Y 4 - 280 - 010) An underground factory installed since 1940, is working full time.

Towers more than 60 metres long have been installed (treat with reserve).

Personnel are composed of political prisoners, right wing and some foreigners. They are forbidden to leave the factory.

4. SPAICHINGEN. (Sheet X 3 - 750 - 420) Large armament manufacture, specialising in the manufacture of wooden mines and Panzerfaust.

IV. 'Noble' refugees.

Constance: Himmler's wife is installed at the INSEL HOTEL.

Goering's wife near Constance at MAINAU.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28
SECRET

P/H 2724/14
cy 1.

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value B/2

Date: 4 March 1945

Interruption of traffic via SINGEN.

Rail traffic via SINGEN is still cut in all directions.

Large crews of workmen are occupied with the repair work, and are working principally on the reconstruction of the two tracks destined to reopen direct traffic in the direction of DONDINGEN.

It is estimated that this traffic will be able to be reopened the evening of March 5, 1945.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 [redacted]
SECRET
H/ 2728/19 [redacted]
9!
POLICY
TARGETS
AIR ROOM
USSTAF
PLANS
DIOS

D.C.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value 2/3

Date: 5/3/45

Sensitive points for railroad traffic between Austria and Italy.

1. To the North East of WELS in the direction of LINZ there is an enormous freight station having about 2 kms of platforms. On February 24 there were in the station more than 20 freight trains and about 200 tank cars.

2. The section of the line BISCHOFSHOFEN and PFARRWERFEN.

3. The stations of INNSBRUCK, RUM, HALL, WOROL, SALZBURG, LINZ, repaired immediately after each bombardment.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/1 XXVII-28 [redacted]
TP/H 2728/20 [redacted] cy 1.

SECRET

S.C.S.B.
S.S.U.
S.H.A.E. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C/3

Date 2 to 5-3-45

Extract

RASTATT. The Luftgau from VERSAILLES is now on the airfield at FREIBURG. That from PARIS is at WIESBADEN.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 T/H 2728/21 cy 1.

SECRET

D.C.S.M.
D.S.M.
S.H.A.E. (6th Army Group)

Source Value C/3

Date 5/3/45

Messerschmidt Plant LEONBERG near STUTTGART.

One kilometre by crow's flight to the West of LEONBERG, the barracks of the locality consisting of 3 buildings are situated.

At these barracks large quantities of spare parts for Messerschmidt Aircraft are deposited.in the building to the South of the road going from LEONBERG.

These parts were evacuated from the plant at BUDISLAU, transferred near LEONBERG.

In LEONBERG station, the agent also saw special wagons destined for the transport of Messerschmidt aircraft. The agent also assisted in loading spare parts into a wagon in LEONBERG station, which was after sent towards STUTTGART.

The Messerschmidt plant, originally at BUDISLAU has been transferred to an underground location near LEONBERG in a hillside immediately to the East of the town.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I [redacted] XXVII-24
SECRET

2728 Pzz
P/H [redacted]
cy 1.

POLICY
TARGETS
AIR ROOM
GIOS

D.G.E.R.
D.S.R.
S.R.O. (6th Army Group)

Source Value X/3

Date: 8/3/45

Bombing of factories in Germany.

A factory annex of MESSERSCHMIDT located at SULZ (BADEN) was bombed without success on December 26, 1944.

This plant employs 100 workers and makes small parts for aircraft engines.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 [redacted]

SECRET

T/H [redacted] ag 1.

POLICY
TARGETS
AIR ROOM
FILE
COPY

D.C.M.R.
D.S.K.
S.H.A.E. (6 Army Group)

Source Value C/3

Date 10-3-45

Lack of Ammunition for AA in Germany.

Germany is going through a grave crisis of ammunition for AA at the present time. Stocks are reduced to practically nothing for most German Towns.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-28 TJH 2728/24 gl.

SECRET

U.S.S.R.
U.S.A.
S.H.A.E. (6th Army Group)

Source Value 3 2

Results of bombardment.

I. Artillery fire - 10 March.

1). The station and railroad installations of HALTINGEN-EIMELDINGEN have sufferred great damage.

2). Railroad traffic between HALTINGEN and MULHEIM was still interrupted on Tuesday March 13. It had been partly reestablished on the day of the 14th.

3). Fire carried out on March 10 on the area of LUTTEIM towards 1730M resulted in the explosion of a large ammunition dump.

II. Air Raid.

Food depots were destroyed at IDENBACH on March 10 notably 60 tons of cheese, 50 tons of sugar, 150 tons of flour; stocks of textiles were burnt.

Thirty wagons were burnt, as well as a small coal depot.

10 workmen were killed and 15 wounded.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XXVII-26 2728/25 T/H 91.

SECRET

U.G.R.D.
U.S.E.
S.H.A.E. (6th Army Group

Source Value C/3

Date 11-3-45

Plant working for the air force in BADEN.

At KLUFTERN (about 7 kms. NW of FRIEDRICHSHAFEN) there is a plant making important component parts for "Düsenflugzeuge" (jet aircraft).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

359 ...TH ARMY GROUP SITUATION MAPS

...LMED

CALL NO.
570.3231
Jun-Aug 45
TO THE ARCHIVES
OF THE WAR
HISTORICAL OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Jun-Aug 1945
6th Army Gp

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MICROFILMED

7651-19

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

587.607
24 Sep 1944 –
8 May 1945
#1-33 Copy 1

RETURN TO:
Director
Research Studies Institute
Attn: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

16048 6 AG Weekly Intelligence Summary

434-2579

607
944 -
945
COPY 1
TO:
es Institute
s Branch
Alabama

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

SECRET

[redacted]
By Authority
A. C. of S., G-2
Initials: K. P. C.
Date: 25 Sept 44

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

FOR WEEK ENDING 24 SEPT 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

During the period 17 to 24 September, the enemy was forced to continue his retreat. However, the rate of retreat had decreased considerably and increasing resistance was being met on all sectors of the Southern FRANCE front.

Southwest FRANCE was completely abandoned by the enemy, with the exception of garrisons estimated at 12,000 men in LA ROCHELLE and 10,000 in the GIRONDE estuary. A total of some 60,000 men remain to be rounded up in the whole area. Heavy losses in personnel were suffered with the complete breakdown of transportation and salvage of material was negligible. The rapid advance of our troops up the Rhone valley forced upon him the necessity of funnelling the remnants of these forces through the gap between the LOIRE and RHONE rivers before junction could be made by the Allied forces in that area. The forces rescued consisted mainly of security and training units which were necessary for the bolstering of the defensive positions the enemy had to man west of the Rhine.

This rescue the enemy executed by using his armored and mobile forces in the LXXXV Corps to delay our advance up the RHONE valley, banking on the difficult terrain between the river and the Alps and JURA ranges to slow us sufficiently in that area. Meanwhile, the LXVI Res Corps and Battle Group OTTENBACHER came across FRANCE below the LOIRE River, forming the North flank of the protective corridor.

The junction of these forces completed, the enemy was anxious to straighten his own lines and connect with the 1st Army to the North. His forces were split up into battle groups, due to the impossibility of bringing up replacements for his organic units, the loss of experienced officer personnel, and the necessity for controlling the mass of small loose units in the area. With the relatively stronger corps on the flanks, LXXV on the South and LXVI Res on the North, the miscellaneous remnants comprising the LXIV and IV GAF Corps retreated toward the BELFORT Gap and the VOSGES. The flank corps were used to deliver counter-attacks which prevented outflanking of the center corps until they were able to reach the natural defensive positions in the VOSGES.

The enemy hold two strong defensive bastions at BELFORT and EPINAL, on either side of the VOSGES. His Southern flank runs across BELFORT and the difficult terrain to the SWISS border, from which area he seems to be removing his last armored formation (11 PZ Div). Defensive works, terrain, a large number of second rate troops and the possible arrival of reinforcements (?100 JAG Div) seem to satisfy him as to his ability to hold this area. The VOSGES mountains, offering natural positions for defense which the enemy has built up considerably form the center of his line. The armored strength to the North completes the line facing the SIXTH U S Army Group. The build-up in armored strength which is continuing along the German 1st and 19th Army boundary shows that the enemy is obviously aware of the danger to his forces should any penetration in the LUNEVILLE area open up the road net to STRASBOURG and the RHINE. In this whole area the enemy must prevent a breakthrough to the RHINE which could trap his forces between that barrier to rapid movement and the SWISS border. The decision as to the fate of the RHINE bridges, as far as the enemy is concerned, depends directly on his ability to time correctly the last possible moment at which he can use them for escape. On this front, the enemy shows every intention of making full use of the defensive possibilities offered by the line he now [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

[redacted]

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1490 - 250 000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

On the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier there is no evidence for expecting any change in the enemy's defensive attitude. The presence of an initially large number of troops in this area was due to a faulty appreciation of our intentions. The nature of the terrain is unfavorable for military operations from FRANCE into ITALY under the best of conditions and the imminent approach of winter will make them virtually impossible. The increasing demand for troops in other areas has already resulted in a thinning out of his forces-elements of both 42 JAGER Div and 90 PANZER GRENADIER are now on the ITALIAN front, while the equivalent of one regiment of the latter has definitely moved out of Western ITALY--and no reinforcements are available. With the ADRIATIC front rapidly deteriorating and the events in the BALKANS making an escape route through Northeast ITALY an absolute necessity, the military situation will outweigh political considerations and force the enemy to withdraw even more forces from the FRANCO-ITALIAN border.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS

At the start of the period, the enemy apparently was planning his defense on a pivotal line based on BELFORT and extending toward the VOSGES and a junction with the German First Army. Initially, prepared positions were utilized at LISLE and in the area of FAUCOGNEY (K1624) where counterattacks supported the defense. Tanks were utilized in an organized opposition which covered the withdrawal of the LXIV Corps toward LUXEUIL. Great sensitivity to our patrol's probes in the DOUBS River area indicated that this was a focal point in the enemy's defense.

By 18/19 September, the enemy's stubborn resistance at such points as GUNEY and GONCHOLLES was slackening, as slight withdrawals took place. Stiff delaying action was combined with use of road blocks well supported by mortar and artillery fire. This degenerated into scattered rear-guard defenses and harassing artillery fire about the 19/20 September, as the bulk of the enemy withdrew across the MOSELLE River.

A coordinated defense along the entire front was being organized by 21 September, since a junction had been made with the First Army on the right flank. The DOUBS River bridgehead was being stubbornly maintained from ST. MAURICE to VILLARS SUR ESCOT. Counterattacks and consolidated opposition indicated a new determination to hold, particularly in the region of ETLAY(L1920). South of REMIREMONT resistance continued strong, while road blocks denied to us all roads to the town. Indications of the evacuation of EPINAL were to be seen in the destruction of bridges, and in movement to the East.

On the Alpine Front an increased enemy sensitivity to our advances in the areas LANSLEBOURG(H4257) was evident as he reacted with increased artillery fire and aggressive manning of positions.

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

a. General

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the SIXTH ARMY GROUP on the ALPINE front were generally disposed on a line MENTONE-MT. S. SALVATOR-ROUTE N205-S. STEFANO-LAROCHE (N3365)-AIGUILLES(H3603) - MONT GENEVRE (K4703) - MODANE (K4131)-BESSANS (H5260)-BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H5766)-VAL D'ISERE(H5275)-LES MASURES (H4792) -BOURG ST. MAURICE(J4680)-ALBERTVILLE(J1843)-LA GIETTAZ (U2305). No important changes occured in the disposition of enemy forces, although there are indications of possible withdrawal of the 90 Pz Gr Division.

On the Northeastern Front enemy forces were generally disposed on a line: BELFORT(A3565)-MONTBELIARD(P8281)-MELISEY(K1815)-REMIREMONT(K1544)-EPINAL(V0413)-GERBEVILLER(V1089).

The enemy 19th Army, which had finally arrived in the BELFORT GAP, succeeded in establishing a firm link with the German 1st Army, where his LXVI Corps was able to join an armored force consisting of a Panzer Division (21 Pz Div) and three Panzer Brigades (111,112,113). The LXIV Corps and IV GAF Corps, constituting the central group of the 19th Army, consist of remants of 716, 189, 159, 338, 198 Infantry Div. Corps reorganized in battle groups of varying size and strength.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The considerably weakened LXXXV Corps (the pivoting group around which the 19th Army executed its retreating movement) is being reinforced by various units reorganized hastily in the BELFORT area, chiefly from the debris of units and isolated troops retreating from the West.

a. ALPINE FRONT

The German LXXV Corps is responsible for the defense of the Alpine passes. It has under its command three divisions: 157th Reserve Mountain Division, which has been identified in the PETIT ST. BERNARD and the MOUNT CENIS area; the 5th Mountain Division, with elements identified at MOUNT GENEVRE and COL DU LARCHE: and the 148th Reserve Division, which, until recently, has been providing the bulk of the opposition to our troops in the NICE-CANNES sector. These units, like most German units, are seriously understrength and, all total, it is estimated that the enemy probably has no more than 25,000 to 30,000 Germans in this area, with the combat infantry effectives numbering approximately 13,000 to 14,000.

Initially, elements of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division were identified in the COL DU LARCHE and the MOUNT GENEVRE pass area, and elements of this division are still being found in the area. However, PW's interrogated recently state that the 1st Bn. of the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Bns. of the 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, have recently departed from this area for GERMANY. PW's further state that the 5th Mountain Division is to relieve the 90th. AFHQ Weekly Intelligence Summary, for week ending 11 September, reports this division being on the move, but believe that its destination is for the Italian battle area, rather than GERMANY. Never the less, it appears that the division is leaving the area and will no longer be concerned with the situation in the Alpine passes.

Identification of the 80th Infantry Regiment of the 34th Infantry Division along the coast, in the MENTON area, plus PW statements, indicate that the 148th Reserve Division is in the process of being relieved by the 34th Division. This is understandable in light of the battered condition of the 148th, which has taken the brunt of the fighting in this area since August 15: furthur, the German Command in Italy is probably concerned with the steady progress being made in the MENTON area; and, fearful of the Allies' intentions, KESSELRING may be in the process of providing a stronger protection for his Northwest flank than that capable of being provided by the 148th Reserve Division.

Farther to the East are found four Italian divisions, one German division (42nd Jaeger Division), and several independent German mountain battalions. The 42nd is currently reported to be moving to the East, and elements have already been identified in the current Italian battle area. It is possible that the four German divisions remaining in the Alpine passes could be relieved by these German trained Italian divisions, or the mountain battalion thereby making these units available for more active theaters. In this connection, the present campaign being conducted by the Allies in ITALY is placing a severe strain on the resources of Marshal KESSELRING, and as progress is made in the Appenines, it becomes increasingly more likely that the enemy, in his search for reinforcements for the Gothic line, will call upon these four German divisions in the Alpine area to play a more active role.

b. NORTH EAST FRONT

The German 19th Army opposing the US 7th Army and the French 1st Army has under its command four Corps: LXVI Res Corps, LXIV Res Corps, IV GAF Corps, and the LXXXV Corps.

The LXVI Reserve Corps(LUNEVILLE-EPINAL area) is responsible for the vital area where junction with the 1st Army has been definitely established. According to last reports and identifications the LXVI Corps is being gradually reinforced and built up into a tactical unit, with the possibility of an increased amount of armor. The 21 Pz Div, 111 Pz Brig, 112 Pz Brig and 113 Pz Brig are available in the area, while the 16 Inf Div, considerably weakened, is being built up by the addition of B. G.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] R. The Battle Group [illegible], organized from various units (192 Sec Regt, elements of the 194 and 95 Sec Regts, the 213 Inf Regt, elements of the 1708 Arty Regt and the [illegible] Engr Regt) may be considered a fairly cohesive group. Estimated available strength of the Corps is: 120 tanks and 20/25,000 men (including the armored formations.)

The LXIV Reserve Corps([illegible] area) consists of remanent of 716 & 189 Inf Divs reorganized in Battle Groups ([illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]). The SCHERER Battle Group seems to constitute the strongest group, with various elements organized in three battle groups (ZANDER, SCHMIDT and MAYER). The Corps represents a patched-up group of units, reassembled on the battlefield, demoralized by retreat and constant change of commanding officers. Approximate strength of the Corps: 8/10,000

The IV G. A. F. Corps([illegible] area) consists of remnants of 159 and 338 Inf Divs organized in battle groups (159 Div: B. G. HOELZL, GIES, DEGENER: 338 Div: B. G. LORAU). In addition to these units, the Corps also includes 198 Inf Div, with the 63 GAF Regt, and probably the B. G. [illegible] attached. The IV GAF Corps composed chiefly of remnants of disintegrated divisions, may be considered, as its northern neighbor, a weak and gradually deteriorating unit, probably used in the present retreating maneuver, for delaying action in order to slow down the pressure of the US 7th Army and French 1st Army. Approximate strength of the Corps: 5/6,000 men.

LXXXV Corps(BELFORT area) composed of the 11 Panzer Div, 1 Training Flieger Div and various elements organized in two Battle Groups (OPPEN and GRAF), bore the brunt of the fighting in the BELFORT area, constituting the hinge around which the 19th Army executed its retreating maneuver. The Corps seems to be withdrawing its units East of BELFORT. The 11 Pz Div may be pulled out altogether from the Southern sector and, after refitting, may be used in the Northern sector(junction of the 19th and 1st Armies). At present, the LXXV Corps, considerable weakened, requires considereble reshuffling and reorganization. According to French FFI reports, units are being reorganized in the BELFORT area, and they are believed to be almost entirely formed of troops recovered from units withdrawing from BELFORT. It may well be that these units will be used for reinforcements of the LXXXV Corps, with possible new arrivals. Approximate strength of the Corps: 35-45 tanks, 12,000 men.

In addition to these identified component parts of the Corps, there were additional units identified on the Sixth Army Group front, which probably are directly under 19th Army. The 30 SS Division (arrived from DANZIG end of August) has not yet been engaged on the front. The Russian Volunteer Cadre Division (components unknown), which has activated the 5 Cossack Inf Regt, the 5 Kuban Regt and the East Mountain Regt, was identified in the BELFORT area. As to the components of Battle Groups BAUER and SCHMIDT, B. G. BAUER contains AA and GAF Supply Troops, while B. G. SCHMIDT has 90 Flieger Regt and 54 GAF Regt: it is reasonable to assume that they contain other units, as yet unidentified. Approximate strength of miscellaneous units: about 8,000 men.

4. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

The present increased artillery activity and generally stiffer enemy attitude may be one result of the improvement in his supply situation resulting from the heavy westward rail movements prior to 16 September. Having withdrawn close to the borders of the Reich, the enemy can make increased use of the excellent German railnet, relatively untouched by bombing and in no immediate danger of organized sabotage. Thus, the large-scale motor movement prevalent in the withdrawal from southern France have been replaced by heavy rail traffic, bringing supplies from South Germany via SINGEN and ULM, to the Rhine at NEUF BRISACH(V-7435) and KEHL (W-0597). Four new pontoon bridges across the Rhine in the NEUF BRISACH area, (Sept 13) would permit movement by motor transport into the Vosges area. In the area south of KARLSRUHE the enemy supply situation may be still further improved by rail movements now in progress, as well as by the recent large reduction in the number of fortress workers along the east bank of the Rhine.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. FORTIFICATIONS

The German retreat from South France seems to have been so far ahead of schedule that the Siegfried Line was not ready for use as the troops approached. In many cases its works along the Rhine had been disarmed or damaged by flood. Work was pushed feverishly. One estimate reported 20,000 workmen, mostly Italian restoring the fortifications between KARLSRUHE and WEISSENBURG early in September, and even the inmates of concentration camps were employed on the work.

Second-rate troops, deficient in training but probably quite adequate for fortress work, were brought by train from the MUNICH area. By 12 September, the work had so far advanced that 10,000 fortress workers could be spared for more pressing need further north. Their departure helped ease the supply situation, grown critical due to the sudden influx of troops and the need for creating an adequate reserve for the approaching Siegfried siege. It is probable that this reserve will not be complete before the end of September.

Meanwhile, the work of creating at least a delaying position along the VOSGES and in the [illegible] took shape. Passes and ridges in the Vosges were only lightly defended by machine guns and small field pieces late in August, but the natural defensive advantages of the terrain as well as the approach of bad weather makes heavy large-scale fortifications in that region seem unnecessary. Recent air photographs reveal no major work in the Vosges, but agents report tank traps 8 meters deep being prepared in that area, and other sources indicate preparation of roadblocks.

Enemy defense organization of the BELFORT GAP, consisting of AT ditches, trenches, and pill boxes, seems to be strongest in the GIROMAGNY(K-3014-CHAMPIGNY(K-2010)-BELFORT-MONTBELIARD-SCHLONCOURT(A-3474)-DELLE(A-4579) area. Only 9 of the 21 French forts ringing BELFORT show major military activity, and these are generally East and South of BELFORT. The civilian population has been forced to aid in the construction, and 1500 specialist workers arrived from COLMAR on 14 September. Bridges in the area south of BELFORT have either been blown or prepared for demolition, indicating an enemy intention to employ the Rhine-Rhone and Haute Saone Canals as obstacles to aid the defense.

A defense line along the forward slopes of the Black Forest was under construction early in September. On 14 September 600 foreign civilian workers were removed from the LORRACH(K-99) fortifications work, and sent to the interior of the Reich. Whether this action is due to a high level of completion of defenses in that area, or to a greater need elsewhere is not known.

F. L. Harrison

F. L. HARRISON
Colonel, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2, Hq., 12th Army Group	5
G-2, First Army	5
G-2, First Army TAC	1
G-2, Third Army	10
G-2, Seventh Army	10
G-2, 1st French Army	10
G-2, Ninth Army	5
G-2, SHAEF (Fwd)	2
G-2, SHAEF (Rear)	1
G-2, ETOUSA	1
A-2, AAAF	1
G-3 (1), 21 Army Group	1

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

A-2, Ninth Air Force	1
Off Dir of Intel Hq., USTAF	1
G-2, War Department	1
MIRS, War Office	1
G-2, CONBASE	5
American Embassy (Attn: Lt. Col. VOTION)	1
G-2, Hq., Fwd Echn, Com Z, APO 350	1
G-2, Adv Sec, ComZ, APO 113	2
COMUSBAS, FRANCE	1
OSS	2
G-2, Hq, First Allied Airborne Army	1
AFHQ	1
AAI	1
C/S	1
DC/S	1
SG/S	1
G-1	1
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	1
G-5	1
AA	1
Arty	1
Engr	1
Fin	1
JA	1
IC	1
Med	1
AC (Ops)	1
Armored	1
OB School, Hq, Mis ETO, APO 887	1
G-2 Sixth Army Group (MAIN)	10

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH U.S. ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

P 38

030900A October 1944.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCY SUMMARY NUMBER - 2

For Week Ending 30 September 1944.

I. GENERAL SUMMARY.

During the period, the enemy used increased artillery and some armor to cover his withdrawal and reorganization. The loss of EPINAL forced him to abandon the Moselle line, and fall back to the strong defensive terrain of the Vosges. His southern anchor remains in the fortified BELFORT region, but there is no naturally strong position between NANCY and the Saverne Gap. Armor as a reenforcement of that area is a logical development, and SHAEF reports the appearance of the Fifth Panzer Army there.

On the Alpine front, the situation remains static, with no sign of substantial enemy withdrawal.

2. ENEMY DISPOSITION.

A. Northeastern Front.

At the close of the period, 19th Army forces were generally disposed on a line: HENAMENIL (Q1409)--CROISMARE (Q1401)--VAXAINVILLE (V2791)--MENARMONT (V1981)--RAMBERVILLERS (V1872)--AUTREY (V2267)--PIERREPONT (V2263)--DEYCIMONT (V1951)--ST. JEAN DU MARCHE (V2250)--TENDON (V2247)--CLEURIE (V2240)--THIEFOSSE (K2839)--FRELUPT (K2732)--CHATEAU LAMBERT (K3027)--MIELLIN (K3022)--CHEVESTRAYE (K2816)--PRESSE (K2515)--RONCHAMP (K2309)--LOMONT (K2200)--MIGNAVILLERS (P1795)--FAIHE (P2285)--COLOMBIER CHATELOT (P2480)--LONGEVILLE SUR DOUBS (P2581)--VILLERS SOUS ECOT (P2978),-VILLAR LES BLANONT (A3564).

(1) 66 Reserve Corps (East of LUNEVILLE--RAMBERVILLE area).

The 21 Panzer Division seems to remain under 66 Reserve Corps, together with 16 Infantry Division, supported by Battle Group STINGER and Battle Group JACKEL (a patched-up mixture of GAF service troops and other personnel with little combat training) and Battle Group OTTENBACHER, consisting of artillery units, engineer units and infantry.

(2) 64 Reserve Corps (area East of REMIREMONT).

Composition remains unchanged, except that Battle Group WITTE has been incorporated into Battle Group SCHWERIN (remnants of 189 Infantry Division). Remnants of the Battle Group BRODOWSKI (General BRODOWSKI is a Prisoner of War) seem to be incorporated into the 716 and 189 Infantry Divisions.

(3) 4 GAF Corps:

The 159 Infantry Division, broken up into several Battle groups, probably all under Gen. DEGENER, has been reinforced by Battle Group HENKE. Battle Group IOPAU, consisting of remnants of 338 Infantry Division and 242 and 244 Infantry Divisions, has received reinforcements, which may indicate an attempt to reorganize the group on divisional lines.

(4) 85 Corps:

The BODENSEE Regiment, which has recently been identified in the Corps sector, cannot be considered an effective substitute for the 11 Panzer Division, recently removed from the Corps sector and sent to bolster the area east of NANCY. If the First Flieger Division should like-

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

B-1/72

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

wise be withdrawn, as French reports indicate is possible, the 85 Corps would no longer be capable of holding the vital BELFORT area. In that case, reenforcements would have to be brought from Germany, or found in the remnants of destroyed units reorganized in the neighborhood of MULHOUSE. Should the German High Command consider it necessary to withdraw a corps into general reserve, the 85 Corps would seem the most logical candidate.

(5) Estimate: Approximate Strength of 19th Army at close of period:

80 - 100 tanks
24,000 - 28,000 men, capable of infantry action.

B. ALPINE FRONT.

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth U.S. Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed along the line: GRIMALDI (S-8068)--CASTILLON (S-7594)--ROGUE BILLERE (N-6514)--ST. MARTIN VESUBIE (N-6020)--ST SAUVER (N-4823)--ISOLA (N-4535)--JAUSIERS (P-5045)--M. AIGUILLERRE (N-4492)--MONTEGENEVRE (K-4602)--M. TABOR (K-3022)--MODANE (K-4132)--BESSANS (H-5261)--BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H-5576)--BOURG ST MAURICE (Z-4680)--ALBERTVILLE (Z-6683).

The German 75 Corps remains responsible for the defense of the Alpine passes. It has under command the 34 Infantry Division (GRIMALDI area); elements of the 5 Mtn Div (vic LARCHE Pass); 148 Res Div (by now pulled back into the rear zone); 157 Reserve Division (MODANE area); some few elements of the 90 Pz Gr Division (VAL DE STURA area); the MEERES-ALPEN Regiment (vic. of PRINARDO, N-4255); and the ALPEN JUGEND units which are believed to be in the VAL D'OSTA region. The two to three Italian Divisions of the 75 Corps have been moved nearer to the front which may indicate their possible future employment. It would seem risky to replace the Germans with Italians, as all reports confirm their very low morale and low combat efficiency. The estimated corps strength remains unchanged: 30 tanks and 12,000 to 15,000 men.

3. - OPERATIONS.

a. XV Corps:

The beginning of the period was marked by an upsurge in artillery activity in the areas of Foret de PARROY and Foret de MONDON (V1896). An enemy defensive area based on World War I defenses extended from MANONVILLER (V2099)--DOMEVRE (V3196) to AVRICOURT (Q3206). Resistance was heavy north of MARINVILLER (V1699). The enemy strongly defended the north bank of the VEZOUSE River, holding HABLAINVILLE (V2591) and AZERAILLES (V2388). At the end of the period, the enemy continued to resist our attempts to enter the Foret de PARROY.

b. Seventh Army:

Armored concentrations northeast and southeast of LUNEVILLE (V0799) were active early in the week. The enemy remained aggressive in the areas of BEMONT (K2447) and CREVANNVILLER (K2645); TENDON (V2147) and JEUXEY (V0757) were occupied only after strong resistance, including Mark VI tanks, had been overcome. Resistance began to decrease as scattered delaying groups were encountered in the Foret de HAITE (V1657) and in POMPIERRE (V1263) and GIRECOURT (V1761), behind which defensive positions were reported being dug. At the end of the period resistance north and northeast of EPINAL had become disorganized, while strong forces opposed our occupation of ST. HELENE (V2066) and GUGNECOURT (V1761).

C. First French Army:

On 25 September, the First French Army was confronting an enemy

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Wky Int Sum #3
G-2, 6 USAG,
3 Oct 1944

line at the entrance of the BELFORT Gap, heavily defended by strongpoints and artillery. Our capture of COLOMBIER CHATELOT (P5480) and ST. MAURICE ECHELOTTE (P2780) provoked such a reaction that our troops were forced to withdraw. Strong points at SERMAMS (P1992), GRANGES LA VILLE (P1934) and GEMONVAL (P2060) were aggressively held, while only moderate resistance was offered at LYOFFAN (K1805) - LARPE COUTUE (K2204). Infantry opposition began to decrease and we were able to occupy MELAY (K1940). The enemy then flared up again at the end of the period, using artillery-supported infantry and scattered tanks in a series of counterattacks on the axis: MAGNY--JOBERT--LYOFFAN: at FREDERIC-FONTAINE (K2305) and at CHEVESTRAYE (K2816).

d. Alpine Sector.

On the Alpine front, the enemy continued his defensive attitude, reacting swiftly to our patrol activities. He held a line of strong points extending: GRIMALDI--CASTILLON--MOULINET--E. ST. MARTIN VESUBIE--ST. ETIENNE TINEE--LARCHE. Artillery fire was general from forts on MT. BARBONNET and MT. AGAESEN (vic. SOSPEL). Near the end of the period, MENTON was under heavy shellfire, as the enemy continued his static defense.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(G-2 INTELLIGENCE SUM.#2,-wky-)
(- for Pd. ending 30 Sept.44)

E. L. HARRISON
Colonel, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2, Hq., 12th Army Group	5	G-2, First Army	5
G-2, First Army T.C	1	G-2, Third Army	10
G-2, Seventh Army	10	G-2, 1st French Army	10
G-2, Ninth Army	5	G-2, SHAEF (Fwd)	4
G-2, SHAEF (Main)	1	G-2, ETOUSA	1
A-2, AEAF	1	G S (I), 21 Army Group	1
A-2, Ninth Air Force	1	Off Dir of Intel Hq., USSTAF	1
G-2, War Department	1	MIRS, War Office	1
G-2, COMBASE	5	American Embassy	
G-2, Hq., Fwd Ech, Com Z, APO 350	1	(Attn: Lt. Col. VOTION)	1
G-2, Adv Sec, Com Z, APO 113	2	COMUSBAS, FRANCE	1
OSS	2	G-2, Hq, First Allied	
APHQ	1	Airborne Army	1
AAI	1	C/S	1
DC/S	1	SG/S	1
G-1	1	G-2	5
G-3	5	G-4	1
G-5	1	AA	1
Arty	1	Engr	1
Fin	1	JA	1
IG	1	Med	1
AG (Ops)	1	Armored	1
OB School, Hq, Mis ETO, APO 887	1	G-2 Sixth Army Group (Main)	10
Hq. XII Air Force	1		

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

IPG/ems
SECRET
By Authority of
A. C. of S., G-2
Initials: J. J. G.
Date: 10 Oct 44

080900A October 1944

121

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 3

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 8 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

Recent moves and identifications of enemy troops clearly indicate that Sixth Army Group is now facing a major portion of Fifth Panzer Army's two identified Panzer Corps (47 and 58), as well as a Nineteenth Army that has, according to evidence in a captured order, sufficiently recovered its balance to start reorganizing its divisions from the present collection of independent battle groups, which range the strength scale from exhausted battalions to strong brigades to weak divisions.

The major move during the period involved the withdrawal of the Sixty-Sixth Reserve Corps. There is no evidence as to its intended use or destination, but the units it formerly commanded continue to be identified. Therefore, it may well be assumed that it is moving out of the area or is to organize defenses in the rear (its role during the RHONE Valley retreat of Nineteenth Army).

Following the withdrawal of Sixty-Sixth Corps, PW's identifications indicate that 47 Panzer Corps sidestepped almost as far south as RAMBERVILLERS. Assuming that the 47-58 Panzer Corps boundary was adjusted accordingly, this should place all of 47 Panzer Corps and part of 58 Panzer Corps on the front of Sixth Army Group.

While not confirmed from gound sources, the TAC/R report of heavy rail movement South of STRASBOURG on the 8th, may have been connected with the arrival of new units in the COLMAR-MULHOUSE area.

The Alpine front remains generally static. However, adding the enemy's overall situation in Italy to the fact that winter brings a communications problem through the passes, it is doubtful whether the enemy will much longer elect to maintain any of his troops West of the more easily defended passes.

2. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: FORET DE PARROY (Q 1806), VAXAINVILLE (V 2891), XATTEVILLERS (V 1680), BRU (V 2273), FAYS (V 2156), HERPELMONT (V 2652), THLEFOSSE (K 2839), LE MENIL (K 3233), CHEVESTRAYE (K 2816) RONCHAMP (K 2209), ONANS (P 2286), LONGEVELLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

1. 58 Panzer Corps:

11 Panzer Division, 111 and 113 Panzer Brigades (both apparently absorbed by 11 Panzer Division).

15 Panzer Grenadier Division (this is included upon the assumption that 47 Panzer Corps has assumed command of 16 Infantry Division --see below).

2. 47 Panzer Corps

21 Panzer Division, 112 Panzer Brigade (latter absorbed by 21 Panzer Division).

16 Infantry Division (as PW identifications confirm the division was not withdrawn with 66 Corps, it is assumed this unit came under command of 47 Corps, when the latter sidestepped southward).

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

1. 64 Reserve Corps:

B G TAEGLICHSBECK, a strong group which was under 64 Reserve Corps has not been located lately while the 716 Infantry Division and the 189 Reserve Infantry Division remain in the sector. The 716 Infantry Division absorbed some elements of the B G BRODOWSKI indicating a trend in reorganizing

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the disrupted elements of the Division. The 189 Infantry Division, also in process of reorganization (upgraded from Trg Division), absorbed the B G WITTE.

2. 4 GAF Corps:

The 338 Infantry Division (B G LOPAU) including absorbed elements of the 242, and 244 Infantry Divisions, the 198 Infantry Division (reinforced by the 63 GAF Regiment), and the reorganized 159 Infantry Reserve Division remain the chief tactical units under the Corps. Added to this a number of Battle Groups are on the front in the BELFORT area (MENKE, SPITZMULLER, ROTH and BOSCH). The BODENSEE Regiment, a new arrival. operates as a B G; however, one Bn has been lately identified in the 64 Corps Area.

3. 85 Corps:

The 1st Flieger Division still remains on the front south of BELFORT, although repeated statements of PW's indicate the withdrawal of the Division to the MULHOUSE area.

A newly identified B G ESCHERICH, composed of Infantry, SP arty, and tanks, is evidently being brought in to the line in order to strengthen the position of the enemy in the BELFORT area, weakened by the departure of the 11 Panzer Division.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY RESERVE

Battle Group VON OPPEN, the 30 SS Division, the Russian STAMM Division, the 19 Sec Division and various elements reorganized in the MULHOUSE area, may be considered as general reserve. The majority of these are of low combat value. This group may also be strengthened by new arrivals (the 100 Light Infantry Division, elements reported in the MULHOUSE area).

In connection with the reshuffle of the enemy's dispositions these units may be put under the 66 Reserve Corps and the 85 Corps.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH ON SIXTH US ARMY FRONT

	Effectives	Overall	Tanks	Arty
U. S. XV Corps Sector	5,700	28,250	45	56
U. S. VI Corps Sector	11,150	17,550	35	132
First French Army Sector	6,400	8,300	--	--
Nineteenth Army Reserve	8,500	13,000	30GHQ	50-60GHQ
TOTAL	31,750	67,100	110	188-198

3. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed along the line: ALBERTVILLE (Z 6683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL - SUR - ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S PAUL - S U (P 5055), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

The German 75 Corps remains responsible for the defense of the Alpine Passes. Generally the disposition remains unchanged. The 34 Infantry Division, elements of the 5 Mountain Division, elements of the 90th Panzer Gren Division, the 157 Reserve Division and various smaller elements (888 Mtn Bn, MEER ALPEN Regt), are still on the front. The 148 Infantry Reserve Division, ALPEN JUGEND units and the Italian MONTE ROSA and SAN MARCO Divisions remain in the region west of TURIN.

The LOMBARDY Corps has been identified in this area from a captured document. Its composition is as yet unknown, but it probably includes at least one of the German Divisions on the Mediterranean flank.

Estimated Strength: 12-15 thousand men including the Italian units.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period, the enemy showed a determination to hold the center of the line, clinging tenaciously to strategic terrain features, while offering less resistance on the Southern flank. In the North his efforts were concentrated on holding the FORET de PARROY.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

a. SEVENTH ARMY

(1) XV Corps: Throughout the period, the enemy, despite stubborn defense by use of tank-held road blocks, counter-attacks, and mines, was being forced back from the FORET de PARROY. By the end of the period, only possession of its SE portion remained in doubt. Elsewhere in the Corps sector counter-attacks took place in the area of ANGLEMONT (V 2286), MARAINVILLER (V 1699) and MENIL - FLIN (V 2089) with some nebelwerfer fire noted.

(2) VI Corps: The occupation of BAMBERVILLERS (V 1872) forced the enemy to concentrate on blocking further advance through the road net extending from the town. His immediate reaction was explosive, as he utilized all arms and reinforced the surrounding terrain and brought steady artillery fire on the town. By the end of the period he had relinquished only the forest area N E of the town and was still stubbornly defending JEANMENIL (V 2271).

In the central sector, the enemy's defense centered on line of advance GRANDVILLERS (V 2160), BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), which he defended through counter-attacks and the use of up to 15 tanks. By the end of the period his defense had fallen back to the area W of BROUVELIEURES. N of this area AUTREY (V 2267) fell, despite stubborn delaying action, while to the South BROYERES (V 2457) remained in enemy hands.

From LEPANGES (V 2153) to VAGNEY (K 2345), the enemy's stubborn defense decreased as he withdrew his forces to straighten his lines, leaving SP guns and delaying forces behind. By the end of the period resistance was weakening as VAGNEY (K 2643) was mopped up. LE THOLY (V 2643) continued to be heavily defended, and infiltrations were observed in the area.

b. FIRST FRENCH ARMY

The enemy's defense during the period has centered about the highway LURE-BELFORT in the form of counter-attacks, infiltration, and continuous heavy artillery, including that from the long range guns in the BELFORT forts. Occupation of ROUGEMONTS (K 2309) was prevented until 3 October, while counter-attacks occurred in the vicinity of RECOLOGNE (K 2109) and FRESNE (K 2415). Infiltration were attempted in the FORET de MONTAGNE (K 3022), while pockets remained to be cleared up in areas BEUVAROUX (K 2408) and LE RHIEN (K 2211). At the end of the period counter-attacks took place West of LAPILLE (K 2824) and N of CHEVESTRAYE (K 2815). The enemy was reported sending replacements to MESIL (K 3232). Advance through the BROCHE and MORBIED Passes was strongly resisted. In the DOUBS River sector patrols were contacted.

c. A B T F

The enemy continued his defensive attitude, utilizing harassing artillery and aggressive patrols of up to 40 men. As the period progressed, he made use of ambush tactics against our patrols. By the end of the period contact was made at CAMP DES FOURCHES, as freezing weather began to set in.

5. MOVEMENTS

Inclement weather during the week hampered continued observation of motor and rail movements behind the enemy lines. However, enough was observed to indicate that the enemy was still using railheads well forward of the Rhine for the supply of his troops despite our fighter-bomber attacks. Several days of good weather may change his mind in as much as one days activity netted 14 locomotives and 26 boxcars destroyed by the 7th Army air support. The enemy also appears to be well enough organized to wait until night for his large motor movements. Only light scattered M/T movements have been observed during the period by daylight in the Sixth Army Group area. An increased rail movement was noted on 7 October when 22 trains were observed moving predominantly E and NE on rail lines from (Q 7317 to R 6359). Barrage balloons were reported over the West STRASBOURG yard indicating increased air defense of the railheads. There was heavy rail activity on the 8th between STRASBOURG and SELESTAT.

2 Incls:
Annex #1 - German Defenses of the VOGES and the BELFORT Gap.
Annex #2 - Captured Order: Reorganization of 159 Reserve Division.

Eugene L. Harrison.
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION:
G-2 Special

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

GERMAN DEFENSES OF THE VOSGES AND THE BELFORT GAP

In keeping with the Fuhrer's order to hold the VOSGES-BELFORT line at all costs, the German's are feverishly continuing the strengthening of the defenses blocking all routes offering eastward passage. A line of fire trenches, AT ditches, and pillboxes with machine guns, AT guns, and artillery, runs from BLAMONT through FRAIZE with the greatest density around ST. MARGUERITE, blocking the approach to SAALES PASS. (See attached sketch).

In addition to the fortifications enumerated, the terrain itself is well adapted for defense, since the narrow defiles of the Vosges allow little maneuver room and are easily defended. The approaching inclement weather will materially aid the enemy.

In the BELFORT region, several lines of defense are reported:

a. The GIROMAGNY - CHAVANNE - HERIMONCOURT line, a forward position of light field fortifications.

b. The FRANIER - COUTHENANS - CHAVANNE line, a heavier line of field defenses, forming an outpost of the MLR.

c. The GIROMAGNY - MONTBELIARD - HERIMONCOURT line, (with an alternate position CHALONVILLARS - DELLE) apparently meant to be the MLR, and heavily organized with fire-trenches, AT ditches, pillboxes, AT guns, and artillery.

d. The ROUGEMONT - DANNEMARIE - MERTZEN line which continues SE to the Swiss Border, is still under construction.

e. A ROUGEMONT - DELLE line may exist.

There is considerable activity around BELFORT itself with indications pointing to the manning of most of the old forts. Earthen defenses are being prepared on the slopes and around the forts, and many of the roads between them are being mined, as are roads leading to BELFORT. The shoulders are already mined especially in defiles and at all possible parking areas. This is particularly true on the LE THILLOT - GIROMAGNY; MONTBELIARD - BELFORT; DELLE - BELFORT roads. A.A. defenses have been increased in the BELFORT - MULHOUSE AREA.

The quality of present enemy resistance in the REMIREMONT area may be due in part to his relatively incomplete defenses of the GERARDMER - SCHLUCHT route to COLMAR and the Rhine Plain. In the area to the north, and in the Belfort Gap, his defenses have reached a point where he can adopt a more defensive attitude.

ANNEX No 1 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Weekly
Intelligence Summary No 3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

A captured document dated 24 September 1944 gives the following information on reorganization of the 251st Reserve Grenadier Regiment:

A. The 19th German Army has ordered the reorganization of the 159th Reserve Infantry Division; the table of organization will be that of the Infantry Division 1944.

B. However, only the men and materiel now available may be used for this reorganization.

C. The 251st Reserve Regiment is organized as follows:

Res. Gr. Bn. 205 as I Bn.

Res. Gr. Bn. 57 as II Bn.

13 (Infantry Gun) Company

Headquarters Company

Reorganization of a 14th Company is proposed for a future date.

D. The 251st Reserve Grenadier Bn will be reorganized into three rifle companies and one heavy weapons company. The machine gun sections of the heavy weapons company may not be attached to the rifle companies until the heavy weapons company shall have been completely reorganized.

The companies are composed of one headquarters section, 3 combat sections and a supply section. Effectives of the 2d Company as of 24 September: 16 noncoms, 87 men.

E. A field replacement battalion under the orders of Major Zollner, CP at Giromagny, is established. The field replacement battalion is charged with the instruction of all men in the division not already trained for infantry combat.

F. Men belonging to the Fortress Cadre Bns shall be returned to those units.

G. A report of all personnel belonging to the 16th, 189th, 198th, 338th, and 716th Infantry Divisions will be furnished. These men will be returned to their original divisions. Same procedure will be followed for personnel of the frontier guards, State railroads and the German labor service.

ANNEX No 2 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Weekly
Intelligence Summary No 3.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

P 61

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

S E C R E T
By Authority of
A.C. of S., G-2
Initials:
Date: 15 Oct 44

150900A October 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 4

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 15 OCTOBER 1944

59

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

During the period the enemy was forced back toward his prepared defensive positions in the VOSGES. The reorganization of his divisions was effected by the amalgamation of various battle groups into the framework of larger units. Divisions on either end of the front have assumed responsibility for definite sectors. The narrowing of the sector assigned to the center corps will permit regrouping of their components into more organic tactical units.

The enemy is reacting strongly to Allied attacks all along the line, particularly in those sectors where he is being backed up into his constructed defensive positions. Units with counterattacking capabilities, such as 106th Panzer Brigade, are being brought into the front line. Indications of considerable artillery reinforcements arriving from STRASSBURG are substantiated by an increased use of artillery.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth forces were generally disposed on a line: VAUCOURT (Q 2308), REHERREY (V 2890), XATTEVILLERS (V 1680), BRU (V 2273), FAYS (V 2156), JUSSARUPT (V 2752), ROCHESSON (K 3245), LE MENIL (K 3233), CHATEAU LAMBERT (K 3127), BELVERNE (K 2401), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE-SUR-DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMOUNT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) 58 Panzer Corps:
The bulk of 11 Panzer Division is committed on the left flank of US XV Corps. (North of FORET de PARROY)

(2) 47 Panzer Corps:
15th Panzer Grenadier Division sidestepped to the South and its bulk is committed together with 21st Panzer Division on the XV Corps sector. Elements of the Division were badly mauled in the last engagements. A prisoner of war stated that the second and third battalions of 115 PGR went to G ermany for refitting. Whether the 16th Infantry Division is under the 47th Panzer Corps or the 64th Reserve Corps is as yet unclear.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) 64 Reserve Corps:
Elements of 15th PG Division and the 16th Infantry Division are committed on the left flank of US VI Corps. The 716th Infantry Division and elements of the 198th and 189th Infantry Divisions are opposing the US VI Corps on the rest of the sector. PW's statements confirm that the Divisions are in process of reorganization. The 198th received, on Oct 9, 6-800 replacements, said to have come from Germany, as well as new guns.

S E C R E T

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

1923

SECRET

The 189th Infantry Division (recently upgraded) has under its command: B G BAUER, B G MARKEL, 192nd Security Regiment, 200th Security Regiment, Police Battalion MULHOUSE, 3/685th A A Battalion, 198th Fusilier Battalion, 602 Mobile Battalion, 608 Mobile Battalion, B G MAHNKE. As the organic units of the Division were destroyed (except for the 38th Reserve Jaeger Battalion and 163rd Grenadier Battalion) the units at present under 189th should be considered as a basic build up of its strength. General OTTENBACHER, who relieved General SCHWERIN at the beginning of October, is in turn reported relieved by the newly promoted General BAUER.

(2) 4 GAF Corps:

338th Infantry Division inder the command of General ACHMANN is opposing the French II Corps. According to a captured document the new Divisional organization is as follows: 757th GR with 1 Battalion C/V, 333rd GR with 2 Battalion C/V, 308th GR, 338th AR, 338th Signal Battalion, 338th Engineer Battalion and 338th AT and 338th A A Companies.

The 308th Grenadier Regiment which has apparently not received replacements is being withdrawn to the rear possibly in order to reorganize. 159th Reserve Infantry Division is opposing the French II Corps. As has been reported in Weekly Summary No 3, the Division is being reorganized on the basis of a 1944 T/O.

(3) 85 Corps:

A change in the disposition of the enemy is apparent in the Northern sector of the French I Corps. Reports suggest that the 106th Panzer Brigade (FELDHERRNHALLE) is relieving elements of the 1st Flieger Training Division. Furthermore, elements of the Brigade von OPPEN (KASSEBEER D/V Regiment with I Battalion BOSCH, II Battalion RAEDECKER, III Battalion MURMANN) have been identified on the right flank of the French I Corps.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY RESERVE

It has been established that the Russian FREIWILLIGE STAMM Division is the 19th Security Division and possible new arrivals for this group may continue to be considered as general reserve.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Northern Front)

	STRENGTH	TANKS	ARTILLERY
SEVENTH US ARMY			
Units in contact-	9,800	40	
Supporting units-	16,000		168
TOTAL	25,800	40	168
FIRST FRENCH ARMY			
Units in contact-	10,000	25	
Supporting units-	15,000		150/180
TOTAL	25,000	25	150/180
SIXTH US ARMY GROUP			
Units in contact-	19,800	65	
Supporting units-	31,000		318/348
Estimated Reserve W of Rhine	30,000		
TOTAL	80,800	65	318/348

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), FONDAMINE (P 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8068).

Only patrolling and fire fights are reported on the French-Italian Border. It is considered that the enemy is withdrawing East, leaving a rearguard and some artillery to cover his retreat.

Strength: 12-15,000, including Italian units.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period the enemy gradually gave way on the Northern sector (FORET de PARROY), while holding fast and consolidating his advantageous positions in the central sector and aggressively denying us any advances on the BELFORT Axis.

(1) First French Army: On the N flank, CHATEAU LAMBERT (K 3126) and LE THILLOT (K 3129) remained strong points in the enemy's aggressive defense with counterattacks being made early in the period at LA PILLE (K 2824). His withdrawal from REMANVILLERS (K 2831) and RAMONCHAMP (K 2930) was forced only after strong counterattacks had degenerated into delaying action behind heavy artillery concentrations. Our advance up the MOSELOTTE Valley (vic K 2826) then progressed with little opposition. Counterattacks, however, proved effective enough to deny our troops the occupation of the HILL 763 (K 2826) and the area W of ROCHESSON (K 3245). The end of the period was characterized by counterattacks supported by heavy tanks and artillery in defense of PLANCIS (K 3041).

(2) VI Corps: On the 3rd Division front, LE THOLY was stubbornly held from dug-in positions and enemy mortar and artillery fire forced our patrols to withdraw from HILL 781 (W of the town) at the end of the period. About 13th October the enemy began to withdraw from the area of JULIENRUPT (V 2440). In the central sector, the Germans utilized heavy mortar and artillery fire to frustrate our advance on HERPEMONT (V 2652) and JUSSARUPT (V 2752). Toward the end of the period he withdrew from BEAUMENIL (V 2554) leaving the town heavily mined. On the 45th Division front the enemy began to stabilize his lines, but continued his stiff resistance along a line FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264) to W of BROUVELIEURES (V 2650). The infiltration and close-in fighting of the beginning of the period became a defense based on well dug-in positions as construction activity went on in area W of BROUVELIEURES to BRUYERES (V 2457). Counter-attacks with tank and artillery support testified to the senstivity of the enemy in this area.

(3) XV Corps: Since relinquishment of the FORRET de PARROY area, enemy activity has been light, consisting mostly of patrols and scattered artillery, and NEBELWERFER fire as the enemy withdrew from MANONVILLER (V 2099) and MOYACOURT (Q 1809) to dig in E of FORET de PARROY and along the ridge W of VAUCOURT (Q 2308).

(4) F A B T F: The enemy continued his defensive attitude as the volume of artillery fire increased, without a corresponding increase in the number of guns.

5. SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION

a. FUEL DISTRIBUTION IN THE GERMAN ARMY

Of particular interest is a PW interrogation report which provides insight to German methods of fuel supply in France, based on the experience of 198th Infantry Division in static and fast moving situations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

The report, believed reliable, states that gasoline is drawn directly from Germany by the Army which in turn ships the fuel to Corps where Divisions call for their allotments. Within divisions the lower echelons down to company call for fuel supplies from their higher echelons.

In a static situation all echelons make requests for gasoline every two or three days. 198th Infantry Division under such circumstances is said to have consumed 1500 gallons of fuel every 2-3 days.

In a fast moving situation divisional requirements rose to 5,000-6,000 gallons every 1-2 days.

PW stated that procedure even for lowest echelon of his Infantry Division was to have on hand enough fuel for movement of 350 km. (218.7 miles) without refueling. Whenever the tactical situation permits, and divisional fuel requirements are in large quantities, divisions may call directly at Army depots for gasoline supplies.

b. SUPPLY AND MOVEMENTS

During the period 21 Sept - Oct 5th, German railroads, continued to bring troops and supplies westward across the RHINE. These shipments are reported to include 100 field guns, 50 AA guns, and several heavy railroad guns which moved westward through STRASBURG. Activity at KARLSRUHE seems to have been chiefly troop and supply movement to the VOSGES and SAAR fronts.

The rail lines along the SWISS border between WALDSHUT (B 39) and SINGEN were very active in movement of supplies. Although part of the activity may be involved in large-scale industrial evacuation of ALSACE, much of the remainder must be military.

Despite constant air attacks during the past week, the enemy continued heavy rail movements to supply and reenforce his defensive position in the VOSGES.

c. TRANSPORTATION

An interesting light is thrown on the railway transportation problem in Germany by a recent report which pointed out that during the first weeks of September more than 400 locomotives were destroyed. Because of the trained-labor shortage, as well as lack of essential materials, repair work on the damaged trains was rendered practically impossible. Increased waterway traffic as a supplementary means of transport has been reported in the upper RHINE area.

6. DEFENSES

German preparations for war on their own soil continue. The party leader of BREGENZ (C 5080) is quoted as saying during a September conference that every German locality would be prepared for defense, and the civilians would be armed. A large supply of prefabricated barracks which was recently brought to the BAVARIAN ALPS was declared by workmen to be intended for the use of the German, "MAQUIS". Indications of a possible headquarters may be gained by the report from French ground observers that feverish activity is to be seen around BERCHTESGARTEN, with numerous underground telephone lines being laid for a 50 km. radius around the OBERSALZBERG Peak, which overlooks it.

This weeks activity has been characterized by the strengthening of the enemy MLR in the VOSGES. This line has now been extended northward from BACCARAT to SARREBOURG and along the many valleys leading N E through the VOSGES. A high concentration of defensive positions and fire power has been established at MOYENMOUTIER (V 3776) where part of the MLR leads up the valley to SEMONES. Wire has been seen for the first time and in some sections the trenches are camouflaged to blend with the natural features of the terrain. Scattered defensive positions have been established between FRAIZE and LE THILLOT (V 2929) blocking the few avenues of access through that area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Around BELFORT, there has been a general increase in the artillery and A A concentration and continued digging of trenches and A/T ditches strengthening the positions in the BELFORT-DANNEMARIE Area.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION

G-2 Special

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Auth. of A.C. of S., G-2
Initials: EJH
Date: 21 Oct 44

210900A October 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 5

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 21 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The enemy continued falling back on prepared defensive positions in the VOSGES, offering especially stubborn resistance in the central sector (west of the BALLON massive).

The appearance on the front of a great number of fortress battalions strengthens the supposition that after reaching prepared positions in the VOSGES, more mobile units will be withdrawn and assigned to sectors requiring a more considerable build up.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line:
XURES (Q 2010), BENAMENIL (V 2197), REHERREY (V 2890), XATTEVILLERS (V 1679), MENIL - SUR - BELVITTE (V 2277), JUSSARUPT (V 2751), ROCHESSON (K 3145), LE DAVAL (V 3443), VENTRON (V 3427), RAMONCHAMP (K 2930), FREDERIC FONTAINE (K 2204), MIGNAVILLERS (P 1795), LONGEVELLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps:

While the bulk of 11 Panzer Division remained committed North of the FORET de PARROY (left flank of US XV Corps) the enemy is apparently changing his disposition by bringing in elements of the 553rd Infantry Division from the METZ area, committing them east of the FORET de PARROY.

(2) XLVII Panzer Corps:

15 PG and 21 Pz Divisions were strongly committed on the US XV Corps zone. 15 PG Division received considerable replacements (PW states that 104th PGR is up to 90/120 Co strength). Furthermore 56 Fortress Battalion relieved the 51 Fortress MG Battalion, committed in the 15 PG Division sector.

Considering the enemy's evident intention to fall back on the fortified position: SARREBOURG - BLAMONT - BACCARAT, anchored in the North on the marshy area DIEUZE - MITTERHEIM - FENETRANGE, and in the South on the GRAND BALLON massive, mobile units at present committed West of that line can be relieved by static units (Fortress Battalions) and elements of infantry divisions and will become available for other sectors where they are badly needed. 15 PG Division may reasonably be chosen for such a move.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:

According to captured documents the Northern boundary of 16 Infantry Division has been moved South (FORET de MORTAGNE - ST DIE inclusive). The sector of LXIV Corps is further narrowed by this move.

All three Regiments (221st Res Gren, 223rd Res Gren, 225th Res Gren,) of 16 Infantry Division, as well as the 19 SS Police Regiment, the 49 Fortress MG Battalion and elements of a few Security Regiments, attached to 16 Infantry Division, were identified in the US VI Corps Zone.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET SECRET

Further South 716 Infantry Division is opposing the US VI Corps with the 726th and 736th Infantry Regiments in line.

189 Infantry Division with its new build up (Sixth Army Group Weekly Summary Number 4, of October 14) and 198 Infantry Division under General Major SCHIEL, with 305th GR, 326th GR, Bn BOEHMAN, 235th Security Battalion, 198 Fusilier Battalion, and I, II, III, IV Battalions of 63rd GAF Regiment in line, were committed on the right flank of the US VI Corps and the left flank of the II French Corps.

(2) IV GAF Corps:

338 Infantry Division was bearing the brunt of the fighting around LE THILLOT, stemming the advance of the French II Corps. During the week the Division was considerably reinforced by the 1034th Fortress Battalion; 40th Fortress MG Battalion; 1433rd Fortress Infantry Battalion and the 291st and 293rd Battalions (constituted of outlaws). The 746th Engineer Battalion, originally assigned to build fortifications, has been added to the build up of combat effectives of the 338 Infantry Division.

Elements of 106 Panzer Brigade were thrown into the battle in the vital sector of the front for which the 338 Infantry Division is assuming responsibility, but there is no indication that this newcomer is under the division. It is rather reasonable to assume that the Brigade remains under the Corps.

According to PW statement 189 Infantry Division has been put under command of IV GAF Corps. Such a change in disposition indicated that IV GAF Corps assumed responsibility for the vital central sector while the LXXXV Corps remains responsible for the BELFORT area, the Southern anchor of the whole defense system in the VOSGES.

(3) LXXXV Corps:

The previously reported appearance of 106 Panzer Brigade in the Corps area has not been confirmed by its engagement on the Corps sector, as the enemy was evidently compelled to throw elements of this mobile unit into action on the endangered portion of the central sector (LE THILLOT).

159 Infantry Division (recently ungraded) with the 9th GR, 251st GR, 1000th Recn Battalion, the 74th Sec Brigade, and miscellaneous smaller units under its command constitutes the right flank of the Corps, denying the French I Corps access to the BELFORT Gap from the West.

Further South 91 GAF Regiment of the 1st Trng GAF Division is still identified in the French I Corps zone, while the presence of elements of the Brigade von OPPEN, on the right flank of the I French Corps has been confirmed by recent identifications.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Northern Front)

No Change.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were generally disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL - SUR - ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

Enemy activities were restricted to patrolling. Enemies dispositions have not undergone any change and it is considered that his intentions remain the same.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period the enemy's attention centered on the central zone where stubborn resistance revealed the danger he felt in our drives on the MOSELOTTE Valley, N/W of BROUVELIERURES (V 2560) and against the key terrain features of BRUYERES (V 2457), which was cleared by the end of the period.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I French Corps: In the Southern sector of the front an artillery build-up was noticeable during the period around BELFORT, where at least two new battalions were located.

II French Corps: The enemy reacted strongly early in the period to our advance up the MOSELOTTE Valley, after the capture of SAULXURES (K 3137). He defended strongly in the area W of LETTRAYE (Q 3031), PLANOIS (K 3041), W of ROCHESSON (K 3245) and at CORNIMONT (V 3429) with heavy fighting and counterattacks. During the see-saw course of the fighting, the enemy was able temporarily to retake HILL 739 (V 3328). His artillery fire was devoted to the sector of the MOSELOTTE Valley from CORNIMONT (V 3429) to LES AMAIS (K 3037) and on TRAVEXIN (K 3528). With capture of LE HAUT DU FAING (V 3431), a key point of the enemy's proposed Winter line was breached and furious counterattacks in this area signified the blow dealt to the Germans as the period ended.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: Main emphasis during the period was laid on the area of BRUYERES (V 2457), E of FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264) and BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), both in our steady advances and in the enemy's stubborn defense with all weapons (including AT grenades and bazookas) and counterattacks. About 19 October strong resistance was received from the hill W of JUSSARUPT (V 2752). By the end of the period BRUYERES was cleared and limited withdrawal by the enemy was observed to the E bank of the MORTAGNE River. Close contact continued to be maintained in the area FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264), BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), while the enemy stiffened his defense from dug-in positions to the north.

XV Corps: During the early part of the period, the enemy defended capably with artillery concentrations and automatic fire from well dug-in positions near IGNEY, (W of VAUCOURT (Q 2308). Only moderate opposition was made to advances near EMBERMENIL (Q 2304). By 18 October counterattacks by tanks were being launched in the area (Q 2303), and the enemy continued this aggressive attitude until the 20th, when activity slackened to mixed artillery fires, with Nebelwerfer fire beginning to be noted regularly.

(3) ALPINE FRONT

ABTF: Enemy defensive attitude continued with scattered artillery fire and light patrol activity.

4 DMM: The enemy made a strong raid on TERMIGNON (K 5040) on 19 October, but was forced back. Otherwise the front was quiet.

5. SUPPLIES

The movement of enemy supplies into the two enemy army areas appears from traffic reports to have been maintained without substantial reduction in volume. In view of this heavy traffic and the absence of evidence to indicate the existence of supply shortages, it is not likely that he is experiencing any difficulties in bringing up supplies to Sixth US Army Group front.

Rations are probably supplemented considerably by taking produce and livestock from the land, as in the ST DIE area several car loads of potatoes were moved daily in a Northeasterly direction.

A general shortage of fuel exists due to the strategic bombing of processing and storage installations in Germany and occupied countries. Nineteenth Army fuel requirements however are not apt to be substantial in the present static situation. Its position has been further enhanced by the location of rail heads in the forward areas which permits economical use of motor transport for short hauls with resulting reduction in fuel requirements.

The supply position of the armies under Army Group G is not likely to cause the enemy grave concern while he has full use of the RHINE crossings. That he is preparing for their possible loss is indicated by the assembly of materials for pontoon bridges at STRASSBOURG.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. MOVEMENTS

Rail movements reported during the past week indicate that the line from SINGEN - RADOLFSZELL via DONAUESCHINGEN - VILLINGEN - OFFENBURG is the principal route used for movement of troops and supplies to STRASSBOURG. Supplies from STRASSBOURG are then forwarded to railheads at ST DIE, AVRICOURT, SAARBURG and SAVERNE.

Continued rail activity was observed in the MULHOUSE-COLMAR area. Railheads for the Southern area are probably located at MUNSTER, THANN, BELFORT and MONTBELIARD.

The evacuation of factory parts and materials from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE area continues. The route just N of BASLE and the SWISS frontier in the direction of SINGEN is moving empties in a Westerly direction and loaded trains to the East.

In the Northern sector, supply trains appear to be moving from NURNBERG into the KARLSRUHE area over a double-tracked main line, which from HALL may be partly diverted to a secondary line with good connections through to KARLSRUHE.

7. DEFENSES

BELFORT: In the BELFORT area, enemy outposts protecting the western and southwestern approaches to the MLR show a general increase in heavy infantry weapons and artillery. Photo reconnaissance confims the construction of a second MLR running from ROUGEMONT (V 4204) to MERTZEN (V 5488) with a few scattered positions further south indicating that it may be prolonged to the SWISS Border. A high concentration of AA defends the entire BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector. (Annex I is an analysis of distribution of fire power based on Photo Interpretation by the FIRST FRENCH ARMY.)

VOSGES: In the VOSGES, photo reconnaissance shows the MLR to have been extended northward and to be anchored on the swampy area bounded by DIEUZE (Q 2520), MITTERSHEIM (Q 4129), FENETRANGE (Q 4723), RECHICOURT (Q 3407). Roads permitting movements through this area are obstructed by A/T ditches and continuous entrenchments perpendicular to the direction of approach.

GERMANY: The reconditioning of the SIEFGRIED LINE is reported completed, the fortifications having already received their supplies of food and ammunition. The SIEFGRIED DEFENSES are reported being extended to a depth reaching east of FRANKFURT, MANNHEIM, MUNSTER, and the northern regions of the BLACK FOREST. Defenses are also reported under construction along the southern approaches to Germany, in the ALLGAUER ALPS (C 87) and along the INN River Valley to KUFSTEIN (E 39), where, given sufficient time, the Germans would have another SIEGFRIED LINE guarding the outlet of the BRENNER PASS.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

2 Incls:
Annex #1 - Analysis of distribution of Fire Power.
Annex #2 - Weather Summary for the Middle Rhine Valley for November.

S E C R E T

WEATHER SUMMARY FOR THE MIDDLE RHINE VALLEY FOR NOVEMBER

GENERAL

Weather conditions throughout the Middle Rhine Valley in November continue to be unfavorable for combined military operations. This area lies within the zone of migratory storms which move from the North Atlantic across Central and Northern Europe, bringing rain and overcast skies for prolonged periods. Occasionally, a northeasterly current out of Russia will cause brief periods of clear, cold conditions. These, however, are merely short interruptions in the regular regime. With continued overcast and frequent rain, the soil becomes saturated with moisture, impeding the movement of wheeled vehicles. Poor visibilities and low ceilings, combined with sodden airfield conditions, will limit the use of tactical aircraft on a majority of November days.

TEMPERATURES

The mercury in November shows a marked decline in keeping with the seasonal trend. The general average for the area is near 40 degrees:

Strasbourg	40.0	Karlsruhe	40.5	Nurnberg	39.0
Metz	41.0	Basel	40.6	Munich	37.2

The highest ever registered at Strasbourg in November was 71 degrees, and the lowest on record was 11 degrees. In general, the temperature will reach a daily mean maximum of 44 and a daily mean minimum of 36. Readings below freezing will occur on ten days during this autumn month at this Middle Rhine Valley city.

PRECIPITATION

Rainfall, though still moderate, shows a general decline from the autumnal high in October. The average for the region is close to two inches:

Metz	2.2"	Frankfurt	1.7"	Nurnberg	1.5"
Strasbourg	1.9"	Basel	2.4"	Munich	1.7"

The greatest monthly total ever recorded amounted to 5.0" at Metz and 4.9" at Strasbourg; while the least registered was 0.9" and 0.5", respectively. Twenty-four hour falls of 1.3" at Metz and 1.7" at Strasbourg are the heaviest on record for a single day. The chief characteristic of the rainfall pattern is the tendency to prolonged rain spells. Over sixty per-cent of the rain periods will last for three successive days or more. Measurable rainfall may be expected on the average of fifteen days during the month in the Upper Rhineland. The mercury drops low enough in November for snow. Two to three days of light snow will occur in an average year, although the depth is never great at this season. The heaviest November twenty-four hour fall measured 1.3" at Metz and 1.7" at Strasbourg.

CLOUDINESS AND HUMIDITY

The proximity of the North Atlantic Ocean lends a strong maritime character to the air masses invading the region. The moisture content is high with resultant excessive cloudiness and high humidities. Total cloudiness averages close to 80 per-cent: Metz and mountain stations 80%, Strasbourg and valley locations 76%. Mornings, on the average, are slightly more cloudy than evenings. Absence of sunshine (only 1.2 hours per day) prevents rapid drying, accentuating the humid conditions.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

WEATHER SUMMARY FOR THE MIDDLE RHINE VALLEY FOR NOVEMBER

Humidity content is near the winter peak. Strasbourg shows a 0700A average of 92% and a 1400A mark of 80%, both high figures. The frequency of fogs demonstrates the high moisture content of the air at this season. Metz experiences eight days with heavy fog, while river valley towns in the Rhine valley may have ten to twelve days with fog.

VISIBILITY

Restricted visibility will occur on two-thirds of the days. It will be below 6 miles on 20 mornings a month, below 2½ miles on 14 mornings, and below 1½ miles on 10 mornings. Visibility improves generally by noon as the fog lifts to a low overcast. Dense fogs with zero-zero conditions often occur in the Vosges Mountains area for two to three days in a row, when valleys experience fog in the mornings only. Obstructions to good vision are a distinct handicap to accurate aerial bombardment at this season of the year.

WIND

The prevailing winds are from the southwest. Contours of the north-south river valleys accentuate the normal flow of cyclonic winds. Seventy-eight percent of the observed wind movement at Strasbourg is from the south thru southwest to west, and similiar conditions exist at Metz 59 percent of the time. The velocities are moderate with an overall average of 9 miles-per-hour. At Strasbourg calms have been experienced 22 percent of the time, velocities between 1 and 7 m.p.h. 64 percent, and between 8 and 18 m.p.h. 14 percent. Gales will occur only once a month.

SURFACE WIND DIRECTION (%)	N	NE	E	SE	S	SW	W	NW	CALM
METZ	4	8	4	5	9	15	10	3	42
STRASBOURG	6	2	1	1	16	35	10	7	22

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T

DAILY ALMANAC FOR NOVEMBER, 1944

COLMAR-MULHOUSE AREA * 48 00 NORTH 07 30 EAST

NOVEMBER	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
1	0715	1712	1814	0800	FULL MOON
2	0717	1710	1850	0917	"
3	0719	1709	1934	1030	"
4	0720	1708	2023	1136	"
5	0722	1707	2119	1232	"
6	0723	1705	2219	1317	"
7	0725	1703	2321	1406	LAST QUARTER
8	0726	1702	----	1426	"
9	0728	1700	0024	1452	"
10	0729	1659	0127	1515	"
11	0731	1657	0230	1536	"
12	0732	1656	0332	1557	"
13	0734	1654	0436	1618	"
14	0735	1653	0539	1640	"
15	0737	1652	0644	1704	NEW MOON
16	0738	1651	0750	1734	"
17	0740	1650	0857	1808	"
18	0741	1649	1000	1851	"
19	0743	1648	1102	1942	"
20	0744	1647	1155	2043	"
21	0746	1646	1241	2150	"
22	0747	1645	1320	2304	"
23	0749	1644	1351	----	FIRST QUARTER
24	0750	1644	1421	0019	"
25	0751	1643	1448	0136	"
26	0752	1642	1513	0254	"
27	0754	1641	1536	0412	"
28	0755	1641	1609	0531	"
29	0757	1640	1633	0650	"
30	0758	1639	1710	0808	FULL MOON

CIVIL TWILIGHT (Sun 6 deg. below horizon; outdoor civilian activity ceases) subtract 35 minutes from sunrise and add 35 minutes to sunset.

NAUTICAL TWILIGHT (Sun 12 deg. below horizon; outline of objects just visible) subtract 75 minutes from sunrise and add 75 minutes to sunset.

ASTRONOMICAL TWILIGHT (Sun 18 deg. below horizon; synonymous with darkness; same as British First and Last Light) subtract 110 minutes from sunrise and add 110 minutes to sunset.

ALL TIMES ARE "A" ARMY TIME OR VIENNA MERIDIAN (15 DEG. EAST) TIME, WHICH IS ONE HOUR IN ADVANCE OF "Z" GREENWICH TIME.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

S E C R E T
By Auth. of
A.C. of S., G-2
Initials: EWK
Date: 28 Oct 44

P/31 (59)

280900 A October 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 6

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 28 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The recent withdrawals of mobile units (15 Panzer Grenadier Division and probably 11 Panzer Division) from our Northern flank possibly indicates a decision by the enemy to transfer much of Fifth Panzer Army to more critical areas of the Western Front.

At the same time, the continued identification of new fortress and other static units points out that the enemy evidently feels his defences on the Northern flank have reached a stage of completion which enable him to pass from offensive defense to static or delaying de - fense.

If these suppositions are correct, it is likely that the substitution of static for mobile units will continue.

The current improvement of the enemy's situation is probably due in part to freedom from constant air attacks. This enables him to make maximum use of his most forward rail facilities for the movement of troops, as well as supplies.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: XURES (Q 2010), LEINTREY (Q 2603), NOSSONCOURT (V 2178), JEANMENIL (V 2271), LA BOURGONCE (V 3268), West of ST DIE (V 3966), LES ROUGES EAUX (V 3163), LA CHAPELLE (V 2954), LE THOLY (V 2643), LA BRESSE (V 3534), VENTRON (V 3527), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps:

No contact has been established by US XV Corps with the 11 Panzer Division since 23 October. Possibly the division will follow the 15 PG Division and will be entrusted with a new mission.

In addition to elements of the 553 Infantry Division, the 59 GR of the 19 Infantry Division (until lately spread over a wide front from South of PRUM (VIII US Corps zone) to NE of NANCY) were identified by the XV US Corps in the LVIII Panzer Corps sector.

Thus the composition of the corps is undergoing a considerable reshuffle probably in view of a possible withdrawal of the enemy to the prepared fortified position SAAREBOURG-BLAMONT-BACCARAT.

(2) XLVII Panzer Corps:

15 PG Division has not been identified since October 19. An officer PW from the 56 MG Battalion stated on Oct 20 that his unit relieved elements of 104 PGR, which with the rest of the division were withdrawn to Germany.

The 21 Panzer Division and the 16 Infantry Divisions were heavily c mitted in the VI US Corps zone.

The 16 Infantry Division possibly passed temporarily under Fifth Panzer Army. Such a supposition is substantiated by the fact that personnel of the division are now carrying copies of "PANZERFUNK" instead of the "WACHT". (Newspapers of the Fifth Panzer Army and Nineteenth Army respectively).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

S E C R E T

Logically the 16 Infantry Division should be under XLVII Panzer Corps. However, the intention of the enemy to fall back on an organized defensive position, the decreasing number of armored units in the Fifth Panzer Army sector and a persistent build up of Infantry Divisions in that area, suggests that a major reshuffle of enemy units is taking place. Consequently the XLVII Panzer Corps may be withdrawn and replaced by an Infantry Corps, with one mobile unit (21 Panzer Division) remaining for the time being under its command, as a minumum counterbalance to our armor.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:

Elements of the 716 Infantry Division reinforced the battered front of the 16 Infantry Division (716 Engineer Battalion; 716 Artillery Battalion; 736 GR).

The situation in the 198th and 189th Infantry Division sectors remains obscure. Elements of the 189 Infantry Division were last identified on 17 October. Since then elements of the 198 sidestepped South and were identified by II French Corps (326 GR) in the 189 Division sector, suggesting that the division assumed responsibility for the sector of its Southern neighbour. Possibly the 189 Infantry Division has been withdrawn due to sever losses.

(2) IV GAF Corps:

The 338 Infantry Division, heavily committed in the fighting around LE THILLOT is now furnishing reinforcements to the ST DIE sector. The 291 Criminal Battalion; 2 Battalions of 757 GR; the 407 Engineer Battalion and elements of the 933 GR were identified in the US 3 Division zone.

The reported arrival in the COLMAR area of the 269 Infantry Division from NORWAY, confirmed by the identification of 1 Company 469 GR on the French II Corps zone, suggests that the newly arrived division, which possibly has considerable experience in mountain warfare, may assume responsibility for a sector in the VOSGES, probably the region of the BALLON massif.

In such a case the remainder of the 338 Infantry Division may follow, its elements already committed in the ST DIE area, where the whole division may assume responsibility for a sector of the main line of resistance ST DIE-BACCARAT.

The 106 Panzer Brigade has not been identified for the last few days. There are indications that the Brigade is regrouping, possibly under the 21 Panzer Division, in the vicinity of ST DIE.

(3) LXXXV Corps:

The 159 Infantry Division with the von OPPEN Brigade and miscellaneous attached smaller units, responsible for the approaches to the BELFORT GAP, continues to oppose the French 1st DMI of the French II Corps and the French I Corps.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in contact	17,910
Supporting units	13,640
Artillery effectives	12,000
General Res West of RHINE	34,000
TOTAL	77,550
Guns	410
Tanks	120

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. The sector of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border is held by the following German and Italian forces: Coast to LARCHE Pass, 34 Infantry Division; LARCHE Pass to MT BENEVRE, elements 5 Mountain Division and elements of 90 PG Division (1/2 Battalions); MT GENEVRE, 85 Mountain Jaeger Regiment and elements of the MONTE ROSA Division; MT CENIS Pass, elements 157 Mountain Jaeger Division; PETIT ST BERNARD Pass, elements 157 Division; GRAND ST BERNARD Pass, elements 157 Division.

Recent movements in the region of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border include the following:

Units of the 139 Mountain Regiment, previously contacted in the Alpine sector have lately been identified in the TRENTO-VERONA area. Alpine troops coming from Western ITALY are concentrating in the region of the BRENNER Pass. Many unidentified headquarters are re-locating in the LAKE COMO and LAKE GARDO regions. Troop concentrations are continually reported in MILAN, with high percentage of the units coming from the West; the bulk of the organized formations are made up of SS units, of which detachments had been used in the French border sector. Increased traffic on the reopened Autostrada from TURIN to MILAN has been noted since early October. The same type of concentration has been reported in TURIN, which appears to be the distribution point for troops passing through to the East. Traffic on the road PINEROLO-TURIN shows a preponderance of troop convoys eastward, with the main cargo toward the West being war material. The bulk of the 5 Mountain Division is reputed to be holding the passes NW of GENOA, while the First Regiment and Alpine units of the MONTE ROSA Division have been identified in the hills NE of GENOA. Units of this Division have been reported recalled from the French border due to wholesale desertion and negotiations with partisans. Only small MONTE ROSA detachments have recently been contacted in the MAIRA Valley area on the Alpine front. Large numbers of German and Fascist troops have been reported in all-out attacks to mop up the partisans in the VALD'OSSOLA, VAL SUSA and VAL PELLICHE to insure free passage on routes from the border to the East. Local withdrawals have been effected in the BARDONNECHIA basin, where defense lines have been constructed across the VAL DI SUSA and armor brought up to the area of OULX (H 34). An increase of medium caliber artillery fire in this sector and in the coastal area has been noted during the past few days.

Preparation for withdrawal may be indicated by these activities. Actual large-scale withdrawals would seem to depend upon the developments along the border, on the Southern front and in the TRIESTE-TARVISIO area.

b. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Alpine Front)

In contact	6-7000
Supporting units	6000
TOTAL	12-13000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

a. GENERAL

Despite the harmful inroads made by our attacks during the period, the enemy's reactions have been neither hasty nor unbalanced. His plan to utilize such static units as are available, to hold successive delaying lines in covering the retreat to the SIEGFRIED Line is altered only by the necessity to mass, his few reserves of wide-spread units at such points of eruption as occur in his front.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: The light patrol activity and sporadic artillery fire characteristic of the enemy's attitude on this front were broken only by the entrance of one adventurous enemy patrol into HYEMONDANS (P 2574) and a late increase of artillery fire on forward positions E of PONT DU ROID (DOUBS River sector).

II Corps: The steady rain of artillery fire on the areas of LE HAUT DU FAING (V 3428) and CORNIMONT (V 3429) increased to a crescendo by the 25th as it supported (with mortar fire) a nearly successful attack on RONDFAING (K 3343), on the N flank of the 3 DIA salient. Aggressive patrols probed the outskirts of the 1 DMI in the FRESSE wood (K 2614) and S of RONCHAMP (K 2308) as the period ended.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: At the outset of VI Corps' attack, the enemy seemed confident of dealing successfully with our attempt to break through his positions. His first concern was with the line running E of the BELMONT (V 2758)-BRUYERES (V 2457), railroad and for the FREMIFONTAINE (V 2364)-BROUVELIEURES (V 2560) area; the latter he defended with hand grenades and automatic weapons in close-in fighting, while counterattacking from BELMONT (V 2758) with tanks. But on the 23rd forced withdrawals had already begun E of BROUVELIEURES (V 2560) and N of DOMFAING (V 2760), accompanied by a shifting back of artillery. Despite his resistance E of FREMIFONTAINE (V 2364), the enemys' nervousness was shown by a heavy artillery reaction to our use of smoke screens and by his utilizing precious ME 109's in strafing our troops. By the 25th, the enemy had manned positions constructed earlier, and resistance stiffened generally. Close-in fighting in MORTAGNE (V 2764), BIFFONTAINE (V 3057) and LES ROUGES EAUX (V 3063) became necessary and small arms, mortar and artillery fire slowed our advance E of the MORTAGNE River. General withdrawals began to be observed N and E toward HOUSSERAS (V 2466 as we captured abandoned vehicles and equipment in our progress along the river. Resistance lessened, except in the forests on the Corps extreme N and S flanks. Another holding position had been manned by the enemy on the 26th, E and N of HOUSSERAS (V 2466); infiltration tactics began to be used from the vicinity of the NEUNE River Valley (V 3055). Reinforcements in tanks and personnel contributed to the strong determined attitude displayed about the 27/28 Oct, particularly in the area of BIFFONTAINE (V 3057). The enemy succeeded in making use of his strongly defended roadblocks in cutting off one of our battalions in the area of (V 3460). Artillery, utilized throughout much of the period in support of defensive action, assumed a greater role as 500/600 round concentrations were poured into the 3rd Division sector. By the end of the period, resistance was stubborn on the high ground vicinity V 2866, of our N flank zone and in the salient to the S, vicinity (V 3358), where counterattacks up to five in an hour were taking place. LA BOURGONCE (V 3268) was in our hands and only scattered resistance was encountered as the enemy's fortified zone was neared.

XV Corps: In the Southern sector, the enemy succeeded in retaking MENARMONT (V 1880) on 23 October. He devoted most of his efforts during the rest of the period to scattered patrolling and to harrassing artillery fire, mainly in the areas of GLONVILLE (V 2286), FONTENOY (V 2084), and BENAMENIL (V 2197).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Resisting all our attempts to probe his activity in the Northern sector, the enemy developed his dug-in positions and brought up tanks, thus being able to launch counterattacks which penetrated our lines vicinity (Q 2306). Further attempts were repulsed by 27 October and by the end of the period the zone was generally quiet, with indications that front lines were now only lightly held.

(3)- ALPINE FRONT

4 French DMM: Unsuccessful small-scale enemy attacks on CONDAMINE (P 5150), CHENAILLET (P 4999), BESSANS (H 5260), and TERRIGNON (K 5040) signified an unusual curiosity on the enemy's part. Harrassing artillery covered our zone effectively during the period, with heavy concentrations falling on BRIANCON (P 3998).

FABTF: A sharp increase in artillery fire vicinity COL DE BRAUS (S 7098) preceded several small enemy attempts at infiltration SE of CASTILLON (S 7594). On the 28th of October, ten explosions were heard in the vicinity of MT BARBONNET and SOSPEL (S 7598), two explosions E of MT VETEBRENA. A smoke screen was observed over the COL DE BRAUS (S 7098) tunnel.

5. SUPPLIES

a. Positions in the PIRMASENS-ZWEIBRUCKEN sector of the SIEGFRIED LINE have been stocked with French and Italian types of ammunition according to an escaped Russian PW who hauled these supplies in to the line. Ammunition was stored in about 25 barracks and 15 underground dumps having about 40 tunnels of concrete construction, all well dispersed over an area of 32 square miles. Each of these subterranean installations consists of a group of 3 or 4 separate tunnels of varying lengths up to 3 km. Several of the main tunnels of the larger dumps have narrow guage railway, and passages leading to concrete block houses in the defensive line. All are equipped with electric lighting and telephone systems. Loading platforms and entrances to the dumps are located a short distance from hard-surface highways generally 500 to 750 metres from a village. The following localities are known to have such installations:

BURGALBEN	PETERSBURG
DELLFELD	PIRMASENS (probable Branch Ord. Depot)
HOBEISCHWEILER	RODALBEN (also barrack & large open dump)
HOELMUHLBACH	THALEISCHWEILER - (THAL-FROESCHEN)
MASSWEILER	WINDSBERG
NUENSCHWEILER	and between PETERSBERG and GERSBACH

Ammunition arrived by trains over the LANDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN line which were unloaded daily at RODALBEN (30 cars), THALEISCHWEILER (25 cars), DELLFORD (15 cars), and also at RIESCHWEILER, while gun parts were taken to PIRMASENS-NORD.

A substantial number of barracks in this area appear to have been used for storage of ammunition, possibly to supplement the stocks in the underground dumps. Underground installations of this type, are likely to be found in other sectors of the SIEGFRIED LINE.(SOURCE - OSS Report VF 71)

b. German exports of Silesian coal destined for ITALY appear to have been continued via ST MARGRETHEN over SWISS railways. Some of this coal traffic is occasionally routed through MANNHEIM and ST LOUIS, possibly due to Allied air attacks on the rail system in Southern Germany.

c. Reports from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector continue to show considerable manufacturing activity although quit a number of factories have been stripped of machinery and equipment for removal to Germany.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. The enemy is removing heating and plumbing systems as well as generators from industrial plants in the ST DIE area which will probably be used for repairs to damaged or newly constructed German installations.

e. A PW of 34 Division captured along the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier claimed that food and ammunition were sufficient, but that re-supply was irregular. Battalion and Company supply columns arrive from BREIL at night.

6. MOVEMENTS

Railroad and highway transportation difficulties coupled with the lack of repair material and a shortage of skilled labor have led the Germans to turn as much traffic as possible to the waterways for transportation. Reports received during the week show that traffic on the LEOPOLD CANAL at FREIBURG (W 0933) and on the MARNE-RHINE CANAL continues to be very heavy. Because of transport difficulties, the evacuation by rail of factory equipment from MULHOUSE has been greatly retarded. Further hampering of enemy communications is found in a French report which states that traffic has been interrupted on the HOLLENTAL line between FREIBURG and DONAUESCHINGEN.

Reports received during the past week show that considerable rail activity took place in the DONAUESCHINGEN area during the first week in October when numerous troop and supply trains passed through towards OFFENBURG.

Further activity along the RHINE is brought out by French and OSS reports stating that the bombing of the dam at KEMBS caused the river to run so low that traffic over the bridge at HUNINGEN was interrupted. In addition it has been reported that the rapid current of the river does not allow boats of medium tonnage to go further than NEUENBURG (V 8712). Boats from STRASBOURG to BASEL carry only half loads. (OSS Report).

Because of unfavorable weather TAC/R reports during the week were limited. Ground reports state considerable rail traffic still persists between ST DIE and STRASBOURG, the former being the unloading point for rails and barbed wire. More rail activity was evident along the AUGSBURG-ULM line carrying troop and supply trains toward COLMAR, STRASBOURG, and SAARBRUCKEN.

Reports on the bombing of RHINE River Bridges during the past week revealed the following:

Bridge at	(V 9050)	vic SASBACH	- destroyed.
"	" (V 9868)	" RHEINAU	- destroyed.
"	" (V 9976)	" ERSTEIN	- 1 hit, west approach, 2 near misses.
"	" (R 2932)	" SELTZ	- damaged, 2 hits east end of bridge, 2 hits east approach
"	" (A 8987)	" HUNINGEN	- 6 near misses.

The status of the NEUF BRISACH and the CHALAMPE bridges is not definitely known at present, but a report has been received indicating that munition trains are now using these bridges, previously reported unfit for rail traffic.

7. DEFENSES

VOSGES-BELFORT:

This week has disclosed the construction of a continuous system of fire trenches and A/T ditches around PHALSBOURG (Q 6518) defending the approaches to the SAVERN GAP. Numerous machine guns are already in position.

GERMANY:

The aggregate of numerous small items obtained from S.R.F. and O.S.S. ground sources indicates that the enemy is strengthening his defenses in the KARLSRUHE-BRUCHSAL (20 km NE of KARLSRUHE) area, and generally throughout the inner BLACK FOREST Region down to the Swiss Border.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

This may indicate additions to the existing defenses in the "THIRD ZONE" of the SIEGFRIED LINE which is anchored on the difficult terrain of the BLACK FOREST, or may very well be the establishment of a second continuous line of defenses based on the natural obstacles which the region proffers.

Concrete emplacements are being prepared for heavy artillery around BASEL, and, further east, a line of defenses is reported under construction beginning NE of SACKINGEN (B 1584) and running northward to TODTMOOS (W 2004). Camouflaged bunkers have been strategically distributed along the line and the main towns have been transformed into strong points. This creates a line running parallel to the SIEGFRIED LINE from the SWISS Border through the southern BLACK FOREST and indicates concern of the enemy over the status of his defenses blocking the RHINE Valley east of BASEL.

Scattered reports of defenses under construction as far east as ULM (X 68) would indicate that the enemy is preparing to fight to the end on his own soil.

8. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

PANZERFAUST 60m:

A third version of the PANZERFAUST has recently been recovered in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS.

The PANZERFAUST 60m is very similar to the PANZERFAUST 30m. The main difference being in the attachment of the tail to the grenade; a new type of firing mechanism; and an increased range as indicated by the sight bracket, which is from 30 meters (33 yards) to 80 meters (87 yards). The sight is marked with luminous paint.

Eugene L Harrison.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl:

Annex #1 - The German G-2 at Work.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

I THE GERMAN G-2 AT WORK

The following captured document shows how intelligence is being gathered by the G-2's in divisions opposing us today. Although the enemy's methods are similar to our own, the comments on lack of air reconnaissance and the interrogation of American PW are of interest. (Document captured by First US Army):

246 Volks Grenadier Division Div Hq. 27/9/44
G-2 Nr 10/44 - Confidential

SUBJECT: G-2 Operations.

1. The officer in charge of keeping the enemy situation up to date at Division is the G-2. It is his duty to furnish the G-3 at all times a clear and dependable picture of the enemy situation. He has at his disposal, in addition to his clerical personnel, two officers (interpreters) as his assistants for the interrogation of PW.

2. In order to gain an intelligence picture of the enemy situation, the G-2 principally has the following sources:

a. Messages from his Lower Units.

(1) Immediate messages. Every important observation of the enemy is to be reported to Division at once. In particular the following observations:

(a) Special Surveillance by the Guards: To prevent the loss of any special observations noticed by the guards, an observation record will be kept at each post, into which all special incidents will be entered. This record will be kept in duplicate, so the guards will have a copy at all times and the Division G-2 the other copy for evaluation of the report.

(b) Reports of Enemy Recn and Combat patrols: All actions undertaken by the enemy against our own MLR to be reported to Division at once by wire and to be followed up with a written report including overlay.

(c) Observation of Enemy Air Activity: Unusual tactics of the enemy air force, as well as every bomb dropped in our own battle sector, parachutists, including emergency jumps and all not definitely indentified flares in the air, are to be reported immediately.

(d) Conduct of the Civilian Population: The fact that the troops engaged in battle on German soil place considerable confidence in the population, constitutes a great danger for the counter-intelligence. One must always bear in mind that an increasingly growing number of enemy agents are being employed in the zone of the interior.

(2) Routine Messages. Hereto the following special orders are issued:

b. PW Statements: Now that the air superiority of the enemy in the West has practically eliminated our own air reconnaissance, the importance of PW statements play a much more decisive role then heretofore. A skilled interrogation report is often the only source of information about the enemy that extends past the outer area of the MLR into the depth of enemy occupied territories. It is therefore always of paramount importance to take as many PW as possible and to evacuate them as fast as possible to the G-2 of Division for interrogation. The following applies in particular:

(1) The interrogation of PW takes place only at Division. Lower units are prohibited from interrogating PW, as they thereby hamper the possibility of a successful interrogation by the interpreters of Division, who have been especially trained for the job. Practically all English and American PW render good information when interrogated by skilled interpreters.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) The evacuation of PW to the Division Coll Pt must be carried out by the troops without delay. For security reasons PW will never be evacuated to the Division CP.

(3) Prior to the evacuation of PW to the Division Coll Pt all weapons and personal belongings, except his paybook, will be taken from the PW; for example pocketknives, all papers, money, etc. All belongings will be placed in individual bags identifying the owner, and turned over to the PW escort. This is of special importance for the evaluation of PW statements (captured documents) etc.

(4) In case of enemy wounded who cannot be evacuated, request an interpreter from G-2 of Division to be sent at once, especially if officers are among the wounded. If immediate evacuation to an aid-station is unavoidable, this will be mentioned in the request, enabling the officer to report to the proper station.

(5) It is strictly prohibited to retain PW for work.

c. Evaluation of captured material. Captured material of all types, particularly documents, will often lead to the most important results of intelligence, only the skilled eye can decide what is important and what is not important. Small scraps of paper are at times of much more value than maps, etc. The rule therefore should be: All captured material will be evacuated to the G-2 of Division at once. Proper evaluation, however, can only be effected if place of capture and by whom are indicated. Bags containing types of material thrown together in a disorderly fashion and without these markings are practically worthless. Remove all papers from the dead and one of the two identification tags (the other remains with the body) and evacuate them to Division.

d. Rcn and combat patrols. In order to gain a clear picture of the enemy, special rcn and combat patrols are sent out by Division on specific rcn missions. For example: To pry into enemy positions and installations to the front of our own MLR, capturing of PW, etc. Upon completion of the mission, a written report including an overlay by the patrol leader will be submitted to the G-2 of Division as quickly as possible.

e. Other intelligence sources for enemy reconnaissance. Other intelligence sources for enemy rcn are the signal radio-interceptors, the tapping of telephone wires, the employment of agents and spies commuting between the front lines who are commandeered by the G-2 of Division, Air Rcn, etc.

3. Men responsible for keeping the enemy situation up to date at regiment and independent battalions are the respective S-2's.

For the Divisional Commander
UNGER

ANNEX No 1 to SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 6

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SHAEF G-2 (A&P)
L-449
RECEIVED
3 NOV 1944
AG M&D
NSSTAF

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

S E C R E T
By Auth. of
A.C.ofS.,
G-2
Initials:
Date: 4 Nov
1944

P-151(55)

040900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 7

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 4 NOVEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

It is accepted that Fifth Panzer Army has been transferred to another area of the Western Front, and that a common boundary between First and Nineteenth Army has been reestablished. The substitution of Infantry Divisions for mobile units has continued, climaxed by the appearance on the front of the 269 Infantry Division. A considerable regrouping of enemy forces was accomplished and Battle Group formations reappeared in the most threatened sector (ST DIE area), suggesting that by reason of our consecutive attacks the enemy is finding his stock pile of reserves dwindling.

2. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line:
XURES (Q 2010), LEINTREY (Q 2603), MIGNEVILLE (V 2992), VACQUEVILLE (V 3187), THIAVILLE (V 3179), LA SALLE (V 3269), West of ST DIE (V 3966) LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), LA CHAPELLE (V 2954), LE THOLY (V 2643), CORNIMONT (V 3329), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE-SUR-DOUBS (P 2681), VILLER LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. Changes in the disposition of Armies and Corps:

There are strong indications that the enemy has made considerable changes in the disposition of his higher headquarters. The XLVII Panzer Corps has not been located for some time and there is no evidence that the LVIII Panzer Corps has responsibility in the Northern Sector. It is accepted that the Fifth Panzer Army has also left the Southwestern portion of the front, probably entrusted with a new mission elsewhere.

Evidently a new Corps has taken over the XLVII Corps sector and possibly that of the LVIII Panzer Corps. Indications are that the LXXXIX Corps is the candidate. This new alignment of Corps naturally establishes a common boundary between the First and Nineteenth Armies. The location of such a boundary is still unknown.

The LXIV Reserve, the IV GAF and LXXXV Corps remain in line, although the transfer of the Headquarters LXXXV Corps from BELFORT to DIEFMATTEN (V 5300) (Northeast of BELFORT) presupposes that another headquarters, possibly on Corps level, may have been established in BELFORT, with responsibility for that fortified area.

b. FIRST ARMY

The reported location of Headquarters First Army in ST AVOLD (Q 2557) suggests that the army assumes responsibility for a sector including the area north of BLAMONT, with the 361 VOLKSGRENADIER and the 553 Infantry Divisions as the southernmost Divisions possibly under LXXXIX Corps.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

10478

(1)(?) LXXXIX Corps:

The 361 VOLKSGRENADIER Division, converted early in September from the 596 VOLKSGRENADIER Division, arrived on the southwestern front from HOLLAND about 18 October, where it underwent additional training and organization.

The personnel of the Division consists mainly of 17-18 year olds, interspersed with older re-inducted men. It is reported that the morale of this unit is rather low.

Elements of the 952 Volks GR were identified in US XV Corps Zone on October 3, while elements of the 953 Volks GR were identified further North of US XII Corps Zone. The third regiment of the division (951 Volks GR) remains unlocated.

The 553 Infantry Division committed in early September in US XII Corps Zone, was badly mauled at the beginning of October. Since then the division received at the end of October replacements with little training. All three regiments of the division (1119, 1120, and 1121 GRs) have been identified since October 30 in US XV Corps Zone (BLAMONT area). As the regiments of the 553 and 361 Divisions are sandwiched, the delineation of the boundary between the two divisions remains obscure.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:

In view of the general regrouping of the enemy's forces, the present location of the 21 Panzer Division (BACCARAT area) presupposes that it is at least momentarily under LXIV Reserve Corps.

The 21 Panzer Division was heavily committed astride the boundary of US XV and VI Corps Zone (BACCARAT area).

The heavy losses sustained by the division in the fight around BACCARAT require replacements. PW's stated that the I Battalion of the 22 Panzer Regiment is refitting in DUNTZENHEIM (Northwest of STRASBOURG). (The 22 Panzer Regiment was identified in the 21 Panzer Division sector on October 25 and 26. It appears that the 22 Panzer Regiment is now with 21 Panzer Division substituting for the organic 5 Panzer Regiment, which has not been identified since August).

Considering, however, the enemy's general trend in withdrawing mobile units (especially from the VOSGES front) for general refitting, a possible withdrawal of the 21 Panzer Division should be considered, provided that a substitute can be found (possibly another division from NORWAY or a mountain division from the Twentieth Mountain Army).

716 Infantry Division, withdrawn from its old sector, has been interspersed between the 21 Panzer Division and elements of the 338 Infantry Division, also withdrawn from its old sector and thrown piecemeal in the battle around ST DIE. So far, the I/726 GR, I/736 GR and IV Ost Battalion 726 GR, of the 716 Infantry Division, were identified in the new sector. Both Divisions (716 and 338) were badly shaken and their combat efficiency is low.

It is difficult at this stage to picture the organization of the sector opposing US 3rd Division Zone.

Organic and some of the attached elements of the 338 Infantry Division (757 GR, II and III/933 GR, 291 and 292 zbV Battalions) are operating as BG's, supported by BG's hastily organized from remnants of the 16th Infantry Division (BG GRIMM, 201 and 202 Mountain Battalions, II/2112 PGR, 49 Fortress Battalion, 437 Replacement Battalion). In addition, BG ESCHERICH and 602 Mobile Battalion, (which absorbed 608 Mobile Battalion) were also identified in this sector.

The present situation of BG ROLLIN remains obscure. It is reported that Col. Rollin is in command of 933 GR, identified in the northern sector, while none of the other units of his BG were identified in that area.

(2) IV GAF Corps:

198 Infantry Division sedestepped south, assuming responsibility for the sector of the withdrawn 189 Infantry Division, (According to PW statement, the effectives of the Division dwindled down to 600).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

It is probable that its third regiment (308 GR) until lately operating under 338 Infantry Division, has returned to the 198 Infantry Division (identified on November 3 (V 3359). 269 Infantry Division (some elements previously attached to the 338 Infantry Division probably still remain in the sector, namely: 1039 Fortress, 40 Fortress, 1433 Fortress, 807 Fortress, 808 Fortress Battalions, 404 Engineer, 746 Engineer Battalions, II Battalions and I-II Battalions C/V) opposes the French 3 DIA and a portion of the French 1 DMI. In the present alignment of enemy units the 269 Infantry Division constitutes the best tactical unit on the VOSGES front. Since only four battalions, (including the Fusiliers) have been committed so far, the division has at its disposal a relatively large number of reserves (about 4000 combat effectives).

(3) LXXXV Corps:

No change in disposition. The 159 Infantry Division and the Brigade von OPPEN remain responsible for the sector opposing the center (portion of the French II Corps) and right flank (French I Corps) of the French First Army.

d. GENERAL RESERVE

It is accepted that the enemy has at his disposal west of the RHINE the following units which should be considered as General Reserve: I GAF Training Division, 19th Army Security Division, 30 SS Division and about ten Fortress Battalions.

In addition to these units, it is estimated that about 10,000 reserves would be quickly available from WEHRKREIS V and other sources. Current enemy replacements and reserves are composed mainly of poorly trained personnel with poor equipment. The units in the General Army reserve are equivalent to approximately one U. S. Infantry Division in number of combat effectives, but are very low in fire power and morale. Possibly their only role would be in defense of well-prepared positions, backing up units in the line.

e. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in contact	20,300
Divisional Reserve	12,700
Artillery Effectives	12,000
Gen Reserve W of the RHINE (including additional reserves made available from WEHRKREIS V and other sources.)	32,000
T O T A L	77,000
Guns	410
Tanks and S. P.	60

3. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4080), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. No change in enemy disposition was reported.

It appears that the 34th Infantry Division is withdrawing to a winter defense line running north form SAN REMO (T 0089) to TRIORA (O 0008). The enemy is, however, maintaining outposts on the present contact line.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH ARMY GROUP (Alpine Zone)

In Contact	6-7000
Reserves and Artillery Effectives	6000
T O T A L	12-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

a. GENERAL

The enemy seems willing to withdraw on predetermined lines of resistance in the Northern sector, while holding fast in the central sector W and SW of ST DIE (V 4165), where he is already defending key positions in his fortified line.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: The usual patrolling and harrassing artillery fire was punctuated by an increase in mortar and artillery fire at PONT DE ROIDE (P 3474) on 1/2 November.

II Corps: For five days the enemy peppered the sector well with artillery fire, particularly in the area of CORNIMONT (V 3329) only to be taken by surprise by the 3 DIA's attack of 3/4 November. His reaction, initially feeble, stiffened at his line of resistance, due to his being strengthened by additional troops.

(2) SEVENTH ARMY

VI Corps: During the period, resistance has centered on the key terrain W and SW of ST DIE (V 4165), with successive dug-in strong points delaying our advances on the N and S flanks, as the enemy withdrew to more tenable positions and straightened his lines. JUSSARUPT (V 2752) was occupied at the outset of the period with no opposition, while small but determined counterattacks held us off in the area V 3666. Dug-in positions NE of BIFFONTAINE V 3057 were utilized on the S flank, while an enemy withdrawal to the NE was indicated; FRAIPERTUIS V 2470 proved clear of enemy on 29/30 October. Contact was regained with our "LOST BATTALION" by 30/31 October at V 3457, however, south of that area intense opposition and counterattacks kept us off HILL 616 (V 3664) while he was successful in taking HILL 526 (V 3468). On the North ST BENOIT (V 2673) was cleared of the enemy. Strong resistance was met only in the area (V 2873). Resistance began to stiffen generally on 31 October/1 November when our troops were forced back vicinity V 3258. By 1/2 November only scattered resistance was received on the South flank, prior to the occupation of the terrain feature at V 3468. The FORET DOMANIALE continued to be resolutely held from strong points scattered along its edges, but LES FAINGES V 3569 and NOMPATELIZE V 3470 were easily taken by our troops. Later dug-in positions delayed our advance on the ST BENOIT-RAON-L'ETAPE V 3479 axis. At the end of the period the enemy had taken up a defense from strong points at the mouth of the LES ROUGES EAUX Valley. HILL 616 and HAUT JACQUES V 3564 remained firmly in enemy hands in the central sector, but LA SALLE V 3269 was cleared.

XV Corps: Aggressive patrols and widespread artillery had characterized the enemy's attitude until the 1 DB's attack on 1 November, which evidently attained a degree of surprise. Opposition was found to be strongest on the line AZERAILLES (V 2388), HABLAINVILLER (V 2591), RECLONVILLE (V 2594), BACCARAT (V 2624), VACQUEVILLE (V 3187). Infantry supported by tanks defended the areas of ST POLE (V 3390) and MONTIGNY (V 3191) after the fall of BACCARAT. By 2/3 November, a shift of units from the North to DOMEVRE (V 3196) seemed to be under way. At the end of the period enemy opposition was stiffening although LEINTREY (Q 2603) proved to be clear of the enemy.

Alpine Front: A general, though limited, withdrawal of troops in the FABTF sector was indicated by reports of explosions, bridge demolitions, PW statements, and our occupation of SOSPEL (S 7498). Artillery fire, however, continued to harrass our lines.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. SUPPLIES

According to an OSS report of 1 November, air attacks on gasoline plants had a serious effect on all trasport in Germany and particularly in ALSACE where very few vehicles are now gasoline operated. Due to shortage of liquid motor fuel in this area, even the Army services of supply depend on charcoal burners for fuel.

Stocking-up of small supply dumps in the BLACK FOREST appears to be progressing steadily according to reports which claim that numerous storage sites are being developed, although only a few of these have so far been located.

Indications that machinery and equipment evacuated from areas west of the RHINE and from ITALY are being used for new factories in the area of Lake CONSTANCE, and notably in the vicinity of LINDAU (C 58), coupled with increased rail activity and a recent shift of railway administrative personnel to the SINGEN-RADOLFSZELL (W 91) sector, suggest that part of German industry is being shifted from occupied zones to the comparative safety of the region just north of the SWISS frontier which as yet is largely unaffected by Allied Air effort.

6. MOVEMENT

German railways continue to feel the effects of Allied air attacks in a serious lack of rail equipment, especially locomotives. Reports also indicate that many workers refuse to drive the trains through the exposed areas, particularly those leading towards the western front.

Reports of the past week indicate that the rail line from SINGEN through IMMENDINGEN in the direction of WALDSHUT is being used for transporting troops and supplies. This line is also being used for the evacuation of factory material from the MULHOUSE area, although from WALDSHUT these "non-war" materials pass through SCHAFFHAUSSEN to SINGEN. A recent Swiss report now refers to it as the "Strategic Railroad Line".

French sources stated that heavy freight traffic from Italy to Germany uses the INNSBRUCK-LINDAU line. The freight may be more factory equipment evacuated from Italy.

Activity along the RHINE shows that the power production of the KEMBS Plant is back to 50% and the RHINE boats can again run from STRASBOURG to BASEL. It has also been reported that all RHINE traffic now moves exclusively by night. Boats are loaded in HOLLAND for STRASBOURG, the main point for traffic across the RHINE, and here they are reloaded for shipment via the RHINE-RHONE Canal. In this connection it is of interest to note that many bargemen have been transferred from the RHINE to RHINE-RHONE Canal.

While there is NO indication that these shipments are of a military nature, this waterway, although a fairly slow means of transport, represents a valuable addition to the enemy's land lines of Communication especially when his rail lines become unserviceable. TAC/R for the past week reported continued rail activity in and around MULHOUSE, BELFORT, and CERNAY (V 5812) areas.

The NEUF BRISACH and CHALAMPE railroad bridges appeared to be in use again for railroad traffic. However, since then they have both been hit by Air, and their serviceability is at present unknown. The pontoon bridge at CHALAMPE was also hit by Air on 29 October. According to a French report, the pontoon bridge at NEUF BRISACH has now been reinforced to carry 40-50 tons.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The present status of the RHINE River bridges from BASEL to KARLSRUHE is as follows:

HUNINGEN - (A 890879) - Probably again in usable condition.
CHALAMPE RR - (V 858128) - Hits on 29/10 by bombs.
CHALAMPE - (V 859132) - Hit on 29/10 by bombs.
NEUF BRISACH - (V 881363) - No report of any bombings.
NEUF BRISACH RR - (V 885359) - Hit in east end 2/11 by bombs.
SASBACH - (V 898499) - Destroyed 20/10 by bombing.
RHEINAU - (V 984681) - Destroyed 20/10 by bombing.
ERSTEIN - (V 997765) - Hit on west approach on 20/10. Probably again usable.
STRASBOURG - (W 049972)
STRASBOURG - (W C49973) - No report of any bombings. Main routes of
STRASBOURG RR - (W 048974) traffic across the RHINE.
DRUSENHEIM - (R 172173) - No report of any bombings.
BEINHEIM RR - (R 277277) - No report of any bombings.
SELTZ - (R 293321) - 2 hits east end of bridge. 2 hits on eastern approach 20/10.
KARLSRUHE ROAD & RR - (R 415485) - No report of any bombings.

Pontoon bridges reported destroyed may now have been restored. Recent reports have indicated the spotting of extra pontoons and material along the river which might be used for just such a purpose. However, no definite information has been received that damaged bridges have been replaced or repaired.

7. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

The recent capture of an enemy agent disclosed a technique with respect to sabotage which may be repeated. This agent was to penetrate our lines with a view to locating the whereabouts of gasoline supply lines and storage points. He was then to return to his base and thereafter lead a group of carefully trained and equipped saboteurs to the exact point where most effective sabotage could be committed. This group was to either penetrate the lines or be parachuted in the area where the sabotage was to take place. If detected they were to pretend they were refugees and would offer to give tactical information to the first Allied officer they contacted.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

2 Incls:

Annex # 1 - Weather Statistics.

Annex # 2 - The Sixth Army Group Front.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

WEATHER STATISTICS

I. General
II. The Vosges Mountains
III. The Belfort Gap
IV. The Rhine Valley
V. The Black Forest

I. GENERAL

The appended statistics give pertinent weather data in the area south of MANNHEIM. It will be noted that rainfall is generally high, flying conditions are bad, and by November, the cloudy skies and unsettled weather of early winter prevail.

II. THE VOSGES MOUNTAINS. (See Appendices A and B).

1. Temperature

Winter weather prevails in the area during the months of November through March at altitudes of 3,000 feet and above, which are generally snow covered. At lower levels, snow does not lie on the ground for long periods. In the northern sector, where the mountains are lower, mild unsettled weather alternates with cold spells. Valleys generally have low night temperatures, causing fog which persists until late morning.

2. Precipitation

Although October is the wettest month of the year, the worst storms occur in late December and January. During November, skies are overcast a majority of the time.

3. Influence on Movement (See Appendix A).

Roads over the summits of mountains are liable to be blocked intermittently. Passes over 4,000 feet altitude are blocked for a period of four months or more. The Route des Cretes is completely snow-blocked for about five months.

III. THE BELFORT GAP (See Appendix C).

1. Temperature

The temperature varies as follows:

a. Cold snaps generally follow rain.
b. At the geginning of November, the first cold weather begins to appear. (About 32 degrees F).
c. The first serious frosts are noted toward the end of November.
d. The real cold period begins in Mid-December. (Oftentimes a mild spell between Christman and the first of January).
e. Streams are not sufficiently frozen to permit skating before Christmas, as a general rule.

2. Precipitation

Autum is the driest season of the year. The heavy rains and snow storms begin about the middle of December.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

3. Influence on Movement

a. In general, the ground does not become soggy until December.

b. In the Gap itself, there are no dangerously icy conditions of roads before the middle of December.

IV. THE RHINE VALLEY (See Appendix D).

1. Temperature

Temperatures in November average just below 40 degrees, but these temperatures combine with high humidity to cause discomfort. January is the coldest month.

2. Visibility

Skies are overcast a majority of winter days in most of this sector with a minimum of overcast days in the Karlsruhe-Mannheim sector and a maximum over the Belfort-Freibourg-Strasbourg area.

3. Influence on Movement

Except for long periods of freezing, winter is the season of unfavorable movement on unimproved roads. Roads east of the Rhine are less favorable to traffic than on the west. The spring thaw is more unfavorable to movement then fall rains.

V. THE BLACK FOREST

1. Temperature

This area is characterized by temperatures of 11 to 35 degrees F, and by precipitation in the form of snow. There may be long periods of low lying clouds. The concentration of wind within narrow valleys produces local winds of great violence which are an important element in the local climate. The annual temperature range increases towards the south. (Freiburg, 34 degrees F.) The rise in temperature is slow in this region. 120 days with frost during a year is average; the first frost coming by the 15th of October for the outer fringes and the 1st of October for the central region. The last frost will come between the 21st of April and the 5th of May for the outer fringe and after the 19th of May in the central region.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. Precipitation

The average rainfall in this region is 33 inches a year and in some areas of the forest as high as 55 inches. The outer fringes receive from 31 to 47 inches and the higher central region well over 47. The minimum rainfall for this region comes during the winter months of November, December, and January. The winter rains often occur as light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dryest month of the year, it may have a greater number of rainy days than any other month. At higher altitudes, snow is the more predominate form of precipitation. January is the month with the most snow days with February and March being very little behind. Snow may fall as early as October, but rarely below altitudes of 1,500 feet. In November, snow begins to be fairly frequent. By December, winter conditions have set in and snow is as frequent as rain. On the outer fringes, the average is from 30 to 50 days of snowfall for the season. In the higher central region the average is over 50 days.

3. Visibility

The winter is the cloudiest season of the year. The clouds are low and mountain regions are often above cloud level. Up to levels of 3,000 feet, hilly and mountainous regions have a notably high cloud amount. (Eight-tenths of the time in winter). Because of this winter cloud maximum combined with the shortness of daylight, sunshine hours in January average only one to two hours per day. Fog is nearly always land fog. At high mountain stations, mists and fog are really clouds and the frequency of occurence is very high.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A"

THE VOSGES PASSES

PASS	HEIGHT BLOCKED (FEET)	ROUTE
BONHOMME (V 5151)	3144 Intermittent Dec to Mar	ST DIE (V 4265)- COLMAR (V 7142)
ROUTES DES CRETES	2950 Nov to late May 4450	BONHOMME PASS (V 5151) SCHLUCHT PASS (V 4841) CERNAY (V 5820)
SCHLUCHT (V 4841)	3737 Late Nov to May	GERARDMER (V 3642)- COLMAR (V 7142)
BRAMONT (V 4233)	3173 Intermittent Dec to Feb	GERARDMER (V 3642)- THANN (V 5212)
BALLON DE ALSACE	3685 Late Nov to Early April	BELFORT (V 3493)- GERARDMER (V 3642)
ROUTE JOFFRE	2428 Dec to March	MASEVAUX (V 4508)- THANN (V 5212)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "B"

RAINFALL IN VOSGES MOUNTAINS
Based on 50 year observation
Given in mm.

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Col de Bussang	161	139	150	141	114	136
Ballon de Servance	193	166	203	163	126	165
Le Thillot	189	173	204	172	143	164
Ramonchamp	180	160	182	171	141	148
Remauvillers	178	160	186	166	136	151
La Bresse	173	152	162	148	128	143
Cornimont	186	166	193	169	137	157
Cornimont (Travexin)	194	174	202	177	143	164
Saulxures-sur-Moselotte	180	157	174	161	127	141
Basse-sur-le-Rupt	164	143	155	143	115	126
Trougemont (Basse-s.-Rupt)	159	139	149	139	111	122
Les Truches (Rochesson)	170	147	149	136	111	127
Saint-Ame	148	128	129	118	96	110
Vagney	132	114	115	105	86	99
Dammartin-les-Remiremont	137	115	116	107	84	96
Remiremont	136	115	119	106	86	97
Col de la Schlucht	148	133	145	137	122	130
Retournemer	192	169	178	163	142	159
Gerardmer	151	136	127	112	104	122
Granges	135	118	125	110	94	106
Bruyeres	121	106	109	90	85	95
Pouxeux	114	97	98	89	75	82
Bouzey (Sanchey)	95	78	78	64	60	63
Epinal (C.M.)	104	85	87	73	68	74
Epinal (M. Demangeon)	96	78	80	67	62	68
Thaon	89	72	71	57	56	55
Chatel-sur-Moselle	93	71	63	50	46	50
Charmes	79	65	57	49	43	49
Lerrain	104	89	93	76	65	67
Legeville	92	78	77	64	54	61
Dompaire	90	75	74	60	55	57
Mirecourt (Ec. Normale)	78	67	61	51	46	52
Mirecourt (M. Bronswick)	85	71	66	56	49	54
Brouvelieures	116	101	102	87	79	88
Rambervilliers	87	70	70	54	48	56
La Hardalle (Plainfaing)	134	111	120	119	105	114
Saulcy-sur-Meurthe	106	90	94	86	74	81
Gemaingoutte	96	76	82	72	62	70
Provenchores	110	94	101	97	84	89
Sainte-Marguerite	90	77	81	73	63	69
Saint-Die	93	82	83	74	65	71
Saint-Die (Saint-Martin)	108	92	96	87	76	83
Col du Praye	140	124	131	144	140	133
Vexaincourt	128	118	112	113	92	104
Senones	104	96	93	81	72	88
Raon-l'Etape	95	80	84	69	62	68
Lamarche	89	74	62	55	44	53
Vittel	89	75	70	58	49	58
Parey-sous-Montfort	93	79	74	62	54	61
Contrexeville	94	79	71	58	47	58
Bulgenville	80	67	65	51	43	51
Beaufremont	93	76	76	64	54	62
Chatenois	88	76	75	67	58	62
Noncourt	88	71	73	61	52	60
Neufchateau (C.M.)	92	73	74	63	52	61
Barville	103	86	87	72	62	71
Domremy-la-Pucelle	91	75	78	64	55	63
Trampot	103	95	98	83	70	75
Val-d'Ajol	155	132	143	121	99	116
Plombieres	146	127	141	134	114	124

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "B" (CONTINUED)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Xertigny	117	97	98	82	70	79
Thielouze (Uzemain)	103	88	87	75	64	70
Melomenil (Uzemain)	102	87	86	74	63	69
Bains	91	76	74	62	52	60
Fontenoy-le-Chateau	104	84	81	67	57	62
Viomenil	105	87	84	72	62	71
Frain	99	86	80	71	60	64
Monthureux-sur-Saone	92	78	73	63	52	54
Grignoncourt	95	79	74	63	53	60
Chatillon-sur-Saone	88	75	69	59	50	63

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "C"

RAINFALL IN BELFORT GAP

Based on 50 year observation 1851-1900
Pricipitation given in mm.

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont	118	100	94	83	73	85
Froide-Fontaine	140	117	107	95	85	99
Belfort (Meteor. Obs.)	107	90	84	71	63	75
Belfort (Castle)	84	60	65	55	49	58

FREQUENCY OF WIND DIRECTION

Based on 1000 days of observation
over period of 20 years.

	N.	NE.	E.	SE.	S.	SW.	W.	NW.
BELFORT								
October	44	90	274	32	27	84	364	85
November	40	130	291	48	32	60	315	84
December	31	95	283	47	43	103	308	90
January	44	105	326	44	34	69	310	68
February	33	89	326	57	23	94	294	84
March	27	90	288	46	24	98	333	94

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

APPENDIX "D"

RHINE VALLEY
TEMPERATURE (50 year study 1851-1900)
(Degrees Fahrenheit)

	Average Low	Lowest on Record	Average High	Highest on Record
TRIER Alt.: 161m.				
October	31	23	68	75
November	24	8	57	68
December	16	-7	51	58
January	15	-3	50	57
February	18	-6	53	65
March	22	5	61	72
KAISERLAUTERN Alt.: 242 m.				
October	27	20	67	73
November	20	3	57	67
December	9	-11	50	57
January	7	-14	48	55
February	12	-12	53	65
March	16	1	61	71
KARLSRUHE Alt.: 122 m.				
October	30	23	69	77
November	24	10	57	68
December	13	-7	53	60
January	10	-9	51	63
February	15	-7	55	64
March	20	5	64	72
HAGUENAU Alt.: 145 m.				
October	26	14	73	83
November	20	9	60	69
December	8	-15	53	58
January	5	-17	51	63
February	11	-10	57	68
March	15	4	70	78
STRASBOURG Alt.: 145 m.				
October	31		66	
November	24		57	
December	15		59	
January	11		49	
February	16		54	
March	20		61	
ICHTRATZHEIM Alt.: 146 m.				
October	29		71	
November	21		60	
December	10		53	
January	10		54	
February	17		59	
March	22		66	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

APPENDIX "D" (Continued)

AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (50 year study 1851-1900)
(Degrees Fahrenheit)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Frankfurt-sur-Main	49	40	33	32	35	41
Darmstadt	50	40	35	33	37	41
Basel	49	40	33	32	35	41

PERCENTAGE OF FREEZING DAYS
(Figure based on 1000 days. Observation made over 20 year period. i.e. 330 days would mean 1 day in 3 freezing).

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Kaiserslautern	132	330	618	708	619	542
Karlsruhe	87	300	569	668	567	418
Ichtratzheim	115	419	666	652	611	445

TOTAL NUMBER OF VERY LOW TEMPERATURES. (Based on 1000 days)
Temperatures of 14 degrees F. and below

	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Kaiserslautern	4	51	88	42	38
Karlsruhe	1	32	64	28	13
Ichtratzheim	0	50	71	17	1

FREQUENCY OF WINDS (Based on 1000 observations)

	N.	NE.	E.	SE.	S.	SW.	W.	NW.
KAISERSLAUTERN								
October	27	86	195	62	15	161	382	72
November	15	72	265	76	15	184	314	59
December	31	71	207	61	12	190	349	79
January	31	94	230	57	13	211	294	70
February	30	87	242	76	6	154	307	98
March	47	92	206	55	9	154	317	120
KARLSRUHE								
October	12	337	50	68	25	479	13	16
November	14	379	76	61	19	431	7	13
December	13	320	55	59	31	497	10	15
January	8	354	74	49	49	443	7	16
February	10	354	83	44	22	457	12	18
March	19	363	54	36	15	468	21	24
MANNHEIM								
October	158	67	48	81	293	171	91	91
November	162	82	51	109	308	158	77	53
December	187	84	30	90	318	143	75	73
January	163	87	67	107	316	119	65	78
February	170	97	66	71	275	125	107	89
March	175	104	49	51	237	151	114	119
STRASBOURG (Based on 100 days)								
October	3	2	1	1	19	43	11	6

(Calm 14 days)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "D" (Continued)

RAINFALL IN LOW RHINE (Based on average of 50 years. Given in mm.)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Rheinua	60	41	28	28	24	36
Pont de Kehl	66	51	43	37	33	42
Schlestadt	52	52	40	29	26	33
Melkerei	145	142	158	123	113	130
Ichtratzheim	65	47	39	34	30	43
Obernai	55	42	39	31	27	37
Saales	131	116	129	112	104	112
Rothau	114	118	136	99	98	101
Strasbourg	61	48	40	35	32	40
Strasbourg-Neudorf	59	46	39	35	31	39
Lutzelbourg	82	71	74	58	52	68
Phalsbourg	83	74	72	56	48	62
Wolfenhutte	82	72	69	65	51	65
Herrenwald	80	74	69	71	50	65
Erlenmus	83	75	72	67	51	65
Ueberach	68	60	62	46	42	53
Hagenau	70	61	61	50	40	54
Eberbach	78	68	66	56	47	62
Goersdorf	78	76	77	64	49	61
Rittershofen	82	73	71	59	46	56
Lauterbourg (Port)	64	58	55	44	37	47
Landau	61	58	64	53	41	45

RAIN FALL IN UPPER RHINE (Based on average of 50 years. Given in mm.)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Huningue	62	47	37	33	27	35
Salzlecke	68	47	38	38	30	37
Vieux-Brisach	56	37	26	23	21	28
Saint Pierre	112	85	79	70	61	82
Wolschwiller	93	69	61	54	46	58
Ferette	125	102	97	85	76	100
Roppentzwiller	86	66	62	54	47	64
Tagolsheim	91	71	68	58	48	69
Courtavon	101	74	68	58	51	69
Dannemarie	94	81	78	68	57	71
Wolfersdorf	84	73	70	60	52	64
Dornach	75	63	55	46	42	53
Mulhouse	71	58	51	47	37	47
Lac d'Alfeld	207	192	241	205	172	197
Sewen	178	168	202	159	127	156
Oberbruck	140	125	154	121	104	122
Masevaux	136	136	164	135	99	125
Sentheim	143	134	152	121	93	111
Bourbach le Bas	137	127	151	126	93	120
Oelenberg	80	65	63	57	44	57
Heimsbrunn	80	66	62	52	41	55
Wildenstein	180	179	211	175	140	180
Oderen	150	143	171	143	113	137
Wesserling	133	114	117	99	81	102
St Amarin	118	101	112	93	73	94
Weiler	122	97	107	85	64	88
Thann	109	92	104	85	71	84
Cernay	87	70	76	61	45	63
Ballon de Guebviller	182	168	224	189	174	187
Lanchen	195	187	225	191	157	183
Niedernauchen	161	155	171	136	112	147
Sengern	118	114	127	119	98	114
Guebviller	81	69	72	67	48	64

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "D" (Continued)

RAINFALL IN UPPER RHINE (Continued)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Logelbach	53	38	28	25	21	29
Colmar	51	36	27	24	20	28
Mittlach	158	146	180	155	128	146
Breitenbach	94	76	72	60	52	64
Munster	97	85	94	82	65	78
St Giles	61	48	45	41	32	40
Trois-Epis	72	62	61	47	39	53
Bonhomme	123	103	116	105	100	126
Hachinette	80	75	76	69	58	67
La Poutroie	93	86	86	79	67	77
Bebelnheim	69	49	44	42	31	37
Aubure	91	87	101	95	78	95
Baumschule	80	62	71	65	54	66
Ste-Marie-Aux Mines	113	102	97	83	73	86
Kleinhohe	100	92	92	91	74	87

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

APPENDIX "E"

RAINFALL IN RHINE AND MOSELLE VALLEYS IN GERMANY

Given in mm.
Rhine Basin

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Fribourg-en-Brisgau	77	59	58	42	37	52
Karlsruhe	66	57	55	48	40	52
Bruchsal	59	52	49	42	38	46
Neustadt am Hardt	58	56	52	47	39	48
Spire	53	41	38	33	29	36
Durckheim am Hardt	54	43	42	36	30	40
Ludwigshafen	48	37	33	28	24	32
Mannheim	46	36	32	28	22	30
Frankenthal	49	36	31	28	23	31
Grunstadt	46	38	34	31	24	32
Worms	46	36	32	27	21	30
Monsheim	51	46	38	37	29	36
Pfeddersheim	42	36	32	30	22	32
Oppenheim	45	37	34	30	24	31
Darmstadt	66	50	54	44	38	48
Mayence	47	38	38	31	26	31
Francfort-sur-Main	57	49	50	44	33	39
Wiesbaden	58	50	51	44	32	38
Biebrich	54	44	44	38	31	36
Eltville	46	37	38	32	27	31
Hattenheim	52	43	44	36	31	35
Alzey	45	36	35	30	22	33
Nieder Saulheim	48	37	36	31	23	32
Geisenheim	48	38	39	33	29	33
Rudesheim	49	39	40	33	29	33
Kammerforst	51	42	42	35	30	34
Weissenthurm	56	49	48	40	35	40
Birkenfeld	85	80	90	79	60	64
Hochscheid	64	50	53	51	38	46
Rhaunen	60	50	53	48	36	45
Kirn	54	45	48	41	31	38
Simmern	59	50	50	45	39	45
Sobernheim	49	38	39	33	26	34
Kaiserslautern	60	58	59	53	44	51
Waldmohr	82	82	91	83	65	70
Kusel	72	69	81	63	50	55
Baumholder	67	67	77	71	50	60
Kappeln	55	54	56	47	36	48
Meisenheim	52	44	44	37	28	37
Rheinbollen	61	53	51	46	38	46
Thiergarten	73	61	59	54	44	54
Kreuznach	45	40	36	32	26	32
Wollstein	45	35	35	31	22	33
Langenlonsheim	43	37	35	31	24	31
Stromberg	54	46	47	39	32	41
Lorch	47	38	38	32	28	34
Oberwesel	52	42	43	34	30	39
Bogel	62	48	50	43	37	47
Boppard	56	49	50	44	39	49
Oberlahnstein	57	44	44	39	32	42

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LEGEND

FRONT LINE	BRIDGES
FORTIFICATIONS	DAMAGED /
DIV. BOUNDARIES	KNOCKED OUT-X
STRONG POINTS	DATE: NOV 4, 1944

THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

G-2 SAG

SECRET

0412.00 A NOV 1944

KEY

ROADS ~ R R BRIDGES ++++ HY. BRIDGES = FLOATING BRIDGES ~ TEMP. BRIDGES >---< SIEGFRIED LINE

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP APO 403

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Auth. of
A.C. of S., G-2
Initials:
Date: 11 Nov 44

110900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 8

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 11 NOVEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

During the week, the enemy maintained a coherent defense in the face of almost continuous attack. Aided by naturally defensive terrain and bad weather, he rapidly shifted small units to threatened localities. This resulted in a confusion which may well require some new tactical unit to cover reorganization.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: LAGARDE (Q 2410), HERBEVILLER (V 3966), ST MAURICE (V 3290), RAON L'ETAPE (V 3378), West of ST DIE (V 3966), LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), LAVELINE (V 2754), LA FORGE (V 2641), CORNIMONT (V 3329), RAMONCHAMP (K 2830), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), COLOMBIER-CHATELOT (P 2379), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. Change in the disposition of Armies and Corps:

The alignment of Corps north of ST DIE still remains somewhat obscure. The presence of an Infantry Corps (probably the LXXXIX) is accepted on the north flank of LXIV Corps. A PW of 1119 GR, 553 Infantry Division, stated that the second battalion, previous to its commitment on 8 November, was in LVIII Panzer Corps reserve. However, it is definitley accepted that both 553 Infantry Division and 361 Volksgrenadier Division are operating under an infantry corps on the First Army south flank.

The LXIV Reserve Corps responsible for the sector North and South of ST DIE has probably under its command the 716, remnants of 16 and elements of the 338 Infantry Divisions, while IV GAF Corps, which has apparently shifted North, assumes responsibility for the sector occupied by the 198 Infantry Division. LXXXV Corps order dated 15 October found on PW from 338 Infantry Division, suggests that the Corps sector now extends north to include the 269 Infantry Division. Such a shift to the North of the LXXXV Corps sector and the reported presence in BELFORT of General von OBERN'S Headquarters may indicate further changes in the assignment of responsibilities on the enemy's southern most sector.

b. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von der CHEVALLERIE)

(1) LXXXIX Corps:

361 Volksgrenadier Division. 953 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 952 Volksgrenadier Regiment were committed in the XII US Corps zone, while 951 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on November 7 on the 100 US Division zone, sandwiched between elements of the 716 Infantry and 21 Panzer Divisions.

553 Infantry Division had its elements spread on a front opposing the 44 US Division and left flank of the 2 French armored Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5779

SECRET

c. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. d. Inf. LASCH)

A further shift to the South of the 21 Panzer Division confirms the presupposition that the division is temporarily under LXIV Reserve Corps. Elements of the 192 PGR and the 21 Panzer Recon Battalion were identified on November 9 in the 100 US Division's zone, while contact with elements of the division previously identified on the XV Corps zone, was lost. The intentions of the enemy as to further use of the division remain obscure.

A PW statement on November 7 may confirm the indication that the division will be withdrawn.

The picture on the 716 Infantry Division sector remains confused. The 736 GR and 716 Fusilier Battalion were identified in 3 US Division zone with the 951 Volksgrenadier (361 Infantry Division) on its right. The 726 GR on the other hand was shifted South and remains intermingled with elements of the 338 and 16 Infantry Divisions.

Further south remnants of the 16 Infantry Division (elements of 221 GR, B G GRIMM, 225 GR) intermingled with organic and attached elements of 338 Infantry Division (757 GR, 201 and 202 Mountain Bns, 291 ZBV Bn) are operating in Battle Group formations, opposing the 3 US and portion of the 36 US Divisions zones. All these elements are presumably under 16 Infantry Division.

(2) IV GAF Corps (CG: Gen.d. Flg. PETERSEN)

198 Infantry Division. Organic elements (305 GR, 308 GR, 326 GR, 198 Fus.) and attached units (360 Cossack Regiment, 61 Fortress MG and the 39 Fortress MG Battalions) were identified in the 36 US Division zone. Due to the broad front occupied by the division, a reorganization of the sector should be expected. Such a supposition implies either the shifting of the 269 Infantry Division north or the insertion of new elements, possibly Volksgrenadier formations. French SR reports the arrival of such units on the VOSGES Front.

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen.d. Inf. KNIESS)

The 269 Infantry Division, previously supposed under the IV GAF. Corps, seems to be now under LXXXV Corps (indicated by captured order). The three regiments (469 GR, 489 GR and 490 GR) were committed south of GERARDMER, stemming the attack of the French 3 DIA. It may be presumed, therefore, that this fresh division has also committed its reserves. The location of the southern boundry of the division is not known, and it is not clear who assumes responsibility for the sector occupied by the remaining elements previously attached to the 338 Infantry Division, (1034 Fortress, 40 Fortress, 1433 Fortress, 807 Fortress 808 Fortress Battalions, 404 Engineer, 746 Engineer Battalions, II and III/CV.) The 933 GR, identified on October 30 in the 16 Infantry Division sector has not been identified since, suggesting that the regiment has followed the divisional staff located in LXXXV Corps area. The reported presence of the staff of the 338 Infantry Division in VIEUX THANN (V 5212) may indicate that the divisional staff still assumes responsibility for the sector opposing portions of the French 3 DIA and DMI zones.

It also seems that the 159 Infantry Division has shifted south while von OPPEN (headquarters located in BELFORT) possibly assumes responsibility for the sector opposing I French Corps. The lack of activity and identifications on this front leaves at present no basis for clarification of the enemy disposition opposite the I French Corps zone.

d. GENERAL RESERVE

No change.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in contact	20,000
Divisional reserve	10,000
Artillery effectives	12,000
**General reserve W of the Rhine (including additional reserves made available from Wehrkreis V and other sources)	28,000
TOTAL	70,000
Guns	410
Tanks and S. P.	60

**The withdrawal of the 405 Division East of the RHINE reduces the previously estimated figure by 4,000.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), FONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. No change in enemy disposition was reported.

b. Enemy maintains in contact a screening force, while apparently regrouping the bulk of troops in prepared positions on the foothills.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Alpine Zone)

In contact	6-7000
Reserves and artillery effectives	6000
TOTAL	12-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

The enemy is determined to hold the ST DIE area, while falling back to the East bank of the MEURTHE, and to new prepared positions in the Northern zone. On the remainder of the Sixth Army Group front, he continues to maintain his position, with vigorous reaction to our patrolling.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Enemy artillery activity continued to be sporadic, concentrated on the areas of CLAIREGOUTTE (K 2205) and FREDERIC FONTAINE (K 2304) on 8/9 November. Telephone wires were cut at VERMONDANS (P 3375) on 9 November; on the 10th an enemy munition convoy was taken under fire in the MATHAY (P 3580)-BOURGOINON (P 3578) area.

II Corps: Hills 1013 (V 3336) and 1050 (V 3444) were the scenes of the period's main action, as a see-saw battle raged for their possession. The enemy counterattacked and used infiltration tactics, but was unable to loosen our hold on Hill 1013. Comparative quiet again prevailed by the period's end, with the only disturbance coming in the form of six bombs dropped by low-flying aircraft near SAPOIS (K 2945) on November 10.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: In the Southern zone, the enemy's defence during the period centered about the LES ROUGES EAUX Valley, where the reaches of the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMPS (V 3460) provided vantage points for strong resistance; LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), whose approaches had been well fortified; and the crossroads town of LAVELINE (V 2853). SP guns at strong points provided static defense abetted by local tank-supported counterattacks. Determined opposition was carried to the last ditch as the enemy resisted our entry into LE HOUSSIERE and VANEMONT (V 3658) with strong mortar, artillery and tank fire at the end of the period.

In the central zone, determined resistance at the beginning of the period was met from strong positions at HAUT JACQUES (V 3764) and Hill 616 (V 3664) on the axis of approach to ST DIE. Further North, the enemy utilized small arms and MG fire from dug-in positions and in house-to-house fighting in slowing our advance in DEYFOSSE (V 3374), LE MENIL (V 3474) and LA BOSSE (V 3373). SP, mortar and artillery fire continued to harass our troops as they entered these towns. By the end of the period, the enemy seemed to have withdrawn to new positions to the East.

To the North, THIAVILLE (V 3130) and the approaches to RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478) were stubbornly defended at the beginning of the period; the defense was bolstered on the 5/6 November by the arrival of new troops and by use of tank fire from East of the MEURTHE River. By the 9th, new enemy positions had been found in the FORET DU RECLOS (V 3883) and opposition was centering on the roads leading to RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478). Rocket fire was received in BERTRICHAMPS (V 3081). By 9/10 November lack of contact and PW statements implied that the enemy had withdrawn East of the MEURTHE River.

XV Corps: In the southern zone, harrassing arty fire began the period as concentrations fell on HERBEVILLER (V 2896), MONTIGNY (V 3191) and VACQUEVILLE (V 3287). The enemy was improving his defenses in the area V 3191, V 3290. Three ME-109's made a nuisance raid over the zone and enemy patrolsvainly attempted to cross the BLETTE River at V 2993. By the end of the period only sporadic artillery fire and light patrol activity were reported.

The enemy in the northern zone spent most of his time improving defenses including those N of the VEZOUSE River from Q 2700-V2898. Tanks and Nebelwerfers were observed in the area Q 2904; enemy troops proved to be still in position in the eastern part of the FORET DE PARROY (Q 2005). By the 10th of November forward positions seemed occupied in greater strength as contact was made on the entire front. On the 10/11 November enemy planes dropped three bombs S of MARAINVILLER (V 2099).

Alpine Front

In the 4 DMM sector scattered artillery continued to harass our zone as the enemy was reported to have set off demolitions and burned villages in the LARCHE area.

Resistance to the FABTF assault on MT GRAMMANDO (S 7893) was only light. Explosions were general and frequent throughout the period, occurring at the VAL MADONNA (N 62), in the area of N 7506; some 20-25 occurred N of VENTIMIGLIA (S 8787). Slight enemy action and scattered artillery fire were reported during the period.

5. SUPPLY

Prisoners from three Infantry divisions (553, 716 & 16 I.D.), two Armored brigades (111 and 113), as well as from 21 Panzer Division provide additional information on German methods of supply in the Northern sector of Sixth US Army Group front during the month of October. The general procedure for Infantry and Grenadier formations is to assemble Battalion and Company transport at dusk every third day for night movement under strict blackout conditions to depots or nearby railheads, returning early next morning to the battalion area. In some instances supplies were called for at regiment, but more often from division or even Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to company trains, which frequently consist of one horse-drawn vehicle per company, for transport forward to the unit each night after dark.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The company trains did not ordinarily handle ammunition, which was delivered to the front by battalion trucks.

Infantry, in moving from one location to another, usually carried two or three days march rations and sufficient ammunition. Company trains moved separately and were set up when the unit had been established in the new position.

Fuel for armored units was brought forward by a gas and oil section of battalion supply company which distributed the supply to the companies under cover of darkness. Prisoners claimed that shortage of food and ammunition did NOT exist, and that fuel enough for requirements was regularly provided. However, there was an acute shortage of spare parts.

6. MOVEMENT

Limited observation during the week due to unfavorable weather prevents any conclusion as to trends of movement observed during the period. The few observations available showed only light and scattered movement. At STRASSBOURG, concentrations of 1500 railroad cars were noted on 6 November, and again on 8 November, but lack of observation on 7 November prevents a complete picture as to the amount of turnover. 10-12 locomotives with steam up were observed in the STRASSBOURG marshalling yards on 8 November.

The condition of the RHINE River bridges has not been reported changed during the week, with the exception of the ERSTEIN bridge (V 997765) which is now reported serviceable. A French report states that the Germans have stocked enough reserve material along the banks of the RHINE between STRASSBOURG and HUNINGEN to build 7 or 8 bridges. Some of these would be built for light vehicles and marching troops, while others could carry vehicles weighing up to 60 tons.

7. DEFENSES

Our steady advance toward his MLR has caused the German to strengthen his position by plugging the gaps in the system of continuous fire trenches all along the Sixth Army Group front. In the VOSGES, a second line of fire trenches is being excavated a few hundred yards behind the existing defenses, and 100 new pillboxes are reported under construction around PHALSBURG (Q 6519) defending the approaches to the SAVERN GAP. Bridges are destroyed or prepared for dynamiting and roads are generally mined throughout the sector. Strongpoints show an increase in heavy weapons, A T guns, and artillery.

Ground sources continue to report large-scale construction of fortifications throughout the BLACK FOREST, and in the rough country to the East (SWABIAN JURA). This would seem an indication of some lack of confidence in the SIEGFRIED Line, as well as determination to resist on German soil.

The enemy seems worried about his defenses along the Swiss border, both east and west of the RHINE. Along the BELFORT-SWISS border he is strengthening this heretofore comparatively weak section of his MLR with A/T ditches, fire trenches, mining and blocking all roads by cut trees. The enemy is not leaving any stone unturned that might hamper our movement, be it only for a very short time. East of BASLE where the RHINE follows the Swiss frontier, additional defenses are being reported cutting the valley from WALDSHUT (B 39) to STUHLINGEN (W 50) and from SINGEN (80) through TUTTLINGEN (W 83) to SIGMARINGEN (X 14).

8. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

Two saboteurs, charged with the mission of locating gasoline pipelines for future sabotage were seized by Seventh Army on 1 November. A third member of the party was caught on 10 November. Information has been received that additional agents will be sent to effect sabotage of this nature.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2 "Spec Distribution"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


STRASBOURG
ERSTEIN
MOLSHEIM
SELESTAT
SAVERNE
PHALSBOURG
SARREBOURG
SARREGUEMINES
BITCHE
DIEUZE
MORHANGE
METZ
THIONVILLE
LUXEMBOURG
ARLON
NEUFCHATEAU
BASTOGNE
SEDAN
MONTMEDY
MEZIERES
RETHEL
LAON
SOISSONS
CHATEAU-THIERRY
MEAUX
PARIS
FONTAINEBLEAU
MELUN
TROYES
CHAUMONT
LANGRES
DIJON
BESANCON
VESOUL
BELFORT
MULHOUSE
COLMAR
SELESTAT
EPINAL
NANCY
TOUL
BAR-LE-DUC
VERDUN
ST MIHIEL
COMMERCY
ST DIZIER
VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS
CHALONS
REIMS
EPERNAY
SOISSONS
LAON
HIRSON
AVESNES
MAUBEUGE
CAMBRAI
ST QUENTIN
PERONNE
BAPAUME
ARRAS
DOUAI
LENS
LILLE
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
CAMBRAI
BOULOGNE
CALAIS
ST OMER
HAZEBROUCK
YPRES
DUNKERQUE
GRAVELINES
BERGUES
WORMHOUDT
CASSEL
POPERINGHE
ARMENTIERES
COMINES
WERVICQ
MENIN
COURTRAI
TOURNAI
ROUBAIX
TOURCOING
ROUBAIX
LILLE
DOUAI
ARRAS
ALBERT
AMIENS
MONTDIDIER
NOYON
COMPIEGNE
SOISSONS
CHATEAU-THIERRY
MEAUX
PARIS
FONTAINEBLEAU
MELUN
TROYES
CHAUMONT
LANGRES
DIJON
BESANCON
VESOUL
BELFORT
MULHOUSE
COLMAR
SELESTAT
STRASBOURG
ERSTEIN
MOLSHEIM
SAVERNE
PHALSBOURG
SARREBOURG
SARREGUEMINES
BITCHE
DIEUZE
MORHANGE
METZ
THIONVILLE
LUXEMBOURG
ARLON
NEUFCHATEAU
BASTOGNE
SEDAN
MONTMEDY
MEZIERES
RETHEL
LAON

P 187

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

S E C R E T
By Auth. of
A. C. of S., G-2
Initials: C W
Date: 18 Nov 44

56

Off of Asst Chief of Intelligence
USSTAF

180900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NUMBER 9

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 18 NOVEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

In the face of Seventh US and First French Armies attack, the enemy's coherent defense is showing signs of deteriorating. Some divisions have reached a dangerously low level of combat effectives and are candidates for withdrawal. The arrival of one new large unit and various smaller units, as well as a reshuffle of the enemy's disposition, does not seem to meet the emergency. Therefor, further substantial reinforcements will be needed to reestablish the required balance.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: LA GARDE (Q 2410), AVRICOURT (Q 3105), PARUX (V 4094), RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478), ST DIE (V 4165), CORCIEUX (V 3652), ROCHESSON (K 3145), LE DAVAL (V 3433), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 3209), CHAMPEY (P 2696), HERICOURT (P 3296), MONTBELIARD (P 3587), MANDEURE (P 3681), ST DIZIER (A 4274).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von der CHEVALLERIE)

(1) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von GILSA)

361 Volksgrenadier Division, considerable regrouping took place during the period. 951 Volksgrenadier Regiment was withdrawn from the 100 US Division zone and together with 953 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified in the XII US Corps zone. The 952 Volksgrenadier Regiment, previously located in the XII US Corps zone, was identified on 16 November in 44 US Division zone.

533 Volksgrenadier Division, all three Regiments were heavily engaged in the XV US Corps zone. 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been reported badly mauled, with its strength of effectives decreased to the equivalent of a company. During the period, all the organic elements of the division were identified in the sector (1553 Artillery Regiment, 1553 Engineer Battalion, 553 Fus. Battalion, 1553 A T Battalion). In addition elements of the Xth close range A T Regiment were also identified in the division sector.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. WIESE)

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. LASCH)

The 21 Panzer Division left the VOSGES front for the METZ area, where elements of two regiments were identified. Its sector has been taken over by the 708 Volksgrenadier Division, newly arrived from CZECHOSLOVAKIA. During the period, the 728, 748, and 760 Volksgrenadier Regiments, 708 A T Battalion, 708 Replacement Battalion, 708 Training Battalion and the 658 Artillery Regiment were identified in the XV Corps zone. Furthermore, a number of units, presumably attached to the division were also identified in the divisional sector (1417 Fortress Battalion, 602 Mobile Battalion, 14 and 19 Pen. Battalions, (probably labor battalions used for construction work) and the VOSGES JAEGER Battalion).

11103

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

716 Infantry Division. It is doubtful whether the division still remains in the sector, as no identifications of its units were reported since November 12. The strength of the division is estimated at about 1200. Unless the hard pressed enemy is obliged to throw into the battle all available units, the 716th should be a candidate for refitting and reorganizing.

16 Infantry Division. The division bore the brunt of the battle around ST DIE and its units are dangerously depleted. It is estimated that its effectives reached the critical level of 600. Unless the enemy brings up considerable replacements the division cannot be considered a tactical unit capable of reestablishing a reasonable balance in one of the vital sections of the VOSGES front, additionally weakened by the transfer of elements of the 338 Infantry Division from the sector to the southermost sector of the LXXXV Corps.

(2) IV GAF (CG: Gen d. Flg. PETERSEN)

198 Infantry Division is another candidate for substantial reinforcements. Its estimated effectives (including attached units) do not exceed 1800. In addition, the division is occupying an excessively large sector, suggesting that the enemy has its forces dangerously stretched in the area North of GERARDEMER.

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNIESS)

269 Infantry Division. Since its heavy commitment South of GERARDMER previous to November 12, none of this division's units were identified in the French II Corps zone. This leaves in doubt the role of the division in the general reshuffle of the enemy's dispositions on French First Army front. Its southern neighbor, the 159 Infantry Division is to all appearances undergoing a reorganization. The identified 1211 and 1210(absorbed elements of 251 GR) Infantry Regiments are probably the newly renumbered regiments of the 159 Division. The probable Third Regiment (1209) has not yet been identified and is supposed to include the 9 GR. The 189 Infantry Division, recently renamed Volksgrenadier Division, reappeared on the 2 DIM front and took over the southern portion of the 159 Infantry Division sector. 1212 (formerly 1000 Sec. Regiment) and 1214 (formerly MENKE Regiment) Volksgrenadier Regiments were identified in the 2 DIM zone. It is probable that the 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, not yet identified is the former Regiment JUNGE (including HOLLENMAYER and GABRIEL).

338 Infantry Division took over the sector formerly occupied by von OPPEN Brigade. PW statements reveal that its recently renumbered Regiments (confirmed by the captured document found on Gen. OSCHMANN, CG 338 Infantry Division) were constituted by the absorption of regiment KASSERBEER and ROTH (previously of the von OPPEN Brigade) and possibly by the inclusion of elements of its old organic units. Regiment GEIGER, identified on the southernmost portion of the divisional sector, includes Battalion VOGT (composed of elements of the 91 GAF Regiment, 1433 Fortress Infantry Battalion) and the WONITZKY Battalion (composed of the LXXXV Corps Training School, and elements of MURMAN Battalion.) There are indications that the GEIGER Regiment is the former 757 GR (Major GEIGER was C. O. of a Battalion of the C V Regiment partially absorbed by 757 GR.) 758 Regiment is the former ROTH Regiment of the von OPPEN Brigade. 759 Regiment contains Battalions BOSCH AND RAEDEKER of the Regiment KASSERBEER, (von OPPEN). Considering that the 933 GR, an organic regiment of the division, was practically exterminated, it is possible that remnants will be also included in the 759 Regiment. Other organic units of 338 Infantry Division identified in the divisional sector were: 338 A T Battalion, 338 Engineer Battalion, 338 Fus. Company. In addition, units probably attached to the division were identified by document (993 GHQ Artillery Battalion and the 50 MG Battalion).

Brigade von OPPEN. Elements constituting the brigade were absorbed by the 338 Infantry Division and the 189 Volksgrenadier Division. According to reports from reliable sources, Gen von OPPENS headquarters were transfered to BELFORT, suggesting a new assignment of responsibilities.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

GENERAL RESERVE

No Change.

e. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in Contact	16,000
Divisional Reserve	10,000
Artillery Effectives	14,000
Gen Res West of RHINE (including additional reserves made available from Wehrkreis V and other sources)	25,000
T O T A L	65,000
Guns	425
Tanks and S P Guns	60

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

a. No change in enemy disposition was reported.
b. Enemy's tendency to withdraw bulk of forces to the foothills continues.
c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

Combat Effectives	6-8,000
Artillery Effectives	3-4,000
T O T A L	9-12,000

4. OPERATIONS

The enemy seemed to be committed during the present period to a policy of withdrawal with persistent delaying action on the entire front. His utilization of good defensive terrain seems thwarted by lack of sufficient strength to make a definite stand.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

After strong reaction on 16/17 November at ST MARIE (P 2888) and ARCEY (P 2589), the enemy fell back steadily with moderate resistance until all the area S of MONTBELIARD (P 3688) was cleared, the LISANE River crossed, and FAYMONT (P 2099) and LOMONT (K 2100) to the West were occupied. The enemy opposed our initial attack on the North before LE THOLY (V 2643), but withdrew, resisting weakly, as he fired LE THOLY, LA BRESSE (V 3534), GERARDMER (V 3642), and ANOULD (V 4254) in his retreat.

VI Corps: From his preliminary defense on the high ground NE of REHAUPAL (V 2647) to AUMONTZEY (V 2852), the enemy gave way steadily burning the towns in his path and leaving scattered screening forces to resist in MARIEMONT (V 3450) and to delay with small arms our patrols in area V 3755-3753. Resistance from improved positions TAINTRUX (V 3961), ROUGIVELLE (V 3663), LA BOLLE (V 3964), shifted to the hill mass S of ST DIE (V 4165), as withdrawals became obvious, and ST DIE and its neighbors were burned. Continuous counter-attacks and use of heavy mortar and artillery fire helped the enemy to build up and then hold the line along the RAON L'ETAPE (V 3479) NEUF MAISON (V 3485), BADONVILLER (V 3889), highway; his increased resistance of the 16/17 November had calmed down as THIAVILLE (V 3180) was entered at the end of the period.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

XV Corps: Our early breakthrough of the forward defense lines at ANCERVILLER (V 3393) prompted a slight unavailing armor reaction at HALLOVILLE (V 3395); NONHIGNEY (V 3894) was held as a strong point throughout most of the period, but the enemy had fallen back to stubborn resistance before BLAMONT (V 3499) and the VESOUZE River, as we occupied BADONVILLER (V 3889) at the end of the period. The LEINTREY (Q 2603), VEHO (Q 2400) Road and World War I positions on high ground vicinity Q 2506 provided excellent defense positions until overrun, after which AVRICOURT (Q 3206) was stubbornly defended and attempts made to reconstitute the AVRICOURT-MOUSY (Q 3008) Line proved fruitless, despite reinforcements from the North.

Alpine Front: Exceptions to the usual harrassing fire and desultory patrolling characteristic of the 4 DMM front were to be found in demolition activity in the LARCHE Valley at the beginning of the period. In the FABTF zone, the enemy stirred himself and staged several company strength attacks early in the period in the area S 7096-7895, while fire fights took place 15/16 November at N 7312; vehicle movement was noted in the S 8887 and VENTIMIGLIA areas.

5. MOVEMENT

Because of extremely bad flying weather, this information is chiefly from OSS and French sources.

All empty open freight cars in the KARLSRUHE rail district were being moved towards the BELFORT area on 5 November. Possible preparation for evacuation of materiel may be indicated.

Many troops from NORWAY and DENMARK have already (13 Nov) been sent to the western front and south Germany. Three battalions of mountain troops from NORWAY passed through NEUF BRISACH and COLMAR towards MUNSTER followedthe next morning by a train carrying skis. These mountain troops have not yet been identified on our front. Another three trains of Volksgrenadiers (possibly part of 306 Volksgren Div) passed through STRASSBURG on 12 November destined for the VOSGES Front. Also reported were two trains carrying artillery (50 light and estimated 50-100 medium pieces) plus three trains of small arms ammunition which moved into our area via the bridges of KARLSRUHE, STRASSBURG, and CHALAMPE.

A large amount of traffic out of South Central Germany and Austria is carried along the Swiss border to SINGEN, thence to OFFENBURG, via VILLINGEN. The SINGEN, IMMENDINGEN line, therefore, remains of primary importance, and reports mention heavy AA and smoke generators recently arrived at SINGEN.

An increasing number of ferries along the RHINE have been reported between RHEINAU and the Swiss frontier, and are being used for the transport of heavy night traffic only. In addition, 50 barges were reported observed in the vicinity of NEUENBURG. These barges ferry troops and material across the river and can form a temporary bridge should the existing one be damaged

After a successful bombing day (18 Nov), TAC/R reports indicate that only the BRISACH floating highway bridge remains serviceable south of STRASSBURG. All other bridges south of STRASSBURG are reported out of action. (TAC/R 18 Nov and 12 Nov).

6. DEFENSES

VOSGES:

In the north our progress in the BACCARAT, BLAMONT Sector should permit us to outflank the enemy MLR running BLAMONT (V 3499) ETANG de STOCK (Q 4117), CANAL des HOUILLERES (W of SAAREBOURG, Q 5015). Following a NE direction, parallel to and east of this MLR no major organized defenses are encountered until the strongly defended position at PHALSBOURG is reached, barring the immediate approaches of the SAVERN GAP.

Information concerning VOSGES passes is derived mainly from ground sources. The SAALES Pass (V 5372), reputedly the easiest pass in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), PRAYE Pass (V 5486) and LE DONON Pass (V 5790) all of which outflank the SAALES position, are defended by some entrenchments, mined roads,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

and artillery or mortar positions, but are not as strongly organized as the SAALES Pass, due undoubtedly to the more difficult terrain. In the High VOSGES, the Germans are reported building dams across streams with the intention of blowing them up and flooding the valleys, thereby making cross-country movement difficult.

SIEGFRIED-MAGINOT:

Ground sources report that former MAGINOT defenses are being reorganized around SAAREGUEMINES by adding trenches and A/T barriers. It is likely that the enemy will alter the MAGINOT field defenses in our sector for a delaying action, but it is questionable that he will be able to use many of the concrete installations against an attack from the south.

Ground sources report a mass movement of fortifications workers from the BLACK FOREST to AUSTRIA where the Russian advance constitutes a more immediate threat. Fortifications are under construction on the heights and in the valley of the DANUBE, between VIENNA (X 49), PASSAU (Q 21) and RATISBONNE (U 15), and in the SALZBURG (Z 92), BERCHTESGADEN (Z 90) region.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

(G-2 Spec Distr.)

Incl 1
Appendix #1 - December Weather Summary.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECEMBER WEATHER SUMMARY

FOR THE

VOSGES MOUNTAINS AND UPPER RHINE VALLEY

GENERAL

In December, temperatures drop off sharply from November levels and average very close to freezing. Precipitation, though generally less in amount than in the preceding months, will occur on more than half the days. Much of this, especially in the mountains, comes as snow or freezing rain. Long periods of overcast skies are the rule. These conditions combine to produce a soil super-saturated with moisture; movement of wheeled and even tracked vehicles is distinctly limited. Furthermore, frequent low ceilings and poor visibilities will prevent the use of tactical aircraft on three out of four days. In all, December is a decidedly unfavorable month for operations in the field.

TEMPERATURE

Temperatures will average near freezing throughout the area. Altitude and distance from the sea are the controlling factors. Epinal, with an average of 33° is typical of the Vosges foothills. Ballon de Servance with 27.7° shows the effect of the High Vosges. Strasbourg and Karlsruhe with 34° indicate the ameliorating influence of the Rhine Valley. Munich with 30.7 is representative of the Bavarian Plain. These are only the averages. Cold waves, originating in the intensely cold air of Eastern Europe, may invade the area at any time in December. The absolute minimum ever registered in the vicinity was close to -15 degrees in the severe winter of 1879-1880. In an average year the lowest to be expected will be about 10 degrees. The mercury is scheduled to slip below freezing on about 20 of the 31 days.

TEMPERATURE DATA
(Degrees Fahrenheit)

	MEAN	AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM	AVERAGE DAILY MAXIMUM
BELFORT	32.9	28.9	36.8
BALLON DE SERVANCE	27.7	----	----
RAMONCHAMP	32.2	25.0	39.4
EPINAL	32.7	28.2	37.2
MIRECOURT	33.6	----	----
LUNEVILLE	34.7	----	----
NANCY	34.0	29.7	38.3
ROTHAU	33.1	----	----
STRASBOURG	33.8	29.7	37.9
SAVERNE	33.6	29.5	37.8
MULHOUSE	35.1	----	----
COLMAR	36.0	30.9	41.0
MUNSTER	33.8	28.6	39.0
KARLSRUHE	34.0	----	----
MUNICH	30.7	----	----
BASEL	33.1	----	----

PRECIPITATION

The controlling factors in the rainfall pattern are altitude, mountain exposure, distance from the sea. Northeastern France may be divided into four rainfall belts. First, there is the High Vosges with an average altitude of 1850 feet which receives the excessive December total of 7.87 inches. Secondly, the intermediate altitudes of 1250 feet record the moderate fall of 4.52 inches. A third rain area is that of the low elevations of the Rhine Valley (500 feet), lying in the rain shadow of the Vosges Mountains and receiving a monthly total of only 1.26 inches. Lastly, the plateau area of Lorraine, with an average altitude of 650 feet, receives a monthly mean of 2.40 inches.

SECRET

S E C R E T

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The same figures apply to the mountains of the Black Forest and Southern Bavaria with the amount dropping off as distance from the sea increases. Nurnberg has an average of 1.7 inches and Munich 1.8 inches.

Rainy days are frequent in December. The High Vosges will have 16-18 days with measurable rainfall. The Rhine Valley reflects the effect of the Vosges Mountain barrier and has only 12-15 rainy days.

Snow may be expected at any time during the month. Amounts are seldom heavy, and the snow cover remains for only short periods. Again altitude is the controlling factor. Rothau (1138 feet) receives an average December fall of 2.0 inches with the greatest monthly total in recent years being 8.2 inches. Measurable amounts of snow may be expected to fall on 4-5 days at Epinal and Munster and on 9-10 days at high altitudes such as Ballon de Servance. In the High Vosges, the average December snowfall is 6.6 inches, and the record fall is 23.6 inches. A tabulation of the Vosges passes usually snow blocked is available in Appendix A, Sixth Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary dated 4 November 1944.

RAINFALL - DECEMBER
(inches)

COL de la SCHLUCHT	5.67
GERARDMER	5.00
EPINAL	3.42
MIRECOURT	2.40
ST DIE	3.26
BACCARAT	2.87
NANCY	2.64
LUNEVILLE	2.32
SELESTAT	1.42
STRASBOURG	1.65
MULHOUSE	2.24
LAC d'ALFELD	9.48
COLMAR	1.06
MUNSTER	3.70
BELFORT	3.31
ROTHAU	5.35

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CLOUDINESS AND MOISTURE

The outstanding characteristic of the Vosges-Rhine winter is the excessive amount of cloud cover. The average cloudiness at Epinal is 77%, at Strasbourg 79%, and at Saverne 81%. There are no completely clear days indicated. Furthermore, at Strasbourg, there will be an average of 18 days when the sun does not break through the clouds at all

Relative humidity averages high. The prevailing flow of southwesterly winds brings large amounts of maritime air to the vicinity. Strasbourg shows an average figure of 89%, one of the highest for all France.

The Combination of excessive cloudiness and high humidity prevents any thorough drying-out of the soil. The effect of this condition on military equipment is obvious.

VISIBILITY

Visibility records are very inadequate for this region, but fog is known to be frequent at this time of year. Strasbourg experiences fog on a third of the winter mornings. It often forms at an early hour and persists in the river valleys to the noon hours. It is a distinct hindrance to aviation as most of the airfields are located in valley exposures subject to fog. At Strasbourg 22 December mornings will have less than 6 miles visibility, 16 will have less then 2½ miles, and 11 will have less than 1¼ miles.

WIND

The prevailing wind is from the south thru southwest and west. The second most frequent direction is north-east with about 20% of the observations. These introduce the dry, intensely cold air of Russia to Western Europe. Wind velocities, in general, are light with an overall average of 8 mph. Gales (over 32 mph) are seldom experienced. About one a month may occur, usually from the southwest.

WIND DIRECTION PERCENTAGES

	N	NE	E	SE	S	SW	W	NW
STRASBOURG	22.6	17.0	.7	3.4	28.8	14.5	7.6	5.4
SAVERNE	2.0	22.1	18.8	.9	3.5	26.1	25.6	1.0
MULHOUSE	12.1	7.8	.3	9.9	19.1	30.0	18.4	2.4
BELFORT	3.1	9.5	28.3	4.7	4.3	10.3	30.6	9.0
NANCY	12.2	19.8	7.9	2.6	16.5	26.6	10.3	4.1
EPINAL	3.8	16.8	5.0	1.2	14.2	41.5	13.2	.5

Source: XII Tactical Air Force

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DAILY ALMANAC FOR DECEMBER

COLMAR-MULHOUSE AREA - 48°00' N - 07°30' E
(Altitude 500 feet)

Dec.	Rise	Set	Rise	Set	
1	0757	1641	1809	0917	Full Moon
2	0758	1641	1902	1019	
3	0758	1640	2002	1111	
4	0800	1640	2105	1153	
5	0801	1639	2210	1227	
6	0803	1639	2324	1255	
7	0804	1639	----	1319	Last Quarter
8	0805	1639	0017	1341	
9	0806	1638	0120	1402	
10	0807	1638	0222	1422	
11	0808	1638	0322	1444	
12	0809	1638	0430	1507	
13	0810	1638	0536	1534	
14	0811	1638	0643	1607	
15	0812	1639	0750	1646	New Moon
16	0813	1639	0853	1735	
17	0813	1639	0951	1834	
18	0814	1639	1040	1940	
19	0815	1640	1122	2053	
20	0815	1640	1157	2211	
21	0816	1640	1227	2325	
22	0816	1641	1253	----	First Quarter
23	0817	1641	1318	0031	
24	0817	1642	1344	0158	
25	0818	1643	1410	0313	
26	0818	1643	1443	0430	
27	0818	1644	1519	0546	
28	0818	1645	1602	0657	
29	0819	1646	1651	0803	Full Moon
30	0819	1647	1749	0900	
31	0819	1648	1852	0946	

RECEIVED 21 NOV 1944

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CIVIL TWILIGHT (Sun 6 deg. below horizon; outdoor civilian activity ceases) subtract 33 minutes from sunrise and add 33 minutes to sunset.
NAUTICAL TWILIGHT(Sun 12 deg. below horizon; outline of objects just visible) subtract 70 min. from sunrise and add 70 min. to sunset.
ASTRONOMICAL TWILIGHT (Sun 18 deg. below horizon; synonomous with darkness or BRITISH FIRST or LAST LIGHT) add 105 min. to sunset and subtract from sunrise.

ALL TIMES "A" ARMY TIME OR 15 DEGREES EAST TIME, ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN GRENNWICH MEAN TIME.

For EPINAL - add 4 minutes to all figures.
For VITTEL - add 6 minutes to all figures.

ANNEX NO. 1 to SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 9
of 18 November 1944.

SECRET

THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

~KEY~

ROADS ~~ R.R. BRIDGES ++++ HY. BRIDGES FLOATING BRIDGES TEMP. BRIDGES SIEGFRIED LINE

G-2 6AG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Auth. of
A. C. of S., G-2
Initials:
Date: 25 Nov 44

P 209(56)

Office of Dir of Intelligence
Hq 1ST AHF

250900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 10

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 25 November 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The combined attack of the First French and the Seventh US Army has completely disorganized the enemy's resistance. The swift advance resulted in the anihilation of two German Divisions, the capture of more than 15,000 prisoners, including several generals and members of Nineteenth Army Headquarters, guns and considerable equipment. The present disposition of the enemy remains chaotic. With both his flanks dangerously threatened, he cannot have any hope of reestablishing the required balance West of the RHINE. Even the committment of one or two fresh major units could not materially change his situation, particularly if the weather permits constant air bombardment of the crossings.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army Forces were generally disposed on a line: FENETRANGE (Q 4727), WEINBOURG (Q 7830). WEYERSHEIM (R 0412), STRASBOURG (W 0298), MOLSHEIM (V 8193), BARENBACH (V 6286), NATZVILLER (V 6481), FRAIZE (V 4554), E of GERARDMER (V 4440), LE MENIL (K 3232), ROUGEMONT (V 4204), BELFORT (A 3494), TRETUDANS (A 3486), ROMAGNY (A 5090), LARGITZEN (A 5884), BALLERSDORF (A 5691), MULHOUSE (V 6806), KLEINLANDAU (V 8404), KEMBS (A 8399), HUNINGEN (A 8888).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) XIII SS Corps (O. G. F. KEPPLER)

11 Panzer Division and 17 SS PG Division, sidestepped south to meet the threat of XV Corps attack. Elements of both divisions appeared in the VIPERSVILLER (Q 4235) and TIEFFENBACH (Q 6433) area. (Left flank of XV US Corps)

130 Panzer LEHR Division. The 901 PG was identified at ERKARTSWILLER (Q 7230) in the 44 US Division zone. According to PW statement, the remaining elements of the division were to be committed in the same sector.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. von GILSA)

According to PW statement General GILSA left the corps on 21 November. The Chief of Staff was captured on 22 November and the corps lost control of the operation.

361 Volksgrenadier Division. All three regiments (951, 933, and 952 Volksgrenadier Regiments) were committed in the 44 US Division zone, intermingled with elements of the 11 and 130 Panzer Divisions. The division was heavily committed and sustained severe losses.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf WIESE)

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. LASCH)

Captured enemy document indicates that 553 Infantry Division, 708 Volksgrenadier Division, 716 Infantry Division and the 16 Infantry Division are operating now under LXIV Reserve Corps.

6351

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

553 Volksgrenadier Division. The division opposed the attack of the 2 French Armored and 44 US Divisions. At the end of the period the division was reduced to about 800 combat effectives. The CG, General BRUN, was captured on 22 November. During the period the enemy endeavoured to reinforce the division by committing the following units: 814 MG Battalion, 104 Replacement Battalion, 736 A A Battalion, 60 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 13th Army Assault Battalion.

708 Volksgrenadier Division is opposing the 79 US Division and portions of the 100 US Division. Heavily committed since the Allied attack, the division and attached units (301 Mountain Battalion, 812 Fortress MG Battalion, 1417 Fortress MG Battalion, 19 Punitive Battalion, 802 Mobile Battalion and the 1316 Artillery Regiment) suffered heavy losses.

716 Infantry Division. Between November 12 and 20 no elements of the division were identified. Since the attack of VI Corps, the division apparently received replacements and was reinforced by additional attached units (the 5th Cossack Regiment, 54 Engineer Battalion, elements of the X Fortress Antitank Regiment and the 454 Russian Battalion). On November 20 and 21 all units were identified in the 100, 3 and 103 US Divisions zone.

16 Infantry Division. Another division which was in process of reorganization. According to PW's of 16 Infantry Division, their unit was reorganized as a Volksgrenadier Division. Units of the division were spread on a broad front. The 1316 Artillery Regiment was identified in the 708 Division sector. The 221 GR was identified in the 103 US Division zone, the 223 GR was identified in 36 US Division zone, and the 225 was identified in the 3 DIA zone. In addition the following attached units were identified: 202 Mountain Battalion, 360 Cossack Regiment, 933 GR and 61 Fortress MG Battalions.

(2) IV GAF Corps (CG: Gen d. Flg. PETERSEN)

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNIESS)

The situation in the southern sector was somewhat confused. The First French Army reported the appearance of a new Corps Headquarters, probably the LXIII Corps (previously located in NORWAY, controlling coast defenses). The location of the LXXXV Corps is unknown. The IV GAF Corps is believed to assume responsibility for the sector opposing the French II Corps.

269 Infantry Division. Elements of the division (489 GR, elements 469 GR, 269 Recon Battalion, 269 Engineer Battalion) and the attached I, II and III Battalions of the BODENSEE, reconstituted as a regimental unit, were identified in the 3 DIA zone while the 490 GR (now destroyed) and elements of the 469 GR were identified east of BELFORT in the I French Corps zone.

59 Volksgrenadier Division was committed in the 1 DMI zone north of BELFORT. The three regiments (1212, 1213, and 1214 VGR) were identified in the sector opposing the November 25th attack of a combat team of the 5 French Armored Division.

198 Infantry Division. The division was withdrawn from its old sector (opposing the 3 DIA) and committed east of BELFORT in order to stem the attack of the I French Corps. The units attached to the division (360 Cossack Regiment, 61 Fortress MG Battalion) remained in the old sector under 16 Infantry Division.

338 Infantry Division, was virtually destroyed in the battle south and east of MONBELIARD. The 189 Volksgrenadier Division, was heavily committed east of BELFORT in the 2 DIM zone and sustained heavy losses.

30 SS Division. The 75 and 76 GR and the 30 Artillery Battalion were identified in the MULHOUSE area, thrown into the battle piece-meal. In order to meet the emergency the enemy has also reinforced this sector by committing the BG MAERKER and the 34 Replacement Battalion.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) General Reserve

The 30 SS Division has been committed in the southern sector in order to stem the advance of the French First Army. It is now accepted that the 19 Army Security Division does not constitute a tactical unit. Other available reserves from the V Wehrkreis, and other sources seem to be employed piece-meal on the whole Sixth US Army Group front.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

Units in Contact	22,000
Divisional Reserve	7,500
Artillery Effectives	?
Gen Res W of RHINE	Committed
Possible Res from Wehrkreis V and other sources	10,000
T O T A L	39,500 - not including arty eff.
Tanks and SP Guns	155 -
Guns	Not possible to estimate on acct of general withdrawal.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), LONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGUILLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. ENEMY DISPOSITION

157 Mountain Division with attached units (888 Mountain Battalion and Gst Battalion) occupies the sector PETIT ST BERNARD (inclusive) to MONT GENEVRE (excluseve).

MONTE ROSA Division (elements) occupies the sector MONT GENEVRE (inclusive) to LARCHE PASS (exclusive)

5 Mountain Division (elements) occupies the sector LARCHE PASS to ST MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6120).

34 Infantry Division occupies the sector from ST MARTIN VESUBIE to VENTIMIGLIA on the MEDITERRANIAN Coast.

b. Bulk of forces withdrawing to foothills.

c. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives	6-7,600
Artillery Effectives and Services	5-6,000
T O T A L	11-13,600

4. OPERATIONS

Dazed by our swift attack, the enemy was powerless to prevent a successful two pronged drive to the RHINE. At the close of the period, an attempt to cover his withdrawal from the VOSGES is developing. This takes the form of a holding attack north of MULHOUSE, and a reenforcing of the HAGENAU area, designed primarily to stabilize a line from the present salient East of METZ, to the RHINE, North of STRASSBURG. Should this prove successful, he might then attempt to recapture STRASSBURG.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Our attack through MONTBELIARD (P 8836), and HERICOURT (P 9732), reached far beyond DELLE (A 4579) before the enemy could mass enough troops to counterattack on 21/22 November. His main line of resistance then became the RHINE-MARNE Canal from MONTREUX (A 4593) to ALTKIRCH (A 6292). Our troops reached MULHOUSE (V 0570) while the enemy still held RHINE bridgeheads from KEMBS (A 8398) southward. By nuisance raids and infiltrations the enemy threatened our lines of communication in the vicinity of RECHESY (A 2578), as he built up his strength further north.

II Corps: The forts of BELFORT (A 3493) and the area N of LE THILLOT (A 3030) provided the major obstacles to II Corps' attack which met moderate resistance and numerous mines and demolitions.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: Only light resistance was encountered until the 21/22 November, when the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to hold prepared positions near FRAIZE (V 4554) and SOULCY. At ST DIE, he resisted strongly until our bridgehead was established. After momentarily strong stands at ST MARGUERITE (V 4364), DIJON (V 4465) and BOURG-BRUCHE (V 5673) the enemy steady withdrew interrupting our progress by vain attempts at infiltration and by use of SP fire. The enemy was soon rooted out of dug-in positions in the FORET DU RECLOS (V 3783); in spite of small arms, sniper fire and mines.

XV Corps: Once BLAMONT (V 3499) was taken, SARREBOURG (Q 5015) proved a minor obstacle, as the enemy beat a steady retreat along the PHALSBURG axis, but resisted with dug-in tanks at NIEDERHOF (Q 4604). He began an assault in the areas of ESCHWILLER (Q 2954) and EYWEILER (Q 3056) that was growing in strength even as the period ended. Meanwhile, except for the AT ditch and strong defenses of PHALSBOURG (Q 1965), and the SAVERNE GAP, the advance of our armored elements had little opposition in its dash to take STRASBOURG intact on the 23/24 November. As the German-held West end of the STRASBOURG-KEHL bridge was being contested, the lower VOSGES yielded surrendering Germans, while an infantry-tank build-up near TIEFFENBACH (Q 3464) was being dealt with.

Alpine Front: As the winter season set in on the Alpine area, skiers, active in the PETIT ST BERNARD (C 0045) and MT CENIS (H 4455) areas broke the monotony of inactivity in the Northern zone. Scattered mortar and artillery fire was noted to the South, as explosions continued in the VENTIMIGLIA (S 8282) area. Bridges were reported demolished by the enemy across the ROYA River between VENTIMIGLIA and BEVERA (S 9282).

5. MOVEMENT

Of interest during the past week were the SHAEF report of movement of one Panzer Division and possibly an Infantry Division through FRANKFURT toward the SAARBRUCKEN area on 18 and 19 November; the report of two trains with heavy artillery going towards KARLSRUHE from JURNBERG on 16 November; and the TAC/R report of intense rail activity on 20 November in the area KARLSRUHE (R 44), LANDAU (R 26), LUDWIGSHAVEN (R 59), and BRUSCHAL (R 65). The appearance of the 130 Panzer Division on the Army Group north flank is probably a result of the movement noted passing through FRANKFURT. The intense rail activity noted on the 20th probably was connected with the withdrawal from the SAARBOURG and SAAREGUEMINES area; however; lack of more precise information renders a proper analysis difficult.

A French report of 21 November statedthat all the available trucks in the LORRACH region (A 9590) were sent to FREIBURG to insure the transport of troops and munitions to NEUF-BRISACH; and that 88 mm guns were being rushed there by truck from SACKINGEN (B 1684) and WHYLEN (A 9784). These movements indicate possible reinforcements to contain the break-through of the French First Army north of MULHOUSE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The approaches of both rail bridges south of STRASBOURG have been bombed, and our advances to STRASBOURG and along the Swiss border, cut the enemy's remaining rail evacuation routes. It remains to be seen how much rolling stock has thus been trapped west of the RHINE. The damaged rail bridges might still be used to evacuate personnel, in any case. The CHALAMPE-NEUENBURG bridge (V 858128), capable of carrying motor vehicles, is now in range of First French Army artillery. The pontoon bridges across the RHINE south of STRASBOURG were all last reported as being out of action. However, bad flying weather has prevented observation since 20 November, so it is now quite possible that they are again being used.

All bridges between STRASBOURG and MANNHEIM appear to be serviceable. These include 5 permanent rail bridges (including 3 combination road and rail) and 3 pontoon bridges.

6. DEFENSES

Capture of a German Inspection Report giving the status of the defenses in the area northwest of ST AVOLD (Q 25), indicates that the enemy intends to make extensive use of MAGINOT line field defenses, and is in process of re-organizing them. However, he has not had sufficient time to complete these preparations. The following tabulation gives the status of the contemplated work as of November 23,

A/T ditches	32% completed
A/T walls & obstacles	45% "
Double apron fence	1% "
First line trenches	54% "
Second line trenches	2% "
M.G. & Mortar emplacements	30% to 100% completed
Artillery & A/T gun emplacements	30% completed
Artillery OP's	80% "

It is quite possible that similar work in the Sixth Army Group sector has been brought to approximately the same state of completion.

The MAGINOT line leaves the RHINE at DALHUNDE (R 1819), where it consists of pillboxes, wire, trenches, and shelters, built on the N and E sides of hills and forests to repulse attack from those directions. The line proceeds northward in the form of a 3 to 5 mile wide belt of pillboxes, A/T obstacles and inundation projects, passing between SOULTZ (R 1038) and WISSEMBOURG (R 1348), where it turns west following roads and valleys to BITCHE. Between SOULTZ and LENBACH (R 0345) are located 5 of the larger type installations of the MAGINOT Line. These were built facing north and east but recent air cover shows slight activity and it is possible that the smaller guns housed in the coupolas can bring fire in any direction.

A number of the MAGINOT Line pillboxes were sited to take the N to S routes under flanking fire; it should therefore be possible for the Germans to make use of these against our approach from the south.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl.
#1 - APPENDIX I, List of French-German Place Names.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

APPENDIX # I

LIST OF FRENCH-GERMAN PLACE NAMES

FRENCH NAME	GERMAN EQUIVALENT	COORDINATE
MULHOUSE	MULHAUSEN	V 7006
CERNAY	SENNHEIM	V 5812
GUEBWILLER	GEBWEILER	V 6124
HUNINGUE	HUNINGEN	A 8938
MASEVAUX	MASMUNSTER	V 4409
SCULTZ	SULZ	V 6221
ROUFFACH	RUFACH	V 6729
NEUF BRISACH	NEU BRISACH	V 8435
GUEMAR	GEMAR	V 7454
SELESTAT	SCHLETTSTADT	V 7962
RHINAU	RHEINAU	V 9869
STRASBOURG	STRASSBURG	W 0298
AMMERSCHWIHR	AMMERSCHWEIER	V 6647
RIQUEWIHR	REICHENWEIER	V 6752
RIBEAUVILLE	RAPPOLTSWEILER	V 6955
ST HIPPOLYTE	ST PILT	V 7259
OBERNAI	OBERENHNHEIM	V 8185
WASSELONNE	WASSELNHEIM	Q 7804
MARMOUTIER	MAURSMUNSTER	Q 7310
SAVERNE	ZABERN	Q 7216
SARREBOURG	SARRBURG	Q 5015
PHALSBOURG	PFALZBURG	Q 6519
BISCHWILLER	BISCHWEILER	R 9019
HAGUENAU	HAGENAU	R 0424
BOUXWILLER	BUSCHWEILER	Q 8125
NEUWILLER	NEUWEILER	Q 7525
FENETRANGE	FINSTINGEN	Q 4728
SAARALBE	SAARALBEN	Q 4845
INGWILLER	INGWEILER	Q 8130
SELTZ	SELZ	R 2733
LAUTERBOURG	LAUTERBURG	R 3242
FAULQUEMONT	FALKENBERG	Q 1750
PUTTELANGE	PUTTLINGEN	Q 4151
SARREGUEMINES	SAARGEMUND	Q 5157
SARRE UNION	SAARUNION	Q 5238
BITCHE	BITSCH	Q 7750
WISSENBOURG	WEISSENBURG	R 1548
DEUX PONTS	ZWEIBRUCKEN	Q 7372
SPIRE	SPEYER	R 5180

REFERENCE:

Names of towns taken from 1/250,000 Army Air Map sheets K 50, K49, K48, L50. Checked against Europe Road Map 1/200,000. Sheets 57 and 62 for French Spelling and the Übersichtskarte 1/1,000,000, Frankreich Sheet for the German Spelling.

(Prepared by Sixth US Army Group Engineers.)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

LEGEND

FRONT LINE ~~~
FORTIFICATIONS ~~~
BRIDGES DAMAGED /
KNOCKED OUT X

THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

G-2 GAG

SECRET

251200A NOV 1944

~KEY~

ROADS ~~~ R.R. BRIDGES ++++ HY. BRIDGES = FLOATING BRIDGES >—< TEMP. BRIDGES)—(SIEGFRIED LINE

175/ NOV 44 / G AG 6012

56

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

S E C R E T
By Auth. of
CG Sixth A G
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 2 Dec 44

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 11

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 2 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The rapid advance of Seventh US Army and the reaching of the RHINE by the 2 French Armored Division in the STRASSBURG area on 23 November caught the enemy completely unaware, isolating the Nineteenth German Army in the VOSGES, thus dislocating the tactical cooperation between First and Nineteenth German Armies. Three Corps commanders were dismissed for their failure to deny us the access to the BELFORT and SAVERNE GAP. In addition to two annihilated divisions the enemy had to withdraw two more battered divisions, unable to provide sufficient replacements.

In the VOSGES the Nineteenth Army continued to fall back on the RHINE, offering stiff delaying action. The enemy endeavored to meet the emergencies by shifting depleted and tired units between the northern and southern VOSGES, without successfully establishing the required balance. It is noteworthy that he did not commit any new major unit in that area, probably considering such a commitment too risky in view of the hopeless tactical situation of his formations south of STRASSBURG.

In the HARDT Mountains, the First German Army forced to withdraw two badly battered major units, continued to fall back on prepared positions.

In order to meet the emergency and to deny the approaches to the successive defenses of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines, the enemy had to commit new units (four divisions).

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period German First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: MACKWILLER (Q 3836), ZINSWILLER (Q 8935), GRIES (R 0517), LA WANTZENAU (R 0606), BOOFZHEIM (V 9670), STOTZHEIM (V 8175), RIBEAUVILLE (V 6855), CLEFCY (V 4351), LES GRANDS VIAUX (V 3836), URBES (V 4120), BURNHAUPT LE BAS (V 5503), East of MULHOUSE (V 8011), HUNINGEN (A 8888).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps. It is presumably the LVIII Panzer Corps which controls the 130 Panzer Division and the 25 PG Division. These divisions constitute an armored mobile group capable of aggressive action within the area SARGEMINES-HAGENAU.

130 Panzer Division. 901 and 902 PGR's, 130 Panzer Regiment, 130 Panzer Recon. Battalion, 130 Panzer Artillery Regiment, 130 Panzer Engineer Battalion and 130 Panzer A T Battalion were identified at the beginning of the period in the vicinity of HAGENAU (R 0420). Since then, the division has shifted to the West and all its elements were identified in the 44 and 45 US Divisions zones (Q 5540 - Q 8435).

25 PG Division. Elements of 35 PGR, 25 Engineer Battalion and 119 PGR were identified in the 44 US Division zone (Q 6936).

(2) LXXXIX Corps. There are indications that this corps has under its command the units which are containing the advance of XV US Corps.

11868 L182

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

245 Infantry Division arrived from HOLLAND and its first elements were identified on 29 November, west of HAGENAU (R 0420) relieving elements of the 130 Panzer Division. At the end of the period the following units were identified in the 45 US Division zone: 935 GR, 936 GR, 937 GR, 245 Artillery Regiment, 245 Fus. Battalion, 245 A T Battalion and 245 Engineer Battalion. PW's state that the division has not received replacements and that its elements are of skeleton strength (I/935 and I/937 GR's, have about 30 men per company).

256 Infantry Division arrived from HOLLAND and was first identified on 25 November. 456 GR, 476 GR, 481 GR, 256 Artillery Regiment, 256 A T Battalion, 256 Engineer Battalion and the 256 Replacement Battalion were identified east of HAGENAU in the 79 US Division zone. PW's stated that the division has received replacements since its arrival on Sixth US Army Group front, but the division is reported to be short of motor and horse transportation.

553 Volksgrenadier Division has been out of contact since 24 November and is probably reforming.

361 Volksgrenadier Division was very badly mauled and was out of contact since the beginning of the period. On 1 December elements of 951 GR were again identified as components of BG KOCH. 953 GR and the 361 Engineer Battalion were also identified, sandwiched between elements of the 130 Panzer Division.

(3) LXIV Reserve Corps. (CG: Gen lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

708 Volksgrenadier Division has been out of contact since 29 November. PW's stated that the division was withdrawing in a southeasterly direction (East of COLMAR)

198 Infantry Division was transferred at the end of the period from the I French Corps zone to the area north-east of SELESTAT (V 7862) and is now opposing the 2 French Armored Division. 326 GR, 235 Artillery Regiment, 198 Fus. Battalion and 235 Replacement Battalion were identified. After heavy engagements in the French I Corps zone, the division should be considered very weak.

716 Infantry Division is opposing the 2 French Armored Division and 103 US Division. Heavily committed, it has sustained severe losses. During the period, the division was reinforced by the 798 Georgian Battalion, 56 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 30 Fortress Engineer Battalion and 460 Replacement Battalion.

16 Volksgrenadier Division is opposing the 36 US Division. During the period the division was substantially reinforced by elements of the 280 Assault Gun Brigade, the 403 Ost Battalion, the 454 Ost (Reiter) Regiment, elements of the G/5 Regiment and elements of the 30 SS Division.

(4) IV GAF Corps. It is believed that the IV GAF Corps was withdrawn east of the RHINE to assume new responsibilities, possibly on the SIEGFRIED Line. In such case new headquarters are probably assuming responsibility for the sector opposing the II French Corps.

269 Infantry Division. Elements 489 GR, and 469 GR were identified on the 3 DIA zone, (French II Corps) next to the C/V Regiment. 490 GR was destroyed on the French I Corps zone.

(5) LXIII Corps. (CG: Gen d. Inf. JOACHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division was opposing the right flank of the French II Corps offering stiff resistance to our advance.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

189 Volksgrenadier Division has not been identified by contact since 19 November. However, the French I Corps reports the location of divisional headquarters at VIEUX THANN (V 5212) indicating that elements of the division remain in that area. The division was very heavily committed and the French First Army states that it is partially destroyed.

30 SS Division. Elements (77 GR and 30 Recon. Battalion) were recently identified east of COLMAR in the French I Corps zone. The remainder of the division was identified on 2 December in the VI US Corps zone (75 GR merged with 76 GR).

(6) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

Units in Contact	25,000
Artillery Effectives	?
Gen Res W of RHINE	Committed
Possible Res from Wehrkreis V and other sources	7-10,000
T O T A L	32-35,000 - not including artillery.
Tanks and S P Guns	140
Guns	Not possible to estimate on account of general withdrawal.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

157 Mountain Division. There are indications that the division might be withdrawn, and that the sector will be taken over by Italian units and the 5 Mountain Division.

MONTE ROSA Division (elements) occupies the sector MONT GENEVRE -LARCHE PASS.

5 Mountain Division (elements) occupies the sector LARCHE PASS-ST MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6130). III/100 Mountain Regiment was identified on 26 November in the valley of MONT CENIS indicating that elements of the division are located in the 157 Mountain Division sector.

34 Infantry Division occupies the sector ST MARTIN VESUBIE-VENTIMIGLIA.

b. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives	6-7,000
Artillery Effectives and Services	5-6,000
T O T A L	11-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

Enemy forces south of STRASSBURG continue an orderly retreat back to the RHINE crossings, in particular the bridge at NEUF BRISACH. In the North, he is resisting fiercely and using armored counterattacks in an effort to deny us the approaches to the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines as long as possible.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Stiff and determined resistance was made to our drive to clean out the remaining pocket in the southern VOSGES. The enemy began to make extensive use of SP guns as support for counterattacks on GALFINGUE (V 6202) and LUTTERBACH (V 6607), which continued throughout the period. He unsuccessfully attempted to dislodge our bridgehead at V 6606 and destroy our position along the DOLLER River from PONT D'ASPACH (V 5705) to the S edge of LUTTERBACH. Enemy pressure continued strong N of MULHOUSE (V 7006).

II Corps: Enemy withdrawals took place at the beginning of the period until good defensive terrain was reached at the Passes of BUSSANG (V 3520) and of ODERON (V 3521). Here, and at the towns of MASEVAUX (V 4408) and LANW. (V 4606), he resisted stubbornly, counterattacking with infantry supported by tanks or SP guns. After the fall of MASEVAUX and LANW , heavy artillery fire in the towns and counterattacks at BOURBACH (V 4711) showed his determination to delay our advance, as he retook several terrain features. Enemy withdrawals took place S of GERARDMER (V 3642) at the end of the period.

(2) SEVENTH ARMY

VI Corps: In the VOSGES area from N of GERARDMER (V 3642) to the RHINE Plain, the enemy resisted fiercely, wherever tenable terrain could be utilized for dug-in positions. MUTZIG (V 7993) was cleared on the 26/27 November, except one of its forts which was still resisting at the end of the period. As reinforcements bolstered his forces, the enemy attempted strong counterattacks supported by tanks. Near the period's end, defended road blocks were opposing our advance on all routes to the RHINE Valley, with strongest resistance met at ITTERSWILLER (V 7774). Reinforcements were observed arriving in the area of SELESTATT (V 7962). Resistance to our drive S and SE down the RHINE Valley was moderate, except in the vicinity of ERSTEIN (V 9480). Elsewhere in this zone our advance was delayed by blown bridges, mines, and flooding. By 1 December BOOFZHEIM (V 9670) and BENFIELD (V 8974) had been taken after slight resistance.

In STRASSBURG, all forts on the outskirts of the city were taken while the enemy still defended the East end of the KEHL Bridge as his reinforcements arrived. About 30 November, the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to cross the river in rubber boats and launches. At the period's end, heavy caliber artillery fire fell on STRASSBURG and its power plant, while the KEHL Bridges were blown by the Germans. NE of the city, our reconnaissance elements contacted small groups of enemy in KILSTETT (R 0909) and GAMBSHEIM (R 1110).

XV Corps: On the front extending from the RHINE to the area of BERG (Q 5833), the enemy fiercely resisted all our attempts to advance toward HAGENAU (R 0425) and through the HARDT Mountain passes. His resistance took the form of heavy counterattacks as tanks were thrown in and infantry reinforcements arrived continuously in the rear areas. His defense centered about the W end of the TIEFFENBACH - INGWILLER Pass, while all vital road nets were protected by strong road blocks, and defensive terrain was held from dug-in positions and by emplaced tanks. TIEFFENBACH (Q 6434) was cleared after heavy resistance, on the 29th, as was the town of INGWILLER (Q 8130). At the end of the period, the enemy was stubbornly holding WINGEN (Q 7336), WIMMENAU (Q 7635) and the area N of TIEFFENBACH from entrenched positions, while resisting strongly in the HAGENAU area.

Alpine Sector: On the Alpine front, an increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire were noted in the S sector on 29 November.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. MOVEMENT

Unfavorable weather limited observation of enemy movements during the period. The few observations that were made showed that he was building up supplies and material in the BLACK FOREST area. The principal lines being used were the DONAUESCHINGEN-FREIBURG line and the DONAUESCHINGEN-OFFENBURG line. On 27 November, following the bomber attack on OFFENBURG, 24 locomotives were damaged on the DONAUESCHINGEN -OFFENBURG line by F/B's. Since these locomotives had no attached cars, it is quite probable that they had been dispersed along the line to prevent large scale loss in the event of a bombing attack. Box cars have also been seen in groups of 20-30 at various marshalling yards along the same route, but further observations are necessary to determine whether these are unloading points or dispersal areas.

Moderate to heavy rail activity continued in the area KARLSRUHE-PFORZHEIM-SPEYER (R 5180)-LANDAU (R 2866). Movement south of KARLSRUHE appeared headed toward RASTATT (R 3429) which seems to be of increasing importance as a supply depot. WEISSENBURG (R 1548) has also seen a good bit of rail activity and may be an intermediate point in the supply system of the enemy forces.

Preparation for evacuation of the German forces west of the RHINE is indicated by the 200 barges observed along the RHINE south of STRASSBURG, the pontoon assembly points reported by OSS on the RHINE east of MULHOUSE, between NEUENBURG and VIEUX-BIRSACH, and in the vicinity of the MARKOLSHEIM-SASBACH pontoon bridge site (V 95). This material might be used either for ferrying purposes or for the construction of bridges to be used after dark.

Of interest is the route taken by the 256 Volksgrenadier Division enroute from HOLLAND to HAGENAU (R 02). A PW reported he passed through MAINZ (M 35)-DARMSTADT (M 64)-KARLSRUHE to RASTATT (R 33) thence across the RHINE to HAGENAU. Movements were made only at night.

With the destruction of the three bridges across the RHINE at STRASSBURG on 2 December, the only crossings still available to the Germans south of MANNHEIM are as follows:

SPEYER RR & Rd - (R 525800), Damaged 1 December.
GERMERSHEIM Floating Highway - (R 472693).
GERMERSHEIM RR - (R 472690).
KARLSRUHE RR & Rd - (R 415485).
SELTZ Ferry-Pontoon Rd - (R 293321).
WINTERSDORF RR - (R 277277).
NEUF BRISACH RR - (V 885359), now serviceable.
NEUENBURG RR - (V 858128), damaged 1 December.

6. SUPPLIES

A document captured from Brigade VON OPPEN, formerly in the BELFORT area, provides further evidence of extreme shortage of optical equipment available to the enemy. The order dated 23 October requires all optical sights to be salvaged at any cost whenever a weapon is abandoned. This applies particularly to captures Allied guns which were claimed to be used in great numbers to bolster German gun positions. Upon destruction of such guns, after expenditure of available ammunition the optical apparatus therefrom must likewise be recovered for conversion to permit future utilization on German guns. Brigade VON OPPEN appears to have forwarded such items directly to the Central Ordnance Office in BERLIN.

A French report claims that the enemy during October conducted tests of tanks equipped with charcoal-burner engines. Training centers for armored units in Germany are believed to have used this type of fuel for some months. This report suggests that due to his strained fuel situation, the enemy may be contemplating the employment of such equipment in battle areas.

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION

"G-2 Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



MAP #1

SCALE 1:1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km

SECRET

G-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
021200 B DEC

185/DEC 44/GAO 6714

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MAP #2

SCALE 1:500.000

10 0 10 MILES

185/DEC 44/G AG 6013

KEY:

SIEGFRIED LINE

MAGINOT LINE

SECRET

G-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
021200 B DEC

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

: SECRET :
:CC, SIXAG:
:Init: :
: :
:9 Dec 44 :

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 12

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 9 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The enemy continued to oppose the advance of the First French Army in the VOSGES pocket with one major unit and remnants of three major units organized in Battlegroups. The constant flow of infantry and vehicular columns over the RHINE indicates the enemy's intention eventually to withdraw his troops from the ALSACE Plain. On the Northern front (HARDT Mountains) the enemy is fighting a delaying action, withdrawing slowly towards the consecutive positions of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period German First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: ROHRBACH (Q 6549), MOUTERHOUSE (Q 7942), REIPERTSWILLER (Q 7936), NIEDERBRONN (Q 9338), WERTZWILLER (Q9230), GAMBSHEIM (R 1110), along RHINE River to RHINAU (V 9868), DIEBOLSHEIM (V 9465), ROSSFELD (V 9171), SELESTAT (V 7862), KAYSERSBERG (V 6448), LA BON HOMME (V 5352), ODEREN (V 4323), THANN (V 5212), MICHELBACH (V 5307), along DOLLER River-HUNINGUE Canal to RHINE River.

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) XIII SS or LVIII Panzer Corps: The presence of the LVIII Panzer Corps in the First Army sector is uncertain. A PW stated that the Corps was located on 18 November in the TRIER area. Unconfirmed reports also indicate its probable presence in Fifth Panzer Army near KOBLENZ. The armored formations present on the left flank of US XV Corps area more probably still under command of XIII SS Corps.

130 Panzer Division has definitely left the XV Corps zone. Third US Army reports that, according to a reliable source, the 130 Panzer Division is assembling in the rear area of the Seventh German Army southern sector, suggesting a Panzer build-up in that area. Such a move would also justify the PW statement indicating the presence of LVIII Panzer Corps in the vicinity of TRIER.

25 PG Division. Elements of the division continued to be identified, during the period, on the left flank of XV US Corps zone. (35 and 119 PGR, 25 A T Battalion, 25 Eng. Battalion). These elements seem to operate as Battlegroups intermingled with elements of 361 Volksgrenadier Division. The combat effectives of the division remain very low (1300). Both PGR's are estimated below 700 combat effectives, and their tank and assault gun complement does not exceed 20.

(2) LXXXIX Corps: Although recent confirmation of the presence of the corps is lacking, it is supposed that the corps continues to assume responsibility for the sector opposing XV and VI US Corps.

361 Volksgrenadier Division. A number of BG's constituted from elements of this division were identified in the XV Corps zone. The total strength of combat effectives of these units is estimated at approximately 700. It seems that a few batteries of the 361 Arty. Rgt. continued to support these remnants of the divisional organic units, hastily organized in BG formations.

553 Volksgrenadier Division has been out of contact since 25 November. However, remnants of some of its elements, were recently identified in the BG KRENKEL. PW's indicated that the division was virtually destroyed, and that the BG absorbed some remnants of the division, while its staff and cadres were withdrawn to KARLSRUHE for the purpose of reorganization into a VOLKSGRENADIER Division.

245 Volksgrenadier Division. Although the division offered the strongest resistance in the Seventh US Army zone (gap between the HAGENAU and BITCHE Forests), effectives of its organic units (about 2000) remained far below normal combat strength. However, the reinforcements recently identified in its sector raised the total combat effectives of the division to about 2500 . (816 Heavy MG Bn; 60 Fortress Eng. Bn.; 104 PG Repl. Bn.)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

12360

256 Volksgrenadier Division. Its combat effectives remained equally on a low level (2500). All the organic units were identified during the period in the HAGENAU area, indicating that the mission of the division is to protect the left flank of the First German Army.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf WIESE)

The disposition of the enemy in the VOSGES sector remained vague. Units were shifted from the southern sector (MULHOUSE) to the north (SELESTAT). The allotment during the period of major units to the corps also continued to be unclear. XC Corps was identified by document originating from the 16 Volksgrenadier Division in the COLMAR area, suggesting that the XC Corps has assumed responsibility for the sector previously occupied by IV GAF Corps. Furthermore, it is assumed that the XC Corps may also be entrusted with the mission of organizing the withdrawal of some of the major units which, after crossing the RHINE, would become available for commitment in the vital sector of the SIEGFRIED Line between KARLSRUHE and ZWEIBRUCKEN. Possible candidates for such a presumed reorganization under XC Corps might be 16 Volksgrenadier and 708 Volksgrenadier Division, whose organic elements were not identified since the beginning of the period.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps

198 Infantry Division lost one regiment (308 GR). The other two regiments (305 and 326 GR) were transferred from the French I Corps zone to the SELESTAT area. The combat effectives of these two units are probably below 500.

716 Infantry Division, heavily committed in continued delaying action around SELESTAT, has been whittled down to about 400 combat effectives. In order to increase its capacity for resistance, the enemy reinforced the area originally occupied by 716 Infantry Division and 16 Volksgrenadier Division with the following: elements of 106 Panzer Brigade (PC Battalion), elements of 269 Infantry Division (469 GR) elements of 189 Volksgrenadier Division (1213 GR), 717 z.b.v. Battalion, 5 Cossack Regiment, 202 Mountain Battalion, 30 Fortress Eng. Battalion, 54 Fortress Eng. Battalion, and 602 Mobile Battalion. Consequently, he succeeded in building the strength of his units, presumably under 716 Infantry Division, (opposing 2 French Armored Division and 36 US Infantry Division), to approximately 3000 combat effectives.

(2) XC Corps

708 Volksgrenadier Division has not been identified during the period. Its effectives were so low (7-800) that the division, or at least elements, were probably withdrawn to refit and reorganize.

16 Volksgrenadier Division would be another candidate for refitting and reorganization. Its organic elements have not been identified during the period.

269 Infantry Division has been subject to further disorganization. Elements were identified in the French II Corps zone. (489 GR, 269 Fus. Bn, 269 Eng. Bn., 269 Repl. Bn., 269 AA Bn., and 490 GR), while other elements (469 GR) were identified in the 36 US Division zone.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division is the only major unit which succeeded in keeping its organic entity. Reinforced by the CV Regiment, the division was stubbornly stemming the advance of the left flank of French I Corps. Its combat effectives with attached units, amounted to approximately 2000. The rest of the French I Corps opposed remnants of 189 Volksgrenadier Division (1212 GR, 1214 GR), remnants of 338 Volksgrenadier Division (elements of 757 GR, 758 GR, 759 GR), and various Battlegroups (BG HAFNER, SS POLICE BN., SS BN. LAUER, BG HAHN).

30 SS Division. The 77 GR was reported virtually destroyed. No other elements of the division were identified during the period. It seems that the German SS complement of the division has been included in the various BG's identified in the French I Corps zone. All these units were supported by the 654 A T Bn., equipped with Jagdpanthers.

c. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Vosges Front)

(1) The correct reading of the present strength estimate is substantially

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

clarified by a review of strength estimates during the various phases of the operations since the beginning of the Allied offensive.

On 16 November the combat effectives of the enemy on the Sixth US Army Group front were estimated at 30,000. On the 7th day of the offensive, the enemy's combat effectives dropped to 21,000, but reached the higher level of 25,000 on 27 November. On 6 December the combat effectives dropped again to 18,000.

Between 16 and 27 November the enemy brought reinforcements amounting to 22,000 combat effectives, followed by another 9000 between 27 November and 5 December.

It is noteworthy that after 27 November (the isolation of Nineteenth German Army in the high VOSGES), the enemy brought in only 3000 reinforcements to the VOSGES pocket, while the majority of replacements and new units were allotted to the Northern sectors opposing the Seventh US Army (6,000).

This analysis reveals that the rate of reinforcements was higher during the first phase of the VOSGES battle than it was during the second phase. Furthermore it reveals that enemy casualties, based solely on estimates of combat effectives, reached the approximate figure of 43,000 since 16 November. Finally it is evident that although the enemy was capable of maintaining his combat effectives until 16 November on a 25-30,000 level, his capability to maintain such a level after 16 November seemed to be reduced.

(2) Estimated Enemy Strength (Combat Effectives) on 6 December.

Units in contact	18,000
Artillery effectives	?
General Reserve W of the Rhine	Committed
Possible reserve from Wehrkreis V and other sources available within the following two weeks	7-9,000
T O T A L	25-27,000
Tanks and S P Guns	70-80
Guns	Information not presently available.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULIES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition.

There are further indications that Italian units are relieving the 157 Mountain Division and the 5 Mountain Division. The location of the 5 Mountain Division remains doubtful, as some of its elements seem to have shifted north. The situation on the 34 Infantry Division sector remains unchanged.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group (Alpine Front)

Combat effectives	6-7,000
Artillery effectives and services	5-6,000
T O T A L	11-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

The enemy is still fighting a well coordinated defense in the Alsace pocket,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

preventing complete encirclement with vigorous counter-attacks northward and southward, while a slow withdrawal from the Vosges is in progress. Flood conditions have permitted him to make excellent use of stream lines. The delay thus gained permits him to evacuate the bulk of his heavy equipment, to organize resistance along the Rhine, and to pin down seven to eight Allied divisions which might otherwise be available for use further north.

At the southern end of the pocket, he has virtually stabilized his position along the HUNINGUE canal and the DOLLER River, launching especially vigorous counter-attacks in the vicinity of LUTTERBACH (V 6507). In the Vosges he slowly withdrew, offering firm resistance only in the area between THANN (V 5212) and ST. AMARIN (V 4619). He held strongly in the sector KAYSERBERG (V 6448) - SELESTAT, employing strong artillery and mortar fire, and bringing up reenforcements at the end of the period. Meanwhile, his defense of the sector east of SELESTAT was aided by flooded terrain, and by long range artillery fire from across the Rhine.

In our northern sector, enemy resistance was strong throughout the period, relaxing only on our extreme left flank (6 Dec) as the enemy withdrew in the direction of the Maginot Line. On the Hardt Mountains, an organized defense line in the area FOLKSBERG (Q 6838) - DIEMERINGEN (Q 5938) was stubbornly held until 6/7 Dec. Demolitions, road blocks, and felled trees were used to delay our advance on ENCHENBERG (Q 7146). He was unable to prevent our penetration of the gap West of the Hagenau Forest, although aggressive action continues on the right flank of our spearhead. At Hagenau, dug-in enemy offered strong resistance, employing 26 planes on 8 Dec. An unsuccessful attempt was made to hold GAMBSHEIM (R 1110) by house-to-house fighting as the period closed.

On the ALPINE Front little enemy activity was noted in the Northern zone. Scattered enemy artillery fire was received throughout the Southern zone.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

a. MOVEMENTS

The end of November marked the movement of troops and materiel through the region of the Black Forrest along the rail routes from DONAUESCHINGEN to OFFENBURG, and from IMMENDINGEN to FREIBURG. With the advent of December, however, the center of activity shifted northward. On the BRUCHSAL (R 6358) - PFORZHEIM (R 7032) rail line, 15 trains were reported seen on 2 Dec. Heavy rail activity was noted in the vicinity of HEIDELBERG, KARLSRUHE, and RASTATT. The marshalling yards of WORMS and ALTRY (M 2727) were also busy with rail activity during the week, and on 6 Dec., approximately 75 locomotives were reported seen by fighter-bombers in the MANNHEIM yards. Since virtually no new major reenforcements have been identified on our front, it seems logical to conclude that much of this movement indicated more troops and supplies for the Siegfried Line.

Indications that the enemy is withdrawing to man the positions of the Siegfried Line are found in the statement of an officer PW who pointed out that the 19th Army was moving eastward across the Rhine to positions in the Siegfried Line. According to his statements, the withdrawal of heavy equipment (mostly horse drawn) has been in progress since 25 Nov, and major units would soon follow. Some verification of these statements may be found in the TAC/R reports of heavy enemy withdrawals on foot across the BREISACH Rail bridge on 5 and 6 December, and in the French report of 500 trucks seen moving eastward from COLMAR on 7 Dec.

Still further indications of enemy withdrawal along Sixth Army Group front comes from the fighter-bomber report that on 3 Dec. heavy rail activity continued in the northern sector of the front in a NE direction from PIRMASENS (Q 9166) towards MANNHEIM. It is quite possible that this activity points to the evacuation of rear area installations such as the Panzer training area, formerly at HAGENAU.

b. RHINE BRIDGES

The enemy still has three bridges available south of STRASBOURG: the BREISACH rail bridge (V 8835); the NEUENBURG rail bridge (V 8613); and the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

MARKOLSHEIM road bridge (V 9050 - reported intact by 4 Dec TAC/R). Crossings north of STRASBOURG are shown on the attached sketch map.

The ferry bridges of DRUSENHEIM, SELTZ, and FRANKENTHAL consist of pontoons and roadway extending only partway across the stream, with a ferry bridging the wet gap.

6. DEFENSES

MAGINOT - SIEGFRIED LINES

Recent photographic cover showed little entrenching activity in the MAGINOT line. Whatever activity is noted is centered around the MAGINOT FORTS of HUNSPACH (R 1539), LEMBACH (R 0444) and BITCHE (Q 7750), but in no way compares with the digging carried out in the Vosges defense line.

In contrast to this, the SIEGFRIED Line is shown by photos to be extremely active, particularly in the SCHAIDT (R 2651) - BERGZABERN (R 1955) Gap between the BIENWALD and the HARDT where a considerable amount of impressed labor is being employed. Each photographic sortie reveals new diggings or continuation of diggings already existing. This sector is already extremely dense in defenses and the new activity takes the form of A/T ditches in some case 3 in depth, construction of innumerable communication trenches between bunkers, and the laying of mines and wire. This same intense activity is taking place in the PIRMASENS (Q 9067) - ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q 7272) area, but the difficult high wooded terrain between OBEROTTERBACH (R 1752) and PIRMASENS (Q 9067) shows comparatively slight activity.

7. ENEMY SUPPLIES

Two captured documents processed by VI Corps clearly show the severe measures the enemy has been forced to adopt for the conservation of motor fuel. An order published by Field Marshal VON RUNDSTEDT on 28 October quoted the following HITLER announcement:

"Fuel is an essential product for the conduct of operations. Commanders of higher and lower echelons must give their fullest attention to fuel supply and in realization of the fuel situation they must devote their time and energy to issuance and strict enforcement of adequate orders for the conservation of fuel....The amount of fuel that can be saved by avoiding non-essential trips can easily add up to the equivalent of entire trainloads to the front."

To "secure the barest minimum of fuel for the fighting front", VON RUNDSTEDT ordered:

1. No Hq, Military posts and unit commanders will use motor transportation when the same mission can be accomplished by using railroads. The resulting conservation of fuel outweighs all difficulties and delays.

2. All essential trips for which rail transportation is not available will be made by using charcoal-burning or Diesel engine vehicles.

3. Synthetic gasoline will henceforth be available for actual combat only (tanks, assault guns, important messenger and supply trips).

"Anyone using fuel for purpose other than the immediate conduct of opeations will be considered a saboteur and court-martialled without mercy".

The same order directs that all single vehicles using synthetic gasoline on essential trips in the area of the Western Theater of Operations must carry a special trip ticket fastened to the windshield. The purpose of the trip and its necessity to the war effort must be clearly explained thereon, in addition to which it must be certified that the trip could not be made by railroad or other means of transportation. Vehicles leaving the areas of Divisions, Corps, Armies and Army Groups, MUST HAVE PERMISSION OF THEIR COMMANDING GENERALS.

On 6 November 1944, G-4 Transportation of Army Group "G" published an addendum to VON RUHDSTEDT's order defining the fuel saving measures which would

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

apply in the Army Group area in addition to those of the Theater Commander. This directive threatens persons on non-essential trips with the following consequences:

a. The vehicle will be confiscated.

b. The passengers will be transferred immediately to a March Battalion destined for action on the VOSGES Mountain front.

8. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Four sabotage agents possessing explosive coal have been arrested by the Seventh Army. Their instructions had been to put the coal into locomotive bunkers or into railroad coal piles after the area was occupied by the Allies. The plastic, which can be molded into any shape, is gray in color, and is covered with coal dust so that it is most difficult to detect from real coal. It has a hole for the insertion of a detonator.

SHAEF recommends that black netting be put over locomotive bunkers at night and that where feasible bulk coal dumps be wired over.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION

"G-2 Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX I

THE MAGINOT LINE

A. GENERAL

The Maginot Line, built to defend France from an attack from the North and the East, runs a few kilometers inside the Franco-German Frontier from LUXEMBOURG to the RHINE, thence along the Rhine to Switzerland. In the area SOULTZ (R 14) to ACHEN (Q 55), it consists of casemates bolstered by a "Gros Ouvrage" every 2 to 5 kilometers. Along the Rhine it consists mainly of artillery casemates with M/G turrets.

The "Gros Ouvrage", of which there are 8 in our northern sector, may be compared to land battleships. Depending on the terrain, they consist of various combinations of casemates, pillboxes, artillery and M/G turrets, generally interconnected by subterranean galleries leading to main personnel and munitions entrances at the rear of the position. These entrances in turn are provided with some defenses against attack from the rear. The quarters for the personnel, munitions magazines, power house, are all located deep underground, and are sometimesserviced by a narrow gauge RR. The entire position is integrated and self-sufficient. The galleries are defended by a pillbox for automatic weapons and are mined so as to enable the garrison to isolate sections in case of penetration from the rear.

B. ARMAMENT.

1. Turrets:

The turrets are placed on top of concrete blocks and are reached by means of a shaft, 10 to 40 meters deep, with a stairway and elevator. The ammunition magazines are below the concrete block and are separated from the general galleries by airtight doors. The armored turret is made of special forged steel, 30 cm. thick, with the raising mechanism located on the lower floor. The turret has a 360° traverse, and rises about 50 cm. All operations, aiming, raising, lowering, working the elevator, etc., may be carried out either by hand or mechanically. The firing compartment is protected by a steel frontal shield, 35 to 40 cm. thick and 2m. deep, anchored in concrete. The thickness of concrete for all turrets is 3 ½ meters

2. Types of Turret.

a. M/G Turret: Twin mounted 7.5 MG'S,
Model 1932,
(Total number in Maginot Line: About 50.).

b. 75 mm. (Model 1933) turret: Two 75 mm. guns,
Semi-automatic breach mechanism,
Range: 11 Kilometers,
Rate of fire: 50 rpm. normal
60 rpm. maximum,
(Total number: About 20).

c. 75 mm. (Model 1932): Not Automatic
Range: 7-8 kilometers,
Rate of fire: 35-40 rpm,
(Total number: About 12).

d. 135 mm. turret: Two 135 mm. mortars,
Model 1932
High trajectory,
Wt. of projectile: About 40 pounds.
Range: 4-5 kilometers.
Rate of fire: 14 rpm.
(Total number: 20).

e. 81 mm. turrets: Two 81 mm. mortars.
Smooth bore,
Fixed elevation (45°).
Finned shells,
Wt. of shell: About 9 lbs.
Maximum range: 3.5 kilometers,
Rate of fire: 35-40 rpm.
(Total number: About 20).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The above turrets are the only installations in the Maginot Line with an all-around field of fire. It has been claimed that these turrets will withstand 420 mm. shells or 90 mm. A.P. ammunition. The embrasures are very small and hard to hit, and since the guns do not protrude they cannot be easily damaged. Even the effect of heavy caliber air bombs on turrets in lowered position is doubtful, although the pivots are susceptible to damage if the turret is hit when in firing position. But should artillery or air bombardment sufficiently disturb the surrounding ground, it would interfere with the traverse or firing. This is particularly true of the mortars.

3. Artillery Casemates.

The 75 mm. casemates contain 3 guns and are organized on the same plan as the turrets with connections to underground galleries, shaft with elevator, and subterranean ammunition magazine.

4. Armament.

a. 75 mm. Model 1929 casemate.

The embrasures are large (3' x 3'), with 4 inches of armor plate. In the firing position, the muzzles of the guns protrude more than 3 feet. The guns are withdrawn to the rear and do not protrude when not firing. The embrasures can certainly be damaged by 90 mm. gun fire.

b. 75 mm. (Model 1932) casemate.

The gun rotates about its muzzle with nothing protruding from the casemate. The armor is the same as for the 1929 casemate.

c. 135 mm. casemate.

Usually of the same type as for the 135 mm. turret with no barrel protruding. The casemate has the same armor as the 75mm.

d. 81 mm. casemate.

Usually two weapons of the same type as those in 81 mm. turrets with the same performance. Owing to the fixed elevation of 45°, the embrasures are very well protected and difficult to damage. The guns in all casemates have clearly defined flanking missions and cannot be turned around; maximum traverse is generally 30°.

5. Infantry casemates.

The larger works are protected by 3½ meters of concrete; some of the smaller ones have only 2½ meters. Their armament consists of 2 - twin 7.5 mm. M/G, one of which may be replaced by a 37 or 47 mm. A/T gun. The casemates also contain grenade-launching tubes, enabling the dropping of grenades into the surrounding ditch. Most of the casemates are equipped with a cupola armored with cast steel about 12 inches thick, and anchored in 2 meters of concrete. They have up to five loopholes backed by optical instruments which could be replaced by a light machine gun or 50 mm. grenade launcher.

C. DEFENSE OF THE ENTRANCES OF "GROS OUVRAGES".

Nearly all the entrances follow the same pattern:

1 casemate containing 2 machine guns,

2 machine guns replaceable by 37 mm. or 47 mm. guns,

2 or 3 cupolas, each with a light MG and observation slits

2 successive revolving armored doors, then a shaft, or ramp, leading to the subterranean galleries. In the first 150 yards, the gallery is covered by automatic rufle fire from a built-in blockhouse.

D. PRESENT CONDITION

From the many conflicting reports on the condition of the MAGINOT Line, only

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

general conclusions may be drawn. Indications are that the Germans did not follow a clearly defined policy of disarming the MAGINOT Line in its entirety, but that it was more of haphazard stripping of weapons for a particular need. It will therefore be found that conditions vary with location. The XXth US Army Corps only reported moderate resistance from a few MAGINOT forts, whereas the XIIth US Army Corps reported the enemy as manning the artillery pieces in the MAGINOT Line at BINING (Q 6548) which is in the vicinity of the "Gros Ouvrage" of ROHRBACH.

Recent air photos show considerable damage done by bombing or demolition in two of the large forts in our sector: SCHONENBOURG and HOCHWALD. This damage appears to be old, and undoubtedly dates to German bombings in 1940.

A captured German document dated November 1944, giving instructions to check on conditions and availability of French artillery in the MAGINOT Line, would indicate that the Germans will avail themselves of every serviceable installation. But this decision has apparently been hurried and forced by recent events, and the condition of the mechanism neglected for four years may well preclude any extensive use of the original MAGINOT armament.

F. CONCLUSION.

Intrinsically the MAGINOT Line presents itself as a powerful defense system, with tremendous armor, little of it protruding above ground to be destroyed. It shows, however, some very great weaknesses which completely nullify the static strength of the individual positions.

1. Being almost totally underground, it relies almost entirely on cupolas for its observation. Their destruction or blocking would leave the main body of the position without its eyes. This is particularly true at night, when the enemy can approach almost undetected.

2. Artillery casemates have a definite fixed angle of fire, and are not completely mutually supporting as in the Siegfried Line.

3. No artillery of higher caliber than 135 mm. was present in any of the MAGINOT fixed defenses.

4. The mechanism of the 360° traverse artillery is delicate so that it requires constant care, and some turrets are so constituted that upheaval of the ground around them can effectively put them out of action.

The attached illustrations show the typical "Gros Ouvrage" of HOCHWALD (R 0844), consisting of two main units: one, W.; the other, E.; of the HOCHWALD hill, and linked by an A/T ditch flanked by nine casemates. The casemates and turrets of the W. and E. units are interconnected by the underground galleries, but the nine casemates, flanking the A/T ditch are independent, and have no access to subterranean galleries.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

185/DEC. 44/6AG 6023

G-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
091200 B DEC.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44

CONFIDENTIAL

MAGINOT DEFENSES
FORT OF HOCHWALD



REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MAGINOT FORTS
HOCHWALD WORKS

1.



1. CASEMATE 1-2-3 ON WEST SLOPE OF HOCHWALD DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND A/T DITCH

2.

2. CASEMATE OF HOCHWALD WEST

3.

3 CASEMATES 2&3 AND A/T DITCH. NOTE SECTION OF A/T DITCH NOT COVERED BY A/T FIRE

4.

4. MUNITIONS ENTRANCE AND PERSONNEL ENTRANCE ON SOUTH SLOPE OF MOUNTAIN

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MAGINOT FORTS

5 MINING OF TUNNELS PERMITTING SEPARATION OF ACTIVE SECTIONS FROM PASSIVE QUARTERS

6. 1 1/2 TO 2 KM. OF UNDERGROUND TUNNELS CONNECTING THE WEST AND EAST POSITIONS, WITH RAMIFICATIONS TO PERSONNEL AND AMMO. ENTRANCES ON SOUTH SLOPE OF MOUNTAIN

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

56

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
CG, SIXG
Init: RHB

16 Dec 44

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 13

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 16 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The enemy utilized revamped and some fresh formations in aggressively defending the Northern edge of the VOSGES pocket, partially corroborating recent PW statements that the Nineteenth Army was to hold, not withdraw, in this sector. On the Northern front, withdrawal N of the German border to the SIEGFRIED Line continues between the RHINE and the HARDT Mountains, while MAGINOT fortifications and the BITCHE forts are being utilized to oppose us aggressively on the West edge of the HARDT.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: HOTTVILLER (Q 7253), BITCHE (Q 7652), EGUELSHARD (Q 8247), NEUNHOFFEN (Q 9146), WINDSTEIN (Q 9544), NOTHWEILER (R 0452) RECHTENBACH (Q 1651), SCHLEITHAL (R 2[illegible]), LAUTERBOURG (R 3342) Along the RHINE River to RHINAU (V 9868), EBERSHEIM (V 6782), SELESTAT (V 7963), OSTHEIM (V 7351), KAYSBERBERG (V 6549), LAKE BLANC (V 5248), FORET DE MUNSTER (V 4632), ODEREN (V 4324), VIEUX THANN (V 5412), SCHWEIGHOUSE (V 5806), along DOLLER River-HUNINGUE Canal to RHINE River.

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf KNOBELSDORF)

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

11 Panzer Division: At the beginning of the period, 11 Panzer Division was actively engaged on the West flank of XV Corps, However, subsequent movements and lack of contact indicate its gradual retirement to the North. The serious depletion of the division's strength would make this movement seem logical.

25 PG Division: Elements of this division, combined with elements of 361 Infantry Division to form a number of Battle Groups which stubbornly resisted along the route of withdrawal in the direction of BITCHE. The unit's worn effectives (approximately 1,000) have been bolstered by the attachment of the 669 Engineer Battalion.

(2) LXXXIX Corps

361 Volksgrenadier Division: In holding scattered positions opposite the 100 Division zone (between the HARDT Forest and the 90 Easting) this division's BG's of approxiamtely 700 effectives received only token aid by the addition of its Field Replacement Battalion. There are also indications that the scanty remnants of the 553 Infantry Division have been absorbed by this unit.

245 Infantry Division: The division narrowed its sector opposite the W flank of VI Corps zone, as it gave way to admit the newly arrived elements of 21 Panzer Division on its right flank. After resisting stubbornly in the LEMBACH area, the division is apparently carrying out a planned withdrawal to positions in the SIEGFRIED Line. Total combat effectives at this date are approximately 2,200.

12620

SECRET SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

21 Panzer Division: The appearance of 192 PGR, 220 Engineer Battalion and 155 Artillery Regiment in the area N of LEMBACH lends credence to PW statements that the bulk of the division will be withdrawn from the XX Corps zone, possibly to defend the vital gap between the VIELWALD and HARDT Forests. Tanks of this unit have already been reported in the area. After its losses at SARLAUTERN, the division should have an effective strength of about 1,300; this deficiency may however be rectified before full committment on the Sixth Army Group Front.

256 Volksgrenadier Division: With the number of effectives at about 1,500, including such attached units as 686 Hy AT Battalion and 35 Engineer Replacement Battalion, this division was putting up resistance near the end of the period opposite the E flank of the US VI Corps, at the LAUTER River. It may well be that part of its broad sector will be taken over by elements of 21 Panzer Division.

Total combat effectives opposing Seventh Army - 6,100.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf WIESE)

The assumption that a planned withdrawal of the Nineteenth Army across the RHINE would take place has been negated by PW statements and our observation of recent trends. Reliable PW's quoted their officers as saying that the existence of the Nineteenth Army depended on its holding the VOSGES pocket. SS men were reported to have been posted on the E bank of the RHINE with orders to shoot anyone crossing from the West side without special permission. Heavy movement W across the BREISACH bridge early in the period apparently connects with the identification of new units in the Northern sector of the pocket. Emphasis has been placed on this Northern bulge, as evidenced by the transfer of regimental units from the SE corner to the front opposite the 36 US Division. XC Corps may now prove to be nothing more than a renaming of IV G.F Corps, since the CG's of both Corps have been identified as one and the same.

198 Infantry Division: Two regiments (305 and 326 GR) of this division have been identified S of SELESTAT, after having been shifted from the RHINE Plain, where the reformed I Battalion of 308 GR still operates. Effective strength (with the absorbed Fld Repl Bn) is now approximately 1,000. The committment of the two battalions, newly-formed 678 GR (coming from FULDA) in the sector between SELESTAT and the RHINE may constitute an increase to the command of 198 Infantry Division.

716 Infantry Division: The division's organic elements continue to be identified S of SELESTAT. Among the attached elements are know to be 469 GR of 269 Infantry Division, and the 30 and 54 Fortress Engineer Battalions. Thus present strength of organic and attached units of the division, facing 2 French Armored Division and 36 US Division is approximately 1,200 effectives.

(3) XC Corps

708 Volksgrenadier Division: Organic units of this division have been again identified on the 36 US Division front, although the 728 VG Regiment has shifted to the sector E of SELESTAT. Total effectives should be approximately 700.

Battle Groups in North Zone: On the front of the 36 US Division, pieces of 189 Infantry Division are still being identified (1089 Eng Bn and 1213 GR) with total effectives of about 300. Newcomers in this area include Regiment REIMERS which is made up of NCO's from WEHRKREIS IX School (strength 900) and a BRAUN Regiment, composed of approximately 1,200 SS personnel. Late arrivals during the period include the SS REICHSFUEHRER Escort Battalion which came from East of the RHINE by way of MULHOUSE early in December.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

16 Volksgrenadier Division: On a front before the 36 US Division and 3 French DIA, this weak division has been well padded with attached units (BG LANG, 360 Cossack Regiment, 4 G.F. Ren Bn and 291 zbV Bn). For its holding role, it has some 1,500 effectives.

269 Infantry Division: Inactive during most of the period, this division still maintains the bulk of its forces opposite the 3 French DIA, with one regiment (469) under command of 716 Infantry Division near SELESTAT. Total effectives are about 1,300 at present.

(4) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division: The division continues stubbornly to oppose the left flank of French I Corps with regiment C-V under command, making total effectives about 1,700.

189 Infantry Division: The elements of this division in this zone (1212 and 1814 GR), with the addition of the 19 Army Assault Battalion, can muster an effective strength of about 1000.

338 Volksgrenadier Division: Although only remnants of 757, 758, and 759 GR's continue to exist opposite I French Corps, it appears that some effort toward reforming is being made. General v. OPPEN succeeded General OSCHMANN(deceased) as CG of the division. The division's strength, with attached replacement battalions, is approximately 1,350 effectives.

Battle Group in South: Various battlegroups and replacement units (BG HAFNER, HAHN, Bn LAUAR) continue to hold the sector on the right flank of French I Corps. Their combined strength is about 2,200 combat effectives.

30 SS GR Division: The division is believed to be reforming.

Total combat effectives opposing First French Army - 14,600.

c. Estimated Enemy Strength (Combat Effectives) on 15 Dec. 1944.

Units in Contact:	
Seventh Army	6,100
First French Army	14,600
Artillery Effectives	?
Gen Reserve W of RHINE	Committed
Possible reserve from WEHRKREIS V and other sources	7-9,000
T O T A L	27-29,700
Tanks and SP Guns	70-80
Guns	Information not presently available.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S. MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), MT. CENIS (K 3022), AIGUILLES (N 3703), S. CREYERS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition.

Firmer indications have been observed that elements of the LITTORIO Division have relieved elements of the 5 Mountain Division (5 Mtn Bn) in the sector W of CUNEO, and to some extent in the zone

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

between the SUS.. and ..OSE. Valley as well. The 5 Mountain Division has thus been able to spread its units farther to the North, taking over, with the LITTORIO and other Italian elements, sectors formerly occupied by 157 Infantry Division, which is believed to have withdrawn most of its units. In the 34 Infantry Division sector, the 80 Regt. (in reserve) is now patrolling the coast and fighting Partisans on the coastal sector. In the apparent belief that Allied forces have stabilized their positions in the lower Alpine sector, the Germans are digging emplacements in the coastal zone, the only area believed breachable in Winter months.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives	6-7,000
Artillery Effectives and Services	5-6,000
T O T A L	11-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

In the VOSGES pocket, the enemy's efforts are concentrated on aggressively warding off all threats of a breakthrough from the North or SW, while he continues to hold on the DOLLER River line and the RHINE plain S of STRASBOURG. The determined daily counterattacks which contested the strategic terrain N of COLMAR at KAYSERBERG (V 5448) and W of SELESTAT (V 6962) reached their climax when strong forces, bolstered by reinforcements from across the RHINE, temporarily cut the road between ST MARIE (V 5961) and RIBEAUVILLE (V 6955) on the 13/14 December. Along the RHINE plain elements of 198 Infantry Division delayed our southward advance by use of road-blocks, village strongpoints and artillery fire from the SIEGFRIED Line. At the period's end, fresh units were counterattacking fiercely in this area. The enemy's Southern RHINE bridgehead was wiped out midway through the period. Defense of the THANN area (V 5412) was aggressive as the period began, decreasing about the 15th December.

On the Northern front, steady progress was made by our forces as the enemy utilized defensive terrain of the HARDT Mountains only in delaying as he withdrew to the SIEGFRIED Line while stubbornly holding the hinge of the BITCHE forts. BISCHWILLER (R 0918) fell early in the period and stubborn resistance at HAGENAU (R 0424) was overcome by the 11/12 December. The SELTZBACH River was crossed despite opposition from roadblocks, entrenched infantry and tanks. 256 VG and elements of 21 Panzer Division provided strong resistance to our drive on WISSEMBOURG (R 1548), but on 15 December our troops crossed the German border and by the end of the period were knocking at the SIEGFRIED Line gates N and NW of WISSEMBOURG, without enemy contact. In the Eastern HARDT Mountain area, the enemy withdrew steadily, but in the forts of the BITCHE area elements of 361 VG and 25 PG Divisions continued to resist stubbornly.

5. MOVEMENT

a. RAIL

Bad flying weather and poor visibility again hindered air reconnaissance throughout the week. However, the few successful missions that were flown indicate that BRUCHSAL (R 6359), HEIDELBERG, MANNHEIM, and LANDAU (R 2866), were active during the week. TAC/R reported that on 16 December rail activity in this sector was heavier than at any other time during the past month. PFORZHEIM and KARLSRUHE were also unusually active on 16 December. Reported moderate activity in FREIBURG and movement between SAARBRUCKEN and ZWEIBRUCKEN and in the MANNHEIM-KAISERSLAUTERN area probably point to normal supply activity in the FREIBURG sector with some equipment for the SIEGFRIED Line, and reenforcements for the SAARLAUTERN-MERZIG sector, especially for the Nineteenth Infantry Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Various reports indicate the following were the main lines of rail transportation for troops and material throughout November and early December.

1. NORTH to SOUTH

a. MAINZ-DARMSTADT-KARLSRUHE (across the RHINE)
(This line carries the bulk of rail traffic in this sector; sometimes the crossing over the RHINE was made at RASTATT)

b. MAINZ-DARMSTADT-WORMS-KAISERSLAUTERN.

c. MANNHEIM-NEUSTADT-LANDAU.

d. KARLSRUHE-FREIBURG.

2. EAST to WEST

a. NURNBERG-KARLSRUHE (via HEILBRONN or STUTTGART)

b. MUNICH-ULM-KARLSRUHE.

c. MUNICH-DONAUESCHINGEN to FREIBURG or OFFENBURG.

d. SINGEN-WALDSHUT (Both lines).

b. ROADS

Throughout the week only light scattered road activity was reported along Sixth US Army Group front except for three long columns moving southward toward NEUNKIRCHEN (Q 3885) on 16 December.

c. WATERWAYS

The status of bridges north of STRASBOURG is shown on the attached overprint. South of STRASBOURG, the Germans still have in use the rail bridges of BRISACH (V 885359) and CHALAMPE (V 858128) in addition to the pontoon bridge at SASBACH (V 9149).

The GERMERSHEIM rail bridge (R 4669) was reported by TAC/R as being used to carry the bulk of rail traffic across the RHINE on 16 December. The bridges of OPPAU, MANNHEIM, and KARLSRUHE also appear to important crossings over the RHINE at present.

6. DEFENSES

The SIEGFRIED Line confronting our troops in the Northern sector, leaves the RHINE at NEUBURG (R 3743) opposite KARLSRUHE and follows a westward course a few kilometers inside the German frontier. It passeses through the BIENWALD, emerges into a 6 Km. gap north of WISSEMBOURG, then proceeds through the PFALZERWALD to PIRMASENS (Q 9066) and ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q 7272). A secondary line parallels the main line just south of LANDAU (R 2867).

From NEUNBURG to STEINFELD (R 2350), through the BIENWALD, it takes the form of a thin line of pillboxes, casemates, and infantry strong-points, preceeded by either an A/T ditch, minefield, or wire belt. The line appears to be comparatively shallow here and little constructional activity is seen at present. However the dense forest precludes any critical observation and it can be expected that the underbrush is liberally strewn with mines, wire, tank traps, and M/G nests.

From STEINFELD to BERGZABERN (R 1956) the line bridges the 6 Km. gap between the BIENWALD and the difficult terrain of the PFALZERWALD. This gap is strongly fortified to a depth of 6 to 8 Km. with a great density of pillboxes, casemates, M/G turrets, several rows of A/T ditches, dragons teeth, and fire and communication trenches. Some of the larger works of the SIEGFRIED Line are located here. Considerable additional excavating is seen here at present. A/T ditches and fire

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

trenches are being dug and mines and wire are being profusely strown throughout the gap.

The secondary line about 12 Km. further north, consists of an A/T ditch, backed by pillboxes, running from HORDT (R 4363) to (R 3161), just southeast of INSHEIM. The line continues southwest of LANDAU (R 2867) to ESCHBACH (R 2164) and peters out in the PFALZERWALD around ANWEILER (R 1667). This part of the line seems to consist mainly of passive shelters and should not constitute a major obstacle.

From OBEROTTERBACH (R 1752) the main line proceeds through the PFALZERWALD via NIED-SCHETTENBACH (R 0954), BUDENTHAL (R 0555), where it again broadens into a dense area of concrete works, A/T Ditches, and fire trenches, barring the south to north road network. It then proceeds westward along the road to PIRMASENS (Q 9066) via FISHBACK (Q 9854) to LUDWIGSWINKEL (Q 9554) where it jumps a few Km. further north and proceeds westward to EPPENBRUNN (Q 8757). This sector, FISHBACK (Q 9854) to EPPENBRUNN (Q 8757), appears to be the thinnest in the SIEGFRIED Line, due undoubtedly to the difficult terrain. Air photos show only a thin line of pillboxes defending the road running westward to PIRMASENS.

At EPPENBRUNN, the line turns sharply northwestwardly, passing southwest of PIRMASENS and proceeding to ZWEIBRUCKEN. This area is again 3 to 5 Km. deep and densely fortified with concrete works, A/T ditches, dragons teeth, fire trenches, mines, and wire. It has been considered one of the strongest sectors of the line. Recent photo coverage also shows considerable activity in the shape of additional digging of A/T ditches, fire and communication trenches, and laying of mines, and wire.

SIEGFRIED LINE EAST OF THE RHINE

A captured German document reveals that 43,094 civilians were employed on fortifications on the 1st of October, 1944 but only 28,483 on 10 November. The reduction is attributed to the innundations in the LAHR (W 1071), OFFENBURG (W 1585), and KEHL (W 0697), districts and to the fact that farm labor is exempt from work on fortifications until 15 November.

Photo coverage has shown great activity in the line between KEHL and KARLSRUHE. Although there is practically no building of new heavy positions, a great many fire trenches and communication trenches connecting pillboxes are being dug, and trench systems are being organized around villages. The digging activity is on a scale comparable to that noted previously in the VOSGES.

From KARLSRUHE to GERMERSHEIM (R 4569) there has been slight activity confined mainly to installation of AA Batteries.

ARTILLERY

Whereas heretofore casemates were believed to have been built to house 88 MM A/T guns at the most, PW interrogation reveals that a number of casemates in a sector familiar to him, near ZWEIBRUCKEN, contain 10 cm. KANONEN (Range 20,800 yds.). These were sited to serve in the role of additional A/T defense only, according to the PW.

7. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Information from SHAEF reveals that at METZ preparation had been

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

made for the complete destruction of the P.T. and T. building and approximately 1/2 ton of dynamite was found under the floor boards of the three floors. In addition a "T" mine had been placed, with trip wire, at the entrance to the Repeater Room. This is the first authenticated case of booby trapping of P.T.T. installations in German territory, and it is felt by SHAEF that this may be taken as an indication of things to come.

Eugene L. Harrison.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2 Special Distribution

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

P-333

P-333(56)
R-1133

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
CG, SIXAG
Init: 1.7.
28 Dec 44

28 December 1944

MEMO TO: G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Addressees:

Enclosed illustrations to our G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 13 dated 16 December, for your information.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

10024

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC.
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44

CONFIDENTIAL

16/1200 DEC.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE 1:1,000.000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km

185/DEC 44/6AG 6024

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 1200, 16 DEC.
6-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP

SECRET

56

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Auth of CG 6 A G
Initials: CHA
Date: 23 Dec 44

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 14

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 23 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The German Nineteenth Army, partially isolated in the VOSGES area, is showing every intention of maintaining its defensive positions in the pocket and along the RHINE. The German First Army has been forced back into the HARDT Mountains after having attempted to salvage and husband infantry strength for the SIEGFRIED Line, by strengthening weak points with mobile armored forces. Reported heavy RR movement in the rear area of First German Army indicates probable arrival of reinforcements.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (SAAR-VOSGES Front)

At the close of the period First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line : VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), WALSHEIM (Q 6361), BITCHE (Q 7650), NEUNHOFFEN (Q 9146), BUNDENTHAL (R 0555), SCHWEIGHOFEN (R 1949), NEUBURG (R 3643), South along RHINE to RHINAU (V 9768), SELESTAT (V 7861), OSTHEIM (V 7251), ODERNEN (V 4323) SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), East along HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to border of Switzerland.

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

11 Panzer Division continuing to play the role of a "Ghost Division" vanished at the beginning of the period from the XV US Corps zone, to appear as part of the spear-head driving North West in the BASTOGNE area. However, location of 110 and 111 PGR's is at the present writing unknown.

347 Infantry Division. This division formerly opposing XX US Corps is now opposing XV US Corps. It arrived from First US Army front in poor shape and while committed on Third US Army front the division has not given a too good account of its fighting ability. Its combat effectives are estimated at approximately 2,000, and further signs of weakness have been revealed by PW's early in December, when they indicated that the merging of companies was taking place.

17 SS PG Division holds a sector opposing XV US Corps in the area N/E of SARREGUEMINES. The division has been favored with a steady flow of replacements which accounts for the maintenance of its identity in spite of continuous heavy losses. It appears from PW statements that the division received during November about 2,000 replacements, losing 50% of this complement in PW's. The division is once more at low ebb and its combat effectives are estimated at approximately 2,000 including personnel from Trains and QM Services, which are being used as Infantry Replacements.

257 Volksgrenadier Division suffered heavy losses on the eastern front during summer 1944 and was subsequently disbanded. The division was apparently reorganized later as a Volksgrenadier Division in LITZMANNSTADT (Poland) prior to its arrival on the Sixth Army Group front where it was first identified on 20 December, replacing the withdrawn 11 Panzer Division. Its combat effectives are estimated at approximately 4,000 presuming that the reorganized division turned up in fairly good shape. So far the 457, 466, and 477 VG were identified. PW of II/466 stated that strength of his unit was 400, indicating however, that the quality of the personnel was poor.

13037

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

25 PG Division continued to resist stubbornly in the BITCHE area, with 35 and 119 PGR's identified during the period. The division is presumed to have approximately 15 assault guns, and its combat effectives including attached units (669 Eng Bn, First Army Assault Co, BG WESTMARK) are estimated at 1,500. It is, however, possible that the division received replacements at the end of the period for 35 PGR had been out of line before its last identification on December 22, for about 5 days.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HOLNE)

Although substantiated evidence is lacking, it is presumed that the corps is assuming responsibility for the sector between BITCHE and the RHINE. Such a supposition is based on logistic premises justified also by terrain and the existing need for a higher tactical headquarters on the enemy's left flank.

361 Volksgrenadier Division was opposing elements of the VI US Corps. The combat effectives of the division are very low (800) and there is no evidence of reinforcements arriving during the period.

245 Infantry Division covered the retreat to the SIEGFRIED Line during the period. Its present location is doubtful as no identifications have been reported since December 17. The combat effectives of the division were at a critically low ebb. PW's stated that remnants of the regiments would be consolidated in the third battalions, while first and second battalions would receive replacements. So far, there is no confirmation of any influx of replacements to add to the combat effectives of the division which are estimated at 1,700. It is, however, possible that, according to PW statement, the XII/I Regiment (700 strong) will be absorbed by the division, which would raise its combat effectives to approximately 2,500.

21 Panzer Division was identified at the beginning of the period in the area north of LEITACH. During the period elements of the division shifted to the East and 192 PGR, 200 AT Bn, 220 Pz Engr Bn and 155 Pz Arty Rgt were identified in the area east of RUDERTHAL (R 0555). It was this division that stemmed the advance of the 14 US Armored Division and 103 US Infantry Division. As the enemy has reached the SIEGFRIED Line held by Infantry Divisions and static units, the 21 Panzer Division may be withdrawn as mobile reserve or used in another sector where its mobility would be of greater value. The location of its second PGR (125) badly mauled early in December, remains unknown and it is probably reforming. The division lost several hundred prisoners while engaged on VI US Corps front and as it has not received replacements during the period, combat effectives of units contacted (192 PGR, 220 Eng Bn, 200 AT Bn) are evaluated at 500 approximately.

256 Volksgrenadier Division opposed stubbornly the advance of 79 US Division and was defending at the end of the period the SIEGFRIED Line between WISSEMBURG and the RHINE. The division received during the period about 600 replacements raising its combat effectives to about 2,500, including the attached 42 PG Replacement Regiment (104 and 405 Bns).

b. The front along the RHINE between LAUTERBOURG and RHINAU is held on the eastern banks of the river by static units. It appears from PW statements that these units located in the region opposite LAUTERBOURG are under 553 Volksgrenadier Division, now supposedly refitting in the KARLSRUHE area, while the static units south of that region appear to be, according to documents captured in STRASBOURG, under 405 zbV Division.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. WIESE)

During the period the enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance along the Nineteenth Army front, and there were no signs of any change in his attitude, although the flow of replacements for his battered units was on the decrease as compared with the previous period. The increased density of AA around NEUF BRISACH is indicative of the importance the enemy is attaching

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

to the crossings of the RHINE. This may be accepted as an additional indication that the enemy will continue in maintaining his forces on the western bank of the RHINE.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division opposed the French 2 Armored Division, north east of SELESTAT, intermingled with elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division. The 326 GR however, was located by document as being attached to the 189 Volsgrenadier Division sector. The combat effectives of the division are accepted at the level of 1,200, which includes several hundred replacements received by the division during the period.

708 Volksgrenadier Division is apparently in the process of cannibalizing the remnants of 716 Infantry Division, if reported PW statements will prove correct. The low combat effectives of the division (850) would justify any reinforcements. Inasmuch as in this case, cannibalizing is being effected between two equally weak units it would appear that the fighting qualities of 708 Volksgrenadier Division receive a higher evaluation at Army Headquarters than those of its prospective victim.

716 Infantry Division. Its organic units are estimated at approximately 700 combat effectives. The possible absorption by the 708 Volksgrenadier Division may eliminate the division from the list of major units on the First French Army front.

(2) XC Corps (CG: Gen. der Fl. PETERSEN)

189 Volksgrenadier Division. In addition to the 1213 VG and elements of the 1089 Eng Bn, the 1214 VG was identified in the sector opposing 3rd US Division. Furthermore, 1212 was also located by documents in the same sector. This would bring the whole division back to the northern sector. As established by captured documents, the division has under its command the following attached units: 326 GR of 198 Inf Div; Regt 13/IX (BG REIMERS); Regt 15/IX(BG MYER or MYRA); Escort Battalion REICHSFUHRER; I/V Regt; BG BAYE (vaguely connected with 106 Panzer Brigade); Regt BRAUN; SS Bn LAUER. The combat effectives of the organic units are low (about 900). It is estimated that, with the attached units, combat effectives of the division may reach approximately 2,000-2,500.

16 Volksgrenadier Division opposed during the period the 3 DIA. Its sector has been considerably narrowed as most of its attached units passed to the command of the 189 Volksgrenadier Division. Consequently, the strength of the division has been considerably decreased. With the remaining attached units (360 Cossack Rgt and Bn LANG) its combat effectives do not exceed 1,500.

269 Infantry Division continued to oppose the 3 French DIA maintaining light contact. With exception of the II/469 GR, which remained unlocated, all of its organic units were identified in the sector.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division remained fairly inactive during the period, opposing the 2 French DIM. According to PW statements, II/CV was absorbed by 1211 VGR. The lack of identification of the remaining two battalions suggests that the whole regiment may have been absorbed by the division. With the attached units (836 Ost Bn and BG DIETER) the combat effectives of the division are estimated at 1200-1500.

338 Volksgrenadier Division although weak, continued to oppose the 1 French Armored Division and the 9 French DIC. During the period the division was reinforced by the 746 Engineer Bn. Its combat effectives at the end of the period do not exceed 1,500.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

It is believed that the tactical Headquarters in immediate control of the area between MULHOUSE and the RHINE is Brigade H..FFNER. Combat effectives of various BG's operating in that area are evaluated at approximately 1,200. The coordination of enemy operations in that sector suggests that the BG's (BG BEUCHELT; 56 Jager Repl Bn (ex BG NIEDERMAYER); BG SCHILLING; Security Bn M..RKER; 269 ..T Bn of the 269 Infantry Division) are being controlled by this command.

d. ENEMY STR..NGTH SIXTH ..RMY GROUP FRONT (S...R-VOSG..S Front)

Units in Contact:		
Seventh US ..rmy		15,000
First French ..rmy		13,000
..rtillery Effectives:		
Seventh US Army	No figures available	
First French ..rmy		4,500
Possible Reserve from Wehrkreis V and other sources available within the next 2-3 weeks		21,000
T O T .. L		53,500
Tanks and SP Guns		
Seventh US ..rmy	No figures available	
First French ..rmy		120

3. SIXTH US ..RMY GROUP FRONT (..lpine Front)

..t the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US ..rmy Group on the ..lpine Front were disposed as follows: ..LBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S M..URICE (Z 4680), BONNEV..L-SUR-..RC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M ..BOR (K 3022), ..IGULL..S (N 3703), S. QUAYR..S (N 4394), POND..GNE (N 5050), ST S..UVEUR (N 4823), S M..RTIN V..SUBIE (N 6020), GRIM..LDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

... Considerable movement Eastwards from TURIN follow..d by several

in that area. The old Alpine sector of the 157 Mountain Division seems to be taken over by a combination of the 5 Mountain Division, the LITTORIO Division and various smaller Italian units. It appears therefore that the 5 Mountain Division has definitely spread its units further north while retaining portions of its old sector. The 34 Infantry Division continues to occupy the southernmost sector with at least one regiment (80th) in reserve.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (..lpine Front)

Combat Effectives	6-7,000
..rtillery Effectives and Services	5-6,000
T O T .. L	11-13,000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

VOSGES POCKET: 19 Army made its strongest bid throughout the period in holding the KAYSERBERG (V4952) pocket, and preventing any breakthroughs toward COLMAR from NW. Even after KAYSERBERG had fallen midway through the period, his efforts continued in the area of ORBEY (V5747) and at MITTELWIHR (V6950; only in the SW corner of the pocket did he show any comparable resistance, with counterattacks in the SCHNEIGHOUSE (V5706)- OBERFELD (V5117) area. One armored CA along the Rhine plain E of SELESTAT proved abortive; elsewhere in the sector the enemy was very alert to our activities and utilized arty and morter fire heavily.

On the northern front, the enemy was still defending strongly just W of the Rhine River, at the beginning of the period, while falling back to the SIEGFRIED Line in the E HARDT Mountains. He held fast in the Maginot Line of the HARDT mountains and defended tenaciously the BITCHE forts. As the period progressed resistance in the Maginot line decreased as the main forts at BITCHE were finally reduced by 21-22 Dec, but the enemy became more aggressive to the East, opposing bitterly our attempts to cross the LAUTER River at BUDENTHAL (R0555) and counterattacking fiercely in the NIEDERSCHLETTENBACH (R-0854) area. By the end of the period only small raids and defensive fire were noted in HARDT mountain area, while resistance and fire fights continued in the SCHONAU (R0151) BRUDENTHAL (R0555) sector. Steady vehicle movement had been continuous, during latter part of the period, with much of it into SCHONBACH Q7653.

ALPINE FRONT: On the 19/20 Dec an enemy raid on MT GELEVRE (R4505) was repulsed. In the S sector, a one-man submarine was captured intact inside the MENTON breakwater. Two PW's of an enemy patrol of 7, reported to have been in MENTON for 3 days, were captured.

5. MOVEMENT

A. Rails

Activity in the MANNHEIM, PFORZHEIM-STUTTGART, RASTATT and LANDAU areas was much heavier than usual this week with the MANNHEIM-KARLSRUHE line one of the most active in the entire area.

Further North, the GIESSEN (G 62)-LAHNSTEIN (L 98)-(South of KOBLENZ), and GIESSEN-FRANKFURT lines, carried very heavy traffic on 17 December. Large scale southward movement was shown the same day on the line LAUTERECKEN (L 91)-KAISERSLAUTERN. Later in the week heavy movement from KAISERSLAUTERN, LAUTERECKEN, and ZWEIBRUCKEN, was seen moving towards HOMBURG, which was very active throughout the entire period, possibly indicating the arrival of a new division in this sector.

Heavy rail movement of troops and equipment through SINGEN towards FREIBURG, OFFENBURG, and KARLSRUHE, from 4-12 December was reported by First French Army. The reported movement of 8-10,000 troops from the MUENSINGEN (X2981) training area to PFORZHEIM on 4-5 December, and the French report of an increase in the transportation of troops and supplies, including new tanks, from the AUGSBURG region towards PFORZHEIM since 13 December, strongly suggest an influx of reenforcements into this area.

B. Roads

Reports of unusually heavy rail movement in the HOMBURG area are further supplemented by reports of heavy road movement there throughout the week. On 17 December a 10 mile convoy was seen moving from KAISERSLAUTERN toward HOMBURG. Another convoy of the same size was observed moving south toward NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983).

C. Rhine Bridges

The status of Rhine bridges north of STRASBOURG is shown on the attached overprint. South of STRASBOURG, the rail bridges at BRISACH and CHALAMPE remain still serviceable.

D. Conclusion

Rail movements in the BLACK FOREST coincide with reports on troop concentrations in that area. It is possible that the enemy is forming, or re[illegible]

 SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

one or more Volksgrenadier Divisions in that region. Furthermore he used the LORRACH-FREIBURG area for assembly of replacements destined for the VOSGES pocket.

As the German First Army is holding a very wide sector from the Rhine to the Moselle, held between WURTH and ZWEIBRUCKEN by rather weak divisions, a reinforcement of that portion of the front is to be expected. Rail activity in HOMBURG and LANDAU might indicate, therefore, the arrival of formations, even of major units.

6. SUPPLIES

The hasty formation of a German "Peoples Army" evidently finds the enemy unable to clothe and equip such a sizable force from existing stocks. This is clearly brought forth in a basic directive of 12 October by FUEHRER HQ., in a document captured by Seventh Army, which states that all soldiers of the VOLKSSTURM, without distinction of rank, will furnish their own clothing. All uniforms, as well as weather-resistant sports and work clothes, are declared suitable. Equipment to be brought is to consist of only bare essentials, but should include knapsack, blanket, and cooking and eating utensils, even if improvisation is necessary. Uniforms of the party and other organizations must be dyed to make them suitable for field service. This suggests a convenient means of concealing the true status of party members when they as individuals enter the VOLKSSTURM.

Another advantage in a non-uniformed force, required only to wear an armband for identification, is that it enables its components to merge quickly with the civil population with relatively small chance of immediate detection, except when actually participating in combat.

Ordnance Technical Intelligence with Seventh Army reports that of all ammunition recently examined, approximately 50% was manufactured since July 1944, whereas 18 to 20% was produced during October and November 1944. No indications of a general shortage of ammunition have as yet been reported, but the above findings suggest that the enemy at present is able to build up ammunition stores for not much more than his immediate requirements.

7. DEFENSES

On the First French Army sector, ground sources continue to report feverish activity in the BASLE - LOERRACH - WEIL sector. A/T ditches and fire trenches are under construction and many locations have been evacuated. Barricades are also reported under construction at all the crossings along the Swiss Frontier from BASLE to RACKINGEN (R 18). This with other fortifications already reported along the Swiss Border seems to indicate the Germans to be concerned about our possible crossing of the narrow strip of Swiss Territory, and thereby turning the SIEGFRIED Line.

A high ranking German officer, who participated in maneuvers calling for the defense of the BIENWALD, reveals that an attack through the narrow corridor between the BIENWALD and the RHINE would, if successful in its early stages, be later opposed by the KARLSRUHE - MAXIMILIANSAU (R 4149) bridgehead which has been strongly fortified for some time (CSDIC #662). Air coverage of early November shows A/T ditches and fire trenches covered by a few pillboxes and casemates barring the southern approaches to this bridgehead south of HAGENBACH (R 3747). No fortifications defending the western and northern approaches are revealed. However, branches of the Old Rhine, usually filled at high water season, would afford an excellent defensive position, facilitating the creation of a bridgehead similar to that on the First Army Front, and the small bridgehead which held out on the west of the Rhine at STRASBOURG.

Captured documents analyzed by M.I.R.S. indicate an apparent disagreement among German commanders about the value of connected trench systems. One faction disapproves of them because they give away positions, and advocate slit trenches, foxholes, and strongpoints. Slit trenches are considered by others to be unsatisfactory, since an essential of defense is surprise opening of fire from alternate positions. Slit trenches compel the individual soldier always to fire from the same place, and their supply is almost impossible.

During the recent campaign in the VOSGES, the enemy used a connected trench system, covered by boards and camouflaged with dirt and grass, indicating that he

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

has learned from the Normandy Invasion and has reconciled the differences of opinion with a compromise which combines camouflage of position with possibility of movement and supply.

The effect of naval artillery and air bombardment on the German defenses in Normandy is analyzed from a paper prepared by M.I.R.S., LONDON, from a number of captured enemy reports on the invasion.

1 - The preceding wide spread air bombing disrupted the entire transport system and caused shortage of ammunition by the second day.
2 - All minefields laid near the coast were blown up and proved useless. Barbed wire entanglements were broken down and easily crushed by tanks later.
3 - All field works were destroyed; the sides of communication trenches were crushed in and only concrete emplacements were able in part to survive the havoc. Although the MG turrets generally survived the bombardment, they were lifted out of position and made useless for firing. Slit trenches, especially if covered with strong wooden lids, gave the best protection.
4 - All flame throwers, including those built into emplacements, were put out of action, with most of the crews being killed.
5 - Goliath tanks, which had been held in readiness, were either destroyed or buried by debris, their circuit was shot to pieces and the terrain so churned up as to be impassable to them.
6 - Signals communication, searchlight cables, and position-finding installations were eliminated.
7 - The smoke barrages put down in the course of Allied landings compelled the German artillery to fire blind. No provision had been made for the automatic weapons to lay down defensive fire on fixed lines in the dark or in smoke. (Note: this probably has been remedied in the defense of the SIEGFRIED Line).

Even more disastrous than the material effect was the morale effect of the rapidly and precisely firing naval guns, including those of small caliber. The drum fire inspired in the defenders a feeling of utter helplessness. The instinct of self-preservation completely drove from their minds any desire to fight and destroy.

This effect on the morale of men whose concrete bunker is subjected to the pounding of artillery fire, is substantiated by a PW captured on the VI US Corps front: Five or six heavy caliber hits succeeded in knocking the heavy steel door from its anchorage in the concrete but effected no penetration in the door itself; hits on top of the bunker knocked down pieces of masonry but caused no damage; three hits from flat trajectory fire caused a hole 6 to 8 inches in diameter, and smoke penetrating through the doorway made breathing difficult. There were no killed or wounded, but PW states that the mental anguish was greater than the physical effect of the shelling. All occupants were captured.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON RHB.
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl.
Incl #1 - January Weather Summary

G-2 Spec Distr.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

JANUARY WEATHER SUMMARY

FOR THE

MIDDLE AND UPPER RHINE VALLEY

General

In January the mercury reaches its lowest point and will average freezing or slightly below. Precipitation begins to fall off from the late fall high totals. Much of this, however, especially on high ground comes as snow or sleet, greatly impeding traffic. The general visibility remains poor and is a distinct handicap to military observation and to the operation of tactical aircraft. Cloudiness, though still considerable, averages less than in December and ceilings are generally higher. In all, January possesses many disadvantages for field operations, but is an improvement over the previous three months and leads up to the relatively favorable winter month of February.

Temperature

Temperatures will average very near the freezing mark. Altitude and distance from the sea are the controlling factors. The VOSGES Mountains and BLACK FOREST areas average lower than RHINE Valley locations. Strasbourg is typical of Middle RHINE cities, with an overall mean of 31.5°: a daily maximum of 37° and a daily minimum of 27°. The absolute lowest on record for January there is minus 8°. In an ordinary year temperature will dip below the freezing mark on 17 days. Mountain spots in the VOSGES, HARDT, and BLACK FOREST Mountains will experience colder weather with averages near 25° above 2,500 feet and an absolute minimum of minus 15°. In the Bavarian Plain the average figure reaches 30° at Nurnberg and dips to 28° at Munich

January Mean Temperatures

Strasbourg	31.6	Karlsruhe	32.9
Mulhouse	32.4	Munich	28.2
Grand Ballon	24.4	Basel	31.8
Colmar	33.1	Berlin	31.5
Frankfurt	32.0	Nurnberg	30.0
Sarreguemines	32.0	Feldberger	25.5
Lac d'Alfeld	30.9		

Precipitation

The chief control in January precipitation is altitude and exposure. Westward facing locations in the VOSGES, HARDT, and BLACK FOREST Mountains receive as much as four to five times as much rainfall as adjacent river valleys. The hills east of Trier and north of Saarbrucken receive an average of 3.60 inches, while Low[illegible]oselle towns, such as Trier and Coblentz, get between 1.60 and 2.00 inches. In the [illegible]RDT Mountains just north of the SIEGFRIED Line the average again increases to 2.80 inches, although an eastern-facing slope like Kaiserslautern records less than 2 inches. The floor of the RHINE Valley in January lies in the rain shadow of [illegible]se mountains and is one of the driest areas in Germany at this time of year. Basle, Strasbourg, Speyer, and Mannheim all have less than 1.60 inches. New Breisach is the driest spot in Germany in January with an average of only 0.96 inches for the month. BLACK FOREST Mountains, like the VOSGES, act as a rain catch and have very excessive falls on their upper slopes. The three highest stations, receive over 6.50 inches with one averaging 7.50 inches, the second highest January figure in Germany. Wet and dry areas like these, lying in such close proximity, make flood prediction extremely difficult. As one progresses eastward, the rainfall drops off rapidly with Stuttgart and Ulm measuring only 1.60 inches.

Rainy days are frequent in January. Strasbourg has fifteen days with measurable precipitation. Mountain stations on either side of the Valley will have 16-18 days with rain.

Snow may be expected at any time during the month. Amounts are seldom heavy, except on the higher mountains, and the snow cover lasts for relatively short periods. Strasbourg at 500 feet has an average January fall of only 1.2 inches and the greatest ever registered there amounted to only 5.1 inches.

SECRET SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

In mountain areas above 2,000 feet practically all the precipitation falls as snow and by the end of the month amounts accumulate in the passes that seriously hamper traffic. In the BLACK FOREST localities at 1,500 feet can expect a 4 inch snowcover 20% of the time. At 3,000 feet this figure jumps to 84 %. Deep snows seldom occur at 1,500 feet, but at 3,000 feet depths over 16 inches may be anticipated 50 % of the month.

Cloudiness and Moisture

The chief feature of the RHINE Valley winter is the excessive amount of cloud cover. At Karlsruhe at 0800A the sky is overcast 56 percent of the days and clear only 12.5 percent. By 1400A the figures are 56 percent and 15 percent. After sunset the average of cloudy days is 59 percent, while 25 percent are clear. This emphasises the daily trend in cloud cover: overcast skies at dawn tend to improve gradually throughout the day with the best conditions obtaining in the early evening. Sunshine is near the minimum for the year. Karlsruhe receives an average of only 1.5 hours per day throughout the month.

Relative humidity is high. The prevailing southwesterly winds bring moisture laden air to the area. Strasbourg shows an average humidity for the month of 88 percent, one of the highest for all France. Occasional dry periods may be experienced when cold, dry winds from Russia sweep across Germany and into France, bringing intense cold and low himidities.

Visibility

Horizontal vision in the RHINE Valley is generally poor throughout January. Cold air settles in the Valley and traps a layer of dust, smoke, haze, and fog which may persists for a week to ten days without change. At Karlsruhe at 0800A visibility is better then 6 miles only 25 percent of the time. The hourly improvement is shown by the 1400 A figure of 33 percent and the 1900A mark of 38 percent. On the other hand, visibility below one mile may be expected 12 percent of the time regardless of the hour. Very poor visibility tends to persist all day, but moderate visibility will generally improve throughout the day.

Wind

The prevailing wind in the RHINE Valley is south and southwest. At Karlsruhe 55 percent of the noon observations show southwest. North and northeast are the second most frequent direction with 37 percent. Wind speed averages low at Karlsruhe. Twenty-four percent of the morning observations show calm and only 5 percent over 19 mph. By noon the calm figure has dropped to 16 percent, but the high wind chances remain at 5 percent. Evening shows a marked increase in calm to 28 percent, and the figure for winds over 19 mph. drops to 2.5 percent.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

ALMANAC TABLES FOR STRASBOURG - JANUARY, 1944

48 35 N 07 45 E - 500 Feet Altitude

JANUARY	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
1	0822	1649	1950	1025	FULL MOON
2	0822	1649	2056	1056	
3	0822	1650	2154	1122	
4	0822	1651	2304	1145	
5	0822	1652	----	1206	LAST QUARTER
6	0821	1654	0006	1225	
7	0821	1655	0109	1245	
8	0821	1656	0213	1306	
9	0820	1657	0319	1332	
10	0820	1658	0425	1401	
11	0819	1700	0532	1436	
12	0819	1701	0638	1520	NEW MOON
13	0818	1702	0740	1615	
14	0817	1704	0830	1725	
15	0816	1705	0919	1854	
16	0816	1707	0958	2052	
17	0815	1708	1029	2110	
18	0814	1710	1057	2229	
19	0814	1711	1125	2347	
20	0813	1712	1147	----	FIRST QUARTER
21	0812	1714	1212	0103	
22	0811	1715	1241	0219	
23	0810	1716	1313	0354	
24	0809	1718	1351	0446	
25	0808	1720	1437	0552	
26	0807	1721	1530	0643	
27	0806	1723	1630	0741	FULL MOON
28	0804	1725	1734	0822	
29	0803	1726	1840	0856	
30	0802	1728	1945	0924	
31	0800	1730	2050	0948	

SOURCE:
Air Forces Weather Station
XII Tactical Air Command

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44

CONFIDENTIAL
23 1200A DEC.



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



185/DEC. 44/EAG 6025

SECRET

G-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 231200A DEC.



LEGEND

ROADS
BRIDGES
RAIL ROAD
HIGHWAY
FLOATING
FERRY
SIEGRIED LINE
ROUTES OF APPROACH
MAGINOT LINE
FORTS

G2 6 AG

~THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT~ NORTH SECTOR~

SECRET

P-366

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 403, U. S. Army

56

SECRET
By Auth of
CG 6 Army Group
Initials: WCH
Date: 30 Dec 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 15

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 30 December 1944

1. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Enemy Activities in Forward Areas, and Units in Contact.

The enemy is showing an aggressively defensive attitude along the entire Sixth US Army Group front. The German Nineteenth Army, although contained in the VOSGES pocket, maintains a defensive but wary attitude and uses every opportunity to keep the initiative. The German First Army has used the time made available to it by reorganizing and refitting its worn units behind the strong defensive positions of the SIEGFRIED Line. The area behind the RHINE from BASLE to KARLSRUHE is apparently under command of HIMMLER himself in his capacity as Commander, UPPER RHINE.

In the VOSGES pocket, eight divisional formations control approximately 15,000 combat effectives. Two divisions (716 and 159 VG) have been out of contact for sufficient time to have been refitted with the replacements coming into this area from across the RHINE. Tanks have also been noted, with an increase in Jagdpanzers. The relatively short interior lines of communications permits the enemy to mass his forces with extreme rapidity to meet attempted attacks by our forces. His position in the plain below the high slopes of the mountains and in the dense HARTH forest area make his intentions difficult to discern, with the possibility of regrouping and attacking in any sector always a threat.

Along the US Seventh Army northern front, elements of nine divisions are still in contact. The equivalent effective strength amounts to approximately 13,000 in infantry troops. The total armored vehicles, including tanks and SP guns, available in the area are now estimated at 125. The refitting of 17 SS, 25 PG and 21 Panzer Divisions should now have progressed to the point where these units may be considered good in combat effectiveness. The enemy shows no sign of retreating, but on the contrary is quick to occupy all ground relinquished by Allied forces. His artillery positions have increased in number, both forward of and behind the SIEGFRIED Line. There is continued evidence of bridgebuilding and large scale movements directly behind the front. The enemy's intentions in this area are definitely aggressive, if only for the purpose of preventing withdrawal of Allied forces from this front to the EIFEL sector.

b. Enemy Reserves.

There are at least five divisions in reserve in the area directly fed by the WEISSENBURG-LAUTERN-HOMBURG lines. 17 SS, 25 PG, and 36 Infantry Divisions have been rebuilding for a period of some two weeks. 21 Panzer has not been identified in its former sector for a week and has undoubtedly moved back into a reserve position. The 553 VG has, according to PW's, left its former position in the line near KARLSRUHE and is assumed to have moved into the general assembly area behind ZWEIBRUCKEN and PIRMASENS for further refitting. Of the candidates from NORWAY (710 Inf, 2 Mtn, 6 SS Mtn), only 710 Infantry and 6 SS Mountain are definitely known to have begun traveling. The terrain in the area favors the employment of a mountain division, but no solid identifications have as yet been made. The 216th Infantry Division is still carried as being responsible for a sector of the SIEGFRIED Line near KARLSRUHE. The 405 and 415 Administrative Divisions are known by document to be controlling the miscellaneous units in the defensive positions behind the RHINE. The presence of some staff or corps size seems necessary for supervision of the relatively quiet but dangerous RHINE sector north of the pocket.

C2-239

SECRET SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. Capabilities.

The following capabilities remain open to the enemy:

1. Attack on the axis HOMBURG-SARREBOURG with present forces augmented by an estimated three to five low calibre divisions.

Discussion:

Capability 1 is favored. The aggressive defense, as discussed above, the build up in the area, the heavy rail activity, the time elapsed permitting refitting, and the total number of troops definitely make it possible. The strategic advantages of forcing the commitment of the Seventh Army's forces at this time when the enemy cannot risk weakening his own front further by sending troops to the EIFEL sector are apparent. Should the enemy succeed in reaching SARREBOURG, the withdrawal of Allied forces from hard won territory between the VOSGES and the RHINE north of STRASBOURG might become necessary. The morale factor alone in such an eventuality would be considerable for the enemy, without cosidering the delay to the Allied plans for advancing into Germany.

2. A rapid shift of forces from north to south within the VOSGES pocket for attack on the axis MULHOUSE-BELFORT, reinforcements being available from the Black Forest.

Discussion:

Capability 2 would be executed only in conjunction with capability 1, and at the period when the main attack in the SAAR area had progressed to a noticeable extent. The purpose in this case would be to force employment of all possible Allied reinforcements in the VOSGES thereby preventing their use in the SAAR area.

3. A limited attack across the RHINE with STRASBOURG as the objective.

Discussion.

Capability 3 is considered in the same light as capability 2.

4. Aggressive defense along the entire Sixth US Army Group front, using the reserves for commitment on the EIFEL sector.

Discussion.

Capability 4 is not favored. The risk that the Allies might release troops from this front to reinforce the EIFEL counterattack will force the enemy to take aggressive action against the Seventh Army. Furthermore, for the reasons given in capability 1 above, the enemy cannot remain inactive in this area.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

At the close of the period First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FOLCKLING (Q 3861), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), UTWEILER (Q 6858), BITCHE (Q 7650), NEUHOFFEN (Q 9146), BUNDENTHAL (R 0555), SCHWEIGHOFEN (R 1949), NEUBURG (R 3643), South along RHINE to RHINAU (V 9768), SELESTAT (V 7861), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LE VALTIN (V 4644), ODILIEN (V 4323), MUNSTER (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), East along HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to border of Switzerland.

(a) FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

Although it is still difficult to draw definite conclusions from available information on enemy's intentions, it is clear that he is proceeding with a reorganization of his dispositions in First German Army sector. The probable withdrawal of his mobile units, (21 Pz Div, 25 PG Div, 17 SS PG Div) into Army or Army Group reserve (HOMBURG area) suggests a build up of mobile striking force, which could either reinforce the EIFEL drive, or (which is more probable) may become a nucleus of a striking force. Furthermore, unsatisfactory identifications of 36 Infantry Division and 361 VG Division indicate the probable withdrawal of these major units for refitting and ultimately possible new assignment connected with the indicated enemy build up opposite Seventh US Army's left flank.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division and attached units (BG SAARBRUCKEN, and VG Training Bn WESTMARK) oppose XV US Corps. Combat effectives of the division with attached units are estimated at approximately 2,500.

17 SS PG Division is accepted as a candidate for withdrawal and refitting. There are indications that the division may have received 50-60 new tanks. Furthermore a PW stated that 1,000 replacements have been received. There is sufficient evidence to assume that this SS Division will be restored to its role as a strong mobile force for this critical area.

19 Infantry Division. This division has evidently assumed control of the sector vacated by 17 SS PG. So far two regiments (73 and 74 GR) were identified in 44 US Division zone. Third US Army estimated the combat effectives of the division at 2,000 on 25 December. Unless the division received replacements, combat effectives of 73 and 74 GR would not exceed 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division continued to oppose 100 US Division. Losses were suffered by the units in line. As no arrival of replacements was reported combat effectives are estimated at 3,000.

25 PG Division is another candidate for withdrawal, refitting and inclusion in First Army or Army Group G reserve. There are strong indications that elements of the division have been refitting for some time and that substantial reinforcements have bolstered the fighting capacity of this major unit. However, more precise details are lacking and no appraisal of its combat effectives can be made at present.

21 Panzer Division also has probably been withdrawn. Elements of the division were last identified on Seventh US Army front on 25 December while its tank regiment (22 Pz Rgt) was reported refitting for some time. Lack of substantiating evidence renders any estimate of its combat effectives difficult.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEHNE)

361 Volksgrenadier Division has been identified very unsatisfactorily during the period. It is therefore probable that the division is being gradually withdrawn for refitting and ultimate new assignment. So far the sector occupied by the division has been reinforced by the 52 GAF Battalion, but evidence is lacking whether the battalion has relieved elements of the division or is operating under the division.

245 Infantry Division. Although satisfactory identification is lacking it is believed that this division is continuing to occupy the sector opposing 44 US Division. As was stressed in G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 14, 23 December, the division was badly depleted and was expecting replacements. Possible arrival of replacements could be tied up with increased RR activities in the rear area of LXXXIX Corps.

256 Volksgrenadier Division was considerably reinforced by two march battalions (818 and 819) each estimated at 600 combat effectives and a Volkssturm battalion estimated at 300 combat effectives. In addition a BG ANTON presumably connected with SIEGFRIED Line defenses is operating under 256 VG Division. Combat effectives of divisional organic and attached units are estimated at approximately 3,000.

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

The front along the RHINE between LAUTENBURG and RHINAU is held on the eastern banks of the river by static units. These units were accepted as operating under the 553 VG and 405 zbV Divisions. There are indications, however, that 553 VG Division which was supposedly refitting in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE may have been sent to another area. Static units manning the SIEGFRIED Line south of KARLSRUHE are accepted as remaining at present under 405 zbV Division (by captured documents in STRASSBURG).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

During the period the enemy's attitude in the VOSGES area remained unchanged. Since 23 December no substantial reinforcements arriving in that area were reported. On the Second French Corps front enemy divisions seem to be intermingled and no divisional boundaries can be established on the basis of identifications. The status of 716 Infantry Division remains obscure. 159 VG and 269 VG Divisions have not been satisfactorily identified for more then 8 days and it may be presumed that elements of these major units are refitting in the immediate rear areas.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division continued to oppose the French 2 Armored Division. The 326 GR, however, remained located in the vicinity of KAYSERBERG (V 6247). Combat effectives of the division are estimated at 1,000-1,200.

708 Volksgrenadier Division had its elements spread on a large front intermingled with elements of 189 VG and 198 Infantry Divisions. No confirmation of a supposed absorption by the division of remnants of 716 Infantry Division have been received.

716 Infantry Division. The status of the division remains obscure. Last identifications of organic units were reported on 13 December. It is probably refitting for use as a tactical unit in control of the scattered forces within the pocket.

(2) XC Corps (CG: Gen. der Fl. PETERSEN)

189 Volksgrenadier Division. Last identifications of organic and attached units were reported on 21 December. However, a new unit (Rgt. MAECKER) was identified in the sector. The regiment has three battalions. The combat effectives of the first battalion were given by PW at 300. It is therefore presumed that combat effectives of the whole regiment may be at 900-1,000. Combat effectives of divisional organic and attached units (including Rgt MAECKER) are estimated at approximately 3,000.

16 Volksgrenadier Division. Elements of the division were last identified on 27 December. Combat effectives of the division were at a low ebb, estimated with attached units at 1,500.

269 Infantry Division. Since 20 December only the 489 GR was identified on 24 December sandwiched between elements of 189 VG and 708 VG Divisions. The location of other elements of the division remains obscure.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division remained as in the previous period fairly inactive. Last identifications were reported on 13 December. It is therefore presumed that elements of the division are refitting in rear areas.

338 Volksgrenadier Division. Elements were identified on 29 December in the 4 French DMM zone. No arrival of reinforcements in that area was reported and combat effectives of the division are estimated not to exceed 1,500.

Brigade HAFNER was opposing French 4 DMM. According to PW statements the brigade consists of two regiments (Rgt BAUMGARTEN and Rgt FRANKE).

Regiment BAUMGARTEN consists of Battalion SHILLING; 56 Jaeger Repl Bn; Battalion BEUCHELT (14 Repl Bn); Battalion VOGEL. Regiment FRANKE, the exact composition is not known. It is presumed however, that the regiment includes Battalion MAERKER and the 746 Engineer Battalion. Combat effectives of the brigade are estimated at approximately 1,200-1,400.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact:	
Seventh US Army	13,000
First French Army	13,000
Artillery Effectives:	
Seventh US Army (VI Corps only)	2,800
First French Army	4,500
Reserves:	
Possible build up in the HOMBURG Area	25,000
Units available in the Black Forest Area	15,000
Possible Reserves from Wehrkreis V and other sources available within the next 2-3 weeks	12,000
T O T A L	85,300
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Seventh US Army	80-100 inc immediate reserve.
First French Army	20-30
T O T A L	100-130
Guns	
Seventh US Army (VI Corps only)	87
First French Army	120
T O T A L	207

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680) BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M T.ROR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

(a) Enemy Disposition.

More clarification has been obtained on the present enemy disposition in the Alpine Sector.

The 157 Mountain Division has definitely been relieved in the PETIT ST BERNARD sector by elements of the LITTORIO Division (VARESE Bn/4 Alpine Regiment). The 888 German Reserve Mountain Battalion was relieved by an unknown German unit. (Possibly elements of 5 German Mountain Division).

In the BARDONECHE sector I/297 German Mountain Regiment was relieved by a battalion of the MONTE ROSA Division. In the MT GENEVRE sector I/85 German Mountain Regiment was relieved by the TIRANA Battalion of the MONTE ROSA Division.

In the ST MARTIN VESUBIE area the German 4 Mountain Battalion of German 5 Mountain Division has been relieved by III/3 Regiment of the LITTORIO Division.

Elements of the 5 German Mountain Division (85 Recon Bn) were still carried north of ST MARTIN VESUBIE and further confirmation of its presence in that area is awaited.

The sector South of ST MARTIN VESUBIE continued to be occupied by the 34 German Infantry Division with two regiments in line (107 and 253 GR) and one (80 GR) in reserve.

On the basis of this information it appears that elements of the MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions have relieved the 157 German Mountain Division and possibly elements of the 5 German Mountain Division. Thus the northern sector of the Alpine front seems to be taken over by the Italian Republican Army, while the responsibility for the southern sector considered most vulnerable, remains with the 34 German Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives:

Lack of substantiated information pertaining on organization and strength of Italian Units renders estimate of combat effectives impractical. Combat value of these units may be estimated as poor.

Combat effectives of 34 German Infantry Division are estimated at 4-5,000.

4. OPERATIONS

The enemy has in general adopted a defensive but wary attitude throughout the period, while his tendency to change dispositions indicates purposeful activity behind the quiet front.

On the northern front patrol activity and harassing artillery fire accompanied his improvement of defenses from the RHINE to the HARDT Mountain foothills. Aggressive, early in the period, particularly in the area of HABKIRCHEN (Q 5660) and NW of BITCHE, enemy elements in the HARDT Mountains and the SAAR district had assumed a defensive stand by 30 December.

The violent counterattacks in the VOSGES pocket NW of COLMAR continued until 26 December, when only moderate resistance was encountered in that area, and quiet had prevailed by the period's end. Only a raid in the vicinity of LOECHLE (A 8294) on 29/30 December broke the ominous inactivity of the south VOSGES pocket.

On the Alpine Front, the one event of the period was the unresisted capture of 17 armed Italians area N 6322.

5. MOVEMENT

In the HARDT Mountain region, heavy rail activity continued throughout the week. The KAISERSLAUTERN-HOMBURG line appears to be one of the most active routes on Seventh Army Front.

T.C/R on 24 December reported a concentration of 1,000 boxcars standing along a 10 mile stretch between LAUTERECKEN (L 8917) and KAISERSLAUTERN. No movement or loading activity was observed. This concentration was dispersed several days later in groups of 25 and 50 cars.

Fighter-bombers on 30 December indicated the presence of 1,000 boxcars and 100 locomotives on the SARREGUEMINES line east and north to BAD KREUZNACH (M 0938) of which perhaps 800 cars and proportionate number of locomotives were scattered along the many marshalling yards throughout this rather extensive area. The entire sector appeared to be active on the 30th.

The marshalling yards at MAINZ, MANNHEIM, WORMS, SPEYER, and LANDAU, were again seen with fairly heavy concentrations of rolling stock and locomotives.

The STUTTGART-ROTTWEIL rail line was reported active at various times throughout the week. On 25 December a total of 11 trains were seen moving south and southwest along the line. Again on 27 December, this line appeared active with 8 trains seen. These activities lend confirmation to the suggestion that such movements remain related to reported troop concentrations east of the RHINE. Only slight rail and generally scattered motor transport activity was observed in the lower Black Forest region.

SHAEF photo reconnaissance of 27 December reported movement of medium tank trains on the vital FRANKFURT-HEIDELBERG-KARLSRUHE line. This compares with T.C/R reports for 28 December of many scattered trains moving generally south and southwest toward KARLSRUHE where the yards were active throughout the period.

The STUTTGART-HEILBRONN area was likewise seen to have a heavy concentration of stationary cars on the twin lines from LUDWIGSBURG to STUTTGART on 28 December. HEILBRONN apparently handled a considerable volume of traffic as the yards were reported nearly full throughout the week.

COMMENT:

These concentrations of rolling stock in KAISERSLAUTERN-BAD KREUZNACH, and the presence on 25 December of a total of 250 railway fuel cars at KAISERSLAUTERN, BIEBERMUEHLE, and GRUENSTADT, strongly suggest a build-up of supplies, possibly intended for offensive action, in the HARDT Mountain area.

Movements east of the RHINE appear to be connected with troop concentrations in the general area of PFORZHEIM

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

6. DEFENSES

Photo interpretation reports reveal th t the enemy continues to entrench himself both in the ZWEIBRUECKEN-PIRMASENS area and in the corridor between the HARDT Mountains and the RHINE. Some digging activity is seen even as far b ck as WORMS. Road blocks are being est blished on roads south of ZWEIBRUECKEN, PIRMASENS, and LANDAU. Air coverage of the 15 December and l ter, reveal a number of artillery emplacements being in the depth of the SIEGFRIED Line in the ZWEIBRUECKEN-PIRMASENS area and between the HARDT Mountains and the RHINE. More recent cover shows some of these to be occupied by light field artillery and in a few instances by medium artillery. Emplacements are also making their appearance near shelter, apparently to accomod te AT weapons. These emplacements are in addition to the organizational artillery which is at present located between the front line and the SIEGFRIED Defenses.

During their assault on the SIEGFRIED Line, the VI US Corps found practically all pillboxes manned, with the exception of a few which were in front of the enemy main defensive position. Pillboxes were protected by firing trenches in front and connected by communic tion trenches. Personnel could move from one d maged pillbox to another via the communication trench without exposing themselves. Fire trenches also protected the interval between some pillboxes.

Defenses were generally sited so as to have good fields of fire commanding avenues of approach and were usually mutually supporting. Routes of approach favorable for tank employment were protected by either AT ditches or dragons teeth covered by pillboxes located at the rear. Wire was used extensively to protect trenches.

Pillboxes were generally protected by inf ntry equipped with MG's, rifles, and machine pistols, to prevent outfl nking. Personnel in the trenches outside of pillboxes ceased firing when subjected to a concentr tion of artillery or mortar fire but resumed fire immedi tely there fter.

In general, white phosphorous silenced fire from a pillbox, only temporarily. Direct hits of our light and medium artillery usually h d little effect on pillboxes. Locations of defenses observed coincided very closely with those indic ted on 1/25,000 over-printed maps.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2 Special Distribution

2 Inclosures
Inc # 1 - The Rhine Bridges.

Inc # 2 - Enemy Disposition.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY CMH SEC.
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44

185/Dec 44/6AG 6027

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





SCALE 1:1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km

185/Dec 44/6AG 6028

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 301200A DEC.

G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

Encl. #2 to
G-2 Weekly Intell. Sum. #15

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

56

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 423, U. S. Army

Off. of Dir. of Int. Hq USTAHF

P-587

SECRET
By Auth of
CG 6 Army Group
Initials: H. T.
Date: 6 Jan 44

DDI (A)

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 16

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 6 January 1944

1. GENERAL

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

On 30 December the enemy was opposing Seventh US Army on a line roughly east-west from LAUTERBOURG-BITCHE-SAARGUEMINES with six divisional formations (256, 245, 361, ~~257, 19, 347 Infantry Divisions~~).

Seven divisional formations were accepted as being in reserve (21 Pz, 25 PG, 17 SS PG, 36 Inf, 172 Res, 553 and 559 Inf.). Reinforcements equivalent in strength to an estimated three divisions were considered available for this front. The bulk of these are being absorbed by units already in line or in reserve, with 6 SS Mountain already committed as a complete unit.

On 1 January the enemy launched an attack from the area with six divisions (36 Inf, 559 Inf, 17 SS PG, 257 Inf, 256 Inf, and 361 Inf).

On 6 January the enemy had in line the bulk of ten divisions (245, 256, 361, 6 SS, 257, 559, 17 SS, 36, 19, and 347) with three and possibly four identified divisions located in immediate reserve. (21 Pz, 25 PG, 172 Res and possibly 553 VG Divisions).

It is estimated that on the Seventh US Army front the enemy massed about 150-200 armored vehicles, thus increasing his capability to meet the counterattacks immediately launched by our forces.

At the present stage of operations it is difficult to discern further intentions of the enemy. So far he had succeeded in occupying the HARDT massive thus improving his operations west of the HARDT Mountains trough the WISSEMBURG gap. However, the stubborn resistance of our forces and counterattacks in strength forced the enemy to commit the majority of his forces in the HARDT Mountains pocket, leaving him with only three or four fresh divisions for new operations.

b. Capabilities. (see Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944.)

Capabilities as set forth in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944, remain basically unchanged.

Capability 1 has been attempted by the enemy and was met easily by our forces. However, the drain on the enemy's strength has not been sufficient to eliminate entirely his definitely offensive intentions. The armored strength has not yet been committed and its use will determine which of the following modifications he will employ:

a. To await further reinforcements and carry on with his original intention.
b. To accept a more limited objective and shift his effort from the west to the east side of the HARDT Mountains.

That the enemy could reinforce this front with the necessary offensive power can hardly be expected when his position along the rest of the front is growing critical. Since his ultimate objective - to pin down the Seventh Army - can still be effected by operating against the ALSACE Plain from the east by more complete use of the forces presently at his disposal, it may be expected that the continuation of the offensive will come in that area.

The attempt to effect this capability will be marked by the movement of armored forces toward the east along the BITCHE-WISSEMBOURG-KARLSRUHE line and an outbreak of RHINE crossings north and south of STRASBOURG, with renewed activity against the northern edge of the VOSGES pocket.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

At the close of this rather active period First and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FOLCKLING (Q 3861), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6565), BITCHE (Q 7650), KOHLHUTTE (Q 7338), REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037), BAERENTHAL (Q 8442), DAMBACH (Q 9245), CLEBOURG (R 1145), FORT LOUIS (R 2321), South along RHINE to RHINAU (V 9768), SELESTAT (V 7861), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LE VALTIN (V 4644),

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ODEREN (V 4323), SIEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), East along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to border of Switzerland.

(a) FIRST ARMY (CG: Ben. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

The situation in this area has clarified itself to some degree. In the attack which started on 1 January, First German Army has to date committed eight divisions with one division holding on either flank. The 21 Panzer Division, 25 PG Division and 172 Reserve Division are accepted as being in Army Group or Army Reserve in the HOMBURG-PIRMASENS area. The attack has not as yet developed sufficiently to indicate the actual alignment of corps responsibilities. However, the XIII SS Panzer Corps is probably in charge of the present phase of attack with an unidentified corps and the LXXXIX Corps taking the area from east of the attack zone to the RHINE.

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division continues to hold the sector which is now on the front of the 106 Cavalry Group and the 103 Infantry Division anchoring the right flank of the enemy. During the period, 860 GR was the only organic unit identified. However, a number of attached units appeared on the scene, (41 GAF Fortress Engr Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 107 Repl Bn; and Bn SCHWAB) all of which suggests that the other divisional organic units might be refitting in the immediate rear. Combat effectives of the division including attached units are estimated to be approximately 2,000-2,500.

19 Infantry Division has elements on the 44th Infantry Division sector which aided the holding attack of the 347 Division and supported the preliminary advance of 36 Infantry Division. North of SAAREGUEMINES the 73 and 74 GR were identified during the period. The third regiment, 59 GR, was located on the left flank of the division at Q 7444 after having been drawn down from the Third US Army front where its combat effectives were estimated to be 120. Since the previous identification was made 26 December, it must be assumed that some replacements have been received by 59 GR. In addition, 73 GR was reported on 2 January to have an average company strength of 100 which would indicate that the division as a whole has received substantial replacements. Combat effectives therefore are estimated at 2,500-3,000.

36 Infantry Division had elements committed on the XV Corps front on 1 January after having had a 10 day period to rest and refit. Originally it appeared that its mission was immediate support of the 17 SS PG on its left, but as the period progressed it was found that 87 and 165 GR's had only one battalion each committed, with the remaining battalions reported to be reforming at BAUMHOLDER. PW's stated that heavy casualties had been sustained in the attack. Combat effectives - 1,200.

17 SS PG Division. As indicated in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, this division had been rebuilding and refitting for return to the role of a strong mobile force. Its committment therefore, on 1 January, as the spearhead of the attack was not surprising. Both regiments (37 and 38 PGR's) had an average strength of 100-120 men per company. The division's armor, according to PW statements, consists of one battalion of 45 assault guns with 20 Mark V tanks (Panther) attached. Discounting losses taken by the division in the attack, combat effectives are still carried at 3,000 - 3,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division. Developments during the period indicate that the sector was originally held by various BG formations from WKR XII. After the attack was launched one battalion each of 466 and 477 VGR's passed through to fulfill their mission of supporting the advance of 17 SS PG by pressing forward in the area just west of BITCHE. On 3 January elements of 457 VGR came into line, but it is believed that a large portion of the divisional organic units continued refitting. Combat effectives should be fairly high i.e. about 3,500.

559 Volksgrenadier Division was seriously depleted while holding a sector on Third US Army front. 1126 VGR which was last identified in that sector on 23 December evidently had absorbed some of the troops of 1125 and 1127 VGR's which were being refitted in the rear areas. On 1 January, XV Corps identified 1126 and 1127 VGR in the attack as well as some attached units (58 Fort MG Bn and OCS WIESBADEN).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

1125 VGR has not been located as yet and it may be presumed that it is being carried in divisional reserve. PW's taken indicate that the average company is about 100 strong. Combat effectives of the division should total approximately 2,000.

361 Volksgrenadier Division. This division took a very definite part in the attack and acquitted itself well. Its previous low strength was evidently raised by partial refitting of its units directly behind the line.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord. The arrival of this unit on the Western Front was finally realized on 2 January when PW's were taken from the Signal Battalion. Confirmation was made on the 5th when elements of 12 SS Mountain Regiment were identified in line at Q 7436 between 361 VG Division and 256 VG Division. PW's stated that the division had left DENMARK by rail on 24 December and had been routed via HAMBURG-ZELLE-HANOVER-GOETTINGEN-FULDA-WUERZBURG-MANNHEIM-LUDWIGSHAFEN-LANDAU-PIRMASENS reaching STURZELBRONN on 30 December. Prisoners further state that the division consists of two regiments (11 SS and 12 SS Mountain Regiments) of 3 battalions each. Personnel are said to be 70% VOLKSDEUTCHE, including a large portion of Hungarians. Commanding General is SS Gruppenfuhrer BOENNER. Combat effectives are carried at 6-7,000.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEHNE)

256 Volksgrenadier Division was shifted about 36 hours before the attack from the RHINE River flank to the area near NEUNHOFEN where it was given the task of holding the left flank of the zone of attack. Identification of all three regiments (456, 476, and 481 VGR) was made in the BAERENTHAL-DAMBACH zone. Combat effectives number in the neighborhood of 3,000.

245 Infantry Division had a static role during the period. The only identified unit was the attached XII/I Regiment north of LEMBACH. It is presumed that most of the organic elements of the division are refitting in the rear of its relatively quiet sector.

East of LEMBACH no other unit has been identified. However, some major unit must be in the area to control the Volkssturm and miscellaneous units reported to be covering the front.

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

Ground sources report that a higher headquarters for the Upper Rhine have been established in the Black Forest area with persistent indications that HEINRICH HIMMLER is in command. There are also indications that this command has subordinated to it (a) the Nineteenth Army on the VOSGES front and (b) one or possibly two Corps covering the area along the east bank of the RHINE. Nominations as possible candidates are the XVIII SS Corps and XC Corps, which according to some reports no longer exercises jurisdiction in the pocket itself. The composition of such Corps remains a matter of conjecture, but recent rail and road movements between BASLE and KARLSRUHE are indicative of a potential build-up of troops in that area.

(1) The east bank of the RHINE from LAUTENBERG to RHINAU continued to be held by static units operating under 405 zbV Division. Late in the period, various probing efforts were made in the vicinity of GAMBSHEIM and OFFENDORF where small units were established by 5 January. Elements of E-V Regiment, 81 Grenadier Replacement Battalion, and Motor Transport Replacement Battalion No. 5 were identified in the area, the latter under command of 553 Division. Mission was said by PW to occupy evacuated territory or to determine whether it was still held by American troops. Some PW's did not know the mission, had been given a very short notice of the orders to cross, and had been supplied with only one day's ration.

(c) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

While the attitude of the enemy remained defensive, the gradual shift of forces to the northwestern shoulder of the pocket was noticeable during the period. Elements of two battalions of 269 Infantry Division were identified north of COLMAR, but the location of the rest of the unit remained nebulous. In the same area elements of one regiment of 198 Infantry Division were also located while the 708 VG Division sidestepped to the east, indicating a possible build-up in the MUNSTER-COLMAR-SELESTAT area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The build-up in this area, created primarily by the displacement of units within the pocket, is intended to serve two purposes: (1) firmer protection of COLMAR, key city of the pocket; and (2) the mounting of a limited offensive in conjunction with the main effort in the SAAR-HARDT area. The arrival of some six replacement battalions permits the enemy at least a very aggressive defense.

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division. The relatively quiet activity in this sector during the period partially accounts for the lack of identifications. The division is now seriously depleted and would be a logical candidate for refitting. Perhaps the arrival of replacements in the VOSGES pocket has helped satisfy this need. 326 GR remains NE of COLMAR intermingled with troops of 708 VG and 269 Infantry Division

716 Infantry Division. The undetermined status of the division is caused by the paucity of information received during the period. Consideration should be given to its possible refitting and employment as a tactical unit in command of the various scatteredunits within the pocket.

189 Volksgrenadier Division has not been identified since the close of the preceding period. PW's stated that 1212 VGR had absorbed 1214 VGR. This division is also a likely candidate for the reception of newly-arrived replacements but present information does not indicate a combat effectiveness of over 1,000.

708 Volksgrenadier Division. The apparent piecemeal employment of the division is indicated by the identification of some elements NE of COLMAR on 3 January and elements of 748 VGR on 4 January south of SELESTAT. An additional candidate for replacements, combat effectives now number about 1,000.

269 Infantry Division. On 2 January one battalion each of 489 and 469 GR were identified north of COLMAR which may foreshadow the arrival of other elements of the division in the ST AMARIN region. Low in strength, it is estimated that combat effectives do not exceed 1,100.

16 Volksgrenadier Division is carried as a virtual nonentity for PW's are now reporting regimental strengths to be about 100 each. Unless reinforcements are received soon, it is probable that the remaining elements will either be withdrawn or reorganized into battlegroups. Its strength is now undeterminable.

Miscellaneous Units. In addition to units previously mentioned along the northern front of the pocket, there are a number of scattered units which bolster the defensive potentiality of the enemy. It is estimated that these combat effectives total 3,200.

(3) LXII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division. 300 replacements were received by the 1210 VGR during the period. Identifications last made on 1209 and 1211 VGRs were made on 6 December and 29 December respectively. The latters strength at that time was about 300 so it should be expecting reinforcements. Combat effectives of the division are estimated at 1,500.

338 Infantry Division had little chance to recover from the losses sustained early in December. In as much as no organic units have been identified since 28 December it may well be that the division is refitting prior to fresh employment, probably repeating its usual role of bringing a loosely held sector under tactical controll.

BRIGADE HUFFNER composition remained unchanged with Regiment BAUMGARTEN and Regiment FRANCE under command. Combat effectives are estimated at about 1,200.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(d) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact (Infantry effectives):		
Seventh US Army		30,000
First French Army		15,000
Artillery Effectives:		
Seventh US Army		15,000
First French Army		5,000
Reserves:		
Build up opposite Seventh US Army		20,000
Units available in the Black Forest		15,000
T O T A L		100,000
Tanks and SP Guns:		
Seventh US Army	in contact	80
	in reserve	150-200
First French Army	in contact	20- 40
	in reserve	50- 60
T O T A L		220-380

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), MT BOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

(a) Enemy Disposition

Further adjustments of enemy disposition were reported. It appears that two Italian Infantry Companies are attached to the 253 GR of the 34 Infantry Division. Furthermore PW's stated that on the left flank of the 44 AAA Brigade there were no German units located, suggesting that unidentified Italian Units relieved elements of 5 Mountain Division in that sector.

In the French sector only the 85 Recon Battalion of the 5 Mountain Division was identified which fact, combined with the reported absence of German units on the left flank of the 44 AAA Brigade, seems to indicate that the bulk of 5 Mountain Division may have been withdrawn from the Alpine front.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

Combat effectives:

Lack of substantiated information pertaining on organization and strength of Italian Units renders estimate of combat effectives impractical. Combat value of these units may be estimated as poor.

4. OPERATIONS

Frustrated in his attempt to achieve a decisive breakthrough in his HARDT Mountain counteroffensive, the enemy is apparently massing armor for new thrusts E and W of his present wedge, whose limits he is stubbornly defending, while probing our RHINE flank positions N and S of STRASBOURG.

One hour before the turn of the year, the enemy launched his counteroffensive through the HARDT Mountains on a front extending from NEUNHOFEN (Q 9146), BANNSTEIN (Q 8345), BITCHE (Q 7750), to SAARGEMUINES (Q 5159). Preceded by heavy artillery and mortar preparations, in some areas, and supported by enemy aircraft, initial gains were made mainly in the area of BARENTHAL (Q 8442), by tank-supported infantry. Panzer elements enjoyed moderate success in pushing toward their objective of ROHRBACH (Q 6549), toward the west it was only at heavy cost that the enemy was able to force a crossing of the SAAR near SAARGEMUINES at Q 5460. By 3 January, pressure was heavy in the REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037), and BARENTHAL areas as he infiltrated into PHILIPPSBOURG (Q 8742); but only short-lived gains were made by armored units in the attacks SW of BITCHE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The assembly of armor and infantry for projected attacks were frustrated by our artillery and counterattacks E of SAARGEMUINES. The enemy's axis of advance was becoming restricted as he occupied WILDENGUTH (Q 7838), on the 4th, and partially occupied PHILIPPSBOURG with infantry and tanks; but his attempts at REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037), and MEISENTHAL (Q 7140), were blunted. An armored drive in the good tank country SE of SAARGEMUINES temporarily put GROSREDERCHING (Q 6252) in enemy hands, while ACHEN (Q 5949) became a bone of contention between Allied and German armor. A new sphere of action opened on the 5th as approximately a bn of enemy forces were reported crossing to the W of the RHINE where they had occupied HERRLISHEIM (R 1215), OFFENDORF (R 1312), and were threatening GAMBSHEIM (R 1110). Strong pressure at DAMBACH (Q 9244) indicated the enemy's intent to search for new points of attack. Elsewhere he went over to the defensive, putting up stiff resistance to our attacks in the WINGEN (Q 7335) and WIMMENAU (Q 7634) area, while falling back slightly from ACHEN and REDERCHING.

West of the RHINE, the enemy forces were cleared from WEYERSHEIM (R 1513) while strong resistance continued at GAMBSHEIM. At the close of the period the situation in this area had not been completely clarified or restored. It was estimated, however that three platoons were established on the west bank of the RHINE supported by some 88's and a few tanks. The participating troops were identified as being under command of 553 Division were not of very good calibre. At the end of the period DAMBACH (Q 9244) continued active as steady movement indicated further build-up in the area; the enemy made successful infiltrations on the East side of his pocket as stiff resistance contined to our advance N of WINGEN (Q 7436) and WIMMENAU (Q 7735). Infantry and tank attacks were repulsed S of SAARGEMUINES, while movement N of ERCHING (Q 6557) and GUIDERKIRCH (Q 6656) indicated an imminent action brewing in that area. Two isolated enemy battalions still resisted strongly at WINGEN.

In the ALSACE pocket, ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408) was the scene of continuous, intensified counterattacks throughout the period. Strong enemy raids were made on KEMBS (A 8596), while aggressive patrols were met in the THANN (V 5413) area; west of the RHINE near ERSTEIN (V 9580) and at WITTERNBACH (V 9268). Elsewhere on the northern edge of the pocket, the enemy made but one heavy counterattack at ORBEY (V 4847). In the ALPINE sector normal patrol activity and harassing artillery fire prevailed.

5. MOVEMENT

On 2 January the RAF sighted a 27 mile long road convoy southbound on the KARLSRUHE-BASLE road, with the head of the column approximately 20 miles south of OFFENBURG. In this same area during the period 1-3 January 7 trains and many groups of coaches were sighted at intermediate stations of the HASLACH-OFFENBURG-LAHR rail line. Little active movement was reported on the rail lines but indications strongly point to military movements taking place in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG area.

The rail lines FRANKFURT-KARLSRUHE were active on 2 and 5 January with trains going in both directions. During these same days much activity and some turnover was noted in the marshalling yards of FRANKFURT, WORMS, MANNHEIM, and LUDWIGSHAFEN. The BRUCHSAL (R 6359) yards on 1 January and the ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0253) and HEILBRONN (S 0861) yards on 2 January were between 50-65% full.

In the SAAR very many groups of boxcars were sighted on 2 January on the lines WORMS-KAISERSLAUTERN-SAARBRUCKEN and the lines LUDWIGSHAFEN-NEUSTADT-LANDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN. On this day the ending of a large military move appears to have taken place on the LUDWIGSHAFEN-NEUSTADT-LANDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN line. On 5 January, there was again heavy activity on the lines KAISERSLAUTERN to SAARBRUCKEN. The bridges at WORMS and MANNHEIM appear to have been the principal points of entry into the SAAR during the past week.

The appearance of a great number of groups of cars without locomotives in the battle zone suggests that enemy rail movement generally takes place under cover of darkness, so as to prevent Allied air interference. There are also indications that the enemy is attempting to augment his lines of communications into the COLMAR pocket by making more ferries, pontoons, and pontoon sites available for the RHINE crossings.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. SUPPLIES

The enemy appears to have encountered little difficulty in bringing up supplies to the area of his advance on Seventh Army front. This may be partly due to the fact that his supply installations, originally intended to serve the SIEGFRIED Line, are advantageously located in his present forward area from which motor transport can supply fighting formations with a minimum of fuel expenditure.

Dumps in this area are sited generally close to the railway serving PIRMASENS, ZWEIBRUCKEN, HOMBURG, and SAARBRUECKEN. His ability to maintain the flow of supplies into this sector will depend largely on the status of the RHINE rail crossings, principally at WORMS and MANNHEIM which appear to be in greatest use, and the contined serviceability of the two most regularly travelled railways via KAISERSLAUTERN and LANDAU. A build up of stocks appears to have taken palce during the latter part of December when an increase in rail movement was noted prior to the offensive. There is at present no evidence which would indicate that the enemy is experiencing shortage of supplies in this area.

Distribution

Special

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

3 Inclosures:
#1 Inc. - The Rhine Bridges.
#2 Inc. - Enemy Dispostion.
#3 Inc. - Sixth US Army Group
Front - North Sector.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





061200 Jan.

Encl. #1
G-2 Weekly Intell. Sum. #16

SECRET G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

186/JAN 45/6 AG 6029

REPRODUCED BY ENGR. SEC. 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ DEC 44

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT
NORTH SECTOR

SCALE : 1/500,000 DATE : 061200 A JAN.
ENCL. #3 TO G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. #16

SECRET

185/JAN 45/6AG 6031

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

: SECRET :
: By Auth of :
: CG 6 Army Group :
: Initials: :
: Date: 13 Jan 45 :

Dir of Intel
USTAAF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 17

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 13 JANUARY 1945

69

1. GENERAL

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Elements of thirteen divisional formations were still in contact on the Seventh US Army front at the beginning of the period. By the end of the week, active contact was being maintained only with the more aggressive units. Of these only 17 SS PG, 6 SS Mountain, and 36 Infantry Division showed marked sensitivity, while 21 Panzer, 25 PG, 256 VG and 553 VG were evidently using the temporary lull in the HAGUENAU area to gather strength for an attack. An increase in movement toward this area indicates the imminent arrival of reinforcements. There is definitely a need both for infantry and for armor if the enemy intends to press home his avowed purpose of freeing ALSACE. Continuous ground reports and movement tabulations make 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions the most likely of the candidates for this front, now that 711 Infantry Division has been identified on the Eastern Front and 11 Panzer seems to be moving closely behind the front in the MERZIG-SAARBRUCKEN area.

On the First French Army front, the 106 Panzer Brigade and all of the eight divisional formations except 16 VG Division were identified during the week. Reinforcements were still arriving in numbers sufficient to allow an increase in strength in spite of some losses. The rebuilt power of 106 Panzer Brigade was notable, and 269 Infantry Division must still be accounted the best unit in the area. However, there is no evidence that the enemy is bringing in any new formations of offensive proportions. On the contrary, the quality of reinforcements arriving seems to be declining.

b. Capabilities

The enemy's capabilities remain basically unchanged from those previously set forth in Weekly Intelligence Summaries No. 15 and 16.

The acceptance of a more limited intention on the Seventh US Army front is now obvious. Even in the ALSACE plain, enemy dispositions seem to indicate that STRASBOURG is the eventual objective, with SAVERNE now only a dim hope. However, to carry out what would appear to be his logical plan-advances south and southeast from the HARDT Mountains and against HAGUENAU, with aggressive action out of the RHINE bridgehead and due north from the COLMAR pocket-more strength is necessary.

The capabilities in the COLMAR pocket are also more limited. The relief of 269 Infantry Division by 338 VG and the subsequent shift of strength to the COLMAR-SELESTAT area further reduces the possibility of an attack northwest against the ST DIE-MOLSHEIM road directly from the HOHNECK area. Although the capability of action against MULHOUSE cannot be entirely discounted, the attempt to move directly north out of the pocket towards STRASBOURG must be favored as the primary German intention. Sufficient strength for a major operation - or even for this operation alone, should the HAGUENAU area be completely dominated by the Allies - is not present in the area. That the enemy could find the necessary forces in the Black Forest is always possible, but hardly probable at this time. Finally, the extension of a long flank along the RHINE-RHONE canal under heights now completely controlled by the Allies is not without its obvious weakness. A larger number of enemy troops will be required as the enemy moves forward than he could spare for so limited a profit.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar Vosges Front)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth German Armies were disposed as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 65[illegible] BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), DAMBACH (Q 9245), CLEBOURG (R 1145), FT LOUIS (R 2321), DRUSENHEIM (R 1518), ROHRWILLER (R 1117), GAMBSHEIM (R 1010), South along RHINE to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LE VALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), SAEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the [illegible] al to NIFFER (V 8201) South along RHINE to Swiss border.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(a) FIRST GERMAN ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

Immediately after the close of the preceeding period the enemy committed his mobile forces which had been held in abeyance pending the outcome of his initial effort. At present, 172 Reserve Division is the only identified unit not committed, but there are strong indications that the Army reserve has been increased. Corps responsibilities began to take form as the XIII SS Panzer Corps was located by PW reports at SCHEIDT where it appears to have charge of the attack along the ROHRBACH axis. In the HARDT Mountain sector, the control of the forces must be vested in a Corps headquarters, as yet unidentified. Whether LXXXIX Corps controls all of the area east of the HARDT Mountains to the RHINE including the attack area of 21 Panzer and 25 PG is not clear as yet, but the mounting magnitude of the effort in the HAGUENAU area would seem to require the presence of another corps, probably armored.

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division remained inactive on the front of the 106 Cavalr Group and the 103 US Infantry Division. 861 GR was identified on 7 January which confirmed the continued presence of the unit in the sector but no identification has been made of 860 GR since 1 January. Of the attached units 80 GR Repl Bn was identified 10 January. Consequently it is assumed that the division has been able to res and refit considerable portions of the unit while holding a line which both sides regard with only mild interest. Combat effectives including attached units are carrie at 2,800.

19 Infantry Division continued to hold the sector opposite the 44 US Infantry Division while contributing to the advance in the HARDT Mountain sector by the shift of elements of 59 GR from the left flank of the divisional sector (identified by document as Q 6055) to the western edge of the HARDT salient where it opposes the 36 US Division. The major portion of the division, however, continued to oppose the 44 US Division as the 73 GR and 74 GR were identified on the 6th and 7th of January respectively. Total combat effective strength including miscellaneous units such as the 202 Stomach Bn and BG KLEIN would probably not be more than 2,400.

17 SS PG Division has been fighting in front of the 44 US Division and the 100 US Division since the attack was launched on 1 January. Both PGR's were identified during the period indicating no substantial change in positions. In addition to the Assault Gren Bn spotted on 4 January the division has attached the 59 Fortress MG Bn and OCS WIESBADEN unit. Considering the action in which it has been involved the strength is estimated at 2,800 combat effectives.

(2) Possible Unidentified Corps

559 VG Division had 1126 and 1127 VGR's in line on 9 January opposite the 36 US Division and the 100 US Division. The fact that 1125 VGR has not been committed since the attack started raises some doubts as to its actual existence, but it may have been cast in a defensive role for the area just west of BITCHE which has not been very active. Including BG HEITMANN strength is estimated at 1,900.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord bore the brunt of the effort in the southern part of the HARDT Mountain salient. Both the 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regiments were identified 11 January as was the Engineer Bn and the Recn Bn. Early in the period the Arty Regiment was also located and later it was found that the 506 SS PG Bn is one of the divisions attached units.

Regarding strength, PW's stated that the unit has sustained severe losses in Finland and Norway which had not been alleviated by reinforcements due to the hasty departure from Norway and Denmark. Therefore, the combat strength is now reckoned as being about 5,000, including possible reinforcements still arriving.

257 VG Division continued its eastward shift around the rim of the HARDT salient until the end of the period. It seems to have established itself in the south sector opposing the 36 US Division and the 45 US Division. All VGR's were identified during a period which was aggressive but not particularly offensive. Combat effectives: 1,800.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

361 VG Division committed all of its units against the 45 US Division front where 951, 952, and 953 VGR's were identified. The US VI Corps evidently took the unit into camp for it is reported that 951 was destroyed. Strength is estimated at 1,000.

36 Infantry Division pulled back during the period from the US XV Corps zone where it had attempted to assist the original attack by 17 SS PG Division. On 9 January elements of 118 GR turned up in a sector of the 45 US Division front in which the enemy's attitude was rather defensive. It is presumed that 87 GR and 165 GR are being refitted in the rear since their effectives were very low. The scanty information available makes it impossible to render estimate of the division's strength.

256 VG Division continued to support the pivotal position on the east flank of the HARDT salient. During the period all three regiments were identified on the 45 US Division front, but were comparatively inactive. The division has been given additional firepower with the attachment of 815 and 816 Super Heavy MG Bn. Total combat effectives: 2,100.

(3) LXXXIX Corps (and an unidentified Corps)
(CG: General HOEHNE)

It is unlikely that this Corps would be given command responsibility over such a formidable force as 21 Panzer Division and 25 PG Division on the RHINE flank. However, its presence in the area must be considered. Pending future clarification it is carried as having a passive mission which may be both defense and training.

21 Panzer Division was committed early in the period on the front of the 79 US Division after the effort in the HARDT sector was launched. 125 PGR, 192 PGR and 220 Engr Bn were identified on 8 January and were believed to be still in the proximite area at the close of the period even though they were not in close contact. The division received a considerable number of replacements in the period from the end of December to early January when it was out of line, but it is not felt that the refitting was entirely complete prior to its reappearance. Precise figures are still lacking but it is known that heavy losses were suffered in its effort this week which should materially reduce the estimated 4,000 it was credited with before the attack.

245 Infantry Division continued its static role opposite the northern front of the 45 US Division and the eastern portion of the 79 US Division. The only identification during the period was the capture of one PW from 937 GR on 8 January who stated that the mission of his unit was to insure road clearance for 21 Panzer Division. The fact that 935 and 936 GR's have not been identified since middle December may indicate that they have been refitted and may turn up in a revivified condition. All factors considered, the division's strength in combat effectives is carried at 4,000 including the 600 accredited to XII/I Regiment (atchd).

25 PG Division supported the effort of 21 Panzer on the front of the 79 US Division and 14 US Armored Division and as the attack progressed remained in more constant contact than its partner. 35 and 113 PGR's were identified on 9 January while the Engr Bn, Recn Bn and the 5 Tank Bn (an attached unit said by PW's to have about 40 tanks) put in an appearance as late as 11 January.

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

North of STRASSBOURG, the bridgehead over the RHINE River established during the previous period continued to exist as a harrassing factor. PW's taken from 553 VG Division in that sector stated that the operation is controlled by the XIV SS Corps. It has been further reported that XVIII SS Corps is charged with the area east of the RHINE and south of the VOSGES pocket which has been pregnant with reports of enemy activity.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

553 VG Division in the bridgehead was quiet at the period's close after all of its VGR's were identified by 9 January. The division appears to have incorporated diverse units into its regiments as is shown in the example of 1120 VGR which absorbed Volkssturm Bn STURMLINGER and Bn HOPPE. Other miscellaneous units (elements 2 SS Police Rgt; E/V Rgt; 35 Engr Bn; elements K/V Rgt; 1127 Fort Arty Bn) which were identified between 4-9 January appear to be under the command of 553 VG Division rather than subordinate to 405 zbV Division as was previously believed. Combat effective strength is estimated at 2,000-2,500 with about 30% still on the west bank of the river at the close of the period.

(c) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

This command rose from its passive attitude this week and succeeded in stimulating considerable activity in its sector. A major reshuffling of forces took place as 716 Infanty Division, long out of contact, assumed control over a sector in the French I Corps zone. The 338 Infantry Division shifted to the northwest and took over the sector of 269 Infantry Division along the VOSGES ridges. The latter then proceeded to the northwest and was located at the end of the period just south of SELESTAT. Consequently it would appear that these changes took place in order to support the effort of 198 Infantry Division which attacked northwards along the RHINE-RHONE canal on 7 January.

(1) LXIV Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division advanced against the front of 1 DMI (Fr), reached the village of KRAFFT and succeeded in clearing the area between the canal and the RHINE River. During this period 326 GR and 308 GR were identified on 7 January and 11 January respectively. In addition, the 192 Engr Bn (11 Jan) 746 Engr Bn (12 Jan) and 198 Fusilier Bn (7 Jan) were located in the line. Including attached units it is estimated that combat effectives do not amount ot more than 1,500.

106 Panzer Brigade provided the armored support to 198 Infantry Division. PW's state that after reorganization the Brigade consists of seven companies, three of which have armored reconnaisance vehicles with the other companies consisting of motorized infantry. They also indicate that the Bde has one bn of 40 tanks and SP guns. Probable strength of combat effectives: 800-1,000.

269 Infantry Division is in a new location opposing the 1 DMI and perhaps the 3 US Division. The 469 GR was identified on 11 January, but there has been no trace since 2 January of the 489 GR. Suspicious also is the lack of contact with 490 GR, last heard of in the middle of December.

That the division had been given a period for rest and refitting is obvious, but any estimate of strength is very difficult. Reinforcements from Norway reported in the Black Forest may be intended for this division.

189 VG Division continued to hold on the northwestern sector of the pocket opposite 3 US Division. 1213 VGR was identified early in the period but no appearance has been made by the other regiment (1212 VGR) since 28 December. Strength 700-1,000.

708 VG Division also holds a sector in front of the 3 US Division. 760 VGR was identified on 8 January and early in the previous period 748 VGR was located south of SELESTAT, probably now on the flank of 269 Infantry Division.

Combat effectives number about 1,000.

16 VG Division. The lack of identification of this unit since 29 December is rather indicative that a period of refitting is taking place in the rear areas.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Miscellaneous Units which are filling the gaps in the enemy lines in front of the 3 US Division are a variety of outfits from the various Wehrkreis. Combat effectives of their units now number about 3,000.

(2) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

338 Infantry Division has taken over the former sector of 269 Infantry Division along the VOSGES Mountains and opposes the 10 DI and 2 DIM. 757 and 758 GR's were both identified during the period but the location of 759 GR has not been ascertained since 31 December when it was in the SENNHEIM area. Including newly arrived replacements strength of the division is estimated at 1,600.

159 VG Division is still in the southwest corner of the pocket opposing 2 DIM and 1 DB. 1209 VGR turned up on 9 January. However, last identifications of 1210 VGR and 1211 VGR were on 4 January and 29 December respectively. It is reported that 1209 VGR did reorganize and receive replacements (as was reported of 1210 VGR during the previous period) and the regiment's strength has now been upped to 600.

716 Infantry Division finally came out of obscurity when it took over the former 338 Division sector in the MULHOUSE area opposite 9 DIC. Although the 726 and 736 GR's were identified during this period after having been out of contact for almost one month, it is not practicable to attempt a strength estimate prior to the receipt of additional information.

BRIGADE HAFFNER had elements identified on 10 January opposite the front held by 9 DIC and elements of the FFI. Combat effectives: 1,000.

(d) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	32,000	
First French Army	17,000	*

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	15,000	
First French Army (East of RHINE)	5,000	

Reserves:

Build up opposite Seventh US Army	10,000	**
Units available in Black Forest	15,000	
T O T A L	94,000	

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh US Army in Contact	150-180
Seventh US Army in Reserve	70
First French Army in Contact	50- 60
First French Army in Reserve	30- 50
T O T A L	300-360

(*) Estimate has been raised on the basis of reports of reinforcements in VOSGES pocket.

(**) Estimate lowered due to the commitment of 21 Panzer; 25 PG; 553 VG Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), POMPAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

(a) Enemy Disposition

The Franco-Italian border is held by German and Italian forces which are recapitulated as follows:

(1) The sector from the coast to ST MARTIN VESUBIE: 34 German Inf Division.

(2) The sector ST MARTIN VESUBIE to LARCHE PASS: Elements of the LITTORIO Division and possibly elements of 5 German Mountain Division.

(3) The sector LARCHE PASS to MONT GENEVRE: Elements of 5 German Mountain Division and elements of MONTE ROSA Division.

(4) Sector MONT GENEVRE to PETIT SAINT BERNARD and Swiss border: Elements of 5 German Mountain Division and elements of LITTORIO Division.

The enemy continued to demonstrate a defensive attitude with the usual patrolling and spasmodic artillery activity. The combat value of the troops opposing us has materially decreased since the tendency has set in to replace German units with Italian troops. Indicative of their attitude is the garrisoning of rear areas by German soldiers in order to protect their line of supply and possible lines of withdrawal. This is particularly true in the valley regions.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

The shifting of units, and the lack of positive information on the strength of the Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but it is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000 with 60% carried as combat effectives.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS.

An attack begun 6/7 January out of the VOSGES pocket and along the RHINE - RHONE Canal cut a wide swath up to V 9469, as it combined with armored elements crossing the river near ERSTEIN (V 9430). In securing the Rhine bank, the enemy further gained the towns of OBENHEIM (V 8673) and GERSTHEIM (V 9776). Pressure continued strong in the area of HERBESHEIM (V 9272), and E of the ILL River, the enemy held all towns except KRAFFT (V 9780) by the period's end.

In the Rhine pocket N of STRASBOURG, HERLISSHEIM (R 1315) changed hands several times during the period, but was occupied by the enemy by 11 Jan, as DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) and GAMBSHEIM (R 1110) continued to be strongly held. STATTMATTEN (R 1921) was cleared of enemy by 12 Jan.

The futility of the enemy's attempts in the so-called MAGINOT corner, to break out through our cordon in the areas of STUNDWILLER (R 1836) and ASCHBACH (R 1837) caused a slight shift to the west of his area of attack. Momentary success was enjoyed by his push against HATTEN (R 1733) and by the end of the period he had partially occupied the town. Attacks begun briskly early in the period on RITTERSHOFFEN (R 1553) had decreased as the period closed.

In the HARDT Mountain pocket counterattacks were being launched on PHILIPPSBOURG (Q 8742) as the isolated enemy forces in the area of WINGEN (Q 7335) were mopped up as the period began. By 9 January, the enemy was digging in near ALTHORN (Q 7540), offering stiff resistance there as well as at REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037). ALTHORN was successfully regained and counterattacks were launched from there and from WILDENGUTH (Q 7837) as entrenching activity was observed on these flanks of the enemy salient.

Movement in the SAAR Zone at the beginning of the period between ERCHING (Q 6557) and VOLMUNSTER (Q 7258) led to armor-supported attacks from ERCHING. The drive was stopped only after the enemy had reached ACHEN (Q 6049) and GROS REDERCHING (Q 6252) on 8/9 January. Elsewhere in the zone small-scale attacks were dispersed by artillery or repulsed during the period as a late all-out attack on RIMLING (Q 6455) took that town on 10 January. Activity flared up in the Western zone as small attacks and strong opposition were met in areas from Q 3370 - Q 3668. On the 12/13 January a concentration of 1300 troops and 150 vehicles was observed in the SAARBRUCKEN (Q 3965) area.

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES.

A. TAC/R.

Bad weather throughout the week restricted the number of aerial observations to a minimum and made impossible any indication of trends in enemy military movements. However, the limited observation revealed active road movement within the COLMAR pocket on 8 and 10 Jan., and a concentration of 50 plus vehicles including tanks on the right bank of the Rhine River in the vicinity of KENZINGEN (W 0255) on 10 Jan.

Rail activity was very light in the FREIBURG area on 10 Jan., when a few trains including some flats were sighted on the lines radiating from the city. There was also some movement on the same day between OFFENBURG and KENZINGEN, and the marshalling yards at RASTATT, BUHL, and OFFENBURG showed increases in their holdings of rolling stock.

On the rail lines east of KARLSRUHE - MAINZ, no cover was obtained during the week and the scanty reports concerning movement in the Saar region revealed that some rail activity was taking place on the BAD KREUZNACH - KIRN lines on 10 Jan. Scattered road movement was also sighted on this same day between SAARBRUCKEN and KAISERSLAUTERN. On 12 January, a single observation yielded the information that about 150 vehicles including armor, plus about 1500 troops were converging from the north on SAARBRUCKEN.

The enemy appeared more daring during the past week as regards road and rail movement during the daylight hours. This was no doubt due to the inclement weather which prevailed during the period. Numerous prisoner of war reports have been received stating that in certain in-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

stances fighter/bombers have bottled up road movements sufficiently to prevent the arrival of supporting weapons.

B. SUPPLIES.

Interrogation of PW's from various formations on Seventh Army Front during the past week indicates that supplies of ammunition and rations were generally sufficient. However, due to Allied air activity, local shortages occasionally developed.

PW's stated that the enemy's current policy is not to establish large ammunition stores, but that he prefers to create a number of well dispersed small dumps in order to achieve a measure of protection against air attacks. Some dumps of this type were claimed to be in the vicinity of CONTWIG (Q 7773), east of ZWEIBRUCKEN. This appears to be consistent with the enemy's known practice of siting supply installations in fairly close proximity to the LANDAU - ZWEIBRUCKEN railway.

The two known POL dumps belonging to the enemy in the Alsace pocket are both located north of COLMAR and are well sited to maintain the armored forces attacking towards STRASBOURG. In addition, the enemy has a large fuel depot in the Moos Wald (W 03) as a potential reserve east of the Rhine.

The FREIBURG - BRISACH - COLMAR rail line continues to be the main supply route into the pocket, with pontoon bridges and numerous ferries in operation to insure adequate supply.

C. BOMBING OF SINGEN.

The bombing of the SINGEN railroad center on 25 December completely destroyed the large rail bridge over the River Aach thus cutting lines of communication with IMMENDINGEN to the north and SCHAFFHAUSEN to the southwest. The marked effect which the destruction of this rail bridge had upon this communications system is self evident by the fact that for a period of 11 days all through traffic toward the front had to be re-routed through RADOLFZELL (W 9503) and SIGMARINGEN (X 1044). The special effort of repair crews working both day and night stresses the importance of the strategic rail lines through SINGEN to IMMENDINGEN and SCHAFFHAUSEN. By the night of 5 January, provisional repairs had made it possible for through traffic to be resumed.

D. CAMOUFLAGE OF TANK CARS.

German railway officials are reported to have ordered many thousands of camouflage cases for railroad fuel tank cars. In the past it has been indicated that tank cars were being disguised as boxcars, but this activity was restricted to those areas which were particularly liable to air attacks. The present wide scale effort to conceal tank cars is now necessary since no area is any longer immune from aerial attack. Camouflage may therefore be used in order to protect the contents of these cars and to avoid making known the location of production plants or possible storage points.

6. COUNTER - INTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY REFRESHER.

As the initial infiltration scare begins to wear off, security alertness tends to lag. This offers a vulnerability which the enemy will be quick to exploit. It would be dangerous to imagine that the Germans have exhausted their bag of tricks in the line of infiltrating GI clad soldiers or agents in civilian clothes. Careless guards are a costly gamble. Hence the following tips are republished with the suggestion of individual dissemination to all road guards and MPs. Each one should know these things:

WAYS OF SPOTTING GERMANS IN AMERICAN UNIFORM

1. In halting vehicles question the driver because, if Ger-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

man, he will be the one who speaks and understands the least English. The best English speaker of the group will wear an officer's uniform and sit in the front seat next to the driver. Thus, the best way to trap these parties is to ask the driver for his trip ticket, and then ask the driver some questions which he will have to answer.

2. Helmets are usually not marked with signs designating officers or NCO's.

3. Dog tags should be compared with identification cards. Ask for serial number. Staff cars must be stopped also, and you must forget rank when asking for dog tags, ASN, etc. Some of these GI-clad Germans are posing as high-ranking officers. One is supposed to be dressed as a Brigadier General. None of the Germans captured so far in GI uniform has known his "ASN".

4. Soldiers offering paybooks as means of identification are suspicious and ought to be carefully checked.

5. AGO cards used by Germans are Form 65-4, which carries an officer's counter-signature below holder's signature. However, 65-1 is the form generally carried by American officers. Forged AGO cards may be brand new, filled out by the German himself, signed by him, and then dirtied up a bit; but creases in the card can usually be spotted as new.

6. Trip tickets should be checked in rear areas.

7. All personnel not knowing the password should be regarded with suspicion and should be investigated. The password must never be given to unknown soldiers by guards or control posts. It is known to have been done in the past.

8. On several occasions Germans, posing as Americans, were dressed only partly in American uniform. Therefore, uniforms should be closely checked.

9. Staff cars being used by the Germans are believed to be Citroens painted khaki with the white star. Also look out for persons riding in the rear of trucks.

10. Simple questions should be asked which American personnel should know the answers to as a further means of identification.

11. Don't forget that any German jeep party will be heavily armed on a desperate mission. In order to facilitate escape they may be carrying phials of acid to be thrown into the faces of allied personnel, so one man should cover while another inspects credentials.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S, G-2

DISTRIBUTION

SPECIAL

INCL. 3

Incl. #1 - Rhine Bridges.
Incl. #2 - Sixth US Army Group Front.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

190/JAN.45/EAG 6033

REPRODUCED BY ENGR. SEC.
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC. 44

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





SCALE: 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

SECRET
ENEMY DISPOSITION
13 1200 A JAN.

G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #17

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

57

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

Dir of Intell USTAAF

: S E C R E T :
: By Auth of :
: CG, 6 Army Group :
: Initials: :
: Date: 20 Jan 45 :

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 18

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 20 JANUARY 1944

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Organization of the German Command.

Enemy control of units facing the Sixth US Army Group is clear except for the subordination and composition of XXXIX Panzer Corps.

Army Group G at through at least the First Army encompasses the front from the Moselle through LUXEMBOURG on the north. There is some evidence for the acceptance of von BLASKOWITZ and General der Infanterie Hans von OBSTFELDER as the relative commanders. The corps under command include LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divisions); XII SS Corps (19 Inf, 17 SS PG and 559 VG Divisions) XC Corps (257 VG, 256 VG, 36 Inf and probably 6 SS Mountain Divisions); and LXXXIX Corps (245 Inf Div).

Army Group OBERRHEIN under HIMMLER functions in an operational capacity through the Nineteenth Army in the COLMAR pocket, with LXIV Corps (198 Inf, 708 Inf, 189 VG, 16 VG and possibly 269 Inf Divisions) and LXIII Corps (338 VG, 159 VG and 716 Inf Divisions) as subordinate echelons. Its administrative function as a defense command is exercised through Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN (which may equate with a reported Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army similar to the Twenty-fifth Army in HOLLAND) under General der Artillerie and SS Obergruppenfuhrer Heinrich von MAUR. The subordinate echelons are 14 SS and 18 SS Corps, controlling replacement training units, police and Volkssturm in the area east of the RHINE.

The subordination and composition of the higher command controlling the offensive operations west of the RHINE between LUXEMBOURG and the southern limit of the bridgehead is open to question. 245 Infantry Division, the only divisional unit known definitely to be subordinate to LXXXIX Corps, has had practically no role in the present operation. 21 Panzer and 25 PZ Gr Divisions are known to be operating in conjunction in what is termed Operation Feuchtinger, named obviously after the Nazi favorite and panzer general last identified in command of 21 Panzer Division. 7 Para Division, whose arrival was evidently the signal for the beginning of the operation, committed only elements of its 20 Para Regiment at HATTEN. 19 and 21 Para Regiments crossed the RHINE into the bridgehead and are presently in contact there. The initial crossing was made by elements of 553 VG Division, which was directly controlled by 14 SS Corps. It was von MAUR, signing himself as Oberbefehlshaber der Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN on 5 January, who addressed the following to the units of his command: "I place my full trust and all my hopes in you so that in a few days I am able to report to the Fuehrer: The Swastika flies once again from the Strasbourg cathedral" On 13 January HIMMLER's congratulatory message to the troops in the bridgehead was signed in his capacity as Oberbefehlshaber der Heeres-Gruppe OBERRHEIN. On 19 January the Reichsfuehrer's Escort Battalion was identified in the bridgehead. Finally, the identification of XXXIX Panzer Corps provides the higher tactical unit capable of controlling the offensive units already active in the area and the newly-arrived 10 SS Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

b. Capabilities and Discussion.

The actual use and subordination of the offensive units concerned (the Reichsfuehrer's Escort Bn, 21 Pz, 25 Pz Gr, 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions), undoubtedly the strongest units on the whole Sixth US Army Group front and three of which were obviously brought in for the operation, determines not only the enemy's capabilities, but also his intentions in this area. The following capabilities may be listed.

1. To stabilize the front from the Moselle to the HARDT Mountains, with spoiling attacks against the Allied bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN and holding attacks in the vicinity of the major cities. The low number and poor quality of the troops in the area makes the execution of this capability imperative and purely defensive in character. 11 Panzer Division does not represent sufficient offensive power to permit the enemy more than an aggressive defense and the possible employment in this area of salvaged remains from the ARDENNES diminishes as the Allied counteroffensive gathers momentum. Finally, there is no evidence of other reserves which the enemy's previous costly failures along the western edge of the HARDT Mountains must have taught him were necessary to make any venture profitable.

2. To defend the COLMAR pocket, the Allied attack launched in the MULHOUSE area has robbed the enemy of any offensive capability he may have had in the southern sector. In the northern sector of the pocket, it has been established that the enemy's intentions were limited to the establishment of a main line of resistance on the ILL River. A reliable officer PW has stated that operations northward from the VOSGES pocket were intended to be only diversionary in character, with the main effort to be directed against STRASBOURG from the north.

3. To attempt to capture STRASBOURG. Again the number and quality of troops does not permit execution of a capability allowed the enemy before 1 January, that of capturing SAVERNE and the entire ALSACE plain. Coordinated drives south from the eastern HARDT and through the HAGUENAU forest, east against SAVERNE from the RHINE, and northeast against MOLSHEIM would all be necessary. Without increased reinforcements, the enemy is not capable of meeting all the requirements for such action. However, the capture of STRASBOURG would serve not only to maintain the initiative, but also as an extremely valuable morale factor within Germany. The excessive political tinge of the higher commands, the expressed intentions of the enemy in this area, and the obvious determination to gain some advantage from a poorly conducted military campaign into which good troops are now being thrown after the bad, lends some weight to the possibility that the operations are being controlled by Army Group OBERRHEIN. A southward shift of units from HATTEN through the newly established corridor to the GAMBSHEIM area would be even more convincing evidence that XXXIX Panzer Corps has been provided with the best units at the disposal of the Army in order to save the Party's prestige. If HITLER could not enter ANTWERP, HIMMLER must at least take STRASBOURG.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing 6th Army Group were as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), DIMBACH (Q 9245), CLEEBOURG (R 1145), ROESCHWOOG (R 2225), DRUSENHEIM (R 1518), East of WEYERSHEIM (R 0713), South along RHINE to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LEVALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to Swiss Border.

b. FIRST GERMAN ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

The importance which the enemy has attached to this front after the failure of his ARDENNES effort has been very noticeable of late particularly in his propoganda broadcasts. More concrete results of this attitude were revealled in the arrival of two major units (7 Para Div and 10 SS Pz Div) during the current period opposite the Seventh US Army. His reserves in this area at present are in a depleted state. There is one located division (172 Res Div) which could possibly be committed and one badly

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

mauled division (361 VG Div) which although identified at the beginning of the previous period has not been contacted since that time and is presumed to have been withdrawn into local reserve.

Originally a mobilization division of Wehrkreis XII, 172 was upgraded to a Reserve Division. At present, it appears to provide reinforcements for the units opposing the Seventh US Army. Its static role is evident from the list of the units identified as having been under its control prior to commitment: 35 Observation Bn; 41 GAF Fortress Bn; 58 Fortress MG Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 87 Repl Bn; 107 Gren Repl Bn; 282 Stomach Bn; BG HARTIG; BG FRIDMAN; BG KLAMPMAYER; EINHEIT KLEIN; BG WIESBADEN and BG ZWEIBRUCKEN.

(1) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. WALTER HOERNLEIN)

347 Infantry Division displayed no sign of any change in its passive attitude and no identifications were made of any of its units during this period. Organic strength: 1,500; attached units: (41 Fortress Engr Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 107 Repl Bn; 514 Repl Bn) approximately 900, for a total of 2,400 combat effectives.

(2) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division was also inactive and no identifications were made during the period. In addition, contact with its element (59 GR) in the HARDT Mountain sector has not been firm since 15 January. Organic strength: 1,500; attached units: 300; for a total of 1,800 combat effectives.

17 SS PG Division came into prominence late in the preceeding period when the Commanding Officer SS Colonel HANS LINGNER was captured while on a personal reconnaissance. Subsequent interrogation has revealed that the capacity of the unit is fairly low, in his estimation. During the period, 38 SS PGR was identified, but the lack of contact with 37 SS PGR tends to confirm the theory that it was badly mauled and is refitting in the rear areas. All factors considered, combat effectives are estimated at about 2,400 and (20-30) tanks or SP guns.

559 VG Division had 1136 and 1137 VGR's still in line on 12 January in a sector which has taken on a purely defensive color. The continued lack of identification of 1135 VGR since the attack started is perhaps accounted for by PW statements that the regiment was disbanded and has not been reconstituted. Including BG ZWEIBRUCKEN, 58 Fortress MG Bn and BG HILDMANN effectives are estimated at 2,000.

(3) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. (L?) PETERSEN ?)

257 VG Division stubbornly resisted our efforts to take ground in the southeastern corner of the HARDT Mountain salient and undoubtedly sustained some losses. After 466 VGR was contacted on 14 January, the subsequent identification of 477 VGR and 457 VGR on the 15 and 19 January respectively definitely limited the division's sector. Considering the action in which it has participated, the strength of the division is estimated at 1,500 combat effectives.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord continued during the early part of the period to play a major defensive part along the critical southern edge of the HARDT salient. PW's stated that the Arty Regt had some batteries refitted with 105 mm gun howitzers in place of the former 75 mm mountain howitzer. Further PW statements revealed that new uniforms and weapons had been issued to the unit while in Denmark. During this period elements of 12 and 11 SS Mountain Regiments were identified on 12 and 19 January respectively. Incomplete contact, therefore, makes it appear that while some units remain in line, the major part of the division has been pulled back into what would be conservatively termed local reserve. The strength of the division is at least 4,000 combat effectives.

256 VG Division shifted from the east flank of the HARDT salient down to the southeastern corner where it appears to have taken over at least part of the front formerly held by 6 SS Mountain Division. Although completely on the defensive all three VGR's were identified during the period. Total combat effectives including attachments (39 GAF Bn and 815 Super Heavy MG Bn) are now estimated at 1,700.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

36 Infantry Division appears to have been definitely committed in the pivotal position on the e st flank of the HARDT salient where both 118 GR and 165 GR put in an appearance during the period. 87 GR has been unidentified since 2 January. The accounting for the rest of this division as r fitting in rear areas is, in part, supported by PW statements that the reason for our identification of only one battalion of each regiment on the day of the initial attack was that the other battalions were refitting in BAUMHOLDER. Organic units are estimated at 2,800 combat effectives with an addition al 300 in the 51 GAF Bn and the 81s Super Heavy MG Bn.

(4) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEHNE)

245 Infantry Division has been lightly contact d of late. 937 GR was identified in the sector northeast of WISSEMBOURG while available information indicates that attached units (XII/I Regt and 52 GAF Bn) have the responsibility for the sector between the two vital attack areas. That the division remains in the area is supported by the PW statement that the division CP is located in the SIEGFRIED Line at R 1756. Organic strength: 3,500; attached units: (XII/I Regt and 52 GAF Bn) approximately 700, making a total of 4,200 combat effectives.

(5) XXXIX Panzer Corps
(Note: Subordination of units to this and XIV SS Corps is still in doubt)

21 Panzer Division continued to fight fiercely in the area of HATTEN-RITTERSHOFFEN and sustained heavy losses in these engagements according to PW statements. It was also stated that the operations were call "FEUCHTINGER" which would indicate either that 21 Panzer division controlled more than its own units in the battle or that is Commanding Officer has been given control of a higher tactical unit. A single large replacement battalion is reported provided 4-500 men for the division, with 300 additional troops being sent to a pool in WISSEMBOURG and the balance to 25 PG Division. Considering the activities engaged in during the period it is reasonable to assume that the infantry effective strength of the division is about 2,000 and that organic tanks and SP guns number approximately 50.

25 PG Division experienced the same heavy fighting as the 21 Panzer Division under whose control it may have operated during the period. Both 35 PGR and 119 PGR were identified on 19 January but the tank battalion has not been positively contacted since 11 January. The 4-500 replacements received recently will help to offset the heavy losses suffered by the division in the HATTEN area. It is estimated that the division has 2,000 combat effectives supported by 30 tanks or SP guns.

7 Para Division had its three Para Regiments identified on 17 and 18 January. First elements of the division were located in the vicinity of HATTEN on 14 January after its arrival from HOLLAND. Route of approach appears to have been; VENLO; (the end of December); to HANNOVER-ERFURT-HEILBRONN with crossings of the RHINE being made at KARLSRUHE and GERMERSHEIM thence to LANDAU and NEUSTADT. The evidence suggests a strong infantry division of nine battalions and an artillery regiment of three battalions. Some of the vehicles are known to be wood-burning. At the close of the period one regiment (20 Para) appeared to have been detached for duty in the HATTEN area while the other regiments were in position along the west bank of the RHINE. Organic units are estimated to have a combat effective strength of about 4,500.

10 SS Panzer Division first gave evidence of its location by the capture of a 17 year old Sergeant in the bridgehead area on 19 January. The division had never been identified in the ARDENNES salient and hence had over one month in which to be refitted in manpower (reported to be 90% GAF) and equipment. The division appears to have moved by road from SAARBRUCKEN-NEUNKIRCHEN area via ZWEIBRUCKEN-PIRMASENS-BERGZABERN then to the east bank of the RHINE opposite the bridgehead. Elements of 21 SS PGR and 22 SS PGR were identified by the close of the period. The division has at least 4,500 combat effectives plus 80 tanks and SP guns.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OBERRHEIN)

a. **XIV SS Corps** (CG: Maj. Gen. SS v.d. BACH-ZELEWSKI)

No additional information has been received which would suggest that this corps controls any units other than 553 VG Division in the RHINE bridgehead. Its role is in any case assumed to be largely administrative.

553 VG Division had none of its organic units identified during the period but PW's continued to refer to its command responsibilities in the area. The regiments appear to have emphasized their already motley tone by absorbing various miscellaneous units. For example, BG KAPPES, is now 1st Bn 119 VGR; 1120 VGR equates with Bn HOPPE and Bn STURMLINGER. Information is scarce on the composition of 1121 VGR. Thus far, it is only possible to estimate the strength of committed units at 5-600, while the attached units (2 SS Police Regt; Bn MEYER; Bn OBERRHEIN and Regt E/V) increases the total to about 1,000 effectives.

405 zbV Division is still controlling a large number of static replacement and defense units along the east bank of the RHINE, stretching at least from R 1107 to W 0018. Whether it is still directly subordinated to Wehrkreis V or now under one of the new higher echelons in the area has not been settled. Its function, however, has not changed.

(2) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

LXIV Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division appeared to have been satisfied with its diversionary effort during the preceding period. Its subsequent conduct was hardly indicative of offensive intentions. 308 GR was the only regiment identified during the period (15 January). There was evidence however, that some 500 replacements were recently received by the division and by this amount the previous estimate of combat effectives is increased to 2,000 including attached units (192 Engr Bn; 56 Fortress Engr Bn and 746 Engr Bn).

106 Panzer Brigade has not participated in front line activity since 8 January at which time it was identified northeast of SELESTAT. Therefore careful attention must be paid to ascertain its zone of future committment. Combat effectives are still carried at about 800 with an estimated 30 tanks or SP guns.

269 Infantry Division has not clarified its status since the close of the last period. At that time, only the 13th Company of 469 GR was identified. PW's have stated that the front in the COLMAR area is rather thinly held by 198 Infantry Division and attached units. The length of time during which this unit has been refitting suggests a new role, with the possibility that it may move to another front. Pending more confirmation combat effectives of the division remained at 2,000.

189 VG Division appeared to have increased its regiments to 3 in number as 1214 VGR was identified on 14 January. Previously 1214 VGR had been reported absorbed by 1212 VGR but now it seems to have been reorganized from undetermined sources. Organic strength: 1,000; attached units approximately 800, making a total of 1,800 combat effectives.

708 VG Division also eluded identification during this quiet period. The 728 VGR is assumed to be refitting for it has not yet been identified this month. Combat effectives including attached units are estimated to amount to 1,800.

16 VG Division finally came out of the unidentified column (after one Month) as elements of 241 VGR turned up on 16 January. PW said that the regiment was reorganized from Regt WICKER and Bn WASER. Based on last known identifications and the fact that some refitting must have taken place, combat effectives should number in the vicinity of 1,000.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

338 Infantry Division drew attention to itself only by a slight shift to the northwest in the quiet VOSGES sector as 759 GR was identified on 18 January. Strength estimate is unchanged at 1,600 combat effectives.

159 VG Division continued itslull in the southwest corner of the pocket as no identifications were made during the period. Conservative strength estimates of the division would be 1,800 total combat effectives.

716 Infantry Division remains a very large question mark, although a deserter stated that the division CP was at KUENHEIM V 8542 in early January. This same deserter in relating his past stated that he arrived in the VOSGES pocket with FELDSTREP Battalion 15 (COLMAR), which unit was absorbed into one of the regiments of 716 Infantry Division. Then in compliance with an order dated 11 December, this division was absorbed by 708 Infantry Division, whereupon his unit became I/748 GR. It therefore appears that 708 Infantry Division has absorbed the troops of 716 Infantry Division, but not the staffs of the division. Therefore, if a regimental staff of the division appears in any sector it may forecast the absorption of the motley formations in the area into a new 716 Infantry Division. There is sufficient evidence to accept such a possibility as an accomplished fact in the HARTH forest area where the connections between 716 Infantry Division and the various units of Brigade HAFFNER have become increasingly more frequent.

BRIGADE HAFFNER. Miscellaneous Battle Groups identified on 15 January approximate 1,000 in combat effective strength.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	38,000
First French Army	17,000

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	18,000
First French Army	5,000

Reserve:

Units available in Black Forest	15,000
Reserve opposite Seventh US Army	5,000
T O T A L	98,000

Tanks and SP guns:	
Seventh US Army	200-240
First French Army	70-100
T O T A L	270-340

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), POND MINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

No change in enemy dispositions and attitude.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

The lack of positive information on the strength of the Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but is is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000 with 60% carried as combat effectives.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

Having extended the COLMAR Pocket to include the area bounded by the RHINE and ILL Rivers during the previous period, the enemy satisfied himself with aggressive patrolling actions and harassing fire in the region North of SELESTAT. However, he managed to gain a small bridgehead over the ILL River in the vicinity of BERFIELD (V 9075) which he still maintains. Within the pocket proper the enemy made a few sorties in the area northeast of COLMAR, in the region west of THANN and in the HARTH Forest. All attacks were unsuccessful.

The Germans successfully maintained their positions in the Rhine bridgehead from dug in positions along the railroad N of HERRLISHEIM (R 1315) during the early part of the period and on 16 January launched an infantry attack supported by tanks from OFFENDORF (R 1312) to the north, enabling him to reach the NE outskirts of HERRLISHEIM. From these positions he maintained a strong defense with small arms, mortar and machine gun fire while further reinforcements were being carried across the RHINE by barges.

The "MAGINOT Corner" was the scene of an intense enemy effort through out the period as counterattacks utilizing tanks and flamethrowers led to house-to-house fighting in both HATTEN (R 1733) and RITTERSHOFFEN (R 1634). Balked in his break-out attempts, the enemy utilized fresh troops and armor to join with the bridgehead further south as he took STATTMATTEN (R 1921), DEMGOLSHEIM (R 1821), and for a short time, SESSENHEIM (R 1921). The tempo of his efforts was increased, resulting in the recapture of SESSENHEIM and the woods in the vicinity. Smoke screens and camouflage aided his troops in gaining the line of pillboxes in vicinity R 1734.

Infantry in dug-in positions offered strong resistance in the HARDT Mountain zone near ALTHORN (Q 7540), BUEHN (Q 8039) and REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8036), holding US troops to minor gains. However, the enemy mounted a few small-scale attacks in the HARDT Mountains attempting to cut roads in the areas (Q 7639 and Q 7738) by means of infiltration tactics.

Chief activity in the SAAR area during the period has been that of trains carrying pontoons in the W half of the zone, and of vehicle movement in area Q 4064 - 5066.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. TAC/R

The enemy continued to reveal little rail activity during daylight hours, but it was apparent that two major rail movements were being completed early in the past week; one in the LANDAU - NEUSTADT sector, and the other in the SAARBRUCKEN - NEUNKIRCHEN - HOMBURG - PIRMASENS AREA. Increased activity was also noted on the lines about BAD KREUZNACH. In the Black Forest from VILLINGEN and DONAUESCHINGEN toward OFFENBURG and northward, some military activity was apparent on all days available for observation. Some southward movement in the direction of OFFENBURG from the north was also reported. Unimportant activity was observed in both the FREIBURG and COLMAR areas. The Germans continued to display a willingness to move vehicles on main roads closer to the front during hours of daylight. However, some of these moves were probably forced upon him as a direct result of the numerous cuts effected on his parallel rail lines in the rear of forward positions.

The identification of medium tank trains, large numbers of flats (some loaded with motor transport) and groups of boxcars on the lines between RASTATT and OFFENBURG substantiated the view that a

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

military move took place early in the week into this area, chiefly from VILLINGEN and KARLSRUHE. The substantial vehicular movement in the area north of OFFENBURG on 18 - 19 January is at least partially connected with the arrival of 10 SS Panzer Division.

Within the Vosges Pocket and in the FREIBURG area very little rail activity was noted. However, it was clear from the fresh tracks converging into the Illwald Forest, that these woods concealed a fair amount of armor.

The FRANKFURT, DARMSTADT, MANNHEIM, and NEUSTADT rail lines were active on 14 January and the marshalling yards of WORMS, MANNHEIM, and GERMERSHEIM were all one-half full. This rail activity appears to have been connected with the movement into the NEUSTADT - LANDAU area.

The ending of a large scale related movement into the NEUSTADT - LANDAU area apparently took place on 14 January. The weather permitted reconnaissance over the area on only 13 and 14 January, but on these days 13 trains were sighted, as well as a large number of flats loaded with tanks and motor vehicles. The appearance of scattered groups of boxcars on most station sidings between WORMS and KARLSRUHE on 15 January suggests that the cars were being shunted about prior to collection for distribution.

Loadings in the yards and in small stations on the lines about SAARBRUCKEN, HOMBURG, NEUNKIRCHEN, and PIRMASENS, on 14 - 15 January took on added importance with the sighting of 3 medium tank trains plus some 150 loaded flat cars. In addition, TAC/R sighted large groups of tanks in the area during this period. This movement appears to have started in a northeasterly direction. At PIRMASENS, the trend of road movement on the same day also appeared to be toward the east.

B. ATTACKS ON RAILS.

Enemy rail communications in the Saar area bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers were subjected to intensive air attacks. Approximately 80 cuts were effected during the week, but due to inclement weather, the enemy had had sufficient time to make repairs. The cuts do not appear to have caused any serious delays, but the inconveniences were no doubt annoying. The sealing in of a tunnel on the NEUSTADT - KAISERSLAUTERN line temporarily prevented through traffic, and photos of 14 January show that most of the BAD MUNSTER rail bridge has been destroyed, thus preventing uninterrupted movement between BINGEN and NEUSTADT.

C. FERRY CROSSINGS

The Germans are employing a total of at least 15 ferries along the Rhine between RHEINAU (V 984681) and RHEINWEILER (V 846012) in order to provide more ample means of communication with the Vosges Pocket. In general, night use appears to be much preferred.

At least two types of ferry are in actual operation, one capable of carrying 4 - 5 trucks, and the other a cable ferry guided by a steel cable strung across the river. The Germans also maintain much pontoon bridging equipment in the vicinity of these sites.

The following is a detailed list of known crossing sites showing the location and type, where specifically identified:

RHEINAU (V 984681)
SCHONAU (V 941571)
SASBACH (V 898498)
JECHTINGEN (V 883468)
GEISWASSER (V 915311)
NAMBSHEIM (V 895270)
BALGAU (V 885252)
NEUENBURG (V 859129)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

BALTZENHEIM (V 880440)
KUHNHEIM (V 878420)
BRISACH (V 885360)
HOCHSTETTEN (V 896346)
*STEINENSTADT (V 850075)
*BILLINGEN (V 860036)
*RHEINWEILER (V 846012)

* Cable Ferry

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

2 INCLOSURES

Incl - #1 - The Rhine Bridges

Incl - #2 - Enemy Disposition

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

 SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY ENGR. SEC. 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ DEC 44

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





SCALE: 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

SECRET
ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 20 1200A JAN

G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #18

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

P 487

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

128

: S E C R E T :
: By Auth of :
: CG, 6 Army Group :
: Initials: WCH :
: Date: 27 Jan 45 :

U.S. Strategic Air Forces
Dir. of Intelligence

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 19

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 27 JANUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The enemy organization along the Sixth US Army Group front has been clarified.

Army Group G controls the front from the Moselle through approximately the WISSEMBOURG - HAGUENAU road. Under it the First Army operates through the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (257 VG, 256 VG and 6 SS Mtn Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf and 36 Inf Divs).

Army Group OBERRHEIN includes the operational Nineteenth Army in the COLMAR pocket, the administrative defence command known as Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN (possibly Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army), and the XXXIX Panzer Corps. The subordinate units in the pocket remain unchanged, except for the replacement of 269 Infantry Division (identified on the Russian front) by 2 Mountain Division. The administrative role of XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps has been confirmed by agent reports and some documentary evidence. XXXIX Panzer Corps has conducted the operations in the HAGUENAU-RHINE area with 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, 10 SS and 21 Panzer Divisions under command, as well as those units in the GAMBSHEIM area controlled by the staff of 553 Division.

The offensive power of the enemy has definitely diminished along the front. West of INGWILLER, there has been practically no offensive action. On the contrary, an excellent agent source reported various defensive preparations already in effect. Both 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions have been absorbing reinforcements from 172 Reserve Division's various units, while 19 Infantry was forced to recall its errant unit from the HARDT. Any reinforcements received by 17 SS were necessary to permit the spread of this battered formation, whose original combat efficiency was depreciated by its captured commander. Nor can the divisions in the HARDT be held in higher esteem, with the possible exception of 6 SS Mountain, whose losses from a second surrounded battalion are revealing both poor tactics and even poorer quality personnel.

East of the HARDT the enemy has by no means achieved a success worthy of his announced intentions and the units delegated for the operation. The aggressive actions were in the nature of probing attacks, searching for the weak point where his armor might be effectively used. In addition terrain factors forced him to canalize his efforts along routes which were obvious and easily controlled. This indecision was prolonged to the point where extremely bad weather and events on the other fronts decided the issue for him. By the end of the period the enemy's offensive intentions were no longer possible of execution.

In the VOSGES pocket the enemy was reduced to shuttling his units to meet attacks from north and south. Commitment of mobile formations in the south was followed by a parcelling out of the reserves, when even 2 Mountain Division was found operating on both sectors. A distinct lowering of the quality of forces in the CERNAY sector set in early, while even the enemy's better troops were having extreme difficulty holding well prepared defensive positions in blizzards propitious for such an intention.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

As for strategic reserves, there were none identifiable along the whole Sixth US Army Group front. 361 Infantry Division was in fact cannibalized, while its staff retired to Germany. 47 Infantry Division, hardly an impressive unit, had to be brought in from the northern front and was committed immediately after a road march from LANDAU to HATTEN. 245 Infantry Division was approaching the lines in an obviously relief capacity. 2 Mountain Division drew part of its complement from 188 Reserve Division in Austria and 5 Mountain Division on the Italian Alpine front. 30 SS, according to prisoners from another unit, was in such a demoralized condition that the enemy did not dare to use it, for fear of mass desertion. Finally, documentary evidence for the presence of II SS Corps is completely discounted, as merely the rough draft of a plan whose temporarily pregnant possibilities never achieved fruition.

In sum, the enemy has lost the initiative.

b. Capabilities

1. From the Moselle to the Rhine:

(a) to attempt to stabilize the front, withdrawing if necessary to the successive positions along the Moder, the Maginot Line, the Siegfried Line. The high cost of his present operations, the inability to use armored formations efficiently under actual terrain and weather conditions, definite indications of their withdrawal, the preparation of defensive positions with a subsequent economy of forces and the lack of contact for some days combine to make this capability the most favored.

(b) to defend east to the HARDT and carry on his attempt to recapture STRASSBOURG. Bad weather and energetic resistance have successfully thwarted any serious enemy advances with heavy losses to his present strength. The turn of events on other fronts has deprived him of the reinforcements necessary for further progress. This capability is not favored.

2. In the COLMAR pocket:

(a) to reinforce and attempt to maintain his present lines. Here again reinforcements are lacking and available strength is being depleted to a point where manpower earmarked for the Siegfried Line is being drawn upon. The present defensive position running from MULHOUSE through CERNAY, along the VOSGES and then the canals to the Rhine, is being forced and will fall under determined attacks. The danger to the Nineteenth Army of a sudden breakthrough from north and south cannot be underestimated by the enemy. Finally, the cessation of active operations in the HAGUENAU area makes no longer imperative the necessity to keep occupied a large part of the Allied forces. The possibility of an eventual intention to break out against STRASBOURG from the BENFELD area is no longer considered. This capability is not favored.

(b) to retire in good order into the Siegfried Line after having completed the establishment of a bridgehead position in the NEUF BRISACH area. A retreat into the Siegfried line would permit an economy of forces now necessary to the enemy, releasing some for use in the HAGUENAU area eventually. Gruppe von OPPEN has already been identified making ready the ancient fortress area of NEUF BRISACH, under exactly similar circumstances to those prevailing earlier at BELFORT. Such a position would effectively deny use of the Rhine valley to the Allies and serve to protect the vital east bank communication lines for the enemy. This capability is favored, particularly in conjunction with 1 (a) above.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the font lines of enemy forces opposing 6th Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLINGEN (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), BISCHWEILER (R 0919), HOERDT (R 0410), KILSTETT (R 0808), South along the Rhine to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), SELESTAT (V 7862), JEBSHEIM (V 8147), LE VALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), CERNAY (V 5811), ITTENHEIM (V 7012), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to the Swiss Border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army failed, during the period, to make any appreciable changes in its front line, excepting on its left flank which moved forward to the line of the Moder River. 47 Volksgrenadier Division is a new arrival in the area and was first contacted to the West of HAGUENAU. However, the cannibalizing of 361 Infantry Division offsets the above new unit, with 256 Infantry Division receiving the lion's share of its remaining effectives. The role of 172 Reserve Division with headquarters at HOMBURG continues to be the same: namely to provide replacements for divisions actively engaged in line. This division constitutes the only known reserve for the army.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLIEN)

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) continues to hold the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to the vicinity of FORBACH (Q 3966). Identifications of elements were made by Sixth Army Group's left flank neighbor: 347 Fusilier Battalion, and 347 Artillery Regiment at Q 2981 on 21 January. Due to the extremely light contact during the period it is believed that the enemy's losses were negligible. Its strength is estimated at 2,400 combat effectives including 900 combat effectives from 41 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 80 and 107 Grenadier Replacement Battalions (172 Res Div), and 514 Grenadier Replacement Battalion.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BRITZELMEYER) holds the sector from FORBACH (Q 3966) to Q 5956. The only identification of subordinate units during the week was 59 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4662. This indicates the return of the regiment to its parent unit from control of 559 Infantry Division. Combat strength of the division is estimated at 1,600, including the attached Battle Group KLEIN with 400 effectives.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division extended its sector slightly to the east and is presently holding the line from Q 5956 to the BITCHE area (Q 7750). 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 7353 on 25 January after being absent for over two weeks. The regiment is believed to have been completely reorganized after suffering extremely heavy casualties during its earlier attacks. Col. LINGNER, captured Commanding General of the division, revealed that the division had no organic or attached tanks but did have 22 X 75 mm assault guns on 3 January. The present strength is 2,000 effectives with about 20 SP guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLER) continued to hold the line between Q 7550 - Q 7643 passively. The present existence of 1125 Grenadier Regiment is very doubtful as no identification of the unit has been made since its destruction in December. The only unit contacted was 1126 Grenadier

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Regiment on 23 January. Some replacements were received during the period, presumably making up for any losses suffered. Combat strength including Battle Group ZWLIBRUCKEN, Battle Group HELDMANN and 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, totals 2,000 men.

(c) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL) has been holding the quiet sector between Q 7443 and Q 7738. The following identifications were made during the period: 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 22 January; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 22 January Q 7442; 257 Engineer Battalion, 22 January Q 7441. Division strength is 1,500 effectives.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. FRANZ) moved forward after the US forces withdrew to new positions in the HARDT Mountains. The line now extends from Q 7738 to Q 8336. Reported identifications were: 476 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 24 January Q 8137; 481 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 7937. 456 Volksgrenadier Regiment has not been contacted since 14 January. Although 256 Infantry Division received the bulk of the 4-500 remaining effectives of 361 Infantry Division, the division strength is still depleted. The combat effectives total 1,600 men, including 400 effectives in 38 German Air Force Battalion and 815 Super Heavy Machine Gun Battalion, which are still believed attached to the division.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: Maj. Gen. BRENNER) in moving eastward during the present period sidestepped 256 Infantry Division and assumed responsibility for the sector between Q 8336 and Q 8632. One battalion of 12 SS Mountain Regiment was surrounded and decimated at Q 8430. The following identifications were made during the period: 11 SS Mountain Regiment, 24 January Q 8534; 12 SS Mountain Regiment, 25 January Q 8530. No replacements are known to have arrived and, on the basis of the casualties suffered, the strength of the division is now estimated at 3,000 effectives, including the satellite 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion.

(d) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOEHNE)

36 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM). The sector held by this division runs from Q 8632 to Q 9544. Identifications: 87 Grenadier Regiment, 23 January Q 9027; 118 Grenadier Regiment, 23 January Q 8850; 165 Grenadier Regiment, 24 and 25 January Q 9544. Organic units now number approximately 2,300 effectives.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Gen. BORK) is the new arrival from Northwest Germany. The division was first identified West of HAGUENAU on 23 January, but PW's claim that the division was previously committed in the HATTEN area on 16 January. It has the sector from Q 9328 to Q 9726. The identifications are: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 24 January Q 9728, and on 25 January at Q 9626; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 9726. 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment is as yet unidentified. The division appears to have been despatched to this area without any loss of time or extensive reorganization. Its combat effectives total only 1,500 men.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER) was moving forward into line, according to a reliable source. The last identification by contact was made on 15 January when prisoners were taken from 937 Grenadier Regiment in the US 45 Infantry Division zone. Other prisoners taken on 21 January placed the command post at ERLENBACH (R 0957). There were indications that this formation, whose organic strength is estimated at a minimum of 3,000, would supplant one of the divisions eligible for withdrawal.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

C. ARMY GROUP OBERRHEIN

(a) Army OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von MAUR)

(a) XXXIX Panzer Corps

25 Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. BAUMEISTER) closely followed our withdrawal from the HUTTEN area and after a slight delay was committed in operations to cross the Moder River. Its remaining offensive power was utilized to reinforce 7 Parachute and 47 Infantry Divisions, with which it operated as combat teams. Identifications: 35 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January R 0025; 119 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 9627. Its maximum strength is 1,500 combat effectives plus 20 tanks and SP guns.

7 Parachute Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERDMANN) committed only 21 Parachute Regiment during the period, but there are indications that 19 and 20 Parachute Regiments followed it into the area Northwest of HAGUENAU. The bulk of the division was previously in the GAMBSHEIM bridgehead area. It is now holding a sector from Q 9726 to R 0425. Interrogations indicate that the battalions were 400-450 strong at the time of initial commitment. However, 21 Parachute regiment suffered heavy losses on the Moder River. Present strength of the division is 3,700 effectives.

10 SS Panzer Division (CO: Col. HARMEL) is crammed into a short sector east of HAGUENAU (R 0425 to R 0820). Both regiments (21 and 22 PGR's) were identified at R 0622 on 25 January. This denotes a shift to the west and a switch with 21 Panzer Division in the lineup. At time of commitment, battalion strength was approximately 350. Total combat strength at present is believed to be around 3,500 men, supported by 65 tanks and assault guns.

21 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. FEUCHTINGER), mentioned above in the switch with 10 SS, was located on a relatively long front from R 0820 to R 0511. Identifications are as follows: 125 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 24 January R 0713; 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January R 1018. The division is in a weakened state and, in spite of some replacements, its strength is estimated at 1,600 combat effectives, supported by 40 tanks and SP guns.

(b) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. von dem BACH - ZELEWSKI)

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) is merely a divisional staff controlling a heterogeneous collection of units rapidly assembled from convalescents, over-age and reserve personnel on the East bank of the Rhine. The extent of its sector is not known but it has its left flank on the Rhine at R 1107. The combat effectives of the division are estimated at 2,500 men but the calibre of the troops is very low.

Recent interrogations indicate the composition of the division to be as follows:

Regiment MARBACH (3 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN)
Battalion SCHMIDT, Battalion TREUTLER, Battalion ZIERES (ex I Bn E/V Regt), Battalion MORG, (6 Bn OBERRHEIN), II Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment.
Regiment HOELSCHER
Battalion KAPPES (ex I Bn 1119 VGR), Battalion MEYER, Battalion MOELLER, I and III Battalions 2 SS Police Regiment, Police School HEIDENHEIM.
Regiment von LUETTICHAU
REICHSFUEHRER Escort Battalion, Battalion WIMMER.

405 zbV Division still controls static units along the East bank of the Rhine from R 1107 to W 0018.

(c) XVIII SS Corps

30 SS Grenadier Division. A prisoner states that the Germans do not consider the division suitable for combat because of the tendency of large numbers to desert.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. WIESE)

The Nineteenth Army continued its stubborn defense of the VOSGES pocket and maintained its combat effectives at 17,000. The recent arrival of 2 Mountain Division into the area is offset by the withdrawal of 269 Infantry Division. 269 Infantry Division has been claimed by the Russians on the Eastern front.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SCHIEL). 308 Grenadier Regiment was identified at V 7750 on 25 January and there are other indications that the division is being operated in pieces south of its old sector north of SELESTAT. The unit strength is estimated to be 1,500 plus 500 combat effectives for the attached 56, 192 and 746 Engineer Battalions.

708 Infantry Division (CO: Col. MUELLER) was contacted in almost its entirety north of COLMAR. The divisional sector extends from V 6846 to V 7646, with support rendered by 16 Volksgrenadier Division. Losses for the present operations have totaled approximately 400 effectives. Thus, the present combat effectives of the division total 1,000 men.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) has been committed in the area northeast of COLMAR, on 24 January, thus shortening the sector of 708 Infantry Division. The division was last identified in the Western VOSGES on 30 December. Identifications: 223 Grenadier Regiment, 26 January V 7645. The division has received some replacements. The numerical strength of the unit, approximately 1,200, is a result of the absorption of numerous miscellaneous unaffiliated units.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN), traced through Norway and Denmark during recent weeks, was first identified by French I Corps on 22 January. So far the following identifications have been made: 136 Mountain Regiment, 26 January V 8147; 111 Mountain Artillery Regiment, 26 January V 7646; 55 Mountain AT Battalion, 26 January on French II Corps front; 82 Mountain Engineer Battalion, 26 January on French II Corps front; 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion, 25 January V 7348. Elements of the division were committed almost immediately upon arrival in the MULHOUSE area, and later in the period, the bulk of the division joined the battle in the COLMAR sector. The division is organized as a standard mountain division and its combat effectives are estimated at 4,500. There are indications that reinforcements from 5 Mountain Division, in addition to the already identified 4 High Mountain Battalion, may be expected.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. ZORN) 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, the only unit to be identified during the period, was located at V 6148 on 21 January. This does not indicate any change in the divisional sector. The division is slightly to the west of our attack and combat effectives are still believed to be about 1,000 plus 500 attached.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EMERT). The major change is the identification of 758 Grenadier Regiment north of MULHOUSE on 24 January, as 757 Regiment and the Anti-Tank Battalion were still identified in their old sector in the vicinity of V 5018. It is believed that 758 Regiment was detached to aid 716 Infantry Division which suffered heavily in the French I Corps attack. PW stated that Colonel von OPPEN was relieved by Colonel EMERT. With no reports of replacements, strength is still estimated at 1,600.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. DERNEN) was in close contact from V 5117 to V 6610 where it resisted stubbornly throughout the week. 1209, 1210, 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiments were all identified in that sequence from south to north on 21 through 24 January. PW's of 1211 Regiment stated they were reinforced recently by 111 Mountain Replacement Battalion, but casualties (of 1209 in particular) exceeded these replacements. Strength, including the attached 201 Mountain Battalion, is 1,500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is now definitely established as being back in line, holding from V 6610 to the Rhine V 8300. It is of interest to note that the division has added a third infantry regiment, 706. It is composed of the former Battalions VOGEL, NIEDERMEYER (56 Repl Bn), and BEUCHELT (14 Repl Bn) of the BAUMGARTNER Regiment of the old HAFNER Brigade. Major BAUMGARTNER's Regiment became one of the organic elements of the division. 726 Regiment, now virtually destroyed, is composed of the previously identified Battle Groups KEMPE, EMMENDORFER and MAERKER. 736 Regiment was not identified and its whereabouts are not known. The division took a bad beating in its determined defense against the 9 Colonial Division and it is now supported by 758 Regiment of 338 Division; I Battalion 137 Mountain Regiment of 2 Mountain Division; 654 Tank Destroyer Battalion; and 4 High Mountain Battalion. The identification of the latter deserves particular attention as it came from the Alpine front where it had operated under 5 Mountain Division. Organic strength of 716 Division is estimated at not more than 1,300.

106 Panzer Brigade. One Company (armored reconnaissance) was identified on 25 January at V 6609. This is a shift from the northern to the southern side of the VOSGES perimeter. Location of other companies of the brigade is not known. Tanks possibly belonging to 106 Panzer Brigade were supporting counterattacks at various points of the Pocket. Strength is placed at 700 men, with 25 tanks and SP guns.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	35,000
First French Army	17,000

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	18,000
First French Army	5,000

Reserve:

Estimated reserve opposite Seventh US Army	5,000
Estimated reserve in Black Forest	10,000
T O T A L	90,000

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh US Army	165-180
First French Army	65- 90
T O T A L	230-270

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020) GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Although no change in enemy disposition has been reported, there are indications that elements of 5 Mountain Division may be withdrawn from the Alpine Front. The appearance of 4 High Mountain Battalion in the COLMAR pocket and lately PW statements indicating that elements of 5 Mountain Division are now under 2 Mountain Division suggest that the garrison of the Alpine Front may lose some of its complement.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but is is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

The attack by the French First Army in the THANN-MULHOUSE area on 20 January achieved initial surprise. Progress was steady until vicious counterattacks by 716 Infantry Division supported by elements of 2 Mountain Division and 106 Panzer Brigade, with extremely heavy artillery fire, stopped the forward surge at the cost of heavy losses in both men and materiel. Successful repulsion of the enemy counterattacks was followed by a resumption of the slow advance against a motley collection of reinforcements which manned the prepared defensive positions. At the close of the period our forces were approaching CERNAY (V 5812) and WITTELSHEIM (V 6312). Throughout the week operations were hampered by continuously bad weather, with blizzard conditions mounting.

The attack northwest of COLMAR began under adverse weather on 23 January. The initial effort carried across the ILL river after the capture of some bridges before destruction was possible. Enemy counterattacks regained the river line and permitted occupation of pillboxes and hastily dug positions controlling the approaches to the COLMAR and Rhone-Rhine Canals. By the end of the period the enemy was being forced back across the COLMAR canal south of HOLTZWIHR (V 7146) after having yielded JEBSHEIM (V 8047). Resistance to the Allied attack was initially fierce, but showed signs of diminution at the end of the week.

In the Rhine bridgehead, enemy attacks toward WEYERSHEIM (R 0513) marked the beginning of the period. However, a change of dispositions resulted in a buildup west of HAGUENAU. The main attack was launched on 25/26 January in an all out effort to gain crossings of the Moder river. The Allied lines were pierced temporarily, but the situation was immediately restored. By the end of the period contact was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

SP and artillery fire marked the early days of the week in the WIMMENAU-REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8036) area. A slight withdrawal of Allied forces followed at ZINSWILLER (Q 8935) on 22 January. Battalion strength attacks and infiltration tactics led to temporary enemy occupation of ROTHBACH (Q 8433). Local attacks continued, particularly at MUHLHAUSEN (Q 8532) and SCHILLERSDORF (Q 8430), both of which were eventually cleared. The SAAR sector was relatively quiet throughout the week. Artillery fire from heavy guns hit SAARALBE (Q 4845) sporadically.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. T.C/R

During the current week aerial reconnaissance was greatly hampered by bad weather and poor visibility. The limited observations which were made revealed little rail movement except for the unusual activity observed in the Saar along the KAISERSLAUTERN-LANDSTUHL line on the 26th of January. East of the Rhine in the Black Forest area, some rail movement in a general southeasterly direction was noted on the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line and light to moderate activity was observed in the yards at APPENWEIER, OFFENBURG, LAHR (W 1071), and GENGENBACH (W 2079), on 23 January. On 24 January a concentration of 500 railroad cars was observed at BOTZINGEN (V 9942) on the rail line leading to BRISACH, while across the Rhine in the COLMAR pocket, no rail movement was seen, although considerable vehicular activity was reported heading southward toward ENSISHEIM and SULZ (V 6220).

The presence of 20 trains plus a concentration of 1000 boxcars on the sidings in the KAISERSLAUTERN-LANDSTUHL area reported on 26 January, reveals a movement capable of carrying a major military unit into the Saar region. The fact that 500-700 vehicles were seen just south of this area on 23 January, and that considerable vehicular activity took place in this sector on the 22nd, is further circumstantial evidence that indicates the possible arrival of an equivalent division in our area.

Extensive road activity was also reported in the rear area east of WISSEMBOURG and in the vicinity of LANDAU possibly representing the southward movement of supplies in that region. In the vicinity of FRIESTETT (R 1508) groups of tanks and motor transport totalling approximately 40-50 tanks and 50-75 vehicles were reported on 20 January. In connection with these concentrations it is of interest to note that the enemy has 6 dismantled pontoon bridges at prepared sites to cross the Rhine in this area between STRASBOURG and WINTERSDORF (R 2727). One report specifically states that the pontoon bridge at DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) is capable of carrying tanks across the river.

B. STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS

Adverse weather conditions which prevailed throughout the week not only hindered observation but also made it practically impossible for Allied aircraft to launch successful attacks upon the enemy's communication system. This lull in aerial activity afforded the Germans a welcome opportunity to repair any cuts and to rebuild their rail transportation net as is evidenced by repairs to the now serviceable ELLER (L 5767) and NONNWEILER (L 4612) bridges in the Saar.

Photo cover of 23 January shows that sufficient damage to the BULLAY rail and road bridge (L 5761) continues to render it temporarily impassable and that the north railroad bridge at BAD MUNSTER (M 0835) is also believed to be still unserviceable.

Photo interpretation reports reveal that the Germans have approximately 43 Rhine crossings available between STRASBOURG and MANNHEIM. Three of these are fixed combination rail and road bridges and a fourth is the rail bridge at GERMERSHEIM: the rest are pontoon bridge and ferry crossings. South of STRASBOURG, there are 27 suitable crossings sites, 15 of which are believed to be in actual use, the status of the remaining 12 being unknown. Except for the rail bridges of BRISACH and NEUENBURG (which can also be used for motor transport traffic) these crossings are either of the pontoon bridge or ferry type.

6. DEFENSES

No new trends have developed in the organization of enemy defenses in the last few weeks.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The main activity has consisted of the consolidation of the communication and fire trenches connecting the pillboxes and casemates of the Siegfried Line. This is in keeping with the standing order of defending these strongpoints from the outside and permitting retreat to adjacent installations. This work seems to have reached a high state of completion throughout the Sixth US Army Group Front.

Double and triple lines of continuous fire trenches have been developed in the area KEHL-KAISERSTUHL, several kilometres behind the bulk of the Siegfried concrete defenses. These trenches are interconnected around towns, forming perimeter defenses. This would indicate that the order to turn each town into a strongpoint is being applied.

New air cover continues to reveal additional pillboxes and casemates which heretofore had not been observed, thereby gradually increasing the density of known defenses in the Siegfried Line. This is particularly true between BASLE and KEHL where the entire Rhine Plain to the foothills of the Black Forest can be considered as an organized defense area, although the concrete works do not approach the high density found nearer the Rhine.

Lack of air cover, due to weather, precluded observation of any German defensive activity between the present front line and the Siegfried Line in our northern sector.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

German Frequency Induction Igniter

From documentary evidence, it has been known for some time that the German Army has been experimenting with frequency induction igniters.

The igniter is used to detonate S-Mines. One igniter is placed for every ten S-Mines, and employs an electric circuit. The purpose of the igniter is to prevent the use of electric mine detectors. It functions on the same wave length, and when the detector approaches the igniter, the waves are picked up by a coil antenna. They are transmitted to the relay which closes the battery circuit, thus firing the mines by means of electric detonators.

The sensitivity of the igniter is such that it will be detonated by any strong wave sent out in its vicinity.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

APPENDIX

APPENDIX "A" - Weather Conditions in Upper Rhine Valley for February.

2 INCLOSURES

Inc. #1 - The Rhine Bridges.
Inc. #2 - Enemy Disposition.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A"

WEATHER CONDITIONS IN UPPER RHINE VALLEY FOR FEBRUARY

GENERAL

February is the most favorable winter month for military operations in this area. Rainfall reaches the lowest level for the year and cloudiness is slightly less than at any time of the year except summer. Temperatures, though slightly higher than in January, remain below freezing for considerable periods, assuring a firm foundation for cross-country movement in many localities. In the air, cloudiness drops off and visibilities improve over the preceding months, providing an increased number of operational days for tactical air support. In all, February presents better weather conditions than either of the two preceding months or the two spring months to come.

TEMPERATURE

The mercury begins to rise in February. Averages are, in general, two to three degrees above those for January. Only at elevated points does the mean remain below the freezing point. Colmar, with a mean of 36.9 degrees shows the highest average, while Grand Ballon in the High Vosges returns the lowest February mean of 24.9 degrees. Valleys points, such as Strasbourg, Mulhouse, and Karlsruhe, enjoy a mean of 35 degrees. The highest temperatures ever registered in this area for the month fall in the high sixties, while below zero marks are still possible. Colmar once recorded -8.3°. In an average February the mercury will rise to a maximum of 55 degrees and drop on the coldest day to a low of 10 degrees. To the east of the Black Forest slightly lower temperature prevails: Donaueschingen has 28.0° and Munich 29.0°.

FEBRUARY MEAN TEMPERATURE

Belfort	35.2	Baden Baden	35.0
Saverne	35.1	Freudenstadt	30.0
Strasbourg	35.1	Stuttgart	36.0
Grand Ballon	24.6	Ulm	31.0
Nancy	35.8	Augsburg	32.0
Metz	36.0	Freiburg	36.0
Sarreguemines	35.2	Karlsruhe	35.8
Mulhouse	35.2	Basle	36.0
Donaueschingen	28.0		

PRECIPITATION

February is the driest month of the year. Often a northeasterly circulation prevails for many days, bringing cold, dry air from the Great Russian Plains. Elevation and exposure are the chief determining factors in the rainfall pattern. Again the amounts received vary considerably in adjacent localities.

Valley locations, in general, receive less than two inches. Now Breisach has a mean of 1.20 inches and all points in the Rhine Valley floor and Alsatian Plain have less than 1.60 inches. Similar figures obtain also in the Bavarian Plain with Donaueschingen in the rain shadow of the Black Forest, receiving only 1.20 inches. Further east there is a slight rise (Munich 1.9 inches), but nowhere does the amount exceed 2.0 inches. The Vosges and Schwarzwald show almost double and triple the rainfall of the valleys. Averages as high as 5.6 inches are reached at Ruhstein and Todtmoos in the High Schwarzwald. Even the hill country on either side of the Saar provides sufficient elevation to catch additional moisture. East of Trier the average rise to 3.2 inches and in the Hardt Mountains to 2.4 inches.

Snow cover reaches its maximum depth in late February. It is entirely dependent on altitude. At Strasbourg the average February snowfall amounts to only 0.8 inches and the greatest depth ever measured on the ground was 5.9 inches. Mountain stations in the Vosges and Schwarzwald report considerably greater depths. Feldberg in the Black Forest has an average February fall of 60 inches and a mean snowcover of 103 inches. Snow will measure somewhat deeper on Eastern slopes than on western. In the mountain passes of the Vosges and Schwarzwald snow drifts may form a serious obstacle to the movement of military traffic.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MEAN FEBRUARY PRECIPITATION

Besancon	2.3 inches	Frankfurt	1.3 inches
Metz	1.5	Freudenstadt	4.7
Strasbourg	1.3	Nurnberg	1.1
Basel	1.5	Munich	1.3

CLOUDINESS AND MOISTURE

Cloud cover in the Rhine Valley, though less than in January, continues to be considerable. Karlsruhe at 0800A has overcast conditions 57 percent of the mornings. The figure falls to 49 percent by noon and to 48.5 percent by 1900A. Thus, the sky may be expected to be overcast 50 percent of the time. Clear skies will prevail 20-25% of the time at Karlsruhe. Similar conditions are found over much of the area with mountain locations in the Vosges and Schwarzwald reporting slightly higher percentages of cloudiness.

Relative humidity is high. Southwesterly winds predominate and this brings moisture-laden winds from the Atlantic. Strasbourg shows an average morning relative humidity of 88 percent and a noon figure of 76 percent. These high figures prevent rapid drying, though occasionally this regime is broken when cold, dry winds sweep out of Russia and brings spells of very dry conditions.

VISIBILITY

Visibility in the Rhine Valley is generally poor throughout February. Obstructions to vision in the form of precipitation, smoke, haze, or fog are present most of the time. At Karlsruhe visibility is better then 6 miles at 0800A only 27 percent of the time, and is below 2½ miles 51 percent. There is a marked improvement in the morning hours, as over 54 percent of the noon observations show better than 6 miles. After sunset a rapid deterioration sets in. Often periods of very poor visibility tend to persist for several days. A haze layer settles near the ground, obscuring both horizontal and vertical sight. Sometimes however, the plateau regions west of the Vosges and east of the Schwarzwald are not affected by this haze layer which tends to settle over the Rhine Valley.

WIND

The prevailing wind over the entire area is Southwest. This flow is emphasised by the contours of the Rhine Valley tending north and south. 41 percent of all wind observations at Karlsruhe are from the Southwest and Strasbourg shows 43 percent from South and Southwest. The second most frequent direction at Karlsruhe is Northeast with 20 percent, while Strasbourg tends to North and Northwest with 24 percent. All other directions occur less than 10 percent. Calms exist at Karlsruhe 8.2 and at Strasbourg 15 percent of the observations. Wind speed in low. A general average of 7-8 mph. prevail over the entire area. Gales (Over 32 mph.) are seldom experienced, probably less than once a February.

WIND DIRECTION

	N	NE	E	SE	S	SW	W	NW	Calm
Strasbourg	11	4	2	2	12	31	10	13	15
Metz	8	14	3	3	8	16	10	4	34

SOURCE:

Weather Officer - XII T A C

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUNRISE AND SUNSET TABLES FOR FEBRUARY, 1945

Strasbourg 48 35N 07 45E 500 feet elevation

FEBRUARY	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
1	0758	1728	2150	1006	FULL MOON
2	0757	1730	2253	1030	
3	0755	1731	2356	1050	
4	0754	1733	----	1111	LAST QUARTER
5	0753	1734	0059	1129	
6	0752	1736	0205	1159	
7	0750	1738	0310	1231	
8	0748	1740	0416	1330	
9	0746	1741	0519	1359	
10	0745	1743	0617	1459	
11	0743	1744	0707	1610	NEW MOON
12	0741	1746	0747	1731	
13	0740	1748	0826	1848	
14	0738	1750	0853	2010	
15	0736	1752	0921	2130	
16	0734	1753	0947	2250	
17	0732	1755	1013	----	
18	0730	1756	1040	0008	FIRST QUARTER
19	0728	1758	1111	0126	
20	0727	1759	1148	0239	
21	0726	1801	1231	0347	
22	0724	1803	1321	0448	
23	0722	1804	1419	0540	
24	0721	1806	1520	0623	
25	0719	1808	1625	0659	
26	0717	1809	1730	0710	FULL MOON
27	0715	1811	1835	0752	
28	0713	1812	1939	0815	

For Civil Twilight subtract 37 minutes from sunrise and add 37 minutes to sunset.

All times are "A" Army Time or 15 Degrees East Time.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE: 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

190/AN 45/6AG 6036

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 27 1200A JAN

G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #19

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

P-23

: S E C R E T :
: By Auth of :
: CG, 6 Army Group :
: Initials: S L H :
: Date: 3 Feb 45 :

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 20

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 3 FEBRUARY 1945

USSAF Dir of Intelligence

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Confirmation of several probabilities has further clarified the enemy situation on the Sixth US Army Group front.

The cessation of offensive action by the enemy in the SAAR-PALATINATE was marked by the withdrawal of several major units and concomitant realignment of responsibilities. Army Group G may be assumed to have regained control of the whole northern sector as far as the RHINE, after the failure of HIMMLER's politico-military campaign in ALSACE. From the west the corps are aligned as follows: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (257 VG, 6 SS Mtn, and 36 Inf Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf, and 10 SSPzDivs). XXXIX Panzer Corps, formerly controlling the HAGUENAU area, probably relinquished its command and followed in the withdrawal of its three major units (25 PG, 21 Pz and 7 Para Divs). The First Army remains as the intermediate echelon, with the probability that LXXXIX Corps is operating independently under the army group, for the same logistical and tactical reasons which previously made the similar situation expedient.

Behind the RHINE, Army Group OBERRHEIN is returning to its purely administrative defence command status. The loss of XXXIX Panzer Corps and the imminent liquidation of the Nineteenth Army will remove from its control all offensive forces. XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps now can have only a defensive role under a still elusive higher echelon (Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army). In the rapidly constricting COLMAR pocket, no changes in organization were noted.

Along the entire front, the enemy's offensive power has been completely eliminated. West of the HARDT only screening forces have been contacted, with defensive positions obviously under construction. In the HARDT mountain sector, a gradual sidestepping process by 257 Infantry and 6 SS Mountain Divisions permitted the withdrawal of 256 Infantry Division. East of the HARDT 10 SS Pz Division has been forced to spread thinly from the RHINE to limits west of HAGUENAU, helping to cover the sectors vacated by 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute Divisions. Although no positive evidence is as yet available, the recent pattern of train movements suggests that all four of the divisions withdrawn are destined for employment on other sectors of the front.

In the VOSGES area, the orderly disengagement of the Nineteenth Army began to show signs of hasty retreat. 708 Infantry Division had already fallen back across the river, while 16 Volksgrenadier, 189 Volksgrenadier, and 198 Infantry Divisions were beginning to lose organic cohesion. Reinforcements from 5 Mountain Division were unable to bolster the weak 2 Mountain Division to the point where it could do more than fight a delaying action. North of MULHOUSE the few remaining troops of 716 Infantry, 159 Infantry and 338 Infantry Divisions were battling to keep the southern shoulder of the pocket firm.

The enemy was completely on the defensive along the entire Sixth US Army Group front.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Capabilities

The enemy has but one capability remaining: to defend himself. He can best execute this capability by withdrawing behind the bastions of the SIEGFRIED Line and the RHINE. In the SAAR-PALATINATE, the present line and the MAGINOT Line could be manned as delaying positions. In the south the enemy can choose only between the RHINE and destruction.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLINGEN (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), LUTZELBOURG (Q 8540), HATTMANN (R 0284), KALTENHOUSE (R 0721), R 1021, R 1120, BISCHWILLER (R 1019), R 1416, HERRLISHEIM (R 1215), R 0714, R 1410, along RHINE River to V 8841, BIESHEIM (V 8638), V 6939, V 6046, V 4845, V 4629, V 6010, ENSISHEIM (V 7118), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE River to the Swiss Border.

b. XXXIX Panzer Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. KIRCHENTRAUER von KIRCHDORF)

The withdrawal of this corps and 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, and 7 Parachute Divisions was started during the early days of the period. The last date of contact with units of the corps was 30 January and it is believed that their departure is nearly complete.

21 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. FEUCHTINGER) was pulled out of line shortly after the failure to cross the Moder River on 24/25 January. The division was in a battered state, and had been located in a sector that can well be held defensively by a unit of lower efficiency. The larger portion of its responsibilities were probably inherited by the units under control of 553 Divisional Staff. Last information shows 21 Panzer Division having 1,400 effectives and 30-35 armored vehicles including self-propelled guns.

25 Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BAUMEISTER) was last identified by a PW of 119 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 30 January. 35 Panzer Grenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 25 January. The combat effectives of the division were estimated at less than 1,000 effectives and the unit is accepted as withdrawn.

7 Parachute Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERDMANN) has not been encountered since 28 January. The western part of its former sector has been taken over by 47 Volksgrenadier Division while the eastern portion probably has become the responsibility of 10 SS Panzer Division. The withdrawal of 7 Parachute Division is accepted. As its commitment on Sixth US Army Group zone was short, its combat effectives are still estimated at 3,500. The division should be ready for action elsewhere on short notice.

c. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ)

(1) 172 Reserve Division is an upgraded division number with headquarters in HOMBURG. The division appears to have as a primary duty the responsibility of supplying replacements for line units of Army Group G.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army assumed a defensive attitude throughout period and made no appreciable changes in its front line positions. Extensive reorganization of its front line dispositions in the area of the HARDT Mountains to the RHINE River was carried out as 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, and 256 Infantry Divisions were withdrawn to the rear. 245 Infantry Division moved into line between 47 and 36 Infantry Divisions and 6 SS Mountain Division sidestepped to the west assuming responsibility for a large sector in the mountains. This afforded the enemy the opportunity to withdraw an additional division from this sector, 256 Infantry Division having been selected.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) last identified 29 January the division is believed to have been squeezed out of line by the westward move of 6 SS Mountain Division and 36 Infantry Division. The low state of its effectives (1,600) and its continuous commitment through December and January should qualify it for rest and refit, but the present serious situation should force early recommitment in a relief or reinforcement role elsewhere on the Western front.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL) now holds the sector from Q 7644 to Q 8138. Of its three regiments only 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified, on 2 February at Q 7541, while 457 and 477 Volksgrenadier Regiments were last contacted on 24 January. PW's of 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment stated that 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment was to their left, with 477 Regiment in reserve. Organic strength in combat effectives is 1,500, plus 200 effectives in the attached 815 Heavy Machine Gun Battalion.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) moved westward taking over part of the former sector of 256 Volksgrenadier Division. It now holds from Q 8138 to Q 8631. 6 SS Reconnaissance Battalion was identified at Q 8137 on 31 January. 11 SS Mountain Regiment was contacted last at Q 8434 on 28 January; 12 SS Mountain Regiment on 2 February at Q 8631. The losses inflicted on the division caused one or more battalions to be withdrawn for refit behind the lines. Combat effectives are estimated to be 2,200 including 200 for 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion.

36 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) shifted slightly to the west, now holding the line from Q 8631 to Q 9028. The extent of its sector was curtailed appreciably by the commitment of 245 Infantry Division. Neither 118 nor 165 Grenadier Regiments were identified during the period. 87 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 30 January at Q 8729. PW's confirm that I Battalion 87 Regiment is still at BAUMHOLDER while II Battalion is subordinated to 165 Grenadier Regiment. Divisional combat effectives total approximately 2,000.

(d) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOEHNE)

This corps is temporarily carried under command of First German Army. Prior to the offensive in the HAGUENAU area, LXXXIX Corps was directly subordinate to Army Group G for logistics and tactical reasons, while operating in this area. It is probable that the same situation will be repeated.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER). The presence of this division in the sector from Q 9028 to Q 9328 has been established by the identification of 937 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9228 on 30 January and of 935 Grenadier Regiment in the same area on 1 February. Initial interrogation of prisoners of 937 Regiment suggests that reorganization of the division during its long rest period was less extensive than had been anticipated. On this basis a strength of 3,000 would be the maximum.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) committed its third regiment, 115 Grenadier Regiment, during the period and now holds from Q 9328 to R 0025, though the withdrawal of 7 Parachute Division may well have forced the division to extend its sector east toward HAGUENAU. Identifications for the period were as follows: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 27 January and 1 February at Q 9328; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 31 January and 1 February at Q 9526; 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 29 January and 1 February at Q 9825. Combat effectives are about 1,500.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLEIN)

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is responsible for a sector from the Moselle to the area L 0501. Identification of 713 Regiment at L 0501 denotes a dhift north into positions formerly held by 11 Panzer Division. 714 Regiment was last contacted at L 0504 on 27 January. Division combat strength is estimated at 3,500 as of 29 January.

719 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SCHWALBE) is holding a long stretch from MERZIG to the SAARLAUTERN area. Last identifications were as follows: 723 Grenadier Regiment at Q 2881 on 1 February and 743 Grenadier Regiment at Q 2880 on 23 January. Strength was estimated at 4,000 on 29 January.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM) was identified by its artillery elements on 1 February on XX US Corps front. However, lack of identification of either Panzer Grenadier Regiment since 27 January and the assumption of responsibility by 416 Division of its former sector would support the theory that the division has been withdrawn. A fair source reported that on 26 January one half of the division left for the eastern front. Latest estimate of divisional strength is 4,500 combat effectives including 50 tanks and self-propelled guns.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) continues to hold the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to the vicinity of FORBACH (Q 3966). During the period only 861 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 29 January at Q 3273, and on 31 January at Q 3173. PW statements lead to the assumption that this is the only organic regiment remaining to the division, it having absorbed 860 Grenadier Regiment. The mission of the division remains purely defensive, with no replacements or any prospect of relief expected. Combat effectives of the division are estimated at 2,400, including 900 from 80 and 107 Grenadier Replacement Battalions (172 Res Div) and 514 Grenadier Replacement Battalion.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) holds the sector from FORBACH (Q 3966) to Q 6055. Identifications during the period include those of 59 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4960 on 27 January, and of 74 Grenadier Regiment on 29 January at Q 5359. 73 Grenadier Regiment has not been identified since 7 January and its present whereabouts are not known. Service personnel of the division have been identified fighting in line as infantry troops. The increased strength of 59 Grenadier Regiment would imply that it had received recent replacements. The division's combat strength is estimated at 1,700, including the 400 effectives of Battle Group KLEIN.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Lt. Col. FICK) holds the sector Q 5955 to the BITCHE area (Q 7750). Light contact throughout the period identified 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 28 January at Q 6654; 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 28 January at Q 6653, and on 31 January at Q 5955. Prisoners of war from 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment stated that their strength and positions had not changed considerably for three weeks and that no relief is expected. Regiment KENTNER (Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN) left the line on 28 January as organic units of the division took over their sectors. Strength of the division is 2,000 effectives with about 20 self-propelled guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) continues to hold the sector from Q 7450 to Q 7644. 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on 29 January at Q 7445, while 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on 29 and 30 January at Q 7450. 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment has as yet not been contacted and there is no evidence of its having refitted. Only small scale actions have relieved the passive tenor of the division's role. Remnants of the 361 Volksgrenadier Division provided 300-350 replacements for 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment. These bring the divisions total combat effectives up to 2,200, including 500 from the attached 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion and Battle Group ZWEIBRUCKEN.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

were diverted to 2 Mountain Division. The division contains a large proportion of Austrian personnel who have proven themselves to be only mediocre troops. Up to the close of the period the division had yielded 2610 prisoners of war.

At the close of the period the division was operating in battle groups mostly in the areas of 198 and 189 Infantry Divisions. The division was originally given an estimated strength of 4,500 troops. However, the extremely heavy losses inflicted on the division suggest that the combat effectives do not now exceed 2,000 men.

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SCHIEL) managed to pull practically all its units out of the SELESTAT (V 7862) area before being cut off. A captured field order of 1 February has the division holding a sector from V 7741 to V 8141, flanked by 2 Mountain Division on its right and 189 Volksgrenadier Division on the left. The proposed lines of withdrawal for the division were in a south-easterly direction. Operationally attached to the division were 1 Battalion 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment (16 VG Div), II and IV Battalions 111 Mountain Artillery Regiment (2 Mtn Div), II Battalion, 1316 Artillery Regiment (16 VG Div), 993 GHQ Artillery Battalion, 2 Artillery Battalion, 1326 Fortress Artillery Battalion, I Battalion 14 AA Regiment, 501 AA Battalion, 2 Company 1316 A/T Battalion (16 VG Div) and elements of 654 GHQ AT Battalion. The existence of 235 Artillery Regiment, 198 Fusilier Battalion, 235 ATk Company, 235 Engineer Battalion, 235 Signal Battalion, 235 Field Replacement Battalion, and Supply Regiment were confirmed. The division, is estimated to have not more then 1,000 organic combat effectives.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. ZORN) was responsible for a sector west of V 7741. Though the western extremity of its sector is not known, 189 Division was responsible for the defense of COLMAR and vicinity. The presence of 1212 Grenadier Regiment, not identified since 28 December, is most doubtful. The regiment is believed either disbanded or detached. Last identifications of the other two regiments were: 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 1 February vicinity V 7442; 1214 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 February vicinity V 7242. Present organic strength of the division is estimated at 800 strong.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MUELLER) has been very badly depleted and is presently incapable of independent action. The regiments of the division have been disorganized and the remnants are operating in various battlegroups under the control of other divisions. A prisoner of war stated that the division trains crossed the RHINE River during the night of 31 January. Its remnants total approximately 500 combat effectives.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) was forced into the NEUF BRISACH area. However, some elements of 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment are still being contacted in the northwest sector of the pocket. The division is being constantly reported as having given up elements to other divisions and the identifications prove the scattered disposition of its units. Its strength does not exceed 500 effectives.

Miscellaneous Units in LXIV Corps Sector: The critical situation in this sector has produced the usual conglomeration of miscellaneous GHQ units, with compositions varying from paroled criminals to converted clerks of higher headquarters. This collection of bodies and odd types of arms is estimated to have increased the total number of combat effectives by a maximum of 1,500 men.

(b) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EBERT). During the beginning of the period commitment of the division remained rather obscure, with only 758 Grenadier Regiment identified at V 7011 on 28 January and at V 6813 on 1 February. On 2 February 757 Grenadier Regiment was identified west of COLMAR. However, the repeated sightings of eastward movement in the former divisional sector suggest that its withdrawal is nearly completed. Organic units total about 1,400 combat effectives.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

10 SS Panzer Division (CG: SS. Brig. Gen. HARMEL) has been left with a considerably enlarged sector due to the withdrawal of 7 Parachute and 21 Panzer Divisions on its right and left flanks respectively. Its line now extends from west of HAGUENAU (R 0124) to BISCHWILLER (R 1020). Last identifications were of 21 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 2 February at R 0124 and R 0919; 22 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 1 February vicinity R 0920. Heavy losses during the previous period have been partially offset by replacements held in local reserve. Divisional strength has been reduced to about 2,800 effectives supported by approximately 50 tanks and assault guns.

d. ARMY GROUP OBERRHEIN

(1) Army Oberrhein (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von MAUR)

(a) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI)

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) has probably expanded north to take over part of the sector vacated by 21 Panzer Division. Its present boundaries are believed to be BISCHWILLER (R 1020) on the right and the RHINE River on its left. Contact during the past week was light, the only identifications being that of Battalion TREUTLER of Regiment MARBACH at R 1312 on 1 February. Combat effectives remain at 2,500 strong. It is understood that this formation is actually a division staff operationally controlling miscellaneous units temporarily assigned.

405 zbV Division continues to exercise administrative control over Volkssturm and garrison units in the SIEGFRIED Line along the East bank of the RHINE River from R 1107 to W 0018.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

30 SS Grenadier Division is still carried East of the RHINE in the general area between OFFENBURG and FREIBURG. It may well have the mission of assisting 405 zbV Division in holding defense positions along the East bank of the RHINE River.

(2) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

The enemy defenses in the VOSGES Pocket failed to withstand heavy Allied pressure from the North and South. The troops of Lt. Gen. RASP were unable to prevent a developing pincers movement within the pocket and, in order to avoid complete annihilation, a withdrawal of men and equipment to the SIEGFRIED Line and Germany was started on approximately 1 February. Casualties in men have amounted to about 6,000 combat effectives during the period and loss of equipment has been proportionate. Two divisional units suffered extremely heavy losses; namely, 708 and 16 Infantry Divisions. No substantial reinforcements have arrived, indicating that the departure of this Army from France is imminent.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) has suffered extremely heavy losses in attempting to stem Allied advances to the RHINE River in the vicinity of NEUF BREISACH. Complete concentration of the division was effected in the area of COLMAR, when elements previously in the MULHOUSE area moved North. The division arrived in the VOSGES Pocket much below T/O strength and was reinforced by elements of 5 Mountain Division and 4 High Mountain Battalion from Italy. The independent Battalion was absorbed by 137 Mountain Regiment, and 3 Company of 85 Reconnaissance Battalion by 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion. A further five companies of 5 Mountain Division, originally intended to serve as a cadre for a new mountain division,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. DERNEN) continued to defend the approaches to CERNAY and ENSISHEIM. The divisional sector seems to have contracted in the east as elements of 716 Infantry Division were identified within the former's area. The division now holds from V 5216 to V 6212. Identifications were made during the period of the following units: 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 29 January; 1210 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 27 January at V 5911; 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 31 January at V 5812 and on 2 February in the vicinity of V 5214. Prisoners state that the two original battalions of 1209 Regiment were consolidated into I Battalion and that 40 Panzer Grenadier Replacement Battalion was possibly renamed II Battalion, 1209 Grenadier Regiment. Organic strength is estimated at 1,200 plus 400 for attached units (201 and 202 Mountain Battalion, 808 Super Heavy Machine Gun Battalion, and 21 Mortar Battalion).

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) has expanded westward as indicated in the identifications of 726 Grenadier Regiment at V 6312 on 30 January. 736 Regiment remains unidentified, but a captured code name list of 15 January confirms its existence. 706 Regiment was last contacted at V 6713 on 1 February. Reinforceing the depleted division are 758 Grenadier Regiment of 338 Infantry Division, 785 Engineer Battalion, 2 Company 654/Tk Battalion, possibly 40 PG Replacement Battalion, and elements of 106 Panzer Brigade. 726 Regiment is known to have received some replacements from 460 Replacement Battalion (ULM). Organic strength, 1,200 plus 600 in attached units.

106 Panzer Brigade. A prisoner has stated that the unit is to move from the vicinity of ENSISHEIM to the area south of COLMAR in order to cover the withdrawal of 189 Infantry Division. Its present strength in tanks and men is much depleted, as it fought very stubborn battles in the south. Total strength is 500 men supported by 15 tanks and self-propelled guns.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve: (Combat Effectives)		
Seventh US Army	25,000	*
First French Army	10,000	**
Artillery Effectives:		
Seventh US Army	13,000	
First French Army	4,000	**
Reserve:		
Estimate Reserves in Saar	7,500	
Estimate Reserves in Black Forest	12,000	
TOTAL	71,500	
Tanks and SP Guns		
Seventh US Army	80-100	
First French Army	40- 50	
TOTAL	120-150	

(*) Sharp drop due chiefly to withdrawal of 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions.

(**) Strength rapidly decreasing as a result of casualties and withdrawals.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

The ranks of 5 Mountain Division in the Alpine sector have again been reduced to provide further reinforcements for 2 Mountain Division in the COLMAR Pocket. However, the strength of nominal Alpine units on this front remains the same, as elements of 5 Mountain Division continue to be identified and ground sources report some influx of other mountain units as replacements into the VAL di SUSA. The only indication of any further weakening of the German units comes in prisoner of war statements that approximately one battalion of Italian troops is distributed among regiments of 34 Infantry Division. Ground sources have not confirmed the report that the general evacuation of PIEDMONT, orderd to begin on 10 January, has actually started.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not excee, 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

The French First Army attack continued its successful push in the Southern VOSGES Sector against stiffening opposition. The enemy established numerous strongpoints with armor support and installed extensive minefields to aid the defense. The heavy fighting which had taken place in CERNAY region subsided by the end of the period.

The unabated drive on the northern flank of the VOSGES Pocket brought our forces well along the COLMAR Canal by 27 January, but the enemy at that time was concentrating remnants of his armored units on the west bank of the ILL River, probably preparing a more aggressive defense. At GRUSSENHEIM (V 8147) his resistance was extremely stiff, but to the west the town of HOLTZWIHR (V 7646) was taken in stride and no contact was reported with the enemy by patrols which reached the canal junction at V 8545. East of the ILL River from SELESTAT to KRAFFT the enemy also remained out of contact.

Thus, the panhandle in the north was successfully cleared by 1 February, as friendly elements reached the Rhine River. Throughout that part of the front, resistance was negligible.

The bitter opposition and armored counterattacks met early in the period in the drive on COLMAR slackened after HORBOURG (V 7448) was finally cleared. Similarly, the capture of ARTZENHEIM (V 8546) materially reduced the strong resistance which small enemy groups had put up in the HARDT Woods. The end of the period saw steady advances being made in spite of the mines, snow, and obstructions encountered all along the front. COLMAR was taken 3 February, but some fighting continued at isolated points. Enemy activity in the rear areas continued to be reported in the form of heavy movement from this area to the south and southeast. This was explained by PW statements to the effect that troops, supply trains, and artillery were evacuating through the NEUF BRISACH area.

The enemy proved himself very alert in the RHINE bridgehead area throughout the period. Our forces found BETTENHOFFEN and GAMBSHEIM clear, but the position from OBERHOFFEN to the road junction at R 0910 was an enemy strongpoint which put up stubborn resistance supported by 8 - 10 tanks. East of BISCHWILLER, he appeared to be entrenching at critical points. The flooding of this area proved to be an obstacle of major proportions at the close of the period, as friendly forces reported water to be waist-high at some points.

The enemy's attitude was definitely defensive in the sector from HAGENAU to the HARDT Mountain area where his principal activity was digging defences north of the Moder River. Scattered resistance, with some tanks, was met in the HAGENAU Forest, but steady vehicular movement to the rear was reported.

REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037) in the HARDT Mountain area was found unoccupied and from that point to the eastern edge of the mountains, no report of enemy contact was received. Further westward, however, the enemy was digging in and reacting to our patrols with mortar and self-propelled gun fire.

The relative quiet in the SAAR remained unbroken except for one minor probing attack in the area of WOELFING (Q 5955), which caused some withdrawal of friendly forward elements. No contact was made in the area from EPPING URBACH (Q 6957) to the BITCHE Forest but the movement of small enemy groups was observed, probably effecting local reliefs.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

Observations made during the period revealed a very definite trend of enemy withdrawal along the Sixth Army Group Front. In the Vosges Pocket vehicular movement to the south and east as well as reports of crossings of the Rhine by barge and ferry indicate a further reduction of enemy forces in the pocket. Along the KARLSRUHE - OFFENBURG - FREIBURG line heavy rail activity was reported, although not very much actual movement was visible. Heavy military activity was also seen in the MANNHEIM-KARLSRUHE - HEILBRONN area, consisting of approximately 25 - 30 military trains reported on 29, 30 January, and 2 February. The SAAR was likewise active with considerable road and rail activity along the WISSEMBOURG - LANDAU - GRUNSTADT (M 3107) lines, and also in the KAISERSLAUTERN - HOMBURG - PIRMASENS area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

East of the Rhine the rail lines converging upon HEILBRONN revealed heavy traffic whenever a break in the weather permitted good visibility. Indications are that the bulk of this activity was movement headed in an easterly direction, thus pointing to a departure either of military units from our front or of troops from the large training camps in the PFORZHEIM - STUTTGART area.

Large scale movements of motor transports in a northeasterly direction along the WISSEMBOURG - LANDAU roads on 29 and again on 31 January, confirmed the conclusion that the withdrawal of enemy forces was underway. This conclusion is supported by the fact that on 2 February, 5 military trains were seen moving north and east on the LANDAU - GRUNSTADT (M 3107) rail line, and another military train eastward from the vicinity of BIEBERMUHLE (Q 9083).

In the Saar large concentrations of locomotives, rail and flat cars, were reported in the sidings and marshalling yards along the KAISERSLAUTERN - HOMBURG line. Photo reconnaissance and TAC/R revealed a total of 8 - 9 trains along the line on 29 and 30 January. One of these trains, hauled by 4 engines, consisted of 15 probable light AA wagons. Reconnaissance of 2 February revealed four additional trains moving west along this line.

It is of interest to note that many of the military trains seen throughout the period were made up in part of flat cars loaded with motor vehicles. Moreover, much of the activity seen in the marshalling yards, especially in the SAAR Region, consisted of large numbers of flats loaded with vehicles. As many as 100 - 150 of these loaded cars were seen at NEUSTADT and another large number at ALZEY (M 2828). A comparative study of the week's movements reveals that rail and road activity was heavier and more pronounced than at any other comparable period during the past month.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc # 1 - APPENDIX "A"
Inc # 2 - Ordnance Depots
Inc # 3 - The Rhine Bridges
Inc # 4 - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A" TO SUMMARY NUMBER 20 DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1945

PANZER BASE CENTER

A Panzer Base is a center where unserviceable armored force vehicles are reconditioned or replaced, and where new or repaired armor and spare parts await collection by field units. Thus, a Panzer Base comprises workshops, spare parts depots, offices, and storage facilities which may be spread over a considerable area. Of the three Panzer Bases located on the western front, two are in the Sixth Army Group area: Panzer Base Center, near KAISERSLAUTERN (R 0094); and Panzer Base South, near PFORZHEIM (R 7133).

The headquarters of Panzer Base Center is now at OTTERBACH. Installations in the immediate vicinity which may be a part of the Base are shown on Enclosure #1. It will be noted that the road and rail nets are adequate, and that installations are widely enough dispersed to render complete destruction unlikely. A workshop company is located in OTTERBERG, repairing tanks and motor vehicles in buildings on both sides of the road leading to OTTERBACH.

Additional repair facilities are available at SIEGELBACH, where normally dense natural cover has been artificially thickened to provide concealment for a camouflaged workshop tent 60 meters long, and for a small wooden shack which serves as an office building. A report of 19 December 1944 mentions vehicles parked under the trees beginning at the north edge of the woods, and extending south in a single line along either side of the road. Approximately 20 tanks and 40 - 50 trucks were reported ready for use, in addition to the vehicles under repair. Later information reveals another large tank, truck and repair point just northeast of KAISERSLAUTERN at R 049952, not shown on Enclosure No. 1.

Winterizing equipment for armored vehicles is available at the HOHENECKEN depot, and further supplies at EINSIEDLERHOF, where a large ordnance depot, reported in September, may still be functioning. A very large ordnance depot just east of KAISERSLAUTERN, at R 060945, is housed in six large storage buildings, and eight sheds. It is a major installation served by five railroad spurs and a good roadnet. It was bombed on 30 December, but damage appears so slight that the installation is probably still functioning. Spare parts are stored at FRANKENSTEIN, where an underground wine cellar, built 60 meters deep into the side of a hill, is used as a depot for replacement motors, tracks, and other spare parts for Pz KW III, IV, and V. Conveniently at hand is the tank factory at NIEDERFELS, a 1 1/2 story building at the south end of town, between the main highway and the railroad tracks. Pz KW III and IV bodies, and Pz KW III, IV, and V, motors are constructed here.

Only little is known about Panzer Base South. A PW taken on 11 December located a tank spare depot called Panzer Base South in a former cellulose factory at MALSCH (R 430324), west of PFORZHEIM. Parts for all types of armored force vehicles are stored there. Photo interpretation and ground information of 20 January 1945 confirm this statement. Much track activity and vehicles parked in the area tend to confirm the report that this is a tank and motor transport repair depot.

Other ordnance installations in the immediate vicinity of the present 6th Army Group Front Lines are shown on Enclosure No. 2.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET
OTTERBERG
HQ
OTTERBACH
SIEGELBACH
KAISERSLAUTERN
EINSIEDLERHOF
FRANKENSTEIN
HOHENECKEN
WEIDENFELS
0 1 2 3 4 MILES
N
PANZER BASE CENTER
LEGEND
MOTORHIGHWAY
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
MAIN ROAD
SECONDARY ROAD
RAILROADS
WORKSHOP
SPARE PART DEPOT
TANK FACTORY
SCALE 1/100,000
G-2 6th ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #1 TO
WEEKLY INTELL.
SUM. #20
AS OF 3 1200A FEB.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


CENTER
SOUTH
?
Saarbrücken
Strasbourg
Colmar
Freiburg
MULHOUSE
BASEL
Guebwiller
Sarrebourg
St. Die
Ribeauville
Turckheim
Gerardmer
Munster
Masevaux
Dannemarie
Altkirch
Thann
Rouffach
Ensisheim
Wittelsheim
Kaysersberg
Schirmeck
Molsheim
Obernai
Sélestat
Erstein
Benfeld
Barr
Villé
Ste Marie aux Mines
Lapoutroie
Ribeauvillé
Kaysersberg
Munster
Turckheim
Colmar
Wintzenheim
Eguisheim
Rouffach
Ensisheim
Guebwiller
Thann
Masevaux
Wittelsheim
Altkirch
Dannemarie
Belfort
Montbéliard
Delle
Porrentruy
Pruntrut
Saignelégier
Tramelan
Moutier
Delémont
Laufen
Liestal
Basel
Rheinfelden
Frick
Aarau
Brugg
Zofingen
Olten
Langenthal
Huttwil
Sursee
Willisau
Sempach
Luzern
Schaffhausen
Winterthur
Zürich
Baden
Wohlen
Bremgarten
Rapperswil
Einsiedeln
Schwyz
Arth
Zug
Cham
Affoltern
Horgen
Meilen
Rüti
Uster
Wetzikon
Pfäffikon
Lachen
Glarus
Ziegelbrücke
Sargans
Mels
Walenstadt
Chur
Ilanz
Disentis
Andermatt
Altdorf
Stans
Sarnen
Brienz
Interlaken
Thun
Spiez
Frutigen
Kandersteg
Gemmi Pass
Leukerbad
Sierre
Siders
Martigny
Orsières
Grand St. Bernard Pass
Aosta
Ivrea
Biella
Varallo
Domodossola
Simplon Pass
Brig
Visp
Leuk
Gampel
Raron
Susten
Gletsch
Furka Pass
Oberalp Pass
Reichenau
Tavanasa
Flims
Ilanz
Thusis
Andeer
Splügen
San Bernardino Pass
Bellinzona
Locarno
Lugano
Chiasso
Como
Menaggio
Porlezza
Ponte Tresa
Luino
Varese
Gallarate
Busto Arsizio
Legnano
Rho
Milano
Monza
Lecco
Bergamo
Treviglio
Cremona
Crema
Lodi
Pavia
Vigevano
Novara
Arona
Stresa
Verbania
Omegna
Orta
Borgomanero
Gozzano
Oleggio
Magenta
Abbiategrasso
Tortona
Voghera
Stradella
Broni
Casteggio
Mortara
Alessandria
Valenza
Casale Monferrato
Vercelli
Santhia
Ivrea
Chivasso
Torino
Pinerolo
Susa
Bardonecchia
Modane
Fréjus
Briançon
Col de Montgenèvre
Sestriere
Cesana Torinese
Oulx
Col du Mont Cenis
Lanslebourg
Col de l'Iseran
Bonneval-sur-Arc
Col du Petit St. Bernard
Bourg St. Maurice
Albertville
Moutiers
Aix-les-Bains
Chambéry
St. Jean de Maurienne
St. Michel de Maurienne
La Mure
Grenoble
Voiron
Bourgoin
La Tour du Pin
Vienne
Lyon
Villefranche
Tarare
Roanne
Montbrison
St. Etienne
Rive-de-Gier
Givors
Oullins
Tassin
Ecully
Caluire
Neuville
Trévoux
Meximieux
Pont d'Ain
Bourg-en-Bresse
Nantua
Oyonnax
Hauteville
Belley
Culoz
Seyssel
Annecy
Faverges
Thônes
Megève
Sallanches
Chamonix
Mont Blanc
Col de la Forclaz
Martigny
Col du Grand St. Bernard
Col de la Seigne
Courmayeur
Col du Petit St. Bernard
Val d'Isère
Tignes
Bourg St. Maurice
Moûtiers
Albertville
Ugine
Faverges
Annecy

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THE RHINE BRIDGES

—· CONDITION ·—

DAMAGED /

DESTROYED X

—· KEY ·—

- PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- COMBINATON HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE

3 1200A FEB.
ENCL. #3 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #20
G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

SECRET

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
DEC 44



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL # 4 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. # 20

SECRET

P-6

140

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

:::::::::::::::::::
:S E C R E T :
:By Auth of :
:CG, 6 Army Group :
:Initials: :
:Date: 10 Feb 45 :
:::::::::::::::::::

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 21

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 10 FEBRUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The departure of all known reserves from the SAAR-PALATINATE for other fronts and the destruction of the German Nineteenth Army's offensive power in southern ALSACE have placed the enemy entirely on the defensive in these areas.

Army Group G is supervising First German Army, whose sector extends from the MOSELLE River to the RHINE River. Operations are controlled by the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 256 Inf, and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry (719 Inf, and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG and 559 Inf Divs); XC Infantry (6 SS Mtn, and 36 Inf Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf, and 257 Inf Divs).

The exigencies of other fronts forced Army Group G to regroup its forces considerably. LXXXV Infantry Corps was shifted from the Seventh Army to the First Army, moving in between LXXXII Infantry and XIII SS Corps, with no change in actual divisional strength. This probably permitted the direct subordination of LXXXIX Corps to First Army. Two more divisions (21 Pz and 10 SS) left the front; their sectors were covered by a shift of 257 Infantry Division and the assumption of organizational control by 905 Divisional Staff. 256 Infantry Division moved across the front and was identified operating in conjunction with 11 Panzer Division, whose relief it is now in position to effect. 6 SS Mountain Division spread its forces thinly over the sector vacated by 256 and 257 Infantry Divisions. The general debility of Army Group G's front in organic divisional units is probably partially made up by Volkssturm infantry and a larger allottment of GHQ troops, particularly artillery. There is a possibility that elements salvaged from the Nineteenth Army may be used, but no other reserves seem at this time available.

The Nineteenth Army was destroyed as an effective fighting force. By 1200 hours on 10 February over 22,000 permanent casualties could be charged against it, as well as the loss of 55 armored vehicles and 66 artillery pieces. It is estimated that no more than 3,000/4,000 combat infantry effectives were successfully evacuated, with only a slightly higher figure for supporting arms and service troops. They could serve as cadre for rebuilding two or three very weak divisions. The present shortage of headquarters and staffs may cause a rapid reidentification of some of the higher formations, particularly the corps headquarters, but their relation to the units beaten in southern ALSACE will be only numerical.

East of the RHINE it is assumed that Army Group OBERRHEIN has returned to its preoperations status of OBERRHEIN Defense Command. Its command is exercised through XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps southward along the RHINE to a point near FREIBURG where Twenty-fourth Army assumes control. Twenty-fourth Army has been confirmed as definitely in control of the Swiss border region and the upper RHINE south of BADENWEILER (V 9513), known to be the headquarters of XVIII SS Corps in late January.

The ultimate role of Nineteenth Army is still conjectural. From its present headquarters at BADENWEILER, it will at least temporarily assume command of the area east of the former pocket, while its remnants reassemble. It may be used in an operational role under Army Group G, relieving the First Army of the HARDT Mountain - RHINE River sector. Finally, it may remain in the eastern RHINE Valley, exercising administrative control over the miscellaneous units which garrison the region. However, since the function of command in this area is administrative rather than operational, this possibility is the least likely.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

L 2184

SECRET

b. Capabilities

For the moment the enemy has only one capability on the Sixth Army Group front: namely, to defend himself. In the northern sector he can attempt to hold on the successive positions of (1) the present line; (2) the MAGINOT Line and the line of the RHINE; and (3) the SIEGFRIED Line. Limited objective spoiling attacks can be launched in the SAAR area. Along the RHINE he is capable only of harassing raids while he marshals his forces for the defensive.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), South along RHINE River to the Swiss Border.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURE GIVEN IN SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES ALWAYS REPRESENTS THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES, UNLESS QUALIFIED. IT INCLUDES ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT INFANTRY OR PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENTS, THE RECONNAISSANCE OR FUSILIER BATTALION, THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION, AND THE COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION. SUPPORTING OR AUXILLIARY TROOPS ARE NOT COUNTED IN THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMATION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USUALLY BE CONJECTURAL AND WITHOUT EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF KNOWN CASUALTIES AND INTERROGATION REPORTS. IT IS ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT A PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF SUPPORTING TROOPS, BOTH DIVISIONAL AND GHQ, ARE TO BE ADDED IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE ENEMY'S OVERALL COMBAT STRENGTH.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ ?)

There have been a number of reports which indicate that BLASKOWITZ has been transfered to an Army Group command on the Eastern front. However, this change has not yet been confirmed. His possible successor is not known.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLEIN)

Corps headquarters has been at WADERN (L 3904) since 6 December 1944. An identification on 1 February placed it specifically in a building at the road bend approximately 70 yards southeast of the village church.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) had only a short rest after its withdrawal from the BITCHE area, for elements of it have already been contacted south of the MOSELLE. So far, however, only 256 Artillery Regiment has been identified, at L 0504 on 7 February. It is believed that the rest of the division will soon go into line to take the place of 11 Panzer Division. Combat infantry strength of division: 2,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is responsible for the line from the MOSELLE to the vicinity of L 0205. Identifications: 712 Grenadier Regiment, on 5 February at L 1399 and L 1498; 713 Grenadier Regiment, on 7 February at L 0502; 714 Grenadier Regiment, on 4 February at L 0502. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,500.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM) was identified in the same general area as 416 Infantry Division, suggesting that the two divisions may have been engaged on a combined mission with 11 Panzer lending support with its mobile and armored forces. Only 110 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was met during the period, at L 0504 on 7 February. It is believed that the bulk of the division has been withdrawn. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 4,000 supported by about 50 tanks.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

The presence of this corps in the SAAR was established by prisoner statements that it controlled 719 Infantry and 347 Infantry Divisions. It formerly formed part of the German Seventh Army in the ARDENNES sector.

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GEDE) is holding a broad front from MERZIG to a point immediately north of SAARLAUTERN. 719 Fusilier Battalion was the only unit identified during the period, at Q 2981 on 4 February. Reinforcements were received at the end of January from 34 Reserve Grenadier Regiment. Combat infantry effective strength is estimated at 4,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) is holding the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to east of FORBACH (Q 4263). Recent identifications of 860 Regiment disprove the assumption that it had been completely absorbed by 861 Regiment and make it appear that such dissolution as took place was merely a temporary measure. In addition, 880 Grenadier Regiment received reinforcements in the form of 80 and 107 Replacement Battalions of 172 Reserve Division, 347 Field Replacement Battalion, and 5 company of 861 Grenadier Regiment. In all probability, the division has acquired 880 Regiment in order to provide the necessary troops to bring it up to the standard 3 regiment - 2 battalion basis. During the period, the following units were identified: 860 Regiment on 6 February at Q 3567; and 880 Regiment at Q 3665 and 4063 on 7 February. Last contact with 861 Regiment was on 29 January. Generally, the division proved to be more aggressive than it had been for quite some time. For on 7 February it mounted a small scale attack in the OETING (Q 4064) area which forced the withdrawal of friendly outposts. Combat infantry strength is carried at 2,400.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) continued to hold the sector from east of FORBACH (Q 4263) to Q 6055 and was comparatively inactive during the period. The 59 Grenadier Regiment which was identified on 7 February at Q 4862 evidently has an extremely weak I Battalion and there is some doubt as to whether or not the II Battalion has been reconstituted. The only other identification made during the period was that of 119 Artillery Regiment on 7 February at Q 5057. 74 Grenadier Regiment was last contacted on 1 February while 73 Grenadier Regiment has not put in an appearance since 7 January. The division combat infantry effective strength, including Battle Group KLEIN, is estimated at 1,700.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG) continued to hold the sector from Q 6055 to the BITCHE area at Q 7750. During the period the division maintained relatively close contact, probably due to its recent strengthening and the consequent boost in aggressive spirit. 37 SS and 38 SS Grenadier Regiments were identified on the 6th and 7th of February respectively, the latter at Q 6353. 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion was also identified on 5 February at Q 6455.

The division has received considerable reinforcements recently. Some 700 effectives for the grenadier regiments arrived from IGLAU (CZECHOSLOVAKIA). The reconnaissance battalion is also reported to have been brought up to strength. Considering this rejuvenation, combat infantry effectives of the division are now estimated at 2,500. Battle Group KENTER, with a strength of 300, is still believed to be in reserve, although it was not contacted during the week. It is believed that the estimated number of tanks and SP guns operating with the division has risen to approximately 40.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) holds a sector from the woods south of BITCHE to Q 7545 with 1126 and 1127 Grenadier Regiments in line. Last identifications were: 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 6 February in the vicinity of Q 7446; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 7 February in the vicinity of Q 7549. 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment has not been identified for a long period and may be undergoing reconstitution. 1126 Grenadier Regiment received a small number of replacements but no further refitting seems to have taken place within the division. A scarcity of heavy weapons has been noted within the unit for it has been proven that some of the battalion heavy weapons companies do not exist. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,200.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(d) XC Corps (CG: ?)

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) expanded further to the west as 257 Volksgrenadier Division went out of line. The division is now defending stubbornly from Q 7545 to Q 8435. Identifications: 11 SS Mountain Regiment, 4 February at Q 7639 and Q 7441, 8 February at Q 7639; 12 SS Mountain Regiment, 5 February at Q 7839; 6 SS Mountain Artillery Regiment, 9 February at Q 8237. Thus the westward extension of the divisional sector was accomplished by 11 Mountain Regiment sidestepping from the left to the right flank of 12 Mountain Regiment. Partial reorganization within the infantry component took place as returning convelescents and rear echelon personnel were allotted to both regiments. Some companies were dissolved in the process of consolidation. Combat infantry strength totals approximately 2,200.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) is committed from Q 8435 to Q 9028. Close contact was maintained during the period as the following units were identified: 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 5 and 7 February at Q 8532; 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 8 February at Q 8929; 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 4 February at Q 8631. 87 and 165 Grenadier Regiments continue to have only one battalion each in the area, the others presumably remaining at BAUMHOLDER. Not including these battalions which should have been ready for commitment several weeks ago, the divisional combat infantry strength is estimated to be 2,000, including 51 German Air Force Fortress Battalion.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER) is holding a very narrow sector between 36 and 47 Infantry Divisions. During the period, the units of the division were not satisfactorily identified due to the quiet which prevailed on the front. Combat infantry strength is 2,500 men.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was in very light contact during the period. The only identification was that of 104 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9228, indicating a slight westward shift. 47 Volksgrenadier Division is believed to cover from Q 9128 to R 0225. Casualties during the period seem to have been negligible and combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL). As mentioned above, this division was withdrawn from its old sector south of 559 Volksgrenadier Division on or about 4 February. It lost no time in moving east to the HAGUENAU area where it, in turn, relieved 10 SS Panzer Division. The following identifications were made in its new sector from R 0225 to north of BISCHWILLER (R 1020); 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 9 February at R 0324; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 7 February at OBERHOFFEN (R 0919); 477 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 9 February, at R 0920. Since there have been no indications of replacements, combat infantry strength is carried at 1,700.

10 SS Panzer Division (CG: SS Brig. Gen. HARMEL) left Sixth US Army Group front about 6 February. PW's claimed their destination was to be the BERLIN front. At the time of its relief by 257 Volksgrenadier Division, 10 SS still had combat infantry strength of approximately 2,800, supported by about 50 tanks and assault guns. Considerable replacements had been received prior to the division's departure.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. OBERRHEIN DEFENCE COMMAND

(1) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI)

905 Mobilization Division was shown by captured documents and PW statements to have taken over the group of miscellaneous units formerly under control of 553 Volksgrenadier Divisional Staff. A captured code list dated 1 February placed the following units under its control: 2 SS Police Regt (GIESEKE), comprised of II Bn 2 SS Police Regt, III Bn 2 SS Police Regt, and VI Gren Bn OBERRHEIN (MORG); 2 Gren Regt OBERRHEIN (MARBACH), comprised of Police School HEIDENHEIM (GRUTZNER), I Gren Bn Army NCO School ETTLINGEN (TREUTTLER), Gren Bn XIII Corps Area NCO School (SCHMIDT), and IV Gren Bn OBERRHEIN (WAGNER); 1514 Fortress Arty Bn (SCHMITZ); 1539 Fortress Arty Bn (MAYER); 405 Engr Bn (TERJUNG); Pz Engr Co FELDHERRNHALLE; 831 Engr Bn; 833 Mtn Engr Bn; 68 AA Regt; 405 AT Bn; and AA Hq TAUCHNITZ. Both its number and location suggest that it is a Wehrkreis V unit. The strength total of the former 553 Division subsidiaries has been reduced considerably by casualties and by the identification of a few of its units in the VOSGES pocket. In addition, elements of 2 SS Police Regiment were identified at R 0621, in the 257 Volksgrenadier Division sector on 7 February. The other sub-units which were not identified during the period, are believed to be responsible for the sector from R 1020 to the RHINE (R 1614). Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER). The staff of this division was withdrawn in all probability for reorganization. There had been reports of 1120 Grenadier Regiment reforming in PFORZHEIM and prisoners claimed that the reconstruction of the division was to take place in south-west Germany. Thus it is possible that the whole division is now being rebuilt in the PFORZHEIM area.

405 zbV Division remains responsible for a portion of the SIEGFRIED Line in the Black Forest.

(2) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH or ROTH)

30 SS Grenadier Division continues to be carried in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG area.

805 Mobilization Division is the second new divisional staff reported to have been formed in Wehrkreis V. It is said to be located in the FREIBURG area. Nothing is known of the component units.

(3) Twenty-fourth Army (CG: Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

This headquarters is now accepted on the strength of several documentary and prisoner interrogation reports. It has been located variously at BADENWEILER (V 91) and ENGEN (W 7717). It controls the Swiss border area for a distance of approximately 50 kilometers north of the border.

(4) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RUSP)

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) is considered virtually destroyed, having lost over 4,700 men in prisoners and at least 1,000 other casualties during its commitment in the VOSGES. The predominantly Austrian personnel of the division gave a poor account of itself, as indicated by the relatively high rate of desertion.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) was engaged heavily to the end and fought well. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were taken and the division may have managed to rescue about 500 of its effectives. Colonel BARTEL was reported to have succeeded Brigadier General SCHIEL as division commander.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE) was mauled very badly in its defense of COLMAR. 1,250 PW's were taken from it and it is not believed that more then 300 combat effectives succeeded in crossing the RHINE. Lt. Col. JUNGE, ex-Commander of 1213 Grenadier Regiment, was stated to have relieved Colonel ZORN.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) was not contacted during the period. It is believed to have pulled its battered remnants across the river about 3 February, but it is not believed that more than 500 combat infantry effectives remained.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) lost at least 1,300 prisoners. A captured order sets the phases of withdrawal from 4 to 7 February. During this period the division was to offer delaying action on consecutive lines, finally holding a sector along the ILL River south-west of DESSENHEIM (V 8130). The following units were attached to the division: Regiment GROSSJOHANN, AZERBEIDJAN Legion (BG LANG?), 3 Grenadier Battalion OBERRHEIN, 360 Cossack Regiment, 4 Border Guard Battalion, Regiment Group 1214 (189 VG Div), SS Battalion ELLWANGEN, BG SCHLAGER, and 1516 Fortress Artillery Battalion. A good part of these units managed to extricate themselves, but organic combat infantry elements of 16 Volksgrenadier Division that survived amount to not more than 400.

(b) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EJERT) managed to pull the bulk of its units out of the VOSGES area, before the closing of the Allied pincers movement succeeded. However, this initial escape did not relieve the division's plight, because 757 Grenadier Regiment suffered very heavy casualties when committed south of COLMAR, 758 Grenadier Regiment was destroyed in the ILL-THUR triangle, and 759 Regiment was mauled during its hasty retreat. 1750 PW's were taken and not more than 400 combat infantry effectives got to the east bank of the RHINE

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BURCKY) finally abandoned CERNAY, after a stubborn defense that is estimated to have cost the division 800 killed or permanently disabled and 1,200 prisoners. Remnants total 400 combat infantry effectives.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) 426 dead attest to the heavy losses suffered by the division in its determined defense of the area north of MULHOUSE. Prisoners totalled over 800. 736 Grenadier Regiment, never identified, was not included in a captured list of component units dated 16 January. Thus the dissolution of this regiment can be accepted. Remnants of the others do not exceed 300 combat infantry effectives.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)
(See note on strength, page 2, paragraph 2)

Units in Contact and Divisional Rerserve:	
(Combat Infantry Effectives)	
Seventh US Army Front	21,000
First French Army Front	4,000 *
Artillery Effectives:	
Seventh US Army Front	10,000
Reserves:	
Estimated Reserves in SAAR	7,500
Estimated Reserves in Black Forest	10,000
TOTAL	52,500
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Seventh US Army Front	80-100
Reserve (11 Pz Div)	40- 50

(*) Remnants of Nineteenth Army

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Continuous rumors about withdrawal of German units from the Alpine front and their replacement by Italian units have not as yet been substantiated by more precise information. However, line crossers from the SAORGE (N 8309) region indicated that some, or even possibly all, of the German artillery units in the northern part of the ROYA River valley have been replaced by Italian artillery units. This information, if correct, could explain reports about additional German artillery that had arrived in the S.N REMO area.

Furthermore ground sources reported repeatedly that the German High Command of the Alpine fron has received orders to begin the retreat in PIEDMONT, leaving the responsibility for the entire Alpine front to Italian units. However, this plan has apparently been abandoned due to the present conditions of roads, the use of gasoline substitutes, and the necessity for night road movements, all of which would create too great a risk of losing all heavy material.

Few identifications were made due to lack of contact because of the weather conditions in the high mountain passes. During the period only the 253 and 107 Grenadier Regiments of the 34 Infantry Division were identified.

Until further clarification, it is accepted that elements of 5 Mountain Division are still part of the Alpine front garrison intermingled with elements of the MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

Vosges Front

In spite of stubborn enemy resistance to the French forces advancing from the south at the beginning of the period the enemy's west-east bridge route across the THUR River was cut by the capture of ENSISHEIM (V 7118). Immediately thereafter, crossings were made at WITTELSHEIM (V 6312) which caused the opposition along the THUR to collapse and paved the way for the immediate capture of RAEDERSHEIM (V 6523) and SOULTZ (V 6222). During this period the enemy was attempting to evacuate his forces from the VOSGES between RHEINKOPF (V 4334) and the SCHLUCT pass (V 4740). In the north he stiffened his resistance along the line HERRLISHEIM-HUSSEREN (V 6637) to assist the VOSGES evacuation and simultaneously put up a strong defence in the NEUF BRISACH area supported by heavy artillery fire from the KAISERSTUHL across the river. The junction of friendly troops from the north and south was finally made at ROUFFACH (V 6728) on 5 February, encircling an estimated 1,000 enemy in the VOSGES.

The next day, our forces found the western approach to the BRISACH bridge unusable while to the east, the ILL River Line from ST CROIX EN PLAINE (V 7334) to NIEDERENTZEN (V 7428) was completelely secured.

By 7 February the area between the RHINE-RHONE Canal and the ILL River had been cleared of enemy and NEUF BRISACH was completely in our hands. At this point in the battle the only bridge over the RHINE remaining for enemy use was the damaged NEUNBURG bridge at V 8512 but additional means were being improvised by the extensive use of ferries. The strong enemy opposition to bridgehead attempts at ILE NAPOLEON (V 7407) was overcome and our advance began in the HARTH Forest. In the north, stragglers continued to be ferreted out of the hills as GUEBWILLER was taken. The RHINE was cleared as far south as BALGAU (V 8525). Contact along the entire perimeter of the remaining front was made only with disorganized remnants who appeared to be under instructions to make their way across the RHINE individually as best they could. The 3 mile bridgehead which remained before CHALAMPE (V 8513) on 8 February collapsed the next day at 0800 when the southern ALSACE pocket was officially declared clear. At the end of the period only large calibre artillery fire from the opposite bank broke the tranquillity of First French Army's WACHT AM RHEIN.

Saar-Palatinate Front

In the HAGUENAU area, ROHRWILLER (R 1217) was cleared early in the period, but subsequent advance in this area was slowed by floods and heavy enemy fire. OBERHOFFEN (R 0920) and DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) were stubbornly defended by vigirous infantry counterattacks supported by tanks. By 7 February OFFENDORF (R 1212) and HERRLISHEIM (R 1214) were found evacuated but heavily mined and booby trapped.

The enemy proved alert to our patrols in the area of BITCHOFFEN (Q 9028) during the period where continuous rear area activity and movement were reported.

In the HARDT Mountain sector the enemy appeared to be digging in to compensate for his extended line of defence. Patrol raids on BISCHOLTZ (Q 8532) and ROTHBACH (Q 8434) inflicted heavy enemy casualties but found him expectant.

In the area west of the HARDT small enemy attacks and infiltrations were attempted south of BLIESBRUCK (Q 5957), and at Q 7447. South of OETING (Q 4063) friendly outposts were forced to withdraw slightly. Light resistance was made to friendly raids on GROSBLIEDERSTROFF (Q 4862), while the enemy was observed defending the woods of LE BRANDENBUSCH (Q 4763). By the end of the period activity had diminished to occasional spurts of small arms and automatic weapons fire.

On the ALPINE Front two Italian Marines, together with a fifteen foot motorboat, two depth charges and a twenty-one inch torpedo, were captured on 5/6 February at S 7683. On 9/10 February there fell into our hands two line crossers, one enemy agent, one German deserter and a Russian deserter.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

The total liquidation of the VOSGES Pocket brought with it large-scale withdrawals of men and equipment along the roads and railroads leading north and east from FREIBURG. To the north, indications of enemy departures were evident in the extremely heavy activity noted in the RHINE Valley from KARLSRUHE to BINGEN. Lines running east from the RHINE likewise revealed some movement away from our front. Activity in the SAAR points to normal supply movements as well as redeployment of enemy forces.

The close of the current period saw the last enemy elements driven across the RHINE from the COLMAR Pocket leaving bridges at CHALAMPE and BRISACH demolished. The roads leading north and east to FREIBURG and ETTENHEIM were very active as trucks, motorcycles, tanks, and armored force vehicles, moved toward assemble areas, rail centers and main lines of communication. Heavy activity along the OFFENBURG - FREIBURG rail axis suggests the arrival and formation of trains destined to alleviate the problems of speedy evacuation. Later in the week, lines running north and east from OFFENBURG revealed traffic moving away from the battle area, thus substantiating the view that military withdrawals were underway.

All along the RHINE Valley from KARLSRUHE as far north as BINGEN, extremely heavy rail activity prevailed throughout the entire period. More than 100 trains were observed in this area, with the preponderance of traffic moving north and east away from our front. In the vicinity of BINGEN, light to moderate two way rail traffic was noticed.

Slight rail activity, probably representing the movement of replacements and supplies, was noted along east-west lines leading from the east into the SAAR. The moderately heavy activity noted in the KAISERSLAUTERN - NEUNKIRCHEN - ZWEIBRUCKEN area is possibly the source of the light traffic seen moving north via BAD KREUZNACH toward MAINZ or BINGEN, suggesting some departure from the SAAR.

B. Status of Enemy Communications

The Tactical and Strategic air forces continued to launch successful air attacks on enemy marshalling yards and communication centers as well as effecting 121 rail cuts and destroying 6 rail and 2 road bridges during the period. A large part of the damage wrought was concentrated in the FREIBURG - DONAUESCHINGEN - OFFENBURG triangle causing heavy damage to equipment and temporarily halting through traffic along these lines. In order to offset the disruption caused by these aerial bombardments, it was necessary for the enemy to rely largly upon motor transport in order to effect the eastward evacuation of troops and equipment from the NEUENBERG - BREISACH area. Direct rail movement to TUTTLINGEN and STUTTGART from the DONAUESCHINGEN - FREIBURG - OFFENBURG area was also brought to a temporary standstill as a result of these attacks.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INC.
#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
#2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 10 1200 AFEB.

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #21

SECRET

142

HEADQUARTERS 6 TH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials:
Date: 17 Feb 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 22

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 17 FEBRUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The defensive attitude of the enemy on the Sixth US Army Group front has continued. In fact, the low priority of this front leaves him no other choice but to struggle along with only those forces presently available in the area.

Army Group G has undoubtedly assumed full command of the SAAR-PALATINATE-BADEN front, with its boundaries limited on the north by the Moselle River and on the south by the Swiss Border. In addition to the First Army, it now has under control the remaining operational elements of the Nineteenth Army. Its mission remains the same: to provide the mobile forces necessary to maintain the integrity of the SIEGFRIED positional defenses. For this, Army Group G can count only on the immediate rehabilitation of Nineteenth Army's defeated divisions as a reserve, as long as the German High Command appreciates an obviously defensive mission for Sixth US Army Group.

First German Army was forced to compensate for the loss of an armored division by some reorganization within its component formations. It continues to operate on its front from the Moselle to DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) through the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (256 VG and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry (719 and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 VG, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (6 SS Mtn and 36 VG Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry (47 VG, 257 VG, and 905 zbV Divs). Train movements indicate the arrival of an unidentified formation of divisional size, which may turn out to be 2 Mountain Division. On the other hand, the departure of 11 Panzer Division has impaired the fighting efficiency of the First Army to a considerable extent. In this emergency, the creation of reserves became a paramount necessity. The weak 245 Infantry Division moved out of line where it could be rehabilitated and serve simultaneously as Army reserve. The divisions in the line created sector reserves by thinning out the elements in contact, except where the immediate threat was obvious. The reorganization of two-regiment divisions on a three-regiment/two battalion basis afforded ease of maneuver for this redeployment, while three-regiment divisions merely moved one regiment out of contact. In addition, Volksgrenadier Divisions have made fuller use of the organic anti-tank battalion's 14 SP guns by employing them consistently in a counterattacking role. This tactical redeployment has resulted in an enemy capability to effect immediate, if limited, shock action against attempted penetrations especially in sectors where the objective is apparent or to which the approach is canalized by terrain features. Where GHQ mobile formations are available, the enemy can still make initial penetration of his defenses most difficult.

Nineteenth German Army has apparently assumed operational control of the mobile units east of the Rhine. Some documentary evidence and observation of train movements indicate two general assembly areas. LXIV Corps has moved northward toward KEHL with 708 Volksgrenadier, 716 Infantry and 198 Infantry Divisions. In the BADENWEILER (V 9513) area, XVIII SS Corps may have taken the place of the apparently defunct LXIII Corps. Of the remaining units, there is slight evidence for northward movement of 106 Panzer Brigade and 2 Mountain Division, the latter probably into First Army's area.

No change has been noted in the status of OBERRHEIN Defense Command, except for the probable transition of XVIII SS Corps from a purely administrative to an operational function. The presence of Nineteenth Army Headquarters in the area has relieved the Defense Command of any operational duties it may have had. Twenty-fourth Army remains in control of the Swiss border region.

SECRET SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Capabilities

The reorganization of First Army mentioned above has not effectively increased its overall defensive capability. The enemy is making the most of his long experience in defensive tactics to stave off the eventual breakthrough. Along the entire Army Group G front his defensive role daily becomes less a capability and more an inescapable necessity.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front).

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), South along Rhine River to the Swiss Border.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURE GIVEN IN SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES ALWAYS REPRESENTS THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES, UNLESS QUALIFIED. IT INCLUDES ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT INFANTRY OR PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENTS, THE RECONNAISSANCE OR FUSILIER BATTALION, THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION, AND THE COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION, SUPPORTING OR AUXILLARY TROOPS ARE NOT COUNTED IN THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMATION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USUALLY BE CONJECTURAL AND WITHOUT EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF KNOWN CASUALTIES AND INTERROGATION REPORTS. IT IS ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT A PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF SUPPORTING TROOPS, BOTH DIVISIONAL AND GHQ, ARE TO BE ADDED IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE ENEMY'S OVERALL COMBAT STRENGTH.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS General HAUSSER).

Higher Headquarters reports that the recently promoted Oberstgruppenfuhrer (Gen) HAUSSER probably commands Army Group G, replacing Gereral BLASKOWITZ, repeatedly reported assuming responsibilities on the Eastern front.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army continued to readjust and organize its defensive positions with 12 Divisions in line between the Moselle and the Rhine and two divisions in reserve.

245 Infantry Division (Acting CO: Col. WAGNER) has not been identified satisfactorily since 31 January. It was squeezed out of line by 36 and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions. The division was withdrawn from line for refitting and at the same time is to serve as Army reserve. The division's strength is 2,000 combat infantry effectives.

Unidentified Division. Heavy military railroad traffic was revealed by tactical reconnaissance to be moving into First German Army area during the early days of the period. The arrival of a divisional formation is accepted on the basis of these train movements. The current situation and the direction of rail traffic make it probable that the unit is one of those formerly under Nineteenth Army.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) committed its three organic regiments about 10 February in completing the relief of 11 Panzer Division. Conflicting identifications obscure the precise divisional sector and, for the present, it can only be stated that 256 and 416 Divisions are responsible for the line from the MOSELLE to MERZIG (Q 2095). 256 Volksgrenadier Division was able to replace some of the losses incurred at BITCHE in January, but its refitting was incomplete and the division is still under strength. Combat infantry strength is estimated at about 2,000.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). As mentioned above, this division shares the MOSELLE-MERZIG (Q 2095) sector with 256 Volksgrenadier Division. The division was in close contact during the period and suffered casualties in several engagements. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,500.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM). Last contact was made on 10 February. The division is accepted as being out of line. Higher Headquarters and Tac-Reports suggest that the division has crossed the Moselle River and is entraining for a new destination. Combat infantry strength was estimated at 4,000 men supported by 50 tanks.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) continued to hold the line from MERZIG (Q 2095) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). 743 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 2981 on 13 February; other elements of the division were met at Q 2880 on 15 February. Combat infantry strength is unchanged at 4,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) remained inactive throughout the period in its old sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to FORBACH (Q 4263). The following identifications were made: 860 Grenadier Regiment, on 10 February in the vicinity of Q 3568, on 15 February vicinity Q 3369; 880 Grenadier Regiment, on 10 February in the vicinity of Q 3863, on 16 February vicinity Q 4063; 861 Grenadier Regiment is unidentified since 30 January. Some replacements were received from the BERLIN area on 5 February. Prisoners confirmed the absence of heavy weapons companies in the battalions of this unit. A similar lack was reported by prisoners from 559 Volksgrenadier Division. The 1945 Infantry Division Table of Organization provides for concentration of heavy weapons from the rifle companies into the heavy weapons companies of the battalions and the regiment. Possible explanations for the prisoner statements may be the use of the heavy weapons companies either as divisional reserve or in static fortified positions, while the rifle companies continue to be employed in the front line. Combat infantry strength is now carried at 2,400.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) remained in very loose contact from FORBACH (Q 4263) to Q 5957. The only units identified during the period were 73 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5758 on 11 February and 74 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5057 on 16 February. Including the Battle Group KLEIN, combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,700.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG) holds the line from Q 5957 to Q 7453. Identifications were as follows: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7055 on 11 February and Q 6657 on 15 February; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7541 on 11 February, at Q 6154 on 12 February, at Q 5957 and Q 6256 on 15 February, and at Q 6555 on 16 February; 17 SS Panzer Battalion (Assault Gun) at Q 6555 on 16 February; 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion in the vicinity of Q 5953 on 16 February. The division offered initially weak resistance against our attack on RIMLING (Q 6555) on 15 February, but rallied later to stage a counterattack with armored support in an unsuccessful attempt to reestablish their line. The division lost seven self propelled guns in these operations.

Prisoner statements exemplify the efforts of German units on this front to cope with the situation with only their presently allotted means. The Assault Gun battalion, organized on a basis of a headquarters company plus three 15 SP gun companies, was held in reserve well behind the line for employment only in counterattacks. The Reconnaissance battalion has a headquarters company plus 4 companies and includes amphibious jeeps. Some of the Artillery battalions are horse drawn. The formation of a reserve within each rifle company was standard practice before they went into action.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

There were no indications of further reinforcements for the division during the period. On the basis of known casualties, division combat infantry strength is reduced to 2,300, supported by 40 SP guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) holds a sector from southwest of BITCHE (Q 7750) to Q 7545. Contact during the week was sporadic and the division maintained its generally passive attitude. Identifications were as follows: 1126 Volksgrenadier Division at Q 7446 on 14 February; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7448 on 12 February and at Q 7449 on 16 February. No replacements were received recently and the division is well below T/O strength, with combat infantry effectives numbering approximately 2,200.

(d) XC Corps (CG:)

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) continued an alert defense of its broad sector from Q 7443 to Q 8433 through the HARDT Mountains. Lack of recent contact with 12 Mountain Regiment and identification of the Reconnaissance Battalion in the old regimental sector suggests that this regiment is in reserve. The following identifications were made during the period: 11 SS Mountain Regiment on 12 February vicinity Q 7639, and on 16 February at Q 7440; 12 SS Mountain Regiment on 10 February vicinity Q 7937; 6 SS Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion on 11 February vicinity Q 8337; 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion, on 13 February vicinity Q 8434. Prisoners report that 6 SS Field Replacement Battalion is training 600 men in the rear areas. These reinforcements have arrived from an Austrian Mountain Replacement Battalion. PW's state that a small number of replacement have also been received by I/11 SS Mountain Regiment from 7 SS Mountain Division "Prinz EUGEN" in southeast Europe. Including the Field Replacement Battalion division combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen. WELLM) was in light contact in its old sector from Q 8433 to Q 9228. PW's stated that the division CP was located at Q 932391. Only identifications were: 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 11 February vicinity Q 8630; 36 Engineer Battalion on 12 February vicinity Q 9128. There is no further news of the battalions supposedly reforming at BAUMHOLDER. The division is operating 2 regiments on line, with II Battalion/ 87 Grenadier Regiment and I Battalion/165 Grenadier Regiment forming one regiment (probably under command of 165 Regiment staff) and 118 Grenadier Regiment the other. The strength of this weak division amounts to approximately 1,700 combat infantry effectives, including 51 German Air Force Fortress Battalion.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was relatively inactive throughout the period. Contact was made with 104 Grenadier Regiment on 14 February at Q 9527 and 115 Grenadier Regiment in vicinity of Q 9826 on 12, 15, and 16 February. The divisional sector remained unchanged, from Q 9228 to R 0225. Combat infantry effectives continue to be estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) had a busy week in the OBERHOFFEN (R 0920) area, putting up a stubborn defense against repeated Allied assaults. All three regiments were in close contact during the period, with last identifications as follows: 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 14 February vicinity R 0424; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 13 February at R 0921; 477 Volksgrenadier Regiment in OBERHOFFEN area. The division holds a line from R 0225 to R 1120. It was reported to have 9 assault guns left in 1257 Assault Gun Company. Of particular interest is the prisoner statement that a divisional mortar company, equipped with 15 X 120 mm mortars, was organized in January with personnel and armament from the regimental 13th companies. Battalions HARTIG and HELDMANN, formerly under 17 SS Division, were identified in support of 257 Division on 11 February. Approximately 250 replacements were received through 257 Field Replacement Battalion. However, losses in prisoners and other casualties more then offset this increase. Combat infantry effectives are now judged to be 1,600 plus 300 for the two attached battalions

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

S E C R E T

905 Mobilization Division presumably remained in charge of the diverse units listed last week. Of these, Battalions SCHMIDT and TREUTLER of 2 Grenadier Regiment Oberrhein (MARBACH) were identified at DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) on 10 February. Prisoners of war taken from the division confirm previous statements that the units responsibility includes a sector on the east bank of the Rhine River, though the limits of the sector are not yet clear. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

At the time of its retreat across the Rhine, this army included 16, 159, 189, 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions, 198, 338, 716 Infantry Divisions and 2 Mountain Division as well as 106 Panzer Brigade. The army appears to have been allotted two assembly areas, one in the vicinity of FREIBURG-MUELLHEIM-SCHONAU, and the other east of OFFENBURG. Rehabilitation and regrouping of these units is continuing.

LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

Strong negative information indicates that this corps has no longer any operational functions under Nineteenth Army.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) is still unlocated after its retreat across the Rhine. Permanent casualties are now estimated at 61 Officers and 1,751 enlisted men killed, captured or severely wounded. Scattered elements of all divisional units are believed to have extricated themselves from the pocket. However, remaining combat infantry effectives do not exceed 400 men.

159 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) is unlocated at present. However, it may be in the area south of FREIBURG. The permanent casualties suffered by the division totaled 43 Officers and 2,997 enlisted men. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400.

189 Infantry Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE) is unlocated, but it too is probably in the area south of FREIBURG. Known permanent casualties suffered by the division totaled 34 Officers and 1,609 enlisted men. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EWART). The disposition of this divisional unit is not known. The division suffered permanent casualties totaling 55 Officers and 2,300 enlisted men. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400 effectives.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) is believed to have moved into the SAAR-PALATINATE area during the present period. The division had been previously reported doing police duty along the western fringes of the Black Forest. Prior to its escape from the COLMAR area the division suffered the highest losses of any unit under Nineteenth Army control. A permanent casualty total of 62 Officers and 6,026 enlisted personnel includes 4,764 registered prisoners of war. It is estimated that the maximum number of personnel evacuated from the COLMAR pocket amounts to 4,000 of all the arms and services, including attached units.

106 Panzer Brigade (CO:) managed to evacuate the pocket in fairly good order. Its present location is believed to be in the area ETTENHEIM (W 0662) - MAHLBERG (W 0666). Its tank strength is estimated to be approximately 20 vehicles, including repaired tanks known to have been in the shops at FREIBURG.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) crossed the Rhine River in the NEUF BREISACH area and then moved to its assembly area East and North of OFFENBURG. The rehabilitation of this corps is presently taking place.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) evacuated its divisional headquarters in the pocket on about 1/2 February, leaving only some elements to fight rear guard actions. It then moved to its assembly area East of OFFENBURG. The division had been in a weakened condition prior to the launching of the Allied offensive. During the action the division suffered 1,487 permanent casualties including 17 Officers. Its present combat infantry strength is 500 effectives.

708 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) after its evacuation of the VOSGES Pocket on 3 February, moved up into its assembly area North of HASLACH. The division suffered 1,489 permanent casualties, including 40 Officers. Latest information indicates that its combat infantry effectives total 500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col.HAFFNER) has been located by a captured document in the area of KEHL. The permanent casualties suffered in the pocket totaled 1,724, including 18 Officers. No positive evidence has been received of reinforcements having been sent to this division. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH or ROTH)

This corps has been probably forced into an operational role under Nineteenth Army from its former purely administrative functions under Defence Command OBERRHEIN. This change in status has been brought about by the need of corps headquarters under the army to tactically control those divisions ordinarily controlled by the departed or defunct LXIII Corps. Its operational headquarters are in the vicinity of BADENWEILER (V 9513).

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG:)

No change in status.

405 zbV Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGAR). A deserter states that this unit was to have been upgraded to a reserve division during the first days of February according to orders issued by the divisional commander. The new regimental numbers were to be 10, 12, and 14, and the present Landesschutzen and Guard Battalions were to form these units. The division was to come under the adminis - trative control of XIV SS Corps. Its present area of operations north and south of KEHL was not to be affected by the reorganization.

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING) continued existence of the division is doubted.

805 Mobilization Division. The division appears to have the dual function of providing replacements for combat units and also administering defensive units manning the SIEGFRIED Line.

(a) XIV Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI)

Its administrative status remains unchanged.

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

It performs defensive duties along the Swiss Frontier from the left flank of Army Group G to the BODEN SEE. Its headquarters are at ENGEN (W 7717).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve: (Combat Infantry Effectives)	
Seventh US Army	21,000
First French Army	4,000
Reserves:	
Estimated Reserves in SAAR	7,000
Estimated Reserves in Black Forest	9,000
T O T A L	41,000
Artillery Guns: Seventy US Army	625
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Seventh US Army Front	130-150
Reserves on Seventh US Army Front (653 Anti-Tank Bn)	30- 50
First French Army Front	20- 30
T O T A L	180-230

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

No confirmation of major changes in enemy disposition has been reported. The 34 German Infantry Division and elements of 5 German Mountain Division are still committed on the Alpine Front. In addition to the LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divisions occupying the central and northern sectors of the Alpine Front, ground forces reported that the SAN MARCO Division may relieve elements of the 34 German Infantry Division. However, no indications of such a move have been received.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

Throughout the period, enemy forces evidenced considerable anxiety over friendly intentions and troop dispositions along the entire Rhine Front. Daily patrols varied in aggressiveness from mere nuisance raids to penetrations of several kilometers. On one attempt, they were content to machine gun friendly positions from

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

boats in mid-Rhine, but late in the period a surprise attack in the vicinity of V 8506 succeeded in taking some eight friendly prisoners. The usual harassing artillery fire and aerial reconnaissance were observed and in the area FREIBURG - FELDKIRCH (Q 9227) heavy vehicular activity was noticeable.

Prisoners stated that fear of an attack from the STRASBOURG area, which the enemy believes has been reinforced, was the basis for the civilian evacuation from many towns in the KEHL-HUTTENHEIT (R 0170) area. Reports were also received that some pill boxes in the KEHL sector had to be abandoned by the enemy due to the rise of the Rhine.

NORTH FRONT

At the beginning of the period, elements of 905 zbV Division supported by armor stubbornly resisted the friendly advance against DRUSENHEIM (R 1618). At the same time, 257 Infantry Division succeeded in strengthening its position near OBERHOFFEN (R 0820) and in cutting the north-south road at R 0920. The town was finally taken on 13 February after severe fighting, including house to house action, but the enemy continued to oppose friendly attempts at debouchment with intense small arms fire. Flooding by the Moder River in the HAGUENAU area impeded friendly operations, as 47 Volksgrenadier Division reacted alertly at BISCHOLTZ (Q 8532) and joined with 36 Volksgrenadier Division in repulsing friendly patrols at BITSCHOFFEN (Q 9128). The latter unit was reported to be preparing a secondary line of defence between ENGWILLER (Q 9131) and GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234), having requested for this purpose 29,000 mines in addition to the daily production of 60 from a sawmill at Q 9233., operated by the engineers.

In the eastern HARDT Mountains, 6 SS Mountain Division held commanding ground in its sector with the minimum number of troops. Patrols from 11 SS Mountain Regiment were unsuccessful in their attempt to take prisoners in the WILDENGUTH (Q 7837) area.

Heavy caliber artillery fire increased considerably by the end of the period with concentrations falling on the bridge at BISCHWILLER (R 1018) and on the towns of OBERMODERN (Q 8527) and PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 8927) as well as BRUMATH (Q 9614) which received some 240 mm fire. A concentration of 20 rounds of railroad artillery fire fell on SAVERNE (Q 7215) during the night of 16/17 February.

West of the HARDT Mountains, activity was negligible early in the period. The URBACH (Q 7055), BLIESBRUCK (Q 5957) area was being manned in increased force but operations in the BITCHE area found 559 Infantry Division holding an extended sector. On 15/16 February our limited objective attack against RIMLING (Q 6535) and GUIDERSKIRCH (Q 6656) met only spotty resistance. The next day, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division counter attacked twice: first with 100 infantry, which was broken up by artillery fire; and later in the area northwest of RIMLING with 200 infantry supported by 10 tanks/SP guns. This offensive penetrated to the Moronville Farm (Q 6455) before the attack was contained and the line restored by friendly forces. At the end of the period, 15-20 bunkers in the BLIESBRUCKEN Woods area (Q 5956) manned by 4-5 men each continued to resist with small arms fire. Some armor was reported regrouping north of RIMLING possibly for another counterattack. To the north, 19 Infantry Division prisoners were taken from a strong point at HANWEILER (Q 5157) on 16/17 February and the right flank of the division was pressed back east of FORBACH.

Enemy losses in these attempts to restore and maintain their lines west of the HARDT Mountains totalled approximately 1,000 prisoners of war and 20 tanks/SP guns destroyed or damaged.

ALPINE FRONT

At the beginning of the period infantry activity was noted in the area of PETIT ST BERNARD (C 40) and BRIANCONNAIS (P 49). Twenty-one Italians occupying ROCHE LA CROIX Gap (N 48) deserted to French troops on 14 February. At the close of the period an enemy outpost reoccupied the village of CLAVIERES (K 49).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

In the LA ROCHELLE zone, enemy patrols were active throughout the period in areas T 4928-4937 as vehicle traffic was heard in the vicinity of R 4346. Five Polish deserters were taken in the area on the 14/15 February as a large explosion was heard in the East sector. On POINTE DE GRAVE loud explosions were heard several times during the period and vehicle movement was observed on the roads Y 3856-3650 and Y 3654-3755. Flares seen on ROYAN on 12/13 February were followed by several volleys of small arms fire. At the end of the period enemy aircraft were sighted over ROYAN.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

With front line activities at a minimum, movements in rear areas highlighted the extensive coverage flown throughout the week. Heavy activity persisted on all days during the period except for the 15th and 16th when a marked decrease in the amount and tempo of movement was evident. The Black Forest area revealed considerable activity this week, probably representing replacements for the remnants of the Nineteenth Army. The northerly movement of one unit of the Nineteenth Army may be connected with movements along the Rhine Valley from FREIBURG to KARLSRUHE and the westward movement of trains over the Rhine into the Saar.

Roads and railroads throughout the Black Forest were extensively used, as remnants of the badly mauled Nineteenth Army moved to assembly areas and regrouping points along the FREIBURG - OFFENBURG - VILLINGEN line. Because of rail interdiction on lines running due north of OFFENBURG, traffic away from the area was, of necessity, re-routed through the very active centers of KARLSRUHE and HEIDELBERG, thence into the SAAR-PALATINATE.

Such a routing would account for only a part of the activity noted along the lines running west from the Rhine toward KAISERSLAUTERN and NEUNKIRCHEN. It must be borne in mind that a large part of the activity in the SAAR is directly connected with the still-operating industrial centers in this area. In this regard it is of interest to note that a large percentage of the trains seen in the KAISERSLAUTERN-NEUNKIRCHEN-SAARBRUCKEN area were made up of coal cars, gondolas, flats, and box-cars. Very likely much of the southbound movement from WORMS and DARMSTADT toward MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG is intimately connected with this industrial traffic. The concentration of 1000 flat cars at MANNHEIM and much rolling stock in other marshaling yards along the Rhine Valley on the 16th of February represents a collection of stock from the SAAR-PALATINATE after the completion of military and commercial movements into that area.

Signs of continued military departures from our front were evident in the activity noted along the LANDAU-NEUSTADT-SPEYER and KARLSRUHE-DARMSTADT lines on the 13th and 14th of February. The trend of military movements along these lines was generally northward indicating that some of these military trains may be headed for points north of the MAINZ area.

B Status of Communications

Capitalizing on the unusually good flying weather afforded them during the latter half of the current period, Allied aircraft flew a record number of sorties attacking marshalling yards, railroad centers, rail lines, road and rail bridges. A total of 92 locomotives and 1617 rail cars were destroyed. 147 rail cuts were scored causing marked delays and making re-routings necessary on many lines throughout the Rhine Valley and in the Black Forest area. Fresh cuts on the KARLSRUHE-FREIBURG, STUTTGART - TUTTLINGEN, and the SCHIETZINGEN - KARLSRUHE lines further hampered communications. The destruction of 3 more rail bridges along the Rhine Valley added to the difficulties of transportation.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The unserviceable bridges at BAD MUNSTER (M 0835) continue to render the BAD KREUZNACH-KAISERSLAUTERN line unusable while the destroyed bridges in the RASTATT area prevent through traffic on the OFFENBURG-KARLSRUHE line.

Indications are that the twin lines from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE carry a major portion of the traffic along the eastern bank of the Rhine. Observations suggest that movement on the easternmost parallel line is usually routed north while the western line carries southbound traffic.

6. DEFENSES

German intentions to hold the Rhine Plain and deny us access through the Black Forest are indicated by the scope of the digging activities on the East side of the Rhine. The section of the 1/25,000 overprinted map attached as enclosure No. 3, shows a typical sector of the Rhine defenses 10 Km south of STRASBOURG.

The pattern followed seems to be an adaptation of the principle of "Coffered" coastal defense, already used extensively in the coastal defenses of North Italy.

This system entails the construction of a first line of defense to deter or delay a landing, with a second line several miles inland where it is hoped to halt it. At right angle to these, but connecting them, are obstacles: streams, canals, A/T ditches or fire trenches aimed at preventing lateral movement, thereby isolating the field of action of any thrust.

In this case, the SIEGFRIED pillboxes and casemates on the immediate banks of the Rhine constitute the first line of defense. It is hoped to check any successful penetrationthrough these at the line of fire trenches supported by additional pill-boxes and artillery.

This system of multiple interconnected lines of fire trenches has the added advantage of permitting surprise opening of fire from alternate positions. Thus, troops subjected to a preparatory artillery barrage can take refuge in any one of the original position. This trench network is further strengthened by being anchored on towns which have been turned into strongpoints by the construction of perimeter defenses.

This digging is in progress from BASLE to KARLSRUHE, and it is estimated from air cover that 600 Km. of fire trenches and 250 Km. of communication trenches have been dug since early December.

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Appendix "A"
#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
#2 Inc - Enemy Disposition
#3 Inc - Defense Overprint

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A" TO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #22.

WEATHER CONDITIONS ALONG THE UPPER RHINE VALLEY FOR MARCH

GENERAL

Although February is the best Winter month for air operations in this area, conditions in March present an improvement insofar as ground activities are concerned. In spite of a general increase in precipitation, there are fewer overcast days in March and much less snowfall and snowcover. A general increase in temperature, better soil conditions, and a longer daily period of daylight and sunlight are to be expected.

TEMPERATURE

Average temperatures along the Rhine Valley and in Southwestern and Western Germany for March are about 5 degrees warmer than for February. In the Black Forest the mean minimums remain below freezing, but in the warmer Rhine Valley itself mean minimums are in most instances 32 degrees or above. Mean monthly temperatures are above 41 degrees along the Rhine from just north of Basel to just north of Strasbourg, slightly colder (37 to 41) to Karlsruhe and warmer than 41 north of Karlsruhe. East of Freiburg, mean temperatures drop sharply to 34 degrees in the mountain regions.

MEAN TEMPERATURES FOR MARCH

Rhine Valley		
	Baden	40.0
	Basel	40.8
	Metz	41.0
	Strasbourg	41.2
	Karlsruhe	41.2
	Freiburg	42.0
Black Forest		
	Villingen	31.8
	Donaueschingen	34.0
	Freudenstadt	35.0
Western (Central) Germany		
	Ulm	37.5
	Augsburg	38.0
	Nurnberg	39.0
	Stuttgart	42.0

PRECIPITATION

There is a general increase of precipitation over all of the area. In the mountainous regions east of Freiburg and Baden, mean monthly precipitation increases sharply to over 6.0 inches, in contrast to less than 2.4 inches for the most part all along the Rhine. The mean number of days with precipitation over .004 inches for the whole area varies from 10 to 18 days.

Mean Precipitation (Values in Parenthesis are for February)

Nurnberg	1.3 in (1.1)
Strasbourg	1.5 in (1.3)
Frankfurt	1.6 in (1.3)
Metz	1.8 in (1.5)
Munich	1.9 in (1.3)
Basel	2.0 in (1.5)
Besancon	3.1 in (2.3)
Feldberg	4.5 in
Freudenstadt	5.7 in (4.7)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Mean Number of Days with Snowcover in March

Karlsruhe	2
Trier	2
Frankfurt	2
Ulm	2
Nurnberg	3
Metz	3
Strasbourg	3
Stuttgart	4
Munich	10
Freudenstadt	14
Feldberg	30

Mean Number of Days of Snowfall

Stuttgart	5
Ulm	5
Munich	10
Freudenstadt	10
Feldberg	13

Mean Monthly Snowfall in Inches

Frankfurt	0.3
Kaiserslautern	2.2
Trier	2.8
Nurnberg	3.2
Freiburg	11.1

CLOUDS AND VISIBILITY

In the Rhine Valley March has the greatest number of clear days observed for the year except for the month of August. Seven to eight is the average number of clear days (less than 2/10 coverage). However, days with coverages of 8/10 or more remain almost the same in number (see below). With a minimum of high pressure centers over France and Western Germany, visibilities improve generally, if slightly, but periods of several days of poor visibility persist during March.

Number of Days with Low Ceilings and Visibilities
(ceilings 100 ft or less and/or visibility 1½ mile or less)

	Ave	Min	Max
Frankfurt	4	1	12
Strasbourg	6	3	10
Nurnberg	7	3	13
Cologne	7	4	10
Munich	8	1	15
Metz	8½	5	15

Mean Number of Clear and Cloudy Days
(Values for February in parenthesis)
Clear - less than 2/10 sky cover
Partly cloudy - 2/10 to 8/10
Cloudy - 8/10 to overcast

	Clear	Partly Cloudy	Cloudy
Trier	4 (2½)	14 (12½)	13 (13)
Munich	4 (3)	15 (13)	12 (12)
Nurnberg	4 (4)	15 (11)	12 (13)
Karlsruhe	5 (4½)	13½ (10)	12½ (13½)
Lower Main Valley	7 (5)	15 (11)	9 (12)
Frankfurt	7½ (5)	14½ (11)	9 (12)
Strasbourg	8 (7)	13 (9½)	10 (11½)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A" TO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #22 (Cont'd)

SOIL AND WIND

With warmer temperatures in March, evaporation will begin to exceed saturation and the soil begins to dry out. Conditions for freezing ice on the ground may be present for 4 to 6 days, while conditions for frost will be present for 16 to 20 days.

The prevailing surface wind is southwesterly with southerly and westerly winds next in predominance. In the Strasbourg area, 26% of observations show southwesterly winds, 24% southerly and westerly, 11% northerly. Wind velocity remains low. Strasbourg records show 74% of the winds are from 1-7 mph, 15% calm, 11% 8 to 18 mph.

SUNRISE AND SUNSET TABLES FOR MARCH 1945

Strasbourg 48 35N 07 45E 500 feet elevation

MARCH	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
1	0710	1814	2042	0834	Full Moon
2	0708	1816	2146	0854	"
3	0707	1817	2249	0914	"
4	0705	1818	2353	0936	"
5	0702	1820	2457	1000	Last Quarter
6	0700	1821		1028	"
7	0658	1823	0202	1103	"
8	0656	1825	0304	1146	"
9	0654	1826	0402	1239	"
10	0652	1828	0455	1344	"
11	0650	1830	0540	1458	"
12	0648	1831	0618	1616	New Moon
13	0646	1833	0651	1639	"
14	0644	1834	0719	1902	"
15	1642	1835	0746	2025	"
16	0640	1837	0812	2148	"
17	0638	1838	0840	2309	"
18	0636	1840	0911		"
19	0633	1841	0946	0027	"
20	0631	1843	1027	0039	First Quarter
21	0629	1845	1116	0244	"
22	0627	1846	1212	0340	"
23	0625	1848	1313	0425	"
24	0623	1849	1416	0502	"
25	0621	1850	1522	0532	"
26	0619	1852	1627	0558	"
27	0617	1853	1730	0620	Full Moon
28	0615	1855	1834	0640	"
29	0613	1856	1937	0659	"
30	0610	1858	2040	0719	"
31	0608	1859	2144	0739	"

All times are "A" Time.

(Source - First T.A.F.)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

200/FEB. 45/6 AG 6052

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

.200/FEB. 45/6 AG 6053

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 171200A FEB.

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #22

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Section of defense overprint
Sheet 7512 ALTENHEIM

.200/FEB. 45/6 AG 6051

Scale 1/25,000

0 1/8 1/4 1/2
STATUTE MILES

G-2 6th Army Group
Encl. no. 3 to G-2 Weekly
Intell. Summary no. 22

SECRET

P 123

140

HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials:
Date: 24 Feb 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 23

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 FEBRUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The enemy's defensive attitude between the Moselle and Rhine Rivers continued for still another week. The lengths to which he was forced in order to maintain his lines unbroken - the sacrifice of German soil in the Moselle - Saar triangle and of German civilians at FORBACH - strengthen the belief that he has no alternative. On the BADEN front extreme nervousness as to Allied intentions is the sole explanation for the sporadic raids across the Rhine.

Army Group G found it necessary to draw on the depleted Nineteenth Army in order to preserve the First Army in this extremity. Its mission of providing the mobile forces necessary for adequately defending the Siegfried Line is steadily becoming more impossible to fulfill. With the entire Allied front in motion, Army Group G will find it difficult even to protect its forces from the demands of the other hardpressed German armies. From SAARBURG to SAARBRUCKEN the Siegfried Line has become the front line. Now General HAUSSER must prepare to execute his mission with only his own resources and they cannot be fully counted upon.

First German Army demonstrated the effect of its lack of reserves upon present operations. The new alignment of divisions represents actually a desparate attempt to meet a situation where the initiative is entirely in the hands of the Allies. From West to East, the major formations were identified as follows: LXXXII Infantry Corps (256 VG and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry Corps (719 and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS Corps (559 VG, 19 VG, 17 SS PG and 2 Mtn Divs); XC Infantry Corps (6 SS Mtn and 36 VG Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry Corps (47 VG; 257 VG, and 905 zbV Divs) Especially notable were the displacement of 559 Volksgrenadier Division by the newly arrived 2 Mountain Division and the move of the former westward to aid in the defense of FORBACH. Reconstruction of the maneuver would indicate a redisposition of limited forces conditioned strictly by an appreciation of Allied intentions. The sudden increase in the gravity of the situation at FORBACH outweighed the enemy's fears of Allied attacks in the HAGUENAU area. 559 Volksgrenadier Division had evidently been moving east of the HARDT while 2 Mountain Division was preparing to occupy the vacated sector. The threat to FORBACH forced immediate despatch of reinforcements, principally elements of 559 Division but also including 2 Mountain Division's Reconnaissance Battalion. The use of Volkssturm battalions at SPICHEREN (Q 4366) and at FORBACH, the hasty march of a battalion of 719 Infantry Division, and the coordination of the defense by the town commandant at SAARBRUCKEN all point to the measures which the enemy must employ merely to hold his lines. The reserves of the First Army are obviously nearing the point of complete commitment.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Nineteenth German Army has already given up one of its divisions (2 Mtn) for the SAAR front. The others have scarcely had sufficient time for rehabilitation. In any case, this defeated army can supply possibly two more divisional formations by gathering together staffs and personnel from its remnants. In the meantime, it can continue to serve as the mobile force for the Upper Rhine.

OBERRHEIN Defense Command maintained its watch on the Rhine.

b. Capabilities

Army Group G has still only one capability: to attempt to defend itself. It may do this by falling back entirely into the psychological safety of the SIEGFRIED Line's masonry or by fighting delaying actions from behind its prepared positions. There is no doubt that it will never regain the initiative. There is no doubt that the execution of its mission will be more an attempt than a capability.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), ST ARNVAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7750), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSSENHEIM (R 1517), South along Rhine River to border of Switzerland.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The withdrawal of its right flank from the Moselle to the Saar imposed extensive reorganization of the First Army's troop dispositions. It was able to maintain the integrity of its lines in the central sector only by committing its reserves and by further withdrawal. Of its two reserve divisions, 2 Mountain is now in the lines and the existence of 245 Infantry as an organic unit is now somewhat doubtful. At best 245 Infantry Division can be considered more a divisional staff controlling Volkssturm and defense units in the rear areas rather than a formation with tactical capabilities.

245 Infantry Division (CO: Col. WAGNER). The precise nature of this division has long been a riddle. Not more than two of its battalions, (I Bn, 935 GR and I Bn, 937 GR) have been committed at any time since the middle of December. It is inconceivable that the German Army could afford to hold a field division in reserve for this length of time. The division command has repeatedly been reported in the LUXEMBOURG sector of the SIEGFRIED Line. It is believed that, when the division was relieved in December, much of its remnants were consolidated into the two battalions that have been contacted and that the divisional staff then assumed control of diverse static units known to be manning SIEGFRIED defenses. The combat infantry strength of the two original battalions, one or both of which may be detached, is estimated at 300 each; that of the static units at 2,500.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen FRANZ) retained all its subordinated units in line in an effort to stem Allied advance, but, by the end of the period, the division had withdrawn across the Saar River to new defense positions. It became clear that 256 Division was holding a sector north of 416 Infantry Division. This sector is limited by the Moselle to the north, and SERRIG (L 1510) to the south. Elements of the three grenadier regiments (456, 476, 481) and all auxiliary units were identified in the area on 20 February. Interrogation showed that the division had an average rifle company strength of 50 at the time of its commitment, about 10 February. Losses since then have been considerable and present combat infantry strength is not in excess of 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) had the bulk of its units concentrated in the area L 0502 - L 0704 on 19 February. At this time elements of 712, 713, and 774 Grenadier Regiments, 416 Artillery Regiment, 416 Engineer Battalion, and 1416 Anti-Tank Battalion were identified in the area. By the end of the period, the division completed its withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line positions on the east bank of the Saar. Its present sector extends from L 1510 to MERZIG (Q 2095). The division suffered heavy permanent casualties during the week, thus reducing its combat infantry effectives to approximately 2,500 men.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) is still responsible for the line from MERZIG (Q 2095) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). II Battalion, 723 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 4667 on 21 February. This battalion, after resting for several weeks, was sent to bolster 347 Infantry Division in its defense of SAARBRUCKEN. Prisoners claim that the battalion is under the SAARBRUCKEN Defense Command. The whereabouts of the remainder of 723 Regiment is not known. 743 Regiment was located in its old area Q 2881 on 17 February. Division combat infantry strength is now estimated at 3,500

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) is possibly continuing to hold the sector as far north as SAARLAUTERN. However, its forces are concentrated south and southwest of SAARBRUCKEN for defense of the city itself. The division offered stubborn resistance against Allied attacks. After suffering considerable losses, the division was reinforced by the commitment of local Volkssturm units, 67 Reconnaissance Battalion of 2 Mountain Division, 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade (also known as T D Bn GUSTAV or T D Bn "G" zbV)., 486 Anti-Tank (Briagde) Battalion, 1313 Fortress Artillery Battalion. Furthermore, II Battalion, 723 Grenadier Regiment (719 Inf Div) was shifted east from the MERZIG area, and II Battalion, 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment (559 VG Div) was shifted west from the BITCHE area to reinforce the defenders of SAARBRUCKEN. The last identifications were: 860 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965 and Q 4467 on 22 February; 861 Grenadier Regiment At Q 3172 on 22 February; 880 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4066 and Q 4367 on 22 February; 347 Artillery Regiment at Q 4169 on 22 February; 347 Engineer and Anti-Tank Battalion at Q 4467 on 22 February; 347 Replacement Battalion at Q 4267 on 22 February; 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade at Q 4570 on 20 February; 486 Bazooka Battalion at Q 4969 on 22 February. The divisions authorized assault gun strength of 14 is increased by 25 assault guns of attached 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade. The divisions casualties amounted to at least 600 men, reducing organic combat infantry strength to about 1,800 men, excluding Volkssturm.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

Has the sector from SAARBRUCKEN to BITCHE area and controls 559 Infantry, 19 Infantry, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 2 Mountain Divisions. The corps has not only been forced to withdraw its forward positions under pressure, but also has needed more forces to prevent a breach of its lines. First Army was compelled to subordinate 2 Mountain Division to the corps on about 18/20 February. Due to the two distinct terrain features presently within the corps boundaries there is a strong likelihood that its responsibilities will be reduced to cover only the single terrain feature directly and indirectly connected with the defense of the Blies Valley. The result of this shortening of the sector will be that 2 Mountain Division will come under the tactical control of XC Corps.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR). Prior to the arrival of 559 Volksgrenadier Division on its right flank, 19 Infantry Division was concentrating its forces in the defense of the area just east of FORBACH although its entire sector extended to the east as far as Q 5857. The division fought with much determination throughout the period. Its present sector extends from Q 4467 to Q 5857. All infantry regiments were identified within the area Q 4467 to Q 4862 as was 1119 Anti-Tank battalion. A prisoner states that the Anti-Tank battalion has two assault gun companies of eight guns each. In present heavy defensive fighting the division suffered heavy losses and its present strength is estimated at 1,000 combat infantry effectives.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) fought well but took heavy punishment resisting our attacks of 15-16 February. The divisional sector extends from Q 5957 to Q 7453. 37 SS Grenadier Regiment was identified on 23 February at Q 6656; 38 SS Grenadier Regiment was last contacted on 22 February at Q 6556 and 6156; 38 SS Grenadier Regiment is one more of the First German Army units to be reported as not having heavy weapons companies in the battalions. Remnants of both regiments are reported to have been reorganized on a two-battalion basis. 500 casualites since 15 February are accepted, thus, lowering the division combat infantry strength to 2,000.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) during the early days of the period held a sector southwest of BITCHE (Q 7750) to Q 7545. The last identifications in this area were: 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 6956 on 17 February; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7445 on 17 February; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7449 on 16 February. The commitment of I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment seems to have merely been an expedient to aid in keeping firm the left flank of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division during the US push. It was also the first identifications of this regiment which was reconstituted from elements of XII/1 Static Regiment since its dissolution in December.

The division was relieved of its sector in this area on the following days and went into line in the SAARBRUCKEN area on the right of 19 Infantry Division via WISEMBOURG-PIRMASENS-SAARBRUCKEN. II Battalion 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified at Q 4468. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,000.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) equates with the unidentified division which arrived into First Army area during prior period. The division replaced 559 Volksgrenadier Division in the BITCHE sector. The following identifications were made: 136 Mountain Regiment at Q 7452 on 23 February; 137 was stated by a prisoner of war to be on the right of 136 Mountain Regiment; 67 Reconnaissance Battalion was contacted in the FORBACH area on 22 February. The dispatch of the reconnaissance battalion to FORBACH (Q 3866) was merely a temporary expedient. 2 Mountain Division lost 4,800 prisoners in the COLMAR pocket and its combat infantry effectives were considered to have been actually destroyed as of 8 February. However, much of the artillery and service elements reached the east bank of the Rhine. Combat infantry strength depends chiefly on the number of men retrained from supply services and on the number of replacements received during the past two weeks. Its combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,200.

(d) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) continued to defend its drawn out HARDT Mountain sector from Q 7442 to Q 8433. Contact was relatively light as the division held elements in local reserve for purposes of refitting. The division obviously has a high priority on replacement as witnessed by the fact that prisoners claim 1,300 replacements to have been received since the beginning of February. Of these, 800 are said to be Moslems. The majority of these new comers came from AUSTRIA. Some of these replacements are still with the divisional field replacement battalion; others have already been absorbed by line units, raising the combat infantry strength of 11 Mountain Regiment to about 1,400. 11 Mountain Regiment was last identified at Q 7738 on 22 February; 12 Mountain Regiment at Q 8237 on 23 February. Division combat infantry strength, including the attached 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion, is 3,200 men.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLEM) was not identified during the period, probably due to lack of activity on its front from Q 8433 to Q 9227. Identification of I Battalion, 935 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9227 on 20 February is interpreted as a bolstering of the feeble 36 Volksgrenadier Division, rather than as a full scale commitment of 245 Infantry Division. Maximum combat infantry strength, including I Battalion, 935 Regiment and 51 German Air Force Battalion, is 1,800.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) remained in light contact in its sector west of HAGUENAU, continuing to hold from Q 9227 to R 0325. Identifications made were: 103 Grenadier Regiment at R 0324 and Q 9924 on 19 and 19 February; 104 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9427 on 21 February; 115 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9726 on 16 February. The status of the division is substantially unchanged, combat infantry strength is still estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) was inactive during this week while recuperating from the heavy losses of the past period. Its sector is unchanged, from HAGUENAU (R 0325) to east of OBERHOFFEN (R 1120). Following identifications were reported: 457 Grenadier Regiment on 19 February at R 0524; 477 Grenadier Regiment on 23 February at R 0922; 257 Engineer Battalion on 18 February at R 0324; while 466 Grenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 13 February. Still attached to the division are Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN as well as I Battalion, 2 SS Police Regiment. Combat infantry strength, including attachments 2,000.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

905 Moblization Division (CG:) is rather lightly committed in the sector from R 1120 to the Rhine, with only Battalion SCHMIDT and TREUTLER and elements of 2 SS Police Regiment in line. The rest of the units under command of the division are believed to be manning defenses on the east bank of the Rhine or are in reserve. Combat infantry strength of units in line is judged at 800 and of those in reserve, or east of the Rhine, at 700. (Total 1,500 combat infantry effectives.)

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

This army has lost at least one of the divisions it had under its command in the ALSACE Pocket, since 2 Mountain Division was contacted in the First German Army area. This would leave Nineteenth Army with 16, 159, 189 and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions; 198, 338 and 716 Infantry Divisions; and 106 Panzer Brigade. The departure of LXIII Corps is accepted. The continued presence of LXIV Corps with 198 Infantry, 716 Infantry, and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions in the OFFENBURG area is a strong probability. It must be presumed that the refitting of these divisions is progressing and that they will be capable of limited action in the near future. Recent estimates made on the basis of more detailed interrogation agree substantially with previous estimates that not more then 4,000 enemy combat infantry effectives escaped from the ALSACE Pocket. It is confirmed that 90% of the artillery effectives and 75% of the artillery pieces crossed the Rhine. This figure is equivalent to 3,600 men and 90 artillery pieces. Losses sustained by service and anti-aircraft units, are believed to have been negligible. Of armored units, 40 tanks and assault guns are believed to have escaped.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) remains unlocated though an unconfirmed agent report places it in the FREIBURG (V 0832) TUTTLINGEN (W 8032) area. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 500.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) is not yet located definitely, though it is also reported in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. Combat infantry effectives are 400.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. TUNGE) is another division that may be in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. One unconfirmed report names the Eastern front as the division's ultimate destination. Combat infantry effectives total 300 men.

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EHART) is the fourth division reported in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area by the same source. Its combat infantry effectives are believed to number 400.

106 Panzer Brigade (CO:) has been refitting for some twenty days. It will be remembered that only about one half the unit was committed in the VOSGES Pocket. Therefore, its early appearance on some other sector of the front is to be expected.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) continues its rehabilitation in the area East and North of OFFENBURG.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL). According to a captured division order entitled "Organization Order Number 2", dated 18 January, the division was to be reorganized immediately, according to the Table of Organization of Infantry Division 1945. In order to bring about this reorganization, the following changes were to take place, the supply units were to be drastically reduced and the personnel thus made available to be used as combat troops. All assault rifles were to be concentrated in one platoon per company. The overstrength in assault rifles will be available for the regimental heavy companies. Each regiment is to form one heavy company (4 Company) which would comprise all light guns, medium mortars and heavy machine guns. In case of a surplus of these weapons, they were to be used to form the cadre for a second heavy company (8 Company). The thirteenth (Infantry Gun) companies would be completed with the acquisition of heavy (120 mm) mortars as infantry guns are presently not available. However, the necessary training for handling the guns due to arrive would begin immediately in order to have trained crews when the weapons were delivered.

The fusilier battalion was to become an infantry battalion and the designation "squadron" for the first company was to be dropped as the mobility of this battalion would depend on the number of bicycles which could be provided.

The existing motor transport of the division was to be reduced so as to correspond with the new Table of Equipment. It was inferred that 198 Infantry Division possessed more vehicles than permitted by the new T. O. and was to give up the surplus. This plan did not go into effect in January as the heavy commitment of the division precluded any major organizational changes. However, it can be assumed that, now that the division is being rehabilitated, this reorganization will take place according to the order outlined above. The division is located east of OFFENBURG (W 1585) with left-over combat infantry effectives from ALSACE numbering 500.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) is still carried in its initial assembly area north of HASLACH (W 2664). Combat infantry effectives is estimated at 400.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is presumed to have stayed in its assembly area in the vicinity of KEHL (W 0596). Survivors of the "Pocket" are estimated at 400 combat infantry effectives.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINFARTH or ROTH)

Its operational status remains unchanged.

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG:)

No change in status.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) is responsible for an extensive sector along the Rhine River to the north and south of KEHL (W 0596). The upgrading of this unit to a reserve divisional status is accepted.

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING) continues to be carried in an uncertain status.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:),according to prisoner of war statement, was located in NEUENBURG (V 8716) area and was in command of 7 OBERRHEIN Regiment on 31 January.

805 Mobilization Division (CG:) like 405 Reserve Division is responsible for a section of the SIEGFRIED Line defenses. The division according to prisoners of war, is composed of three regiments, with three battalions each. The 5 Volkssturm Regiment holds the central sector from V 8844 to V 9130 with its 11, 12, and 20 Volkssturm Battalions. On tis right, 3 Russian (Ukrainian) Depot Regiment

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

holds from V 8844 to V 9457. The number of the third, a Volkssturm Regiment, is not known, but it holds a sector south of 5 Volkssturm Regiment. Interrogation has established that the 5 Regiment, composed of Volkssturm from BADEN, has a strength of 600-700 combat infantry effectives, equipped with regular infantry weapons.

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

Status of this army remains unchanged.

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian)

A captured document of the LXXIV Corps, dated 17 January 1945 identifies this division as follows: "Cavalry trained Russian non-commissioned officers and men are needed for the formation of a Reconnaissance Battalion for 600 Infantry Division (Russian). It is requested that all cavalry-trained Russian volunteers in your sector, even from German units, be given an opportunity of applying for transfer to the 600 Infantry Division (Russian). The number of those volunteers is to be reported to this office and the volunteers are to be transferred to the 600 Infantry Division (Russian). Training Camp, Munsingen".

f. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve: Combat Infantry Effectives)	
Saar-Palatinate Front	20,000
Rhine Front	4,000
Reserves:	
Estimated Reserves; Saar-Palatinate Front	5,000
Estimated Reserves; Black Forest	7,000
TOTAL	36,000
Artillery Guns:	
Saar-Palatinate Front	600 pieces
Tank and SP Guns:	
Saar Palatinate Front	140-160
Reserves on Saar-Palatinate Front	30- 50
Rhine River Front	20
TOTAL	190-230

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. Enemy Disposition

The enemy has not materially changed his dispositions along the Alpine Front during the present period. There are indications that local reliefs within the units of 5 Mountain Division have taken place. A further infusion of Italian elements in forward positions in the passes northeast of MOUNT AIGUILETTE (N 59) has occurred. The reports of either evacuation or thinning out of the forces under LXXV German Corps 34 Infantry, 5 Mountain, LITTORIO Infantry, and MONTE ROSA Infantry Divisions are still without foundation. However, in the area west of TURIN, two Anti-Aircraft battalions, one light and one heavy, have departed for the east.

b. Enemy Activity

Evidence of the enemy's forward expansion of his northern outpost line is seen in the occupying of positions SW of MONT BLANC at CROIX DU BON HOMME and COL DE FENETRE, giving him observation of the valleys between CONTAMINES and SAINT GERVAIS. In the same area, an ambitious patrol unsuccessfully attempted to destroy the cog-wheel railway at AIGUILLE DU MIDI (C 42) moving over passes better than 3000 meters high

c. General

During March, the prevailing snow conditions and poor communication facilities will prevent assumption of an offensive attitude by the enemy. The present lack of depth in his dispositions is indicative of passive intentions. However, defense of the present positions will continue to be aggressive, with frequent raids for harassing and intelligence purposes.

Enemy combat infantry effectives total approximately 9,000, with a full complement of supporting and auxili ry troops.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

Elements of the miscellaneous units on the east bank of the Rhine continued to send patrols across the river throughout the period. PWs stated that the forces were made up of Volkssturm personnel in large part, usually under command of Wehrmacht or SS officers, with harassing missions only.

On the night of 21 February a force estimated at company strength crossed the river in ten motorboats and raided friendly strongpoints southeast of BALGAU (V 8525). During the raid friendly elements at V 8823 were forced to withdraw temporarily and a strongpoint one Kilometer to the north was surrounded for a short period.

NORTH FRONT

From the Rhine to the western HARDT the enemy maintained a completely defensive attitude, reacting to patrol activity especially with artillery fire. Early in the period 250 rounds of Nebelwerfer and heavy artillery fell in the area Q 9028 - Q 8533. SAVERNE (Q 7215) was intermittently shelled by a 380 mm gun, receiving four rounds on 18/19 and three on 23 February.

BITCHE and the area west to Q 6255 were generally quiet. 559 Volksgrenadier Division attempted minor infiltrations east of RIMLING (Q 6355). Elements of 1125 Regiment were unsuccessful in regaining the ground lost earlier in the week by 17 SS Division. An increase in artillery fire was noted east of BLIESBRUCKEN Forest (Q 6255) and was especially marked late in the period near BITCHE after the arrival of elements of 2 Mountain Division.

BOBINGEN (Q 4965) proved strongly held by elements of 19 Infantry Division as at least five tanks were heard in the town. Enemy troops had by the end of the period, entirely withdrawn from BLIESMENGEN (Q 5461). The division fought fiercely, throwing in infantry-tank counterattacks to hold its line in the VORDERWALD Forest (Q 5063), but was forced to withdraw beyond BLIESGERSWILLER (Q 5261) and KLEINBLITTERSDORF (Q 4962). Enemy infiltration attempts in the VORDERWALD woods were unsuccessful.

On the east flank of the 347 Infantry Division's salient resistance was strong, but troops of the 19 Infantry Division were cleared from GROSBLIED - ERSTROFF (Q 4862) and ZINZING (Q 4764) early in the period. The enemy was unable to hold a firm line in the center and withdrew approximately one mile on 20 February, giving up the BRANDENBUSCH woods (Q 4663) and ALSTING (Q 4564). Fierce counterattacks at SPICHEREN (Q 4567) were overcome by 21 February. STIRING-WENDEL (Q 4267) proved heavily defended, but the road between that town and SAARBRUCKEN had been cut as enemy elements were forced from the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN in the vicinity of the ARNVAL woods (Q 4668). On 23 February, 347 Infantry Division elements, reinforced by units of 19 Infantry and 2 Mountain Divisions, made a series of three tank-supported counterattacks in an effort to regain the heights. Volkssturm units from SAARBRUCKEN and one battalion of 719 Infantry Division aided in the defense of FORBACH (Q 3965), as house-to-house fighting continued in the western outskirts at the close of the period.

ALPINE FRONT

At the beginning of the period friendly positions at COL DU FREJUS (K 4323) received hostile machine gun fire, as did our patrols to COL DU MONT CENIS. On 19 February an enemy raid on our post at AIGUILLE DE MIDI (C 42) was repulsed as the enemy reacted strongly to our attempt to occupy ROCHE LA CROIX (P 9252). Patrol clashes occurred at BRUILGLACIER (Z 4989) and at LAC DES ROOSSES (H 6353)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

Patrols were fired on during the period in the LA ROCHELLE zone at ANAIS (T 4937) and at (T 5234) as the enemy was observed establishing positions west of PERRIERES where a patrol clash took place on 23 February. Two heavy caliber shells, probably fired from OLERON, landed north of FOURAS (T 3416) on 23 February. A friendly raid at RONCE (Y 2795) netted 7 prisoners of war, a 20 millimeter cannon and a machine gun. 77 millimeter fire (50% duds) fell in the area of GRANDE GORCE (Y 4877) on 20 February.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Reports of scattered military rail and road activity throughout our area indicate that the regrouping and normal supply of enemy forces in BADEN and the SAAR PALATINATE area were continuing. Activity in the Black Forest region centered around FREIBURG and moderately heavy traffic was also seen in the CALW (R 7413) - FREUDENSTADT area on 22 February. Marshalling yards and rail lines in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-MANNHEIM-LANDAU area revealed considerable activity on 22 February with a westward trend indicated by the observations.

Heavy holdings in the FREIBURG marshalling yards and moderately heavy rail activity in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG-VILLINGEN triangle on 19 and 20 February suggest that perhaps another unit of the regrouping Nineteenth Army is being assembled prior to transfer to an active sector further to the North. Rail activity in the CALW - FREUDENSTADT area included some military traffic directed to the east with the remainder of the movement going in a southerly direction deep into the Black Forest. These trans moving into the forest may be carrying tired and wounded soldiers to rest centers known to be in the area north of the Swiss Border.

Throughout the Rhine Valley, the movement of military and supply trains coupled with the sizeable concentrations of railroad rolling stock in marshalling yards of the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-MANNHEIM-LANDAU area on 22 February indicated the arrival of some badly needed reinforcements for the SAAR. To the west, unusually light activity prevailed in the SAARBRUCKEN-NEUNKIRCHEN area throughout the period with scattered rail and road movements suggesting normal supply activities for servicing the SIEGFRIED Line installations and formations in that sector. Light rail traffic was also noted in the ST WENDEL-BAD KREUZNACH area on 22 February with scattered trains seen moving in a northeasterly direction.

Observations made during the week reveal no large scale departures or arrivals within the SAAR PALATINATE.

B. Status of Communications

Fighter and medium bombers were especially active throughout the week with mediums concentrating on marshalling yards and railroad stations, while fighters exerted their main effort on railroad lines. Attacks were particularly successful on 22 February when 170 rail cuts were made and 2 bridges destroyed. The majority of these cuts were scored east of the Rhine on lines east from STUTTGART and from MANNHEIM to BASEL. The results of these attacks, coupled with effects of preceding bombings, succeeded in greatly hampering enemy movement along our front.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Through traffic on the LANDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN line was temporarily halted. North-South traffic was at a standstill along the OFFENBURG-KARLSRUHE line as a result of the destruction of the RASTATT rail bridges. Traffic was rendered temporarily impossible on North-South lines through BAD MUNSTER because of the successful bombing of the approaches to the rail bridges. East of the Rhine some canalizing of traffic was effected and resulted in an overall slowing down of movement through ou the area.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc # 1 - The Rhine Bridges
Inc # 2 - Enemy Disposition

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 241200A FEB.

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #23

SECRET

SECRET

140

HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

P 150 P1 - ROB

:SECRET :
:By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: (:
:Date: 3 March 1945:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 24

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 3 MARCH 1945

USSAF
Dir of Intel

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

On the Sixth Army Group front the enemy maintained a shallow line only by extensive manipulation of his dwindling forces. For some time the comparatively low priority of this sector of the Western Front has prevented the allocation of reinforcements except in the form of low grade replacements. Now even that low priority has disappeared, with the result that line units are being withdrawn for more urgent use on other fronts.

Army Group G is being compelled to rely on its natural river lines and man made positional defenses in order to compensate for the loss of troops. In spite of the obvious difficulties in which Army Group G found itself, the German High Command was forced to sacrifice further territory in the Saar-Moselle triangle in preference to sending aid. In fact, with two of Nineteenth Army's hastily rebuilt units being rushed to the COLOGNE plain, the First Army was kept from falling back along its entire front only by the arrival of another definitely scratch unit from the Black Forest. In any case, it is clear that Army Group G has no longer a true reserve for tactical employment; what little reserve strength it has is constituted only by replacements and local Volkssturm.

First German Army's position continued to deteriorate because of the lack of reserves. Two nominal divisions (49 VG and 16 VG) reappeared on the front, but neither was actually more than a division staff which served to give some tactical organization to the scattered battle groups and Volkssturm units being employed. In fact, 16 Volksgrenadier Division represents merely a different name for units formerly under command of 906 zbV Division which the former picked up as it passed westward. With 2 Mountain Division again rushed off in a stop gap capacity, the plight of First Army was made even more evident when it had to rely on remnants of the defunct 245 and 16 Volksgrenadier Divisions to replace 6 SS Mountain Division in the western HARDT Mountains, trusting to the naturally strong defensive value of the terrain to maintain the line. The eventual fate of 6 SS Mountain is difficult to determine, but it definitely has been withdrawn from contact. First Army can hardly hold its line against the Allied aggressive defense with the weak aggregation it now has under command. This withdrawal of one of its stronger formations leaves it still further dependent on terrain and local Volkssturm to hold what the High Command has obviously appreciated to be a defensive sector.

Nineteenth German Army still serves as a manpower siphon for the entire Western Front. Of its original eight nominal divisions, it has so far given up four (2 Mtn, 338 VG, 189 VG and 16 VG). Another of the remaining four (159 VG, 198 VG, 708 VG, 716 VG) has already at least been assembled for movement, leaving LXIV Corps, and the static divisions (405 and 805) to maintain the watch on the Rhine.

OBERRHEIN Defense Command and Twenty-fourth Army maintained their existence.

b. Capabilities

Army Group G can still attempt to defend itself. In the execution of this endeavor it may elect to be destroyed along its present position or to maintain the integrity of its organization by falling back to the Rhine. The selection of the lesser evil is the only capability which remains.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), ST ARNUAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), HOTTVILLE (Q 7253), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence south along the Rhine to the Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The threat created by the Allied bridgehead South of TRIER and the probable demands for divisions by higher headquarters upon First Army has compelled the army to continue the redisposition of its available forces. 6 SS Mountian Division was extended northward to cover the sector vacated by 2 Mountain Division early in the period and was itself later withdrawn from contact. 2 Mountain Division was sent to the SAARBURG (L 1413) area to reinforce the badly battered 256 Volksgrenadier and 416 Infantry Divisions. This was considered insufficient by the enemy as he also brought in 49 Infantry Division which had been resting and refitting for over nine weeks. In addition a battle group of 11 Panzer Division was left behind in order to eradicate the initial bridgehead over the Saar River. The sector vacated by 6 SS Mountain Division was taken over by elements formerly part of 245 Infantry Division operating as an independent battle group on the right flank: by the rehabilitated 16 Infantry Division of Nineteenth Army in the central sector; and by a westward extension of the 36 Volksgrenadier Division. sector.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER). During the early part of the period this division expanded its sector to the right to effect the relief of 2 Mountain Divisions in the BITCHE area. Then on the night of 27/28 February it too was relieved by some miscellaneous units, 16 Infantry Division and by a shift of 36 Infantry Division sector responsibility to the west. The division made only a fair showing during its early tour of duty in this area. However, after gaining some experience and receiving a large number of reinforcements the unit fought well. Last identifications were as follows: III/12 SS Mountain Regiment at Q 8237 on 24 February; II/12 SS Mountain Regiment at Q 7449 on 28 February, and 11 SS Mountain Regiment at Q 7639 on 24 February and at Q 7837 on 28 February. The division has not yet left the First Army area. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,200.

245 Infantry Division (CO: Col. WAGNER). The continued presence of this unit in our sector is doubted. The elements of the division identified in the BITCHE area Q 7750 have been detached from the division for sometime. Recent prisoner of war statements indicate that no attempts were made to reinforce or reorganize the division since its abortive commitment in December. The remnants of the division, totalling 1,000 combat infantry effectives at the time, were then organized into a few battalions and later subordinated to other units in line. The two elements formerly part of the division which have been identified to date are the I/935 Volksgrenadier Regiment (previously subordinated to 36 Volksgrenadier Division) on the right and a 300 man battle goup "LOETZE", composed of elements of 935 Volksgrenadier Regiment (previously subordinated to 47 Volksgrenadier Division) on the left. The sector occupied by these units is between Q 7354 and Q 7444.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) is responsible for the sector from the Moselle River to L 2421. All regiments of the division were identified during the period in the area L 1512 and L 1714. On 27 February Volkssturm units were also found operating within the divisional area, probably as reinforcements. The organic divisional elements have been decimated as a result of recent operations west and east of the Saar River. Losses in prisoners of war from 11 February to 22 February amounted to 1,400. Present combat infantry strength is 500.

49 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was identified at L 2412, on 27 February through prisoners of war yielded by 150 Volksgrenadier Regiment. This is the only unit of the division identified to date. The extent of the divisional reorganization is unknown. However, it is believed that only elements have arrived in the area south of TRIER. Combat infantry effectives are unknown.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) relieved 559 Volksgrenadier Division in the area of BITCHE 18/20 February and in turn was relieved by 6 SS Mountain Division about 25 February. The parent units followed 82 Mountain Engineer Battalion and 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion into the SCHWARZWAL DER HOCHWALD region where its services where in very heavy demand in order to reinforce 416 Infantry Division. The division presently holds a sector from ZERF (L 2412) to L 2008. On the basis of preliminary interrogation, it appears that the division has consolidated its remnants into a reduced table of organization. The two mountain regiments have two battalions each and each battalion has only three companies. The combat infantry effectives total 1,200.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) must be considered as virtually destroyed as the result of its recent engagements. Several battalions were over run and others were practically annihilated as they tried to retreat across the Saar. Among the prisoners were 2 regimental and several battalion commanders. Remnants committed in area L 1906 do not exceed 300 combat infantry effectives.

Major General PFLIEGER is indicated as having taken over command of the battle group of 11 Panzer Division which stayed behind after the bulk of the panzer division left for COLOGNE area beginning its move on or about 13 February. The unit remaining had approximately 18 tanks. The fate suffered by this battle group is unknown.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

Corps headquarters was reported at HABACH (Q 438878).

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) appears to have extended its already drawn out front to assist the remnants of 416 Infantry Division. The divisional front is now believed to extend from L 1902 to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). The division remained unidentified during the period, probably due to the fact that it is occupying SIEGFRIED Defenses east of the Saar. There is some indication that II Battalion 723 Grenadier Regiment, last identified south of SAARBRUECKEN on 26 February may have returned to its present unit. Division combat infantry strength is still 3,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) contracted to the west to make way for the commitment of 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 347 Division now holds from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to FORBACH (Q 4066). Last identifications were: 860 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3966, 26 February; 861 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965, 1 March and 880 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965, 28 February. A large part of the division's forces are fighting in the northern portion of FORBACH which has been stubbornly defended. In the remainder of the sector contact was light. 67 Reconnaissance Battalion is no longer in the area having been identified in the SAARBURG sector with its parent unit, 2 Mountain Division. The anti-tank units listed under 347 Infantry Division last week have probably come under command of 559 Volksgrenadier Division.

The divisional Anti-Tank Battalion is organized along the line of the new 1945 Table of Organization. Due to losses, only 8 assault guns (75 mm) still remain, and on the basis of prisoners statements, combat infantry strength is lowered to 1,600 plus 300 for the attached 12 Landesschutzen Battalion.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen von der MUEHLEN). It is now clear that the division was relieved by 2 Mountain Division around 18 February in the BITCHE area. Waiting only long enough to assemble, the division marched west to take over a sector directly south of SAARBRUECKEN between 347 and 19 Infantry Divisions. The sector of the division extends from Q 4066 on the west to Q 4966 on the east. Identifications were: 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 26 February, at Q 4267; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 25 February, at Q 4769 and Q 4468. A prisoner of war of 1126 Regiment believes that both battalions of 1125 Regiment have now been reformed. However, the second battalion has not yet been contacted. Other prisoners state that several divergencies from the new table of organization exist. Instead of regimental anti-tank companies, anti-tank weapons are said to be within the battalion heavy companies. Furthermore, the division is said

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to have two reconnaissance troops made mobile with bicycles and armed with machine guns. The assault gun company, part of the anti-tank battalion, suffered losses and now has only six 75 mm assault guns remaining. Probably attached to the division are 486 Anti-Tank Battalion, 5/XVII Anti-Tank Company, and 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade. Prisoners captured from this division during the past period made the first references to Volkssturm personnel being made available to divisions in combat as reinforcements. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 2,400 including 400 attached effectives.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ERITZELMAYR) shortened its sector on both flanks and now holds the line between the Saar River (Q 4966) and Q 5560. The fighting in this area has slackened considerably, resulting in fewer contacts. Identifications made were: 74 Grenadier Regiment on 20 February at Q 5462; 119 Engineer Battalion on 27 February at Q 5264; and 19 Fusilier Company on 26 February at Q 5363. Though a prisoner stated that 59 Grenadier Regiment, which had been virtually destroyed, was to be reactivated, the division is in very poor shape and combat infantry effectives are carried at 1,000.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) was recovering its balance after the heavy blows of the previous week. The division extended its right flank 2-3 miles to the west and now holds the sector from Q 5560 to Q 7354. Apart from small skirmishes contact was loose and the only identifications were: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6957, 28 February; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6456, 28 February and 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion at Q 5658 on 2 March. The division staff is planning a defense in great depth as indicated by the preparations being carried out. The divisional C P has not only been withdrawn to ZWEIBRUCKEN, eleven miles behind the lines, but also a secondary defense line has been constructed three miles to the rear of present positions.

2 Company of 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion was identified west of the division sector, at Q 4567. It is thought that this company was detached and is serving as a XIII SS Corps mobile reserve. Prisoners draw attention to the division's successful ruse of using decoy tanks to draw our fire and to give the impression of great armored strength.

Approximately 200 replacements from the divisional replacement battalion were split between the regiments. 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment is in the process of reforming its third battalion. Combat infantry strength, including these replacements, is estimated at 2,000 on the basis of detailed interrogation. The division has lost 630 prisoners since 15 February.

(d) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL), last reported with the other survivors of ALSACE in the Black Forest, became heir to 6 SS Mountain Division's HARDT sector from Q 7444 to Q 8135. Identifications made to date are: 221 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7938 on 1 March; 225 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7444 on 2 March; and 16 Fusilier Battalion at Q 7738 on 2 March. Details regarding the division's present status are still lacking. It has been ascertained that I Battalion 221 Regiment is the former Battalion MORG (VI Bn OBERRHEIN) of 905 Mobilization Division. Due to the division's depleted state when it left ALSACE, other battalions may also have been grafted. It is interesting to note that, contrary to Volksgrenadier Divisional organization, paybook entries show that the former 1316 Reconnaissance Company was renumbered to 16 Fusilier Battalion. Combat infantry strength is given tentatively as 1,500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLEM) continued to stay in very light contact from Q 8235 to Q 9227. The division is utilizing this quiet interlude for its long overdue rehabilitation. The units from BAUMHOLDER (PFALZ), promised for months, have finally arrived, incorporated in a 36 Division AUFFRISCHUNGS (Replacement) Regiment. 9 - 11 Companies of this regiment became II Battalion 165 Grenadier Regiment. What became of the rest of the Replacement Regiment is not known for certain. It is highly probable that it was used to reform I Battalion 87 Grenadier Regiment identified on 2 March, and the regimental companies, thus putting the division back on the standard 3 regiment - 2 battalion basis. Identifications were: 165 Grenadier Regimentat Q 8434 on 28 February; 87 Grenadier Regiment on 2 March; and 36 Engineer Battalion at Q 9028 on 1 March. The combat infantry strength of the division is now estimated at 2,000.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) continued to hold its old sector from Q 9227 to just west of HAGUENAU (R 0224) with elements of all 3 regiments in line. Identifications were: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 1 March at R 0124; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 March at Q 9227; and 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 March at Q 9726. Prisoners of war state that 47 Volksgrenadier Division is to move to the BITCHE area. Though not likely, this is a possibility. Prisoners also report the arrival of some replacements from the divisional Replacement Battalion at SCHWETZINGEN on 24 February. On this basis, strength is increased to 1,700.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) remained responsible for a sector including HAGUENAU (R 0224) and OBERHOFFEN (R 0920). Activity was still at a minimum and the only identification made was that of 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 26 February at R 0523. I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment and Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN are still attached. The organic combat infantry strength of the division is 1,600 and the strength of its attachments total 400.

905 Mobilization Division (CG:) was not identified during the period. However, it is believed that the division is still holding the sector from R 1120 to the Rhine. A Battalion MORG, formerly under 2 SS Police Regiment, was identified in the sector of 16 Volksgrenadier Division. It appears that 905 Division has given up some of the units listed under its command as of 1 February. The line is held by not more than 800 men with a further 500 troops being held in reserve or manning positions east of the Rhine. Total combat infantry effectives total 1,300.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

To date the Nineteenth Army has lost 2 Mountain, 16 and 189 Volksgrenadier, and 338 Infantry Divisions, the latter two divisions having been identified in the KREFELD area. Consequently only 159 and 708 Volksgrenadier, 198 and 716 Infantry Divisions and 106 Panzer Brigade remain under control of the Army and out of contact. Rail movements in the area indicate that 159 Volksgrenadier Division may be departing and tend to confirm the belief that 106 Panzer Brigade has gone.

It is significant that none of the redeployed divisions were units under the control of LXIV Corps (708 Volksgrenadier, 198 and 716 Infantry Divisions). It would seem, therefore, that this Corps is destined to remain in the Black Forest area. Obviously, sufficient time has elapsed for all of the Nineteenth Army units which escaped from the COLMAR pocket to have been reorganized and absorbed sufficient reinforcements to make them capable of limited employment. Although the recommittment of former Nineteenth Army divisions in other sectors was undoubtedly premature and caused by the exigencies of the situation, in no case should they be regarded as being totally impotent.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was last reported in the area FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. The observed northward rail movement on the line HASLACH-DONAUESCHINGEN on 1-2 March may well equate with the departure of this unit from the Black Forest. It is the only defeated division of LXIII Corps formerly in the VOSGES pocket which has not been recommitted on another sector of the front.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) is still believed to be refitting in the OFFENBURG area. Strength estimates for the remaining divisions are not ventured at this time as the extent of replacements received and service personnel retrained for infantry duty is not known. A figure of 1,200 combat infantry effectives is accepted for each division prior to commitment.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is located east of OFFENBURG (W 1585).

708 Volksgrenadier (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) is located north of HASLACH (W 2664).

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is probably still in the KEHL (W 0596) region.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

The headquarters of this corps are believed to be at BADEN-BEILLER (V 9511). Its operational status is unchanged.

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG:)

No change in status.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) is still responsible for SIEGFRIED Line defenses along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING). No further clarification of its actual existence is available.

805 Mobilization Division (CG:) remains responsible for SIEGFRIED Line defenses along the east bank of the Rhine north of BRISACH.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:) was reported in the NEUNBURG (V 8713) area and in immediate command of the OBERRHEIN Regiment. In view of its number, it logically falls into the 405, 805, 905 series. It is a Wehrkreis V unit which may eventually be upgraded to a divisional status. Its present sector extends along the Rhine, north of LOERRACH (A 9590).

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

Status of this army remains unchanged.

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still located at MUNSINGEN with no further details as to its organization having been received.

f. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Palatinate-Rhine Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve: (Combat Infantry Effectives)	
Saar-Palatinate Front	18,500
Rhine Front	4,000
Reserves: (Estimated)	
Saar-Palatinate Front	5,000
Black Forest	5,000
TOTAL	32,500
Artillery Guns:	
Saar-Palatinate	600
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Saar-Palatinate Front	140-160
Saar-Palatinate Front (Reserves)	50- 70
Rhine River Front	15- 20
TOTAL	205-250

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONNETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Although there have been persistent reports that the MONTE ROSA Division is gradually relieving 5 Mountain Division, there has been no apparent major change in enemy dispositions in that sector. The identification of 100 Mountain Regiment of 5 Mountain Division in the ALLESANDRIA area by partisans on 21 February does not coincide with the PW identification of that regiment on 17 February in the MOUNT BLANC area. The relief of German combat troops by the LITTORIO Division in the CUNEO area is possible explanation for the reported departure of 1000 German service troops from this area. That 34 Infantry Division continues to be in the area is evident from prisoner of war identification as late as 1 March.

b. General

The prevailing weather conditions during March will prevent the assumption of an offensive attitude by the enemy. However, it is to be expected that the enemy will continue to defend his present positions by sending out frequent parties for harassing and intelligence purposes.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

Throughout the period, patrols continued to cross to the west bank of the Rhine in an attempt to ascertain friendly dispositions and intentions. His quest for information was materially aided by the improved weather conditions which permitted daily air reconnaissance of the Alsace region.

On 24 February a combat patrol from the 3rd Russian (Ukrainian) Depot Regiment, estimated at two platoons in strength, attacked friendly outpost east of MARCKOLSHEIM (V 8653). The patrol suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire and was forced to withdraw across the river leaving 23 prisoners in friendly hands. Moderate sucess was gained by the enemy raids when three friendly prisoners were taken on 25 February southeast of NEUF BRISACH (V 8736) and four additional prisoners were taken in the NIFFER (V 8301) area on 2 March. The enemy artillery fire was generally light along the entire Rhine front.

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

From the Rhine to the HARDT Mountains, the enemy's defensive attitude continued as field positions were improved and mines were laid between the HAGUENAU Forest and NEIDERBRONN (Q 9238) area by 47 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Reactions to friendly patrols proved the enemy alert while movements in rear areas indicated that a westward extension of divisional sectors was being carried out in the HARDT region. Artillery fire was comparatively light but during night 24-25 February, a 380 mm gun near HOFFEN (P 1536) and a 170 mm gun near BAERENTHAL (Q 8442) placed five and seven rounds, respectively, on SAVERNE (Q 7215).

The extensive movements behind the lines in the HARDT Mountains sector resulted in the relief of 2 Mountain Division and later 6 SS Mountain Division. 6 SS Mountain Division temporarily assumed responsibility for 2 Mountain Division's sector until it in turn was also relieved. The change over was carried out by the employment of miscellaneous battle group formations in the BITCHE area (Q 7750), 16 Infantry Division, newly arrived from the Nineteenth Army, in the central sector, and by 36 Infantry Division which extended its right flank to the west. On the front our patrols found the enemy extended but alert, while friendly observation posts were harassed somewhat by artillery fire.

In the Saar Valley, 19 Infantry Division, offering moderate opposition with small arms and artillery fire, was forced from BUBINGEN (Q 4964) and BLIESRANSBACH (Q 5263) on 24 February. In an attempt to regain some of the lost ground, this division later in the afternoon mounted three unsuccessful counterattacks north of BLIESRANSBACH with infantry troops supported by armour. An additional attack was mounted on 27 February which also failed. After spending himself on these ventures, he was content to dig in and await the next friendly move.

559 Volksgrenadier Division and 347 Infantry Division, aided by Volkssturm, made repeated attempts to retake the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN. Minor attacks and attempted infiltrations into woods east of STIRING-WENDEL (Q 4166) were only temporarily successful. At the close of the period, the enemy still held STIRING - WENDEL and the northwest portion of FORBACH as artillery and mortar fire exchanges became the predominent activity.

ALPINE FRONT

On 24 February the evemy repulsed a friendly patrol at K 4902 with strong small arms fire and on the same day, one of our outposts at K 4313 was subjected to some machine gun fire. The possible renewal of enemy attacks on AIGUILLE DEMIDI (C 5024) was indicated by the arrival of two supply convoys at REFUGES TURINO MARGARITO (C 5318). Activity in the coastal area was confined to harassing artillery fire.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

Enemy activity in the LA ROCHELLE pocket was concentrated in the northern zone. He carried out numerous reconnaissance missions in attempts to ascertain friendly troop dispositions. During this time, the Germans also completed their own re-grouping and brought up supplies. Preparations were completed on 1 March and the attack was launched in the direction of ANAIS (T 5137) and ST JEAN (T 5346) with one battalion of infantry. By 0900A I Battalion 223 Grenadier Regiment had penetrated into ST JEAN and by 1130A fighting was in progress in ST SAUVEUR (T 5241). At the end of the day, as a result of friendly counterattacks, the enemy was forced to withdraw to a line: SUIRE (T 4845), 500 meters west of BOURDON (T 5044), BOIS DE BEAUREGARD (T 5042), 500 meters west of ST SAUVEUR (T 5241), ANAIS (T 5137).

In the ROYAN sector, the enemy's only activities were occasional exchanges of artillery fire and minor patrol activity. On 2 March, the POINTE DE GRAVE pocket became the scene of an enemy attack when 200-300 enemy pushed four kilometers south of MONTALIVET (Y 2747) before being contained by friendly forces.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A Tactical Reconnaissance

Renewed road and rail activity at key points throughout the SAAR-PALATINATE-BADEN areas were brought about by a further shuffling and movements of enemy units during the period. Activity in the region of the Black Forest on 25 February and 2 March indicated that additional military units of the Nineteenth Army were entraining and moving to the north toward the more active battle areas. Extensive traffic seen in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-WORMS area on 25 February appeard to be connected with some reinforcements or perhaps a unit arriving into the SAAR. The heavy activity observed on 1 and 2 March in the NEUNKIRCHEN area and along the PIRMASENS-LANDAU line indicates that a unit withdrawal was in progress.

The OFFENBURG-FREIBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line as well as the ROTTWEIL-HORB-STUTTGART line showed considerable activity throughout the period with definite indications that military moves were underway in the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN area. On 2 March, four military trains were seen on the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line with the trend of movement being to the north. Rail activity in the DONAUESCHINGEN area and in the area east of FREIBURG on both 1 and 2 March serves to confirm the belief that the resources of the Nineteenth Army are being further tapped for duty on more active sectors.

Heavy rail traffic was observed in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-WORMS area on 25, 27 February and again on 2 March. The marshalling yards in this sector likewise simultaneously revealed heavy loadings and considerable activity. Although much of this activity appeared to be normal two way traffic of civilian needs, commercial traffic, supplies and materiel, the direction of the military trains on 2 March indicated a move to the north towards MAINZ, traveling out of our zone.

In connection with the activity seen east of the Rhine on 25 and 27 February, it appears that some of this traffic carried reinforcements for the SAAR-PALATINATE where it was evident that arrivals had taken place early in the current period. In the NEUNKIRCHEN-SAARBRUCKEN area on 1 March several rakes of empty flat cars, as well as one loaded infantry type train, were seen, but cover of the following day revealed that these were no longer present in same area. The fact that moderately heavy rail activity including some military trains was noted in the ZWEIBRUCKEN-PIRMASENS area on 2 March leads to the possible conclusion that the railroad rolling stock which had been seen in the NEUNKIRCHEN area on the previous day was being used to make up the trains needed to move military traffic away from our immediate front.

B Status of Communications

Despite repeated concentrated attack upon their railway system, the Germans are still able to route their traffic through or around important rail centers as was indicated by the amount of movement observed throughout the period. The persistent cutting of enemy rail lines during the week did succeed in canalizing and even interdicting traffic on certain lines, but through traffic along these main routes was rapidly re-established. However, the unserviceable rail bridge at RASTATT

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

continues to prevent through traffic along the KARLSRUEH-OFFENBURG line and the partially destroyed rail bridge over the Rhine at RUEDESHEIN (M 1553) undoubtedly causes a major disruption of rail routing into BAD KREUZNACH. This unserviceable bridge at RUEDESHEIN also accounts in all probability for the relatively light traffic seen throughout the northern portion of the SAAR-PALATINATE.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc #1 - The Rhine Bridges
Inc #2 - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

140

HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

:::::::::::::::::::::
:S E C R E T :
:By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: :
:Date: 10 March 1945:
:::::::::::::::::::::

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 25

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 10 MARCH 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The collapse of German forces in the north has left Army Group G the only higher echelon with units on the west bank of the Rhine River. The consideration which it should receive in the allocation of reinforcements in order to carry out the mission of holding the SAAR-PALATINATE is radically tempered by the dearth of reserves available, the demands of the REMAGEN bridgehead and the ominous threat to the RUHR and WESTPHALIA. Army Group G maintained a thinly manned line by the constant shuffling of its limited forces without even the possibility of reserves.

Army Group G will probably assume responsibility for all German forces in the SAAR-PALATINATE. Its mission will be to maintain the integrity of this command, with withdrawals carried out only on the threat of annihilation. The hasty commitment of 159 Volksgrenadier Division just south of KOBLENZ and the obviously rescue mission in the same area of 6 SS Mountain Division, immediately after completion of a similar role south of TRIER, points to the enemy's appreciation of the gravity of the situation along the Moselle. The strategic defensive position of Army Group G has been greatly jeopardized by the collapse of Seventh Army lines in the EIFFEL and the Siegfried positions in the First Army area will no longer be an asset but rather a liability if the Moselle River is crossed from the north because of the necessary immobility of fortress troops.

First German Army continues to decline progressively in regard to quality and quantity of troops under its command. 49 Volksgrenadier Division, which made a brief appearance one week ago, disappeared as surreptitiously as it had appeared. While 2 Mountain Division continues to hold successfully the pivot town of ZERF (L 2312) in the SIEGFRIED Line where it had gone as a stop gap formation, 6 SS Mountain Division continues its tour of the SAAR-PALATINATE. Upon its departure from the HARDT Mountains on 28 February, the division appeared on the right flank of 2 Mountain Division for a few days, but was later sent to hold the line on the Moselle River at CARDEN (L 6876).

The move of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division's Assault Gun Battalion from the divisional sector to the SAARBRUCKEN area in order to provide armour support against aggressive Allied actions has been characteristic of the patchwork solutions resorted to by the enemy to counteract local penetrations and undue pressure. Further manifestation of the enemy's anxiety was the alert reception which friendly patrols met in the area from the HARDT Mountains to the Rhine River.

Nineteenth German Army no longer poses the threat of an offensive action since five of its eight nominal divisions (2 Mtn, 16 VG, 159 VG, 189 VG and 338 Inf Divs) and 106 Panzer Brigade have departed from the Black Forest. 708 Volksgrenadier Division has also been destroyed by cannibalization by 198 and 416 Infantry Divisions. While the remaining two divisions (716 and 198 Inf Divs) remain unaccounted for, it is believed that 716 Infantry Division is also leaving the Black Forest for a more active sector of the front. Thus, with the increasing duties of Army Group G in the SAAR-PALATINATE, it appears unlikely that Nineteenth Army would be carried as a responsibility of Army Group G. The enemy obviously appreciates a defensive attitude by the Allies along the Upper Rhine River and hence would be giving a single Army Group commander the responsibility for coordinating two distinct types of operations.

b. Capabilities

The advance of Allied forces to the Rhine has even more completely restricted Army Group G to a strictly defensive capability. In the execution of this capability it can hold only temporarily on the Moselle and the SIEGFRIED Line because of the absolute dependency of these positions on each other for mutual support. The penetration of the one would leave the forces on the other in immediate danger of attack from the rear, if not of complete encirclement. In such an eventuality, the enemy must consider the saving of his troops of prime necessity, outweighing even the protection of the SAAR-PALATINATE. If he wishes to live to fight another day, the enemy must choose to fight and run away.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

2. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th US Army Group were as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), ST ARNUAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), HOTTVILLE (Q 7253), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence South along the Rhine to the Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The increasing threat in the TRIER area, the depleted condition of 416 Infantry and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions, the deteriorating condition on Seventh German Army front, compelled the First German Army to make further changes in its disposition in order to strengthen its right flank.

The 6 SS Mountain Division was committed south of TRIER on 6 March, between 2 Mountain and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions. However, at the end of the period the 2 Mountain Division was reported extending its sector to the north, while the 6 SS Mountain Division was being withdrawn to be recommitted probably in the Moselle area.

Remnants of the 245 Infantry Division were absorbed by 16 Volksgrenadier Division and Divisional as well as 935 Grenadier Regimental Staffs were withdrawn about 26 February to Germany presumably to complete the reformation of a new division.

Considering that the First Army is left without any major unit in immediate reserve, which is badly needed on account of the thinly held front lines, the 198 Infantry Division may move into the Saar-Palatinate as Army reserve.

6 SS Mountain Division "NORD" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) in First Army reserve last week, was committed on 6 March in the area south of TRIER, at which place 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regiments have been identified. The commitment of the division in that sector strengthened the depleted units on both flanks, (2 Mtn and 256 VG Divs) as its 3,200 combat infantry effectives are capable of a strong defense action. However, the deteriorating situation in the north induced the enemy to withdraw the division at the end of the period for commitment in an area more immediately threatened.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG:)

Due to the general state of flux of the divisions in this Corps area, it is difficult to establish precise divisional boundaires. The Corps holds a line from South-East of TRIER (L 2827) to North of MERZIG (L 1900). The disposition of divisions from north to south is as follows: 256 Volksgrenadier Division, 2 Mountain Division and 416 Infantry Division.

6 SS Mountain Division is believed to have withdrawn from the Corps zone to the north and east of its former positions. The failure to identify further elements of 49 Infantry Division in the corps area suggests that either additional divisional units are being kept in reserve or do not, in fact, exist.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) was forced to keep its remnants in line South-East of TRIER. 481 Volksgrenadier Regiment and several auxiliary units were identified on 6 March. The divisions combat infantry effectives amount to about 500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) proved itself aggressive despite its depleted ranks. Originally south of 6 SS Mountain Division, this division extended its sector to the north at the end of the period to provide for the withdrawal of 6 SS Mountain Division. The division staged several spirited counterattacks in the ZERF (L 2412) area. Combat infantry strength totals 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is being held in line despite its virtual annihilation. The division can be considered only in terms of remnants. Even with converted service troops, not more than 700 combat infantry effectives are believed to remain.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIELS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) continued to hold defenses from L 1900 to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). Contact during the week was very light; consequently new identifications are lacking. According to revised estimates received, division combat infantry strength is lowered to 2,000.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) stubbornly resisted all attacks in the FORBACH (Q 4066) area, but later in the period the division lost its toehold on the northern part of the town. Its present sector extends from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to Q 4168. Last identifications were: 860 Grenadier Regiment, 6 March at Q 3768; 861 Grenadier Regiment, 4 March at Q 3172 and Q 3966; 880 Grenadier Regiment, 6 March at Q 3768; 347 Fusilier and Replacement Battalion, 5 March at Q 4068; 347 Anti-Tank Battalion, 5 March at Q 3767; 347 Engineer Battalion, 4 March at Q 4167. Losses during recent engagements were considerable. Combat infantry strength now does not exceed 1,400. 400 is added for 12 Landesschuetzin Battalion and the newly committed Alarm Companies HAHN and HESSE.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) remained in its sector from north-east of FORBACH (Q 4168) to the Saar River at Q 4966. Identifications here were: I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4168 on 8 March; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4470 and Q 4168 on 4 March; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 26 February. I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment is operating under 1126 Regiment while the 1125 staff is said to be in the TRIER area, forming a new regiment March Battalion IX, totaling 300 men, arrived at SAARBRUCKEN 1 March. Though originally destined to become II Battalion 1125 Regiment, it was used as a general replacement unit for the division. No additional information was available this week concerning the utilization of Volkssturm personnel as reinforcements for this division. 559 Volksgrenadier put up a determined though costly defense for SAARBRUCKEN against our attacks on 3-4 March. Combat infantry effectives total 2,300 men including attached units.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) kept its old sector which extended from the Saar River (Q 4966) to Q 5560, while the division continued its defensive attitude, the following identifications were made: 73 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5165 on 6 March; 74 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5266 on 3 March; 119 Engineer Battalion at Q 5564 on 4 March; 19 Replacement Battalion at Q 4966 on 7 March; 59 Grenadier Regiment apparently has not yet been reconstituted in accordance with previously reported plans. 119 Labor Battalion, composed of 300 unreliable foreigners and their German guards, was attached to the Engineer Battalion. Several alarm companies, formed from the Division Combat Schools have been sent into line as Battle Group BEUTNER. Two companies of 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion were identified operating in 19 Division territory. Combat infantry aggregate, including the alarm units, is estimated at 1,300.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) made use of the quiet that prevailed in its zone (Q 5560 - Q 7354) to continue its reorganization and improvement of positions. Identifications made were: 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6157 and Q 6456 on 8 March; 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7256 on 5 March. A Battalion SACHS, composed of personnel drawn from the divisional services, was also contacted on 8 March at Q 5956. III Battalion 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment has been reformed. Prisoners mentioned that, in the absence of the Assault Gun Battalion (identified at Q 5065 on 4 March in 19 Division sector), amplifiers were used extensively to simulate the sounds of moving armour in the divisional area. Combat infantry strength is carried at 2,100. Indications were evident that increased anti-gas precautions are being taken.

(d) XC Corps (CG:)

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) has in addition command of units which were previously part of 245 Division and are now located on the right flank of its divisional sector. Consequently, the divisional area now extends from Q 7354 to Q 8036. Last identifications were as follows: 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7738 on 9 March; 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7541 on 9 March; 225 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7547 on 7 March; 16 Fusilier Battalion at Q 7540 on 6 March; Battle Group LUETZE (remnants 937 Grenadier Regiment) at Q 7451 on 6 March;

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and I Battalion 935 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7354 on 4 March. It appears that I Battalion 935 Grenadier Regiment and Battle Group LUETZE are all that remains of the 245 Volksgrenadier Division. The staffs of the division and its units, according to prisoners, have returned to Germany. Aside from controlling these remnants, 16 Division has made use of all available sources to rebuild its line units. In addition to the incorporated Battalion MORG from 905 Mobilization Division, remnants of 189 Volksgrenadier Division were also absorbed. This was confirmed by prisoners from 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment who stated that remnants of 1212, 1213, and 1214 Volksgrenadier Regiments made up II Battalion 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment and that only the staff and cadre of 189 Division went to the COLOGNE area. Other replacements came from service units, air force, and the navy. As a result, the divisional combat infantry strength was increased to 2,100 including attached units.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) spent a generally quiet week in the sector Q 8036 to Q 9027. Only identifications made during the period were as follows: 87 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8236 and 118 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8928 on 8 March and 165 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8434 on 4 March. Further disposition of the previously reported Replacement Regiment was indicated by the conversion of I Battalion into I Battalion 87 Grenadier Regiment. The disposition of II Battalion of the Replacement Regiment remains uncertain. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,000.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) extended slightly to the west and now holds from Q 9027 to immediately west of HAGUENAU (R 0224). There was no indication during the period that the division would move to the BITCHE area as was previously planned according to prisoners statements. Units identified were: 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9328 on 7 March; 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9825 on 8 March. 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 1 March. Losses suffered during the period were negligible and combat infantry effectives total 1,700.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) continued to hold the line from HAGUENAU (R 0224) to OBERHOFFEN (R 0920). Activity was practically at a stand still, resulting in a complete lack of identifications of organic units during the period. A prisoner of war taken on 2 March stated that 3-400 men remained in the Field Replacement Battalion. The integration of these men into the weakened regiments may be expected. I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment was again identified in the division zone on 6 March at R 0622. Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN are still accepted as attached to the division. Organic combat infantry strength is estimated at approximately 1,900, while attached units raise this figure to 2,300.

905 Mobilization Division (CG:) is responsible for the sector from R 0920 to the Rhine River. Regiment MARBACH was identified on 1 March east of OBERHOFFEN and a deserter from 51 German Air Force Battalion was taken at R 1222 on 9 March, suggesting the battalions presence in this area. Combat infantry strength estimate remains unchanged at 800 on line and 500 in reserve or in positions on the east bank of the Rhine.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

The critical situation that has beveloped on the Western Front north of the Moselle River during the past thirty days has siphoned all but two nominal divisions from the Nineteenth Army. Only 198 Infantry Division at RASTATT (R 3528) and 716 Infantry Division remain in BADEN.

106 Panzer Brigade was identified on 3 March in the vicinity of COLOGNE. However, its armour was not contacted. 708 Volksgrenadier Division is reported to have been cannibalized by 198 Infantry and 416 Infantry Divisions. 159 Volksgrenadier Division was contacted in the area north of the Moselle River at KAIL (L 6576).

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was identified on 10 March in the vicinity of KAIL (L 6576). Prisoners were taken from II Battalion 1210 Grenadier Regiment and a captured map established the existence of I Battalion. Prisoners of war also state that the remainder of the division was to follow from the neighborhood of the Swiss border. The division was last located in the FREIBURG - TUTTLINGEN area. Its combat infantry effectives are not very large.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN). Elements of the division have been absorbed by both 198 Infantry and 416 Infantry Divisions. Prisoners of war yielded by 416 Infantry Division stated that they were reinforcements from 748 Volksgrenadier Regiment. It appears that the staffs of the division have been left behind and are to be entrusted with the rehabilitation of the division at a later date.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM)

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) has moved to the vicinity of RASTATT (R 3524) from the area east of OFFENBURG (W 1585). Elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division are reported to have been absorbed by 198 Infantry Division. Combat infantry strength is tenatively estimated at 1,500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER). No new information regarding the divisions location has been received. Last carried in the KEHL (W 0596) region, its northward move is a distinct probability. Tentative estimate of combat effectives is 1,200.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

Its location and operational status remain unchanged.

c. DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. MAUR)

Status unchanged.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) continues to man defenses along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING). Due to complete lack of information over a period of more than a month the division is no longer carried in the Black Forest area.

805 Mobilization Division (CG:) is still responsible for SIEGFRIED positions along the Rhine north of BRISACH.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:). Controlling 7th Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN and other as yet unidentified units, is holding Rhine defenses north of LORRACH (A 9590) with headquarters in the vicinity of NEUENBERG (V 8713).

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No change.

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still carried at MUNSINGEN pending further clarification.

f. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Palatinate-Rhine Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve: Combat Infantry Effectives)	
Saar - Palatinate Front	17,000
Rhine Front	4,000
Reserves: (Estimated)	
Saar - Palatinate Front	- - - -
Black Forest	2-3,000
T O T A L	23-24,000
Artillery Guns:	
Saar - Palatinate	500
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Saar - Palatinate	125-135
Saar - Palatinate (Reserve)	55- 65
Rhine River Front	15- 20
T O T A L	195-220

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Information received indicates that the enemy has carefully executed a withdrawal of elements of 5 Mountain Division. It appears that the division staff and cadre remain in the area while the combat infantry strength of the division has been substantially withdrawn. Thus, the enemy has been able to drain personnel from the division for use elsewhere while maintaining German control over Italian units on the front. The 34 Infantry Division continues to hold the coastal sector with increased Italian support. The 8 Battery, 2 Artillery Regiment of the LITTORIO Division, in addition to the 2nd Separate Bersaglieri Battalion, have been identified as being under command of 34 Infantry Division.

b. General

Increased enemy activity in the high mountain areas has been permitted by improved weather conditions. Small raids by the enemy are to be expected for the purpose of creating a diversion and to increase his own prestige. No indications of general enemy withdrawal have been manifested.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The enemys anxiety was evidenced by the harassing patrols which he continued to send across to the west bank of the Rhine. The numerous patrols reported in the CHALAMPE (V 8513) - KEMBS (A 8398) region was indicative of his particular interest in friendly intentions in that area. Artillery fire was generally light with the STRASBOURG and CHALAMPE-KEMBS areas receiving the major part. However, on 9 March between 0445A and 0620A approximately 2000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell in the area between the Rhine and the MATTERWALD (R 1317). Enemy air activity was on a reduced scale during the period, however, four aircraft, including jet planes were reported in SELESTAT-STRASBOURG area on 4 March and seven jet planes were reported south of MULHOUSE on 5 March.

SAAR - PALATINATE FRONT

The German LXXXIX Corps in the Rhine Valley and the XC Corps in the HARDT Mountains maintained a defensive attitude, but friendly patrols found the enemy on the alert. Movements in the 16 Volksgrenadier Division sector on 3 March indicated continued regrouping while activity in the BITSCHHOFFEN (Q 9128) - GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234) area on 5 and 7 March pointed to local reliefs. Artillery and mortar fire, although generally light and scattered, increased somewhat in the HAGUENAU area on 4 March and in the HARDT on 5 March.

In the SAAR Valley, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 19 Infantry Division remained alert to attempted friendly penetrations. 559 Volksgrenadier and 347 Infantry Divisions offered stubborn opposition to renewed friendly attacks. After prolonged house to house fighting, FORBACH was finally cleared on 5 March. On the same day an estimated 1,200 French, Russian, and Polish prisoners were liberated from a stockade at STIRING WENDEL (Q 4166). Heavy fighting continued in STIRING WENDEL until 7 March when the factory section was cleared of enemy. To the west, the BOIS DE LA RESERVE (Q 3666) was cleared and 347 Infantry Division was forced slowly back to the East-West railroad in the FORET DE FORBACH. Here the enemy dug in and was resisting stubbornly at the end of the period.

ALPINE FRONT

Improved weather permitted increased enemy activity. Outposts were established on COL DE LA GALISE (H 67) and COL D'ARNAS (H 45). PETIT ST BERNARD (C 04) and MOUNT CENIS (H 45 regions were the scene of light infantry activity and occassional artillery and mortar fire. According to reports, an armoured train equipped with twelve 155 mm

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

guns was located in the SAN REMO (T 0089) tunnel, for the purpose of laying down heavy artillery fire on MENTON (S 78). However, these preparations were interrupted on 5 March when the tunnel was bombed by friendly aircraft causing an explosion heard twenty miles away.

ATLANTIC FRONT

In the LA ROCHELLE pocket on 3 March one company of enemy attempted an infiltration between friendly outposts at VENDOME 'T 4748) and COSSE (T 4549). Some movement of infantry and artillery toward THAIRE (T 4225) and AIGREFEUILLE (T 4729) on 4 March lent credence to prevalent rumors of enemy action. However, no action resulted. Following the 2 March attack south of MONTALIVET (Y 2747) in the GRAVE pocket, the enemy withdrew and friendly forces reoccupied old positions. Occasional exchanges of artillery fire and minor patrols characterize the activity of the period.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A Tactical Reconnaissance

Visual reconnaissance was greatly hampered throughout the current period by unusually bad flying weather. Only on 3 and 9 March was cover available, and even then it was by no means complete. Movements seen in the Saar on 3 March appeared to be a continuation of the activity noted in the PIRMASENS area during the latter half of the previous week and were probably connected with the move of 6 SS Mountain Division from the BITCHE area to ZERF (L 2413) where its units were identified on 6 March. On 3 March much activity was also observed along the FREIBURG-OFFENBURG line and marshalling yards at MAHLBERG (W 0666), LAHR (W 1072) and OFFENBURG appeared active.

Observations made on 9 March showed several hundred loaded motor transport moving north and east in the AUSSEN (Q 3696) area northwest of NEUNKIRCHEN. Some light motor transport activity moving south was seen between BAD DURKHEIM and LANDAU and several loaded flats were sighted in the vicinity of LANDAU. East of the Rhine, five stationary trains totaling 150 flats loaded with motor transport and guns were seen along the FREIBURG - KARLSRUHE - PFORZHEIM line. In the KARLSRUHE marshalling yards, four trains were seen facing north and three east. Much rail activity was reported in the STUTTGART area.

On both 3 and 9 March pontoon bridging activities were observed along the Rhine between DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) and KARLSRUHE suggesting that preparations are underway to make more crossing sites available in this sector. More complete and recent information also reveals that numerous additional ferries are now in operation all along the Rhine. Exact location of these crossing is shown in Inclosure # 1.

B Status of Communications

Poor operational weather afforded the Germans an excellent opportunity to repair damage to rail lines and installations during the past week. Intermittent coverage revealed that facilities had been sufficiently repaired to permit the movement of through traffic on some of the more important lines recently cut. Repairs to the WORMS and BAD MUNSTER rail bridges likewise succeeded in opening additional lines to through traffic.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES
#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
#2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

1200/MAR 45/6AG 6062

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP Hq



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 10 1200 A MARCH

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #25

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 17 March 1945

110

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 26

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 17 MARCH 1945

D-4

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The time remaining to Army Group G for its tenure in the SAAR-PALATINATE is rapidly diminishing as a result of the deep penetrations southward from the MOSELLE River to east of BAD KREUZNACH and to BINGEN. The present rate of reinforcements, without hope for any increase, can merely delay the debacle. Threatened breaches in the line will of necessity be reinforced by drawing on the limited available local reserves. The gathering and preservation of manpower along the Western Front must certainly be of the highest priority. A coordinated defense of the east bank of the Rhine River, south of MAINZ, will depend upon the ability of Army Group G to extricate itself from its present predicament.

Army Group G has the unenviable task of supervising two faltering armies, the German Seventh and First. The ability of SS General HAUSSER to maintain his forces intact will receive as supreme a test in the SAAR-PALATINATE as he experienced in the ARGENTAN-FALAISE pocket last summer. The present period has witnessed a transfer of forces from the south, placing more dependence on the SIEGFRIED Line, and the commitment of one of his reserve units in the BAD KREUZNACH area where the obvious mission is to block the drive of U.S. Armored Divisions from cutting his lines of communication far to the rear. The importance of holding our effort in this area in order to protect RHINE crossings must be weighed against the threat existing in the TRIER-MERZIG area, where a concerted Allied effort might very well roll up the MOSELLE River line and outflank the HUNSRUCK Hills.

The Seventh German Army had its right flank pierced to BINGEN-BAD KREUZNACH without having the opportunity to reorganize its forces already badly battered in the EIFEL. Its mission to cover the right flank of First Army appears to be almost beyond possibility of fulfillment. The paucity of troops available was clearly demonstrated by the hasty dispatch of 198 and 559 Infantry Divisions to BAD KREUZNACH in a blocking role. This disposition will offer only a temporary respite as the entire gap created is not possible of cover with forces available. Indication that the enemy failed to appreciate US intentions or strength was illustrated by the sending of 12 SS Mountain Regiment of 6 SS Mountain Division from the DIEBLICH (L 8190) area to the SCHEIDEN (L 2507) area.

The First German Army made obvious its lack of depth at the close of the period by withdrawing its main position into the SIEGFRIED Line. Its mission will be to maintain a secure left flank on the SIEGFRIED Line in order to preserve crossing sites for possible withdrawals across the river. The withdrawal of 559 Infantry Division from east of SAARBRUCKEN into temporary Army or Army Group reserve further weakened its front. The responsibility for the defense of the SIEGFRIED Line between SAARLAUTERN and ZWEIBRUCKEN is known to have been sectionally allocated to divisions presently in the area. The assistance possible to First Army by Fortress and Volkssturm units is confined to those troops already in the positions. The critical situation developing on its right flank compelled not only the commitment of local reserves but also required aid from its neighbor.

The Nineteenth German Army was reduced to absolute impotence as its last remaining combat division, 198 Infantry, departed on 16 March for the battle area.

b. Capabilities

In the SAAR-PALATINATE the capabilities of the enemy were further restricted by the advance of US forces to the BAD KREUZNACH area. The major question facing the enemy is still the method by which he may get fullest use of the limited forces remaining at his disposal.

The enemy may attempt to establish a defensive line approximately southwest from the bend of the RHINE to the SIEGFRIED Line. A position south from BINGEN along the NAHE River to the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN would have been most favored by terrain, with the north flank dropping gradually south between the MOSELLE and the HUNSRUCK under Allied pressure. The loss of BAD KREUZNACH will force the enemy to anchor the northern flank further south on the RHINE, near WORMS if possible, shortening the base of the defensive triangle. In any case, the road net from KAISERSLAUTERN to the RHINE must be protected as the final avenue for escape.

Execution of this capability will necessarily depend on the enemy's ability to hold his lines. Troops must be spared from the west wall positions in order to strengthen the north flank and the junction of it to the SIEGFRIED Line. There is no doubt that the enemy will eventually be forced across the RHINE, if only because of his inability to reinforce present positions. General HAUSSER can decide only how many Germans he wished to leave in our hands west of the RHINE.

L-3711

SECRET
SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3673), South Bank of SAAR River to BREBACH (Q 4969), BISCHHISHEIM (Q 5169), REICHHEIM (Q 6060), DIETRION (Q 7766), Camp de BITCHE (Q 8051), MOUTERHOUSE (Q 7943), PHILIPPSBOURG (Q 8743), GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234), HAGENAU (R 0424), SCHIRRHOFFEN (R 1423), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence South along the Rhine to the SWISS BORDER.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS GEN HAUSSER)

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) previously located in the RASTATT area (R 3524), was identified West of BAD KREUZNACH (M 0834) on 16 March. Prisoners stated they had come from the KARLSRUHE area where the division absorbed remnants of 716 Infantry Division. Having had over a month in which to recuperate from its last engagement, the division should be in fair shape by German standards. Its planned reorganization according to the Infantry Division 1945 pattern and its absorption of elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division have been previously mentioned. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 2,000.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN), last identified in its old sector South of SAARBRUCKEN on 12 March, was withdrawn on 14 March and its sector shared by the adjoining 347 and 19 Infantry Divisions. What mission the German Command had envisaged for the division has not been established. In any case, the Allied breakthrough South of the Moselle River forced its commitment South of BAD KREUZNACH at M 0834 on 16 March. Organic combat infantry effectives totalled 1,800.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FELBER)

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) was not contacted after its withdrawal south of the Moselle. According to an unconfirmed report, a single prisoner (possibly a straggler) was taken in the REMAGEN bridgehead on 16 March. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1500, supported by approximately 10 tanks.

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Gen der Inf BAYER)

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) brought one regiment South from the vic L 3342 to consolidate its remnants in defense of RIOL (L 3233). Identifications were: 208 Grenadier Regiment on 11 March at L 2946, 12 March at L 2828, 226 Grenadier Regiment on 15 March at L 3233. Combat infantry elements do not number more than 750.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: SENSFUSS) was untouched in the clearing of the COCHEM pocket. The division was last identified in position in the area near NEUNAGEN (L 3040) but no identifications were made during this period. It is estimated that 1400 combat infantry effectives still remain.

560 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: BADER) is in the area near BERNKASTEL (L 5348). Indications are that the division was forced to form into battle groups of approximately 100 men each. The only identification made during the period was that of 1130 Grenadier Regiment on 11 March near L 5348. Combat infantry effectives are carried at 500.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KOLB) has not been contacted since 7 March and is located South of the MOSELLE. A new 36 VOLKSGRENADIER REGIMENT was being formed at WILDFLECKEN (N 59) on 9 March, while remnants of 352 Infantry Division were used to bolster the other regiments. Some replacements were picked up from 2 Panzer Division. The division is believed to have a combat infantry strength of 1000 effectives.

246 Infantry Division (CG: KUEHNE) was retreating East toward the MOSELLE when contacted on 12 March. Identifications include: 404 Grenadier Regiment at L 3765 on 11 March; 352 Grenadier Regiment at L 4450 on 12 March. Its combat infantry effectives total 1400.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) XIII Corps (CG: Gen Lt GRAF von ORIOLA)

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen BUERCKY) attempted to hold a line extending along the South bank of the MOSELLE from BURGEN (L 7578) to COCHEM (L 5872). Identifications were 1210 Volksgrenadier Regiment at L 6976 on 11 March; 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiment at L 7280 on 11 March, vic L 7781 on 12 March, at L 7678 on 13 March. Ineffective in its defense, the division has been pocketed by our drives across the river and by the westward expansion of our armored spearhead. Average battalion strength was said to be 250 on 13 March. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 900.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: Maj Gen BRENNER) heralded by elements of 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion moved both its regiments to the area East of BRODENBACH (L 7981) about 11 March from vic L 2828. Our attack South of TRIER caused a change of plans and 12 SS Mountain Regiment returned South to SCHEIDEN (L 2705) on 14 March. 11 SS Mountain Regiment was left only to be swept aside by our armored drive. Identifications in the Northern sector were: 11 SS Mountain Regiment at L 8580 and L 8281. Remnants of combat infantry effectives left in this area total approximately 800.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt Gen OBSTFELDER)

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG:)

General HAHM was relieved of his command by Gen HAUSSER personally and an SS officer is stated to have taken his place. The Corps continued to hold a sector from East of TRIER (L 2827) to North of MERZIG (L 1900). The disposition of its divisions remained substantially unchanged with remnants of 256 Volksgrenadier Division holding the northern sector, 2 Mountain Division the central and remnants of 416 Infantry Division the Southern portion of the sector. Toward the end of the period 12 SS Mountain Regt of 6 SS Mountain Division was identified in support of the impotent 416 Infantry Division.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen FRANZ) consolidated its remnants into several small battle groups that lack any semblance to a divisional organization. They were supported by some small, static units. This conglomeration managed to put up a fair defense against Allied attacks. Combat infantry strength of divisional remnants does not exceed 500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig Gen UTZ) weakened by several abortive counterattacks without sufficient heavy weapon support, was forced to give way to continued pressure in the SCHWARZWALDER HOCHWALD region. Both organic regiments were identified on 13 March. Combat infantry effectives total 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj Gen PFLIEGER) was also forced to withdraw its much battered remnants. An indication as to the importance the enemy attached to the divisional area (North of MERZIG) is gleaned from the fact that both 12 SS Mountain Regiment of 6 SS Mountain Division and at least one battalion (III Bn 38 SS PGR) of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were committed in the SCHEIDEN (L 2705) area. Remainder of 416 Infantry Division is estimated at 600 combat infantry effectives. Attachments increase the total to 2000.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt Gen KNIESS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig Gen GAEDE) was more fortunate than the division on its flank. Protected by strong SIEGFRIED defenses on the East bank of the SAAR, the division remained in only loose contact. The identification of 719 Field Replacement Battalion at R 3075 on 13 March suggests that the division was obliged to extend its sector to the South and now holds from L 1900 to VOLKLINGEN (Q 3175). Combat infantry strength is 2,000.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj Gen TRIERENBERG) had to extend its sector to the East, taking over some of the area vacated by 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 347 Division withdrew to SIEGFRIED Line positions along the north bank of the SAAR, abandoning its bridgehead South of that river. The sector now extends from VOLKLINGEN (Q 3175) through SAARBRUCKEN (Q 4770). 860, 861, 880 Grenadier Regiments,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

347 Artillery Regiment, and 347 Engineer Battalion were identified in this area on 14 and 15 March. The organic combat infantry strength total of 1,300 is raised to 1,600 by attachment of 12 LANDESSCHUETZEN Battalion.

(c) XIII Corps (CG: Maj Gen MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig Gen BRITZELMAYR) expanded to the West to take over responsibility for the Eastern portion of the sector vacated by 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 19 Infantry Division now holds from exclusive SAARBRUCKEN (Q 4770) to Q 5862. The division is in poor shape and was unable to prevent one penetration to the SIEGFRIED Line at Q 5471 on 16 March. On 15 March, 73 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 5067 and Q 5166; 74 Grenadier Regiment, 119 Anti-Tank and Engineer Battalions at Q 5364; 719 Artillery Regiment at Q 5266. 59 Grenadier Regiment has not been contacted since its destruction on 23 February. Elements of 18 Werfer Brigade are operating in the divisional area as 21 Werfer Regiment was met at Q 5567 on 15 March. 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion, previously reported as operating under 19 Division, has returned to its parent unit. Though 200 replacements were received from the division combat school on 12 March, combat infantry effectives do not total more than 1,200.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col KLINGENBERG) put up a determined defense but had to withdraw slightly under strong pressure. It now holds from Q 5862 to Q 7559. Last identifications (15 March) were: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6457 and Q 6956; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6556; 17 SS Engineer Battalion at Q 5957; 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion at Q 5661; 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion at Q 6858. III Battalion 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was contacted at SCHEIDEN (L 2705) on 14 March, indicating that the enemy failed to appreciate our intentions. It appears that Volkstrum men were used to release some divisional service personnel for combat duty. This expedient raised division combat strength by about 300. However, recent losses and the detachment of one battalion effected a reduction of overall strength to 1,900 combat infantry effectives.

(d) XC Corps (CG:)

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) put up only spotty resistance against our attack and was unable to prevent the capture of BITCHE. The division is responsible for the line from Q 7559 to Q 8442. On 15 March the following identifications were made: 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 8037, 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7441, 225 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7549. 16 Fusilier Battalion was contacted at Q 7842 on 16 March. The attached I Battalion of 935 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified at Q 7467 on 17 March. Casualties lowered the divisional combat infantry strength to 1,900 including the two attached battalions formerly part of 245 Infantry Division.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen WELLM) proved to be thinly spread in its sector from Q 8442 to Q 9133. Resistance was scattered and fairly light. The following identifications were made on 15 March: 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 268 Artillery Regiment, and 36 Engineer Battalion at Q 8830; 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 8536. It was determined during the period that II Battalion 36 Replacement Regiment, the disposition of which had been vague, was absorbed by 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Allowing for casualties, present combat infantry strength is 1,800.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt Gen HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj Gen BORK) was taken by surprise by our recent attack. I Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment was captured intact and their reaction to the attack was generally confused. At week's end the division held from Q 9133 to R 0224. Last identifications, made on 15 March, were: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9229, 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9527, 47 Fusilier Battalion and 147 Anti-Tank Battalion at Q 8929. The identification of the Fusilier Battalion is of particular interest inasmuch as it points to reorganization of the division in accordance with the Table of Organization for the Infantry Division 1945. Deducting known losses, combat infantry effectives total 1,500.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen SEIDEL) resisted with determination and gave ground only under strong pressure in its sector from R 0224 to R 1423. Identifications made on 15 March were: 466 and 477 Volksgrenadier Regiments and 257 Artillery Regiment at R 0920. 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 257 Fusilier Company at R 0420; I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment (attached) at R 0623. Combat infantry strength now amounts to 1,800 including 200 for attachments.

905 Mobilization Division (CG:) now holds the sector from R 1423 to the Rhine. Contact in this area was generally light and the only identification made during the period was of 905 Fusilier Company at R 0920 on 15 March. The constitution of such an organic auxiliary unit may be a forerunner to an upgrading of the division as in the case of 405 Reserve Division. Combat infantry strength is still carried at 800 on line and 500 along the East bank of the RHINE or in reserve.

(3) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt Gen RASP)

By this time Nineteenth Army has lost all the major units under its command while in the COLMAR Pocket. It may very well be that the Army staff remains in the Black Forest to assume operational command of the units along the RHINE in the event of an Allied crossing, thus complementing the OBERRHEIN Defense Command's administrative functions. In any case, it is obviously an Army staff which C in C West has in reserve, whose ultimate disposition is not yet clear.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col HAFNER), last reported in the KEHL (W 0596) area, was stated by prisoners of 198 Infantry Division to have been absorbed by that division. Though the division's rehabilitation in the future is a possibility, it can be written off for the present.

(a) LXIV Corps (Lt Gen THUMM)

The Corps continues to be responsible for a portion of the SIEGFRIED Line in the STRASBOURG area.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt Gen REINEFARTH)

No change in status or location.

(4) DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt Gen MAUR)

No Change Reported.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj Gen SEEGER) remains in positions along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig Gen von OPPEN). Prisoner of war statement that General von OPPEN commands this division confirms previous indications that the division was identical with the Divisional Group "NEUF BRISACH". 291 Penal Battalion (zbV) was identified in the divisional sector, but its relation to the division is not known.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:) remains North of LORRACH (A 9590) controlling 7 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN and some still unidentified units.

(5). Twenty- Fourth Army (CG: SS Lt Gen HANS SCHMIDT)

No change reported.

(6) 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still carried at MUNSINGEN. There has been no recent identifications or confirmation of its location.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(7) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th ARMY GROUP (SAAR-PALATINATE-RHINE Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve:
Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar - Palatinate Front	
First Army	12.500
Seventh Army	13,500
Rhine Front	4,000
	30,000
Reserves: (Estimated)	
Saar-Palatinate	- - -
Black Forest	1,000 - 1,500
TOTAL	31,000 - 31,500
Artillery Guns:	
Saar-Palatinate	950
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Saar - Palatinate	135 - 155
Saar - Palatinate (Reserve)	35 - 45
Rhine River Front	10 - 10
TOTAL	180 - 210

3. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions.

Italians units, interspersed with the remaining elements of 5 Mountain Division, now man the bulk of the positions on the front. Of the German units, 100 Mountain Regiment Elements are confirmed in positions at MONT CENIS (H 4565), and BARDONNECHIA (K 8418). A new replacement battalion has been added to the forces of 85 Mountain Regiment East of AIGUILLES (H 4603). Prisoners of war state that the entire LITTORIO Division has been accounted for holding positions along a sector of the front. In the coastal sector, 34 Infantry is still in control. However, 80 Infantry Regiment has not yet returned from its Anti-Partisan activities North of IMPERIA. A possible indication of some future movement from the area was the observation of large numbers of stationary railroad cars on sidings between CUNEO (N 8655) and BRA (O 1485), early in the period.

b. General

The increase in the number of patrols and attempts at ambushing friendly patrols in the Northern sector confirms the enemy's extreme anxiety concerning our present activities and future intentions. This anxiety was also shown earlier in the period in the Southern sector of the Alpine Front. There are as yet no definite indications of German withdrawals from the Franco-Italian border.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The enemy continued his nuisance raids over the RHINE River without any greater success than he experienced in the past period. Early in the period, a minor enemy infiltration was repulsed in the WANTZENAU (R 0706) area. Of particular interest was the area near W 0489 where a series of enemy landing attempts were frustrated on March 11 after he had previously tried to put patrols across the river just south

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of that point. Artillery fire was generally light and scattered throughout the period.

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

During the period preceding the Allied attack on 15 March, the enemy demonstrated no particular activity. Friendly patrols encountered a normally alert enemy all along the line. West of the HARDT Mountains, several enemy patrols averaging about 25 men in strength were easily repulsed without their having accomplished any positive results. However, the enemy's main anxiety was obviously in the HAGUENAU area, where our patrols met intense all weapons fire.

On 12 March, an Allied limited objective attack to enlarge the MODER bridgehead caused immediate reaction with a relatively strong but unsuccesaful counterattack coming on the night of 13 March. Still appreciating the major Allied threat to us in the HAGUENAU area, a gradual withdrawal was effected west of the HARDT under cover of heavily mined terrain and continuous sniper fire. 559 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 17 SS Division were released from their positions on the line.

The Allied attack beginning early on 15 March evidently achieved complete tactical surprise. Light to moderate resistance, spotty contact, and numerous thick mine fields canalizing friendly maneuver characterized the opening phase. Our secondary attack met determined resistance, as had been expected, in the CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN (R 0821) area while 257 Division fought a house-to-house retreat in HAGUENAU. After having been initially driven back, both 47 and 36 Divisions rallied to counterattack unsuccessfully with armor in support. BITCHE was bypassed on the north and subsequently entered without opposition, as 16 Division withdrew. 17 SS Division, which was engaged in releasing some units from the line, was able to offer only light resistance before it retreated to its prepared positions. Its Assault Gun battalion continued to carry out its general support role by covering forward positions during the withdrawal, with strong effort at WEISKIRCH (Q 7157) and VOLMUNSTER (Q 7259).

Between the valley of the BLIES and SAARBRUCKEN, Allied tactical surprise was counterbalanced by strongly prepared defensive positions, based on towns and strongpoints screened by extensive minefields. The initial impetus of the attack was absorbed only at the cost of sacrificing the enemy garrisons obviously left to cushion the blow, while the bulk of the enemy forces sought the protection of the SIEGFRIED Line.

At the close of the period, all indications pointed to a general withdrawal all along the line into the WestWall. Artillery fire became sporadic as both air reconnaissance and prisoners reported enemy columns moving hastily back. By noon of 17 March, enemy opposition was apparently disintegrating and the outer defenses of the SIEGFRIED Line were already being penetrated.

ALPINE FRONT

The enemy was particularly active in the northern and central sectors. Friendly patrols were ambushed near BRIANCON (P 3998) and LANSLEBOURG (Z 5241). At MONT BLANC (C 4723) and PETIT ST. BERNARD (C 4500) enemy groups were observed working on defenses. Artillery fire was only scattered in the coastal area. Otherwise the usual quiet prevailed along the entire front.

ATLANTIC FRONT

Enemy patrols were normally active in the La ROCHELLE zone. One unsuccessful attempt was made to encircle a friendly OP East of LA PREUILLE (T 4724). Some concentrations of troops, and supplies, were reported in areas T 3844 - 4538. At ROYAN light machine gun fire was received in the vicinity of Y 4772 and enemy artillery was reported in the area of Y 4773. Some water activity was noted for on 14 March an enemy boat approached CHAPUS (T 2901) and fired several volleys. In addition an enemy tug towing a barge was attacked northwest of ILE D'AIX by a friendly ship which forced the abandonment and capture of the barge.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Movements consisted of heavy traffic in the ST. VIVIEN (Y 3653) vicinity and foot troops moving in the area of Y 3751. In addition, some enemy traffic between PANISSAS Y 3751 and GAYAC was observed on 14 March.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Observations during the period were facilitated by excellent weather and extensive cover. Rail movement within the Black Forest area and in the Saar Palatinate were on a small scale. However, moderate to heavy activity was observed in the eastern Rhine Valley and on the rail lines, MOSBACH (0385) - STUTTGART. Much road activity was seen in the areas STUTTGART - KARLSRUHE - RASTATT - OFFENBURG - FREUDENSTADT, and in the SAAR - PALATINATE.

On 14 March, 21 scattered trains were seen throughout the Black Forest moving in all directions. There were also moderately heavy loadings in the FREIBURG marshalling yards on the same day. On 14, 15, and 16 March a total of four large vehicular convoys and groups of horse drawn transport were observed moving in a northward direction from the area RASTATT - OFFENBURG - FREUDENSTADT. This indicated that a possible major military move was under way from this region.

There was a military train reported at PFORZHEIM on 10 March and another on 15 March. In addition, some 90 flats loaded with motor transport or tanks were observed in the DURLACH (R 5345) area. Fufther to the north limited military activity was reported at HEIDELBERG and DARMSTADT. The moderately heavy rail activity observed on the north-south line through HEILBRONN revealed limited military activity with one military train sighted at LUDWIGSBURG on 15 March. The trend of traffic on this line was north in the direction of ASCHAFFENBURG.

Except for the 3 loaded military rakes observed in the ST WENDEL area on 13 March, military rail activity in the SAAR - PALATINATE was negligible throughout the period. An accumulation of rolling stock was noted in the western Rhine Valley on 16 March, especially in the yards at LANDAU, NEUSTADT, and EDENKOBEN (R 2877). In direct contrast to the rail movement, the road activity was very pronounced throughout the period. There were strong indications of enemy withdrawals to points north of the SIEGFRIED Line on 13 - 16 March inclusive, and it appeared that the movements from SAARLAUTERN - PIRMASENS areas had ZWEIBRUCKEN as their focal point. On 16 March, a 300 vehicle convoy was moving East from BINGEN just prior to the arrival of US forces on the NAHE River. There was also a trend of vehicular movement towards crossings of the Rhine River from area LANDAU - BAD DURKHEIM on the same day.

Pontoon and ferry activity continue along the Rhine between DRUSENHEIM and KARLSRUHE and reports of 16 March show that many of the bridges and crossings along the river are protected by an increased number of barrage balloons.

B. Status of Communications

The Third Army's sudden drive to BAD MUNSTER has cut off the north-south line from KAISERSLAUTERN to BINGEN and in addition threatens the route from KAISERSLAUTERN to WORMS. With the one RUDESHEIM rail bridge unserviceable, it is evident that the enemy's communications net in this area has received a telling blow. At the present time it appears that the east-west line from NEUNKIRCHEN through KAISERSLAUTERN is the only main line left to the enemy in the SAAR. However, previous bombings throughout this area have so weakened the lines and taxed the repair facilities of the Germans that it is extremely difficult for the enemy to repair the lines properly in order to move trains along the lines still remaining in his hands in the Saar. East of the Rhine, persistent cutting of lines leading from KARLSRUHE continues to slow down the movement of trains along the Rhine Valley.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-2.

INCLOSURES
#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
#2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

+200/MAR 45/6AG 6070

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP APO



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 km.

.200/MAR 45/6AG 6069

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 171200A MARCH

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #26

SECRET

SECRET

P 252

HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 24 March 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 27

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 MARCH 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation.

Army Group G has been reduced to merely an expression as a result of its complete and overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE. The process of destruction of Army Group G started with the annihilation of Nineteenth Army in the VOSGES Pocket. The forced assumption of supervision of Seventh Army early in March failed to infuse the Army Group with sufficient revitalizing strength to avoid its present fate. The beaten enemy has been almost completely evicted from west of the Rhine with losses estimated to have exceeded 75% of the combat effectives and approximately 50% of the total military personnel initially located in the area prior to the attack. His losses in tanks, guns, equipment and supplies were at a proportionate level. In addition, strategic territory has been yielded by the enemy.

Army Group G under SS General HAUSSER can hardly hope to gain new recuperative powers or changes in obvious missions. The right flank of the Army Group borders Fifteenth Army's flank on the Lahn River, with its left flank extending to the vicinity of KARLSRUHE. Its primary mission of defending this long stretch of the Rhine River was already made dubious of accomplishment as a result of a successful Allied crossing north of GERNSHEIM (M 5430). Its main effort will now be to contain this new breach. Enemy forces available for this task are insufficient in numbers and are presently in a greatly disorganized state. The arrival of divisional units will not be numerous or immediate as a strategic threat of large proportions exist in the REMAGEN bridgehead area and the crossings of the Lower Rhine in vicinity of WESEL will of necessity have priorities exceeding those in our area. Unit reinforcements will continue to be piecemeal and will be ineffectual.

Seventh German Army during the previous period had its right flank pierced by a rapid US armoured thrust. During the present period a swift exploitation of the above success, plus the collapse of First Army's flank, resulted in the reduction of the army to a few remnants retreating over the Rhine into the area of WIESBADEN. The army will be hard pressed to maintain the right flank of the Army Group even on the River line for only remnants of 6 SS Mountain and 198 Infantry Divisions known to have crossed the river between BINGEN and MAINZ. Additional bits and pieces no doubt escaped, but they are not large and cannot hope to be a coordinated force for some days. To say that the army has a mission would only serve to color its title. Its capabilities are restricted to either total destruction or further withdrawal into the province of HESSE.

The First German Army has a new commander, Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH. He was formerly Chief of Staff of Army Group F in the BALKANS. The army successfully withdrew into the SIEGFRIED Line and maintained a firm left flank hinged on the Rhine River until the very end. However, the failure of its right flank to hold out sealed not only the doom of Seventh Army but also allowed the SIEGFRIED Line to be rolled up from the rear. What remains of the army is merely a shell. The army cannot hope to be revived by replacements from the interior of Germany. Its resuscitation can be only at the expense of divisions from other fronts.

The Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth German Armies continue their defensive roles in BADEN and along the Swiss border respectively.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to withdraw into the interior of Germany before our advancing forces.

He is faced with the task of containing simultaneously several bridgeheads. In our area, he must specifically prevent the Allies from outflanking the ODENWALD and seizing the FRANKFURT area in order to block the southern approaches to KASSEL. The disorganized state of his troops and the insufficiency of presently available reinforcements do not permit listing this as an enemy capability. Reinforcements of sufficient strength and quality for such a possibility could be drawn only from another front or from NORWAY. In neither case could they arrive in time.

The bulk of the defeated remnants evacuated from the SAAR-PALATINATE may most probably be deployed between MAINZ and MANNHEIM in the hope of delaying the fall of DARMSTADT and protecting the road to KASSEL. Since the SIEGFRIED Line extends to the vicinity of GERMERSHEIM and there is not so imminent a threat to the KARLSRUHE area, it would be logical to extend the responsibility of Nineteenth Army as far north as MANNHEIM. In such case, Nineteenth Army could use its partially prepared static forces to receive the remanants of First Army and join in the defense of the river lines to the east in the direction of the Allied advance.

In any case, the initiative is entirely in the hands of the Allies. The enemy can only try, and without hope of eventual success, to delay the final surrender.

2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: along the Rhine River from KOBLENZ (L 8895) to LUDWIGSHAVEN (R 5296) thence to SPEYER (R 5180), IGGELHEIM (R 4385), FRIESBACH (R 3976), LINGENFELD (R 4572), KUHARDT (R 4360), LEIMERSHEIM (R 4458), SCHAIDT (R 2551), NEUBURG (R 3743), thence elsewhere along the Rhine River to the Swiss Border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(Since the correct alignment of Corps and Divisions are unknown at the present time, for the sake of convenience these units are listed according to their last known subordination.)

Seventh and First German Armies have very likely taken over jurisdiction of areas east of the Rhine opposite their former sectors. Of the Corps, LXXXIX Corps is reported as north of MAINZ, while XC Corps still controls 905 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier and the RAESSLER Divisions in the area GERMERSHEIM-KARLSRUHE. Unlocated Corps include: XIII, XIII SS, LXXX, LXXXII, and LXXXV. The divisions listed below have suffered extremely heavy casualties and for all practical purposes must be be considered destroyed.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) was destroyed during the period in the SAAR-PALATINATE, seven weeks after having suffered a similar fate in the VOSGES Pocket. Over 1,000 prisoners had been taken by 17 March. When the division was last contacted at KASTEL (L 4407), its disorganized remnants were fighting in alarm companies that did not total more then 300 combat infantry effectives.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KOLB) was used to cover withdrawals over the Moselle at the beginning of the period at ZELL (L 6158). Remnants were last contacted at L 8725 and L 7731 on 20 March. During the last days, the end came to the division. However, a new 36 Volksgrenadier Regiment is known to be reforming at WILDFLECKEN and may soon reappear east of the Rhine.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. HOBE) was last contacted attempting to salvage at least 1,000 men by permitting small groups to infiltrate toward the Rhine from the area of KRIEBSFELD (M 1323). Much of 212 Grenadier Regimant had been caught on the run from L 7113 to L 7621 on 19 March, while 226 Grenadier Regiment may have gotten remnants across in the vicinity of SPEYER. Of its total of 2,000 on 15 March, not more than 300 combat infantry effectives remain.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was swept to the southwest by our armored drive. Elements were scattered between BAD KREUZNACH and WORMS on 20 March. Few remnants of its 1,500 (16 March) men could have escaped over the Rhine. Combat infantry effectives number approximately 300.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was thoroughly destroyed when fallen upon by Allied troops near SIENHACHENBACH (L 8122). Upon learning that escape routes to the Rhine could not be found, commanding General (Gen. SENSFUSS) shot himself. Remnants of the division amount to 200 combat infantry effectives.

246 Infantry Division (CG: KUEHNE) elements of this division were last identified in the vicinity of L 7731 near KIRNON 20 March. Not more than scattered remnants are believed to have survived.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) tried to forestall the inevitable by staging a counterattack in its sector east of TRIER at the beginning of the period. Results of the attack were disasterous as artillery preparation and heavy weapons support were totally inadequate. The division resorted to the drafting of Volkssturm to fill in gaps, but these too, were insufficient. Last contact with all major units was on 20 March in area L 7626 - L 8516. Not more then 300 combat infantry effectives are believed to have escaped across the Rhine.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) drafted Volkssturm men to fill some of the ranks in its sadly depleted units. Ultimately this expedient proved to be of no avail. What remained of the division was badly mauled in the Allied breakthrough to ST WENDEL. Stragglers were picked up in the NEUSTADT area on 22 March. No effective combat infantry strength is believed left among remnants which escaped across the Rhine.

560 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) the division headquarters was overrun on 17 March. PW's state that the unit yielded its last 150 men to 3?? Infantry Division on 8 March. However, the last remnants were destroyed in a pocket west of WORMS on 21 March.

(1) Seventh ~~German~~ Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FELBER)

The subsequent exploitation of the US breakthrough to BAD KREUZNACH during the previous period and the collapse of LXXXII Corps early in the week created a void on the left flank of First German Army whereby the annihilation of this army was made certain. LXXXIX Corps had transferred to Seventh Army about 13/14 March but it was eventually withdrawn to the east bank of the Rhine between KOBLENZ and MAINZ where it is presently located. XIII and LXXX Corps were located along the Moselle River prior to their forced withdrawal. Reinforcements plus cadres from the ~~remnants of escaped divisions~~ can contribute little to Seventh Army's strength.

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) began its attempt to stem the flood of Allied armor with a four hour fight at BAD KREUZNACH (M 0938) on 18 March, where elements of 3 Panzer Regiment and both Panzer Grenadier Regiments were identified. Remnants were at M 1636 and between M 3727 - M 4330 on 20 March. Divisional remnants crossed the Rhine between WORMS and MANNHEIM. Its combat infantry effectives may number 400, ~~while guns and tanks are believed destroyed and/or abandoned.~~

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BRENNER). Our simultaneous drives caught both pieces of this divided division off guard. Along the northern Moselle, 11 SS Mountain Regiment was pressed against the Rhine. However, it was able to cross and later play a small part in the defense of MAINZ. 12 SS Mountain Regiment and other elements moved in the SCHLEIDEN (L 2706) area were well-nigh destroyed in the rout. Total combat infantry effectives are approximated at 400.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

On 6 March Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER was replaced as Commanding General of First German Army by Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH, formerly Chief of Staff of Army Group F. The army under its new commander fared little better than Seventh German during the period and for all practical purposes can be considered destroyed. The maintaining of a firm left flank in the SIEGFRIED Line, aided immeasureably those enemy forces escaping from the SAAR-PALATINATE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Of the thirteen divisions in First Army at the beginning of the period three divisions (256 VG, 416 Inf, and 2 Mtn Divs) are considered destroyed. The remaining ten divisions (719 Inf, 347 Inf, 19 Inf, 17 SS PG, 16 VG, 36 VG, 257 VG, 905 VG, 47 VG, and RAESSLER Divs) all suffered extremely heavy casualties in men and equipment.

(a) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

Upon the departure of LXXXIX Corps, XC Corps assumed control of 36 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier, 905 Volksgrenadier, and RAESSLER Divisions with the task of holding the SIEGFRIED Line and denying us the approaches down the Rhine Valley. It was successfully performing its mission up to the time itsrear became threatened. Whereupon, it was forced to withdraw over the Rhine River in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE at the close of the period.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELIM) withdrew the bulk of its units into the defenses of SIEGFRIED Line northwest of WISSEMBOURG, by 22 March under the covering actions of 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment supported by some Volkssturm troops. From these positions, the divisionfought with much determination. Orders were subsequently issed to the troops to make their way over the Rhine individually and by any available means. Combat infantry effectives of organic units is 800.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) is one of the stronger units left to the enemy. It exchanged sectors with 905 Division, and assumed responsibility for the vital left flank of the First Army, anchored on the Rhine. This flank had to be held at all costs to keep open an escape gap for what remained of Army Group G. This mission was accomplished as the division managed to hold its SIEGFRIED Line positions, until the end. The losses in manpower, however, were considerable as close contact was maintained throughout the period. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at not more than 1,000.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) was discovered to have been lurking behind our front for some time and to have been responsible for the manning of SIEGFRIED defenses in the Rhine Valley, north and north-east of WISSEMBOURG. As our attacks forced the withdrawal of 905 and 257 Division to the SIEGFRIED Line, elements of Division RAESSLER became interpressed among the two. The following divisional organization is given in a captured document dated 2 March: BG LIENWALD controlling: Fortress AT Bn 502, Fortress AA Bn 802, Volkssturm Bns 40/1 and 40/3, 5 and 6 Cos Fortress AT Regt XVIII, 3 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. BG OTTERBACH controlling: 52 GAF Bn, Volkssturm Bn 40/47, 4 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. BG LESBERG controlling Landesschutzen I Bn 1015, Volkssturm Bn 40/7, Fortress MG Bn 58, 2 and 3 Cos Fortress AT Regt XVIII, 2 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. Staff Fortress Arty Regt 1245 controlling: 1304, 1503, 1509 Fortress Arty Bns. Of these the following were identified during the week: 112 Fortress Cadre Battalion, elements XVIII Anti-Tank Regiment, 52 German Air Force Battalion, 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, 40/3, 40/7, 40/47 Volkssturm Battalions. Present combat infantry effectives among these units total approximately 1,000.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) switched positions with 257 Volksgrenadier Division to take over a sector north-east of WISSEMBOURG. Several prisoners claimed that the division has been upgraded to Volksgrenadier status. This is supported by the identification of a 905 Fusilier Company. The composition of the division is as follows: Regiment MARBACH (Bns SCHMIDT and TREUTLER), Regiment GIESECKE (Bns SARNOW and WEYGAND), Artillery Unit SCHILLER, 905 Fusilier Company, and an Engineer Battalion. Regiment MARBACH was last identified at R 1652 on 21 March, Regiment GIESECKE on 20 March, 905 Fusilier Company at R 1553 on 22 March. Deducting losses sustained during a week of costly fighting, the division is now estimated at 600 combat infantry effectives.

(b) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHN)

(c) ~~LXXXV~~ Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS)

(d) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Major Gen. MAX SIMON)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) pulled out of its SIEGFRIED positions after the deep Allied penetrations north and south of its sector (SAARLAUTERN-MERZIG) had made them untenable. Some elements were trapped by the Allied junction in the HOMBURG area, but straggler identifications were made in the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

KAISERSLAUTERN area on 22 March. Combat infantry strength of divisional units that crossed the Rhine is about 800.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) lost heavily in our initial assaults. When the precariousness of the situation became apparent, the division withdrew by echelons. By 19 March all regiments had been pulled out of line, leaving only miscellaneous fortress units to delay the friendly advance. Nevertheless, elements of the division were caught in the pocket north of SAARBRUCKEN and not more than 500 combat infantry effectives escaped capture or destruction.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) resisted strongly during the early days of the offensive. It was ably assisted by numerous miscellaneous units including local Volkssturm Battalions. 59 Volksgrenadier Regiment is now known to have been dissolved, and the remainder of the division suffered heavily in men and material during its withdrawal. GHQ units were sacrificed in order to aid in the departure of the divisional remains over the Rhine. However, elements were pocketed in the area of ST INGBERT (Q 5476) and gathered up. Escaped combat infantry effectives total 500.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS. Col. KLINGENBERG) was still in contact on 20 March but had incurred heavy casualties up to that date. Its route of withdrawal was from a position northwest of BITCHE to north of PIRMASENS. After having lost 1,300 prisoners on 20 March, the SS officers appropriated units in the vicinity in order to bolster the ranks. For example 6 SS Mountain Replacement Battalion from 6 SS Mountain Division was forced into service on the line after it had been en route to its parent unit and the remnants of I/935 VGR and I/937 VGR of 16 Volksgrenadier Division were formed into Battle Group GUGERBERGER. This novel exhibition of initiative was very temporary in its effect. At present, only remnants of 37 and 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiments exist. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated at 600.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) fought with determination from SIEGFRIED positions south of PIRMASENS. Heavy casualties were sustained during a week of costly fighting. The division started its withdrawal to the Rhine on or about 20 March, when Allied advances south of KAISERSLAUTERN threatened its axis of retreat. Present combat infantry strength is judged at 700.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was split up at the beginning of the period and was employed in the familiar stop-gap fashion. 104 Regimental Staff, controlling I Battalion 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment and II Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, shifted westward. The former was committed at SAARBRUCKEN and the latter north of ST WENDEL. 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment moved north toward the BAD KREUZNACH salient, where it was identified at M 2830 on 20 March. It probably crossed the Rhine between MAINZ and WORMS. II Battalion 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment was last contacted in its old area at Q 9527 on 15 March, I Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9532 on 18 March. If the divisional staff ever manages to reassemble these far-flung elements, they will not total more than 800 combat infantry effectives.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen von der MUEHLEN) suffered disastrously after having been caught in the pincers of our armored drive. Complete chaos resulted when contact was lost between the troops and their commanders. On 18 March, 1126 Grenadier Regiment had elements at L 8346 and also Q 3890 which illustrates the manner in which its forces had become separated. On the same day, 1127 Grenadier Regiment had troops at M 0734 and the next day at L 6406. While both regiments were identified in the M 3021 area on 21 March, the division's final mauling in the area west of the Rhine occurred later in the period in the vicinity of WORMS. It is estimated that some 400 combat infantry effectives reached the east bank of the Rhine.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col, BARTEL) had been reformed from elements of 716 Infantry Division, at KARLSRUHE from where two of its regiments were sent on 16 March to stem our armored drive. One regiment (326 GR) was committed in the area south-east of SIMMERN (L 8556) on 16 March and its subsequent withdrawal route took it southeast across the Nahe River and then north to BINGEN, where it crossed the Rhine. 300 Grenadier Regiment was first contacted east of BAD KREUZNACH (M 0938) and withdrew toward MAINZ, as did 305 Grenadier Regiment. After having lost 600 men in two days prior to 18 March, the division is estimated to have only 600 combat infantry effectives left east of the Rhine.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(e) Volkssturm. Ten Volkssturm battalions were contacted during this period which had been recruited from GAU WESTMARK. In addition, documentary evidence showed that a policy had been adopted to utilize 25% of the younger men as reinforcements for divisional units. The average strength of these battalions is 400.

c. Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

Lt. Gen. RASP was taken ill early in March and was replaced by Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER, the former commander of First German Army. It is very likely that Nineteenth Army has extended its sphere of responsibility as far north as MANNHEIM. Inasmuch as the SIEGFRIED Line defenses extend to the area of GERMERSHEIM and the areas around the cities of SPEYER and MANNHEIM are known to be fortress areas, such an extension would create no change in the purely static defensive mission of Nineteenth Army.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM). Mission and location unchanged.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER). It has been discovered by a captured document that SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER former commander of XIII SS Corps replaced SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH as Commanding General of XVIII SS Corps during February. The former commander of the corps is believed to have gone to the Eastern Front with HIMMLER.

Mission and location unchanged.

(d) DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. MAUR)

No Change Reported.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) remains in positions along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN)

No Change.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:)

No Change.

(e) Twenty-Fourth (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No Change reported.

(f) 600 Infantry Division (Russian) Failure to receive any additional information concerning the existence of this division, beyond the single documentary report received early in February, is sufficient grounds for dropping the unit.

(g) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th ARMY GROUP
(Army Group G and Nineteenth Army Fronts)

Divisional Units on Army Group G Front:	
Combat Infantry Effectives;	
Army Group "G" Front	10,000
Nineteenth Army Front	4,000
TOTAL	14,000
Reserves: (Estimated)	
Army Group "G" Front	------
Nineteenth Army Front	1,000
TOTAL	15,000
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Army Group "G" Front	80-100
Nineteenth Army Front	10- 10
TOTAL	90-100

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5380), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5302), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), CRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

There has been no perceptible change in enemy dispositions on this front. Twenty-five prisoners were captured north-east of BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5090) on 23 March, of this number [illegible] proved to be Germans, the remainder were Italians. Such an even distribution among combat troops indicated more widespread use of G German nationals in the northern sector than had been supposed. Confirmation of the location of the MONTE ROSA Division's MORBEGNO Battalion, north-west of MONT CENIS was made by PW interrogation.

b. General

The advent of more favorable weather conditions has permitted the enemy to carry out extensive forays on our outpost line. Despite the persistence of rumors concerning imminent withdrawals from the front, the enemy's status quo continues to be upheld.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The sector along the Rhine River as far north as DRUSENHEIM (R 1517) continued to be quiet. Enemy nuisance raids which averaged one per day were confined to the STRASBOURG area. On 18 March, a friendly patrol to the east bank of the river south of MARKT DAM (A 8890) had a very weak enemy reaction. Other than the 18 rounds of railway artillery which fell on COLMAR on 17 March, artillery and mortar fire was extremely light.

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

At the beginning of the period, the German First Army was being forced by our attack to conduct a general withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line, in the Rhine Valley and the HARDT Mountain areas. The enemy executed this move so rapidly that contact was lost for a time before being regained on 18 March at LAUTERBOURG (R 3241). West of the HARDT, the enemy was stubbornly resisting from prepared positions which he had earlier occupied. The Allied thrusts toward ST WENDEL (Q 5997) from the east and BAD KREUZNACH (M 1038) from the north forced the transfer northwards of 47 Volksgrenadier Division from the eastern HARDT area.

By 19 March it became obvious that the SIEGFRIED Line positions in the SAAR Valley were being hopelessly outflanked. Then began the withdrawal of 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions which accounted for the lack of opposition to our crossing of the Saar River, west of SAARBRUCKEN. Meanwhile, elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were shifted to the NEUNKIRCHEN (Q 6083) area where a counterattack was staged in order to temporarily maintain a route of escape. SAARBRUCKEN (Q 4671) and HOMBURG (Q 7181) were cleared against negligible opposition and ST INGBERT (Q 5576) was found unoccupied on 20 March. The momentum of the coordinated offensive in the SAAR-PALATINATE had, by this time, reached its full swing. Allied Forces from the north took LANDSTUHL (Q 8890) and KAISERSLAUTERN (Q 0394) and the German First and Seventh Armies were in full and definite retreat. Extrication of the remaining enemy forces was attempted by a turning movement hinged on PIRMASENS (Q 9167) and a withdrawal to a line along the western HARDT. In the Rhine Valley, 257 and 905 Volksgrenadier Divisions exchanged sectors but continued to offer stubborn opposition. Artillery fire also increased in this area in a determined effort to hold SIEGFRIED positions in the Rhine Valley. Although 16 Volksgrenadier Division fell back in the face of overpowering opposition, 36 Volksgrenadier and RAESSLER Divisions held strongly and succeeded in regaining some lost ground in the vicinity of LUDWIGSWINKEL (Q 9553).

Aided by the SIEGFRIED Line, the defenders of the BIENWALD held firm on 21 March, launching unsuccessful counterattacks in the STEINFELD (R 2250) area. In the north, however, the advancing Allied Forces had cleared the Rhine as far south as LUDWIGSHAFEN, had taken the vital communications center of NEUSTADT, and had cut off remaining units in the HARDT by severing the main line of retreat at ANNWEILER (R 1667). On 22 March 36 Volksgrenadier Division began a withdrawal and the forces remaining could not prevent our breaching the line in the region of DORRENBACH (R 1654). The breakthrough that followed removed all doubt as to the fate of the remnants still left in the HARDT. On 22 March, LANDAU was taken and the MAXIMILIANSAU Bridge (R 4148) was reported unserviceable. Friendly troops found the SPEYER Bridge (R 5280) destroyed on 23 March which canalized all the retreating traffic toward the GERMERSHEIM Bridge (R 4769) which was found destroyed the next day. The pivot in the BIENWALD Forest was held by 257, 905 and RAESSLER Divisions until the very end of the period when resistance west of the Rhine had practically collapsed. The front line now runs along the Rhine River except for scattered groups in the GERMERSHEIM area.

ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity in the Atlantic pockets was confined to the usual exchange of artillery fire and normal patrolling. Some truck movement was reported in the northern portion of the LA ROCHELLE pocket on 20 March and in the AIGREFEVILLE (T 4729) region on 22 March. ST VIVIEN (Y 3653) was the center of interest in the GRAVE pocket where enemy working parties were observed throughout the period.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ALPINE FRONT

Enemy patrols and raiding parties were particularly active during the period in the central sector. On successive days CHALET DE L'HORTIERE (K 4630), BRIANCON (P 3898) and the passes at PETIT ST BERNARD (Z 87) and PETIT MOUNTCENIS were the scenes of patrol activity. The enemy attacked friendly outposts in the MONTGENEVRE (K 4502) sector on 21 March but was forced to withdraw after a lively skirmish. Two enemy positions in the region of BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 87) were occupied on 23 March and twenty five German and Italian prisoners taken. Artillery and mortar fire was generally light along the entire front.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Clear weather prevailed throughout the period on all days except 21 March, thus making possible excellent coverage of enemy movements throughout the 6th Army Group area. All out withdrawals along the roads within the SAAR-PALATINATE marked the extremely heavy activity seen in this area throughout the week. The little rail movement that was seen west of the Rhine likewise showed an easterly trend. Coverage revealed heavy barge and pontoon activity along the Rhine and showed heavy rail traffic on lines radiating from KARLSRUHE on 18 and 19 March. Later in the week, very little rail movement was seen in the eastern Rhine Valley. However, traffic continued on the north-south rail lines in the HEILBRONN area throughout the period. Extensive rail activity was also noted in the Black Forest region during the week with two-way traffic being especially noticeable on the ROTTWEIL-STUTTGART and OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN lines.

Hundreds of motor transports, horse drawn wagons, motorcycles and vehicles of all types clogged main and secondary roads in the SAAR-PALATINATE as the enemy frantically tried to salvage troops and equipment from the rapidly disintegrating pocket formed by Third and Seventh Army troops. With only one or two rail lines open, very limited rail activity was possible and most of the traffic was, of necessity, forced onto the roads. In the KAISERSLAUTERN-BAD DURKHEIM-NEUSTADT area approximately 1500 vehicles of all kinds were seen on 20 March and 500-800 others were sighted on 21 March throughout the PIRMASENS-BERGZABERN-LANDAU region. Large concentrations of demolished vehicles littered east-west roads from FRANKENSTEIN to BAD DURKHEIM and from ANNWEILER to LANDAU on both of these days as Allied aircraft continued to pound fleeing convoys on their way toward the Rhine. Permanent rail and road bridges, pontoon bridges, ferries and barges, all were in readiness to insure the passage of withdrawing troops over the Rhine. As Allied troops kept advancing, however, one by one the large permanent type bridges were blown until at the close of the period none were left standing.

Main lines of retreat for enemy forces trapped within the pocket west of the Rhine followed roads running east from KAISERSLAUTERN to NEUSTADT over the bridge at SPEYER and roads from PIRMASENS to LANDAU and across the river at GERMERSHEIM. However, temporary crossings all along the river from WORMS to KARLSRUHE were active in transporting troops.

Good coverage of 18/19 March revealed extensive rail and road traffic throughout the KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART-EBERBACH-DARMSTADT area with indications that some scratch formations were being gathered to hold the eastern banks of the Rhine from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE against U. S. crossings. At the close of the current period, however, movement along lines running from KARLSRUHE to the north appeared to have diminished greatly, and it became evident that the Germans were relying upon alternate lines further east to move their troops and supplies. The EBERBACH - STUTTGART line was very active with 2-way traffic on 19 and 23 March and heavy barge activity was seen on the Neckar River from HEILBRONN to HEIDELBERG on all days except 19 and 20 March.

Indications are that lines throughout the Black Forest were also used for re-routing traffic to and from the Rhine Valley. The ROTTWEIL-STUTTGART line showed marked activity on every day of the period and although 2-way traffic was sighted, it seems logical to conclude that this line together with the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN route, which was also consistently active throughout the week, is being used to service enemy forces in the threatened Rhine Valley area particularly in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

B. Effect of Allied Air Attacks

The enemy's losses in men, materiel, and territory in the past week were accentuated by the activities of Allied aircraft in and behind the battle area. These operations cut the enemy's path of withdrawal and then decimated him as he tried to clear a way out. At the same time, the routes and supplies of reinforcements on the east bank of the Rhine were subject to effective attacks.

(1) Communications. While Allied advances on the ground were continually cutting the main arteries of rail and road transportation within the battle area, leaving many isolated groups of enemy troops in a state of hopeless bewilderment, the enemy's communications lines on both banks of the Rhine were sliced by medium and fighter bombers. After a few days, virtually all rail traffic within the battle area disappeared, and Allied planes were greeted by the unusual sight of large numbers of enemy M/T on the roads during daylight hours. On the east bank, rail cuts were applied on all lines leading into MANNHEIM, and particular attention was paid to the north-south line feeding into the area from KARLSRUHE to MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG. In the latter part of the week, the mediums participated in a series of attacks on rail crossings over the Neckar River, leaving the enemy two, perhaps three tenuous north-south lines leading into Third US Army's bridgehead from supply centers at ULM, STUTTGART, HEILBRONN, and PFORZHEIM. The attack of 23 March on HEIDELBERG marshalling yard, when it was three fourths full, not only halted all rail traffic in the yard by probably cost the enemy needed supplies being unloaded for the defense of the east bank of the Rhine.

(2) Motorized Equipment. The combined effect of ground and air attacks, in addition to the blowing of the Rhine bridges north of SPEYER, forced the enemy to funnel his movements through the KAISERSLAUTERN-NEUSTADT line before fanning out toward SPEYER, GERMERSHEIM, and MAXAU. The resulting crowding of M/T gave the fighter bombers a field day, and claims of XIX and XII TAC in the past week surpassed 4000 M/T destroyed and over 3000 damaged. Even making allowance for the normal inflation of such claims - and this inflation is likely to be especially large here due to the considerable number of M/T carcasses which accumulated along the roads after repeated attacks, it is nevertheless evident that a serious toll was taken of a critical item in the enemy's larder of equipment. It is likely that prior to the Allied offensive, the enemy units in the SAAR-PALATINATE were limping along on considerably less then the 400 odd trucks allotted in the divisional T/E, and these heavy losses on the west bank of the Rhine will mean curtailed mobility on the east bank.

(3) Defenses. On 16 March, the medium bombers poured 450 tons of bombs onto a large defensive installation in the SIEGFRIED Line at ZWEIBRUECKEN. PW reports of this attack indicate that great success was achieved, not only in the destruction of pill boxes and other fortifications, but also in the severe demoralization of the personnel manning them.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S.C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES
#1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
#2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION -
" Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



.200/MAR 45/6AG 6071

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

.200/MAR 45/6AG 6072

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 24 1200A MARCH

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #27

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: CWM
Date: 31 March 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 28

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 31 MARCH 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G, after its overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE, has been able to organize cohesive resistance only at a few widely scattered critical points deep behind the conquered river barrier. Its twenty-eight divisions, of which at least eleven must now be accounted destroyed, left 62,000 prisoners of war west of the Rhine. In addition, 52,000 prisoners were taken from its non-divisional units. Similarly staggering losses in heavy weapons and transport equipment, coupled with the almost complete disorganization evident in the retreat across the Rhine and the denial of an opportunity to gain a respite, have prevented and will continue to prevent effective regrouping and refitting. These same factors further minimize any enemy capability to launch more than local counterattacks against the 6th Army Group.

Army Group G not only failed to contain the GERNSHEIM (M 5430) bridgehead, but, even more fatal, found itself incapable of guarding the FRANKFURT-ASCHAFFENBURG gateway to the KASSEL corridor. The resultant exposure of Army Group B's flank and rear will end with the encirclement and destruction of that command, leaving General HAUSSER dependent on only his own resources to stave off a similar fate. He must now defend all approaches to NUREMBERG and MUNICH with forces which are already too thin for their 200 mile front. As long as the High Command continues to follow its policy of throwing all its resources against the most imminent threat, HAUSSER will enjoy a second priority at best and must make shift with hastily organized training and convalescent units. Their necessarily piecemeal commitment as stopgaps will render them ineffective. Only strong armored formations in strength sufficient to blunt our own armored thrusts could make positional warfare even a temporarily successful possibility for the enemy. There are none to be had, unless some panzer divisions could be disengaged from the Eastern Front.

Seventh German Army now enters its third week with an exposed right flank. Its rapidly extending area of responsibility has so spread its divisions that they are able only to man potential BASTOGNES and critical terrain features. The lack of mobile or armoured reserves make it vulnerable to wide outflanking tank drives whenever its infantry is pinned by strong contact with Allied forces. It is definitely beyond the powers of this Army to reestablish contact on its right with the Fifteenth German Army. Should it lose contact with the First German Army on the south, Seventh Army's collection of divisional numbers will be wiped from the map.

First German Army retreated across the Rhine in obvious need of both time and reinforcements. On the contrary, it was immediately called upon to supply troops for the previously vacant KARLSRUHE-GERMERSHEIM sector of the SIEGFRIED Line and blocking forces for the WORMS-ASCHAFFENBURG area. This dissipation of already inferior strength has overtaxed its ability to hold the key Rhine Valley cities and the mass of of the ODENWALD features. Its mission to protect the avenues leading to the east is likewise doomed to failure as long as the necessary mobile reinforcements remain unavailable.

Nineteenth German Army, reduced to a training command after its defeat, has become the last resource for Army Group G. The advance of Allied divisions is forcing upon it the necessity to become operational before it has had time to replace the manpower drained by the armies to the north. With a temporarily static front along

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

the Rhine of over 100 miles manned by troops whose positional duties will render them ineffective once their strongpoints have been bypassed, the Nineteenth Army is equally in danger of having its right flank rolled up and of subsequent encirclement. To carry out its mission it can depend only on a few new recruits from the interior of Germany, since Wehrkreis V has already been exhausted by previous drafts, and on the convalescents who fill the camps in its area. The present state of 553 Volksgrenadier Division, which spent two months reforming at PFORZHEIM, is indicative of what will be met. In general, the lack of trained troops in the various arms and services will not permit the production of balanced formations even for the few battered staffs now trying to regain some effectiveness in the Upper Rhine area.

Twenty-fourth Army continues its training and defensive missions along the Swiss border.

The turn of military events is effectively destroying the "National Redoubt" for want of both territory and personnel. Any retreat into the mountains of southeastern Germany will hardly be voluntary on the part of the German leaders. In fact, this projected ultimate concentration area is much more likely to terminate as a concentration camp area.

b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to withdraw into the interior of Germany before our advancing forces.

Army Group G is faced with the almost insurmountable task of containing Allied armor spearheads directed deep into the heart of South Central Germany. Nineteenth Army must attempt to prevent the rolling up of the SIEGFRIED Line in BADEN from the rear. The almost completed encirclement of Army Group B and the deep penetrations beyond the forward positions of First Parachute Army threaten to expose all Northern Germany, west of a line KASSEL-HANOVER. Any troops made available for the western front must be directed to the north to carry out at least blocking attempts. Thus, Army Group G and Nineteenth Army must carry on in their extending areas with extremely few replacements. Finally, the lack of armor in reserve forshadows the enemy's future loss of large areas of military productivity which in turn will further reduce his ability to resist. Immobile troops may hold in a few scattered areas, but they will be isolated and cleaned up with only minor difficulties.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Odenwald Front)

a. At the close of the period, the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: GELNHAUSEN (N 0379), KAHL (M 9146), ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0054), REISTENHAUSEN (N 1331), WERBACH (N 3720), TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM (N 3815), DALLAU (S 0598), MOOSBRUNN (R 8692), SPEYER (R 5080), South along Rhine to BASLE (A 8783).

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

The rapidly expanding front of Army Group G and the need for rearwakd displacement of higher headquarters in the face of Allied advances, has caused some confusion as to the exact locations of specific corps. However, LXXXIX (CG. Lt. Gen. HOEHNE), XC (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN), LXXXII (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM), XIII (CG: Lt. Gen. von ORIOLA), XIII SS (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON), LXXX (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER), and LXXXV (CG: Lt. Gen. KNIESS) Corps are believed to be still under the control of First German and Seventh German Armies.

The reason for listing some of the divisions considered destroyed for all practical purposes, is to indicate troops or remnants of units involved in defensive fighting in widely scattered sectors.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) fought stubbornly in its SIEGFRIED Line sector east of HOMBURG until the withdrawal of the remnants of First and Seventh Armies across the Rhine was completed. Due to the protection afforded by strong defensive positions and the short route of withdrawal, casualties were light by comparison with other Army Group G divisions. The Division lost only 900 prisoners. Consequently combat infantry effectives are estimated at approxi - mately 1,000. At the end of the period the division was holding the east bank of the Rhine, from KARLSRUHE to about R 5072.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG:) (Left Flank Units)

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) formed a few weak battle groups out of the personnel that it extracted from the SAAR-PALATINATE. These are now in line north of ASCHAFFENBURG in the BUEDINGER WALD (N 08). All tanks are believed to have been lost east of the Rhine where 1,500 prisoners of 2 Panzer Division were taken. Combat infantry strength is judged at 400.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) managed to pull its fast shrinking units out of a number of successive traps. The division lost 1,400 prisoners during the SAAR-PALATINATE operation. Last contact was reported in the vicinity of H 0307 where about 1,000 combat infantry effectives are believed to have been gathered.

5 Parachute Division (CG) was committed at KOBLENZ until Rhine crossings by our troops obliged it to withdraw via the GIESSEN area where divisional elements were pocketed. Units which escaped were moved south east to the general area M 9895. Recent losses have been heavy and present combat infantry strength is estimated at 600.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was virtually destroyed in the BAD KREUZNACH-WORMS region where it lost 2,400 prisoners. Remnants were gathered and sent into line north of ASCHAFFENBURG in the general area N 07. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELIM) succeeded in withdrawing its depleted units across the Rhine between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE. After reassembling there, the division moved to the north-east and was committed immediately south-east of ASCHAFFENBURG. The following identifications were made on 30 March: 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment at N 0251; 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment at N 0447; 36 Reconnaissance Battalion. The division lost 2,000 prisoners in addition to many dead and wounded during the course of operations west of the Rhine after 15 March. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at 700.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) gathered a number of stragglers which were assembled in area N 1244 for commitment at ASCHAFFENBURG. Some divisional remnants appear to be still operating under command of 36 Volksgrena- dier Division. However, the divisional staff is believed to be in control of the bulk of its own remnants and of the remains of 256 Volksgrenadier Division. 416

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Infantry Division lost 3,500 prisoners during the final stages of the SAAR-PALATINATE campaign. Combat infantry strength is judged at 300.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) was identified by a prisoner of Headquarters Company who stated that divisional remnants were collected at ASCHAFFENBURG on 27 March from HEIDELBERG and were told to report to 416 Infantry Division in area N 1244. This indicates that remnants of the two divisions were merged prior to their probable subordination to 256 Volksgrenadier Division. Almost 3,000 prisoners of this division were taken during the last two weeks. Even after the conversion of service troops, not more than 400 combat infantry effectives remain.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

After the shattering blows received by the First Army in the SAAR - PALATINATE and during its retreat across the Rhine, seven of its divisions were virtually destroyed, the rest decimated. The Army was unable to offer anything but scattered opposition against our advances east of the Rhine. Opposition was generally centered around localities and non-combattant arms of the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm were committed as infantry to reinforce the totally inadequate regular combat troops. Without substantial replacements in both men and materiel and without receiving a substantial breathing spell the Army cannot hope to stem the Allied tide.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) crossed the Rhine in widely scattered straggler groups. Some of these were reassembled and are now located in the woods in area R 6182. Their commitment in the Rhine Valley south of MANNHEIM appears imminent. Combat infantry strength of all salvaged elements is estimated at 800. The division lost over 1,600 prisoners in the SAAR-PALATINATE operation.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) succeeded in withdrawing a part of its amalgam of units from the WISSEMBOURG region. These are believed to be manning defenses along the Rhine from KARLSRUHE to RASTATT. The division lost 1,400 prisoners and its present combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 600.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) was contacted as elements of 1119, 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiments and 553 Fusilier Battalion were identified in the vicinity of M 8321 on 28 March. At the end of the period, the division was believed to hold a sector from MILTENBERG (N 1024) to AMORBACH (N 0717). Prisoners stated that, prior to its latest commitment, the division had been reforming in the KARLSRUHE area. The division remained out of contact since the end of January. However, the extent and sources of replacements have not as yet been ascertained. Combat infantry strength is not believed to exceed 1,500.

352 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was virtually destroyed again in the SAAR-PALATINATE. It netted over 2,500 prisoners during the past two weeks. Remnants now committed in the WALLDUERN area (N 1810) do not add up to more than 300 combat infantry men.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KUEHNE) continues to lay claim to a nominal existence as it staved off complete annihilation by assembling some stragglers into a battle group formation that was identified at M 7618 on 28 March. Combat infantry strength of this unit is estimated at 400.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG). Elements were identified at HANAU (M 8571) where they staged a counterattack on 27 March. A reliable source locates elements in the GERMERSHEIM (R 4669) - WIESLOCJ (R 7078) area. The divisions disorderly retreat from the SAAR region suggests the possibility that elements are located in both areas. The division lost 3,000 prisoners and organic combat infantry strength is estimated at 500 including recovered stragglers.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) was largely destroyed in the BAD KREUZNACH region. Regiments were collected in Battle Groups SCHUETZ and SATTLER and were committed east of HEIDELBERG. The 696 Grenadier

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Regiment of 340 Infantry Division which was reforming in DARMSTADT when we crossed the Rhine, and was therefore unable to join its division engaged on the REMAGEN Bridgehead, became attached to 559 Volksgrenadier Division. Including 696 Grenadier Regiment, divisional combat infantry strength is estimated at 900. 4,600 prisoners of 559 Division were captured west of the Rhine.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) crossed the Rhine fairly early and managed to escape, organizationally intact, although it lost 2,400 prisoners. Apparently the division regrouped south of MANNHEIM, and elements were contacted in the HEIDELBERG area, where 198 Fusilier Battalion and 235 Artillery Regiment were identified on 30 March. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 6-800.

719 Infantry Division (CO:) lost 3,700 prisoners in the SAARBRUCKEN pocket and in its retreat across the RHINE. Among others, Major Gen. GAEDE, its commander, was captured. Such remnants as have been reassembled are committed in the Rhine Valley, south of MANNHEIM. The infantry combat effectives of these remnants are estimated at 400.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was one of the last units to withdraw from its West Wall positions east of the Rhine. Severe casualties were suffered during this prolonged defense, including 1,300 prisoners taken since 15 March. The remnants, probably some 400 combat infantry effectives, are disposed along the Rhine north and south of SPEYER.

(3) Nineteenth German Army (CG:)

It is accepted that the Defence Command OBERRHEIN has been dissolved and that its functions have been taken over by Nineteenth Army, subordinated to Army Group G.

Consequently Nineteenth Army exercises control over the units manning defenses along the Rhine from BASLE to KARLSRUHE. The LXIV and XVIII SS Corps continue to assume responsibility for the two sectors south of KARLSRUHE. The 189, 708 and 716 Divisional Staffs represent a future defensive power of the army and are presently believed in the process of rebuilding. A fairly reliable source reports that headquarters of a Brigade BAUER are located at KANDERN (V 9402). It remains to be seen whether the Brigade equates with 1005 Brigade which is carried in the same general area.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE). Combat troops and some service personnel of this division were absorbed by 338 Infantry and 16 Volksgrenadier Divisions at the end of February. The staff, however, remained in the Black Forest. It is presently believed to be receiving a few young recruits, convalescents, Volkssturm and to be picking up stragglers to reform the division.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER). After its defeat in early February, this division had to sacrifice its remaining personnel to help rehabilitate 159 Volksgrenadier and 198 Infanty Divisions. Its staff is believed to have stayed in the Black Forest where like 189 and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions, it is probably rebuilding its subordinate units.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

The Corps is responsible for the northern portion of the BASLE - KARLSRUHE sector.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) remains along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKMENN). Supply establishments (Ib) of this division were located by agents at ETTENHEIM (W 0561). It is probable that the division which had been cannibalized by other units is reforming in this area.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG:)

This Corps holds the southern part of the BASLE-KARLSRUHE sector. Exact boundaries are not known.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN). No change.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO:). A report locating a Brigade BAUER at KANDERN (V 9402) points to two possibilities. Either this unit equates with 1005 Brigade or it is a separate Brigade. In the latter case, the sector in which 1005 Brigade was previously carried would be shared by the newly identified unit. Brigade BAUER is stated to be in command of 8 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN.

(c) Twenty-Fourth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No change in mission has yet been ascertained.

(d) Prisoners Yielded by Divisions in SAAR-PALATINATE
(Period 13/3/45 - 25/3/45)

DIVISION	PRISONERS BY SEVENTH ARMY	PRISONERS BY THIRD ARMY	TOTAL
2 Pz	30	1522	1522
11 Pz	2	78	80
17 SS PG	2237	667	2904
2 Mtn	167	4313	4480
6 SS Mtn	129	1244	1373
9 VG	93	1662	1755
16 VG	2390	269	2659
19 Inf	1559	169	1728
36 VG	1945	62	2007
47 VG	1099	559	1658
79 VG	174	3025	3199
159 VG	57	2363	2420
167 VG	0	235	235
198 Inf	14	2358	2372
212 VG	172	5207	5379
245 (Elts)	568	30	598
246 VG	94	3099	3193
257 VG	871	0	871
256 VG	568	2389	2957
276 VG	0	93	93
277 VG	0	191	191
326 VG	2	709	711
340 VG	196	374	570
347 Inf	2598	718	3316
352 VG	112	2412	2524
416 Inf	643	2863	3506
553 VG	7	221	228
559 VG	1010	3598	4608
719 VG	2568	1165	3733
905 VG	1312	0	1312
RAESSLER	1373	0	1373
T O T A L	22026	42420	64448

NOTE: PW tabulations include only PW's actually processed by Army cages.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(g) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(First and Nineteenth German Armies)

Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units: *

Seventh German Army	4,900
First German Army	6,600
Nineteenth German Army	4,000
TOTAL	15,500

Reserves: (Estimated)

First German Army	-----
Nineteenth German Army	1,000
TOTAL	16,500

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh German Army	30-40
First German Army	40-50
Nineteenth German Army	15-20
TOTAL	85-110

(*) Excluding miscellaneous non-divisional units.

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Identifications by prisoners of war confirm the presence of II Battalion 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mtn Div) and VARESE Battalion (4 Alpine Regt, LITTORIO Div) in the PETIT ST BERNARD region. While 5 Mountain Division has provided a considerable number of March Battalions for other front, the division is still present in sufficient strength to effectively control the Italian units on the front. Fair sources report that additional elements of the MONTE ROSA Division are being moved from the Appenine Front to the French border region. This follows the trend of movement of Italian units into the area to aid or gradually take over from the German units.

b. General

The enemy has been content with limited activity. Diversionary raids have been infrequent. Artillery exchanges and normal patrolling have characterized the activity of the front. No reports of withdrawals from the front have been substantiated.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

a. RHINE FRONT

The Rhine front from BASLE to SPEYER remained relatively inactive. The enemy sent daily patrols and raiding parties across the River for intelligence purposes and to harass Allied troops. Approximately 100 men using nine boats crossed the Rhine east of MARCKOLSHEIM (V 8652) during the early hours of 26 March but withdrew several hours later. On 28 March about 30 Germans were engaged in the vicinity of PLOBSHEIM (W 0186), and the strongpoint at V 8737 near FORT MORTIER was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy group.. A patrol of nine Germans dressed as American civilians entered GEISWASSER (V 9031) on 29 March, and questioned inhabitants, referring to themselves as a control party. Artillery and mortar fire was light and scattered during the beginning of the period, however, it was increased to moderate toward the end of the period. COLMAR received some 240 mm railway fire from enemy guns located in the KAISERSTUHL on several nights toward the end of the period.

b. SOUTH-CENTRAL FRONT

As the period opened, the last remaining pockets of organized enemy resistance west of the Rhine were being liquidated. 257, 905 and RAESSLER Divisions had held stubbornly to fortifications in the BIENWALD and were the last of the forces of Army Group G to withdraw across the river. By 25 March mopping up along the west bank had been completed but stragglers and scattered groups of enemy continued to be found in rear areas throughout the period. Many German officers had left their units with hopes of making good their escape but found themselves completely cut off. Included among these were Lt. Gen. FRANZ SENSFUSS, Commanding General of 212 Infantry Division, along with his Chief of Staff, and Lt. Gen. GAEDE, Commanding General of 719 Infantry Division.

Not pausing in the pursuit of the depleted German Armies, Allied forces established a bridgehead on the east side of the Rhine early 23 March. Initial advances cleared TREBUR (M 4847) and LEEHEIM (M 5040) against only scattered opposition. The rapid expansion of the bridgehead engulfed DARMSTADT and reached ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0253) which was entered late 25 March. Bridges over the Main River were taken intact at STOCKSTADT (M 9554) and HANAU (M 8572). FRANKFURT was entered the following day. By this time the enemy had mustered sufficient miscellaneous units to offer some, although ineffective, oppositions to Allied advances. Counterattacks were undertaken in the ASCHAFFENBURG area and heavy opposition was being encountered in HANAU and FRANKFURT. At the seme time replacement and antiaircraft battalions offered moderate opposition to further Allied crossings of the Rhine in the WORMS area.

With the bulk of the potential enemy resistance overcome at the river line, Allied forces expanded eastward and southward to the west shoulder of the ODENWALD and the Neckar River respectively. A committee of citizens surrendered MANNHEIM on 29 March after enemy forces had withdrawn under cover of light artillery fire. Opposition in this area continued light and scattered. The Neckar River having been crossed, HEIDELBERG was cleared on 30 March against almost negligible resistance. Meanwhile, the enemy fought an unsuccessful delaying action in the ODENWALD. By the end of the period the ODENWALD had been cleared but the enemy remained very sensitive in the ASCHAFFENBURG region. Here remnants of miscellaneous divisions operating under 36 Volksgrenadier Division and 416 Infantry Division offered repeated counterattacks and contested strongly all attempted advances. South of the ASCHAFFENBURG area, the Main River was crossed and advances east were practically unopposed. At the end of the period, friendly units were nearing WURZBURG.

Allied units proceeding north from the FRANKFURT-HANAU area joined forces with other units from the REMAGEN Bridgehead. GIESSEN was taken and by the end of the period, friendly troops were nearing PADERBORN, KASSEL, and EISENACH.

c. ALPINE FRONT

Enemy forces on the FRANCO-ITALIAN border were engaged in improving defensive positions and some patrol activity. Hill 2655 vicinity PETIT ST BERNARD, which was occupied by Allied forces on 23 March, was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy patrol on 24 March. In the same region, one German and 13 Italians were captured on 26 March during a light engagement. Friendly forces withdrew due to unfavorable weather. Work continued on the defenses in the MONTCENIS Pass, ARMES Pass, and PETIT ST BERNARD regions. Artillery fire was generally light and scattered during the period.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity in the Atlantic pockets was confined to occasional exhanges of artillery and automatic weapons fire and several patrol clashes. Throughout the period the enemy continued work in the vicinity of ST VIVIEN (R 3653) in the GRAVE zone. Approximately one company constructed defenses along a line from Y 448691. to Y 449695 in the ROYAN pocket. LA ROCHELLE had less activity this week than during previous periods.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Visual reconnaissance throughout the period was greatly hampered by unfavorable weather, but even when fairly good coverage was available, as on 24 and 25 March, very little rail or road activity was observed. Strong American crossings of the Rhine between MAINZ and MANNHEIM forced enemy activity on roads and railroads in the Rhine Valley to shift to routes further east with STUTTGART appearing to be the hub of activity. From here north-south lines through HEILBRONN showed use on both the 24th and 25th and the limited movements seen seemed to indicate a continuance of moves to the east. Throughout the BLACK FOREST region light to moderate activity was sighted along the ROTTWEIL-STUTTGART, OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN and TASTATT-FREUDENSTADT lines on these same days but observations were too scanty and scattered to warrant any definite conclusions.

Light rail activity was seen in the KARLSRUHE-MANNHEIM area on 24 and 26 March and 2 military rakes were observed at GRABEN (R 5563) on the 24th. Marshalling yards in this area showed moderately heavy loadings on 24 and 25 March. Road activity was at a minimum throughout this sector although a large concentration of what appeared to be camouflaged motor transports was seen extending for half a mile along both sides of the road southeast of DURLACH at R 5542 on 24 March.

STUTTGART marshalling yards and rail lines leading to and from the city were reported active on both 24 and 25 March probably indicating that the city is now one of the main focal points for incoming and outgoing traffic in this sector of GERMANY. Always a large communications center, its importance cannot but have grown in the light of recent events since American advances have now threatened or actually taken many of the other large cities throughout the Rhine Valley.

Heavy barge activity on the Neckar was noted whenever coverage was available and as many as 1,000 barges were seen between HEIDELBERG and HEILBRONN on 26 March. Scattered motor and horse drawn transports were seen along roads from HEIDELBERG to EBERBACH and as far east as WURZBURG with most of the traffic moving to the east.

B. Effects of Allied Air Attacks

a. Communications

Although poor weather in the latter part of the week grounded Allied medium bombers and greatly limited fighter bomber operations, the clear days preceding were used to considerable advantage to block rail traffic from crossing the Neckar River and feeding supplies and reinforcements to enemy forces opposing the Allied bridgeheads between MANNHEIM and MAINZ.

Aside from the rail line nearest the Rhine, which was subject to artillery interdiction, the enemy had three main entrances to the battle area: at HEIDELBERG, NECKARGEMUEND, and EBERBACH. The line through HEIDELBERG was cut by an attack on a bridge north of BRUCHSAL on 24 March and by damage to the HEIDELBERG bridge last week. The central line was cut at the Neckar by the continued impassability of the NECKARGEMUEND bridge, while the main north-south line STUTTGART-HEILBRONN-MOSBACH-EBERBACH was interrupted at five points as of 27 March by impassable or destroyed bridges. While it was not anticipated that enemy rail traffic would be very large, this interdiction of the battle area must nevertheless have reduced to a mere trickle the traffic which did manage to get through; the small amount of traffic on the STUTTGART-HEILBRONN line must have been effected either by rapid repair to the BIETIGHEIM bridge, or by shuttle operations on either side of the damaged structure.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Supplies

While none of the attacks were in 6th Army Group's area proper, the success of the Allied air offensive against the enemy's gasoline supplies is significant for its extremely limiting effects on his defensive capabilities. It is estimated by the Combined Strategic Targets Committee on Oil Production and POL Depots that the current rate of enemy gasoline output is a mere 33,000 tons, or about 6 per cent of production a year ago. It is estimated furthermore that output in April will not exceed 80,000 tons, or 15 per cent of pre-raid output, even if no more attacks on enemy gasoline producing plants are carried out. The enemy's tactical oil supplies, particularly important in view of the extremely low level of new production, were dealt a serious blow by Ninth Tactical Air Force's raid on the Wehrmacht depots at EBRACH and NEUNHEERSEE on 28 March; each of these depots, which supply First and Third US Armies' front, had a capacity of 6,000 tons and were intact and active prior to attack.

What the offensive against oil has meant in terms of enemy operations is strikingly illustrated by the plethora of prisoner of war reports of abandoned vehicles or curtailed armored force vehicular operations due to lack of fuel. Significant documentary evidence has now come to hand in the form of an order issued as far back as 24 January 1945 by RASP, CG of Nineteenth German Army, to the effect that "...Motor fuel is authorized only for tanks, tank retrievers, and essential communication and command vehicles. Everything else must proceed on foot!"

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

.200/APR '45/6AG 6074

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 31 1200A MARCH

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1
TO WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #28

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

P 628

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: ____
Date: 7 April 1945

142

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 29

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 7 April 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G controls two armies which have totally inadequate forces and, in addition, very weak flank contacts between themselves and with the adjoining armies. It is also confronted with the impossible task of holding every inch of German soil in order to prevent those penetrations into THURINGIA and BAVARIA which would demonstrate to the German people the uselessness of further struggle.

The encirclement of Army Group B and the RUHR has created a military situation more unfavorable, if possible, than presently exists in South Central Germany. The result will be that Army Group G's priority for reinforcements will continue to be secondary. Only Wehrkreis XIII and VII remain to be combed out. The arrival, or even the reconstitution, of large armored forces daily becomes less of a potentiality as the productive capacity of the nation shrinks.

1. Seventh German Army, showing signs of some strength and organization only in the THURINGIAN Forest, is too weak in mobile forces to hold intact its thin, crust like line against renewed and more determined Allied actions. The left flank of the army, extending to the vicinity of NURNBERG - WURZBURG, is continuing to fall back after the capture of ASCHAFFENBURG. The primary task of the army now is to maintain a cohesive front and contact with its flank neighbor. Its mission is to protect the great industrial center of DRESDEN - LEIPZIG - ERFURT.

2. First German Army has not received enough mobile forces to cut off the US tank units reaching CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), nor even sufficient effective infantry forces to organize positions which bear some relation to each other. Its left boundary has undoubtedly been shrunk to the area of STUTTGART from the Rhine River in order to assume a more positive control of its lower formations. The rapidly expanding front line becomes daily more brittle and, with enemy's uncertainty as to the stability of his right flank, preservation of the army will be the only mission possible.

3. Nineteenth German Army, which only last week was under Army Group G, has undoubtedly returned to an independent army status responsible only to OKW in C West. Coupled with its responsibility for reforming three divisions, it has found French and US forces approaching terrain features whereby its SIEGFRIED Line positions and the Black Forest were slowly being turned or at least outflanked. Certainly the army cannot hope to receive troops and reinforcements of any important size which will enable it to maintain its present positions. Slow disintegration will bring about its end.

b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to delay his defeat.

Enemy forces south of the line FULDA - ERFURT are incapable of preventing further large areas of the homeland from being overrun by Allied forces. While armor in sufficient concentration is unavailable to combat friendly tank spearheads, the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

S.G.M.A. - 544 - 1491 - 250.000

limited infantry forces on line are stretched beyond the point where adequate control can be maintained. The existence of strategic reserves within Germany is now certainly no longer credible.

. The highest priority for reserves coming into the west must go to the most critical sector, namely the WESER RIVER - ALLER RIVER - MITTLELENAD CANAL - ELBE RIVER Line in order to reestablish a western front in that area. There is a slight possibility that a few divisions might come from the Russian Front. Not, however, Sixth SS Panzer Army for the time being at least. For there are excellent indications that SEPP DIETRICH is commander of the VIENNA Fortress Garrison with his four panzer divisions, two of which (9 SS Pz and 12 SS Pz Divs) are badly mauled.

The only reserves available for the forces presently in line south of ERFURT are the troops remaining in Wehrkreise immediatley to their rear. These are definitely becoming as limited in number as they already were in quality.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. At the close of the period, the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: HILDBURGHAUSEN (J 1207), RITSCHENHAUSEN (H 9117), OBERSFELD (N 5460), ASTHEIM (N 7843), REPPERNDORF (N 7130), RODELSEE (N 8028), HERRNBERCHTHEIM (N 7812), MARKELSHEIM (S 5199), SCHAINBACH (S 6972), CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), MAULACH (S 6562), RENGERSHAUSEN (S 4491), WILDDERN (S 2281), BAD WIMPFEN (S 0371), HEILBRONN (S 0760), BRACKENHEIM (R 9753), MICHELBACH (R 8852), KIESELBRONN (R 7438), BROTZINGEN (R 5545), ETTLINGEN WEIER (R 4736), NEUBURG WEIER (R 3840), South along Rhine to Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

The known corps under this Army Group are reduced to four in number as a result of Nineteenth Army taking over XC and LXXX Corps west of the Neckar River. They are XIII Corps, XIII SS Corps, LXXXII Corps, and LXXV Corps. The continued existence of LXXXIX Corps is doubted.

352 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was not contacted during the period. It is believed that whatever remained of its combat elements was overrun at the end of the last period at WALLDUERN (N 1810) in our rapid drive toward WURZBURG.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG:) (Left Flank Units)

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER). A battle group of this division was identified on 5 April south of FULDA. Prisoners state that this is a straggler group of 2-300 men which escaped from the east bank of the Rhine between the Main and Lahn River. They are presently consolidated under command of 11 Mountain Regiment. The rest of the division was pocketed in the vicinity of N 09.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY). 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment of this division was absorbed by 256 Volksgrenadier Division. The rest of 159 Division, bolstered by some miscellaneous units, is still believed to be operating independently south east of WILDFLECKEN in area N 59. However, there are indications that it is moving northeast via COBURG (O 2989). Organic infantry combat strength, excluding 1209 Regiment, is estimated at 500.

2 Panzer Division (CO: Col von LAUCHERT). An undated captured document reveals that some remnants of the division were absorbed by 256 Volksgrenadier Division. Nevertheless, the division still appears to be operating independently as evidenced by the identification of 38 Panzer Engineer Battalion (2 Pz Div) on 6 April. The division's present location is believed to be in area N 48. Combat infantry effectives of remnants are estimated at 500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HELM) distinguished itself in its stubborn defense of ASCHAFFENBURG from where it withdrew only after a prolonged and costly fight. Casualties were severe but were balanced by replacements. At the end of the period, the division was holding a sector around N 4070 and had combat infantry strength of approximately 700.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) appears to be still operating independently despite previous reports of cannibalization. 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 159 Volksgrenadier Division, identified at N 2970 on 4 April, is claimed by a prisoner to be under command of 256 Volksgrenadier Division. In addition, the division swallowed up some elements of 2 Panzer Division (by captured document). No organic elements of 256 Volksgrenadier Division were identified during the period. Remnants of 256 Volksgrenadier Division and of absorbed units are estimated at 1,000 combat infantry effectives.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). Remnants of this division were reported fighting under 47 Volksgrenadier Division east of KARLSRUHE. This conflicts with earlier statements and documentary evidence placing the divisional headquarters and remnants in the ASCHAFFENBURG area. Since no recent contact with divisional elements has been made in the KARLSRUHE area, it is probable that only scattered combat units were, in fact, subordinated to 47 Volksgrenadier Division. 416 Infantry Division staff is still in the general region of N 56.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

S.G.M.A. - 3-44 - 1493 - 250.000

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. G$_e$n. FOERTSCH)

Through skillful coordination of the skeletal divisions remaining at its disposal with a large number of replacement, miscellaneous general headquarters, and Volkssturm units, First Army was able to temporarily reconstitute its forces sufficiently to make them capable of limited defensive actions. Though still too weak to block a full-scale Allied thrust, the Army is capable of staging limited counterattacks against armored spearheads and of extracting a fairly high price for our capture of strategically vital features. A much more determined defensive attitude, particularly on the Army's left flank, was evidence of the effort at reorganization that is taking place.

409 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. G$_e$n. KLEIKAMP) has administrative control over all remaining Wehrkreis IX replacement units. 15 replacement battalions of Wehrkreis IX were identified during the period by Seventh and Third US Armies. Two of them (88 and 388 Grenadier Replacement Battalions) were absorbed by 1209 Volksgrenadier R$_e$giment, 159 Volksgrenadier Division. Some were apparently subordinated to the field divisions, and yet another group of battalions had the independent mission of defending part of the LOHR (N 3156) region. The commitment of some battalions as a group suggests the possibility that 409 Divisional Staff was in operational as well as administrative command. However, it is more likely that the staff of one of the destroyed field divisions eventually assumed the operational command of its contribution. Present combat infantry strength of Wehrkreis IX units facing 6th Army Group is estimated at 2,000. A few more battalions, at best, remain to be committed.

413 Mobilization Division (CG:) is in administrative command of the remaining Wehrkreis XIII training and replacement units. A group of these, including the ETTLINGEN Non-comissioned Officer School, is committed east of WURZBURG in area N 63. Wehrkreis XIII has been milked of most of its replacement units during the past month. It is doubtful that more than a few are still uncommitted. Combat infantry strength of Wehrkreis XIII units facing 6th Army Group is estimated at 1,500.

(a) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. G$_e$n. MAX SIMON)

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). On 29 March, the division was reported to have been absorbed by 246 Volksgrenadier Division. However, elements were identified on 4 April at N 5209. Furthermore, prisoners state that about 2,000 replacements were received from Wehrkreis XII and from BAVARIA. A part of these probably equate with Regiment BAYREUTH (Strength: 6-700) and Battle Group SACHS. The division is presently located south of WURZBURG in area N 50 - N 60. In view of recent casualties, combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,000.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. KOLB) was practically destroyed in the PALATINATE. On 6 April the following identifications were made: 57 Volksgrenadier R$_e$giment at S 4491; 116 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 9 Artillery R$_e$giment at S 4696. Apart from stragglers, these represent the first contact with the division east of the Rhine. As yet no details regarding reorganization and replacements are available. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,000.

(b) XIII Corps (CG:)

Lt. Gen. COUNT von ORIOLA, Commanding General of XIII Corps, was captured on 31 March. A captured document dated 29 March located the Corps Command Post at S 2172 and puts 16, 19, 246, 553 Volksgrenadier, and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions under XIII Corps' control. 16 Volksgrenadier Division has left the Corps while 719 Volksgrenadier Division has come under command of the Corps.

19 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) committed its remnants in area S 39 at the start of the period. Later, these were reported absorbed by 2 Mountain Division. 19 Volksgrenadier Division, weak from the outset, lost 1,700 prisoners west of the Rhine after 13 March. 2 Mountain Division was enriched by not more than 300 combat infantry effectives. These are all that are believed to have survived the debacle west of the Rhine River.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG). After the receipt of considerable replacements from PRAGUE and ALTKIRCHEN, the division assembled the bulk of its units at B.D MERGENTHEIM (N 4700) on 1 April. Most of the new personnel was very young and insufficiently trained but had a high morale. The division is now committed north of HEILBRONN in area S 17, where both 37 and 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiments were identified on 7 April. An undated captured document shows 653 Tank Battalion as attached. 17 SS Division has always had a high replacement priority and its refittal is probably well under way. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,500.

719 Infantry Division (CG:). Elements of this division were contacted in the KARLSRUHE area as late as 4 April. However, a shift to the east apparently took place, because on 5 April Battle Group KREBS, containing the remnants of 719 Division, was identified at R 9972. This battle group, incorporating the remaining combat infantry effectives of the division, is believed to contain about 400 men.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) was decimated in its futile attempt to contain the OPPENHEIM bridgehead on the Rhine. 1119 and 1120 Volksgrenadier Regiments were identified at S 2090 on 5 April, confirming the division's presence in this area. On 6 April, remnants of both of these regiments were reported absorbed by 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Each regiment had a commitment strength of about 500 combat effectives. At present, divisional combat infantry strength is not above 600.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is currently holding the line around EPPINGEN (R 8560) flanked by elements of 2 Mountain Division on both sides. However, prisoners stated on 6 April that division was to withdraw east of the Neckar River. 305 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 31 March, 308 and 326 Grenadier Regiments on 2 April at R 6683. 305 Grenadier Regiment, which was committed for the first time since its lengthy reformation at KARLSRUHE, was stated to have 5-600 combat effectives. The other regiments, battered in the PALATINATE, are less well off. Divisional combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,400.

c. Nineteenth Army (CG:)

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was last identified on 5 April, at which time it was operating in two battle groups. The first, including elements of 136 Mountain Regiment, was contacted at S 0665; the second, including 137 Mountain Regiment, at R 7062 and R 7565. Several conflicting reports of re-shuffling within the division remain to be clarified. The absorption of 19 Volksgrenadier Division by 2 Mountain Division is confirmed. Some replacements are also known to have been received from AUSTRIA. Nevertheless, the division is still believed to be in poor shape. Its combat infantry strength totals approximately 1,000.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) is operating in small battle group formations west of HEILBRONN, around area R 9560. No reports of replacements have been received and the division is still believed to be extremely depleted. Combat infantry strength is judged at 400.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) has not been identified since the beginning of the week. Its depleted state and lack of contact would indicate that the division is either dissolved or out of line for refittal; 696 Grenadier Regiment of 340 Infantry Division, previously reported attached to 559 Division, was decimated toward the end of March and the combat elements of the division have not been identified since. Organic combat infantry remnants of 559 Volksgrenadier Division amounted to about 400 after the SAAR-PALATINATE Campaign.

(b) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was considerably strengthened by the absorption of remnants of 79 Volksgrenadier and elements of 347 and 416 Infantry Divisions. In addition, 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment was reorganized at HOCKENHEIM (R 5980) with convalescents and recent inductees, raising its strength to 400. On 31 March, the division was ordered to retreat to the line BRUCHSAL (R 6259) - MUNZESHEIM (R 7158) - MENZINGEN (R 7460). It has since been forced to withdraw its left flank somewhat further south and is currently holding from R 7053 to LENZINGEN. Prisoners state that the Anti-Tank Battalion has lost all its pieces and that the Artillery Regiment is very depleted. Combat infantry effectives total about 1,200.

SECRET

S.G.M.A. - 544 - 1490 - 250.000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) rebuilt two regiments (457 and 466 VGRs) with replacements that arrived from DRESDEN. Each regiment has two battalions with an average company strength of 80-100. However, the number of companies per battalion is varying. The division was reidentified for the first time since the SAAR-PALATINATE operation on 2 April at LEOPOLDSHAFEN (R 4655). It is now responsible for the line from south and south-east of KARLSRUHE probably extending as far west as the Rhine River. Combat infantry effectives total around 1,500.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) was partially rehabilitated by the absorption of remnants of 905 Volksgrenadier Division. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment also received replacements from 476 Grenadier Replacement Battalion, DRESDEN. The division is responsible for the line from WEINGARTEN (R 5850) to R 7053. Its combat infantry strength is judged to be 1,200.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) has not yet been contacted and is still believed to be manning defenses along the Rhine in the RASTATT area. Combat infantry strength estimate is 600.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). The entire remnants of this division were absorbed by 16 Volksgrenadier Division.

(c) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

The Corps remains responsible for the sector from KARLSRUHE to area V 69.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) continues to hold a sector along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (V 0596).

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKMANN) is still located in the ETTENHEIM area (V 0561). It is probably reforming there.

(d) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

This Corps still controls the southern part of the BASLE - KARLSRUHE line.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN) no change.

Brigade BAUER (CO:) also reported as a Panzer Brigade, is claimed by good sources to be located between 805 Mobilization and 716 Infantry Divisions.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) was located by a reliable source in the MUELHEIM (V 9112) area. It is believed to be reforming there. It is probably simultaneously responsible for a sector along the Rhine in that region. The division is said to contain a large proportion of Volkssturm troops and is not believed to be far advanced in its reorganization.

1005 Brigade (CO:). More recent reports cast doubt on the possibility of 1005 Brigade's equation with Brigade BAUER. In one case, a good source mentions both independently and at different locations.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ECKSTEIN ?). A reliable source places the division north of the Swiss border with headquarters possibly at LOERRACH. The division is stated to contain much Volksstuem personnel. Equipment is claimed to be generally poor. Its readiness for action as a division is far from complete or satisfactory.

d. Twenty-Fourth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No change in mission has yet been ascertained.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP

Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units: *

Seventh German Army	4,000
First German Army	7,500
Nineteenth German Army	10,500
TOTAL	22,000

Reserves: (Estimated)

Seventh German Army	------
First German Army	------
Nineteenth German Army	2,000
TOTAL	24,000

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh German Army	30-40
First German Army	40-50
Nineteenth German Army	15-20
TOTAL	85-110

(*) Excluding miscellaneous non-divisional units.
(**) Including only elements facing 6th Army Group.

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEUAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MATRIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Information from partisans confirmed the presence of I Battalion 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mtn Div) and III Battalion 4 Alpine Regiment (Littorio Div) in the BARDENECHE area. Prisoners of war identified the VARESE Battalion (4 Alpine Regt, Littorio Div) in the vicinity of PETIT ST BERNARD. The 4 Alpine Regiment in the AOSTA Valley is being reinforced by a training battalion of 800 convelescents from VERCELLI (J 65). The movement of elements of the MONTE ROSA Division into the French border region has continued and should be nearing completion. Rumors of the departure of 34 Infantry Division from the coastal region have not been confirmed by prisoner of war interrogation.

b. General

The enemy continued work on defenses and remained alert along the entire front. Limited Allied operations on 31 March in the PETIT ST BERNARD area met with success only after overcoming determined opposition. Enemy's intentions are purely defensive but harassing raids may be expected.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1490 - 250 000

4. OPERATIONS

a. RHINE FRONT

The front along the Rhine from BASLE to KARLSRUHE remained relatively inactive. Artillery fire was very light and patrols infrequent. The enemy was apparently no longer anxious concerning Allied intentions along this portion of the front.

b. SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

At the beginning of the period, stubborn resistance was being encountered South of the Neckar River in the HARDT Woods. Opposition was light East of the ODENWALD while determined enemy forces operating under 36 Volksgrenadier Division and 416 Infantry Division continued a stubborn defense of the ASCHAFFENBURG area. Early on 31 March, a new Allied bridgehead was established opposite SPEYER against negligible opposition and rapid advances followed.

In the Rhine Valley, advances south and east were being made against light resistance. East of the ODENWALD, the enemy undertook an effective delaying action as battered divisions were being hurried into line. These units were augmented by replacement units and miscellaneous battle group formations moved west from Wehrkreise XIII and IX. The bulk of these units took up positions and established a line along the Neckar to its junction with the Jagst River (S 0571) - east along Jagst to BAD MERGENTHEIM (N 4701) - north to KOENIGSHOFEN (N 4407) area - east to railroad (N 7813) - north along railroad to MARKTBREIT (N 7421). By 3 April, Allied forces encountered stubborn resistance along the line's entire length. The determined defenders of ASCHAFFENBURG were outflanked by rapid friendly advances in the SPESSART. Completely surrounded, the city was mopped up by 3 April; the enemy having suffered an estimated 4,600 casualties, KARLSRUHE and KLINGENBERG (S 0359) were cleared on 4 April.

By 5 April, increased resistance from SIEGFRIED Line positions developed as French forces pushed toward RASTATT and PFORZHEIM. Stubborn opposition continued to be offered in the area from HEILBRONN to WURZBURG. Breaches of the Neckar - Jagst line at NECKARGARTACH (S 0764) and vicinity S 0974 met sharp enemy reactions, clearly evidencing the enemy's concern over any southward expansion. The bridgehead across the Main at OCHSENFURT (S 6720) was strongly opposed. Heavy fighting witnessed the US troops progress in WURZBURG. On 5 April, the town was bypassed and ROTTENDORF (N 6535) was reached without opposition. The Main River was crossed from west to east, on a damaged bridge at KITZINGEN (N 7429) against light resistance. To the north, the advances through the SPESSART continued against scattered delaying actions and armored spearheads had driven east to SUHL (J 0927) and GOTHA (J 0864).

On 7 April, the advance of friendly troops was slowed as strong resistance was encountered south of MORSCH (R 4040) and ETTLINGEN (R 4938). The enemy still offered determined resistance on the east and south side of the Neckar-Jagst River lines respectively. However, the enemy in the vicinity of DORZBACH (S 4389) was apparently thin as Allied armor on 6 April broke through for a 25 mile run to the important communications center of CRAILSHEIM (S 7062). At the end of the period, there were indications of an enemy build-up in rear of the CRAILSHEIM breakthrough and resistance was stiffening in the southwest approaches to SCHWEINFURT (N 7762), and OSTHEIM (H 7709) were reached.

c. ALPINE FRONT

Enemy forces stubbornly opposed Allied attempts to capture a bunker two kilometers from HOSPICE of PETIT ST BERNARD on 31 March. Superior forces, however reduced the bunker, taking 32 German and 4 Italian prisoners. Attacking again on 5 April, the enemy was forced to relinquish the Fort of MT FROID. Prisoners taken inthis action were 21 German and 1 Italian. A snow storm caused considerable difficulties during attacks on enemy positions, on 6 April, in the vicinity of MT CENIS. A friendly cruiser off CAP MARTIN (S 7584) was bombed on 1 April by a jet propelled plane. Mortar and artillery fire was generally light and scattered, the central and southern zones receiving the major portion. Enemy patrols were reported north of SOSPEL (S 7498), at POINTIN (N 4635), and east of NEVACHE (K 3711) during period.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. ATLANTIC FRONT

In the LA ROCHELLE Pocket, an enemy reconnaissance party of company strength was active on 3 April near FERRIERS (T-5342) and NUALLE (T 4841). Enemy concentrations were reported at VERINES (T 4538) and SERIGNY (T 4345). The following day, enemy reconnaissance in force caused friendly outposts between ST JEAN (T 5346) and FERRIERS to withdraw. After an artillery duel, these same positions were regained. A good source reports the arrival at LA ROCHELLE of small groups of enemy troops and equipment from LORIENT and ST NAZAIRE. The enemy in the ROYAN and GRAVE pockets was generally quiet. However, artillery was unusually active from the ROYAN pocket on 3 April when 100 rounds were fired.

5. COMMUNICATION

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Coverage of enemy movements was limited throughout the current period by operational difficulties and weather conditions. Observations of rail traffic were the most significant, revealing traffic headed for the front from STUTTGART early in the week and the locus of activity shifting subsequently to the NURNBERG area.

On 31 March, 10-12 trains were seen moving north and west from STUTTGART and traffic was also seen throughout the SINSHEIM-BRUCHSAL-BIETIGHEIM area. Similar trends were reported on 1 April with moderately heavy traffic again seen in the vicinity of STUTTGART. The indications were that the Germans were attempting to bring up small replacements of troops and supplies to check Allied advances in the KARLSRUHE - HEIDELBERG area. This appears logical in view of the large number of military areas and supply installations in and around STUTTGART. Scattered road movement in this period was largely eastbound out of HEILBRONN and WURZBURG.

In the latter half of the week, NURNBERG seemed to replace STUTTGART as the center of activity as Allied forces approached the former city. On 5 April, a total of 13 trains were seen between NURNBERG (O 4200 and AUGSBURG (Y 3380) and 3 military trains loaded with motor transport were sighted on the north-south line through DONAUWORTH (T 2318). Intense rail activity was also sighted on lines leading west from NURNBERG, particularly on the NURNBERG - HALL axis. Some of this traffic, particularly on the north-south lines, appeared to be normal, since these are the only main lines for enough removed from the expanding battle area to permit routine supply and troop movements and what little economic traffic is carried. It is likely, however, that the heavy movement on the lines leading to the west was direct supply to the front from the NURNBERG area.

B. Effects of Allied Air Attacks

In the past week, Allied air attacks shifted from enemy transportation to supplies. With the rapid forward movement of Allied ground forces, the enemy must rely on his supply installations close to the front lines rather than on long haul transport to maintain his troops. Even small losses of material at these forward points could result in serious tactical difficulties. These attacks by Allied air forces not only included depots and dumps, but also attacks on rail centers which have been operating as enemy railheads.

Fighter bomber attacks at the beginning of the week covered a large number of small marshalling yards on the fringe of the battle area. These operations were paralleled by medium bomber attacks on HEILBRONN marshalling yard, quay, and sidings and on the rail centers at CRAILSHEIM and WURZBURG. In the past the enemy has established his railheads as near the front line as possible in order to save on motor transport or horse-drawn hauls to the front lines, and it is likely that these attacks deprived front line troops of weapons, ammunition and vehicle replacements.

Several important supply depots within fifty miles of the battle area were also hit. A number of installations for motor transport repair and storage in the STUTTGART area were included in this operation, as well as the large ordnance depot at TUBINGEN (W 9793). Although further from the battle area, the Eigth Air Force bombardment of 5 April of the extensive ordnance depot at INGOLSTADT, in the MUNICH-AUGSBURG area, was significant. This TUBINGEN depot is probably a collecting and

S.G.M.A. - 544 - 1493 - 250.000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

distributing point for ordnance armored force vehicles manufactured in the industrial area to the south and is thus an important source of supplies for both the Eastern and Western Front.

Enemy oil and ammunition depots also suffered attacks. The most important of these was the elaborate KLEIN - ENGSTINGEN ammunition depot south of REUTLINGEN (X 1085) and probable filling plant. It was used to supply enemy troops on the First French Army front.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

#1 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

143

P-356

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U.S. Army

:::::::::::::::::::
:SECRET :
:By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: :
:Date: 14 April 1945:
:::::::::::::::::::

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 30

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 14 APRIL 1945

I. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

A. Enemy Activities in Forward Areas and Units in Contact.

With the enemy lines in a generally fluid condition along the entire Western Front, there is left some semblance of order only on the front of the US 6th Army Group. With a relatively huge rear area still under his command in this zone, the enemy has been able to maintain fairly good organizational control of his dwindling troops.

The 6th US Army Group is facing the remnants of Army Group G (First and Seventh Armies) and the Nineteenth Army. Along the Rhine and east to STUTTGART the Nineteenth Army controls approximately 8,000 Fortress troops with 8 artillery battalions and 8,500 combat infantry effectives organized into 10 nominal divisions, supported by 40/50 tanks and SP guns. The mobile artillery consists of 20 divisional battalions, including Anti-aircraft Artillery in ground support role.

First Army, from STUTTGART to the NURNBERG area, controls 15,000 combat infantry effectives in 9 divisional formations supported by approximately 100 SP guns and tanks. The mobile artillery is estimated at 20 battalions, including dual purpose Anti-aircraft guns.

Seventh Army, from the NURNBERG area to the BAYREUTH area, has 6 nominal divisions totalling 5,000 combat infantry effectives with approximately 40 SP guns and tanks. Mobile artillery is estimated at 11 battalions, including Anti-aircraft guns.

All line divisions are receiving reinforcements, but the rate of attrition keeps actual enemy strength at a fairly constant figure with diminishing quality.

(1) Enemy Forces Opposing 6th US Army Group

ARMY	COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES	ARTILLERY BATTALIONS	TANKS/SP
Nineteenth	8,500	20	40-50
First	15,000	20	100
Seventh	5,000	11	40
T O T A L S	28,500	51	180-190

B. Enemy Forces on the Western Front

The number of nominal divisions along the remainder of the Western Front is 34, of which 19 are surrounded in the RUHR pocket. None of these troops could disengage rapidly enough to move to the 6th US Army Group front.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

C. Strategic Reserves

1. GERMANY (including DENMARK)

There are no known organized divisional reserves within Germany. Contact with the so-called administrative divisions (e.g. 409, 413, 407) controlling miscellaneous ersatz and training units in the military districts, was forced on the enemy as our lines advanced against their home bases rather than through any movement on their part. A few "name" battlegroups (e.g. HAMBURG, FRANCONIA, THURINGIA, DONAU) were made up of better quality personnel from those localities, but that source is now also practically exhausted. The training areas of Wehrkreis V, VII, XIII, and XVIII, within the zone of advance of 6th US Army Group, will contain a substantial number of combed out personnel who can serve to keep the front line units at fair strength. However, their lack of mobility and materiel will decisively limit their use.

2. NORWAY

Of the 12 divisions in NORWAY, it is now estimated that none can affect the battle on the 6th US Army Group front. Junction of the American and Russian Armies will close their route of approach completely.

3. ITALY

Of the 24 divisions in ITALY, it is estimated that a strategic withdrawal could free 10, at the rate of 2 divisions per month under favorable transportation conditions. However, a Russian advance west of Vienna coupled with Allied pressure in ITALY could prevent movement except on the extremely limited BRENNER pass line.

4. RUSSIAN FRONT

The failure to hold VIENNA cost the enemy not only his last effective mobile force in South East Germany (Sixth SS Panzer Army), but also forced the commitment of an estimated 3 divisions from Italy and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Russian successes in the North and Center have probably permitted strengthening of their forces on the Austrian - Czechoslovak front. It is believed that this front must still enjoy a priority over the Southwestern German front. Therefore, it is highly improbable that any divisions would be released from Austria to the Western Front.

D. Movements and Defenses in Rear Areas.

1. Movement

Road and rail facilities are sufficient in all of Southern Germany to provide the enemy full freedom of movement, given the means of transportation. Good rail and road nets provide several alternate routes within the area, even after access to it may have been closed. However, the shortage of means of transportation and the approach of practically continuous good bombing weather will rapidly cut down his already limited mobility.

2. Defenses

Manmade defenses are available to the enemy in the Siegfried Line along the Rhine, to some extent along the Swiss Border, and most probably facing the Czechoslovak border. None of these should present any serious difficulty to Allied advances in a southerly direction.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The imminent junction of the American and Russian Armies in the DRESDEN area will divide the enemy armies in Germany into two main bodies. The northern armies will deteriorate rapidly in strength, being left with no large source of reinforcements and in terrain unfavorable for defense. In addition, they will be dependent entirely on present stocks of materiel. Finally, they will be subject to immediate encirclement and subsequent partition by strong Allied armored columns.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The southern group of German armies will be in a more favorable position. Enemy troops retreating from the Italian, Yugoslav, Austrian and Czechoslovak fronts will be initially able to gather together behind natural mountain and river barriers. Forces now in southern Germany can retreat gradually and concentrically behind similar natural terrain barriers along their entire front and with both the flanks and rear protected. With no dnager of encirclement, the enemy will be able to maintain a cohesive front line whose strength can for a period actually be increased, as long as the rate of withdrawal is controlled by the enemy. There are undoubtedly within the area already fair stocks of supplies and materiel. As the enemy retreats, more supplies will be available from the stocks being evacuated steadily from outside Germany.

Although there is as yet no firm evidence of a National Redoubt on a long-term planning basis, the turn of military events will actually force upon the enemy a concentration of all his resources in southeastern Germany. It is not believed that the German Army as a whole will surrender. His only capability is still that of retreat and consolidation of forces along a gradually constricting perimeter. However, it is a capability which he can continue to exercise for a considerable length of time, unless his front be pierced simultaneously and deeply at several points.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. GEUTENREUTH (O 5371), WEISMAIN (O 5070), HOLLFELD (O 5454), BAMBERG (O 2547), UNT STEINBACH (O 0247), DOTTENHEIM (O 0009), RUCKERTSHOFEN (S 7696), CREGLINGEN (S 6699), BLAUFELDEN (S 6280), KIRCHHEIM (S 0350), BIETINGHEIM (S 0240), PFORZHEIM (R 7032), SCHOMBERG (R 6621), SPROLLENHAUS (R 5611), BUHL (R 2910, ONSBACH (R 2100), ZIEROLSHOFEN (R 1201), South along Rhine to border of Switzerland.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY). The division's contemplated move to the northeast did not materialize completely, as Allied pressure forced the commitment of divisional elements in the BAMBERG area. The division put up only scattered resistance against our crossings of the Main River north of BAMBERG. Its sector includes the region to the north of the town. Other elements of the division were reported still further north, at J 1547, on 11 April. The division's strength was raised somewhat by the inclusion of several miscellaneous battle groups. Combat infantry strength of divisional units on our front is 600.

2 Panzer Division (CO: Col. von LAUCHERT). A captured document dated 2 April showed showed the composition of the division to be as follows: 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (BG JUNG, 59 and 71 PG Repl Bns and 300 Pz Repl Bn), Battle Group SCHLUECHTERN, 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (1 and 15 PG Repl Bns, BG DOERR, BG PANDOERFER), a German Air Force Jaeger Battalion, 38 Panzer Engineer Battalion. Attached were 8 Company 410 and 6 Company 1056 Volks Artillery Corps, Tank Co WILDFLECKEN and 257 Tank Destroyer Company. Elements of the division were identified north of SCHWEINFURT on 8 and 9 April. They are now believed to hold a sector in the LICHTENFELS (O 3777) area. Elements of Panzer Regiment BRANDENBURG are also part of 2 Panzer Division. Combat infantry strength of the division is estimated at 1,000.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was practically annihilated during the period. Brigadier General FRANZ, its former commanding general, was captured with his Chief of Staff and Artillery Commander. FRANZ stated that only about 100 combat infantry effectives remained. These had been committed between 2 Panzer and 413 Mobilization Divisions. It had the mission of holding the Saale River line

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) kept all three grenadier regiments in close contact throughout the period. Some elements were trapped when friendly troops surrounded SCHWEINFURT. The rest was again in danger of being cut off as the result of Allied crossings on the Main River on both divisional flanks, at N 8561 and N 9361. However, the remains of the division escaped to the BAMBERG area where it was for a second time, within a week, harshly treated. The division attempted to maintain its strength by cannibalizing battle groups, but casualties were heavy in all regiments. Combat infantry strength of remaining units is approximately 900.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). All major units of this division were identified on 9 April along the Main south of SCHWEINFURT. General PFLIEGER was said to be organizing battle groups and to be integrating these with the few remaining organic elements of the division. The resulting conglomeration had the mission of defending the Main River, particularly to prevent a breakthrough to SCHWEINFURT. Our attacks, which weremet by a considerable opposition, forced a withdrawal to a line running from N 8652 to N 8740. The combat infantry strength of the remaining forces is about 700.

413 Mobilization Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORNEMANN) continues to administer Wehrkreis XIII replacement units. Many of these were identified on our front during the period. Some of them were absorbed by field divisions. One group is committed under operational command of 413 Division between COBURG and BAMBERG. Armored and mobile units are under command of Battle Group MASSENBACH (see below). Initial strength of some of the battalions was as high as 900, but casualties were severe, especially in view of the poor calibre and insufficient training of the personnel. Combat infantry strength of Wehrkreis XIII units presently committed under tactical control of 413 Division is approximately 1,500.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Battle Group MASSENBACH (CO: Col. MASSENBACH) is also known as "Panzer Verband XIII." It is comprised of armored and mobile replacement units of Wehrkreis XIII. These are committed directly east of WURZBURG in the general area N 82 - 83. There appears to be no operational dependence on 413 Mobilization Division. Combat infantry effectives amount to around 1,200.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)

The First German Army reacted strongly in order to create an orderly Order of Battle situation out of chaos. Numerous miscellaneous units, mostly newly arrived replacements were put under the centralized control of its divisions both in line and in reserve. The divisions of the army 9, 16, 79, 212, 246, 553, and 719 Volksgrenadier, 2 Mountain, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 409 Mobilization all did satisfactorily and have created a fairly stable line in their sectors of operation. They have managed, so far at least, to delay in an orderly fashion.

(a) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

409 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KLEIKAMP) continued to exercise administrative control over the remaining Wehrkreis IX replacement units. Almost all replacement battalions known to belong to Wehrkreis IX were contacted during the past two periods. Many of them were absorbed by field divisions in a speed-up of the orthodox replacement system. Others were committed independently in the general area of Q 04. Similar to Wehrkreis XIII, most of these battalions had a relatively high initial strength but suffered heavily due to inexperienced personnel and inadequate defensive preparations. The units' mobility is particularly poor. Combat infantry effectives of Wehrkreis IX outfits that are operating independently total about 2,000.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col von HOBE) had been virtually destroyed in the SAAR-PALATINATE. A few remnants of 179 Artillery Regiment, consolidated in Battle Group MOECKEL, were met near the Main bend south-east of WURZBURG. They are presently holding in area N 91. The reorganization of the rest of the division was claimed to be planned. The divisionsl staff was reported in the general vicinity. Its chief function was to gather and control straggler groups. Strength of elements now in line is about 200. The commitment of reinforcements is to be expected.

19 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) was contacted on 11 April when Battle Group RUECKER (73 VGR) was identified at S 5965. The division had been practically annihilated and remnants were reported absorbed by other units. Its refittal is probably very incomplete and combat infantry strength is judged at 1,000.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG) now functions as a staff coordinating its own remnants with a variety of battle groups (principally BG BAYREUTH, BG SACHS, and SS BG DUERNAGEL). Possibly some of these are destined to become organic divisional elements. The division put up an extremely stubborn fight on the left flank of our CRAILSHEIM salient. Its determined counterattacks, in combination with 9 Volksgrenadier Division, forced our withdrawal from this area. Combat infantry effectives, including these battle groups, add up to approximately 1,800.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) lost heavily in its powerful counterattacks against the CRAILSHEIM salient. 116 Volksgrenadier Regiment temporarily ceased to exist when its remnants were subordinated to 57 Volksgrenadier Regiment. 36 Volksgrenadier Regiment has long been reported as reforming but has not yet been contacted. 2 Alpine Regiment, composed of 98 and 99 Reserve Mountain Battalions in GARMISCH and SONTHOFFEN, is believed to be attached to the division. Combat infantry strength, including the Alpine Regiment, is about 1,200.

(b) XIII Corps (CG:)

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER). Some elements of the division are still believed to be holding along the Neckar River south of HEILBRONN. The staff, however, shifted eastward and is now responsible for the line south of the Kocher River in the area S 37 - S 47. The division defended both the Jagst and the Kocher River lines with determination. Its strength was bolstered by the absorption of several battle groups. Regiment ROSENHEIM is probably attached. Including this attachment, but excluding elements remaining in the HEILBRONN area, combat infantry effectives add up to about 1,500.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) is once again in relatively good shape, having received a large number of replacements from the depot units of 1, 9, and 12 SS Panzer Divisions. Most of these are extremely young. However, their fanaticism compensates for their age and lack of training. The division stubbornly contested our crossings of the Jagst and Kocher Rivers. It was supported by a number of tanks and assault guns probably belonging to 653 Tank Battalion (GHQ). Combat infantry strength, including the attached Battle Group NORD, is estimated at 2,500.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) shifted its few remaining elements to the east. It was responsible for a fairly short sector at the confluence of the Neckar and the Jagst, later of the Neckar and the Kocher Rivers. There are still no reports of replacements from this division. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was given responsibility for the defense of HEILBRONN, a mission which it executed with considerable elan. Only at the end of the period did Allied forces manage to clear the town. The division was supported by several tanks and self propelled guns and by three Wehrkreis V replacement battalions. The division has not been contacted since the fall of HEILBRONN. Its combat infantry strength, including these battalions, is about 1,800.

719 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) still has only a few remnants to is name. These are committed south of HEILBRONN along the Neckar around S 0555. No replacements have been reported and combat infantry strength is still carried at 400.

c. NINETEENTH GERMAN ARMY (CG: SS. Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

Reacting to the Allied advance the Nineteenth Army reinforced its right flank by shifting the 716 Infantry Division from the lower Black Forest to the PFORZHEIM area and by committing a new arrival, the reconstituted 106 Infantry Division, previously destroyed on the Eastern Front.

Nineteenth Army presently has control over three Corps: XVIII SS, LXIV, and LXXX Corps.

(1) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN). Remnants of this division were recontacted in Battle Group MEIER on 6 April. In addition to this battle group, the staff apparently controls some elements of 553 Volksgrenadier Division and two Wehrkreis V replacement battalions. These now hold a sector from S 0551 to S 0345. Combat infantry effectives total not more than 1,000.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is fighting with its back to the Neckar in the general area S.04. Its status has remained basically unchanged as replacements were approximately sufficient to balance casualties. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,400.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) now consists of two organic regiments and the Fusilier Battalion. The division has stayed in loose contact throughout the period. It was reported to have come under command of 16 Volksgrenadier Division. This, however, lacks confirmation. The divisional sector is in area R 9637. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,000.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL). A captured document dated 2 April shows that 225 Volksgrenadier Regiment also absorbed elements of 137 Mountain Regiment (2 Mtn Div). 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment is composed of the old I Battalion 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 325 and 460 Replacement Battalions. Unit GUGELBERGER contains Wehrkreis Battalion 111 and 16 Fusilier Battalion. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment is apparently dissolved. The division is responsible for the line east of PFORZHEIM, in area R 73 - 83. Combat infantry strength amounts to about 1,200.

(2) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) lost its 726 Grenadier Regiment to 106 Infantry Division. 716 Division, uncontacted since the end of the COLMAR pocket campaign in February, has been partially rehabilitated by the absorption of Landesschuetzen, Volkssturm, and other miscellaneous units. The division's main line of resistance was given in a captured document as

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PFORZHEIM to NEUENBURG (R 6328). This corresponds very closely to the line currently held by the division. Combat infantry effectives are estimated to be 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) received considerable replacements from the Volkssturm and combed out its own service troops. The division put up a rather feeble defense as it was pushed southward from south-east of KARLSRUHE to south-east of RASTATT during the week. Its sector was curtailed in the west by the commitment of 106 Infantry Division. Brigadier General SEIDEL, the former division commander, was killed in action. The Engineer Battalion was committed as infantry. The divisional Assault Gun Company was reduced to 4 Jagdpanther. Combat infantry strength is about 1,500.

106 Infantry Division (CG:) made its debut on the Western Front last week. It had been destroyed in the east and was partially reconstituted by the absorption of 726 Grenadier Regiment of 716 Infantry Division, 728 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 708 Volksgrenadier Division, and miscellaneous units from the Black Forest. Included in these is XVIII Grenadier Battalion OBERRHEIN of 8 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN, previously reported in Brigade BAUER. Possibly all of Brigade BAUER has been absorbed by 106 Division. The division forms Nineteenth Army's anchor to the Rhine. So far its performance has not been inspiring. It fell back readily under Allied pressure. Divisional combat infantry effectives add up to about 1,500.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) is still out of contact. As the sector which it was believed to hold has been overrun by friendly troops, the division's continued existence is doubted.

(3) XVIII SS Corps (CG:)

This Corps has probably assumed administrative and operational control of all the SIEGFRIED Line remaining in German hands opposite French Alsace.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKMENN) is known to have lost its 728 Volksgrenadier Regiment to 106 Infantry Division and elements of its Engineer Battalion to 405 Reserve Division. These indications point to a dissolution of the division.

405 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEEGER). A document captured on 13 April shows the division to contain 4, 10, and 14 Grenadier Regiments OBERRHEIN and elements of 708 Engineer Battalion. If, as was believed, the division is responsible for the right bank of the Rhine in the KEHL region, its early commitment is to be expected. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,500.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN). No change.

Brigade BAUER (CO:). 8 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN, previously reported as belonging to this Brigade, was encountered in 106 as part of Infantry Division. It is possible that the entire Brigade has been absorbed by 106 Division.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ECKSTEIN). The status of this division cannot be any higher than 716 or 106 Volksgrenadier Divisions previously commited, its personnel having been drawn from the same source, namely Landesschutzen, Volkssturm and other miscellaneous units. Equipment and training is of low standard.

1005 Brigade (CG: .) No change.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. ENEMY STRENTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

Nineteenth German Army	8,500
First German Army	15,000
Seventh German Army	5,000
T O T A L	28,500
Reserves: (Estimated)	
Nineteenth German Army	2,000
First German Army	------
Seventh German Army	------
T O T A L	30,500
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Nineteenth German Army	40-50
First German Army	100
Seventh German Army	40
T O T A L	180-190

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5230), MT FROID (H 4255), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEUAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), AUTION (N 7412), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

I GENERAL

The enemy's attitude on the Alpine Front remaind defensive. However, improved atmospheric conditions and his desire to obtain information on Allied intentions and dispositions may account for his increased patrol activities. While abstaining from any aggressive patrolling on the northernmost flank (MONT BLANC), he displayed increased initiative in the ST. BERNARD area, trying to advance his outpost line into French territory. In the contral sector, his patrol activities were centered southwest of MONT GENEVRE.

II ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The defensive mission to hold the Alpine Front is entrusted to elements of two German Divisions (5 Mtn Div and 34 Inf Div) and two Italian divisions (LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divs). With the exception of the 34 Infantry Division which is holding its own sector, elements of the 5 Mountain Division are intermingled in the central and northern sectors with elements of the LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divisions.

34 German Infantry Division is occupying the southern sector from GRIMALDI to ST MARTIN VESUBIE with two regiments in line (253 and 107 GR) and one regiment (80 GR) in reserve. In addition, the 34 Replacement Battalion and 34 Engineer Battalion have been identified in that area during the period.

LITTORIO Division. The 3rd Regiment, supported by an AT Company, is holding a portion of the central sector from ST MARTIN VESUBIE to LARCHE while the 4th Regiment intermingled with elements of the German 100 Mountain Regiment is holding the northern sector (Col. Du St BERNARD).

MONTE ROSA Division is stretched along a wide front from COL DE L. GALISE to the ACCRGLIO River, intermingled with elements of the German 100 and 85 Mountain Regiments (5 Mtn Div), holding the central sector with two regiments, reinforced by the FOLGORE Parachute Regiment.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5 German Mountain Division (CO: Col. STEETS apparently vice Gen SCHRANK) It is not quite clear as to how much of the division has remained on the Alpine Front. Elements of the division were withdrawn in January (the 4th comapnies of the 1/85 and II/100 Mountain Regiments). Elements of the 100 Mountain Regiment are still being identified in the northern sector (ST BERNARD) and in the central sector (between BARDONNECHIA and COL DE LA GALISE). According to PWs, the division has also under its command two "Gebirgsnachrichten Abteilungen" in addition to the 95 Aufklaerungsabteilung. These units, however, have not been identified as yet.

III ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

The enemy's attitude indicates his determination to hold on the Alpine Front, in order to protect the right flank of his divisions still fighting in the Apponines. He obviously did not feel secure enough to entrust the defense of this important flank to the Italian Command and Italian units. He therefore chose a compromise solution by using Italian units intermingled with German, retaining the German control of that front, however. While holding the present line, the enemy is engaged extensively in building defenses in the rear areas, especially along the axis of penetration leading into the LOMBARDY Plain through the PETIT ST BERNARD, MONT CENIS, MONT GENEVRE and COL DE LARCHE. According to reports of the French SRA, the remainder of the MONTE ROSA Division, until lately located on the APENNINE Front, has been transferred to the PIEDONT area. This change indicates the enemy's intentions to increase the Italian garrison, possibly in view of a further withdrawal of German units which might be badly needed elsewhere in case of a general withdrawal from the APENNINES.

The morale of the Italian troops is definitely at a low ebb. German units display on the whole a better fighting stamina, although German prisoners of war taken lately also show an increased war weariness. This may be partially explained by the high percentage of Austrians in the 5 Mountain Division.

The enemy's capabilities on the Alpine Front are strictly defensive. In view, however, of the questionable value of Italian units and the signs of lowering of morale among German units, the defensive capability of the enemy will be gradually restricted and he may be reduced in the near future to the problem of extricating his German units from the Alpine Front.

4. WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

A. ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN FORWARD AREAS AND UNITS IN CONTACT.

There are approximately 30,000 well equipped and supplied troops located in the 6th Army Group area on the Western Atlantic Front. This total is made up of 15,000 combat infantry effectives, 9,000 artillery and miscellaneous troops, and 6,000 non-combatant troops. These troops are distributed as follows:

	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY AND MISCELLANEOUS	NON-COMBATANTS	TOTAL
POINT DE GRAVE	2,300	1,700	1,000	5,000
ROYAN	4,000	2,500	2,000	8,500
LA ROCHELLE	7,500	3,000	3,000	13,500
ILE DE OLERON	700	800		1,500
ILE DE RE	600	800	400	1,800
	15,100	8,800	6,400	30,300

They are supported by the following Artillery and Anti-Aircraft pieces.

	LIGHT-MEDIUM (155 mm)	MEDIUM-HEAVY (over 155 mm)	ANTI-AIRCRAFT
POINT DE GRAVE	80	6	12
ROYAN	116	5	53
LA ROCHELLE	210	10	93
ILE DE OLERON	34		20
ILE DE RE	43	12	20
	483	33	198

In addition there are a few old-type tanks available at LA ROCHELLE.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The mixed enemy garrison of German ground, air and naval personnel have been retrained to fit into the newly created situation. The sttitude of these troops varies from a strong determination to resist to a desire to desert. However, it is believed that control over all can be managed for some time.

Opposition can be expected to be strongest in the LA ROCHELLE sector, where the garrison has been carefully trained for somo time, and reinforcements have recently arrived from ST NAZAIRE. Defensive action in all sectors in the 6th Army Group zone will be initially marked by an enemy withdrawal from his outpost positions to his main defense line for a stand.

Food stocks in the areas are adequate for about two months without further replenishment. However, his ammunition supply can be adequate for a maximum of 15 days of intense fighting.

1. Reserves

The only possible reserves available to the enemy are the garrison troops of ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT. They total about 23,000 and 25,000 men respectively. These troops can be made available in our area only by employing small craft on the sea. However, a serious reduction in the total garrisons of either would make each untenable in the face of available Allied forces. Also the question of supply redistribution will be of paramount importance if a transfer of forces should take place between the garrisons in the Western Atlantic Sector.

2. Conclusion

It is estimated that no large forces will be made available from the ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT Garrisons to augment the troops now in 6th Army Group zone. The enemy's main defense will be based on the well constructed perimeter positions around the critical points.

B. MOVEMENT AND DEFENSES IN REAR AREAS

1. Terrain of LA ROCHELLE Area.

The area occupied by the German armed forces in LA ROCHELLE covers approximately 400 square kilometers. This district is well protected in the north by the swamps of LA SEVERE and in the south by those of DEFOURAS. In the east, swampy valleys run along both sides of the CURE and the AIGREFEUILLE. A ridge-line running northwest-southeast divides the area into two portions and constitutes the only possible axis of attack on the sector.

2. Movement

The rear areas of the enemy controlled sections of Western France are very small and there is little need for motor transport. Communications between all these garrisons in Western France will be carried out by ship as no land communications exists betwen them.

3. Defenses

(1) POINTE DE GRAVE

The land approach to the POINTE DE GRAVE is defended by an anti-tnak ditch, wire and a mine field stretching from the western bank of the Gironde River to the ATLANTIC and completely cutting the defended area from the land. These are supported by anti-tank guns and automatic weapons. Little concrete is present in this defense line. However, the nature of the terrain permits only a few routes of approach, and these are well defended by strong points. The ATLANTIC coast is defended by a number of casemated coastal batteries and underwater obstacles. Apart from a few guns on the northern tip, and a few field pieces, these will not be able to interfere with an attack on ROYAN.

(2) ROYAN

The land approaches to ROYAN are defended by a line of outposts, backed by a belt of minefields completely surrounding the town of ROYAN proper and anti-tank ditch and much wire. These are supported by a number of artillery strong-points.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Minefields are reported surrounding the entire peninsula, and a number of strongpoints are distributed through its northwestern area.

Underwater obstacles and a number of casemated coastal batteries defend the sea approach. Several heavy batteries on the POINTE DE LA COUBRE (N / tip of peninsula) have been reported altered to fire on a 360° angle. Ground sources have later reported them as having been removed.

(3) LA ROCHELLE

LA ROCHELLE is protected against a land attack by an anti-tank ditch doubled by mine fields and barbed wire. Further support is gained by a number of pillboxes, casemated anti-tank guns, and strong points. In the north, several canals form natural anti-tank barriers. A number of pillboxes and artillery casemates form additional strongpoints within the perimeter of the defended zone. There is an additional defense belt cutting off LA PALLICE from the rest of the LA ROCHELLE area. This consists of mine fields, wire and short lengths of anti-tank ditches supported by artillery strongpoints.

The coastal defense is defended by casemated artillery and underwater obstacles.

(4) ILE D'OLERON

Similar to ILE DE RE, this island is protected by under water obstacles and casemated and field batteries distributed along its coast. These are mostly 75 mm, 105 mm, and 155 mm guns. There are no heavy batteries on the island.

(5) ILE DE RE

The defense of this island is aided by underwater obstacles, and casemated coastal and field batteries well distributed along the entire coast. These are mostly of 75 mm to 105 mm caliber with a few 155 mm guns. However, the northwestern tip has several batteries of heavy guns.

CONCLUSIONS

Complete isolation of the garrisons in the Atlantic ports delimits the enemy's capabilities. With no possibility of reinforcements or freedom of maneuver, the enemy can only resist the siege by manning his prepared defensive positions. The enemy may be expected to resist strongly in order to protect these submarine bases, but his will to resist should crack before he has expended his full resources.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. OPERATIONS

a. RHINE FRONT

The front along the Rhine from BASLE to STRASBOURG remained generally quiet. No patrol activity was reported and artillery fire was very light. The German Nineteenth Army was busily occupied redisposing troops in an attempt to meet the Allied thrust driving into the Black Forest from the north.

b. SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

As the period opened the advance of friendly troops was slowed by strong resistance from Siegfried positions south of WORSCH (R 4040) and ETTLINGEN (R 4938). Opposition weakened somewhat on 8 April as that portion of PFORZHEIM, north of the Enz River, was cleared. LXIV Corps offered stubborn opposition to the crossing of the Enz River at DURRMENZ (R 8139) on 8 April and attempted to maintain an intact line along the river. South of KARLSRUHE, the Black Forest was entered against disorganized resistance. RASTATT and the Murg Canal were outflanked and the city was cleared on 12 April. By the end of the period, the Rhine plain opposite STRASBOURG had been reached. BADEN BADEN had been cleared and the Black Forest had been penetrated as far south as GAUSBACH (R 4610). Along the Neckar, LXXX Corps had fallen back but was defending stubbornly the approaches to LUDWIGSBURG (S 0633) and STUTTGART (S 0520).

East of the Neckar River and south of the Jagst River, the enemy defended stubbornly. Reinforcements were hurriedly brought forward and repeated attempts made to close the CRAILSHEIM corridor. Coordinated air-ground attacks were made and on 9 April, on which day 101 enemy aircraft were reported over the area. As a result of heavy enemy opposition, Allied forces withdrew from the corridor early 11 April. HEILBRONN was stubbornly defended until 11 April when the enemy withdrew to take up positions east of the city. The Jagst River line was held until 9 April when an orderly withdrawal was made to the Kocher River. Here the enemy held until 12 April when expanding Allied bridgeheads once again forced the enemy into a withdrawal to maintain the integrity of his line.

The Main and Tauber Rivers south of SCHWEINFURT (N 7983) were strongly defended by miscellaneous battle group formations. In spite of the continued arrival of reinforcements of men and armor and a determined defensive attitude, enemy forces were pushed back from ten to fifteen kilometers in this area during the period. SCHWEINFURT was outflanked from the north but the enemy put up a stubborn defense of the city. Heavy resistance from small arms and 88 mm artillery delayed friendly forces on the approaches but the city was entered on 11 April. After heavy house - to - house fighting during the entire day, enemy resistance finally collapsed. East of SCHWEINFURT, the Main River was crossed from north to south on the morning of 14 April against short-lived but heavy opposition. In this action, the enemy lost 1,820 prisoners, 400 killed and wounded, and 20 tanks and 8 X 88 mm anti-aircraft guns were knocked out.

As the period closed, the enemy was stubbornly trying to hold across the Black Forest and the Neckar - Main Hills, but the superiority of friendly forces was making his task increasingly difficult. German opposition became weak and disorganized as Allied spearheads swept southeast between BAMBERG and BAYREUTH.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Although poor weather hindered observations at the opening of the current period, clearing skies afforded good coverage of enemy activity throughout the greater part of the week. Persistent Allied advances forced the enemy to shift his previously used routes for trrop and supply movements to roads and railroads further to the east.

Marshalling yards and rail lines throughout the BAMBERG (O 2649) - AUGSBURG (Y 3580) - REGENSBURG (U 2055) area were reported active on nearly all days of the period, but it did not appear that any large scale connected rail moves were taking place. In fact, except for the 11th of April when most of the movement seen on the NURNBERG - REGENSBURG rail line was to the southeast, it seemed that only normal two-way traffic of supplies and reinforcements was being maintained. However, the widespread vehicular activity observed throughout this same area on 9, 10 and 12 April presented an entirely different picture. In this case it was obvious that the bulk of traffic, which was largely horse-drawn, was moving east. Much of this activity appeared to be of a civilian nature, possibly indicating large scale evacuation throughout this region. The fact that several large groups of pedestrians were seen moving in an easterly direction along roads in this sector on these same days adds to the belief that many civilians are fleeing this area. On 10 April, a total of approximately 300 horse-drawn transports was observed moving mostly northeast in the vicinity of DONAUWORTH (T 2417) and on 12 April about 600 other vehicles, the greater part of which were civilian horse-drawn carts, were seen moving east in the area centering about SCHESSLITZ (O 3559). Some military vehicles and scattered troop convoys appeared to be intermixed with these civilian transports.

Moderately heavy rail and road activity was noted throughout the STUTTGART - AALEN (T 7328) - ULM (X 6880) area on 10 and 11 April probably representing the movement of some reinforcements and supplies for enemy forces in that region. Light fighters also spotted heavy road traffic moving west toward STUTTGART during the night of 8 - 9 April and aerial reconnaissance reports of 9, 10 and 11 April revealed widespread activity in the STUTTGART, AALEN and ULM marshalling yards. The heaviest military activity was seen in this sector on 11 April when 3 military rakes, 10 groups of scattered boxcars and 6 scattered trains were sighted on the STUTTGART - ULM line.

7. EFFECTS OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS

Tactical and strategic air forces both operated in the Sixth Army Group area in the past week. These attacks, which were carried out on a large scale and over a wide area, hit the enemy at his most vulnerable points: Oil, ammunition, and ordnance. In addition to bombardment of specific supply targets, a number of marshalling yards were hit, all of which have been shown by recent reconnaissance to be centers of rail activity.

Most of the important POL storage depots in southern GERMANY were included in the program of attacks. In the opinion of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee on Oil, the virtual elimination of gasoline producing and refining facilities has greatly increased the importance and activity of storage capacity, and the air operations of the past week should have a significant effect on the enemy's already sorry gasoline position. The Eighth Air Force hit four major active POL depots well to the east of our front and may have affected enemy operations against the Russians as well as against the advance from the west. Medium bombers of First Tactical Air Force attacked the two most important active depots close in to the Sixth Army Group front, GEISLINGEN (S 5505) and WEISSENHORN (X 7970), with considerable success. Following the attack on GEISLINGEN on 10 April, smoke was seen to a height of 10,000 feet, and large explosions were experienced over WEISSENHORN.

Two of the enemy's largest ammunition installations in southwest GERMANY were severely blasted by medium bombers. The storage area at KLEIN ENGSTINGEN (X 1677), south of REUTLINGEN (X 0988), was twice more attacked following the bombardment of the previous week. Photographic cover shows 460 hits within the area, with extensive damage to shelters, warehouses, rolling stock, and the road and rail network. Large tonnages were also dropped on STRASS ammunition depot and filling plant in the ULM (X 6780) area. This depot is reported to have loaded 70 - 100 rail cars daily, or the equivalent of about 1500 tons. Photographic cover had shown it be be an elaborate complex of military buildings, warehouses, barracks, and at least 100 ammunition shelters. A filling-assembly plant is also believed to be operating in the area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1490 - 250.000

These attacks on large enemy ammunition installations are expected to affect ammunition supplies in the field almost immediately, as it is believed that the enemy is living off his depot stocks more than new production at the present time.

The effectiveness of attacks on ordnance depots is probably on the same order of magnitude; prisoner of war reports of weapon shortages, particularly among replacement troops, are very frequent. In the past week, ordnance depots on the Sixth Army Group front were attacked by heavy bombers at LANDSHUT (U 2603) and REGENSBURG (U 2055), and by the Ninth Air Force at AMBERG (O 9901) and KEMPTEN (X 9306).

The attacks on the marshalling yards were well-timed. All of the major yards hit had been reported by reconnaissance as centres of heavy rail activity. On 11 April, the Eighth Air Force bombed the yards at LANDSHUT (U-2603), INGOLSTADT (T 7225) (T 7225), TREUCHTLINGEN (T 3244), and DONAUWORTH (T 2417); on the same date the INGOLSTADT yard was seen to be active with four 45-car trains. Also on 11 April, the Royal Air Force hit two yards in south GERMANY, including almost 500 tons on NURNBERG (O 4200), which has been a hub of activity for over a week.

Eugene Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

#1 Inc - Enemy Disposition - A
#2 Inc - Enemy Disposition - B
#3 Inc - Tab 2

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

.200/APR 45/660 6076

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 14 1200 B APRIL

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1-A TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #30

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

.200/APR 45/660 6077

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 14 1200 B APRIL

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1-B TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #30

REPRODUCED BY ENEMY SEC. 6TH ARMY GROUP APRIL 45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ALPINE AREA

SCALE 1/1,000,000

L - LITTORIO

M. R. - MONTE ROSA

NOTE:

RED UNITS - GERMAN

BLACK UNITS - ITALIAN

ENEMY DISPOSITION AS OF 14 1200 B APRIL

.200/APR 45/660 6078

SECRET

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #30

SECRET

119

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: L. P. S.
Date: 21 April 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 31

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 21 APRIL 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G under its new commanding general, Lieutenant General SCHULZ, had insufficient forces to man properly its entire front from east of STUTTGART to the Thuringian Forest. The shifting of some forces from west to east, although temporarily strengthening the junction between First and Seventh Armies, so reduced the effectiveness of its forward positions in the SCHWABISH HALL (S 4658) area that a deep penetration was made on this flank of the Army Group. A gap has been created in this vicinity. The effects of this penetration will probably result in the driving back of the Army Group as far as the Danube River providing its partition and partial destruction does not ensue in the meantime.

The difficult POL situation and lack of adequate motor transport presently existing in this area have greatly restricted the enemy's ability to maneuver. He has been forced to defend selected strongpoints, more in the nature of blocking positions, rather than attempt the establishment of a coordinated defense line.

The rate of attrition in these rapid actions is continuing to be almost equal to the rate of reinforcements and garrisons encountered in Allied routes of advance. Certainly Army Group G can have no other mission than to stand and defend the rapidly shrinking Reich. To give it the mission of protecting approaches to strategic areas would compel it to wage a war of maneuver which is yet further removed from its capabilities.

Seventh German Army was forced to yield much ground along its entire front. The arrival of tanks for 2 and 11 Panzer Divisions and numerous training units for the infantry divisional staffs under its control cannot permit any change in its defensive attitude. The southward withdrawal of First German Army threatens to so weaken the forces protecting the flanks that Seventh Army is threatened with the necessity for independent operations.

First German Army was carrying out a general withdrawal along its entire front at the close of the period. During the week, the army not only continued to receive numerous reinforcements but also carried out considerable regrouping. 2 Mountain Division moved into the ANSBACH (T 0682) area where it incorporated elements of Division ALPEN. 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division was withdrawn from the HEILBRONN sector and placed in Army Group reserve subject to commitment for the defense of NUERNBERG, but failed to arrive in time. 198 Volksgrenadier Division moved from Nineteenth Army to First Army to replace 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division. To add greater strength to the right flank of the army, two newly formed regiments under command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division also appeared southeast of NUERNBERG. These attempts to create order were inadequate against the deep penetrations being made along its entire front. The lunge by US mobile forces completely split the sector of the front held by 198 and 553 Volksgrenadier Divisions and a breach deep into the army rear areas existed at the close of the period. Numerous prisoners of war have indicated that the enemy is intending to establish a defense line on the Danube River line.

Nineteenth German Army has been unable to produce any additional forces to cope with the French exploitation tactics in the Black Forest. This resulted in encirclement of STUTTGART from the west, in conjunction with US troops driving down from the east. The bulk of Nineteenth Army is threatened with annihilation, as its formations are being divided into small ineffective groups. 257 Volksgrenadier Division was split by the French drive to HORB (W 7083); in the area of PFORZHEIM, 2 regiments of 716 Volksgrenadier Division were surrounded and wiped out. 16 Volksgrenadier Division yielded its anti-tank battalion for the defense of NUERNBERG.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

On 19 April elements of 47 Volksgrenadier were identified attempting to withdraw from the pocket and on the next day available enemy forces were exerting most of their effort to keep the escape routes open while attempting to salvage as much as possible.

b. Capabilities

The enemy can only hope to delay on the Danube River before yielding Upper BAVARIA.

The task of holding the Allied drive towards the south is too large a burden for a weak Army Group and a thrice destroyed army. The enemy may hope to delay along the SUABIAN Alps and FRANCONIAN Hills. However, the positions are already being turned from the west. The only defense line possible to protect BAVARIA is the Danube River line.

Troops in sufficient numbers cannot be made available from the Russian or Italian Fronts until the MUNICH area has been reached. With the initiative clearly in Allied hands, the lack of mobility of enemy forces presently on our front, and the unavailability of reserves will leave the enemy unable to prevent our advance.

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: LAUTERECKEN (T 8093), NEUMARKT (T 7082), FEUCHT (T 5292), EICHELBURG (T 5076), CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), SULZDORF (S 5357), SCHWABISCH GMUND (S 5024), SALACH (S 4711), KIRCHHEIM (S 2606), OBER-URBACH (S 3525), WINNEDEN (S 2232), HOPFIGHEIM (S 1043), MUNCHINGEN (R 9929), LEONBERG (R 9323), BOBLINGEN (R 9310), SIELMINGEN (R 1109), REUTLINGEN (X 0989), DETTENSEE (W 7380), BALINGEN (W 8464), VILLINGEN (W 5340), KNIEBIS (W 4185), TENINGEN (W 0547), SASBACH (V 9048), South along Rhine to Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)

(1) Seventh German Army (CG:) (Left Flank Units)

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) kept all three grenadier regiments in close contact throughout the period. The division fell back from SCHWEINFURT to the NUERNBERG area, offering ineffective delaying action. Taking up positions east of the city, it joined with other units in offering stubborn opposition. All major elements of the division were last contacted southeast of NUERNBERG on 19 April. The division continued to absorb miscellaneous units but casualties were heavy in all regiments. The combat infantry strength of the division is difficult to estimate but is carried unchanged at 900.

SS Division NIBELUNGEN (CG:) was first reported to be forming about 25 March in the FREIBURG area of the Black Forest but it was withdrawn northeast to help meet the threat to the NUERNBERG-BAYREUTH area. The assembly area of the division was shown by a captured map to be east of GRAFENWOHR (P 0132) at P 1934. On 19 April, a prisoner from the division was taken at O 6392. The strength of the division has as yet been undetermined due to insufficient information.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. BOSCHMANN) was relieved in its old sector about 14 April to reorganize briefly and then to be committed in a more crucial area further to the east. A captured document revealed that it was intended for the defense of NUERNBERG. Both Panzer Grenadier Regiments and several auxiliary units were identified east of NUERNBERG on 18 April. The division is now holding the line SE of that city from T 7182 to T 4382. Supported by 653 Tank Battalion, the division launched several unsuccessful small scale counterattacks against our armoured spearhead. 17 SS Division is still in relatively good shape due to the replacements reported last week. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,300.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

719 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) left the HEILBRONN area early in the week and was encountered again north of NURNBERG where 766 Volksgrenadier Regiment was first identified. This regiment, shown by captured documents to be 719 Division's third organic regiment, came from BERLIN to join the division in the NURNBERG area. 697 Grenadier Regiment, previously part of 342 Infantry Division, is also reported as part of 719 Division. These regiments had a commitment strength of about 1,000 each but have sustained severe casualties in recent fighting. The division is presently disposed on a line running due south from the city to area T 4382. In conjunction with 256 Volksgrenadier Division, 719 Division forms a spur in the Allied East-West front. Such a position is untenable for any length of time, and both divisions must choose between retreat or annihilation. Some remnants of 416 Infantry and 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions are committed in the same area and are believed to be under command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division. Including these, the division's combat infantry effectives total 1,500.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). Divisional elements were identified offering stubborn resistance in the ancient defenses of the inner city. After losing practically all its combat troops, 256 Division staff seems to have assumed command of elements 1210 and 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiments, formerly of 159 Volksgrenadier Division, and of some miscellaneous units. Combat infantry strength of this group amounts to approximately 1,000.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

Division von HOBE (CO: Co. von HOBE) equates with the old Battle Group MASSENBACH or Panzer Verband XIII. Colonel MASSENBACH was relieved of his command due to inefficiency. The new commander was previously with 79 Volksgrenadier Division. Division von HOBE contains mobile and armored replacement units of Wehrkreis XIII. These are organized in Regiments HOLZINGEN, ZEITZ, and HEILBRONN, each of which has three battalion size battle groups. Attached to the division is Panzer Battalion VIERZIG, reported to have 24 Mark V and VI tanks. Division von HOBE is committed east of ANSBACH (T 0681) in general area T 27. Combat infantry strength is now estimated at 1,500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was bolstered considerably by the absorption of 1 Alpine Regiment. The latter came from Austria where it was formed from convalescents, German Air Force personnel, and stragglers. 2 Alpine Regiment had been identified last week in the CRAILSHEIM area. 2 Mountain Division shifted east from the HEILBRONN region and is now committed south of ANSBACH in area T 06 - T 16. It was in this area that 1 Alpine Regiment and several auxiliary units appeared at the beginning of this period. It had two battalions and was fairly well off in regard to strength and equipment. The original units of the division suffered heavy losses, but the addition of the Alpine Regiment balances these. Combat infantry strength total about 1,800.

616 Division zbV (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER). This division equates with Division RAESSLER of SAAR-PALATINATE fame. Its chief function is to gather, organize, and control straggler groups. It has committed a heterogeneous assortment of such south-west of ANSBACH in area S 97. Their combat infantry strength is roughly 1,500.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. HUMMEL?). According to a captured document dated 2 April, the composition of this division is as follows: Battle Group HOECKEL, Regiment GAVLL, Regiment RATH, and 179 Engineer Battalion. However, some changes have taken place since that date. Regiment GABLE, which is the same as Regiment BAYREUTH, was reported by prisoners now to be under command of 212 Volksgrenadier Division. Regiment RATH has received the number of the old 208 Volksgrenadier Regiment. The patched up division is responsible for the line south-east of ROTHENBURG (S 7788) in area S 87. Its combat infantry effectives do not exceed 1,000/

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) has been reorganized on the old numbered regimental basis. Battle Group SACHS became 316 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Battle Group REINWALD 320 Volksgrenadier Regiment. The composition of 423 Volksgrenadier Regiment is not known. The division has two artillery battalions. 2 Alpine Regiment was either absorbed by or attached to 212 Volksgrenadier Division. The division withdrew in a southeasterly direction and is now located around CRAILSHEIM (S 7062) in area S 76. Combat infantry strength including 2 Alpine Regiment, is estimated at 1,800.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) XIII Corps (CG)

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) also withdrew along a southeastern axis and is now holding west of CRAILSHEIM in area S 66. The division had a relatively uneventful week, and casualties were not heavy. 2 Alpine Regiment, previously attached to the division, is now under command of 212 Volksgrenadier Division (see above). Without it, combat infantry strength is approximately 1,200.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETTNER) retreated southward in a fairly orderly fashion until our armored breakthrough toward SCHORNDORF (S 3125) - GOPPINGEN (S 4114) outflanked its positions. This left 553 Volksgrenadier Division as the only divisional formation between SCHWABISCH HALL and GOPPINGEN, an impossibly long sector even for a good division. Combat infantry strength of organic elements is about 800.

c. Nineteenth German Army (CG:)

A weak delaying action turned into a complete rout as the Nineteenth Army was split into three separate portions by lightning Allied thrusts. XVIII SS Corps was left with insufficient forces to hold the Black Forest and Rhine fronts, as it was virtually cut off from the remainder of Nineteenth Army. LXXX Corps with elements of LXIV and XIII Corps under its command was desperately trying to extricate its forces from the STUTTGART pocket. LXIV Corps was left with one weak division (257 VG Div) and miscellaneous Volkssturm and replacement units to attempt to hold a north-south line somewhere east of the Necker.

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HARDE) had moved east at the beginning of the period to take over the sector vacated by 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division. It is now located along the east side of the pocket north of SCHORNDORF. Divisional combat infantry effectives add up to roughly 1,500.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) is composed of three regimental battle groups and an artillery battery. These remnants were withdrawing rapidly at the end of the week. They were last located in area S 23. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,200.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MULBE) remained in the same general area south of HEILBRONN. Contact was generally loose throughout the period, and casualties were correspondingly light. Combat infantry strength is still carried at 1,000.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was operating with two organic regiments and some auxiliary units north of STUTTGART. When the threat of our encircling movements became apparent, some divisional elements were hastily shifted to the KIRCHEIM (S 2607)-GOPPINGEN (S 4114) area. However, their defense there was insufficiently prepared and consequently unsuccessful. Earlier rumors of the division's absorption by 16 Volksgrenadier Division were unfounded. Some replacements were received from former elements of 347 Infantry and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Combat infantry effectives now total approximately 1,600.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. TROMPETER). Reports that 726 Grenadier Regiment of this division had been absorbed by 106 Infantry Division were negated by the identification of this regiment in the 716 Infantry Division sector. The old 736 Grenadier Regiment has also been reconstituted from local resources, as well as 706 Grenadier Regiment which first became a regiment of 716 Infantry Division in December 1944. The division drew chiefly on Wehrkreis V replacement pools and on Landesschuetzen units to replenish its combat units. 706 and 726 Grenadier Regiments were both encircled south of PFORZHEIM and practically wiped out by French forces on 19 April. Divisional combat infantry effectives amount to around 800.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) was committed west of STUTTGART in area R 82. In reaction to our attack, it disengaged there and staged a futile counterattack on the flank of the western armored spearhead in area R 80. The division is still in fair shape with organic combat infantry strength totalling 1,200.

465 Mobilization Division (CG:) is a Wehrkreis V administrative staff controlling replacement units. It was recently reported in STUTTGART, its home station. It is probable that the division staff has held back some such units for the defense of the city and its surroundings. Approximately 2,500 troops may have been gathered for this mission. Combat infantry effectives being somewhat lower.

(b) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) has so far avoided pocketing as it withdrew southeastward under light pressure. The division put up only scattered delaying resistance during the period. It is currently the only major formation that could oppose the eastward expansion of our spearhead to the Swiss frontier in the ASCHAFFENBURG region. Such a task is obviously beyound the division's capabilities. Its present combat infantry strength is estimated to be 1,600.

(c) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

106 Infantry Division (CG:), which absorbed the bulk of 708 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 805 Mobilization Division, spent the week in rather feeble delaying action as it was pushed south through the Black Forest. Toward the end of the period it was spread very thinly along the east-west line between FREUDENSTADT and OFFENBURG. Especially in its present battered condition, the division is certainly incapable of effective resistance. It is supported by remnants of German Air Force Brigade OBERRHEIN, but even including this brigade, combat infantry strength does not exceed 1,200.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEEGER) was contacted south of KEHL during the period. It is composed of three OBERRHEIN Grenadier Regiments (IV, X and XIV) which were constituted from local Security, Landesschuetzen, and Volkssturm units. Included in the division is 291 Battalion zbV, previously under command of 805 Mobilization Division. 405 Reserve Division is being pushed south down the Rhine Valley. Its combat infantry strength is approximately 1,200.

Unidentified Division. An unidentified division staff controlling approximately 6 - 9 infantry battalions in located east of FREIBURG. The unit is not believed to have completely formed as yet nor to have the normal complement of divisional supporting weapons or troops. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 1500.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

Nineteenth German Army	15,500
First German Army	15,000
T O T A L	30,500
Available Reserves (Estimated)	
Nineteenth German Army	-------
First German Army	-------
T O T A L	30,500
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Nineteenth German Army	25
First German Army	95
T O T A L	120

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080). VILLAROGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5230), MT FROID (H 4255), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEUAU QUEYRAS (P 5362), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), SAORGE (N 8310), BREIL (N 8003), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions.

Enemy dispositions and capabilities remain unchanged, (see section 3 of Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 30, for week ending 14 April 1945).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS - SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

Strong resistance in the BADEN Plain and Black Forest at the beginning of the period gave way as OFFENBURG (W 1586) and KEHL (W [illegible]7) were taken on 15 April. LXIV Corps fell back offering only scattered opposition until 17 April when a stand was attempted north of LAHR (W 0970) and across the hills of the Black Forest. A spirited counterattack forced friendly units from NONNENWEIER (W 0272). The stand was only temporary, however, as Allied forces resumed the advance against weak and disorganized resistance. FREUDENSTADT (W 5084) was taken and by the end of the period, the Rhine Plain had been cleared as far south as the KAISERSTUHL. East of the Black Forest, Allied spearheads driving toward the Swiss border had occupied VILLINGEN (W 5340) and SCHWENNINGEN (W 5940). The battered remnants of LXIV Corps were now hopelessly split and unable to offer any organized opposition while XVIII SS Corps controlling Rhine River defenses had become virtually cut off.

LXXX Corps held firm along the Enz River between PFORZHEIM and the Neckar River. Friendly forces seemed less interested in this portion of the front while to the west, Allied forces pushing south through the Black Forest were outflanking the Enz River line. East of the Neckar River, XIII Corps defended stubbornly. Counter-attacks and artillery fire held the line intact until 17 April when a slow and well organized withdrawal was begun. Enemy illusions were shattered on 19 April as an Allied armored spearhead from the west captured TUBINGEN (W 9791), crossed the Neckar and reached REUTLINGEN (X 0690). This action again split the remnants of LXIV Corps. Simultaneously, another Allied spearhead drove south from HALL (S 4558), between 198 and 553 Divisions, dividing XIII Corps into two portions. By nightfall, the advance had crossed the Rems River at LORCH (S 4323) and the Fils River west of GOPPINGEN (S 4013), securing intact bridges at both locations. Thus, all of the units of LXXX Corps and portions of LXIV and XIII Corps were rapidly being enclosed in what was doomed to be the STUTTGART pocket. In an attempt to prevent the catastrophe, 16 Volksgrenadier Division was shifted southwest to the WILDBERG (R 7403) area to attack the flank of the TUBINGEN spearhead. Meanwhile, 47 Volks-grenadier Division was dispatched south to the KIRCHHEIM (S 2606) area where it attempted to hold an escape gap for the trapped elements which were hurriedly re - treating southward.

Between HALL and NEUSTADT (O 0812), the enemy maintaining a defensive attitude throughout the period, was forced to withdraw under pressure. The Aisch River line was stubbornly defended on 15 April by the enemy dug in along its south bank. The defense appeared well coordinated and received considerable artillery support. However, the following day, Allied units pressed forward and the enemy resumed a well organized delaying action, falling back slowly. ROTHENBURG (S 7889) was cleared of enemy on 17 April and NUERNBERG (O 4000) was being approached from the northwest as the XIII SS Corps continued to offer resistance, using towns as strongpoints. By the end of the period, ANSBACH (T 0682) had been cleared and CRAILSHEIM (S 7062) had been reached as the First German Army fell back in an attempt to cover its exposed left flank.

BAMBERG (O 2648) was cleared on 14 April after short but heavy fighting in which the enemy lost 20 tanks, 8 - 88 mm guns, and 400 killed and wounded. Advances east toward BAYREUTH (O 7556) and south toward NUERNBERG progressed rapidly in spite of strong opposition at scattered points. BAYREUTH was cleared by Allied forces from the northwest on 14 April and the eastern outskirts of NUERNBERG were reached on 17 April. The defense of NUERNBERG was carefully planned and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 256 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions, elements of 719 Infantry Division, and 667 Assault Gun Brigade were allocated for the task. These units defended the city fanatically and although Allied forces approached the city from three sides, every house was stubbornly defended. By 19 April, the enemy in NURENBERG had been forced into the walled city where remnants held out until late 20 April when it was cleared except for sniper fire. Meanwhile, advances south and east of the city continued to meet strong opposition with continued counterattacks and considerable artillery fire. Although the city of NURENBERG had been lost, the First German Army was determined to prevent an Allied drive south toward MUNICH.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. ATLANTIC FRONT

(1) ROYAN ZONE

The operation which cleared the ROYAN sector took off at dawn, 14 April with an attack on the east side of the area. The enemy promptly withdrew his outposts. These positions upon being occupied by friendly troops were brought under fairly heavy artillery fire. By the end of the day MERSCHERS (Y 4367) was taken and the front line ran from that place to BRIE (Y 4280). After a night of strong enemy artillery fire and small counterattacks friendly infantry advanced on 15 April along highways 730 and 150 to reach ROYAN at 2000B, while armor reached the north and west edges of the town. Troops moving up the ARVERT Peninsula on 16 April penetrated northwest of LA TREMBLADE (Y 2992) and on the following day against sporadic resistance, took LES MATHES (Y 2986) and ETAULES (Y 3387). On 17 April the SAUJON-LA TREMBLADE road was free, and during the night of 17/18 April LA TREMBLADE and RONCE LES BAINS (Y 2897) were taken. By this time the operation had reached the mopping up phase, with a large number of enemy troops holding out in the COBRE Forest at the northwest extremity of the peninsula. Meanwhile, Admiral MICHAELIS and 60 stalwarts defended the last bunker in the south at PONTAILLAC, just west of ROYAN. By 0700B of 18 April all pockets had surrendered and at 0830B resistance officially came to an end at ROYAN. Approximately 6,000 prisoners were captured.

(2) GRAVE ZONE

The line at the beginning of the period ran roughly East-West across the GRAVE Peninsula north of MAYAN (Y 3248). MAYAN was under enemy artillery fire throughout 14 April, while northwest of the town friendly forces occupied PONT DE BREDE (Y 3047), whence they crossed the PERG marshes on the following day to occupy the ground south of VENSAC (Y 3650). During 16 April the advance occupied TALAIS (Y 3550), where the enemy began a last-ditch stand, fighting fiercely to the east of the town. The town itself was attacked by intense artillery fire throughout the night of 16/17 April. On 17 April, however, SOULAC (Y 3061) was reached and at noon the next day LA VERDON was attacked from the west and south, and was taken at 1300B. Against desperate last-minute resistance the peninsula was cleared when the last blockhouse, defended by fanatical officers, surrendered at 2000B on 20 April.

(3) ROCHELLE ZONE

Quiet except for occasional light artillery and patrol activity.

b. ALPINE FRONT

(1) SOUTH ZONE

The enemy quietly evacuated the AUTHION Range (Vic N 7413) on 15 April, falling back to a strongly-mined line of pillboxes east of the Roya River. COLLA BASSA (N 8010) was counterattacked on 16 April, and the next day the enemy retook COLLA BASSA ridge, while the lower ground remained in friendly hands. Just north of COLLA BASSA area friendly troops occupied MAURIAN (N 8111) on 17 April, and moved northward up the slope to seize PEZURBE Ridge, where a German counterattack was repulsed on the following day. On 19 April a stronger enemy counterattack with artillery preparation failed against PEZURBE positions, while friendly troops pushed south and east along the spurs of the COLLA BASSA and took Fort MARTA. Farther to the north LANSFER Redge (N 4839) had been taken on 14 April; here the Italians vainly counterattacked on 17 April and patrol clashes occurred at the place during 19 April. South of the Col of MONTGENEVRE(K 4502) much work and traffic was in evidence during the period, with heavy explosions heard on 16 April.

(2) NORTH ZONE

Works and activity were observed on MT FROID (H 9255) and in the PETIT MT CENIS Pass throughout the period. In the PETIT ST BERNARD Pass occasional mortar and shell fire characterized the period, some digging activity in progress on 19 April.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Extensive cover of enemy activities throughout the period indicated that rail movement was virtually at a standtill throughout the entire Army Group area. Heavy vehicular traffic represented the apparent withdrawal of enemy troops, and the evacuation of civilians and prisoners of war from threatened areas.

Persistent large scale advances by Allied troops choked off one main line after another thus restricting enemy movements to an ever constricting communications net. Early in the period it appeared that the light rail traffic seen on the NUERNBERG-REGENSBURG line and in the vicinity of MUNICH was heading south but in general the activity seen throughout the entire area was so widely scattered and of such light intensity that no definite trends could be ascertained.

In the early half of the period it became evident that rapid gains by American troops were forcing the Germans to withdraw in large numbers throughout the FORCHHEIM (O 4030)-AUERBACH (O 8029)-NUERNBERG area. Approximately 1,100 vehicles of all kinds were seen scurrying to the south and southeast along main and secondary roads in this region on 14 and 15 April. Large groups of civilians likewise appeared to be evacuating this sector and more than 1,000 Allied prisoners of war were spotted amongst the many thousands of pedestrians seen moving to the south on these 2 days. On 17 April several hundred more Allied prisoners were sighted marching to the southeast in the vicinity of VELBRUG (T 8778). Coverage of 20 April revealed widespread vehicular activity in the KIRCHEIM (S 2808)-TIESENSTEIG (X 4098)-PFULLINGEN (X 1087) zone and here again it appeared that nearly all of the 400-500 vehicles seen were moving or facing southeast. More road traffic to the south was noted in the vicinity of DINKELSBUHL (S 8955) on this same day.

B. Effect of Allied Air Attacks

1. General. Destruction of enemy supplies by Allied air attacks was continued on a wide scale in the past week. Medium bombers concentrated their activities on active ordnance depots, ammunition installations, and POL storage points. At the same time, a heavy weight of bombs was dropped on the Atlantic sector by both heavy and medium bombers.

2. Supplies. In the enemy area which is as yet unoccupied by Allied forces, it is likely that the production of new military equipment is at too low a level to have much significance for front line strength; in the case of gasoline, new production has been virtually eliminated altogether. In this situation, the program of attacks on installation which store and distribute military supplies must steadily be weakening the effort which the enemy can show on the front line, and prisoner of war reports consistently substantiate this thesis.

Four large ammunition depots were effectively hit by medium bombers of First Tactical Air Force (Prov). The extensive installation of STRASS (X 8882) was revisited after a prior attack the week before, and operations were also carried out against the large, active depot at DESCHING near INGOLSTADT, and against smaller installations at ALT DETTELSAU (T 28) and GUNZENHAUSEN (T 26). Destruction was also effected at key enemy ordnance depots. Two of these attacks, at ULM-NEU ULM and KEMPTON, were policing jobs to take care of buildings which had been left standing after earlier attacks. Ordnance depots at TUBINGEN, RAVENSBURG, STRAUBING, AALEN and DONAUSCHINGEN were also bombed. Two POL depots were attacked by Ninth Air Force, a surface depot of 12,000 tons capacity at DEGGENDORF and an underground depot of 100,000 tons capacity at NEUBERG-DONAU, the latter being hit with about 800 tons of bombs. Large oil fires were started in both cases.

3. Atlantic Front. The French offensive in the BORDEAUX area was assisted by large scale bomber operations. Eighth Air Force heavy bombers poured more than 3,000 tons of bombs on LA COUDRE, GRAVES, and ROYAN on the night of 13/14 April, and this was followed by an additional 2,900 tons on 15 April. Medium bomber attacks, principally on the JAFFE and OLERON areas, were carried out during the period of 14-17 April, bringing the total tonnage to well over 8,000 tons.

INCLOSURES

Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition - 1A
Inc #2 - Enemy Disposition - 1B

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE V1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

.200/apr 45/tag 6079

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 21 1200 B APRIL

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1-A TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #31



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50

.200/Apr 45/660 6080

SECRET

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 21 1200 B APRIL

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1-B TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #31

REPRODUCED BY THIRD MIG
6TH ARMY GROUP APO
APRIL 45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

:S E C R E T :
:By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: :
:Date: 28 April 1945:

142

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 32

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 28 April 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

That portion of C in C WEST'S command (Nineteenth Army and First German Army) opposite 6th Army Group failed to receive sufficient reinforcements during the week to aid in either the reestablishement of a front line or even to replace the approximately 78,650 odd troops lost as prisoners of war during the period 21-26 April, exclusive of permanent casualties. The inability of the enemy to halt the eastward drive towards ULM and KEMPTEN rolled up the Suabian Mountain positions and turned the Danube River line. This drive coupled with advances to the south through the places mentioned above effectively disorganized and practically destroyed Nineteenth Army. Further to the east, friendly armor has broken contact between Seventh and First German Armies. This was the situation most to be avoided by Army Group G. The result is that First Army is practically isolated and must fight an independent action with exposed flanks for the defence of MUNICH.

First German Army was unable to find suitable connected terrain features upon which it could reestablish a front line against unrelenting Allied pressure. Its rearward progress has continued for the second successive week. The appearance of Vlassov Russians and Hungarian troops in front line positions could not offset the very great need for artillery pieces, ammunition, motor transport, and tanks. The position forced upon First German Army, isolated by the deep wedge driven into its right flank and the disintegration of the Nineteenth Army on its left flank, will compel its early withdrawal to the Austrian Border. The army will be forced back to cover the city of MUNICH, but due to the unavailability of any cross corridors of strong natural defensive positions in the vicinity, the city will fall rapidly. However, Himmler, who is reported in MUNICH, may urge a final German "Sacrifice" for this town.

Nineteenth German Army suffered a tremendous and overwhelming defeat at the hands of the fast moving First French Army. The ranks of the enemy army were cut into numerous pockets and then individually mopped up. The rate of attrition was so high that the enemy's capability of restoring its ranks was not possible of fulfillment. Nineteenth Army will probably have the doubtful honor of being the first enemy army to arrive in the so called "Redoubt" area. It will probably have the mission of manning the few defensive positions already constructed in the BREGENZ-INNSBRUCK area, as well as that of constructing new defenses. The remnants of Nineteenth Army, after having lost approximately 50,000 prisoners of war during the past week, can only hope to delay their day of capitulation.

b. Capabilities

The enemy may be allowed only two actual capabilities:

(1) He can surrender unconditionally.

(2) He can continue his senseless immolation, fighting hopelessly from isolated strongpoints as his lines disintegrate.

The overwhelming military defeat of the German armies north of the Danube and in the Black Forest, the dwindling resources both of men and material remaining to the enemy, and the increasingly obvious war-weariness of the civilian population all combine to make a political capitulation imminent. The hold of the Nazi overlords upon the Wehrmacht and the people is definitely weakening, particularly in BAVARIA. The civilian finds himself in a position of fighting for the protection of his home and possessions not against the Allies, but against the fanatics who will not or may not accept defeat. As for the German soldier, prisoner of war status has become certainly more inviting than the prospect of further resistance under conditions of extreme privation.

Should the Nazis choose to resist, whether through a blind but monumental faith in ultimate victory or through simple fear of their own fate, their resistance will be short lived. The north-south valleys of BAVARIA offer no tenable defensive

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

positions and will serve as avenues into AUSTRIA. His inferiority in guns, supplies, mobility and total lack of air support are so complete that even field losses cannot be replaced. Feverish activity now in the development of defensive positions in AUSTRIA denotes a realization that he waited too long to make the "National Redoubt" a fact. The enemy is militarily completely defeated; he will be allowed neither respite nor truce, choose whichever one he will.

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces oppsoite 6th Army Group were as follows: INGOLSTADT (T 7124), NEUBURG (T 5421), DILLINGELHAUSEN (T 5111), PEICHING (T 3312), AUGSBURG (Y 3277), PEITING (Y 3815), FUSSEN (D 2289), VILS (D 1687), KEMPTEN (X 9304), MEMMINGEN (X 8234), EROLZHEIM (X 7345), FISCHBACH (X 5740), WALDSEE (X 5126), UBERLINGEN (X 0608), KONSTANZ (C 0796), RADOLFZELL (W 9204), WORHUNGEN (W 8303).

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ).

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

Some semblance of organization was maintained by First Army's three corps as they fell back offering scattered delaying actions. LXXXII Corps on the right flank gained 36 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 38 SS Division NIBELUNGEN" as these units were severed from Seventh German Army by the Allied drive toward LINZ. 416 Infantry Division also came under LXXXII Corps upon falling back to the REGENSBURG area. 719 Infantry Division, formerly carried under this corps, gave up its remnants to 416 Infantry Division and its number to 405 Reserve Division in the Black Forest. 256 Volksgrenadier Division remanants have been dropped because of a lack of contact. XIII SS Corps, having lost 416 Division, undertook some shifting of divisions but kept its organization essentially intact. XIII Army Corps gained the remnants of 198 and 19 Infantry Divisions while giving up 9 Volksgrenadier Division staff of which departed for the MUNICH area. Resistance offered by the divisional units was aided by replacement and miscellaneous battle group formations.

(a) LXXXII Corps: (CG:. Maj. Gen. HAHM)

36 Volksgrendadier Division (CG:), renowned for its skill in refilling its ranks with miscellaneous units, remained in contact throughout the week. Its positions were completely outflanked by the Allied thrust along the Czech border. The division, disposed south-east of REGENSBURG, could hardly hope to contain this spearhead. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 800.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen PFLIEGER) was reconstituted by the absorption of elements of 719 Volksgrenadier Division and of other miscellaneous units. The division was responsible for the defense of REGENSBURG, and later, for the Danube line immediately south of that city. It managed to delay Allied progress but was unable to prevent our crossing of the Danube at several points. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated to be 1,000.

38 SS Grenadier Division "NIBELUNGEN" (CG:) was formed in the Black Forest in March by special order of the Fuehrer. It has three Grenadier Regiments numbered 95, 96, and 97. They are composed chiefly of Hitler Jugend personnel. The division was known to have been lurking behind the front for some weeks. Elements were identified on 27 April at U 1245, probably foreshadowing the commitment of the bulk of the division. The division's period of formation was extremely short, and its calibre is certainly below previous SS standards. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 2,500.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CP: SS Col. BOSCHMANN) retreated straight south from the NEUMARKT area and is now committed on both sides of INGOLSTADT (T 7125). Contact was relatively light as the bulk of the divisions withdrew behind a screening force. Remnants of 352 Volksgrenadier Division operating in the same general area as 17 SS Division are believed to be under command of the latter. Including these, combat infantry strength is about 2,000.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ULRICH or ULLICH). Elements of this division were cut off north of DILLINGEN (T 0301). The rest managed to withdraw and is now committed in the same general area as 79 Volksgrenadier Division (T 21). In view of the trapped elements and other casualties, combat infantry effectives now total no more than 1,200.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) was reported by agents to have left the front for MUNICH. Lack of contact during most of the week supported such claims. However, on 27 April elements of the division were identified in the DONAUWOERTH area. It is conceivable that these are subordinated to another division while the 9 Volksgrenadier Division staff is, in fact, in MUNICH. Combat infantry strength is still estimated at 1,000.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. REIMHERR) suffered very severe casualties in its engagements during the previous period. Some prisoners estimated divisional combat strength as low as 200. However, some reorganization did take place, elements of "Division" von HOBE as well as miscellaneous units being used as fillers. The division is presently in contact in area T 21. It is still extremely depleted, and combat infantry strength is about 700.

Battle Group von HOBE (CO: Col. von HOBE) is operating to the south of 79 Volksgrenadier Division with which it is closely affiliated, and to which it is known to have lost at least two nominal battalions. Battle group von HOBE's combat infantry strength is estimated to be approximately 1,200.

(c) XIII Corps (CG:)

Maj Gen von CLAER, commanding general of XIII Corps, was captured by US troops on 23 April. He succeeded Maj. Gen. GRAF von ORIOLA who had been captured at the end of March.

19 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) reappeared during the period on the German XIII Corps front. It narrowly escaped our trap south of ULM, whereupon it moved north-east to the AUGSBURG area. The division is still disorganized, and combat infantry strength does not exceed 600.

151 Field Training Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BADE) was identified by 1307 and 1308 Field Training Regiments west of AUGSBURG on 26 April. Little is known of the composition of the division except that the previously destroyed 560 Volksgrenadier Division provided the staff and probable service personnel as well as the cadre. Tentative combat infantry strength estimate is 2,000.

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BARDE) salvaged some elements from the STUTTGART pocket and the trap south of ULM. Prisoners claim that the division's disorganization is complete. Remnants are now located south of AUGSBURG. Their combat infantry strength is not more than 500.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUETER) retreated southward to east of ULM, where elements were cut off by our spearheads. 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified with 559 Volksgrenadier Division to which it was stated to be attached. 553 Division was badly disorganized by its hurried retreats, and combat infantry strength is now estimted at 500.

c. Nineteenth German Army (CG:)

At the end of the period, Nineteenth Army was in a state of complete exhaustion, comparable in many ways to its condition when it escaped from the COLMAR Pocket in early February. XVIII SS Corps, composed of 106, 719, 352, and 89 Infantry Division, was completely destroyed. The numbers 719 and 352 had been assigned to the 405 and 805 Divisions respectively as the divisions took a last breath. LXIV Corps was left without a single divisional unit as only remnants of 257 Volksgrenadier Division escaped from the SCHWABIAN JURA. Pocket. The meager resistance to Allied advances in the corps sector was offered by miscellaneous battle group formations. LXXX Corps also suffered heavy losses. The major portion of the Corps was destroyed in the SCHWABIAN Jura pocket. However, the Corps headquarters along with remnants of 257, 246, 559, and 47 Divisions escaped. The Corps was rebuilt to some degree by the addition of the reformed 189 Volksgrenadier Division, the organization of replacement units under 465 Division staff, and the commitment of miscellaneous Russian units.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

Miscellaneous Russian Units. The Volunteer Cadre Division, a Russian unit that, until recently, was stationed at MUENSINGEN, was identified during the period. It is organized into four battle groups - LOERGES, LANGE, WRUCK, and DANIELSKE. The division was first committed in area X 39 - X 49 about 22 April. Exact present location is not known, but the division is believed to have retreated to the south-east and to be in the general area Y 10. Initial combat infantry strength was approximately 2,200, but many prisoners including a high percentage of deserters have been taken and the present estimate is 1,300.

Also contacted were elements of 650 Russian Infantry Division. This is another of the series of Russian units formed at MUENSINGEN during the last months. Most of it was reported on the Eastern Front and it is believed that the few companies identified at X 0844 on 22 April represent the only part of the division that remained in the west. Their combat infantry strength is judged at 500.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Gen. ULLMER) moved north from the southern part of the Black Forest to be committed for the first time since its destruction in the COLMAR Pocket in early February. It was encountered on 21 April on the eastern shoulder of the STUTTGART pocket in area S 52. Two of the division's three regiments (1212 and 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiments) had been reformed on a three battalion basis with about 100 men per company. A large part of the personnel is Russian and the rest of the groups are also of low calibre. The division was soon forced to withdraw toward ULM. There its hopes for a defense were dispelled as the city's positions were outflanked from the south. The division had to retreat once again, and what remained of it narrowly escaped the closing Allied pincers south of ULM. These remnants are now believed to be in line in area D 09. The possibility of a close link between 189 Volksgrenadier Division and the Volunteer Cadre Division (Russian) was indicated as prisoners of both units claimed General ULLMER as their commander. Combat infatry strength is now estimated at 1,000.

465 Mobilization Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HOFFMANN), the second Wehrkreis V mobilization division, was contacted, also for the first time, during this period. As was to be expected, it controls an array of Wehrkreis V replacement units. These are committed in the area of X 90. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 16 Volksgrenadier Division is now also under 465 Mobilization Division. Combat infantry strength, including the latter, is about 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: -) suffered very severe casualties and was pocketed east of TUBINGEN (W 9792) at the beginning of the period. Elements managed to find their way back to the German lines and were met again in the MEMMINGEN (X 8234) region on 27 April. These are believed not to exceed 400 combat infantry effectives.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) was identified by some elements in the MUENSINGEN region. These are the survivors of the two successive pockets - the first at STUTTGART, the second in the SCHWABIAN ALPS. The division had been weak even before these escapades. Now not more than 300 combat infantry effectives are believed to remain.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) had a fate very similar to that of 246 Volksgrenadier Division. It too, was contacted south of MEMMINGEN after two close escapes. 1125 and 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiments had both been reorganized during the previous period and 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 553 Volksgrenadier Division was attached to 559 Volksgrenadier Division. However, casualties were very heavy, and combat infantry strength of remnants is estimated at less than 500.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) is in the same category with both 246 and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Only a small part of the division survived the chase from STUTTGART to the MEMMINGEN - KEMPTEN zone. Prior to the breakthrough, the division's third regiment, 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment, had been reformed, and the 147 Field Replacement Battalion was claimed to have 1000 men. Now, however, not more than 500 combat infantry effectives are thought to remain.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL). Only 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment, now attached to 465 Mobilization Division, remains of this division. It lost heavily in the STUTTGART pocket, and the rest was trapped east of TUBINGEN.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. TROMPETER) found its end in a manner similar to 16 Volksgrenadier Division. Two regimental commanders and the division artillery commander were among the captured. The division is considered totally destroyed.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIGER) was renumbered 719 Volksgrenadier Division, the latter having ceeded what remained of its original complement to 416 Infantry Division. The division was caught in the Black Forest pocket and was completely destroyed there.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN) was renumbered 352 Volksgrenadier Division. Elements of the latter were simultaneously reported operating in the INGOLDSTADT sector. These, however, were probably under command of another unit. The division was destroyed in the Black Forest.

89 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BAZING). The staff of this division took over command of 7, 8, and 9 Grenadier Regiments OBERRHEIN. They were renumbered 1056, 1063, and probably 1064 Volksgrenadier Regiments respectively. Formerly their units had been under Brigade BAUER and 1005 Brigade. The division was annihilated in the Black Forest.

106 Infantry Division (CG:) was caught in its entirety in the Black Forest pocket.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

First German Army	14,000
Nineteenth German Army	6,000
T O T A L	20,000
Reserves:	
First German Army	none
Nineteenth German Army	none
T O T A L	20,000
Tanks and SP Guns:	
First German Army	50
Nineteenth German Army	25
T O T A L	75

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period, no definite enemy front lines existed opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine front. Friendly advances had reached the following points: CESANA (K 5203), ARGENTERA (N 3959), VINADIO (N 5747), CROCE DI FERISSON (N 6820), TENDA (N 8820), N 9010. BREIL (N 8005), C.S. ANPEGLIO (S 9285).

a. General

The long awaited withdrawl from the Franco-Italian border became a reality this week as Allied Armies in Italy surged forward, smashing enemy resistance and cutting off the retreat routes of the enemy in northwest Italy. A reliable ground source reported that General SCHLEMMER, of LXXV Corps ordered the general withdrawal

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

from the Franco-Italian front to begin the night of 23/24 April. By 27 April, withdrawal was complete from the coast to MONTGENEVRE (K 4503). Friendly forces pursuing the departed enemy, delayed by mines and demolitions, were unable to establish any contact. In the AOSTA Valley and the MONT CENIS region some German troops remained in position on 27 April but all indications pointed to an early departure. As in many previous instances, the order for withdrawal had been given too late. All main escape routes from North Italy had been cut off by Allied capture of VERONA and by the Partisan activity in TURIN and MILAN. Consequently, the ultimate disposition of the divisions of LXXV Corps is uncertain.

b. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

LXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHLEMER)

34 Infantry Division - German (CG: Brig. Gen. von LIEB) departed from the coastal area where it had gradually lost ground to friendly units which pushed to the ROYA River. On 26 April, contact was completely lost as friendly forces pushed forward up to ten miles in the coastal area, the advance being impeded only by mines and demolitions. On the same day, the division was reported passing through ALESSANDRIA (J 70).

LITTORIO Division - Italian (CG: Gen. TITO AGOSTO) abandoned its positions in the LARCHE Pass after expending its stocks of artillery ammunition on 25 April. Advance friendly elements approaching CUNEO (H 85) from the west on 27 April were unable to regain contact with the division. Other elements of the division (4 Alpine Regt) disposed in the AOSTA Valley were still in contact as withdrawal from this portion of the front had apparently not been completed.

MONTE ROSA Division - Italian (CG: Gen. CARLONI) was formerly deployed along a wide front from COL DE LA CALISE (H 67) to GUILLESTRE (P 47) along with elements of 5 Mountain Division. The MONTE ROSA Division withdrew toward TURIN and contact had been lost by 27 April.

5 Mountain Division - German (CO: Col. STEETS) was deployed in the central sector (SUSA Valley* and in the northern sector AOSTA Valley). This division had not abandoned its positions completely on 27 April. On that day, an enemy patrol was active at BETTAGHET (H 4298) in the AOSTA Valley. To the south, nearly 600 rounds of artillery and mortar fire were received at MONT CENIS (H 45). This indicated that final departure from the SUSA Valley was imminent. A reliable source reported the bulk of 5 Mountain Division in the TURIN area on 25 April.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. SOUTHERN GERMANY

As the period opened, XVIII SS Corps, controlling the southern Black Forest area, was severed from Nineteenth German Army by an Allied armored thrust which reached the Swiss border at EPFENHOFEN (W 6213). Simultaneously, DANAUESCHINGEN (W 5627) and SIGMARINGEN (X 1043) were occupied and the Danube between the two towns came under control of Allied forces. FREIBURG (W 0832) was cleared on 22 April and elements of XVIII SS Corps, unable to offer any effective resistance, fell back as friendly forces dashed southward along the Rhine toward BASEL (A 8883). LORRACH (A 9490) was reached, and following the Rhine eastward, WALDSHUT (B 3691) was passed on 25 April. By this date, the remnants of XVIII SS Corps had undergone a hurried reorganization and had pushed eastward in an attempt to leave the Black Forest trap. Meeting limited success, the force reached an area southwest of TUTTLINGEN (W 8031) before being blocked. Hopelessly surrounded, the corps along with scattered units remaining to the west, offered token resistance and had not been completely mopped up at the end of the period.

LXXX Corps fought desperately to extricate a few battered divisions from the STUTTGART pocket. Some degree of success was attained as 198 Infantry Division followed the 465 Division Staff to the ULM (X 6580) area. Remnants of 47, 257, 246, and 559 Divisions also managed to escape. The major portion of these units, however, moved south into the Schwabian Jura, only to find themselves again pocketed by Allied forces pushing south from GOPPINGEN (S 4014) and east from SIGMARINGEN which met near EHINGEN (X 4766) on 23 April, sealing the fate of the enemy units. The corps headquarters, however, escaped to KEMPTEN (X 9305) where it continued to fight a losing battle with rapidly dwindling forces. Meanwhile, some enemy isolated in the STUTTGART and SCHONBUCH Mountain (W 9698) areas continued to be mopped up until 24 April. The trapped elements of LXXX Corps in the Schwabian Jura maneuvered for several days, attempting to find an escape route while the pocket was being systematically reduced. Finally, on 27 April, this area was declared clear of enemy.

Allied advances continued against negligible opposition. SINGEN (W 8307) and STOCKACH (W 9517) fell on 22 April as the shore of Lake KONSTANZ was reached. The city of KONSTANZ (C 0796) was occupied on 27 April. The enemy offered moderate opposition at ULM but the city, entered from both north and south was cleared on 24 April. Meanwhile, the XIII Corps, south of CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), was being outflanked on the west and began an organized withdrawal. This withdrawal developed into a race for the Danube as Allied armor broke through the crust in the CRAILSHEIM area and sped southeast to DILLINGEN (T 0300) where a bridge over the Danube was secured intact on 22 April. The XIII Corps succeeded in withdrawing across the Danube and together with LXXX Corps, established a defense line south of the Danube and east of the Iller Rivers. Here the enemy fought stubbornly, staging armor supported counterattacks on 25 and early 26 April. In addition, enemy aircraft were very active over the DILLINGEN bridgehead. The delay was only temporary, however, as the line was broken at numerous points late 26 April. The battered enemy which offered opposition only in town, was forced back once more as the area southeast of ULM was cleared. MEMMINGEN (X 6374) was occupied and a bridge over the Werlach River at Y 2156 was secured intact on 26 April. The following day, friendly forces had occupied LEMPTEN and were fighting in AUGSBURG.

XIII SS Corps and LXXXII Corps fared better than their neighbors to the west. After the fanatical fortress stand by LXXXII Corps at NUERNBERG, both corps fell back slowly, offering determined resistance. However, after being outflanked by the armored thrust to DILLINGEN, an orderly withdrawal to the Danube line was begun. Scattered opposition to friendly advances occurred chiefly at road-blocks and towns. DONAUWORTH (T 2317) was cleared on 25 April against negligible resistance but attempts to force further crossings of the Danube on 26 April met strong opposition. The enemy, however, was seriously lacking in artillery and armor and could not effectively delay Allied advances.

Meanwhile, other Allied forces advanced southeast across the Franconian Jura taking REGENSBURG (U 1855) on 24 April.

Driving east, armored columns had crossed into Austria only 35 miles from LINZ (V 8587) and a possible early juncture with the Russian forces. This effectively separated Seventh and First German Armies. Army Group G was left with an almost annihilated Nineteenth and a badly mauled First Army to organize the defenses of MUNICH and beyound that the defenses of the Bavarian Alps.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. ALPINE FRONT

Southern zone: On 22 April the enemy pressed unsuccessful counter-attacks against the PEZURBE Ridge (N 8312), while keeping up a harassing artillery fire on BREIL (N 8004) and SOSPEL (S 7398). Attacks on PEZURBE Ridge were resumed the following day, and friendly positions on MT GROMMANDO (S 7895) were surrounded by the enemy who, however, withdrew of his own accord at midnight. During the night 23/24 April enemy artillery fell on MENTON (S 7786), and throughout the day of 24 April 500 rounds fell in SOSPEL, BREIL and CASTELLAR (S 7890). The next night MENTON and CASTELLAR received 200 more rounds, while other indications placed the enemy's intention to withdraw beyound a doubt. On 25 April friendly forces occupied SAORGE (N 8410), FONTAN (N 8412), AIROLE (S 8497), and VENTIMIGLIA (S 8587), the Germans falling back apparently to SAN REMO (T 0090). Contact was lost between LARCHE and the coast as friendly progress was slowed by heavy mining and demolitions as well as bad weather. On 26 April ERIA MARITTIMA (N 8917) and TENDA Pass (N 82) were cleared, the Department of ALPES MARITIMES completely liberated; the tempo of the enemy's withdrawal was increasing.

Central zone: Period opened with launching of operation which on 22 April captured MEYRONNES (P 5651), PONTIVE and lower ST OURS (P 5652), encircling Upper ST OURS; a Ski Company took LARCHE (N 3365). The following day Upper ST OURS (P 5654) and adjacent positions were abandoned by the enemy. On 25 April enemy activity diminished markedly in area south of LARCHE Pass, though north of the pass the enemy continued to hold. April 24 and 25 were marked by intense artillery activity, the enemy apparently unloading his stocks of ammunition: 60 rounds of 149 mm and 75 mm fell on LARCHE on the 24th, while BRIANCON (P 4097) received 380 and 75 mm fire. ST OURS, LARCHE and MEYRONNES received 30 rounds 149 mm on 25 April. On 26 April friendly troops entered LARCHE Pass, MT GENEVRE (K 4503) and CESANNE (K 5205).

Northern zone: On 21 April the enemy seized FORCLE Pass and a friendly OP in the Mont CENIS area. Next day a strong patrol was sent against a friendly strongpoint at MORTIEDE. From 21 to 25 April enemy works and activity were in evidence in MT CENIS, MT BLANC and BARDONNECHE regions, but on last named date German retreat from MT CENIS became apparent with prodigal expenditure of mortar and artillery shells (including 250 rounds of 149 mm), the sound of heavy demolitions and the abandoment of its positions by the 11th Co of the EDOLO Battalion. The intense artillery fire continued up to 1730B of the following day, when various positions in the FREJUS area (K 42) were found unoccupied.

c. ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity during period was confined to patrolling, visits by lone Recce planes (on 21, 23 and 25 April) and some artillery fire, which fell:

21 April in LA GIGOGNE (T 4826) and PUYROUARD (T 5028
23 April in LE THOU (T 4826)
24 April in GALON D'ON (Y 3294).

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Intermittent cover, occasioned by breaks in the generally unfavorable weather which prevailed throughout the week, revealed moderately heavy rail activity in the MUNICH area and a continued flow of enemy road traffic to the south and southeast along the 6th Army Group front.

Marshalling yards and rail lines in the MUNICH-AUGSBURG-BUCHLOE triangle were active on 25 and 26 April and indications pointed to the probability that BUCHLOE was serving as a switching point for troops and supplies moving to and from the battle area. A large concentration of railroad cars was seen on the BUCHLOE-MUNICH line on both 24 and 25 April and another group of about 800 cars was sighted on the MUNICH-BAD TOLZ line on the 25th. Marshalling yards in the MUNICH-INNSBRUCK area showed moderately heavy holdings and considerable activity whenever cover of this sector was available. However, the activity seen in this area is by no means surprising. In view of existing circumstances, it is to be expected that concentrated air cover should reveal some activity in this realatively small area, which represents the only remaining portion of the enemy's once extensive communications system.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Road movements observed throughout the period represented continued enemy withdrawals at various points along our front. On 25 April approximately 200 vehicles were seen moving south and east from NEUBURG (T 5220) and on the following day reconnaissance planes spotted a 2 mile long vehicular convoy heading south near T 9900. Late cover of 27 April revealed about 500-600 motor and horse drawn transports moving southeast along the road running from SCHONGAU (Y 3617) toward OHLSTADT (D 6299).

5. EFFECT OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS

A. General. Although effective operations were limited by weather in the past week, air attack on enemy supplies continued. Most of the targets were relatively close behind the front lines and therefore probably important sources for the enemy's defense. Medium bombers of First Tactical Air Force (Prov) attacked two large ammunition installations, one at SCHMIDMUHEN (Y 35) and the other at EBENHAUSEN (T 71). The former target contained a large storage area and ammunition filling factory, while the latter was principally concerned with filling and had only small storage facilities. Large explosions occurred in both attacks. Ninth Air Force mediums hit a POL depot at SCHROBENHAUSEN (T 60) containing at least seven heavily camouflaged tanks. This attack leaves the MUNICH/FREIHAM POL depot as the sole remaining serviceable depot supplying 6th Army Group's front.

B. Attacks on the Redoubt. Allied air forces also bombed installations within the Redoubt area. The most spectacular of these operations was the Royal Air Force Bomber Command's raid on BERCHTESGADEN on 25 April, when 6 - ton bombs specially fuzed for deep penetration explosions were dropped on Hitler's chalet and the SS barracks nearby; post-raid photography shows bullseyes on these targets. On the same day, the Eighth Air Force hit three marshalling yards in the same general area, and the Ninth Air Force claimed excellent results on the FREILASSING Ordnance depot (Z 93) just outside of SALZBURG. This depot is relatively important, and pre-raid cover on 20 April showed it to be active. On 27 April, Fifteenth Air Force flew up from Italy to attack the marshalling yards at FREILASSING.

C. Effects on Enemy Supplies. The results of strategic and tactical bombing are apparent in the impotence of enemy forces to halt Allied advances. Enemy tanks are far outnumbered by Allied armor, and the desperate gasoline situation frequently restricts them to the role of armored strongpoints rather than mobile attacking forces. Artillery activity appears to be sporadic, and is intense and concentrated only at isolated points. Flak units have been limited since last December to fire at a few specified points during the bomb-run of Allied planes. Shortage of conventional ground artillery pieces and ammunition has resulted in many flak outfits appearing on the scene as ground artillery, and on one sector of the 6th Army Group front during the week of 8-15 April practically all located enemy gun positions were anti-aircraft.

Examples supplied by prisoners of war indicate what this situation means to enemy operations. A battery of 2 Battalion, 235 Artillery Regiment of 198 Infantry Division had no howitzers, and, although new pieces were expected, these failed to arrive and the personnel of the battery found themselves fighting in an infantry outfit a few days later. The batteries of 4 Battalion of the same organization had only 16-30 rounds of ammunition remaining for their flak guns being used as field artillery. Five companies of 316 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 212 Volksgrenadier Division were in similar shape. Only 20 rounds of rifle ammunition and 150 rounds of machine gun ammunition remained to 3 Company, virtually no ammunition was available for the mortars, and each anti-tank gun had a mere 15 rounds.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition.

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



200/Apr 45/6A0 6085

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
APRIL 45

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: WCH
Date: 8 May 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 33

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 8 May 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Army Group G comprising Nineteenth and First German Armies surrendered unconditionally to 6th Army Group with effect from 1200B Hours, 6 May 1945. No alternative had been left the enemy Army Group. Its rear was exposed by the capitulation of German Forces in Italy effective at 1200B Hours on 2 May. In addition, the rapid friendly advances into the valleys of Western Austria had split its remaining area into several segments. The unpreparedness of defenses and the scanty forces ordered to hold the approaches into the mountain fastnesses of Western Austria clearly indicated that the formation of a redoubt area was merely a belated thought and meant to have been a haven for only a selected few.

Actually the military defeat of Army Group G had been accomplished in the drive through the SAAR-PALATINATE and across the Rhine. Lieutenant General SCHULTZ was never able to present a cohesive front after the initial rout of his First Army by the US Seventh Army. The rate of attrition in manpower continued so high that there never was the slightest possibility of the enemy's keeping sufficient bodies on the line, let alone trained soldiers.

The total disorganization of Army Group G was apparent in the plight of its armies. Nineteenth Army, pocketed time and again by First French Army's highly mobile forces, reached the ALPS without a single divisional formation and was reduced to fighting from a series of promptly isolated strongpoints. First Army yielded more than 200,000 prisoners of war between 28 April and 4 May. Both Armies had lost all organizational cohesion to the point where there was no longer a possibility of coordinated action even between their lowest formations. The capability of defense itself had disappeared, as the retreat turned into a rout. In most cases, opposition by the enemy was due solely to his having been overtaken or surrounded by advancing Allied forces.

There is no question of the complete destruction of Army Group G. The total annihilation of its motley components was forestalled by its surrender. As it was along the entire front, so in the zone of the 6th Army Group, the German Wehrmacht was incontestably defeated on the battlefield.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT

a. 6th Army Group Front Line at Time of Surrender (061200 B Hours) of Army Group "G"

Along the Swiss - LICHTENSTEIN - AUSTRIAN Border at C 3653, C 4150, BLUDENZ (Z 8348), RANKWEIL (C 4554), C 4460, C 4864, DORNBIRN (C 5269), C 5275, C 6482, C 6982, C 7386, IMMENSTADT (C 8686), MITTELBERG (C 8261), C 9271, HINDELANG (C 9881), GRAN (D 1281), D 0164, WELZAN (C 9252), D 0759, D 1261, BODEN (D 1858), D 2058, NAMLOS (D 2166), D 1567, EHENBICHL (D 2478), D 2775, UNTERGARTEN (D 3672), D 3468, D 3163, D 2958, D 2753, V 4851, PERFUCHS (V 3844), OPSTEIG (D 4161), D 3663, GRIESEN (D 4279), D 5480, KRUNZBACH (D 6280), D 6065, D 5563, D 5160, D 6457, INNSBRUCK (D 7556), W 0643, VITIPENO (W 0415), BRENNERO (W 1126), D 7956, D 9562, KUNDL (E 2083), E 1985, E 1079, D 9467, MUHLAU (D 7961), D 6860, D 6264, SCHARNITZ (D 6771), D 6681, WALLGAU (D 6786), Y 1300, MURBACK (Y 8802), Z 0902, Z 1907, Z 3009, Z 3103, RICHL (E 1885), E 2083, WORG (E 2685), OBERNDORF (Z 3700), Z 3820, UBERSEE (Z 5525), Z 8423, Z 8417, Z 7617, Z 7815, BAD REICHENHALL (Z 8515), Z 9113, Z 9304, BERCHTESGADEN (Z 9606), ST LEONHARD (Z 9817), SALZBURG (Z 9925), LAUFEN (Z 8841), BURGHAUSEN (Z 7964), Z 8770.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ). Surrendered unconditionally at 061200B Hours.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

The semblance of organization heretofore maintained by First German Army disappeared during this period and surrender was made of piecemeal units when the end arrived. The army was completely impotent in the face of Allied thrusts as far east as SALZBURG and south beyond the Italian border. Whatever resistance the enemy still offered in the northern approaches of the ALPS between WALCHEN SEE (D 79) and KUFSTEIN (E 3396) became futile when our drive through the INN Valley threatened to cut off these positions.

At the end of the period the only divisions still capable of temporary organized resistance were 38 SS Grenadier Division under LXXXII Corps, holding along the INN east of MUHLDORF (Z 5372); 407 Mobilization Division and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, both withdrawing south of the INN River under control of XIII SS Corps. The following First Army divisions were decimated to less than 500 combat infantry effectives and were considered destroyed for all practical purposes: 9, 19, 36, 79, 212, 553 Volksgrenadier ; 198, 416 Infantry; 2 Mountain; 151 Field Training; and von HOBE Divisions.

LXXXII Corps was responsible for the right and XIII SS Corps for the left half of the Army front. There is no evidence of the existence of XIII Army Corps which was previously overrun.

During the last phase First Army lost approximately 230,000 prisoners of war. Most of these were from a large array of miscellaneous units and from service outfits. This total also accounts for the destruction of the majority of the Army's divisions. 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered intact with approximately 9,000 men and is included in the above total. The combat infantry strength of 17 and 38 SS Divisions, 407 Mobilization Division, and of other divisional remnants was estimated to be 7,000.

Captured documents confirmed the enemy's intention to defend the so-called Redoubt" area. Army Group G was ordered to retreat to the ALPS. However, it was so badly disorganized when it reached the mountain bastion that, even with favorable terrain, a successful stand was out of the question.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. BRANDENBERGER)

Nineteenth Army, far from being able to rally its harassed forces, lost the biggest part of the divisions still at its disposal. The Army put up a very feeble defense of the horthwestern part of the Alpine area.

Not a single Nineteenth Army division was capable of effective defensive action. The following divisions all have a combat infantry strength of less than 500: 47, 189, 246, 257, 559 Volksgrenadier and 465 Mobilization Divisions. Apart from miscellaneous units, These constitute the only combat forces at the disposal of the Army. Their combat infantry effectives were estimated to total 3,000 men. The Army lost approximately 100,000 prisoners during the period.

Nineteenth Army was completely isolated by the meeting of Allied forces south of the BRENNER Pass. With hostile troops to its front, rear, and right flank, and SWITZERLAND on its left, the Army surrendered.

(3) Twenty-Fourth German Army (CG: Maj. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

This Army was for a long period guarding the Swiss frontier east of BASEL against the eventuality of an Allied violation of Swiss neutrality.

More recently agents mentioned the Army staff as moving south from BREGENZ, probably into the heart of the ALPS. Furthermore, a captured document placed the First Indian Legion under Twenty-fourth Army. This legion was identified southeast of Lake CONSTANZ along the Swiss border.

The units under command of Twenty-fourth Army never amounted to more than a skeleton force of low-grade, miscellaneous outfits, most of which the enemy was wary of committing to action. However, these units were absorbed by the Nineteenth German Army during the last days and only the staff of Twenty-fourth Army remained at the time of capitulation.

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

The surrender of General von VIETINGHOFF, German Commander in Chief Southwest, and SS General WOLFF, Supreme Commander of SS and Police in Italy, became effective at 1200 hours GMT on 2 May. With this capitulation, hostilities on the 6th Army Group Alpine Front officially ceased.

There was little activity on the Alpine Front during the period. The enemy withdrawal began in the coastal area with the departure of the 34 German Infantry Division on the night of 23/24 April. It was followed by 5 German Mountain Division and the Italian MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions which began their departure on the night of 24/25 April. The enemy withdrawal in the area from the coast to MONTGENEVRE (K 4503) was completed between 23 April and 27 April. The units were to move to BOLZANO by way of TRENT, the days being allowed for completion of the move. One battalion of the 100 Mountain Regiment had managed to reach T 6177 by 28 April but there it surrendered in toto. The remainder of 5 Mountain Division and 34 Infantry Division had arrived in the TURIN area by 29 April. Blocked by Partisans, the city was bypassed on the west and the major portion of both divisions moved north toward IVREA (J 2270). Harrassed by Partisans and cut off from Germany, both divisions assembled south of IVREA and awaited the Allies. Attempts by the Partisans on 3 May to obtain a surrender were fruitless as the Germans wished to surrender to regular forces.

The two Italian Divisions, LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA disintegrated after leaving their positions on the Franco-Italian border, their members surrendering to Partisans.

4. OPERATIONS

a. SOUTHERN GERMANY

As the period opened, all organized resistance in the Black Forest, the Swabian Jura, and on the Konstanz Peninsula ceased. Only disorganized small groups of enemy delayed the Allied push east. The entire north shore of Lake CONSTANZ and the city of FRIEDRICHSHAFEN (C 3196) was cleared on 30 April. Small enemy groups fell back to BREGENZ (C 5281) and IMMENSTADT (C 8788) where attempts were made to block the passes leading into the Austrian panhandle. Both towns were cleared by 2 May and overcoming ineffective opposition, friendly forces pushed south along the Swiss border and along the Iller River. By 4 May BLUDENZ (Z 8348) [illegible] (C 9281)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

has been occupied.

LXXX Corps, with only remnants of few divisions remaining, fell back into the Austrian Alps, attempting to delay and to block the passes behind them. On 1 May, Lieutenant General FRANZ BAYER (CG LXXX Corps) and his Chief of Staff, Colonel KOESTLIN were captured, thus ending the career of LXXX Corps. Allied forces pushed south along the LECH and OBERAU Valleys, overcoming difficult terrain, roadblocks, and demolitions. GARMISCH (D 5382) was reached on 29 April. At FUSSEN (D 2389) Fieldmarshal WILHELM RITTER VON LEEB was captured and at GARMISCH Fieldmarshal WILHEIM LIST was taken prisoner. South of MITTENWALD (D 6577) the approaches to the Inn Valley were defended by fanatical Hitler Youth and other small groups. Numerous obstacles retarded progress. Negotiations for the surrender of INNSBRUCK failed but Allied forces met little resistance after entering the Inn Valley and INNSBRUCK was occupied against negligible opposition on 3 May. From here, Allied forces pushed rapidly south, securing the BRENNER Pass and linking up with other forces pushing up from Italy on 4 May. Advances were also made along the Inn River and by 4 May WORG (E 2685), to the east, and IMST (D 2753), to the west, had been reached against little opposition.

By 28 April, the First German Army had lost AUGSBURG and its battered forces were deployed on a north-south line along the LECH River and east along the DANUBE River. From this line, enemy infantry with tank support fought delaying actions back toward MUNICH. Only light and scattered contact was made by friendly units in the AMMER (Y 54) and WURM (Y 62) Lakes region as the northern suburbs of MUNICH were reached on 29 April. The Dachau Concentration Camp (Y 7569), containing 32,000 political prisoners, was defended by 300 SS troops. These were overcome and the camp was liberated at 292000B April. During the night, enemy artillery fire was placed on the town of DACHAU. Resistance in MUNICH broke during the afternoon of 30 April and by midnight, the entire city had been cleared. Thus MUNICH, the cradle of Naziism, fell to the victorious Allied forces.

Beaten remnants fell back as friendly units advanced south and east from MUNICH. Armor driving down the Autobahn reached the Inn River at Z 2721 against negligible resistance. At Y 9049, 100 planes in good condition were captured and at Y 9754, 10 jet type planes were taken as little contact was made southeast of MUNICH. At BAD TOELZ on 1 May, Fieldmarshal GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, the epitome of Junker aristocracy, became the Allies' foremost prisoner of war. On the same day, the infamous Admiral HORTHY of Hungary also was made prisoner. The 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered to friendly units at Z 2155 on 2 May. The advance east along the foothills of the ALPS met only light and scattered small arms fire. ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) was taken during the evening of 2 May as the Germans, having heard of HITLER'S death, prematurely celebrated the end of the war. A push south from ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) along the Inn River reached WORG (E 2685) on 4 May where a juncture was made with forces driving along the Ill River from the west. SALZBURG (Z 9524) surrendered as Allied troops raced east along the Autobahn, reaching that town on 4 May. While SALZBURG was being occupied, another column sped southward against little opposition to capture BERCHTESGADEN (Z 9506). HITLER'S mountain retreat, DER BERGHOF, was reported on fire as capturing units approached.

b. ALPINE FRONT

Southern Zone: On 28 April, friendly troops on the coast fell back from BORDIGHERA (S 8986) to VENTIMIGLIA (S 8587); the line of forward troops then ran through TENDA (N 8820) and along the ROIA to its mouth on the coast east of VENTIMIGLIA. To the north, VINADIO (N 5647) was bypassed and the following day contact was established with elements of the Central zone at PIANCHE (N 5148). Meantime, on 28 April, fighting was reported in CUNEO between German troops and Partisans. The town was declared clear the next day. On 30 April an Allied reconnaissance toward LIMONE (N 8833) reached the north end of TENDE tunnel (N 8731). The enemy remained quiet until the surrender on 2 May.

Central Zone: At the beginning of the period, DEMONTE (N 6647) and SESTRIERES Pass (H 3922) were reached and a junction was effected with southern troops at PIANCHE. A prisoner of war reported that the general withdrawal from the central area began on 24/25 April. On 29 April OULX (K 5414), BARDONNECHE (K 4318), CESANNE (K 5203), and the main villages of the QUEYRAS (P 47) region were occupied. In the TURIN area, elements of the 34 Infantry Division were fighting northwest of the city on 30 April. The next day, the division was reported bypassing TURIN in a move to the northwest on the route: ORBASSANO (H 9222), RIVOLI (H 9029), CASSELLE (J 0234).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Friendly forces did not pursue. The commanding general and 5,000 men of the 34 Infantry Division declared willingness to surrender 2 April, but the following day they refused to surrender to the Partisans.

North Zone: The enemy launched raids on ROC NOIR (H 4362) positions on the night of 27/28 April, following up by attacks in strength on FORCLE Pass (H 46) and friendly positions south of PETIT ST BERNARD (C 4401). These attacks were repulsed and the enemy expelled from the PETIT ST BERNARD area on 29 April. At the same time, Partisan forces encircled an enemy salient on MONT CENIS (H 4457) and BUSSOLENO (H 6240) and SUSE (H 5340) were occupied. Thereafter positions remained quiet until the general surrender.

c. ATLANTIC FRONT

OLERON: After some enemy artillery fire on GALON D'OR (Y 3294) on 25 April, all was quiet until 29 April when 80 rounds of 75 mm fell on BOURCE-FRANC (T 2900) from LE GRAND Village (T 2202). Friendly landings on the island began at 400600B April on the beach east of POINTE DE GATSEAU (Y 2397). By 0955B, POINTE DE MENSON (Y 2598) was reached against weak infantry and medium artillery opposition from the enemy who had expected the landing on the east coast and had massed his reserves at DOLUS (T 2108) and at ST PIERRE D'OLERON (T 1811). Friendly advance was brought to a halt at dusk by an enemy counterattack at the north edge of GRAND VILLAGE. The following morning, however, friendly motorized elements entered ST PEIERRE D'OLERON, the capital of the island, and captured the German governor, who issued a directive for a general surrender. Enemy troops had already begun giving themselves up to civilians. When troops holding out in the fort at BOYARD VILLE (T 2314) complied with the directive, all resistance ceased on the island, the last of the enemy surrendering during the night of 01/02 May.

LA ROCHELLE: On 29 April the enemy gave evidence of consolidating positions before VOUTRON (T 4022). Next morning at 0900B, the diversionary attack against LA ROCHELLE was launched from the south, taking THAIRE (T 4124) by 1245B. VOUTRON and YVES (T 3819) were taken the following day as reconnaissance showed that the enemy had withdrawn to the main anti-tank ditch. The attack from the east began at 1630B of 2 May against AIGREFUILLE (T 4730). The enemy fell back to a line of resistance ST MEDARD (T 4434), ANGOUTE (T 3723), and by noon, friendly troops were established on a semicircular line around LA ROCHELLE (T 4527), AIGRE, [illegible]ILLE, VIRSON (T 4932), AMAIS (T 4937), NUAILLE (T 4841), PETIT LARIN (T 4548). Activity on 3 May was confined to an artillery duel while the enemy fell back all along the line, taking up positions along the anti-tank ditch before LA JARRIE (T 4131). On 4 May, artillery fire was light and infantry activity negligible.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

ENCLOSURE

Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition as of
5 1200 B May 1945.

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #33
ENCLOSURE #1

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 5 1200 B MAY
SCALE 1/1,000,000



200/MAY 45/6A6 6087

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

587.6091 X
28 Aug 1944 -
2 Feb 1945

RETURN TO
RESEARCH STUDIES
INSTITUTE
U.S.A.F.
HISTORICAL DIVISION
ARCHIVES BRANCH

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

#310-647

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

313.24

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: CG, Twelfth Army Group
Initials
Date: 28 August 44

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

IMMEDIATE REPORT NO. 40
(Combat Observations)

370.2 (G-3)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 5a, Training Memorandum No. 1, SHAEF, 17 May 1944, subject "Battle Lessons".

Submitted by: Colonel H. A. Tribolet, Infantry, Combat Observer with XV Corps.

Source: Personal Interviews.

COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL OF COLUMN MOVEMENTS; AIR SUPPORT

(Note: Observers from this headquarters have been directed to transmit information regarding coordination of air, armored, and other ground forces in fast moving operations in as much detail and as rapidly as possible. Other reports will be disseminated promptly after receipt.)

1. Comments of Colonel Kramer Thomas, Chief of Staff, 79th Infantry Division.

a. "The 79th Division moved in 2 columns, with the 5th Armored Division on the left flank and the Cavalry Group covering the front and the right flank. Sections of the division reconnaissance troops were attached to the head of each column and to the 5th Armored Division, so that contact could be maintained through use of the same type radio (SCR 506). The SCR 506 radios in the M-8 armored cars of the reconnaissance sections were tuned to the frequency of the artillery liaison plane which covered the columns. In some instances these planes determined the route of advance of the columns.

b. "Combat team commanders were in direct contact with the division commander through the SCR 193 radio. Combat teams moved on division order. Usually the division commander was with one column and the assistant division commander with the other.

c. "Truck companies and trucks from the division and attached artillery were used to move the infantry, and had no difficulty in keeping up with the armored units. In fact, in some instances, the infantry intermingled with them on the flank. It would be better if the armored division could clear designated phase lines before the infantry crossed, to prevent intermingling of columns; also cavalry should start well ahead of the infantry to insure against interference, e.g. cavalry start at daylight, infantry at 1300.

d. "The air support party usually remained with division headquarters but on occasion was with the unit which was expected to meet the heaviest resistance. Combat teams or the reconnaissance troop could radio in and get air support almost immediately. The relay usually ran from cavalry group to reconnaissance troop section, to division air support party to planes in the air."

12 Sep 1944

2. Comments of Major Longino, Air Liaison, Headquarters XV Corps.

a. "In support of operations of the XV Corps, aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command are furnishing close support missions both pre-planned and requested. In addition, armed reconnaissance is furnished for continual cover of advance columns.

b. "After coordination with G-2 and G-3, the requests for pre-planned missions are sent by radio, telephone or teletype to XIX Air Command the night before they are to be flown.

c. "The air support request missions are sent by radio, telephone, or teletype to XIX Air Command as profitable targets appear on the corps fronts or flank. The air support officer making the request is notified of the acceptance or refusal.

d. "Armed reconnaissance is performed over areas requested by corps and division air support parties. These missions are usually flown by 8 aircraft carrying two 500 lb general purpose bombs and 6 .50 caliber machine guns. These planes keep continual cover over the area of advancing columns and maintain radio contact with the air support party attached to the combat command, which designates targets to be attacked.

c. "The Army places liaison officers with each group operating under XIX Tactical Air Command. These officers keep pilots briefed on the ground situation and also aid in briefing for missions.

DECLASSIFIED EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. "The XIX Tactical Air Command places with each Corps and Division of the Army an air support officer with necessary radio equipment and operating personnel. These officers work closely with G-3 and G-2 advising them concerning air support missions; they also transmit requests to XIX Tactical Air Command.

g. "Air support for XV Corps has, because of the fast moving situation, consisted mainly of armed reconnaissance missions in radio contact with air support parties. This has been very successful. The air support parties have been able to place planes over the targets with a minimum loss of time. The 90th Division has used this method very successfully against tanks and other vehicles."

COMMENTS ON THE CARBINE

Repeated indications of unpopularity of the carbine have resulted in an effort by this headquarters to ascertain the cause. The following comments obtained by an observer, contain the first results of this effort. While reports yet to be received may contain evidence of specific faults with this weapon, it is believed that its unpopularity is due to the desire of those in combat for an effective fighting weapon rather than a convenient defensive one, which is all the carbine was ever intended to be.

1. Comments of 2nd Lt Holmes Simons, Jr., 315 Infantry, 79th Division.
"The carbine cannot take the rough treatment given it on the front line. It will not operate after the mechanical parts become dirty. The front line troops do not have time to keep their weapons clean at all times, and must depend on a weapon that will fire even if wet and dirty--the M-1 rifle will do this. The fire power of the M-1 is tremendous; in street fighting we have been able to tear the roofs of houses to pieces and even destroy chimneys with a few well placed shots from the M-1. I have seen Germans knocked flat on the ground by shots from an M-1 at close range. Beyond 200 yards the carbine has no fire power. The M-1 rifle has a very accurate sight and will shoot where you aim. The carbine is not an accurate weapon unless used at ranges under 200 yards. For front line fighting you must have an accurate weapon. The carbine is very light and handy to carry, but I would not recommend it for officers below the rank of Captain. All enlisted men of fighting units should be armed with M-1 rifles."

2. Comments of Captain Cassidy, 314th Infantry, 79th Division.
"At La Haye Du Puits my carbine jammed after two shots. I believe many lives were lost through malfunctioning of this weapon. Most of our officers have pistols or use M-1 rifles."

3. Comments of Lt Mead, 2nd Bn, 313th Infantry, 79th Division.
"I prefer the M-1 rifle over the carbine because of the better rear sight fewer stoppages, and the increased range."

4. Comments of Colonel S. Wood, 313th Infantry, 79th Division.
"I believe that the distrust of the carbine is due to a lack of familiarization and sufficient shooting with the weapon prior to entry into combat. I feel that it is a fine weapon. Captain Lyons of my staff shot 4 Germans with it a few nights ago."

5. Comments of Colonel Vander Hyden, XV Corps, Ordnance Officer.
"I know of no complaints on the carbine by the using services."

6. Junior officers at the 79th Division CP stated that no M-1 rifles were

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

brought to the aid station. Men armed with carbines took the rifles of the wounded and sent in their carbines.

By command of the Army Group Commander:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. W. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, USA	26 copies (include 6 copies for WD)
CG, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES	9 copies
CG, 21st Army Group	6 copies
CG, First U S Army	1 copy
CG, Third U S Army	1 copy
CG, Ninth U S Army	1 copy
CG, C/S and the Chief, each General and Special Staff Section, this headquarters	1 copy
File	1 copy

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

373.32

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 887

SECRET
Auth: CG, ETOUSA
Initials: CWH
Date: 2 Feb 45

OPD
ETO
3

370.2 (G-3)

IMMEDIATE REPORT NO. 41
(Combat Observations)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 4a(2), Training Memorandum No. 4, SHAEF, 19 December 1944, subject, "Combat Lessons".

Submitted by: Lt Col H.A. Miller, Combat Observer, XII Corps.

Sources: As Indicated.

I RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS IN TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Note: The following material is extracted from two letters to the Commanding General, XII Corps, by the G-2 Air, XII Corps, concerning recommended improvements in Tactical Air Reconnaissance procedure:

4 January 1945

"1. Tactical Air Reconnaissance has never been completely satisfactory from our point of view. Although it has provided us with considerable valuable information, there is much more that could be provided.

"2. The factors in this situation and their effects are as follows:

"a. Pilots. Pilots are well trained and are eager to provide the information we want but the system is such that best results are not possible.

"b. Army control. Third U.S. Army prescribes areas to be searched by Tactical Air Command reconnaissance pilots. These areas are very large, averaging about 800 square miles for a single mission and extend as far as 100 or 150 miles into enemy held territory. The result is that most of the information gained is of strategic importance only. Information of the enemy along the Corps front is reported, but the detailed study necessary has apparently never been possible. Furthermore, pilots are briefed to concentrate on items of startegic importance, such as marshalling yards and rail movements deep in enemy territory, and, as a result, the immediate tactical situation suffers. Furthermore, the ground liaison officers are so far removed from the tactical situation that they apparently do not know our needs sufficiently well. It is true that pilots returning from missions deep in enemy territory often call on the VHF radio for our needs, but by that time they are near the limit of the aircraft's endurance and cannot make a detailed study of areas in which we are interested.

"c. Reporting of information. (1) A small amount of information is called directly from planes to our VHF receivers. This information is received immediately but the amount is small.

"(2) G-2 Air XIX Tactical Air Command has lately been sending telegraphic reports of results of missions. This reaches us on the average about 6 to 10 hours after the mission has been completed.

"(3) G-2 Air XIX Tactical Air Command and G-2 Air Third U.S. Army send typewritten reports of the results of missions. These are complete but usually reach us between 12 and 36 hours after the mission has been completed.

"(4) The Air Force reports summaries of intelligence by radio at periodic intervals throughout the day. This method of reporting has never worked for us because of (a) reception difficulties (b) the large scope of information reported (c) delays in the transmission (d) the difficulty of monitoring the channel.

"(5) All the mentionpd methods of reporting suffer from the same difficulties -- information reported is primarily of strategic importance and tactical information is too sketchy.

"d. Availability of planes and pilots. Two reconnaissance squadrons are assigned to XIX Tactical Air Command. Each squadron has approximately 20 planes and approximately 34 pilots. Two planes fly together as a section

MAR 26 1945
11460

SECRET

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS

SECRET

on a mission -- one to observe and one to fly cover for the observer. During the present season each squadron flies an average of 12 to 15 missions per day weather permitting.

*3. Recommended plan. It is recommended that the following plan be adopted immediately.

*a. Two sections or, if possible, three sections of Tactical Air Command reconnaissance planes should be detailed to fly tactical missions for XII Corps only.

*b. G-2 Air XII Corps will be responsible that Air Corps S-2s, Air Liaison Officers and pilots are properly briefed on the corps situation and corps needs.

*c. A reconnaissance area will be designated by the G-2 Air XII Corps each day. This area, in turn, will be broken down into 100 square kilometer areas designated by a simple system. Pilots will be briefed on which of these areas should be searched during the day.

*d. The sections detailed to support XII Corps could fly, weather permitting, a total of three to four missions per day during the present season. Each mission would occupy about two hours, of which one and one-quarter hours would be spent over the area in a detailed search.

*e. On approaching the area the section leader would call XII Corps VHF radio, 'FLIBBY', on the same channel as that used for fighter bombers.

*f. The air support officer would tell the pilot what the needs of the moment were, and the pilot would fly either a newly requested mission or his planned mission at the request of the air support party officer -- all, of course, at the pilot's discretion on his capabilities.

*g. The pilot would remain in close contact with XII Corps VHF radio and would report immediately on the results of his observations in the particular area.

*h. On return to his base the pilot would be interrogated for additional information by the S-2 and the air liaison officer as ~~as~~ present. Reports of these interrogations would be forwarded by the fastest available means direct to the G-2 Air, XII Corps, and a copy would be sent to G-2 Air Third U.S. Army.

*i. Division and other unit requests would be forwarded to G-2 Air XII Corps and would be passed on to pilots by means of the VHF radio or at the briefings.

*j. The operation of 'FABRICATE', XII Corps close support control station, would be available to Tactical Air Command reconnaissance pilots in locating areas and pinpoints and in determing their positions.

*4. Conclusion. It is believed that the above plan would greatly improve the results to be had by XII Corps from Tactical reconnaissance. Any defects in operation of the plan would be shortly worked out by experience."

*23 January 1945

*1. Reference Memorandum 4 January same subject.

*2. I renew the recommendations of 4 January because our experience of the last two days has proved workability of the plan.

*3. At approximately 1000 hours 22 January a very large vehicular movement across the corps front was sighted by artillery liaison pilots. As a result of the sudden appearance of this traffic the control of much tactical reconnaissance was turned over directly to XII Corps. During the course of the day we worked approximately five tactical reconnaissance missions, received reports from many more and simultaneously worked on the same channel over 25 squadrons of fighter-bombers. I do not believe that any condition more difficult than this will arise in the future.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

"4. In substance the operations of 22 and 23 January, except for their emergency nature, were an example of the operation of the recommended plan. The tactical reconnaissance planes, performing magnificently under our control, gave a complete report to us of the movements on our front, permitting us to take immediate action with artillery and fighter-bombers. The tactical reconnaissance planes actually led a very large proportion of the fighter-bombers into the targets. That the operations were successful is proved by the fact that the XIX Tactical Air Command had the most successful day it has ever had, destroying 1169 vehicles and damaging 536 in addition to many other targets destroyed. In addition, for the first time the tactical reconnaissance planes searched an area in which corps and divisions are interested, rather than flying primarily deep strategic missions. In spite of all this, deep strategic reconnaissance did not suffer, the Army receiving full reports from other tactical reconnaissance sections.

"5. As a result of this experience I repeat the recommendations of 4 January. The only change recommended is in paragraph 3e. I no longer believe that a separate channel is advisable. A single channel is preferable in that divisions may listen in and tactical reconnaissance planes can direct fighter-bombers to targets without changing channels. If one channel was adequate for 22-23 January as it was, it will be adequate for any foreseeable circumstance."

By command of General EISENHOWER:

R. B. LORD
Major General, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
R. B. LOVETT
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WD, WASHINGTON, D.C. (For G-3)	6 copies (Air Mail)
CG, ARMY GROUND FORCES, WASHINGTON, D.C. (For G-3)	6 copies (Air Mail)
CG, MAIN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE	1 copies
CG, 21 Army Group	6 copies
CG, Sixth Army Group	30 copies
CG, Twelfth Army Group	50 copies
CG, First US Army	5 copies
CG, Third US Army	5 copies
CG, Seventh US Army	5 copies
CG, Ninth US Army	5 copies
CG, Fifteenth US Army	5 copies
CG, Eighth Air Force	5 copies
CG, Ninth Air Force	5 copies
CG, IX Tactical Air Command	5 copies
CG, XIX Tactical Air Command	5 copies
CG, XXIX Tactical Air Command	5 copies
CG, IX Bomber Command	5 copies
CG, XII Tactical Air Force	5 copies
CG, each US Corps and Division this theater	6 copies each
CG, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command	15 copies
CG, AAF and the Chief, Army General and Special Staff Sections, this headquarters	1 copy each
AG Files	2 copies
Combat Lessons Branch, G-3, this headquarters	200 copies

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 887

SECRET
Auth: CG, ETOUSA
Initials: CAM
Date: 2 Feb 45

370.2 (G-3)

INTERMEDIATE REPORT NO. 41
(Combat Observations)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 4a(2), Training Memorandum No. 4, SHAEF, 19 December 1944, subject, "Combat Lessons".

Submitted by: Lt Col H.A. Miller, Combat Observer, XII Corps.

Sources: As Indicated.

I RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS IN TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Note: The following material is extracted from two letters to the Commanding General, XII Corps, by the G-2 Air, XII Corps, concerning recommended improvements in Tactical Air Reconnaissance procedure:

"4 January 1945

"1. Tactical Air Reconnaissance has never been completely satisfactory from our point of view. Although it has provided us with considerable valuable information, there is much more that could be provided.

"2. The factors in this situation and their effects are as follows.

"a. Pilots. Pilots are well trained and are eager to provide the information we want but the system is such that best results are not possible.

"b. Army control. Third U.S. Army prescribes areas to be searched by Tactical Air Command reconnaissance pilots. These areas are very large, averaging about 800 square miles for a single mission and extend as far as 100 or 150 miles into enemy held territory. The result is that most of the information gained is of strategic importance only. Information of the enemy along the Corps front is reported, but the detailed study necessary has apparently never been possible. Furthermore, pilots are briefed to concentrate on items of startegic importance, such as marshalling yards and rail movements deep in enemy territory, and, as a result, the immediate tactical situation suffers. Furthermore, the ground liaison officers are so far removed from the tactical situation that they apparently do not know our needs sufficiently well. It is true that pilots returning from missions deep in enemy territory often call on the VHF radio for our needs, but by that time they are near the limit of the aircraft's endurance and cannot make a detailed study of areas in which we are interested.

"c. Reporting of information. (1) A small amount of information is called directly from planes to our VHF receivers. This information is received immediately but the amount is small.

"(2) G-2 Air XIX Tactical Air Command has lately been sending telegraphic reports of results of missions. This reaches us on the average about 6 to 10 hours after the mission has been completed.

"(3) G-2 Air XIX Tactical Air Command and G-2 Air Third U.S. Army send typewritten reports of the results of missions. These are complete but usually reach us between 12 and 36 hours after the mission has been completed.

"(4) The Air Force reports summaries of intelligence by radio at periodic intervals throughout the day. This method of reporting has never worked for us because of (a) reception difficulties (b) the large scope of information reported (c) delays in the transmission (d) the difficulty of monitoring the channel.

"(5) All the mentioned methods of reporting suffer from the same difficulties -- information reported is primarily of strategic importance and tactical information is too sketchy.

"d. Availability of planes and pilots. Two reconnaissance squadrons are assigned to XIX Tactical Air Command. Each squadron has approximately 20 planes and approximately 34 pilots. Two planes fly together as a section

MAR 26 1945

- 1 -

SECRET

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS

SECRET

on a mission -- one to observe and one to fly cover for the observer. During the present season each squadron flies an average of 12 to 15 missions per day weather permitting.

"5. Recommended plan. It is recommended that the following plan be adopted immediately.

"a. Two sections or, if possible, three sections of Tactical Air Command reconnaissance planes should be detailed to fly tactical missions for XII Corps only.

"b. G-2 Air XII Corps will be responsible that Air Corps S-2s, Air Liaison Officers and pilots are properly briefed on the corps situation and corps needs.

"c. A reconnaissance area will be designated by the G-2 Air XII Corps each day. This area, in turn, will be broken down into 100 square kilometer areas designated by a simple system. Pilots will be briefed on which of those areas should be searched during the day.

"d. The sections detailed to support XII Corps could fly, weather permitting, a total of three to four missions per day during the present season. Each mission would occupy about two hours, of which one and one-quarter hours would be spent over the area in a detailed search.

"e. On approaching the area the section leader would call XII Corps VHF radio, 'FLABBY', on the same channel as that used for fighter bombers.

"f. The air support officer would tell the pilot what the needs of the moment were, and the pilot would fly either a newly requested mission or his planned mission at the request of the air support party officer -- all, of course, at the pilot's discretion on his capabilities.

"g. The pilot would remain in close contact with XII Corps VHF radio and would report immediately on the results of his observations in the particular area.

"h. On return to his base the pilot would be interrogated for additional information by the S-2 and the air liaison officer as to present. Reports of these interrogations would be forwarded by the fastest available means direct to the G-2 Air, XII Corps, and a copy would be sent to G-2 Air Third U.S. Army.

"i. Division and other unit requests would be forwarded to G-2 Air XII Corps and would be passed on to pilots by means of the VHF radio or at the briefings.

"j. The operation of 'FABRICATE', XII Corps close support control station, would be available to Tactical Air Command reconnaissance pilots in locating areas and pinpoints and in determing their positions.

"4. Conclusion. It is believed that the above plan would greatly improve the results to be had by XII Corps from Tactical reconnaissance. Any defects in operation of the plan would be shortly worked out by experience."

"23 January 1945

"1. Reference Memorandum 4 January same subject.

"2. I renew the recommendations of 4 January because our experience of the last two days has proved workability of the plan.

"3. At approximately 1000 hours 22 January a very large vehicular movement across the corps front was sighted by artillery liaison pilots. As a result of the sudden appearance of this traffic the control of much tactical reconnaissance was turned over directly to XII Corps. During the course of the day we worked approximately five tactical reconnaissance missions, received reports from many more and simultaneously worked on the same channel over 25 squadrons of fighter-bombers. I do not believe that any condition more difficult than this will arise in the future.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

4. In substance the operations of 22 and [redacted] January, except for their emergency nature, were an example of the operation of the recommended plan. The tactical reconnaissance planes, performing magnificently under our control, gave a complete report to us of the movements on our front, permitting us to take immediate action with artillery and fighter-bombers. The tactical reconnaissance planes actually led a very large proportion of the fighter-bombers into the targets. That the operations were successful is proved by the fact that the XIX Tactical Air Command had the most successful day it has ever had, destroying 1169 vehicles and damaging 535 in addition to many other targets destroyed. In addition, for the first time the tactical reconnaissance planes searched an area in which corps and divisions are interested, rather than flying primarily deep strategic missions. In spite of all this, deep strategic reconnaissance did not suffer, the Army receiving full reports from other tactical reconnaissance sections.

5. As a result of this experience I repeat the recommendations of 4 January. The only change recommended is in paragraph 3c. I no longer believe that a separate channel is advisable. A single channel is preferable in that divisions may listen in and tactical reconnaissance planes can direct fighter-bombers to targets without changing channels. If one channel was adequate for 22-23 January as it was, it will be adequate for any foreseeable circumstance."

By command of General EISENHOWER:

R. B. LORD
Major General, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. B. LOVETT
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WD, WASHINGTON, D.C. (Type O-3) 6 copies (AAF only)
CG, ARMY GROUND FORCES, WASHINGTON, D.C. (Type O-3) 6 copies (AAF only)
CG, MAIN SUPPLY HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 3 copies
CG, 21 Army Group 4 copies
CG, Ninth Army 20 copies
CG, Twelfth Army Group 20 copies
CG, First US Army 3 copies
CG, Second US Army 3 copies
CG, Third US Army 3 copies
CG, Ninth US Army 3 copies
CG, Fifteenth US Army 3 copies
CG, Ninth Air Force 3 copies
CG, XIX Tactical Air Command 3 copies
CG, [illegible] Tactical Air Command 3 copies
CG, [illegible] Tactical Air Command 3 copies
CG, IX Bomber Command 3 copies
CG, [illegible] 3 copies
CG, [illegible] 3 copies
CG, [illegible]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, Twelfth Army Gp
Initials: / /
Date: 1 November 44

370.2 (G-3)

IMMEDIATE REPORT NO. 90
(Combat Observations)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 5a, Training Memorandum No. 1, SHAEF, 17 May 1944, subject, "Battle Lessons".

Submitted by: Col H. A. Tribolet

Sources: As indicated

I USE OF RADAR FOR LOCATING GROUND TARGETS

Comments of Officers of XV Corps Artillery and AAA units:

1. General. "The 214th AAA Bn has experimented with the use of radar to locate moving ground targets at night, with some apparent success. The experiment was initiated by Lt Col Carl W. Klotzman, CO 214th AAA Gun Bn and Capt Richard C. Matlack, Bn Radar O.

2. Introduction to experiment. "The idea was suggested when it was noted that convoys of US vehicles showed up in the range scope of the SCR 584. At the time, the set was located on a high hill and had an axial line of sight on the highway along which the vehicles were moving. As they came over a high point some 5000 yds away they showed up as moving pips on the range scopes. The pip movements showed up for 100 to 200 yds before being lost among fixed target pips, caused by trees and bushes.

3. Installation. "Based on this experience and in accordance with the line of sight characteristics of radar, an installation was made in the XV Corps area, overlooking enemy territory. The set was placed as close as possible to the enemy positions in order to get the maximum response from the moving vehicles, which ordinarily show up quite weak on the scope. The position selected was in full view of the enemy. For this reason it was decided to fortify the position and to operate only at night.

4. Operation. a. "The intention was to locate enemy movement on the roads and pass on the information to XV Corps which had set aside certain bns of arty to fire on the targets found. The radar was to report the location and direction and speed of travel and the arty was to compute the point to fire on, then drop a TOT shoot on it.

b. "The most successful method of detection found was to point the parabola at a high point on an axial highway and watch for pip disturbance to occur at the range to the road. Azimuth and range were determined from a map. A vehicle moving through the beam would cause the pips already present from fixed targets to suddenly move up and down and then stop after the vehicle had passed. In some cases when a disturbance was noted the pip causing the reaction could be noted changing in range for a short distance.

c. "Since positive detection depends on noting a change in range, the method employed limited the search to roads which were axial to the radar. When disturbances of the pip occurred, it was noted that the tracking current meter of the auto-track unit oscillated violently and swung more than normal, so it was used as an aid in detecting movement.

5. Results. "The operation was begun on 22 October and by 29 October movement had been detected on three roads and one CR. In the five nights that it was possible to operate, a total of twelve fire missions were sent in on these targets. There was a distinct change in the pace of traffic after the firing in each case, and it was believed that some vehicles were halted as a result of it. As an example, the CR was watched for several nights and when movement was detected it was shelled. Four nights later the CR was again checked and no movement was detected. A switch was then made to a dirt road, where movement was detected and fired upon. This movement also ceased.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. Conclusions. a. "The limited results of the operation were partly due to the wet weather. When it was wet it was difficult to pick out moving echoes from fixed echoes. When fixed targets, such as hills, trees and bushes were wet the pips from them were accentuated and 'bounced' much more than when dry. This made it difficult to distinguish the 'bouncing pip' caused by the vehicle from the pips caused by the fixed targets. When one was detected it soon became lost in the fixed echoes.

b. "It was felt that the use of radar for locating ground targets has definite possibilities and the effectiveness of our FA might be increased by the use of small portable radar sets. Experiments are being continued with new sets with a narrower pulse width."

By command of Lieutenant General Bradley:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: C R Landon B

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, ARMY GROUND FORCES, WASHINGTON, D. C.	2 copies (air mail
CG, COMZ ZONE, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, USA	30 copies (includes 6 copies for WD)
CG, REAR SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES	9 copies
CG, 21st Army Group	6 copies
CG, 6th Army Group	22 copies
CG, First U S Army	5 copies
CG, Third U S Army	5 copies
CG, Ninth U S Army	5 copies
CG, C/S and the Chief, each General and Special Staff Section, this headquarters	1 copy
CG, Eighth Air Force	3 copies
CG, Ninth Air Force	3 copies
File	1 copy

(Pub 4580)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: CG, Twelfth Army Gp
Initials: / /
Date: 1 November 44

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

370.2 (G-3)

IMMEDIATE REPORT NO. 90
(Combat Observations)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 5a, Training Memorandum No. 1, SHAEF, 17 May 1944, subject, "Battle Lessons".

Submitted by: Col H. A. Tribolet

Sources: As indicated

I USE OF RADAR FOR LOCATING GROUND TARGETS

Comments of Officers of XV Corps Artillery and AAA units:

1. General. "The 214th AAA Bn has experimented with the use of radar to locate moving ground targets at night, with some apparent success. The experiment was initiated by Lt Col Carl W. Kietzman, CO 214th AAA Gun Bn and Capt Richard C. Matlack, Bn Radar O.

2. Introduction to experiment. "The idea was suggested when it was noted that convoys of US vehicles showed up in the range scope of the SCR 584. At the time, the set was located on a high hill and had an axial line of sight on the highway along which the vehicles were moving. As they came over a high point some 5000 yds away they showed up as moving pips on the range scopes. The pip movements showed up for 100 to 200 yds before being lost among fixed target pips, caused by trees and bushes.

3. Installation. "Based on this experience and in accordance with the line of sight characteristics of radar, an installation was made in the XV Corps area, overlooking enemy territory. The set was placed as close as possible to the enemy positions in order to get the maximum response from the moving vehicles, which ordinarily show up quite weak on the scope. The position selected was in full view of the enemy. For this reason it was decided to fortify the position and to operate only at night.

4. Operation. a. "The intention was to locate enemy movement on the roads and pass on the information to XV Corps which had set aside certain bns of arty to fire on the targets found. The radar was to report the location and direction and speed of travel and the arty was to compute the point to fire on, then drop a TOT shoot on it.

b. "The most successful method of detection found was to point the parabola at a high point on an axial highway and watch for pip disturbance to occur at the range to the road. Azimuth and range were determined from a map. A vehicle moving through the beam would cause the pips already present from fixed targets to suddenly move up and down and then stop after the vehicle had passed. In some cases when a disturbance was noted the pip causing the reaction could be noted changing in range for a short distance.

c. "Since positive detection depends on noting a change in range, the method employed limited the search to roads which were axial to the radar. When disturbances of the pip occurred, it was noted that the tracking current meter of the auto-track unit oscillated violently and swung more than normal, so it was used as an aid in detecting movement.

5. Results. "The operation was begun on 22 October and by 29 October movement had been detected on three roads and one CR. In the five nights that it was possible to operate, a total of twelve fire missions were sent in on these targets. There was a distinct change in the pace of traffic after the firing in each case, and it was believed that some vehicles were halted as a result of it. As an example, the CR was watched for several nights and when movement was detected it was shelled. Four nights later the CR was again checked and no movement was detected. A switch was then made to a dirt road, where movement was detected and fired upon. This movement also ceased.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

99/12-11.5

0 / 9 2

6. Conclusions. a. "The limited results of the operation were partly due to the wet weather. When it was wet it was difficult to pick out moving echoes from fixed echoes. When fixed targets, such as hills, trees and bushes were wet the pips from them were accentuated and 'bounced' much more than when dry. This made it difficult to distinguish the 'bouncing pip' caused by the vehicle from the pips caused by the fixed targets. When one was detected it soon became lost in the fixed echoes.

b. "It was felt that the use of radar for locating ground targets has definite possibilities and the effectiveness of our FA might be increased by the use of small portable radar sets. Experiments are being continued with new sets with a narrower pulse width."

By command of Lieutenant General Bradley:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: C R. Landon B
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, ARMY GROUND FORCES, WASHINGTON, D. C.	2 copies (air mail
CG, COM ZONE, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, USA	30 copies (includes 6 copies for WD)
CG, REAR SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES	9 copies
CG, 21st Army Group	6 copies
CG, 6th Army Group	22 copies
CG, First U S Army	5 copies
CG, Third U S Army	5 copies
CG, Ninth U S Army	5 copies
CG, C/S and the Chief, each General and Special Staff Section, this headquarters	1 copy
CG, Eighth Air Force	3 copies
CG, Ninth Air Force	3 copies
File	1 copy

(Pub 4580)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0 / 9 3

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, Twelfth Army Gp
Initials: / /
Date: 1 November 44

370.2 (G-3)

IMMEDIATE REPORT NO. 90
(Combat Observations)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 5a, Training Memorandum No. 1, SHAEF, 17 May 1944, subject, "Battle Lessons".

Submitted by: Col H. A. Tribolet

Sources: As indicated

I USE OF RADAR FOR LOCATING GROUND TARGETS

Comments of Officers of XV Corps Artillery and AAA units:

1. General. "The 214th AAA Bn has experimented with the use of radar to locate moving ground targets at night, with some apparent success. The experiment was initiated by Lt Col Carl W. Klotzman, CO 214th AAA Gun Bn and Capt Richard C. Matlack, Bn Radar O.

2. Introduction to experiment. "The idea was suggested when it was noted that convoys of US vehicles showed up in the range scope of the SCR 584. At the time, the set was located on a high hill and had an axial line of sight on the highway along which the vehicles were moving. As they came over a high point some 5000 yds away they showed up as moving pips on the range scopes. The pip movements showed up for 100 to 200 yds before being lost among fixed target pips, caused by trees and bushes.

3. Installation. "Based on this experience and in accordance with the line of sight characteristics of radar, an installation was made in the XV Corps area, overlooking enemy territory. The set was placed as close as possible to the enemy positions in order to get the maximum response from the moving vehicles, which ordinarily show up quite weak on the scope. The position selected was in full view of the enemy. For this reason it was decided to fortify the position and to operate only at night.

4. Operation. a. "The intention was to locate enemy movement on the roads and pass on the information to XV Corps which had set aside certain bns of arty to fire on the targets found. The radar was to report the location and direction and speed of travel and the arty was to compute the point to fire on, then drop a TOT shoot on it.

b. "The most successful method of detection found was to point the parabola at a high point on an axial highway and watch for pip disturbance to occur at the range to the road. Azimuth and range were determined from a map. A vehicle moving through the beam would cause the pips already present from fixed targets to suddenly move up and down and then stop after the vehicle had passed. In some cases when a disturbance was noted the pip causing the reaction could be noted changing in range for a short distance.

c. "Since positive detection depends on noting a change in range, the method employed limited the search to roads which were axial to the radar. When disturbances of the pip occurred, it was noted that the tracking current meter of the auto-track unit oscillated violently and swung more than normal, so it was used as an aid in detecting movement.

5. Results. "The operation was begun on 22 October and by 29 October movement had been detected on three roads and one CR. In the five nights that it was possible to operate, a total of twelve fire missions were sent in on these targets. There was a distinct change in the pace of traffic after the firing in each case, and it was believed that some vehicles were halted as a result of it. As an example, the CR was watched for several nights and when movement was detected it was shelled. Four nights later the CR was again checked and no movement was detected. A switch was then made to a dirt road, where movement was detected and fired upon. This movement also ceased.

SECRET

99118-11.5

6. Conclusions. a. "The limited results of the operation were partly due to the wet weather. When it was wet it was difficult to pick out moving echoes from fixed echoes. When fixed targets, such as hills, trees and bushes were wet the pips from them were accentuated and 'bounced' much more than when dry. This made it difficult to distinguish the 'bouncing pip' caused by the vehicle from the pips caused by the fixed targets. When one was detected it soon became lost in the fixed echoes.

b. "It was felt that the use of radar for locating ground targets has definite possibilities and the effectiveness of our FA might be increased by the use of small portable radar sets. Experiments are being continued with new sets with a narrower pulse width."

By command of Lieutenant General Bradley:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: C. R. Landon B

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, ARMY GROUND FORCES, WASHINGTON, D. C.	2 copies (air mail
CG, COMZ ZONE, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, USA	30 copies (includes 6 copies for WD)
CG, REAR SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES	9 copies
CG, 21st Army Group	6 copies
CG, 6th Army Group	22 copies
CG, First U S Army	5 copies
CG, Third U S Army	5 copies
CG, Ninth U S Army	5 copies
CG, C/S and the Chief, each General and Special Staff Section, this headquarters	1 copy
CG, Eighth Air Force	3 copies
CG, Ninth Air Force	3 copies
File	1 copy

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

587.6091 X
26 Sep 1944

RETURN TO
RESEARCH STUDIES
INSTITUTE
U.S.A.F.
HISTORICAL DIVISION
ARCHIVES BRANCH

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

AFHRA-CAH

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

373.33

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: CG, Twelfth Army Gp
Initials:
Date 29 Sept 1944

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

370.2 (G-3)

IMMEDIATE REPORT NO. 65
(Combat Observations)

This report is transmitted in compliance with paragraph 5a, Training Memorandum No. 1, SHAEF, 17 May 1944, subject, "Battle Lessons".

Submitted by: Lt. Col. Maurice M. Simons, Combat Observer VIII Corps.

Source: Report from CG 2d Inf Div to CG VIII Corps.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES AROUND BREST

1. Missions. A total of 97 missions, involving 795 aircraft, were flown in support of the operations of this div from 23 July until resistance ceased. About 65% of these missions were requested by front line bns and were based on information submitted by inf bns or obtained from arty FOs or In Qs.

2. Effects Upon Ground Action. Normally air support did not furnish direct aid to the small units in the same way as close support wpns such as arty or mortars. Air support had its principal value in destroying or neutralizing strong points 1000 yds or more behind the hostile front lines. The only immediate effect upon the enemy front line troops was usually a weakening of morale. The value of the air support was evident to our small units only after they reached the target area and saw the extent to which enemy strong points had been reduced. Other effects not always immediately apparent to the ground troops were restriction of hostile movement, neutralizing wpns by keeping their crews under cover and limiting hostile obsn.

3. Planning and Control. Information of probable targets was continually sought. The best sources were the inf units, the div arty, civilian evacuees and PWs. Based upon this information, control was exercised as follows:

a. - A list of known or suspected targets was prepared and copies furnished to the air support party O and to the div arty.

b. - The supporting planes, upon arrival, checked in with the ASP, who briefed them with respect to the target with the highest priority. In this briefing he included details as to location of close friendly elements, preferred direction of attack, pertinent conditions existing in the target area, including smoke, burning buildings and prominent landmarks. He then had the target marked with colored smoke and informed the pilot that this smoke had been laid.

c. - The flight leader reported to the ASP when he had definitely located the target and again on completion of the mission, giving observed or estimated results. Ground obsrs also reported on results and this information was given to the pilot.

4. Advantages of Air Alert. Air alert missions have these advantages over planned missions:

a. - The ground comdr is able to direct the attack upon the most important target existing at the time.

b. - Practically eliminates the danger of mistaken attack by the planes on friendly troops caused by changes in the situation which might occur if the briefing were some hours earlier.

16 Oct 1944 7177

5. Examples of Very Close Air Support. On 27 Aug, 12 thunderbolts bombed and strafed a bty. Direct hits on the positions were observed only 200 yds from the front lines of the friendly bn.

b. - Company L, 23d Inf reported that our planes had strafed two hedgerows away from and parallel to their front lines.

c. - On 3 September eight Thunderbolts bombed and strafed enemy positions 150 to 200 yds in front of cos K and L, 23d Inf.

6. Attitude of Ground Troops. a. - CO 9th Inf. As long as the planes are on the target, the soldiers have utmost confidence in them. However, a stray bomb or two and a few wild tracers behind the front lines shakes this confidence quickly

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

b. - CO 23d Inf. On 8 Sept the air bombed and strafed all during the afternoon a hill which had been holding us up previously. That night the remnants of the enemy withdrew and we occupied the hill without resistance next morning. Our recent operations have developed in our men a confidence in close air support. Some bombs have been dropped in or behind our lines. The introduction of a system for marking the front lines with cerise flourescent panels has reduced the possibility of error and the distrust in the minds of the troops.

c. CO 38th Inf. One hill which was a dominating feature at the eastern edge of Brest had harassed our troops and retarded our advance for some time. The air neutralized it completely, destroyed the large guns and operating installations and the inf took the hill without excessive loss. Men in the line and comdrs of all grades appreciate air support and are generally willing to accept the few misplaced bombs. Company B of this regt was strafed on one occasion by our planes. The planes went on, however, and reduced an enemy emplacement that would have caused more losses than did the accidental strafing. After capturing the position most of the co declared they were glad they had the air support, despite the strafing.

7. Effect on Enemy. a. - Statements from PWs indicate the German soldier fears strafing more than bombing, though bombing causes greater damage to wpns, vehicles and material.

8. Suggestions and Recommendations. a. - Comdrs of small ground units are practically unanimous in recommending that strafing or bombing runs be made parallel to friendly front lines, or, if perpendicular to them that they be made far enough away to insure against loss to friendly troops through overs, hung bombs or wild shots. They also recommend that initial evasive action be taken over enemy positions as this frequently shakes loose hung bombs.

b. - In a static situation pilots frequently are confused as to actual location of the forward elements because of panels displayed on vehicles in rear of the front lines.

c. - Valuable VHF radio channels should be divided equally between AGPs working in the area to minimize congestion.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: C R Landon
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, COM ZONE, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, USA	26 copies (includes 6 copies for WD)
CG, REAR SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES	9 copies
CG, 21st Army Group	6 copies
CG, 6th Army Group	13 copies
CG, First U S Army Group	5 copies
CG, First U S Army	5 copies
CG, Third U S Army	5 copies
CG, Ninth U S Army	5 copies
CG, C/S and the Chief, each General and Special Staff Section, this headquarters	1 copy
File	1 copy

(Pub 3809)

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

0800

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

1694 6th AG T-2 Periodic Report

587.6091
23 APR-15 MAY 1945
X

RETURN TO:
Director
Research Studies Institute
Attn: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

23 Apr. 1945 thru 15 May 1945

4

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

5 of 7

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ic Report

24 Apr. 1945 thru 15 May 1945

43411-1823

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

[redacted]

584

LIBRARY AD/1 KH-94

SECRET

a/1

I-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS _____
DATE 24 April 45

FROM: 231800B April 45
TO : 241800B April 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
241800 April 45

No: 1

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Maps: TOWN PLAN, STUTTGART. Scale: 1/19,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:

(1) Co B, 1269th Engr C Bn.
(2) 1st Bn, 398th Inf Regt, 100th Inf Div.
(3) 1st Bn, 152nd Inf Regt (French).

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 42, 45, 47, 101, 101b, 104, 109, 118, 120, 136, 147, 153 and 163.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: 5, 18, 28 and 33.

(c) Opportunity Targets: Deutsches Auslansinstitut, Danziger Freiheit Stw 13

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received:

(a) Files of Deutsches Auslansinstitut which had not been evacuated. Files contained lists of names and correspondence of Kameradschaft in foreign countries including the United States.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Contacted Paul Kübler, Olgastrasse, 95, a U. S. citizen who also has a residence in Munich. He was in Munich a week ago and has valuable information on current military activities in the city.

(2) A French Military Government Team commanded by Lt Col MERCADIER has begun operations in the city. Attached to the team is a mission of four U. S. Officers headed by Lt Col STEWART. Initial proclamations have been posted.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION:

(1) No report of activities for the period.

[redacted]

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of important results of exploitation of targets by specialists).

(1) None available for period.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: City of Stuttgart clear of enemy. No organized resistance nor harassing activity reported during period. City found to be moderately damaged with approximately 75 per cent of targets seized at close of period intact. Investigators called forward from specialists camp at 0800. As of 1500, forty one Investigators had reported. First targets released for exploitation at 1200.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: Ulm has been entered by elements of the 7th US Army and First French Armies.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY COPY

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

Cy 1

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 25 April 45

FROM: 241800B April 45
TO : 251800B April 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
251800 April 45

NO: 2

Maps: TOWN PLAN, STUTTGART. Scale: 1/19,000.

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:

(1) Co B, 1269th Engr C Bn.
(2) 1st Bn, 398th Inf Regt, 100th Inf Div.
(3) 1st Bn, 152nd Inf Regt (French).

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 3, 4, 6, 9, 15, 17, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39, 43, 44, 46, 105,106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 148, 149, 150, 164, 165, 166.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: 16, 20, 22, 36, 41, 113, 116, 117, 121, 122, 134, 140, 141, 155.

(c) Personality Targets: The Oberbuergermeister of Stuttgart (Stroelin) was located and turned over to CIC. Stroelin is a prominent NAZI, was the director of German "auslands" organization, and was a CIC priority target. Two other individuals were referred to CIC for interrogation, Franz Lau and Dr. Walter Gerlach who gave valuable information about the organization of the "Werwolf" as well as information about ammunition stores, location of records, and names and addresses of Party leaders.

(d) Oppurtunity Targets: The concentration camp and subterranean aircraft factory at Kleinglattbach were visited under the guidance of Baroness von Neurath, sister-in-law of former foreign minister von Neurath, who was able to furnish detailed information about the camp and plant under construction. The common grave of 1500 people of seven nationalities, mostly Jewish, was found there.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Status of Targets cont'd:

(d) Oppurtunity Targets cont'd:

The purpose of the plant was the manufacture of jet propelled (Duesen-Jaeger) planes. Work on the plant was suspended in November of 1944. After November the camp was used as a medical center for all Southern German concentration camps.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: A total of 85 files were received and recorded. A total of 12 target-team reports (11 priority I, 1 target of opportunity) and 13 agency reports (2 priority I, 1 priority II, 2 priority III, 8 targets of opportunity) were received.

(2) Documents Forwarded During Period and Destination: During the period, six bags of documents were evacuated, four to Military Government, Stuttgart, one to SHAEF (Main), one to 6th Army Group.

(3) Highlights of Interesting Documents: Outstanding reports and documents received include: report on a concentration camp near Kleinglattbach; on famous art treasures and archives at castles Oehringen, Neuenstein, and Waldenburg; on a meeting with Baroness von Neurath (sister in law of the former foreign minister) on FLAK control and GAF FLAK command posts at Stuttgart; documents from the offices of the Reichsstatthalter and Staatsminister of Wurttemberg on Feindabwehr (counter-espionage) and Verlagerungen (removal of factories and offices) from Deutsches Auslandsinstitut card files of personal contacts abroad (incl USA), "Fragebogen" concerning German families abroad.

c. G-5 Section

Schloss Reitzenstein, Richard Wagnerstrasse, Stuttgart, at one time the Head Offices of the Reichsstatthalter, Staatsministerium(Ministry of State). Innenministerium (Ministry of Interior), Landesplanung, Finanzministerium and the Erdbebendienst (Seismological Institute) is practically undamaged and under guard and is to be used as Headquarters for General Schwartz. The secret files (Verschlussachen) contain correspondence pertaining to the procurement of emergency locations (Ausweichunterkünfte) for the Waffen SS- Police, party and its organizations, railroads, Daimler-Benz, Consulates,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 Section cont'd:

hospitals and old folks' homes, Bosch, Dornier, etc., also directives on M day procedure and classification, examination and handling of secret documents. They were located in a safe (Tresor) on the main floor in the Eastern part of the building.

The Seismological Institute, not in operation since Allied occupation of the City, is technically equipped to continue its work. Peter Schmitt, assistant of Dr. Wilhelm Hiller, the Director of the Institute, acted as guide thru this part of the building. Schmitt, a former French soldier captured by the Germans, is a native of Colmar and speaks German and French fluently. The Institute contains seismological instruments and equipment including 8 seismographs, namely 3 Galitzin (N-S, E-W, Z), considered rare instruments, 2 Mainka (N-S, E-W,) 1 Vertical (Z), 1 Wiechert (Z), and 1 large pendulum (NE-SW, NW-SE).

d. Counter Intelligence Section:

(1) Personalities Apprehended: Two individuals were detained, one Wesselberger, Kriminal Sekretär and Natascha Matusoff, Russian female interpreter for the Kriminal Polizei. The former has been turned over to French authorities and Matusoff released, it being intended to use her as an informant. Interrogation reports on both individuals are being prepared.

e. Intelligence Specialists: (Highlights of important results of exploitation of targets by specialists).
Target 346 (Priority III) Zeis Ikon AG Dresden, Contessa Werk, Dornhaldenstrasse 5.
This factory produced 1000 cameras daily up to 1942. Since the outbreak of war it produced: Releases for bombsights, fisiere for flack (AA) small motors and electro magnetic parts. All items were sent to main factory, Dresden where parts were fitted and completed. Director Eyth is being held with his special staff for further interrogation.

f. General Situation: No Changes.

g. Special Remarks: No Remarks.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XUC-95

Cy 1

SECRET

T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS: WHH
DATE: 26 April 45

FROM: 251800B April 45
TO : 261800B April 45
Hq, T FORCE, 6TH AG
261800 April 45

No: 3

Maps: TOWN PLAN, STUTTGART. Scale: 1/19,000.

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:

(1) Co B, 1269th Engr C Bn.
(2) 1st Bn, 393th Inf Regt, 100th Inf.
(3) 1st Bn, 152nd Inf Regt, (French).

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: No additional targets have been seized from those already published.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: No additional targets reported destroyed.

(c) Targets Exploited and Released: 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 39, 42, 45, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 113, 117, 124, 125, 127, 130, 131, 141, 153, 163, 167.

(d) Opportunity Targets: Institut for Bauforschung und Materialsprüfung, part of the Technical High School, Charlotte Str. 212. Work was entirely that of testing structural materials and metal parts of different specifications. The target was about half bombed out. Equipment and documents belonging to the school were found at other addresses in the city.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: A total of 26 files were received and recorded. Twenty six target-team reports (13 priority I, 11 Priority II, 1 Priority III, and 1 target of opportunity) plus 1 agency report (priority I) were received.

(2) Documents Forwarded During Period and Destination: During the period four bags were evacuated; all to SHAEF. Three were addressed to the attention of Department of Justice (FBI) and the other went to SHAEF (Misc).

(3) Highlights of Outstanding Documents: Outstanding reports and documents received include: Microfilms on air raid damages to Stuttgart, documents removed from Gestapo Headquarters pertaining to German agents operating inside Switzerland, reports on NPI and other subversive activities inside France. These documents have been evacuated to SHAEF (Att'n SCI).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 SECTION

(1) New or Important Information Regarding Civil Population: A letter, signed "In the name of the majority of citizens of Stuttgart" and dated 1 April 45, requested the Oberbürgermeister to declare Stuttgart an open city to avoid the destruction attendant upon its capture by the allied troops.

(2) Developments Which Might Affect Over-all Intelligence Mission:

(a) Bishop Wurm, Evangelical Bishop of Württemberg, and the leader of the Bekenntniskirche in its fight against the Nazis, was interviewed today at Grossheppach. In spite of his 75 years and the bitter struggle of the last twelve years, he is in excellent Health and is preparing to take the lead in the renaissance of Christianity which he confidently expects as the result of the overthrow of the Nazis. In addition to being the head of the Evangelical Church in Württemberg, which has a membership of more than 2,000,000, Bishop Wurm is regarded as the most prominent Protestant pastor in Germany. He has been in contact with Pastor Niemoeller, who is still in the concentration camp at Dachau, until connections were broken with Munich about two weeks ago.

(b) In the Jägerstrasse bunker no papers of any consequence were found but a considerable amount of equipment, such as the long distance telephone exchange of the Reichspost, a dynamo, and a fair amount of electrical supplies, was still in place. One document found purported to give the function of the Stuttgart "Werwolves" as primarily the severence of communications of Allied Troops.

(3) Status of Local Military Government: The Military Government team which will take over the administration of the city of Stuttgart after the departure of the French detachment is at present in Cannstadt, where it has set up Military Government, posted proclamations, appointed a Burgermeister, and organized a skeleton police force. This team, H1C3, has already operated as a Displaced Persons team in Neustadt a.d.W., Wertheim, and Nürnberg.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION: No report of activities for the period.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of important results of exploitation of targets by specialists.)

(1) J. F. Fuchs and J. Görts, 15 Fischerstrasse Zuffenhaussen. This was a well equipped work shop engaged on sub-contract components for the BMW engine. The shop employed approximately 150 employees and was found undamaged.

Robert Bosch, Feuerbach. Manufactured electrical components for diesel fuel injection pumps. Large quantities of many varieties of fuel injection pumps were found.

Kodak-Nagel AG. This target had been making fuzes for 20mm (direct action) and time mechanical fuzes for 88 and 100mm guns. The target was practically undamaged.

Forschungsanstalt Graf Zeppelin, Ruit Ibel. Conducted aerodynamic research on aircraft, bombs, projectiles, parachutes, and torpedoes. Target was undamaged. All technical documents and most portable equipment had been evacuated to Buchau.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Ulm has been cleared except for scattered sniper fire. Artillery fire was still falling on the city from Neu Ulm, on the south bank of the Danube. Advances were made generally in the area between Dillingen and Ulm. A number of towns were taken in the collapsing Swabian pocket south of Stuttgart, including Heidenheim. The nearest approach to Munich was made as Allied troops reached Hard and Cammersfeld, 45 miles northwest of the city.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: Captain PAUL M. LEAKE, Chief, MIS Document Section will assume command of T Force, Stuttgart Operation as of 1200, 27 April 1945.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBRARY AD/I XVI-94

S E C R E T
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 1 May 1945

FROM: 302200 April 45
TO : 011800 May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
011800 May 45

NO: 4

Maps: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale: 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops

(a) Attachments:
1 163rd Engr C Bn.
2 1269th Engr C Bn.
3 D Troop, 33rd Cav Recn (Armd).
4 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
5 3rd Bn, 232nd Inf Regt, 42nd Inf Div.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 8, 14, 17, 18, 20, 30, 32, 35, 40, 43, 45, 47, 49, 205, 206, 207, 208, 215, 216, 222, 224, 226, 230, 234, 235, 236, 242, 245, 246, 248, 251, 252, 255, 256, 257, 265, 268, 512, 522, 523, 533, 534, 539, 541, 545, 565, 570, 572, 575, 576, 577, 578, 580, 581, 584, 586, 589, 590, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 622, 633, 644, 645, 650, 653, 656, 657, 660, 671, 672, 674, 675, 678, 681, 686, 690, 693, 694, 695, 703, 706, 713, 714, 716, 717, 717b, 726, 728, 729, 730.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: 508, 519, 544, 562, 569(reported to have moved to another town, location unknown.

(c) Personality Targets: Two German ex-PW's who parachuted from a British plane near MUNICH two weeks ago. They were trained by the British in sabotage work and took part in the revolt in MUNICH and the seizure of the broadcasting station just prior to Allied occupation.

A third man was a civilian labor deportee who claims to be able to help locate SS and other Fazi leaders in hiding in MUNICH. All three have been turned over to CIC, T-Force.

(d) Opportunity Targets: Two secret files were discovered at the Gauleitung containing detailed description of the air raid shelters at Berchtesgaden and Oberammergau. The correspondence indicates that the Gauleiter had personal interest in the construction of these shelters and for that reason may have been designed for defensive positions and also because there is a possibility that they were intended as storage places for import- and documents.

Other targets taken were the Radio Transmitter in Ismaning, Radio Studio at Rund Funk Platz and Völkischer Berbachter (Newspaper), 22 Thierstrasse, MUNICH.

S E C R E T

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

29301

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Highlights of Interesting Documents: Important operational information obtained: secret wire concerning the evacuation of Luftwaffe material, map showing the outer defenses of MUNICH, and a top secret telegram giving complete line of defense and order of battle South of MUNICH and in the Bavarian Alps.

c. G-5 SECTION: The military Government Detachment for the town of MUNICH is under the command of Major GENE KELLER, who has set up headquarters at the Rathaus (City Hall). He is temporarily under the command of Major O. W. CAMPBELL, G-5 of the 45th Infantry Division who has also established his office at the City Hall.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION: No information available as of this report.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: No exploitation of targets during period covered by this report.

(1) T-Section, 6th AG, requested to have specialists report in MUNICH 3 May 1945.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Elements of T-Force Reconnaissance Troops, Task Forces entered MUNICH at 1600 30 April 45. All First Priority and many Second Priority targets seized at close of the period.

City of MUNICH clear of enemy. No organized resistance nor harassing activity reported. City found to be about 75 to 80% damaged.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 0018

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS WWK
DATE 2 May 1945

FROM: 011800B May 45
TO : 021800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
021800 May 45

NO: 5

Maps: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale: 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1/2 163rd Engr C Bn.
1/2 1269th Engr C Bn.
3/4 D Troop, 33rd Cav Rcn (Mtd).
3/4 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
5/5 3rd Bn, 232nd Inf Regt, 42nd Inf Div.

RECEIVED
7 MAY 1945
HQ
USSTAF

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 23, 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, 39, 44, 46, 209, 212, 214, 219b, 221, 228, 229, 231, 241, 243, 244, 250, 259, 264, 269, 517, 524, 558, 561, 563, 567, 569, 573, 585, 597, 603, 634, 642, 643, 647, 649, 651, 663, 697, 704, 705.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: 19, 37, 41, 53, 511, 567, 571, 659, 685.

(c) Targets Released: 43, 236, 252, 533, 534, 539, 544, 595, 678.

(d) Targets Not Located: 662.

(e) Opportunity Targets: Wladystava Krempa and Igor Cvirk, two polish D.P.'s, forced laborers at factory vicinity Y-837614, volunteered information leading to digging up of the material believed to be the "brain" of a robot bomb. They have been ordered to remain in present location at the factory until they are released. Mechanical parts of the robot bomb "brain" have been secured and are available for examination and study.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: A total of 24 files were received and recorded during the period covered by this report.

(2) Documents Forwarded During Period and Destination: During the period, a total of seven target team reports (two positive reports, Priority III; 2 negative reports, Priority II; 2 negative reports, Priority III, and 1 opportunity target reported) were received.

(3) Highlights of Interesting Documents: Outstanding documents include: correspondence of Gauleiter Giessler, twelve files on SS commanders, and drawings and engineering plans for robot bombs.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Status of Local Military Government:

(a) In addition to the regular pinpointed Military Government Detachment for Munich under the command of Major GENE KELLER, and Major O.W. CAMPBELL, G-5 of the 45th Division, the staff of Military Government of the area was further augmented today by Colonel KENNETH E. WORTHING, G-5 of XVth Corps, who has set up offices today at the Rathaus. Arrangements were made to secure T Force passes for the Colonel and his staff and plans for cooperation between G-5 and T Force were discussed. Lt Colonel MITCHELL WOLFSON, G-5 Ops, 6th Army Group, was visiting with Colonel WORTHING and was brought up to date on the status of G-5 targets in the city.

(b) Representatives of the regional Military Government team who have been assigned to a documents mission have joined G-5 representatives on T Force and will assist in the exploitation of targets of interest to Military Government. The officers are Major ART ALTER, Captain ARTHUR SCHARFELD, and Lieutenant EUGENE SCHWABACH.

(2) Notes of Interest: German Art Museum (Haus der Deutschen Kunst) is the name of the modern building occupied by T Force in the English Gardens. It exhibited and offered for sale the pictures and sculptures of modern German artists. At present there are over one thousand pictures and pieces of sculpture stored in the basement of the building. The average sale price of the pictures amounted to about three or four thousand marks each. There are also a few privately owned pictures in storage, left here by various individuals for safekeeping. Some of the pictures are the property of Dr. Goebbels. A complete inventory of the pictures is in the basement, east wing room 203. Hugo Lindner, Schleissheimer Strasse 11, who is in charge of storage, can supply further details. The director of the museum was Karl Kolp who has departed for parts unknown. He was formerly directly supervised by Karl Giessler, the Gauleiter.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION: No information available as of this report.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of important results of exploitation of targets by specialists)

(1) Target No. 619, Priority III, B.M.W. Plant in Munich-Allach - This target suffered no war damage whatsoever. It employed approximately 12,000 workers. The activities of the plant consisted of the production of the B.M.W. 801 (average production: 800 per month), B.M.W. 003, study on fuses, Hirth Heinkel-Jet unit - type He S. 11 (this plant evacuated from Hirth-Stuttgart); Mercedes Benz Motors and Jumo 004-Jet unit under repair.

(2) Target No. 238. Priority II, Fuehrer Hauptquartier (Underground Installations) Pulach south of Munich - One of the houses in this target, built for use by Hitler, was actually occupied by Borman. This house has a large and elaborate underground section completely equipped to be used as living quarters and offices. All contents of an intelligence nature had been removed. North of the main building described above is another building known as the Kindergarten. This also has underground installations which were apparently used by members of the Volkssturm.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS, Cont'd:

One room of this shelter contains a large amount of weapons and ammunition. No other contents of an intelligence nature were found. A third underground bunker is located in the fenced in area immediately East of the so-called Borman Siedlung. This installation was used for three days by Field Marshall Kesselring as his Hq. Communications equipment in this bunker have all been destroyed. No documents of any kind were found. The castle, "Schloss Schwaneck" contains the Luxembourg Consulate and has never been used as a military installation. Information was obtained from civilian informants including the chief engineer of the Military installation East of the Borman Siedlung and the town building inspector of Pulach.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: German Armies in Italy and Western Austria have surrendered unconditionally. The surrender pact was signed Sunday afternoon, 29 April 1945 at Caserta, Italy.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: A mail room has been set up adjoining Headquarters Commandant to the right of the main entrance. Personal mail may be deposited there. Notices of receipt of official mail will be posted on the bulletin board at main entrance and may be claimed at the Adjutant's Office.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. _____ LIBRARY HQ T

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 3 May 1945

FROM: 021800B May 45
TO : 031800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
031800B May 45

POLICY
TARGETS
AIR ROOM
USSCC
FLAK
TECH
CIOS

NO: 6

Maps: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale: 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 163rd Engr C Bn.
½ 1269th Engr C Bn.
⅓ D Troop, 33rd Cav Recn (Armd).
¼ 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Dkv.
½ 3rd Bn, 232nd Inf Regt, 42nd Inf Dkv.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 16, 21, 29.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: No additions to those previously reported.

(c) Targets Released: 33, 543.

(d) Opportunity Targets: Fuehrer Bauden (NSDAP Headquarters), Konigslichan Platz was the headquarters of the Nazi party and propaganda officials belonging there to. Complete records and correspondence were found throwing light on activities of the NSDAP in recent months, particularly with regard to propaganda.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: A total of 49 items were received and recorded during the period covered by this report.

(2) Documents Forwarded During Period and Destination: During the period six bags were evacuated, four to local Military Government, and two to SHAEF!

(3) Highlights of Interesting Documents: Outstanding documents include: Official and personal correspondence of Gauleiter Giessler, confidential reports on Volkssturm, complete list of SS officers, secret party dossiers, correspondence on religious disputes in Germany, photos showing bomb damage in Munich, files of text and blueprints of aircraft radio transmitters, and telegram to Gauleiter Giessler revealing great shortage of POL in Luftwaffe, 21 April 1945.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Information received indicates the following emergency locations (Ausweichsstellen) of departments of the Chief Finance Office of Munich (Oberfinanzpresidium München). These departments began operations in their new locations approximately six weeks ago:
Department P (Personnel and Administration)
In Charge : Oberregierungsrat Heyd
New Location: Miesbach

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 SECTION Cont'd:

Department St (Taxes)
In Charge : Finanzprasident Grunewald
New Location: Ebersberg (near Grafing)

Department VV (Property Administration)
In Charge : Regierungsdirektor Hirsch
New Location: Schongau

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION: No information available as of this report.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of important results of exploitation of targets by specialists)

(1) Target No. 8, Priority I, Luftgau VII, Prinzregentenstrasse 24-28. This target was only partially damaged by bombing. German Officers, part of the former staff, were captured. One Major, who was left behind and put in charge of remaining personnel, with orders to surrender the building without resistance, was interrogated and stated: All papers, of any importance, had previously been destroyed.

(2) Target No. 251, Priority II, Dr. Alexander Wacker Gesellschaft fur Elektrochemische Industrie G.m.b.H., Prinregentstrasse, 22. This target was seized in good condition. All documents marked "Secret" were burned by department heads on 19 April 1945. This building contained 13 safes which were opened by their respective owners. The following documents were found: Report on Hexachlorethan, a chemical manufactured for the army to be used in smoke screen compounds; confidential reports on patents; confidential manufacturing details; restricted bulletins of the German Ordnance Intelligence, concerning Allied arms and equipment; two files on air raid damage; current files on all war damages; reference manual, marked "Confidential" dated 1944, listing all German corporations; and samples of chemical and synthetic products manufactured by this firm.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Elements of the British Second Army have linked up with the Russians West of Rostock. Another link up has been make between Russian and Allied armies at Bismark.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 0022

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS MHP
DATE 5 May 1945

FROM: 041800B May 45
TO : 051800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
051800B May 45

NO: 8

Maps: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale: 1/12,000

RECEIVED
9 MAY 1945

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
3 3rd Bn, 232nd Inf Regt, 42nd Inf Div.
4 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
5 3 Mine clearance squads of 120th Engr Bn.
6 2nd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 731, 611, 564.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: 540, 554, 556, 557, 559, 588, 629, 668, 699, 701, 720.

(c) Targets Released: 28, 31, 32, 34, 44, 47, 212, 216, 222, 230, 506, 558, 561, 567, 647, 649.

(d) Status of Opportunity Targets:

TARGET NO.	AGENCY	NAME AND ADDRESS	STATUS
0-1	PWD	Radio Transmitter Ismaning	Priority I
0-2	PWD	Radio Station Rundfunk Pl.	Priority I
0-3	PWD	Völkischer Bocbachter 22 Their Str.	Priority I
0-4	CI	Office of Gauleiter Galeriestr & Lauterbach	Priority II
0-5	CIOS	Jet Motors, Lauterbach	Priority I
0-6	CIOS	Hiding Place, Party Records (SE corner of Sindlinger & Dult St)	Priority II
0-7	PWD	Burgerbrauhaus Rosenheimer Str 29	Released, No Value
0-8	OI	Wehrersatzinspektion (Starnberg)	Released, No Value
0-9	OI	Wehrkreis VII, A,B,C (Starnberg)	Released, No Value
0-10	OI	Wehrmeldeamt München IA (Meldeamt Starnberg)	Released, No Value
0-11	OI	Schloss Possenhofen (Possenhofen) Starnberg	Released, No Value
0-12	CI	Schloss Berg Kripo Kempenhausen, Starnberg	Released, Exploited
0-13(P)	CWS		
0-14	G-5	Electric Power Station (vic.T-695) Biederstenier Str. 10	Priority I
0-15	CIOS	Factory for Auto Parts Biederstenier Str. 10	Priority II

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(d) Status of Opportunity Targets Cont'd:

TARGET NO.	AGENCY	NAME AND ADDRESS	STATUS
0-16	CI	SS Hq(?) W/dox (Otto Str & Karl Str)	Priority III
0-17	CIOS,AIR	Luftfahrtforschungsamt (S of Ottobrunn)	Released, No Value
0-18	SIG	A.F. Signal Installations - Ober Haching	Priority I
0-19	CI	Hitler Jugend Kreisleitung - Goethe Str 64	Released, Exploited
0-20(P)	OB, CI	General Sehmsdorf Kaulbachstr. 91	Released, Exploited
0-21	CC	Deutscher Alpen Verein 8-9 Brunnstr	Released, Exploited
0-22	CIOS	Firm Making "Gehirn" Plants - Mosacher Str 23 (Milbertshofen)	Priority I
0-23	CIOS	Kupfer &Messing-press-works - (Moosach)	Released, No Value
0-24	CIOS	Georg Seitl (Moosach)	Released, No Value
0-25	SIG	Signal Dump (Freimauner Str 870615)	Priority I
0-26	CI	Hq Werewolf Movement (?) (Potterkofer Str 11)	Priority II
0-27	CI	KWI (Berlin) Munich (Schwabing) Z-3249	Priority I
0-28	SIG	OKL, Genst. Agt 3&6 Nafu 2&3 - (Grabensee-Wasserburg-Inn)	Priority II
0-29	OI	Reichspressestelle (Arcis Str)	Released, Exploited

Targets marked "Released, Exploited" contained documents and/or information which has been evacuated through Documents Section, T Force.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During period a total of 37 items were received and recorded.

(2) Highlights of Interesting Documents:

2 complete lists on old Party members.
Confidential directives from the Partei Kanzlei.
Correspondence of Gauleitung München-Oberbayern.
Personal correspondence of Dr. Fiehler (Mayor of Munich)
Secret files of Gestapo on Dr. Schuschnigg (former Chancellor of Austria)
Many secret Gestapo files on investigations, executions, orders and propaganda.
Recent files on Volksturm.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Notes of Interest:

(a) The Director of the Reichsbank and his assistants were interrogated at length by G-5 today. It was revealed that more than 200 million Reichs Marks are locked up in the vault and an additional 40 million Reichs Marks are available in uncut currency. Practically all of the officials and most of the employees are in town and the bank will be ready to open as soon as permitted by Military Government. There was no appreciable amount of gold or silver bullion on hand.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 SECTION CONT'D:

(1) Notes of Interest Cont'd:

(b) The Munich mint (T Force target No. 45) is in working condition, despite heavy damage suffered in air raids. There are 800 kilos of silver and 4.5 kilos of gold on hand. This mint was one of six in Germany for the manufacture of metal coins, paper money was printed only at the Reichsdruckerei in Berlin. At present the Munich mint has on hand manufactured coins of the following denominations and amounts: 5 pfennig pieces, 46,000 Reichs Marks, 1 pfennig pieces, 6680 Reichsmarks. Metal reserves total sufficient for the manufacture of 54,000 Reichs Marks in 1 and 5 pfennig pieces.

(c) The oil paintings, tapestries, rugs and various works of art stored in the basement of the Führerbau and adjacent buildings are being taken charge of by the property custodian of the local Military Government detachment until experts can arrive and make an inventory of these objects, many of which appear to be plunder taken by the Germans from France and other countries, and presented as presents to the Führer.

(d) The secret papers of Professor Dr. -Ing. W. Osenberg, the basis of the famous Osenberg Aktion, were discovered in a discarded wooden box among the table silver of the Führerbau this afternoon. They are labelled Geheime Kommandosache and contain lists of the war research projects and the professors in charge of each project.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Activities of Interest: Adolf Mueller, 62 years old, owner of five of the largest printing shops of Germany was arrested today. Mueller was the man who first printed the Voelkische Beobachter back in 1921. From then on he was one of Hitler's backers. In the beginning printing the Beobachter involved large financial risks. Mueller believing in the strength of the movement took them, even proposing to change the weekly into a daily in 1925. Later he expanded in Munich and also bought or built several large printing establishments in other cities. He became fabulously rich though he claims that he was cheated out of part of his earnings by other Nazi officials. He also claims that originally Hitler was a decent man only later yielding to the sinister influence of such men as Goebbels and Himmler. This is not true at least as far as the Voelkische Beobachter goes which from the very beginning was unlimited in its demands to destroy the Jews, eliminate German democrats or demolish France and other "enemies". Mueller never refuted the Voelkische Beobachter or other Nazi papers he printed - among them Goebbel's Angriff and Himmler's Schwarze Korps though at least until 1933 this would not have involved any dangers but only financial losses. Mueller was among the closest personal friends of Hitler.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Target No. 1, Priority I, BMw Plant.

(a) Plant No. 1 - The directors of this plant are inside the plant in the air raid shelter. The guards have instructions not to permit them inside the building. The target is in very good condition. The directors are anxious to give all reports and have preserved all their records as well as the experimental station of the German Air Ministry. It is suggested that representatives of interested agencies meet at dinner tomorrow with Capt PERRY USSBS.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS CONT'D:

(1) Target No. 1, Priority I, BMw Plant Cont'd.

(b) Plant No. 2 - In an attached plant in woods near this BMw Plant No. 2 is located a Rocket Testing Plant employing about 70 specialists and a large number of helpers. Being held is a civilian who worked in the plant who has indicated a spot where burried compressors lie covered with acid and earth. These compressors are said to be the key parts of the rockets being tested at this plant. The acid is said to be strong and dangerous and is destroying the compressors rapidly. A number of designs of rockets are on hand at T Force and available for inspection. The area around this plant is dangerous due to large amounts of propellant charges.

(2) Target No. 625, Priority III, Atlas Werke A.G. Kuglmüllerstrasse 10 - This firm was doing research work on accoustic type controls for torpedoes, also making echo sounding equipment. Parts of echo and torpedo controls were found. Most important documents were destroyed by orders of the Party.

(3) Target No. 589, Priority III, Centralverlag der NSDAP, Thierschstrasse 11 - Joseph Berg who lives at 35 Scheubner Richter Strasse, and was technical manager of this publishing house, surrendered a manuscript of an alleged unpublished work by Adolph Hitler. It was written over 15 years ago and locked up in a safe. Mr Berg had strictest orders that the manuscript could neither be printed or shown to anybody. More information on this can be had through Mr. Berg. He also informed us that an evacuation place for books of the Berlag is in Willibalds Burg near Eichstaedt.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: General EISENHOWER has announced the mass surrender of another German Army Group known as Group G composed of the 1st and 19th Armies to General DEVERS effective at 061200. So great was the confusion that the Army Group Commander could give no strength figures but it is beleived the surrender involves between 200 and 400,000 men. The German 7th Army is the only enemy force left in the west. The 11th Panzer Division surrendered to the American 3rd Army today.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh

HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 0313

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 6 May 1945

FROM: 051800B May 45
TO : 061800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
061800B May 45

NO: 9

Maps: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale: 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
3 3rd Bn, 232nd Inf Regt, 42nd Inf Div.
4 Recn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
5 3 Mine clearance squads of 120th Engr C Bn.
6 2nd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 535, 698, 625, 725.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: 30, 525, 236, 541.

(c) Targets Released: 11, 16, 21, 29, 39, 43, 206, 213, 219, 221, 228, 229, 234, 255, 256, 257, 512, 564, 571, 611, 620, 676, 713, 731.

(d) Targets Unlocated: 32.

(e) Opportunity Targets:
1 O-48, Oberwiesenfeld Airfield - This was the city airdrome and was found in good condition. Assorted single and multi-transports, liaisons, FW 190's, ME109's and 110's were found at the field.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During the period a total of 15 items were received and recorded.

(2) Documents Evacuated and Destination: A total of three bags were evacuated to SHAEF during this period.

(3) Highlights of Interesting Documents: Outstanding documents include: confidential pamphlet on chemical formulas for German explosives; several files from the local German Army Headquarters (Wehrmachts Kommandantur) containing secret orders, directives, including many on defense of city of Munich by "Alarm" units under Generalkommando VII; many files of notes, photos slides and films on the Far East taken from Dr. Credner; and a cardfile of all Party leaders in the Munich area.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Notes of Interest: The German Finance Court (Reichsfinanzhof) - This is the highest finance court, dealing with tax appeal matters. It was found with records intact, up-to-date and the staff still on the job. The records cover income taxes, corporate taxes, capital taxes, sales taxes, profit taxes and include valuable data concerning the tax paying individuals.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Cases Closed:

Riedor, Leonard, former Kriminalsekretaer Sachbearbeiter in the Munich Gestapo - his leads have made possible several Gestapo arrests, and he is now being utilized as a special informant. No arrest report to submit.

Lerner, George, Sachbearbeiter of the SD Leitsabschnitt - now being exploited by this office for development of leads on an SD network. No arrest report to submit.

Geith, Eduard, Kriminalsekretaer in the Munich Gestapo and Untersturmfuhrer in the Waffen SS - interrogated and interned as automatic arrest.

Bodaner, Friederich, Oberfuhrer in SA and Kompaniefuhrer in the Volkssturm - interrogated and interned as automatic arrest.

Lang, Mary, confessed SD agent who propagandized French Nationals in Germany for the SD - turned over to Capt LETELLIER, SM, CIC, 7th Army for detailed interrogation and use in apprehending French SD agents.

Ficker, Hans, Cabinetsrat in the Reich Chancellory, arrested by XV Corps CIC - to be transferred this date to MFIU 500 for detailed interrogation as high German official.

Ehrensberger, Otto, Ministerialist in German Ministry of the Interior, arrested by XV Corps CIC - to be transferred this date to MFIU 500 for detailed interrogation as high German official.

(2) Cases Pending:

Flunger, Frederich, second in command of Munich Gestapo - interrogation continuing.

Heim, Arthur, Generalstaatsanwalt of Lower Bavaria - interrogation continuing.

Dinglreiter, Senta, in service of Colonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP - interrogation continuing.

Boepple, Ernest, Assistant Governor General of Poland - interrogation continuing.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Target No. 638, Priority III, Steinhiel & Sohne, Munich & Martin's Str. 26.
Complete optical research laboratory with complete production of all types lenses and prisms, producing bombsights, Lofte 7K & Lofte 7AK. Approximately 4000 people were employed. Complete bombsights are on hand. Target in excellent condition.

(2) Target No. 619, Priority III, BMW, Allach.
In addition to mass production of BMW 801, the plant included a large and important research and development center for liquid fuel propelled rockets as used in guided misiles and for assisted take-off. This plant had extensive experimental facilities. Considered very adequate by rocket teams. The removal and destruction of classified documents was apparently very thorough.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES/LISTS Cont'd:

(3) Target No. 262, Priority II, SS Abersbochnitt Süd Maria Theresia Strasse 17.

This building intact except for the top floor. The cellar contained wireless and telephone equipment which had been demolished beyond use by personnel before leaving. Spare parts for radios were found in addition to Dossiers and punishment records. The Hausmeister stated the personnel left in two groups. The first group consisting mostly of officers, left on 24 April; The second group leaving 28 April. The Hausmeister (Hans Wogner) stated they burned many records and showed evidence of large quantities of the burned material.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: An official announcement by President Truman announcing the end of the war in Europe may be expected in the next day or two. Similar announcements will be forthcoming from Great Britian and Russia. Admiral Doenitz has requested the German Navy to refrain from damaging or scuttling their ships.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh

HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 35308

S E C R E T
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 8 May 1945

FROM: 071800B May 45
TO : 081800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
081800B May 45

NO: 11

MAPS: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale: 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 2nd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
3 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
4 Recn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
5 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: None for this period.

(b) Targets Found Destroyed: None for this period.

(c) Targets Released: 22, 240, 242, 265, 524, 563, 570, 577, 592, 616, 651, 676.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During the period a total of 2 items were received and recorded.

(2) Documents Evacuated and Destination: Evacuated was 1 bag to 6th Army Group.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) A very large collection of documents, records and art objects were found in the cellars of the Schloss Hohenburg owned by the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg and located near Lengris. The Hauptarchiv of the NSDAP, including a complete newspaper morgue and clipping file, libraries and Luftwaffe correspondence were among the items found. Also included in the find was a valuable collection of art objects which had been evacuated from the Munich galleries as well as the Geological Museum. Numerous locked cabinets were found which will be investigated.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: Nothing of special interest reported for the period covered by this report.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Important Results of Exploitation of Targets by Specialists)

(1) Target No. 6, Priority I, Schloss Fuschl, (Ribbentrop's private office), Fuschlsee - The building is entirely intact and was found under special guard. It is at present being used to house members of the German Foreign Ministry and other diplomats who are being held under protective custody. Herr von Schmieden is the leader of this group and represents the German Foreign Ministry on the spot. He states that Schloss

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS Cont'd:

(1) Target No. 6, Cont'd:
Fuschl was not the private residence of Ribbentrop but belonged to the state and was placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister during his term of office. Ribbentrop moved his field Headquarters to north Germany in July 1944. No documents were found except for those in the possession of diplomats at present living there. Herr von Schmieden volunteered the information that the entire German civil service had been split into two groups, each representing all Ministries, when Berlin became untenable. One of these groups operated from a location in North Germany while the other operated from Garmisch - Partenkirchen to cover South Germany. The Ministers themselves had special railway trains in which they travelled over the country. These trains are now dispersed but Herr von Schmieden beleived the greater part of the group located at Garmisch - Partenkirchen was still there.

(2) Target No. 710, Priority III, Dynamit A.G., Wolfutshausen/Bucksberg - This target was practically undamaged by bombing. Some looting of records had been done by displaced persons prior to its seizure. The Chief Engineer, Joseph Linder, was available on 6 May 45 at the Fernwald Camp where he is being detained. The factory employed 2,000 workers, 600 of them Germans, 600 Russians, 300 French and others. The products of the factory are: Pentaerithrytol-tetra-nitrate in a granulated form phlegmatised with montan wax, exploders filled with PETN, detonators and small arms caps. Production per week was approximately: Phlegmatised PETN, 50 tons; Crystalized PETN (without wax), 1,000 kilos; shell exploders (boosters), 300,000; detonators 1,000,000 to 1,500,000; and small arms caps, 7 to 8,000,000. A plant for the manufacture of picric acid, for the auxiliary exploder tube in bombs was being built but had not been completed.

f. GENERAL SITUATION:

Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Western Allies and Russia at 0241, 7 May 1945. Official confirmation came simultaneously from President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at 1500, 8 May 1945, in broadcasts to their respective nations.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Sam Hursh
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 00615

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6th AG
INITIALS 2nd H.
DATE 9 May 1945

FROM: 081800B May 45
TO : 091800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
091800B May 45

NO: 12

MAPS: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:

1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 2nd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
3 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
4 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
5 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Status of Targets: No Change.

(a) Targets Remaining Available for Exploitation:

1 First Priority: 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 23, 30, 33, 45, 46.

2 Second Priority: 202, 208, 209, 215, 223, 227, 231, 232, 241, 243, 244, 245, 248, 250, 251, 264, 266, 268, 269.

3 Third Priority: 517, 522, 527, 535, 553, 573, 578, 579, 580, 581, 583, 584, 587, 589, 593, 594, 596, 597, 603, 609, 619, 625, 633, 640, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 653, 657, 661, 663, 666, 672, 674, 681, 688, 695, 697, 698, 700, 704, 705, 716, 717, 725, 726, 728, 729, 730, 731, 733.

4 Opportunity Targets: O-1, O-2, O-3, O-14, O-15, O-16, O-25, O-27, O-28, O-30, O-31, O-32, O-33, O-62.

(b) Status of Opportunity Targets:

TARGET NO.	AGENCY	NAME & ADDRESS	STATUS
O-62	Eng. CIOS	F.W. Bertram (Relays (Oberbürgermeister Wunderstr. 103, Pasing)	Released, Exploited
O-63	CIOS G-5	Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Haus Taunetz, Bad Wiesee)	Priority I
O-64	Air CIOS	Glider School-Research Center (Ainring nr. Salzburg)	Priority I
O-65	Air CIOS	Air Port (Salzburg)	Priority II
O-66	CIOS	BMW Dispersal point (Kolbemoor)	Priority II
O-67	CIOS	Süd Chemie A.G. (Heufeld)	Released, no value
O-68	OI CIOS	Technische Hochschule (Vienna)	Released, Exploited
O-69	G-5 OI Air	Schloss Hohenburg, Chief Archives of the NSDAP, Art Treasures, Museum of Paleontology and Museum of Egyptology (Lengries)	Priority II
O-70	CI	Abwehrstelle, Wehrkreis VII (Rottach)	Released, no value
O-71	OI	Stellvertretendes General Kommando VII (Rottach)	Released, no value

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During the period a total of 25 items were received and recorded.

(2) Highlights of Outstanding Documents:

Confidential reports on German radio propaganda in the United States, by Dr. Burgmann, director of secret transmitter.

Secret file of instructions on special commitment (Sondereinsatz) of Party Chancelry (1945).

Confidential instructions on the employment of Political leaders (NSFO=Nationalsozialistische Führungs-Offiziere) in front lines.

Instructions on treatment of PW's and persons of Jewish blood.

Confidential reports on war situation, 1945.

Many files of confidential correspondence between top Nazi Party leaders, dating back to 1927 and containing revealing sidelights on personalities concerned.

Minutes of confidential press conference held 5 April 45 giving frank discussion of war and political situation.

Last-minute threats, shrieks and gasps of Goebbels' propaganda machine.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 SECTION: Nothing of interest to report.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: No important activities reported for this period.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Important Results of Exploitation of Targets by Specialists)

(1) Target No. 241, Priority II. Professor Wilhelm Credner (Professor of Geography at the Technische Hochschule (Technical High School) in Munich, Bernried on the Starnbergsee - The following suggestion has been made by Professor Credner and Professor Albert Kolb during the conversation in connection with above target. German geographic experts would like to cooperate with the U.S. in their war against Japan. Their knowledge might be of special value because while American scientists were kept under close observation during their stay in Japan, German explorers had a more or less free hand in their movements through the country. Some of the expeditions have been made as late as 1939. These scientists could provide valuable information needed for actions against Japan. Their special knowledge would enable them to draft very detailed invasion maps for the coastline of China and Japan.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Reichs Marshal Hermann Goering and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring were captured by the Seventh Army today.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel [redacted]

RECEIVED 12 MAY 1945

HUNSH
T-2

COPY NO. 00719

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 10 May 1945

FROM: 091800B May 45
TO : 101800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
101800B May 45

NO: 13

MAPS: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 2nd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
3 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
4 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
5 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Released: 4, 8, 10, 14, 17, 23, 30, 202, 208, 209, 215, 227, 243, 244, 248, 250, 251, 264, 266, 268, 517, 522, 527, 573, 578, 579, 580, 581, 583, 584, 589, 593, 594, 596, 597, 603, 609, 633, 640, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 653, 657, 663, 672, 674, 681, 688, 695, 698, 700, 704, 705, 716, 717, 725, 726, 728, 729, 730.

(b) Status of Opportunity Targets:

TARGET NO.	AGENCY	NAME & ADDRESS	STATUS
0-73	G-5 OI	Finance Office Bad Tölz	
0-74	CIOS	Paul Schmict, Eng. (V-1 & V-2) SE Munich/Stockdorf	
0-75	CIOS	Flektrochemische Werke Höllriegelskreuth/Grünwald	Released, Expl.
0-76	CIOS	Kraftstoff Institute Seeshaupt/Starnbergersee	Released, Expl.
0-77	G-5	Joseph Zirngibl Bad Tölz, Badstrasse 24	
0-78		Evacuation of Documents and Archivs from Berlin	

(c) Opportunity Targets:

1 Target 0-69, Schloss Hohenburg, near Lengries - This is an old castle in good condition, undamaged by air raids or shelling, owned by the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg. For the past few years, the castle has been evacuation point for certain NSDAP records, Luftwaffe records, as well as for art and museum collections. A folder containing DNB reports on the death of Hindenburg and the succession of Hitler was found in addition to other important documents.

2 Target 0-73, Finanzamt Bad Tölz, Bad Tölz- it was learned from the newly appointed Burgermeister of Bad Tölz that records of the Reichsfinanzverwaltung in Berlin had been evacuated to the Finanzamt in Bad Tölz. These offices are now housing American troops but the above mentioned records covering requirements for supplies and property, compendia on finance administration were found comparatively intact.

1. Records in Munich.
2. Munich - Records and list of detained Persons

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During the period a total of 3 items were received and recorded.

(2) Highlights of Outstanding Documents: Files of data, including working charts, drawings, materials-breakdown, cost estimates, testing grounds, etc., for development and production of jet-propelled planes.

c. G-5 SECTION:

Some changes were recently made in the personnel of the local Military Government Detachment, designed to strengthen and speed up its organization. Lt Col. RALPH B. HUBBARD, Jr. is now in charge as Senior Military Government Officer. Major EUGENE KELLER remains with the detachment as Deputy SMGO. Lt Col. HUBBARD brought about 14 officers with him to augment temporarily the former staff and assist in getting started. The results are already noticeable. The M.G. detachment is beginning to operate as a well oiled machine and getting their problems well in hand.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (This report covers period from 6 May to 9 May 1945 inclusive)

(1) Cases Closed:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
Pflueger, Frederich	Hauptsturmfuhrer	7th Army CIC
Weyersberg, Albert	Reichsanwalt	7th Army CIC to MFIU 500
Helm, Arthur	Generalstaatsanwalt for lower Bavaria	7th Army CIC to MFIU 500
Diesterweg, Gustav	Brigadefuhrer in Waffen SS	Interned
Boepple, Ernst	Assistant Governor General of Poland	7th Army CIC to MFIU 500
Goldbach, Philipp	Gestapo Agent	Interned as auto. Arrest
Preuffer, Johann	Gestapo Agent	Interned as auto. Arrest
Von Mutius, Bernhard	SS Obersturmfuhrer and aid de camp to Von Epp, Governor General of Bavaria	7th Army CIC
Kurton, Hans	Gauamsleiter and former dean of Univ. of Munich	Interned as automatic Arrest
Hubner, Heinz	SD Aussenstellenleiter Amt III and member of NSDAP	Interned as automatic Arrest
Kowing, Franz	SD Aussensttelenleiter Amt III and member of NSDAP	Interned as automatic Arrest
Kellner, Jakob	Gestapo Agent	Interned as auto. Arrest
Winterholler, Stefan	Gestapo Agent	Interned as auto. Arrest
Knabel, Hans	Ortsgruppenleiter and Organizations Amtsleiter in NSDAP	Interned as automatic Arrest
Hallhuber, Max	Kriminalsekretaer in the Munich Gestapo	Interned as automatic Arrest
Kohler, Karl	Former Ortsgruppenleiter and Kreisamtsleiter	Interned as automatic Arrest
Marseljc, Theodore	Dutch National, Hr-eisleiter of Holland Colony in Munich	Interned as automatic Arrest
Langel, Theodor	Ortsgruppenleiter and Volksturm member	Interned as automatic Arrest

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIAL LISTS CONT'D:

(1) Cases Closed:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
Borger, Gustav	Sturmbann Fuhrer since 1938 in the Waffen SS and member of the NSBD	Interned as automatic Arrest
Tiefenthaler, Peter	Gestapo agent(police inspector)	Interned as automatic Arrest
Block, Johann Marie Louise	Secretary for Abwehr Abt III in Munich	307th CIC Hqs.
Von Eberstein, Karl	Hoherer SS and Polizeifuhrer South, SS Obergruppenfuhrer, General in the Waffen SS, Polizei Freiherr	307th CIC Hqs.
Von Grafenstein, Max	Gemeinschaftleiter and Aussenstelleiter in the SD	Interned as automatic Arrest
Reuh, Hans	Gauredner of Munich Bavaria	Interned as automatic Arrest
Mulder, Karl	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned as auto. Arrest
Bischoff, Hans	SS Oberscharffuhrer and inspector of Stadlheim Prison SS	Interned as automatic Arrest
Zapp, Arthur	SS Hauptsharsfuhrer	Interned as auto. Arrest
Gortz, Herbert	SS Junker formerly in Hitler Youth	Interned as automatic Arrest
Sommer, Otto	SS Hauptsharsfuhrer	Interned as automatic Arrest
Wagner, Gustav	SS Untersturmfuhrer	Interned as auto. Arrest
Thies, Gunther	SS Junker formerly in Hitler Youth	Interned as automatic Arrest
Kramer, Eugen	SS Fuhrerbeiverber	Interned as auto. Arrest
Gallistl, Karl	SS Junker	Interned as auto. Arrest
Linnenfelser, Jakob	SS Hauptscharsfuhrer	Interned as automatic Arrest

(2) Cases Pending:

NAME	TITLE
Siekmeyer, Frederich	Abwehr agent
Hilpert, Werner	Agent for Austrian Liberation Movement
Dinglreiter, Senta	Service of Colonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP
Plesch, Hans	Police President of Munich
Lehner, Ludwig	Adjutant and personal adviser to Von Eberstein
Wagner, Ernst	Confessed head of Werwolf movement in Bavaria
Roth, Max	Aussenstellenleiter in the SD
Knollinger, Wilhelm	SS Freikorps Adolf Hitler
Ahrens, Otti	Reported Werwolf
Bassewitz, Ilsebe	Reported Werwolf
Schleiheus, Margarite	Reported Werwolf
Schuler, Willi	Reported Werwolf
Hohenstein, Hans	Reported leader of Werwolf unit
Meng, Willy	Volksturmfuhrer

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Important Results of Exploitation of Targets by Specialists)

(1) Targets No. 3 & 231, Priority I & II, Partei Kanzlei Fuhrerhaus, Adolf Hitler Platz - This target is undamaged but partly emptied of files and furniture, and in disorderly condition. Much furniture was stored in the vast system of underground corridors, together with books, plans, files, not only of Partei Kanzlei but of various other Party agencies. The Partei Kanzlei is not confined to the Fuhrerbau but branches off into subterranean passages, and into adjacent buildings. Some of the rooms were used as ammunition dumps as a last moment emergency. Numerous important documents have been removed from the premises.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: A Force of 400 Superfortresses, largest ever assembled, attacked home islands of Japan today.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: At an air defense operations room at Pfaffenhofen, a top secret document was found giving the locations of all the supply depots for the Luftwaffe in this area.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 00812

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS _____
DATE 11 May 1945

FROM: 101800B May 45
TO : 111800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
111800B May 45

NO. 14

MAPS: TOWN PLAN MUNICH. Scale 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 2nd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
3 3rd Bn, 179th Inf Regt, 45th Inf Div.
4 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
5 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Released: 0-15, 0-16, 572, 592, 731.

(b) Status of Opportunity Targets:

TARGET NO	AGENCY	NAME AND ADDRESS	STATUS
0-79	OI	French Consulate, Widenmayer strasse 51	Released, Exploited
0-80		Abt (Aussen) Wirtschafts-ministerium	Priority I
0-81	CIOS AIR	Pfeiffer A G, Kufstein	Priority II
0-82	SIG CIOS	Anton Kathrein Elektro Werke Lubibergerstr, Rosenheim	Priority II
0-83	AIR CIOS	Bössner Maschinen Fabrik Mailingerstr, Bad Aibling	Priority II
0-84	CIOS	OKH and I G Farben Gendorf near Burghausen	Priority II

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During period a total of 17 items were received and recorded. This included 2 truck loads of documents from Berchtesgaden evacuated there from the Reichs Kanzlei, Berlin.

(2) Highlights of Interesting Documents:

(a) Commanders' battle reports from Russian Front, July-August 1944.

(b) Numerous files of correspondence between and comment on pro-Nazi movements and their leaders in the U.S. (1935-1939), and high Party and Gov't officials in Germany; confidential reports by Ambassador Luther in Washington on President Roosevelt's foreign and domestic policies, economic and political situation in the U.S., reaction of American opinion to Nazi program; letter by Colin Ross, notorious pro'Nazi propagandist, giving explicit suggestions on best way to undermine the position of Rosevelt and gain sympathy for Germany; and much more of similar character.

1. Records found in Munich - Russian with U.S. Nazis.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION CONT'D:

(3) NOTE: The documents received and recorded at this time are being retained and stored at 109 Ismaninger Strasse for the use and disposition of the Army Designated to occupy this area.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Status of Military Government: Detachments specially trained for Austria are taking over the Military Government of the American part of Austria. The regional team for the American zone arrived in Innsbruck yesterday. Personnel for the Austrian detachments have been drawn from the Mediterranean theatre and consists chiefly of WAC officers and enlisted men who have had experience in Italy.

(2) Notes of Interest: A plan to print unlimited amounts of Italian lire in German territory was prevented by the swiftness of the termination of the Italian campaign. German financial agents had 2,500,000,000 lire freshly printed in their possession and had made plans to move the printing presses from Bergamo to St. Ullrich, Austria. Because of their forced retreat from Italy, however, they were compelled to leave behind all except 50,000,000 lire, The agents and their money were picked up by the Americans on the Austrian border. T Force representatives interrogated the leaders of the Verona and the Bozen Reichskreditkasse today and pieced together the story.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Cases Closed:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
Dinglbeiter, Senta	Service of Colonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP	Released
Wagner, Ernst	Confessed head of Werwolf movement in Bavaria	Interned
Roth, Max	Aussenstellenleiter in the SD	Interned
Ahrens, Otti	Reported Werwolf	Released
Schuler, Willi	Reported Werwolf	Released
Bassewitz, Ilsabe	Reported Werwolf	Released
Schleihaus, Margarite	Reported Werwolf	Released
Wurmthaler, Heinrich	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned
Habereder, Fritz	Oberscharfuhrer in the Allgemeine SS	Interned
Eisele, Emil	Informer for the SD	Released

(2) Cases Pending:

NAME	TITLE
Sickmeyer, Frederich	Abwehr agent
Hilrert, Werner	Agent for Austrian Liberation Movement
Plesch, Hans	Police President of Munich.
Lehner, Ludwig,	Adjutant and personal adviser to Von Eberstein
Knollonger, Wilhelm	SS Freikorps Adolf Hitler
Hohenstein, Hans	Reported leader of Werwolf unit
Meng, Willy	Volksturmfuhrer
Kaab, Artur	Ministrialrat and second in command to Plesch, Munich Police President,
Pallut, Jean Paul	French National, PPF
Birkenser, Georg and Anton	German Nationals, aided SS
Van Herweyenen, Hendrik	Dutch National
Land, Mary	Italian National, NSDAP and SD
Proust, Pierre	French National, Gestapo agent
Rochon, Camille	French National

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS CONT'D

(2) Cases Pending Cont'd:

NAME	TITLE
Bellalal, Henri	French National, Suspect Milice
Martin, Henri	French National, Milice
Muller, Joseph	German National, denounced french workers to the Gestapo
Nobels, Joseph	Belgian National, SS Straflager
Doller, John	German National, SD agent(Possible double)

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Important Results of Exploitation of Targets by specialists)

(1) Target No. 0-7, Burgerbrau keller, Rosenheimer-strasse 29 - Main hall and basement of building are in good condition and contains several hundred thousand books. Various Christian and Jewish relics, ornaments and bibles, etc., apparently Nazi loot from German and foreign churches and synagogues are scattered about. Lists of heraldic signs (German cities), hand written and printed manuscripts, certificates and various nazi propanganda were found.

(2) Target 0-77, Joseph Zirngibl,, Bad Tölz, Badstr. 24, Apt. 1 - Zirngibl has been in charge of the disposition by forced sale of Jewish real estate in Munich since June 1943 in the Treuhänder office. From November 1938 to 1940, t ere had been 190 items of Jewish real estate confiscated in Munich, complete record of each of these kept by this office. Since 1940 approximately 400 further forced disposals occured, but in these cases the Jewish owners were allowed to dispose of their property themselves at what ever price could be obtained. Such sales were, however, under the close control of the Oberfinanzpräsident who had been on the committee which determined the sales price of such property from 1938 to 1940 and proceeds of the "sale" were paid into block accounts which were thus of no use whatsoever to the former Jewish owners. Zirngibl has in his possession the complete records pertaining to 190 forced sales of Jewish real estate described above.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Unchanged.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: The Eagles Nest at Target No. 1, in Berchtesgardegaden is inaccessable by vehicle. By foot it is a hazardous three hour trip over snow covered trails. There is no intelligence to be gained from a trip up to the Eagles Nest. A Sub-Section of T Force has been operating in Berchtedgaden for the past five days and considerable material has been uncovered. A detailed report on this phase will be published in the next T-2 Periodic Report.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLEY:

Hursh
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS
DATE 12 May 1945

FROM: 111800B May 45
TO : 121800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
121800B May 45

NO. 15

MAPS: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
3 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Seized: 603, 717b.

(b) Targets Released: 12, 223, 241, 535, 553, 587, 625, 666, 733, O-1, O-14, O-25, O-27, O-28, O-30, O-31, O-32, O-33.

(c) Opportunity Targets: Target No. O-7, Burgerbrau Kellar, Rosenheimerstr 29 - This building was used as a meeting place and for exhibitions by the Nazi party. Here Hitler founded the Nazi party and attempted the famous beerhall putsch of 9 November 23. Various books, papers, circulars, etc., have been found as previously indicated in preceding report.

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During the period a total of 3 items were received and recorded.

(2) Highlights of Interesting Documents:

(a) Journal of Air Fleet Command 3 (Luftwaffenkommando West) covering air operations of both sides in France during period 27 August to 30 September 1944.

(b) Folder containing excerpts from articles in foreign press on Nazi policies 1938, and remarks to emphasize their meaning.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Notes of Interest: Radio Munich, which was captured intact, had its first testing broadcast on Wednesday of this week, but the first official program will be presented tonight when Military Government officials and the Oberbürgermeister will be on the air. The station is under the control of Lt. Col. KINARD from SHAEF Psychological Warfare, who has with him a large staff of officers, civilians and enlisted men. Lt. Col. KINARD also has plans for the publishing of a weekly newspaper, with a circulation of 100,000 copies for the city of Munich and 150,000 for the rest of Bavaria. The local plant of the Völkischer Beobachter will be used for printing the paper, the first issue of which is scheduled to appear early next week. The newspaper will carry Military Government notices, instructions to the citizens by the German authorities, and will also announce the progress of Military Government in its various fields. Captain CONNAUGHTON of the local MG detachment is Public Relations Officer and will work closely with Lt. Col. KINARD in arranging the radio programs and in the publication of the newspaper.

1. Chemical factory in Munich which supplied Japanese information
2 Japanese intelligence of Chemical factory Munich.
3 Munich Chemical factory

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Cases Closed:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
Plesch, Hans	Police President of Munich	Interned
Meng, Willi	Government Pension Administrator, company commander of local Volksturm and ardent Nazi	Interned
Kaab, Arthur	Vice President of Munich Police	Interned
Bock, Leonhard	Ortsgruppenleiter and Party member since 1933	Interned
Reiss, Paul	Sturmbannfuhrer in the SS since 1936	Interned
Fried, Johann	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned
Asum, Leonhard	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned
Englemann, Johann	Ortsgruppenleiter since 1936	Interned
Huber, Georg	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned
Gottler, Josef	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned
Kaiser, Joseph	Reported SS	Released
Scholtz, Gerhard	Reported SS	Released
Heilmeier, Franz	Paymaster in German Army	Released
Lang, Mary	Confessed SD Agent	Interned
Kossarof, Alexis	Oberscharfuhrer in SS	Interned
Nobels, Joseph	Member of SS	Interned

(2) Cases Pending:

NAME	TITLE
Sickmeyer, Frederich	Abwehr agent
Hilpert, Werner	Agent for Austrian Liberation Movement
Lehner, Ludwig	Adjutant and personal adviser to Von Eberstein
Knollinger, Wilhelm	SS Freikorps Adolf Hitler
Hohenstein, Hans	Reported leader of Werwolf unit
Gorlitz, Julius	Brigadefuhrer of SA
Stohr, Gustav	Obersturmfuhrer of SA
Kniese, Fritz	Oberstrumfuhrer of SA
Albert, Gerhard	Reported SS
Schutter, Alfred	Wehrmacht physician
Beyer, Rudi	Reported Werwolf
Reiser, Hans	Reported Werwolf
Fries, Hans	Suspect Abwehr agent
Esser, Herman	Staatsminister.

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Important Results of Exploitation of Targets by Specialists)

(1) Target No. O-75, Elektrochemische Werke AG, southwest of Munich - This plant had been engaged in the production of hydrogen peroxide 82% and of sodium and calcium permanganate. The main hydrogen peroxide plant was totally destroyed but a new small plant was installed which appears to be still in good operating condition. In addition, the higher officials of the company, together with their subsidiary company at Gesthofen have been very closely associated with the whole development of chemical fuels and explosives. Directors of the company have carried on correspondence recently with the Japanese in connection with the above materials. This correspondence was in the possession of Herr von Transehe, sales director of the Gesthofen plant, and as far as we are aware, the Japanese had not been supplied with the full details of the latest processes consequently while they could make hydrazine hydrate from the information supplied, they would encounter numerous difficulties in doing it. The formula for the manufacture of hydrazine hydrate was obtained along with other important documents.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Unchanged.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh.
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 01016

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS _____
DATE 13 May 1945

FROM: 121800B May 45
TO : 131800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
131800B May 45

NO. 16

MAPS: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
3 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Status of Targets:

(a) Targets Released: 33, 46, 596, 603, 661, 697, 717b.

(b) Status of Opportunity Targets:

TARGET NO.	AGENCY	NAME & ADDRESS	STATUS
0-85	OI	CP, 9th SS Pz Gr Div, "Hohenstaufen" between Garmisch & Mittenwald	Released, Exploited
0-86	OI	Schloss Hubertus, Berchtesgaden	Released, Exploited
0-87	OI	Orginisationant der Gauleitung, Kaulbach Str 15	Released, Exploited
0-88	OI	Historical War Diary of OKW 2 miles SW of Hintersee near Berchtesgaden.	Released, Exploited

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Documents Received: During the period a total of 36 items were received and recorded.

(2) Documents Evacuated and Destination: During period one bag was evacuated to SHAEF.

(3) Highlights of Outstanding Documents: Outstanding documents contained: Over one thousand situation maps of the German Supreme Command War Diary, representing a complete day-by-day coverage of the war; a secret report on the meeting between the German Ambassador and the Japanese Military Attache Ott in 1937.

c. G-5 SECTION: Nothing of interest to report for the period.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Cases Closed:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
Knollinger, Wilhelm	Formerly member of SS Freikorps Adolf Hitler	Released

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS CONT'D:

(1) Cases Closed Cont'd:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
Hohenstein, Hans	Reported leader of Werwolf unit	Interned
Gorlitz, Julius	Brigadefuhrer in SA	Interned
Stohr, Gustav	Obersturmfuhrer in SA	Interned
Kniese, Fritz	Obersturmfuhrer in SA	Interned
Albert, Gerhard	Oberfeldwebel in Waffen SS	Interned
Schutter, Alfred	SA Sturmfuhrer and Luftwaffe surgeon with rank of Oberfeldarzt	Interned
Beyer, Rudi	Scharfuhrer in Waffen SS and actual leader of a Werwolf unit	Turned over to SCI
Reiser, Hans	Reported Werwolf	Released
Fries, Hans	Confessed Abwehr agent	7th Army CIC
Esser, Herman	Former Bavarian State Minister, Secretary for Foreign Trafic, NSDAP number two	7th Army CIC to MFIU 500
Fischer, Fritz	Berlin theater producer and reported close friend of Hitler	Released
Voith, Rudolf	Minor official	Released
Wolfle, Michael	Kreisleiter	Interned
Munsch, Joseph	Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned

(2) Cases Pending:

NAME	TITLE
Sicknoyer, Frederich	Abwehr agent
Hilpert, Werner	Agent for Austrian Liberation Movement
Lehner, Ludwig,	Adjutant and personal advisor to Von Eberstein
Illgner, Hans	Ministerialrat Direktor in Reichswirtschafts
Fischer-Dorp, Ewald	Ministerialrat in Reichswirtschafts
Beyer, Karl	Oberregieurungsrat
Michel, Elmar	Ministerialrat in Reichswirtschafts
Reinhardt, Hermann	Ministerialdirigent
Fabricus, Paulus	Ministerialrat
Bolle, Adolph	Regierungsrat
Richter, Martin	Ministerialrat
Jahns, Hans	Oberregierungsrat

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Important Results of Exploitation of Targets by Specialists)

(1) Target No. 2, Priority I, Berchtesgaden, the Obersalzberg - The Obersalzberg is a vast area containing well over 50 buildings most of which have been completely destroyed by our air raid on 25 April 45. In addition, there are many miles of underground passages, most of which were still under construction at the time of capture. Immediately after our raid, civilians started to loot every where and when the Allies took over, the looting continued serveral more days. Hitler's residence, the Berghof, was only slightly damaged, but when it became obvious that the Allies were going to take Obersalzberg, the SS troops set fire to the building. Goering is said to have been at Obersalzberg during the raid, was arrested there by SS troops and then taken to one of his private castles where he was to be executed. Hitler after he had moved his headquarters from East Prussia to Berlin in November 44, was expected to move to Berchtesgaden but for an unexplained reason appeared to have stayed in Berlin. Work on the tunnels continued after the air raid, but most of the high officials fled into the mountains. A thorough search of the underground tunnels yielded no documents of great importance. Mr. Noris of the Arge Holzmann, Held and Francke, who was in charge of the construction work of the tunnels, claims he does not know the purpose to which these tunnels

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS CONT'D:

(1) Target No. 2 cont'd.

were to have been put and states emphatically that, to his knowledge no documents are hidden in them; Great quantities of ammunition, weapons and demolitions were found in almost every tunnel. Hitler's and Bormann's tunnels were constructed in such a manner that each passage could have been defended by built-in machine guns.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: Allied task forces attacked Jap home islands and 600 carrier based torpedo bombers attacked from dawn to dusk. Chinese forces are fighting in the streets of Hungchow, coastal port which has been in Japanese hands for four years. Food situation is becoming acute in Japan.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: None.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh.
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 0121

SECRET
T-2 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, T FORCE, 6TH AG
INITIALS _____
DATE 15 May 1945

FROM: 302200B April 45
TO : 151800B May 45
HQ, T FORCE, 6TH AG
151800B May 45

NO. 18 FINAL MUNICH REPORT

MAPS: TOWN PLAN, MUNICH. Scale 1/12,000

1. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. T-3 SECTION:

(1) Status of Troops:

(a) Attachments at Present:
1 1269th Engr C Bn.
2 Rcn Co, 645th TD Bn, 45th Inf Div.
3 3 Mine Clearance Squads, 120th Engr C Bn.

(2) Additional Opportunity Targets:

TARGET NO.	AGENCY	NAME & ADDRESS	DISPOSITION
0-89	ECON	Ministers of Wirtschaftsministerium, now in Stadelheim Prison	Released, Exploited
0-90	OI	Hauptamt für Technik, Marktschwaben	Released, Exploited

(3) Status of Targets to Date:

	1st Prior.	2nd Prior.	3rd Prior.	Opportunity	TOTAL
SEIZURES	30	45	99	81	255
RELEASES	25	44	98	79	246
DESTROYED OR UNLOCATED	6	3	46	0	55

b. DOCUMENTS SECTION:

(1) Up to date, 354 items have been recorded, 26 bags have been dispatched to SHAEF and other echelons. The building at 109 Ismaningerstrasse has been partially filled with documents, which are being retained for use and disposition of the Army designated to occupy this area. A total of 102 agency reports, 61 agency opportunity reports, 153 team reports, and 30 team opportunity reports have been received. Reports from Agencies and MIS teams which are exploiting the Berchtesgaden-Obersalzberg area have for the most part been submitted to the documents unit in Berchtesgaden and are not included in the above.

c. G-5 SECTION:

(1) Target No. 2, Priority I, Berchtesgaden-Obersalzberg - Preliminary report on Reich Chancellory records removed from Berchtesgaden - Beginning in 1943, and possibly earlier, records of the Reichskanzlei (Reich Chancellory) were evacuated from Berlin W 8, Vossstrasse 6, to a building in Berchtesgaden, Bavaria, referred to as "Dienstgebäude der Reichskanzlei in Berchtesgaden" (Office Building of the Reich Chancellory in Berchtesgaden). Two two-and-one-half ton truckloads of these records (including the index) have been removed by T-Force. The index reveals that the

L-9877

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. G-5 SECTION CONT'D:

(1) Target No. 2, Priority I Cont'd:

records pertain to Reich Government (Reichsministerium) as well as to Reichskanzlei matters. The Reichskanzlei records contain: 569 bundles of material pertaining to the various functions of the Reichskanzlei, including minutes of cabinet meetings, documents in regard to national defense measures, Hitler's rise to power and letters written by Bismarck; current personnel files of civil servants employed in the Reich Chancellory, in addition to old records of former Reichkanzlei employees; National budgets from 1928 to 1942; several hundred folders on various subjects such as labor, civil service, railroads, finance, trade, commerce, budget, Jews, youth, justice, church, art, German Länder, protectorate, Austria, agriculture, army, decorations, party, police, post, press, schools, transportation, insurance, welfare, including approximately 100 folders on activities of the Foreign Office arranged by countries.

d. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

(1) Cases Closed, 14 May 1945:

NAME	TITLE	DISPOSITION
M. Scapini	Former Vicy Ambassador to Berlin (1940-45)	To French Authorities
Colonel L'Heureux	Head of the French Diplomatic Mission for Prisoners of War in Berlin	To French Authorities
M. Bousquet	Secretary general of the Ministry of the Interior for Police	To French Authorities
Madame Bousquet	Wife of the above	To French Authorities
Heilpert, Werner	Agent for Austrian Liberation Movement	Released
Lehner, Ludwig	Major of Schutzpolizei and adjutant to Von Eberstein	Interned
Hofmeister, Josef	Police Inspector in the Gestapo	Interned
Frischeisen, Alfons	Police Inspector in the Gestapo and former SS Oberscharfuhrer	Interned
Jostl, Georg	SD agent and liaison man between Ortsgruppenleiter and NSKK	Interned
Trampler, Rudolf	Oberburgermeister of Speyer and Ortsgruppenleiter	Interned
Gotz, Alfons	SD agent	Interned
Patzlsperger, Jakob	SD Agent	Interned
Seidl, Ludwig	SD agent	Interned
Eichheim, Josef	SD agent	Interned

e. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS: (Highlights of Exploitation of Targets by Specialists)

(1) Target No. 0-89, Ministers of Wirtschaftsministerium, now in Stadelheim Prison - Through the interrogation of Ministerialdirektor Elmar Michel, Ministerialrat Paulus Fabricius and Ministerialdirigent Hermann Reinhardt, the following information was obtained: To insure operation of the Ministry of Economics (Wirtschaftsministerium) after the Allies had cut Germany in two, two separate divisions of this Ministry were formed. The Southern Ministry was to operate Thuringia and southern Germany from the Munich area. Only a minimum of documents were evacuated. The following emergency evacuation places were named by the above:

Reichskommisariat for Enemy Property under Staatssekretär Kron, at Melzungen, Bayrische Wald
Ministry for Food and Agriculture under Staatssekretär Wilhelms, at Mittenwald, Bavaria

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS CONT'D:

(1) Target No. 0-89 Cont'd:

Ministry for Armament, under Dr. Saur, Salzburg, Austria
Ministry for Education, Kloster (monastery) Ettal
Ministry of Interior, under Ministerialdirektor Ehrensberger
at Garmisch
Ministry of Finance at Ilmenau, Thuringia, and Sigmaringen
Ministry of Justice at Leitzmaritz, Czechoslovakia
Forest Office at Garmisch
Ministry of Traffic (Verkehr) at Garmisch
Office for Trade Politics (documents were evacuated to Bad
Salzungen, near Kassel). The staff went to Attenhausen,
Bavaria, Dr. Scharr in charge there.
Also Geheimrat Ripken at Garmisch and Dr. Weldern at
Wiessee, are connected with this agency.
Reichswirtschaftsminister Dr. Walter Funk was last seen at
his farm "Bergehof" at Dietramszell, Bavaria.

f. GENERAL SITUATION: American troops have made gains on Okinawa. British carrier planes attacked Kyushu today, one of the home islands of Japan. Mopping up of Jap troops continues in Burma.

g. SPECIAL REMARKS: The "T-2 Periodic Report, No. 16, dated 141800B May 45" should be amended to read "T-2 Periodic Report, No. 17, dated 141800B May 45". This is the final daily report on Munich operations.

By Order of Colonel PUMPELLY:

Hursh.
HURSH
T-2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

POST HOSTILITIES
ECLIPSE - 6th Army G

File No.
589.97 3A
JAN-MAR 1945

DECLASSIFIED
SecDef Memo 16 May 61

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

POST HOSTILITIES
ECLIPSE - 6th Army Group

MICROFILMED
9879 - 143

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

AG 014/E

TOP [redacted]

587.172A
HISTORICAL DIVISION
ARCHIVES BRANCH

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23

5 FEBRUARY 1945

DECLASSIFIED
SecDef Memo 16 May 61

OPERATION

"ECLIPSE"

DOWNGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF HQ
SHEAF 350.05-1
dtd 1 Jun 45
Date NOV 17 1949

OUTLINE PLAN AND ANNEX NO. 1 (MAPS)

9 FEBRUARY 1945

DECLASSIFIED
SecDef Memo 16 May 61

OPERATION

"ECLIPSE"

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY JTC
JTHEAT 381 -1
dtd
Date NOV 17 1949

OUTLINE PLAN AND ANNEX NO. 1 (MAPS)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Returned to D/19110

REG. NO. B47

COPY NO. 106 OF 125 COPIES

[redacted]

TOP [redacted]

TS 799

11387

MICROFILMED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Sixth Army Group Operations Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE".

1.	Chief, Air Ops. & Req. Section	Chief, Policy & Liaison Section	6 Apr 1945

1. Paragraphs 6 and 15 of Appendix "A" to attached SHAEF letter AG 381-1 GCT-AGM, dated 25 March 1945, should be checked.

2. Annexures cited in Para. 15 have come in since we reviewed the Sixth Army Group plan.

3. Responsibility for air disarmament and disbandment in Sixth Army Group area has changed--being transferred from First Tactical Air Force to Ninth Air Force.

/s/ William G. Lee, Jr.
/t/ WILLIAM G. LEE, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Policy & Liaison Section

1 Incl: SHAEF G-3 Div. GCT 370-65/Plans covering letter dtd 30 Mar 45, to which is attached paper desc. above.

BE/LCW/rk

2.	Chief, Policy & Liaison Section	Chief, Air Ops. & Req. Section	7 Apr 45

1. Noted.

2. No action necessary.

1 Incl: n/c.

LOYD C. WALDORF
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
Air Ops. & Req. Section

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

: ~~TOP~~ SECRET :
: CG, 6th AGp :
: Init: A.F.G. :
: 16 March 45 :

REF: AG 014/E SIG-O

16 March 1945

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

Annex No. 6 to Outline Plan Operation 'ECLIPSE'
HQ 6th Army Group, 5 February 1945.

1. It is anticipated that 6th Army Group operations in SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY will, in general, follow a two-phase tactical plan consisting of the rapid advance of our forces to secure strategic areas deep inside GERMANY and the subsequent deployment throughout a zone of occupation.

a. Primary Phase: A rapid tactical advance to seize and occupy the NURNBERG-REGENSBURG-MUNICH area. It is to be assumed that during this phase sabotage of signal communications will be widespread and frequent.

b. Secondary Phase: The continuation of primary phase operations plus the seizure and occupation, if not already completed, of the MANNHEIM-KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART area and the sealing of the SWISS border.

2. The establishment of signal communications in SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY will, insofar as possible, be consistent with the phasing of tactical operations. The outline plan for the build-up of communication facilities is as follows:

a. Primary Phase:

(1) Signal communications within the command will be commensurate with normal combat operations.

(2) Since this operation will be conducted in enemy territory, widespread utilization during the primary phase of existing civil and/or military communications facilities is not contemplated. In the event, however, that certain existing facilities are exploited, adequate provision will be made for:

(a) Active patrolling of wire lines and guarding of installations such as carrier and repeater stations, relay points, etc.

(b) Repair and maintenance personnel to effect immediate repairs to damage caused by sabotage.

(c) Maximum employment of VHF radio-telephone equipment (AN/TRC-3, AN/TRC-4) to bridge gaps in existing wire lines, to effect river crossings, and to minimize the effects of sabotage by supplementing existing lines on point to point telephone and telegraph service.

(d) Supplementing cipher personnel and equipment to insure that classified traffic will not be sent in the clear over landlines in GERMANY.

(3) A skeleton wire network consisting of suspended spiral-4 cable will be constructed along the axes of armies. This network will be supplemented by an open-wire lead as soon as possible.

(4) A typical Line Route Map is attached as Appendix "A".

b. Secondary Phase:

(1) The primary phase open-wire network will be augmented and expanded. Spiral-four cable installed along the route of the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP~~ SECRET

TSL 1631

13992

main network during the primary phase will be replaced by open-wire. Cable recovered will be utilized to expand local signal communications throughout the zone of occupation.

(2) The rehabilitation of civil communications systems for purely military purposes will be initiated.

(3) Switching facilities will be established as required.

3. Commanders will install, operate, and maintain signal communications agencies in accord with the tactical and occupational necessity. The following specific instructions will be followed:

a. RADIO COMMUNICATION:

(1) Radio communication during the primary phase will be normal.

(2) Secondary phase radio links will be as directed by this headquarters.

(3) Remote transmitter and receiver sites, relay stations, and power equipment installed in GERMANY will be guarded at all times.

b. WIRE COMMUNICATION:

(1) Wire circuits and carrier equipment installed by armies on certain routes to be designated by this headquarters will not be removed by armies without the approval of this headquarters.

(2) Personnel other than U.S. or French military will not be permitted inside terminal, repeater, or carrier stations; or other similar installations except where absolutely necessary to explain existing equipment.

4. Special Signal Project, SIG-6AG-2, has been submitted to higher headquarters as the Class IV procurement project for the development of SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY. Equipment will be made available to armies from project SIG-6AG-2 in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4, Item 1, Section VII, 6th Army Group Signal Instructions.

5. a. Current 6th Army Group Signal Instructions will apply until such time as 12th Army Group assumes control of 6th Army Group forces.

b. Command Post Locations:

(1) 6th Army Group

(a) Initial CP: BADEN-BADEN
(b) Final CP : HEILBRONN (Principal)
TUBINGEN (1st Alternate)

(2) Seventh Army

(a) Initial CP: To be reported.
(b) Final CP : MUNICH.

(3) First French Army

(a) Initial CP: To be reported
(b) Final CP : STUTTGART

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

EMIL LENZNER,
Brigadier General, USA,
Signal Officer.

1 Incl: Appendix "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5

CHART "I"

LINE ROUTE MAP
WIRE PLAN
FOR
OPERATION ECLIPSE



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

CARRIER SHEET

~~US~~ STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

Must remain with attached papers

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH AND INITIAL IN RIGHT BORDER.
USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAGE.

BE/AWD/ms

No.	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT Annex No. 2 to Outline Plan Operation ECLIPSE Hq 6th Army Group, 5 Feb 1945 Enter File Classification AG:
1.	D/Plans Air Ops	Intell Liaison	2 Apr 45	No comments. Alan W. Detweiler ALAN W. DETWEILER Lt. Colonel, A.C. Intell Liaison Officer 1 Incl. Incl. 1 - Annex No. 2

~~TOP~~-SECRET

PAGE No. _____ LIFT HERE. USE OTHER SIDE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LFG/eb

: TOP SECRET :
: CG, 6th AGp :
: Init: :
: 16 March 45 :

4

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

REF: AG 014/E B-O

16 March 1945

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Annex No. 2 to Outline Plan Operation 'ECLIPSE'
HQ 6th Army Group, 5 February 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDICES

Appendix A - The Seizure and Exploitation of Intelligence Targets.

Appendix B - Plan for Interrogation.

Appendix C - Intelligence Specialist Personnel and Intelligence Static Staffs.

Appendix D - Plan for Handling Enemy Documents.

Appendix E - Plan for Counter-Intelligence.

Outline Plan for Operation 'ECLIPSE'
Annex No. 2 -- Intelligence

I --- GENERAL

1. OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'. The plans for the occupation of GERMANY will require Intelligence staffs at all echelons to undertake large additional commitments. Operation 'ECLIPSE' will go into effect on "A" Day, a date fixed by the Supreme Commander, AEF, depending on the status of German resistance at the time. Since many aspects of Operation 'ECLIPSE' will apply to the operations in progress prior to "A" Day, particularly as regards Intelligence functions, the Intelligence organization must be adapted to facilitate a smooth transition.

2. PHASES. Intelligence operations must be adjusted to meet two partially overlapping main phases of 'ECLIPSE':

a. Primary Phase: The completion of military operations by the seizure of primary strategic objectives within GERMANY.

b. Secondary Phase: The consolidation of the United States Zone and redistribution of forces. This phase will involve the reorganization from an operational to a static role, including changes of functions in some cases and changes of command channels in others.

3. EFFECT OF PHASES ON INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS. During the Primary Phase, normal combat intelligence procedure will remain in effect at all echelons. However, certain enemy areas may settle down to occupied status prior to "A" Day or during the primary phase. In such areas, Intelligence procedures of 'ECLIPSE' must be initiated by all echelons. The seizure and preliminary exploitation of priority intelligence targets will be carried on during the Primary Phase, but cognizance will be taken to the long term nature of the effort. During the Secondary Phase, Intelligence staffs of all echelons will carry out the functions of Operation 'ECLIPSE' as set forth below. Accordingly, during the Primary Phase the main effort will be laid on planning for the reorganization and adaptation of all Intelligence staffs in preparation either for actual participation in the Secondary Phase or for turning over to relieving troops. The guiding principle is that, so far as is practicable, continuity in personnel, methods and channels should be observed. Intelligence personnel should be introduced to their eventual responsibilities as early as possible and remain there.

4. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DURING THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY. The transition from the period of operations to that of static occupation, whether begun in the Primary or in the Secondary Phase, will entail a major metamorphosis of all Intelligence agencies. Particular attention must be paid to those areas initially occupied by troops of one of the Allied Nations, but which will later fall into the occupational sphere of another. It will be the responsibility of Army Group to ensure that all arrangements made conform where practicable to the eventual lay-out contemplated for Operation 'ECLIPSE'.

II --- SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

5. MILITARY.

a. Military operations prior to and subsequent to "A" Day will vary according to three capabilities of the enemy:

(i) Surrender by the National Socialist Government of Germany would probably effect complete termination of organized military activity. However, guerilla activity and underground resistance, both overt and covert, would probably be prevalent in varying intensity. Such sporadic fighting may require only police operations in certain areas, but since it is not probable that the Nazi Government will surrender, more extensive resistance must be expected.

(ii) Surrender by the German Armed Forces High Command with the consent of the Nazi Government would effect the same conditions as in (i) above. Surrender without the consent of the Nazi Government would effect an intensification of such conditions on an organized scale, since the Nazi Party would find itself in the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

position of necessarily fighting in self-defense. The capability of the Nazi Party armed forces to resist should not be underestimated.

(iii) Should no surrender be the order of the day, operations will proceed in straightforward military fashion until the enemy is destroyed. In such case, the standard operating procedures of regular warfare will govern.

b. Disarmament and disbandment will proceed according to a rate depending on 5a above and the will of the individual enemy commanders. Disarmament will entail exact accounting for small arms of enemy formations as a primary objective. Records of the formation must be turned over immediately and safeguarded for the eventual checking of personnel as well as for their temporary custody. A constant threat will be partial revolts by military personnel still under arms especially in small units which may be by-passed by the advancing Allied Forces. Infiltration of Nazis among Prisoners of War for the purpose of inciting unrest and riots must be guarded against.

c. Passive resistance, in an uncoordinated form, must be expected. The danger from delayed action mines will be serious. Sabotage will vary from scattered booby traps to attempts at complete destruction of important installations.

d. Long term resistance will be much more difficult to detect and accordingly more dangerous. Its immediate detection and prevention will be a major intelligence task. Fanatic patriotism will extend from individual endeavors to play the role of "the martyred patriot" to insidious plans for the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. The concealment of records necessary for the study of German action during the war and the correction of future plans, the masking of underground storage dumps and factories, and the attempt of the German General Staff Corps to melt away into inconspicuous seclusion must be prevented at all costs. Plans, records and personnel must not be allowed to escape.

6. Paramilitary organizations are an integral part of the Nazi state. They extend their ramifications into every phase of German military and civil life, linking the two inextricably in time of war. The very length of the list of such organizations makes their importance to the German capacity to make war obvious. Unless completely eradicated, the German long term resistance movement will find in the more apparently innocuous of these organizations a fertile field for development. The danger from the SS, the SA and other openly military formations is obvious. All must be as effectively and as completely disarmed as any other part of the German Wehrmacht.

7. The attitude of the civilian population will naturally be conditioned by time and the various strata encountered.

a. Before "A" Day, it is expected that the mood of the people will be variable, ranging from apathy and docility through a barely concealed latent hostility. Periods of temporary anarchy will occasion outbreaks of interfactional rivalry.

b. After "A" Day, the occupation of the country will probably bring about a period of depression, both physical and mental, which will prove fallow for the dissemination of new ideas hostile to the Allied cause.

8. In conclusion, counter-measures must be vigorous and prompt. Intelligence will play a prime role in this operation. Plans for dealing with the situations enumerated must be prepared now and periodically revised in keeping with anticipated trends in the situation.

III --- INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS.

9. There are certain specific tasks connected with Intelligence which must be carried out by Intelligence Staffs during the phases of 'ECLIPSE' in addition to their normal functions.

a. General. The immediate seizure and exploitation of intelligence targets is a command responsibility. It will be executed either by special "T" Forces or by Intelligence Staffs and troops of the unit concerned.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Intelligence Operations. Intelligence Staffs at all echelons are charged with the accomplishment of the following tasks:

(i) The apprehension, interrogation and investigation of "wanted" persons, security suspects, prisoners of war, technical experts, etc.

(ii) The seizure, preservation, scrutiny, and exploitation or disposition of documents.

(iii) The provision of information on how Germany fought the war, in all its aspects: The methods and organization of the war economy, of war industry, and of military, scientific and technological developments.

(iv) The provision of current economic information, as required for the prosecution of operations.

(v) The provision of Intelligence for the prosecution of the war against JAPAN.

(vi) The collection and verification of German maps.

(vii) The obtainment of technical intelligence.

(viii) Coordination with Naval and Air Intelligence, visiting specialists, scientists, researchers, etc.

(ix) Coordination with P and PW on propaganda.

c. Operational Intelligence. Operational Intelligence Staffs will be charged with the accomplishment of their normal functions placing added emphasis on the following:

(i) The routine provision of tactical intelligence for prosecution of operations, whether against regular troops or guerillas.

(ii) Collaboration with Counter Intelligence in providing information on current political trends and underground movements.

(iii) Provision of complete Order of Battle on the Wehrmacht and all para-military organizations for the following specific purposes:

(1) To aid in the disarmament of GERMANY and the disbandment of the German armed forces.

(2) To aid in the liquidation of the German General Staff Corps.

(3) To check for veracity and completeness all information supplied by the Germans.

(iv) The collection of information and initiation of Intelligence research studies upon SHAEF directive. Typical studies would be:

(1) How GERMANY fought the war in all its army aspects.

(2) The accuracy of US Intelligence during the war.

(3) The collation of long-term Intelligence, such as topographic or Engineer Intelligence.

(v) The provision of current economic Intelligence to the extent necessary for calculations in terms of enemy capacity to support the war.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. Counter-Intelligence. Counter-Intelligence Staffs will be charged with the accomplishment of their normal functions placing added emphasis on the following:

(i) Security of the military forces and installations from espionage, sabotage and subversion.

(ii) Destruction of the German Intelligence Services, all security or secret police, and para-military organizations.

(iii) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and its affiliates and the prevention of their rebirth. (See par. 11, Appendix E, this Annex, and Annex C, Counter-Intelligence Directive for Germany.)

(iv) The apprehension and detention or surveillance of German General Staff Corps officers who have not been taken into custody as prisoners of war.

(v) The establishment and supervision of port, frontier and travel security control.

(vi) Coordination with P and PW in matters dealing with censorship.

(vii) Supervision of Civil Censorship. (See Intelligence Directive No. 6, Hq 6th Army Group, 23 February 1945.)

e. Technical Intelligence. Technical Intelligence Staffs will be charged with the accomplishment of their normal functions as outlined in Intelligence Directive No. 5, placing added emphasis on the following:

(i) The search for secret technical developments.

(ii) Collaboration in studies on the methods of application of German technology to the requirements of both peace and war.

f. Signal Intelligence. Signal Intelligence Staffs will be charged with the accomplishment of their normal functions placing added emphasis on the following:

(i) Collaboration and coordination with other established signal agencies for security and intelligence purposes.

(ii) Interception and location of illicit W/T networks not using Wehrmacht procedure.

(iii) Interception of authorized Wehrmacht networks.

(iv) Monitoring for Counter-Intelligence purposes of wire line systems not open to public use.

10. The seizure and exploitation of intelligence targets as the advance is made will be a function of command. Such targets may include any of the following: records and documents, persons, experimental and research stations, material, headquarters of all kinds, ministeries, industrial plants and Naval, Army and Air installations. Target information has been and will continue to be, supplied by Army Group Headquarters to Armies for assignment to appropriate subordinate units. This Army Group will remain responsible for all arrangements for guarding and exploitation of intelligence objectives in GERMANY until the responsibility can be delegated to the Army/District Commander or other competent authority in whose area the targets are situated. In the case of certain specific areas 6th Army Group "T" Force will control and assume the responsibility for the seizure and exploitation of targets. In such areas Army Commanders are relieved of this responsibility. Army Group will cordinate the operations of all intelligence agencies concerned with the seizure and exploitation of targets within the Army Group zone of responsibility.

In order to prepare for operations against Intelligence objectives within the Army Commanders area of responsibility it is considered desirable at Corps or Division level that adequate plans be initiated and executed to organize, train and properly brief provisional "T" Forces prior to the time the combat troops take over an area containing Intelligence targets.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

11. Responsibilities of Intelligence Staffs at all echelons will depend on the phases of operation. In general, Intelligence Staffs must prepare for the assumption of all 'ECLIPSE' responsibilities according to echelon.

a. Primary Phase. Normal combat Intelligence functions and standing operating procedures will be executed by all echelons of units with a mobile mission. Secondary Phase responsibilities will be assumed by staffs of units with a static mission.

b. Secondary Phase. The overall functions of Intelligence Staffs are listed in paragraph 9 above. Responsibilities will vary according to echelon. The general principles may be changed as occasion warrants, but the responsibilities specifically assigned to the various echelons are as follows:

(i) Division. Little in the way of 'ECLIPSE' Intelligence operations need be conducted by Division Intelligence Staffs, except as may be directed by superior headquarters. Division Intelligence functions will normally be limited to the following:

(1) Combat Intelligence as required for the conduct of operations.

(2) Limited civil Intelligence as required for the conduct of operations.

(3) Intelligence on the German Armed Forces, to the extent required in executing divisional responsibility for disarmament and disbandment.

(4) Active assistance to Officers in charge of disarmament and disbandment in dealing with German commanders and staffs in the field.

(5) Screening interrogation of Prisoners of War for selection for Army/District Headquarters Interrogation Centers.

(6) Counter Intelligence security within the perimeters of the divisional sphere of responsibility.

(ii) Corps. In the Primary Phase, Corps Intelligence Staffs will execute functions on Corps level similar to those of Division and in addition serve as channel to and from higher echelons.

(iii) Army/District Headquarters. Army Intelligence Staffs will assume the responsibilities of District Headquarters Intelligence Staff upon the organization of the Military District. All intelligence operations and functions at this level as listed in paragraph 9 above, will be executed, except those specifically assigned to Intelligence specialist agencies.

(iv) Army Group/Zone Headquarters. Army Group Intelligence Staffs will assume the responsibilities of Zone Headquarters Intelligence Staff upon the organization of the Military Zone. All directives affecting policy will be established at this level. The coordination between Intelligence Staffs of subordinate units, between them and Intelligence Specialist Agencies, and between them and Intelligence Staffs of superior formations will be a responsibility of Army Group/Zone Intelligence Staffs. Army Group/Zone Intelligence Staffs will be the sole controlling center for the receipt and dissemination of intelligence to and from the Army Group/Military Zone. It will be the responsibility of Army Group/Zone Intelligence staffs, in all matters concerning Intelligence, to effect a smooth transition

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

between the phases of 'ECLIPSE' and between units in the area and those relieving them, whether of the same nationality or that of another Allied Nation.

12. Directives as Appendices to this Annex are attached. They will treat the following subjects:

A - The Seizure and Exploitation of Intelligence Targets.

B - Plan for Interrogation.

C - Intelligence Specialist Personnel and Intelligence Static Staffs.

D - Plan for Handling Enemy Documents.

E - Plan for Counter-Intelligence.

IV --- ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO AID COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

13. The limited Counter-Intelligence personnel available, and to be available, will not be sufficient to discharge all the necessary tasks. During the occupation Counter-Intelligence officers will therefore be forced to rely upon field commandors for additional personnel to assist in making arrests and raids and in providing guards and escorts for arrested persons. In order that they may operate at maximum efficiency it is desirable that specific units be earmarked to assist Counter-Intelligence teams and that they be trained in the special techniques used in Counter-Intelligence operations.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

EUGENE L. HARRISON,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Asst. C. of S., G-2.

5 Incls.
Incl 1 - Appendix "A",
The Seizure and Exploitation of Intelligence Targets w/1 Incl.
Incl 2 - Appendix "B",
Plan for Interrogation.
Incl 3 - Appendix "C",
Intelligence Specialist Personnel and Intelligence Static Staffs.
Incl 4 - Appendix "D",
Plan for Handling Enemy Documents.
Incl 5 - Appendix "E",
Plan for Counter-Intelligence.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A" to Annex No. 2,
(Intelligence) Operation 'ECLIPSE'
Hq 6th Army Group, dtd 16 Mar 45.

THE SEIZURE AND EXPLOITATION OF
INTELLIGENCE TARGETS

1. GENERAL. With informants so few, and the need for information so pressing and important, the quick seizure of Party and affiliated organizational records cannot be overemphasized.

Intelligence targets will consist of libraries, archives, and other documents, persons of GI or other interest such as technical experts, experimental and research stations, material, headquarters and offices of all kinds, ministeries, industrial plants, and miscellaneous army, navy and air establishments and installations.

2. MISSION. 6th Army Group has the mission of seizing, clearing, guarding, and exploiting targets of significant intelligence and counter-intelligence value in its zone. It has the further mission of providing escorts, billeting and messing facilities for special parties from higher headquarters for technical exploitation of designated targets including documents, secret processes, installations and proscribed persons.

3. SITUATION. In the 6th Army Group area of GERMANY alone there are more than 765 towns containing more than one Intelligence target (approximately 4,800 targets in all). Intelligence units and personnel will participate in the seizure of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence targets, but the problem is so vast that acting alone it would only be possible for them to handle a very small portion of the targets, and then only in a cursory way. For this reason it will be the responsibility of all commanders to apply their maximum resources to the seizure of intelligence targets and their guarding after seizure.

It is of course to be expected that many documents and archives will have been evacuated or hidden, and the majority of the people listed as personality targets will have moved away, gone under cover, or disappeared in some other manner. It will be continuing and long-term task to track down such targets.

a. Means Available.

(1) "T" Force, 6th Army Group. In order to insure that complete coverage is accorded in certain critical areas where large numbers of Intelligence targets are concentrated, this headquarters has organized a "T" Force to handle Intelligence targets in these areas. However, this "T" Force will be limited in the number of areas that it will be able to handle by the rapidity of the advance of the forward units and its size.

(2) Provisional "T" Forces at Army and Lower Levels. The bulk of the task of handling Intelligence targets will fall to the combat formations (Corps and Divisions) as they advance. Provisional "T" Forces should be planned and prepared to operate at lower levels to conduct operation in their zones. (Par 10, basic Annex; Inclosure No. 1, this Appendix). Due to the shortage of trained personnel in this theater it will not be possible to augment the combat formations for this type of operations but where possible Army Group Headquarters will try to shift such specialist personnel, (CIC, IPW and MII teams) as are available around so that there will be as many as possible attached to formations engaged in major operations.

(3) "T" Section. A "T" Section has been established at Headquarters 6th Army Group under the operational control of G-2, 6th Army Group. In connection with the preparations, seizing and safeguarding of and exploitation of targets "T" Section will:

(a) Coordinate these activities of Armies and "T" Force, 6th Army Group with the requirements of "T" Section, SHAEF, and the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence targets of the General and Special Staff sections of Headquarters 6th Army Group.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

(b) Provide Armies and "T" Force with target lists and priorities, descriptive target folders, and available descriptive material of all targets in their zone.

(c) Arrange with Armies and with "T" Force, Sixth Army Group for the authentication and reception of intelligence parties from SHAEF, CIOS and other higher governmental agencies.

(d) Arrange for the setting up of a camp in the rear area for the billeting, messing, care of transportation, etc. of intelligence specialists who are not in a forward area exploiting targets.

(e) Coordinate the movement to target areas of intelligence specialists. Prior to the time each such specialist is allowed to move into a forward area "T" Section will insure that he is properly authenticated, familiar with all governing directives, and instructed to clear through the appropriate Headquarters.

b. Target Distribution Channels. Selected targets will be supplied by Army Group based on SHAEF studies, IPW reports and information from other sources.

Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence targets throughout GERMANY have been published from time to time by SHAEF in the form of O.I. Briefs, Fatherland Notes, SHAEF Personality Cards, EDS (CI)Target Lists, and other publications. At 6th Army Group Headquarters the targets have been extracted from these publications and set up on "Target Sheets", one target on each sheet. A folder was also set up for each town in Southern GERMANY that contained a target. To these town folders were added all the target sheets for each town. Also any additional information that has become available has been added to those envelopes, such as, town plans, aerial photo cover, and bomb damage reports. As we advance into GERMANY and the areas in which each echelon will operate becomes better defined these target folders will be sent forward through intelligence channels until they reach the level that will conduct the operation against the particular target area contained in the folder. At each level on the way forward the targets will be maintained, kept up to date, augmented with new targets that come in later, and such work done on the targets as is possible at that level to make them easier to seize by the formation that is ultimately to conduct the operation. Such folders as apply to an area of "T" Force responsibility will be forwarded to "T" Force for appropriate action. After the targets have been forwarded to "T" Force or started on their way down to lower echelons any new or additional information that is brought to light by a higher headquarters will be sent on forward to be added to the dossiers. By following this procedure the target sheets should be up-to-date at all times with the latest available information on each particular target.

4. OPERATIONS.

a. Areas of Responsibility.

(1) Because of the importance, number, and dispersion of targets, the missions of their immediate seizure and safeguarding and proper exploitation are responsibilities which can be carried out only through the employment of maximum resources of all commanders.

As the advance is made the seizure and initial exploitation of intelligence objectives will be a function of command. In the case of certain specific areas 6th Army Group "T" Force will control and assume the responsibility for the seizure and exploitation of targets. The following cities have been tentatively designated as being of sufficient size and importance to warrant a "T" Force operation.

CITY	WEHRKREIS
AICHACH (Y59)	VII
AUGSBURG (Y38)	VII

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CITY	WEHRKREIS
BADEN-BADEN (R43)	V
BAMBERG (D35)	XIII
BAYREUTH (O86)	XIII
BERCHTESGADEN (Z91)	VII
BISCHHEIM (RO2O2)	V
DARMSTADT (M64)	XII
ERDING (ZO8)	VII
ERLANGEN (O31)	XIII
FRANKENTHAL (M4O)	XII
FREIBURG (WO3)	V
FREUDENSTADT (W59)	V
FRIEDRICHSHAFEN (X3O)	V
FUSCHL (Austria)	VII
GEISLINGEN (S5O)	V
GERNSBACH (R43)	V
GRAFENSTADEN (V99)	V
HEIDELBERG (R79)	XII
HEILBRONN (S16)	V
HOLZKIRCHEN (Y92)	VII
KARLSRUHE (R55)	V
LANDSBERG am LECH (Y34)	VII
LINDAU (C48)	VII
LUDWIGSHAFEN (R49)	XII
MANNHEIM (M5O)	XII
MUNICH (Y85)	VII
NECKARSULM (S17)	V
NURNBERG (O4O)	XIII
OBERNDORF (W89)	V
OBERSALZBURG (Z9O)	VII
PFORZHEIM (R74)	V
REGENSBURG (U15)	XIII
SCHRAMBERG (W56)	V
SCHWABACH (T38)	XIII
SCHWEINFURT (N87)	XIII
SOLLINGEN (R54)	V
STUTTGART (SO2)	V
ULM (X78)	V
VILLINGEN (W54)	V
WEINHEIM (M6O)	XII
WOLFRATSHAUSEN (Y84)	VII
WURZBURG (N65)	XIII

Dossiers are being prepared by "T" Force for the targets in the above listed cities. However, there is a question whether or not "T" Force will be able to operate against all of these cities under some conditions of advance. Should the advance into GERMANY be very rapid there is a probability that these cities will be overrun so rapidly and at such distances from each other that it will be impossible for the one "T" Force to handle them. If this should occur "T" Force will be prepared to turn the targets for such of these cities as are designated by this headquarters over to the armies for operation by the combat formations. Under these conditions the seizure, guarding and initial exploitation of intelligence targets in such cities will become the responsibility of the Army. "T" Force will be prepared to provide briefing to the combat formations on target cities for which "T" Force is initially responsible.

Army commanders will be responsible for the seizure, guarding, and initial exploitation of all Intelligence targets within their Zone of Advance not lying within a "T" Force area of responsibility.

b. Seizing Targets. (Reference: Par. 10, basic Annex; Par 15, Appendix E). The teams to seize the targets must be formed from combat troops who have

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

been previously briefed and oriented on the job they have to do. This briefing should be done by an officer or officers who have prepared and are thoroughly familiar with the plans for the operation.

The scarcity of trained intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel available compared to the number of targets to be seized in each city precludes the seizing of targets by intelligence personnel alone. Even sending one trained intelligence man with the seizing team to each target initially will be impossible in some of the larger cities.

Suitably trained personnel must accompany the seizing teams to clear the target of booby traps, mines, time bombs, etc.

(1) Priorities. Obviously it will be impossible during the Primary Phase of 'ECLIPSE' to seize and safeguard all intelligence targets simultaneously. Therefore, known significant targets are being collated and assigned priorities for seizure and exploitation based upon currently available data.

(a) Installations indicated on target lists as First Priority targets will be seized and placed under guard by Armies, or "T" Force, until released by Headquarters 6th Army Group.

(b) Installations indicated on target lists as Second and Third Priority targets will be seized and placed under guard by Armies, or "T" Force, to the extent troops are available, and their intelligence exploited by Armies, or "T" Force, in accordance with standard intelligence operating procedures.

(c) Persons listed as First, Second and Third Priority targets will be arrested, if located, and processed in accordance with standard CI procedures.

(d) Targets yielding the intelligence of value in the war against JAPAN will be given priority of exploitation over those of value from an occupational viewpoint.

(e) The great bulk of targets will be rated at less than Third Priority. This does not mean that they will be neglected, but rather that their seizure and safeguarding must be planned and executed with the exercise of best judgement and the setting of local priorities. This category includes the large number of targets of which we will later gain information through the actual occupation of the country.

c. Guarding Targets. Each First Priority target must be placed under guard from the moment that it is seized until such time as it is released by orders from this headquarters. All other targets must be placed under guard, to the extent that troops are available, from the moment that they are seized.

Guards posted on seized intelligence targets should be thoroughly instructed as to their duties. They should be shown what types of identity cards are necessary in order to let authorized persons pass and instructed that no one is to be allowed to pass, or have access to the target unless they can show such a card. The officers identification AGO card is not sufficient to permit access to intelligence targets.

It will be the responsibility of the commander of the area that the guard for targets is adequate to prevent any unauthorized entry or damage to the target.

Some targets will require prolonged investigation after the initial seizing force has been withdrawn. Under these circumstances the responsibility for guarding these targets will be passed to the local commander by the commander of the seizing force prior to his withdrawal.

d. Exploitation of Targets.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(1) First Priority. Targets in this category will as a rule be exploited by headquarters higher than Army/District Hqs or by representatives of "high level" agencies such as CIOS (Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee).

(2) Lower Priorities. Other targets will be exploited under the direction of Army/District Headquarters except in selected cases, when Army/District Headquarters will be instructed otherwise.

(3) CI Targets. CI personnel will have priority in the exploitation of CI targets when there are several interested agencies.

(4) Many targets designated for seizure, especially those of the highest priority, are of such a highly specialized technical or scientific nature that they cannot be exploited by the Intelligence Staffs of Army Group, Armies, or lower echelons. Many agencies such as CIOS (Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee of the Combined Intelligence Committee, which represents both United States and British Ministeries), Naval Intelligence, Air Intelligence, SHAEF agencies for Japanese and other intelligence, 6th Army Group Staff Sections and other authorized agencies, have designated field teams consisting of experts for the exploitation of certain of these targets. Other types of targets, such as those of Counter-Intelligence or Operational Intelligence nature, fall within the normal scope of the intelligence staffs and agencies of Armies and lower echelons to exploit.

e. Suspension of Communications and Traffic Control. One of the first tasks of Intelligence assault forces operating in an area will be to insure that all communications in that area are suspended. Although the postal services, telephone and telegraph, radio stations and such are not listed in the target lists, still these services must be suspended as soon as possible for the safety of the troops operating in the area. Plans should be made in advance of the operation in conjunction with G-5 and the Provost Marshal to set up Traffic Control posts at all exits from the area in order to keep refugees off the roads and to keep the civilian population in town until CI personnel have time to pick up as many "wanted" persons as is possible. All officials of the PTT must be picked up and held.

f. Opportunity Targets. It is expected that many installations and persons of intelligence interest not included in the target lists will be uncovered.

g. Reports. "T" Force and Armies will notify "T" Section, Headquarters 6th Army Group promptly when a target area has been overrun and and the targets in it are ready for exploitation. A separate notification will be sent to "T" Section as soon as each First Priority target is secured and available for exploitation.

Although targets of opportunity are normally to be exploited by local Intelligence personnel, if such targets are considered to be of First Priority "T" Section, G-2, Headquarters 6th Army Group will be notified as soon as possible.

5. G-5 TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE TARGET FOLDERS. There have been many targets included in the target folders that are of higher priority to G-5 and Military Government than to Intelligence. For the sake of simplicity these targets have been left in the folders for transmittal down to the level that will operate against them. All these targets having higher priority for G-5 than for Intelligence have been marked as G-5 targets. At the level at which the operation is to be staged these targets are to be turned over to G-5 who will be charged with their exploitation. It is not intended in any way to imply that authorized G-5 personnel will not be allowed access to targets other than those marked as G-5 targets, nor that authorized Intelligence personnel will not be allowed access to G-5 targets.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. Much of the information contained in the target lists has been taken from the SHAEF Personality cards which are not allowed forward of Army Headquarters. For speed and convenience in seizing persons listed in the above-mentioned file this information has been included in the target dossiers. For this reason, if for no other, it is important that precautions be taken in order that these dossiers and the information contained in them not fall into enemy hands. Each target will be classified as "SECRET" until such time as it is seized, at which time the classification of the target itself but not its contents will automatically drop to "RESTRICTED". A team should not start out with more than three targets in their possession at one time. If they should be captured or become casualties while operating against their first target all other targets in their possession would be compromised and would make it very difficult for any teams that went out subsequently to seize the compromised targets. Adequate provisions must be made at all levels for the complete destruction of all target information in case of emergency. Special precautions must be taken that "white lists" do not fall into enemy hands.

7. LIAISON. Each army is to designate an officer from its G-2 Section to handle matters relating to Intelligence targets. This officer will maintain liaison with "T" Section, 6th Army Group Headquarters, and be thoroughly familiar with the army situation as far as Intelligence targets are concerned. Liaison between 6th Army Group "T" Force and Headquarters 6th Army Group will be maintained through "T" Section at Army Group Headquarters. Corps and Divisions will also designate "T" liaison officers who will insure coordination of Intelligence target matters with the next higher headquarters.

8. SUPERVISION AND CARE OF SPECIALISTS FROM OUTSIDE AGENCIES. Intelligence specialists from CIOS, SHAEF, and other higher headquarters who are to exploit targets, will be accredited to Armies by Headquarters, 6th Army Group. As outlined in par. 3 a(3) above, "T" Section, Headquarters 6th Army Group will make provisions for the care of all such specialists in a rear area during the time that they are not actually engaged in the exploitation of targets. However, as targets are uncovered in the forward areas these specialists will move up into the Army Zone and will become the responsibility of the Army. Such specialists will clear through Armies and govern their activities in accordance with all Army directives and procedures. (Documents will be handled and evacuated as prescribed in Appendix "D", this Annex). During the time that any particular specialist is in the Army Zone of responsibility for exploitation purposes the Army will be responsible for providing billets, messing, transportation to and from target sites, and guides, interpreters, or escorts where necessary.

9. LONG TERM EXPLOITATION OF TARGETS. It is to be expected that the exploitation of targets seized, as well as those discovered during the Primary Phase of Operation 'ECLIPSE', will continue for many months, if not for years. It will be necessary for Army Commanders to continue utilizing all available resources in implementing the responsibilities and procedures outlined in this Appendix until the permanent Military District Commanders take over.

1 Incl.
Organization of a
Provisional "T" Force.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATION OF A PROVISIONAL "T" FORCE

As an aid to the formation of Provisional "T" Forces at Corps and Division level the following check list for personnel requirements has been added to this Appendix. The requirements will naturally vary between different units and under various situations but the following may help and save time in organizing forces to conduct operations until a standard procedure is worked out.

Infantry	1. To furnish infantry assault teams. 2. To furnish guards and guides at force headquarters, in the Interrogation Center, for apprehended suspects at the headquarters, and from their place of capture to the headquarters and return when necessary. 3. Runners.
Mechanized Reconnaissance Force.	1. To furnish a good, mobile, communication system. 2. To furnish a flexible, rapid, mobile force. 3. To furnish light armored transport for protection against small arms fire. 4. To furnish mobile firepower (37mm, M.G.)
Engineers	1. Barrier and obstacle removal. 2. Mine detection, building investigation (booby traps).
Signals	1. To furnish advice and aid in suspending local telephone and telegraph communications. 2. To furnish communications with higher headquarters.
Ordnance	1. Time bomb and mine disposal. 2. Technical advice (not concerned with targets).
Medical	1. First aid and medical treatment.
Document Personnel	1. Supervision and control of captured documents. 2. On-the-spot exploitation where feasible.
Interrogators	1. Establish a temporary Interrogation Center for necessary on-the-spot interrogations.
Interpretors	1. Issuing instructions at the force headquarters.
G-5 Detachment	1. Exploitation of G-5 targets. 2. Supervise treatment and disposal of apprehended civilians released at the Interrogation Center. 3. To furnish information to civilians who will wander into the Force Headquarters and the Interrogation Center with complaints and seeking help. 4. Liaison between the Force and civilian agencies. 5. Liaison between the Force and G-5.
G-2 Liaison Officer.	1. Liaison with higher echelons.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B" to Annex No. 2,
(Intelligence) Operation 'ECLIPSE'
Hq 6th Army Group, dtd 16 Mar 45.

PLAN FOR INTERROGATION

1. INTRODUCTION. Requirements for information to be gained from interrogation will vary between the two phases of Operation 'ECLIPSE'.

a. Primary Phase. In general during the Primary Phase, the normal requirements of mobile operations will apply, and normal methods will be followed, except in the case of certain units which have assumed static functions in rear areas. In such cases, static interrogation methods and installations will be set up when directed by this headquarters.

b. Secondary Phase. The organization of interrogation in the Secondary Phase will differ considerably from the tactical, or "normal". It will be adapted to the static, long-term requirements of the occupation of GERMANY.

2. SCOPE. This plan deals with the organization of interrogation of all categories of personnel under static conditions. This organization will be set up progressively on orders of this headquarters as units assume occupation duties. Thus the plan will begin to take effect during the Primary Phase, and should be fully effective at some stage during the Secondary Phase.

3. THE PROBLEM. Under occupation conditions there will be thousands of people to be interrogated, and many agencies will desire the information obtainable, for purposes of counter-intelligence (CI) operations, disarmament and disbandment, military government, the prosecution of war criminals, and for various types of research into how GERMANY fought the war and concerning her technical and scientific developments. Thus the problem of interrogation is both huge and complicated, but the time factor will not be as important as it is under tactical conditions.

4. TYPES OF PERSONS INTERROGATED. Of course every person in GERMANY will be available for interrogation, but this plan sets up a method of selection by which only the more important will be questioned in detail, the information gained being disseminated to all interested parties. Types of persons to be interrogated, of both sexes, will fall into groups about as follows:

a. Those with personal guilt, who must be specially handled during interrogation. They will be interrogated not only to get information, but to get evidence against themselves or others:

(1) Persons of CI interest.
(2) War Criminals.

b. Those without personal guilt. Although these persons may have information which can be used in evidence against others, in general the purpose in questioning them will be merely to get information:

(1) Prisoners of War.
(2) Ordinary civilians.

5. STAGES OF INTERROGATION. In order to select the more important people for detailed interrogation, the following stages will be employed:

a. Field Interrogation. By "field interrogation" is meant those interrogations performed other than at one of the Interrogation Centers described below. The function of field interrogation will be to assist in the selection of individuals to be questioned at the Interrogation Centers. In general no reports of field interrogations will be required, but recommendations will be submitted of those persons considered worthy of detailed interrogation. Copies of each such recommendation will be furnished the Interrogation Center of the Army/Military District concerned, 6th Army Group Headquarters and the 12th Army Group/Zone Interrogation Center.

(1) These instructions are not to be taken as denying Corps and Division Commanders the right to require such detailed reports of interrogation of prisoners of war as are necessary, but

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

copies of such reports need not be furnished above the headquarters which requires them. It is considered that interrogators at Corps and Division will be most usefully employed (in addition to their function of screening interrogation) in rendering active assistance to commanders and staff officers when dealing with the Germans in matters of disarmament and disbandment.

(2) CI may require detailed reports of field interrogations in the sense of arrest reports and investigations, for its own purposes (see Appendix "E", this Annex, and CI Directive for GERMANY, this Headquarters, to be issued). Such reports, however, will not be furnished the Interrogations Centers as a matter of routine. When, however, a given individual of CI interest comes to an Interrogation Center for detailed questioning, copies of all relevant reports will accompany him.

(3) The investigation of war criminals is outside the sphere of this plan, however, when a war criminal is accepted for questioning at an Interrogation Center, copies of all relevant reports will accompany him.

(4) There will unquestionably be many agencies which will conduct field interrogations for their own purposes. When an individual of special interest is accepted at an Interrogation Center for detailed treatment, copies of all appropriate reports will be furnished by the agency concerned.

b. Detailed Interrogation. Detailed interrogation will be carried out at two levels, i.e., Army/Military District and 12th Army Group/Zone, as follows:

(1) Army/Military District Interrogation Centers. Each Army/Military District Headquarters will maintain an Interrogation Center under the supervision of G-2. These Centers will conduct detailed interrogations of individuals recommended by field interrogators as described above, and will produce the great bulk of information obtained from interrogation of all types of persons.

(a) As a matter of routine, the Interrogation Center Commander will receive recommendations from the field interrogators, and will select individuals for detailed interrogation on the basis of directives he will be given by Army/Military District G-2. (This rule does not apply to CI interrogations - see below.)

(b) Persons for CI interrogation will be received by the Interrogation Center in two ways (see Appendix "E", this Annex, and CI Directive for GERMANY, this headquarters, to be issued).

1. Known or suspect members of the German intelligence services, to include persons detected in acts of espionage, sabotage, or subversion, and persons found in possession of sabotage equipment, secret writing materials, codes or communication devices, or in other suspicious circumstances, who are arrested in the field, will be delivered direct to the Interrogation Center by the arresting authority. Pertinent records and reports will accompany the arrestee.

2. From other persons of CI interest, in custody at Internment Camps or elsewhere, Army/Military District G-2 will select the individuals to be sent to the Interrogation Center. Selection will be made from recommendations submitted by field interrogators at the Internment Camps.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(c) Where agencies or staff sections other than G-2 desire that certain individuals be interrogated at the Center, they will apply to the Interrogation Center Commander, who will either receive the individuals in question on the basis of G-2 directives, or in particular cases will refer to G-2 for decision. In such cases, it will be helpful if technical agencies concerned will supply specially trained interrogators, who will be permitted to use the facilities of the Center. In any event, the agency concerned should provide in each case a detailed description of the type of information it is hoped to get, as well as pertinent reference material or an expert to sit in on the interrogation as an advisor.

(d) The Interrogation Center Commander will receive from interested agencies the elements of information they desire from interrogation, and will make every effort to get this information and disseminate it to all concerned.

(e) As a matter of routine, Army/Military District Interrogation Centers will supply copies of individual detailed reports to: G-2 Army/Military District, G-2, 6th Army Group and to the 12th Army Group/Zone Interrogation Center. Further instructions for routine dissemination will be issued as required.

(2) Twelfth Army Group/Zone Interrogation Centers. 12th Army Group /Zone will maintain an Interrogation Center under the supervision of G-2. This Center will conduct detailed interrogations of highly selected individuals. (Note: Present plans do not include the establishment of a Detailed Interrogation Center directly under Headquarters 6th Army Group. References contained herein to the Army Group/Zone Interrogation Center refer to 12th Army Group.)

(a) Certain individuals desired for special purposes will be brought to the Center directly from the field on instructions from either 6th Army Group or 12th Army Group G-2.

(b) Of the persons received at the Army/Military District Centers, the commanders will select certain ones in accordance with directives issued from 6th Army Group Headquarters, for special treatment at the 12th Army Group/ Zone Center.

(c) Provisions of paragraphs 5b (1) (c) and 5b (1) (d), above, apply to the 12th Army Group/Zone Center also.

(d) It is contemplated that the 12th Army Group/Zone Center will carry much of the load of interrogations conducted for agencies exterior to the American Zone.

(e) As a matter of routine, the 12th Army Group/Zone Interrogation Center will supply copies of individual detailed reports to G-2's concerned.

6. COORDINATION OF VISITING AGENCIES. All "visiting agencies", that is, agencies exterior to the American Zone, desiring to conduct interrogations in 6th Army Group area, must first clear with the 12th Army Group/Zone G-2, 6th Army Group G-2, and then with Army/Military District G-2 of the District where it is intended to operate. Such agencies may then conduct field interrogation as desired within the limits set by the G-2's concerned, who may direct that copies of reports be furnished them. Visiting agencies may desire to avail themselves of the facilities of the Interrogation Centers. This is governed by the provisions of paragraph 5b (1) (c), above.

7. SPECIFICATIONS FOR INTERROGATION CENTERS. Organization of Army/Military District Interrogation Center: see Inclosure No. 1 (To follow)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "C" to Annex No. 2,
(Intelligence) Operation 'ECLIPSE'
Hq 6th Army Group, dtd 16 Mar 45.

INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST PERSONNEL AND INTELLIGENCE STATIC STAFFS

I --- REDISPOSITION OF INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST TEAMS

1. GENERAL.

a. Primary Phase. With the exception of those units which will assume static functions during the Primary Phase, the present attachment of intelligence specialist teams will not be changed. Army Group Headquarters will direct the adjustments to be made in the case of those units which assume static functions.

b. Secondary Phase. Intelligence specialist personnel will be redisposed as explained in onsuing paragraphs.

2. REDISPOSITION POLICY.

a. All IPW and MII personnel will remain available for use in this theater as outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4, below.

b. PI Teams attached to units leaving the theater will accompany them. The balance will be used in the theater as outlined in paragraph 5, below.

c. OB teams will remain attached to their present units including those with units destined to leave the theater.

3. IPW TEAMS. As operations progress toward and through the Secondary Phase, IPW Teams will be gradually withdrawn from lower units for utilization in Army/Military District Interrogation Centers, Document Centers and the like. The rate of withdrawal has not been determined, but the ultimate reorganization will allocate to each Division, one IPW Team.

4. MII TEAMS will also be withdrawn from lower units (Corps and Divisions) to be utilized as required. The bulk of this type of personnel will be attached to Army Group to work with Counter-Intelligence agencies.

5. PI TEAMS will remain in present attachments only if the unit is destined for departure from the theater. It is planned to allocate two teams to Army and to withdraw the remaining teams to be held in a reserve pool at 12th Army Group to be utilized as demanded by the situation. Army Photo Interpretation Detachments will be disbanded at such time after "A" Day as they are no longer required by the Army or on specific orders from Army Group Headquarters.

6. DOCUMENT SECTIONS now at Army will be incorporated into the Army/Military District Document Centers described in Appendix "D" of this Annex.

7. PRIORITY OF RELEASE. Army will advise Army Group Headquarters of the preferred priority for the release of intelligence specialist teams in accordance with the plan outlined above.

II --- STATIC STAFF INCREMENTS

8. Army/Military District G-2 Section will be provided with an increment of four officers and five enlisted men, German-speaking for the most part, who will be well versed in information concerning the District in which they will serve. The increment will be attached to the Army when it first overruns its District and will remain there through any subsequent changes of command until it ultimately becomes part of the Army/District Headquarters. Thusly, it is planned to retain personnel acquainted with the District, in the area from the beginning and in that way maintaining a continuity of intelligence policy.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

9. The chart below shows the static staff increment for a military District section:

1.	Unit	No.	Remarks
	Officers		
2.	Lt. Colonel	1 (a)	(a) GSC Officer, G-2 or G-3 background (prefe: ably G-2).
3.	Major	1 (c)	
4.	Captain	2 (1-b) (1-c)	Graduate of C & GS School, German linguist.
5.	Total Officers	4	(b) German linguist, document expert.
			(c) German linguist with CI or CIC background. Expert in travel control.
	Enlisted Men		
6.	Technical Sergeant (502)	1	
7.	Technician, grade 3	2	
8.	Technician, grade 4	1	
9.	Technician, grade 5	1	
10.	Interpreter (320)	(1)	
11.	Draftsman (070)	(1)	
12.	Stenographer (213)	(1)	
13.	Typist (247)	(1)	
14.	Total Enlisted Men	5	
15.	AGGREGATE	9	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "D" to Annex No. 2
(Intelligence) Operation 'ECLIPSE'
Hq 6th Army Group, dtd 16 Mar 45.

PLAN FOR HANDLING ENEMY DOCUMENTS

I --- GENERAL

1. BASIC PRINCIPLE. As the occupation of Germany proceeds, documents will become an increasingly important source of intelligence. The volume of documents normally anticipated in this Army Group area will be materially increased by the evacuation of files and archives from the Berlin area as a result of recent Russian advances. Consequently, the present handling of documents will have to be modified so that only those documents requiring exploitation at higher headquarters will be evacuated. The general rule will be that documents will be left in place or collected in local repositories unless evacuation is essential.

2. RULES ON DISPOSITION. The question as to what types of documents are to be left for local exploitation and what types are to be evacuated cannot be predetermined. However, the documents agencies will decide the action required. For the present, the following guiding principles are prescribed:

a. Documents required locally for military government purposes should be left in place. This applies to documents relating to public utilities as well as civil administration.

b. Archives and libraries should be left intact, and if any single documents are removed therefrom their return must be insured.

c. The following are examples of documents deserving special consideration and decision by documents personnel as to disposition:

(1) Documents wanted by CIOS and similar agencies.

(2) Cryptographic material wanted by signal intelligence.

d. Documents which must not be left in GERMANY will be evacuated. This applies to those military documents which, if left to fall back eventually into the hands of the Germans, might form a basis for future overt or underground attempts to reconstruct the German Armed Forces.

e. CI may, if desirable, freeze any document of purely CI interest so that it is not shown to any other agency without permission. This measure will be taken only on the authorization of the Army/District Headquarters G-2 concerned, and the Document Center will be informed of such action.

f. Documents which are solely of interest to the Navy or Air Force will be turned over in place to the nearest Navy or Air Force Intelligence Staff, or if this is impracticable, a report on these documents will be sent to such Intelligence Staffs. Documents that are of interest to the ground forces as well, will be held by the Document Center, but Navy or Air Force will be given an opportunity of inspecting and copying the documents.

g. The A. C. of S., G-2, this headquarters may, in certain exceptional cases, issue specific directives for handling documents through special channels. This will not, however, involve any great bulk of documents, and the Control Section (see paragraph 7) and Documents Centers will be fully informed of the provisions of the directive.

3. DOCUMENT CHANNELS. All documents requiring evacuation, with the exception of Air Force, Navy, and Signal documents, will be passed through established document channels.

4. SAFEGUARDING OF REPOSITORIES. During the Primary Phase, Armies will insure that in the area of their advance all repositories containing military documents and all repositories specifically designated by interested agencies are secured as soon as captured, and that a report on their location is promptly transmitted through G-2 channels. Securing will be effected by sealing the rooms or building containing the documents, and guards will be posted wherever practicable.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The repositories will remain guarded or sealed until authorized document personnel take custody. Every possible precaution must be taken to prevent sabotage, arson, theft, or any other actions to destroy or misappropriate the documents. It will be borne in mind that the securing of intelligence targets is a command responsibility.

5. DOCUMENT CENTERS. Each Army/Military District Headquarters will be supplied with the necessary trained personnel for establishing and operating a Document Center under the supervision of the G-2 Section. The Document Center will assume the administration of all documents found in the District, and coordinate and facilitate the activities of visiting agencies in search of documents (See Section II).

6. PROVISIONAL DOCUMENT CENTERS. During the period of advance of the Armies, Document Centers may be set up in large cities or industrial areas to insure early availability of the documents found there, and at the same time to provide practical training for the personnel involved. They will be placed under direction of whatever Army has control of the city or area. As soon as Army/Military District Headquarters move into their final location, such Document Centers will be transferred to the Army/Military District Headquarters under which they will remain.

7. DOCUMENT CONTROL SECTION. In addition, there will be a Document Control Section located at 12th Army Group/Zone Headquarters to supervise and coordinate the functioning of the Army/District Headquarters Document Centers and to assist with such work as mimeographing and photographic printing. The Control Section will also serve as the channel between Army/Military District Document Centers and higher headquarters.

8. EXISTING DOCUMENT SECTIONS. During the Primary Phase, the existing Army and Army Group Sections will continue to operate for their respective headquarters and insure the flow of documents of operational intelligence value through the established document channels. As soon as Army/Military District Headquarters move into their final location, the personnel of the Army Document Sections will join the respective Document Centers.

9. EXISTING INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS. The provisions of pertinent 6th Army Group Intelligence Instructions now in force shall continue to be effective unless they are inconsistent with or expressly superseded by this plan.

II --- PROCEDURE GOVERNING AGENCIES IN SEARCH OF DOCUMENTS

10. DEFINITION. It is anticipated that many different agencies will be interested in inspecting document repositories and will wish to remove documents to higher headquarters for detailed study. The term "agency" as used herein includes any individuals, teams, or units originating from outside the Army/Military District Command.

11. CONTROL OVER AGENCIES. To insure that no documents are taken away by one agency that may be desired by others also, it is essential that Army/Military District Commands exercise strict control over visiting agencies by enforcing the provisions of the following paragraphs.

12. REGISTRATION OF AGENCIES. All agencies wishing to operate in a Military District will be required to accomplish proper registration and clearance with successive headquarters.

13. CONTROL BY DOCUMENT CENTERS. In addition, any agencies wishing to examine document repositories will register with and operate through the facilities of the Document Units of the various headquarters through which they are required to clear. They will conform to the Standing Operating Procedure laid down by the Document Center of the Military District in which they wish to operate, and will employ such forms and render such reports as the Document Center may require for the proper performance of its functions.

14. DUPLICATION OF DOCUMENTS. Agencies may request permission to duplicate documents in place. Microfilming assistance may be applied for at the Document Center.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

15. EVACUATION OF DOCUMENTS. Any agency wishing to evacuate documents for exploitation at higher levels, will submit a request to the Document Center, which if the documents can be released, will forward them through established channels to the addressee designated by the agency.

III --- FUNCTIONS OF DOCUMENT CENTERS

16. PURPOSE. Document centers are intended to serve as a control agency for insuring coordinated exploitation of all documentary resources in the District by interested agencies.

17. LOCATION. They should be allotted a large, accessibly located building at or near the District Headquarters, with ample space for setting up offices, a library, and a photographic laboratory.

18. INITIAL DOCUMENT SURVEY. Immediately after establishment of a Document Center, the personnel thereof will survey the entire area of the District for the location of document repositories and will make a cursory inventory of the kind and amount of documents found. They will decide whether the documents should be:

a. Left in place.

b. Collected and deposited at a storage place other than the Document Center Library.

c. Incorporated into the library of the Document Center.

d. Evacuated through military channels.

e. Destroyed.

19. RECORDS. Progressively more detailed records will be compiled on documents in the District, including their disposition or whereabouts.

20. LOCATION LISTS. Catalogs giving location of documents and as much detail as possible will be prepared and circulated to interested agencies within the area, to the 12th Army Group Control Section, and to 6th Army Group Headquarters, G-2.

21. VISITING AGENCIES. The Document Center will have full control of all visiting agencies interested in examining document repositories. It will keep a record of these visits, advise the agencies as to available sources and approve or disapprove the removal of documents by those agencies.

22. DUPLICATION. The Document Center will establish priorities on duplication requirements of visiting agencies and assist with microfilming where possible.

23. RELATIONS WITH STAFF AND COMMANDS. The Document Center, as required by G-2, will furnish information, or make appropriate documents available to all staff sections and commands of the Army/Military District who should keep the Document Center informed through G-2, of specific types of information desired. In priority cases approved by G-2, the Document Center will render active assistance to staff sections and commands in finding particular documents, types of documents, or information.

IV --- FUNCTIONS OF DOCUMENT CONTROL SECTION

24. A Document Control Section will be established by Army Group/Zone Headquarters to perform the following functions:

a. Insure the efficient and uniform operation of the Document Centers in the Zone.

b. Publish and disseminate consolidated location lists of documents.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. Maintain a classified reference index based on the Document Center location lists.

d. Control, supervise, and coordinate agencies interested in documents in the Zone, and insure that all documents other than those expressly exempted above, are evacuated through established channels.

e. Perform document research as directed by G-2.

f. Maintain contact with Document Section, Supreme Headquarters/Control Council.

g. Produce any necessary prints or enlargements of captured negatives and of microfilms made by the Document Centers, and assist the photographic personnel of the Document Centers so far as needed.

V --- PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

25. Organization of Army/Military District Document Center: See Inclosure No. 1, (To follow).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B" to Annex No. 2
(Intelligence) Operation 'ECLIPSE'
Hq 6th Army Group, dtd 16 Mar 45.

PLAN FOR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI)

1. REFERENCE. Reference is made to the "Counter Intelligence (CI) Directive for GERMANY", issued by this headquarters.

2. MISSION. The CI mission in GERMANY is:

a. To provide security for our military interests against espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

b. To destroy the enemy under-cover intelligence (espionage, sabotage, and subversion) services, all security or secret police, and all para-military organizations.

c. To dissolve the Nazi Party (NSDAP) and its affiliates and to prevent their rebirth in any form.

d. To dispose of the German General Staff Corps, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers.

3. RESPONSIBILITY.

a. Within the areas of their commands in GERMANY, Army/Military District Commanders are responsible for the accomplishment of the CI mission, and will discharge this responsibility pursuant to these instructions and the instructions contained in the detailed directive referred to in paragraph 1 above.

b. During stages of 'ECLIPSE' while mobile operations are still in progress CI operations will resolve themselves mechanically into two types, which will be carried out concurrently by the Army/Military District Commanders concerned, as follows:

(1) Maintenance of a CI organization to support tactical operations.

(2) Progressive establishment of static CI coverage of areas conquered.

4. INFORMATION.

a. This headquarters will supply Army/Military District Commanders with all available CI information. The information upon which CI operations will be based initially consists, in general, of:

(1) Guides and special studies pertaining to the main administrative and intelligence machinery of the Nazi state and its auxiliary organizations.

(2) A card-index of known and suspect members of the enemy intelligence services, secret and security police, para-military organizations, and other persons of CI interest.

(3) A listing of headquarters, training centers and other establishments of CI interest.

b. Army/Military District Commanders will collect additional CI information through field operations including the interrogation of arrestees and PWs, the operation of informant systems, and the examination of captured documents.

5. RESOURCES. This headquarters will provide Army/Military District Commanders with CIC, Intelligence Specialist, Special CI, Allied CI liaison, and Counter-Sabotage personnel to the fullest extent they are available. However, it is probable that without assistance this personnel will be of insufficient strength to permit the efficient accomplishment of the CI mission. Therefore, Army/Military District Commanders will, as necessary, augment their normal resources by the use of combat troops.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. Counter-Intelligence Corps.

(1) On or about "A" Day 12th Army Group Headquarters will activate a single CIC detachment to be known as the "Occupation Detachment". This detachment will consist of 323 officers and 1,100 enlisted men, organized into teams in accordance with T/O & E 30-500. Personnel for the detachment will be made available by the simultaneous inactivation of the following detachments and portions of detachments:

(a)	Communications Zone Detachment	611
(b)	SHAEF Detachment	14
(c)	Headquarters 12th Army Group Detachment	245
(d)	56 teams, type B-2, from Divisions	560
	TOTAL	1,430

(2) Attachment of CIC of the Occupation Detachment to Army/Military District and Port Enclave Headquarters will be based on the relative demands of the areas for which the various headquarters are responsible. These headquarters may make further attachments of teams to lower echelons as circumstances require.

(3) There will be no change in the detachments of Army and Corps Headquarters. After the withdrawal of one type B-2 team, each Division will retain a residue of two officers and five enlisted men. Detachments remaining with units will accompany them in the event they leave this theater. However, all officer and enlisted CIC personnel who possess particular qualifications of value in this theater will be transferred into the Occupation Detachment.

b. Intelligence Specialists. The bulk of MII personnel, and all IPW personnel not required for interrogation, will be allotted by this headquarters on the same basis as CIC for employment in CI operations (see Appendix "C", this Annex).

6. BASIC PRINCIPLES.

a. Every effort will be made to contain within GERMANY all persons of CI interest.

b. The security of military interests will take priority over the welfare and convenience of the enemy civilian population.

c. Other than to satisfy the immediate requirements of security, the search for "wanted" individuals will be secondary to security.

d. When the conditions of security permit, positive action will be taken to apprehend those persons of CI interest who remain at large.

e. Evidence gathered against persons of CI interest, whether captured or not, will be collected and maintained in accordance with procedures which will insure the maximum value of the evidence and its admissibility in court.

f. The burden of proof as to identity and innocence will be placed upon the arrestee.

g. Upon capture by any agency, all known or suspect spies, saboteurs, and subverters, and all persons belonging to or associated in any manner with German under-cover intelligence services, security and secret police, or paramilitary organizations, will be referred to CI for investigation.

h. Army Commanders whose forces advance into some areas later to be occupied by troops of another nationality will, upon relief, deliver promptly all CI internees and arrestees and pertinent records to the appropriate authorities, as well as useful information of the area.

i. As a matter of policy, CI personnel will not be used in the apprehension or investigation of war criminals in whom there is no CI interest.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

7. INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL. All commanders will continue to be responsible for devising and implementing within their commands all measures necessary to frustrate the efforts of enemy intelligence, sabotage and subversion.

a. All personnel will be thoroughly instructed in the fundamentals of individual security discipline, and the non-fraternization policy will be enforced strictly.

b. Maintenance of adequate interior guard systems supplemented by patrolling and the use of obstacles is essential to internal security control.

c. All measures necessary for the safeguarding of classified material will be implemented and continually checked for effectiveness.

d. Civilians will not be employed within a military establishment without CI clearance, nor will they be employed under conditions which would permit their gaining access to classified information or vital parts of the military establishment.

8. CIVIL SECURITY CONTROL. Army/Military District Commanders will enforce all measures upon the civil population necessary to frustrate the efforts of enemy intelligence, sabotage and subversion. These measures are to be imposed in the form of Military Government Security Enactments, many of which are now prepared for promulgation. Additional measures will be devised and imposed as needed.

9. FRONTIER SECURITY CONTROL. Frontier Security Control is a responsibility of the Army/Military District Commanders in whose areas of command lies any part of the German frontier (as of 1937). To assist in Frontier Security Control a "Prohibited Zone", paralleling the frontier and extending approximately 5 kilometers into German territory, will be established; the inner line of the Prohibited Zone may be varied to conform to natural barriers or to avoid the evacuation of large centers of population. The object of Frontier Security Control will be to "seal off" GERMANY in order to:

a. Keep inside the country all objectionable individuals, from the CI point of view. This includes all persons in the categories proscribed for arrest.

b. Keep inside the country all war criminals and any other "wanted" persons.

c. Prevent all unauthorized movements into and out of GERMANY of persons, funds, or goods, particularly that pertaining to efforts in furtherance of Naziism or German militarism.

10. TRAVEL SECURITY CONTROL.

a. Travel Permits. SHAEF will issue all Travel Permits authorizing travel into and out of GERMANY.

b. Negotiation. All responsibility for negotiation in matters of Travel Control with the authorities of liberated and neutral countries contiguous to GERMANY has been retained by SHAEF.

c. Travel over Zone Boundaries. A directive will be issued later, governing movement across the boundaries of the US Zone that are not frontiers of GERMANY.

d. Control of Travel by Air. Checks similar to those applied at posts controlling travel across the German frontier must be maintained at all airdromes used for flights into and out of GERMANY.

11. DISSOLUTION OF THE NSDAP. Army/Military District Commanders will dissolve the NSDAP and the associated under-cover intelligence services, secret and security police, and para-military organizations, and will arrest, investigate, and detail all members who are proscribed for arrest. Active steps will be taken

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to insure that the Nazi Party does not live on underground nor in disguised form after its official dissolution. Efficient information-gathering means will be an essential to this end.

a. MG Law No. 5, entitled "Dissolution of the Nazi Party", is the instrument which declares the illegality, prohibits the activities, and orders the dissolution of the NSDAP and all offices, organizations, and institutions enumerated by the law.

b. The dissolution of the NSDAP and its subsidiary organizations will be made a primary CI operation in cooperation with Military Government.

c. The categories of persons proscribed for arrest and detention are enumerated in Table "C", Annex "C", of the directive referred to in paragraph 1 above. For all of GERMANY and AUSTRIA these categories include approximately 358,515 individuals of whom it is estimated for planning purposes 75,000 will be encountered in the 12th Army Group zone of advance and 50,000 in the 6th Army Group zone of advance. In general, these categories and the numbers of personnel to be arrested in each are as follows:

(1)	Security Service of the SS (SD) all personnel	15,000
(2)	The Secret State Police (GESTAPO) all personnel	15,000
(3)	Police Officials	530
(4)	Nazi Party Officials	30,000
(5)	Para-Military Officers	223,250
(6)	Public Officials	4,735
(7)	Individuals named in the SHAEF Personality Card-Index for GERMANY	70,000
	TOTAL	358,515

12. DISPOSAL OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

a. As one of the most important steps in the elimination of German militarism, the officers of the General Staff Corps, with all equivalent Air Force and Naval officers, must be so disposed in post-war GERMANY that they can take no part in any attempts to revive military GERMANY. These men are important in that they have the knowledge and experience of this war, and would therefore be the most efficient organizers of the next. They must be placed in such a position, interned if necessary, that they cannot use their abilities in connection with any undesirable activity. A factor in their surveillance will be denial of access to military records. These must be put safely out of their reach by destruction or evacuation from GERMANY (see Appendix "D", this Annex).

b. CI agencies will take custody of all General Staff officers who have not already been apprehended as prisoners of war, persons of CI interest, war criminals, or as persons who are regarded as potentially dangerous.

c. The task of disposal of the General Staff cannot be left to CI agencies alone, however. The close attention of all commanders having to do with disarmament and disbandment will be needed, particularly since many of the German officers concerned will be required to remain in their old positions as key personnel, until finally dismissed when their services are no longer required by the Allied authorities. In the end, specific command decisions will be required in almost every individual case as to future disposition, although CI machinery can take care of those officers in CI custody. Directives will be issued in future by this headquarters to assist in the rendition of decisions.

13. PROCESSING OF CI ARRESTEES. The arrest and internment of all persons whose continued liberty is likely to constitute a threat to our security or to the accomplishment of the mission of the American occupying force, is a command responsibility. In carrying out this responsibility any and all personnel may be employed, but in cases of CI interest it will be accomplished primarily through the operations of CI personnel. All CI cases will be handled as described below, regardless of what individual or agency makes the initial arrest.

a. The persons and premises of all CI arrestees will be searched, and care will be taken to ensure the chain of possession of all items confiscated as evidence.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Arrestees will be guarded, escorted, and evacuated by CI personnel or personnel operating under CI supervision.

(1) Known or suspect members of the German under-cover intelligence services, and persons detected in acts of espionage, sabotage or subversion, or found in possession of sabotage equipment, secret writing materials, codes or communication devices, or in other suspicious circumstances, will be evacuated to the CI Annex of the Army/Military District Interrogation Center.

(2) Persons arrested because of their rank or position but not falling in the category described in (1) above, will be evacuated to internment camps. An example of such a person would be one who held an office in the government, the incumbent of which was proscribed for arrest.

(3) Other security suspects will be processed according to the merits of the individual case.

c. DETENTION. Arrestees will be detained by CI agencies, or those coordinated with CI, in available facilities or in one of the following:

(1) Detention Camps. In areas where adequate civilian jailing facilities are not available, Army/Military District Commanders will provide detention camps where arrestees may be held pending the completion of preliminary investigation, and prior to the evacuation of arrestees to Internment Camps or Army/Military District Interrogation Centers.

(2) Internment Camps. Internment Camps will be established by Army/Military District Commanders as prescribed in Annex 5-D, G-1 Plan.

(a) CI Specifications. The following specifications for each Internment Camp are stated from the CI point of view only, and do not take into consideration the number of other types of individuals that will have to be accommodated:

1. It is estimated that it will be required to intern for indefinite periods a total of 125,000 persons of CI interest, who will be uncovered in the zones of advance of 6th and 12th Army Groups; 75,000 to 12th, and 50,000 to 6th Army Group.

2. The desirable capacity of individual camps to intern this total, is 7,500 persons. Capacity should not exceed 10,000, nor fall below 5,000.

3. Camps should provide facilities for the segregation of male and female internees, and for segregation by such other categories as is found necessary.

4. Facilities should be available for solitary confinement of up to 50 CI internees.

(b) CI Staff. A CI Staff must be provided at each Internment Camp, which will process CI internees as shown below, less such duties as may be assumed by the Administrative Staff.

1. Check the arrest form which should accompany each individual in triplicate.

2. If no arrest form accompanies the individual, inquire into the circumstances of his case to determine if he should be interned.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. Furnish a receipt to the escort delivering the arrestee, for person and property. This should be accomplished on the escort's copy (second copy) of the arrest form.

4. Register each arrestee by name, identification number, and reception date. The identification number should be prefixed by the Internment Camp designation.

5. Register and place in secure custody such property and evidence as is delivered with the arrestee.

6. Fingerprint and photograph (profile and front view) each arrestee. The record card should contain the name, identification number, and full description of the arrestee, as well as fingerprints and photographs.

7. Complete a personal history questionnaire (MG "Fragebogen") for each internee.

8. Interrogate each internee for the purpose of:

   a. Completing investigation in each case.

   b. Recommending those individuals worthy of detailed questioning at the Army/Military District Interrogation Center (see Appendix"B", this Annex).

9. For each individual, transmit to Army Group Headquarters, through channels, the record card containing photographs and fingerprints, the third copy of the arrest form, the personal history questionnaire, and reports of investigation or interrogation.

10. Clear CI arrestees for release upon instructions of the Army/Military District Commander.

11. Maintain such CI records as are necessary at the Internment Camp. Each record of an individual will include the original of the arrest form.

12. Report through channels to Army Group Headquarters any change in status of internees (release, escape, execution, natural death, etc.), and such other information as is directed.

(3) Interrogation Centers (see Appendix "B", this Annex). Arrestees will be kept at Interrogation Centers only temporarily, during interrogation. After completion of interrogation they will be sent to Internment Camps. Those arrestees who are initially interned at Interrogation Centers, will be processed there as prescribed in paragraph 14c(2)(b) above.

d. Disposal of Arrestees.

(1) No person interned because he is an individual named in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY will be released from internment without the specific approval of this headquarters.

(2) No person interned because he is one of the persons proscribed in the arrest categories will be released from internment without the specific approval of this headquarters.

(3) The ultimate disposal of captured members of the German undercover intelligence services will be decided by this headquarters.

(4) Those persons against whom sufficient evidence has been gathered to warrant trial will be prosecuted by the appropriate US Military Commission or Military Government Court.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Those persons who are considered to be security hazards if allowed to remain at liberty, and against whom there is insufficient evidence to warrant trial, will be interned for such time as is deemed appropriate. This includes those officers of the German General Staff Corps, or equivalent Air Force or Naval officers, who are taken into CI custody.

e. Army/Military District Commanders will establish review boards to review tri-monthly the cases of those persons interned pursuant to the instructions in paragraph 13d above. The review boards will include appropriate representation from Counter-Intelligence, Military Government, and other interested agencies, and will recommend the release, provisional release, or continued internment of the individuals whose cases are reviewed.

14. CONCENTRATION CAMPS. As Allied troops advance into GERMANY many German concentration camps will be overrun. It is estimated that there will be approximately thirty-six camps in the 6th Army Group Zone. There have been reports that many Nazi officials may seek to go under cover by taking the identity of inmates of these camps who have died, or been killed. After assuming the identity of a prisoner they could be transferred to another camp where both they and the prisoner would be unknown, and there they would be accepted by other prisoners as bona fide. It will be most difficult to weed these impostors out as they will have no language difficulties and will probably have an excellent knowledge of the background of the person they are supplanting. A drastic means of escaping detection such as this would probably only be resorted to, and available to, persons of extreme importance to us from an intelligence of war criminal point of view. Therefore it is essential that all precautions be taken to prevent wanted persons from escaping by this means.

Adequate measures must be taken as soon as a centration camp is overrun by troops to see that no prisoner is released, or escapes, until he has been security checked and it has been definitely determined he is who he represents himself to be. The review of cases and release of prisoners is a command responsibility. Reviewing Tribunals of G-5 (Mil. Gov.) officers assisted by G-2 (CI) officers will be set up to review such cases.

Mobile teams of CI personnel will be organized as Concentration Camp Detachments. Their mission will be to move from camp to camp as directed by this headquarters, acting as CI representatives on Reviewing Tribunals and making such investigations as are necessary to insure that no inmate at any concentration camp is released who might be on the "wanted" list.

15. SEIZURE AND EXPLOITATION OF CI TARGETS. CI and other personnel will participate in the seizure of intelligence targets as discussed in paragraph 10, basic Annex.

a. Personality Targets. Persons who are intelligence targets of interest to CI will be processed as described in paragraph 13, above. As a general rule, CI interest will take priority over other interest, the idea being that untrustworthy individuals must be held in custody. However, when a certain individual has information of value to other agencies, the CI authority having the individual in custody must lend full cooperation to make that person available for interrogation. This can be accomplished by sending him to an Interrogation Center, where he will be kept in custody, and the information obtained from him disseminated to all interested agencies. There may be a large number of persons who are in possession of valuable general information who are of minor CI interest only, and perhaps so unimportant from the CI point of view that normally they would not be selected for detailed CI interrogation.

b. Targets other than Personalities. Intelligence targets of interest to CI, not personalities, will be seized as described in paragraph 10, basic Annex. Most such targets will be buildings which are headquarters or offices. In such cases, all persons found on the premises will be arrested and turned over to CI custody. Documents will be safeguarded in place, and the appropriate CI authority notified. The CI authority is then responsible that the proper procedure is taken relative to the documents (see Appendix "D", this Annex).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Materiel or equipment found on the premises will be safeguarded in place for CI examination. Any evidence of torture instruments or methods, together with the names and testimony of witnesses, will be made available to the appropriate G-1.

c. CI Documents. Documents of interest to CI must be preserved and exploited on the principle that other agencies may be interested as well. The procedure outlined in Appendix "D", this Annex, will therefore be followed. Paragraph 2 c of that Appendix does grant authority for special handling of CI documents in certain cases.

16. NAVAL AND AIR CI.

a. Naval. There will be no Naval CI responsibility in connection with the American Zone except for the Port Enclave which will be a 12th Army Group responsibility.

b. Air. The responsibility of Air CI will be limited to the immediate confines of air installations, and will deal with internal security only. Where it is necessary to pursue investigations beyond the limits of air reservations, coordination with the local ground force CI will be required.

17. RECORDS.

a. Personality Index. Army/Military District Commanders will maintain their copies of the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY. Supplementary information to be recorded on these cards, as well as additional cards, will be supplied by this headquarters.

b. Rosters of Personalities. This headquarters will supply Machine Records Unit Rosters of "Wanted" persons, CI arrestees, and other information pertaining thereto.

c. Files. Army/Military District Commanders are not required to maintain permanent files or dossiers pertaining to individual arrestees. 12th Army Group/Zone Headquarters will be the central repository for all such files and records.

d. Special Studies. Army/Military District Commanders are not required to prepare special studies of any CI subject. When such studies are desired by Army/Military District Headquarters or lower echelons a request should be submitted to this headquarters.

18. REPORTS. Army/Military District Commanders will submit a "Monthly CI Report" in the form prescribed in Appendix 1, Annex F, of the directive referred to in paragraph 1 above.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

APO 633, U.S. Army
16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Sixth Army Group Outline Plan for Operation "ECLIPSE"

TO : Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force,
APO 757, U. S. Army.
Attention: Chief, Future Plans Section, G-3 Division
(Forward)

1. This Headquarters concurs in the Sixth Army Group Outline Plan for Operation "ECLIPSE", dated 5 February, 1945.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ WALTER BRELVIG
/t/ WALTER BRELVIG
1st Lt., AC
Act'g.Asst.Adj.Gen.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

CARRIER SHEET

HQ US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

Must remain with attached papers

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH AND INITIAL IN RIGHT BORDER. USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAGE.

BE/JBH/rk

No.	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT: Outline Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE", Sixth Army Group, 5 February 1945. Enter File Classification AG:
1.	Chief, Disarmament & Demobilization, Chief, Policy & Liaison (in turn)	D/PHP	13 Mar 45	1. Outline Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE", Sixth Army Group, dated 5 February, 1945, is attached. 2. It is requested that your comments be forwarded to Chief, Air Operations and Requirements Section by 1200 hours, 15 March 1945. Theodore Cromwell Major A.C. CHARLES M. TAYLOR for Colonel, A. C. Deputy Director Post Hostilities Planning 1 Incl: Subject plan.
2	Chief, Policy & Liaison Section	D & D Section		1. It is noted that paragraph 3d is essentially identical with paragraph 5d of first draft of Twelfth Army Group's Operations Plan for ECLIPSE. 2. The same revision is therefore necessary in paragraph 3d of the Sixth Army Group's plan as has been recommended for second draft of Twelfth Army Group "ECLIPSE" plan, i.e. that the second sentence be deleted and the following substituted therefor: "First Tactical Air Force will take over from Sixth Army Group all German Air Force material, installations, and personnel, (including AA), necessary for the accomplishment of the Air Disarmament mission, as soon as possible, and will be assisted in guarding such material, installations, and personnel by the Sixth Army Group, subject to its operational commitments. H. F. Muenter H. F. MUENTER, Colonel, Air Corps Section Chief

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

LIFT HERE. USE OTHER SIDE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP~~ SECRET

BE/PJH/cr

3.	Chief, Air Ops & Reqs. Section	Chief, Policy & Liaison Section	14 Mar 1945	Except for possible mention in paragraph 5c of the attached Plan of units trained by the Air Forces, i.e., Air Disarmament Division, Ninth Air Force Service Command, there are no comments.

WILLIAM G. LEE, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Policy & Liaison Section.

1 Incl: n/c

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

BRIEF

SUBJECT: Outline Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE", Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 5 February 1945.

a. The above plan designates the objectives to be secured and the responsibilities of major forces during the "ECLIPSE" period. It will provide a basic for further detailed planning by major forces and their subordinate echelons, in order to accomplish the missions of the Sixth Army Group.

Only a small portion of this plan is of particular importance to this directorate as a whole or to individual sections.

b. Paragraphs 3d, 4, and 5c are of importance to the Disarmament and Demobilization Section. It is suggested that Par. 3d be compared with Par. 5d of the Second Draft, Operation "ECLIPSE", Twelfth Army Group, dated 27 February 1945.

c. This is the first draft received.

d. This plan appears to be in consonance with basic policy documents on the same subject.

e. It is recommended that this plan be forwarded to Disarmament and Demobilization and Policy and Liaison Sections for comment.

Loyd C Waldorf

LOYD C. WALDORF
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
Acting Chief, Air Ops. & Req.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 Division (Forward)

SGT/370-05/Plans

19th March, 1945

SUBJECT:- 'ECLIPSE' Sixth Army Group Operation Plan

TO :- Captain L.A. Thackrey, ANEF (Fwd) 1
Colonel W.G. Lee, USSTAF (Main) 2
Supreme Headquarters, AEF:-
G/Capt S.P. Glenvo, A-3 Div (Fwd) 3 - 4
Colonel S.Q. Ventz, A-4 Div (Fwd) 5
Colonel F.C. Brooks, G-1 Div (Main) 6
Lieutenant Colonel W.P. Miller, G-2 Div (Main) 7 - 8
Colonel T.N. Greenbrook, G-3 Div (Main) 9
Colonel W. Wignold, G-4 Div (Fwd) 10 - 11
Lieutenant Colonel G.A. Eden, G-4 Div (Main) 12
Brigadier G.D.C. Royman, G-5 Div (Main) 13
Colonel J.S. Willis, Signal Div (Fwd) 14

1. It is proposed to agree the comments on this plan after the meeting on Twelfth Army Group Plan which is being held in the G-3 Conference Room (Fwd) at 1415 hours on Wednesday, 21st March, 1945.

2. Attached is a consolidated list of comments on the subject plan which you are requested to bring with you to this meeting.-

C.R. GIBSON,
Major, GS,
Future Plans Section.

DATE RECEIVED
20/3
1
MAJOR
CAPT
ENTERED

Copies to:

Brigadier K.G. Nelson, G-3 Div 15
Lieutenant Colonel R.G.H. Phillimore, G-3 Div 16
Colonel J.K. Wilson, Jr., G-3 Div 17
Major C.R. Gibbon, G-3 Div 18
File 19

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TS887
#9582

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Cradock note appendix presumably G-1 G plan will be revised 12 AG plan.

d supply the para.



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

7. Para 2 a, line 4: Responsibility for area control, security and military government will rest with both Sixth Army Group and Twelfth Army

Para 2 a, last four lines: This sentence gives the impression that all dumps, factories, warehouses, etc. will be turned over to Com Zone. This is correct insofar as pertains to enemy armament and ammunition factories, but it is considered that in view of continued necessity of armies for maintenance of German Armed Forces, Allied PW and displaced persons, it will be desirable to retain control of establishments and supplies required for this purpose.

11. Para 3(c). A Naval Task Force will not support the Army troops as stated in this para. Furthermore, while the Navy is responsible for the disarmament of Naval Task, infantry, and Coast Guard formations as well as Naval shore establishments the Army will actively assist the Navy in disarming. It is recommended that this para should be changed to read as follows:

(c) Naval task units, coordinated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, GERMANY, will provide the necessary [illegible] citizens and other persons to control and advise [illegible] Second Force Commanders in Naval disarmament matters and [illegible] continuity of effort in Naval disarmament.

Para 4a: Delete first line and substitute: "Sixth Army Group/[illegible] tactical Air Force (Provisional) will ---"

Para 4a(2): The word "allied" should be replaced by "United [illegible] forces.

Para 4a(10): Reference should also be made to the elimination of German militaria.

Para 4b(3): The expression "disposal of [illegible] German Forces" [illegible] clear it will be found desirable to retain large numbers of [illegible] German Forces for work which you will wish to have performed.

16. Para 5a: It is believed that the present status and training of the personnel indicated in this para should be clarified in order that [illegible] may be fully understood that consideration is to be obtained from [illegible] Theater Commanders regarding the personnel [illegible] directions in this para, and regarding the training being conducted or contemplated under the supervision of that headquarters for personnel to be assigned to post-hostilities functions.

17. Annexes

a. It is assumed that annexes will develop responsibilities which services of armies and military districts will exercise.

b. The list of annexes contains no transportation plan. It is assumed that such a plan will be prepared as one of the "additional annexes" which it is stated will be issued as needed.

c. Although no mention is made of disposal of enemy war material in this document it is assumed that Annex No. 4, "Administration and Disarmament" will cover this pertinent point.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

106 rhb

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

B-47

TJB/rhn

: ~~TOP~~ SECRET :
:CG, 6th AG :
:Init: :
:5 Feb 45 :

AG 014/E C-O

5 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Operation 'ECLIPSE'.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758.
Commanding General, First French Army.

1. The present situation demands that plans be prepared for operations in the event of termination of organized German resistance. (Operation 'ECLIPSE').

2. Forwarded herewith is an outline plan for Operation 'ECLIPSE', Annexes to the outline plan as listed therein will be issued as each is completed.

3. Commanders will initiate their plans for this operation forthwith. The target date for this plan to go into effect will be any date from now on.

4. Operation 'ECLIPSE' is considered to be a continuation of present military operations. The exact conditions and situation that will exist at the time the operation becomes effective cannot be foretold. Subsequent changes in operations will require revision in 'ECLIPSE' planning to meet the new situation.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

1 Incl:
Outline Plan Operation 'ECLIPSE'

DISTRIBUTION:
"Special"
(see reverse)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP~~ SECRET
TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION to Outline Plan Operation 'ECLIPSE'.

2 - SHAEF
2 - CG, COMZONE ETOUSA
15 - CG, 12th Army Group
2 - CG, First TACAF (Prov)
~~1 - CG, SOLOC~~
40 - CG, Seventh Army
3 - CG, First French Army
1 - SHAEF Liaison
1 - CG, 6851st Hq Det, ALS
~~1 - Hq Commandant, 6th AG~~
1 - "A" Force
1 - "T" Force
1 - CIC Detachment
3 - SGS
~~2~~ 1 - G-1
4 - G-2
6 - G-3
4 - G-4
5 - G-5
2 - Signal
2 - Engineer
1 - PRO
1 - PWS
1 - Historian, 6th AG
1 - French Mission
1 - Liaison Section
1 - IX Air Force
19 - G-3 (Spares)
1 - AG Records

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

106

B-237 LFG/jwa

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

~~TOP SECRET~~
CG, 6th AG
Init: [illegible]
25 Feb 45

25 February 1945

AG 014/E C-O

SUBJECT: Security of Operation 'ECLIPSE'

TO : Commanding General, 12th Army Group, APO 655
Commanding General, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, APO 887
Commanding General, Continental Advance Section, APO 667
Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force(Prov), APO 374
Commanding General, IX Air Force, APO 696

1. Outline Plan, Operation 'ECLIPSE', this headquarters, dated 5 February 1945, is forwarded herewith for your information.

2. Attention is invited to SHAEF letter, AG 381 - 1 GCT - AGM, dated 7 February 1945. It is the understanding of this head-

~~TOP SECRET~~

PCO-444

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

quarters that under the provisions of paragraph 2 of said letter distribution or discussion of Operation 'ECLIPSE' below Corps or equivalent headquarters is not authorized. It is requested that this interpretation of the above restriction be observed in respect to Outline Plan, Operation 'ECLIPSE', 6th Army Group.

For the ARMY GROUP COMMANDER:

J. L. Tarr
J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Outline Plan,
Operation 'ECLIPSE'

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP~~ SECRET

106 file

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

~~TOP~~ SECRET
CG, 6TH AG
Init:
5 Feb 45

5 February 1945

OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'

1. Purpose:

To designate the objectives to be secured upon collapse or surrender of GERMANY and the responsibilities of major forces therefor.

2. General Information.

a. "Surrender" is defined as follows:

(1) When a German Government and/or German High Command formally signs the Instrument of Surrender.

OR

(2) When the major portion of the German forces opposing us has capitulated or been overpowered.

b. It is unlikely that a formal surrender will occur. In such case the Supreme Commander, AEF, will fix a date to be known as 'A' Day, when Operation 'ECLIPSE' will become effective. Many aspects of 'ECLIPSE' will apply to the operations in progress prior to 'A' Day.

c. Objectives of Operation 'ECLIPSE' are to effect the following:

(1) Primary disarmament and control of the German forces including paramilitary and police units to prevent renewal of hostilities.

(2) Enforcement of the terms of surrender or in the event of no surrender, the suppression of organized resistance.

(3) Establishment of law and order.

(4) Initiation of steps to complete the control and disarmament of German forces.

(5) Redeployment of Allied Forces into their respective National Zone in GERMANY.

d. This operation will be executed in two main phases in accordance with the priorities of the objectives. It is expected that the phases will overlap.

(1) Primary Phase - An advance by the Allied Forces, conducted at maximum speed consistent with security to secure important strategic areas deep inside GERMANY, and to extend the Allied air threat.

(2) Secondary Phase - The deployment of our forces to secure additional strategic areas; to establish firm control throughout the Supreme Commander, AEF's sphere of occupation in GERMANY; to carry out the disarmament and disposal of enemy forces in GERMANY; and to adjust the dispositions of national forces to coincide ulitmately with the national zones of occupation. (For National Zones of Occupation see Map D, Annex 1).

e. 12th Army Group will be responsible for final occupation of the United States Zone under military control of the Supreme Commander. During the secondary phase at a time to be designated by SHAEF, 12th Army Group will assume command of all forces under Headquarters 6th Army Group, and Headquarters 6th Army Group will be withdrawn from GERMANY.

f. AUSTRIA will be occupied on a tripartite basis - the US/British element being furnished by AFHQ. For planning purposes, it will be assumed that U.S. forces will occupy the GAU of TIROL, VORARLBERG and SALZBURG and RUSSIAN forces, the GAU of OBERDONAU.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATION 'ECLIPSE' (cont'd)

3. Allied Forces.

a. Assumptions.

That when German surrender or collapse occurs, Allied Forces will be disposed generally within present zones of action in prolongation of the present axis of advance.

b. 21st Army Group will operate on the North flank of the Allied Forces with the mission of seizing as the primary objective the KIEL-HAMBURG area and the secondary objective of the BREMAN, BREMERHAVEN, CUXHAVEN, WILHELMSHAVEN area and then relieving as rapidly as possible the U.S. forces deployed in the British Final Zone of Occupation.

c. 12th Army Group will operate on the left (North) of 6th Army Group with the following missions:

(1) During the Primary Phase.

(a) Seizing BERLIN or occupying the US/British sectors and open a L of C thereto.

(b) Occupying the RUHR and the SAAR.

(c) Occupying the LEIPZIG-DRESDEN area if not previously occupied by the RUSSIAN forces.

(2) During the Secondary Phase.

(a) Occupying the ports of BREMAN, BREMERHAVEN, CUXHAVEN, and WILHELMSHAVEN, if not already occupied by 21st Army Group.

(b) Occupying the areas HANOVER-BRUNSWICK, MUNSTER-DORTMUND, KASSEL, COLOGNE-KOBLENZ, FRANKFURT-MAINZ and the area MANNHEIM-KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART, if not occupied by 6th Army Group.

(c) Progressively withdrawing into the U.S. Zone of Occupation as other nationalities take over in their zones.

(d) Organize the U.S. Zone into Military Districts for the purpose of Administration and Military Government.

(e) Establish the U.S. Enclave at BREMEN and BREMERHAVEN.

d. First Tactical Air Force (Provisional)/Ninth Air Force will continue to support both the 6th Army Group and 12th Army Group throughout the operation and will be responsible for air disarmament throughout the zone of action of 6th Army Group. First Tactical Air Force will take over promptly from the Armies and/or Communications Zone all German Air Force material, installations and personnel including AA. The Air Force will provide the necessary liaison officers and staff experts to assist and advise Ground Force Commanders in air disarmament matters and to maintain continuity of effort in air disarmament.

e. The Communications Zone will continue to be responsible for administrative support of 6th Army Group and 12th Army Group throughout the operation but will have no area responsibility in GERMANY. Responsibility for all area control, security and Military Government will rest with the 6th Army Group and be exercised through the tactical chain of command by Armies and Military District Headquarters. L of C troops under Communications Zone will not normally be required for occupational duties dealing directly with the GERMANS. The relationship of L of C troops to the Military District Headquarters will be generally similar to that of Communications Zone troops serving forward of an Army rear boundary to the Army Commander. In the interest of mutual advantage, Armies, Military Districts and Communications Zone will coordinate to the fullest degree in selection and allocation of facilities for operating the L of C. Communications Zone will be responsible for secondary disarmament of GERMANY and service forces under Communications Zone will assume responsibility for dumps, factories, arsenals, warehouses, etc., and accomplish the necessary documentation storage and disposal of enemy war material.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATION 'ECLIPSE' (cont'd)

f. A Naval Task Force will support both 6th and 12th Army Groups and will accomplish the naval disarmament necessary in the Zone of Operations. Naval Forces will provide the necessary liaison officers and staff experts to assist and advise Ground Force Commanders in naval disarmament matters and maintain continuity of effort in naval disarmament.

4. Missions.

6th Army Group, supported by First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) will:

a. Primary Phase.

(1) Occupy NURNBERG-REGENSBURG area and MUNICH area.

(2) Effect primary disarmament and masking of enemy forces in contact and and astride or flanking axis of advance. Diversion of forces for security to be kept to a minimum.

(3) Effect primary disarmament of German Air Forces astride axis of advance or located in NURNBERG-REGENSBURG and MUNICH areas.

(4) Effect initial safeguarding of German war material.

(5) Maintain a tactical air threat to German forces encountered.

(6) Be prepared to take offensive action against sporadic resistance.

(7) Provide for relief and evacuation of Allied PW's and displaced persons.

(8) Institute Military Government in area occupied.

(9) Provide escorts for special parties ordered by the Supreme Commander, AEF, to initiate:

(a) Intelligence activities, including seizure of documents, secret processes and installations and prescribed persons.

(b) Control of information centers, such as radio stations, newspapers, etc.

(c) Seizure of important German equipment required early for use in other theaters.

(d) Control of German government and naval, military and air organizations.

(e) Control of transportation, postal and tele-communications.

(10) Initiate elimination of the National Socialist Party and all its affiliations and the prevention of their rebirth in any form. The detection and arrest of persons inimical to Allied interests and seizure of intelligence objectives.

b. Secondary Phase.

Continue operations instituted in primary phase and in addition:

(1) Occupy and seize firm control of MANNHEIM-KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART area if not already occupied.

(2) Establish complete control throughout operational area to include German frontier. Special attention will be given to sealing SWISS frontier as early as possible to prevent escape of war criminals.

(3) Disarm and dispose of all German forces in operational area.

(4) Establish Military Government throughout operational area on basis of Military Districts.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

(5) Complete occupation of BAVARIA and develop its organization as a Military District.

(6) Initiate occupation, and organization of Military Government of the states of WURTTEMBERG and BADEN until relieved by forces of 12th Army Group.

(7) Establish contact with RUSSIAN forces and with forces under AFHQ and then conform to the inter-zonal boundary with RUSSIA.

(8) Accept and control German personnel from outside GERMANY, if this is initiated.

(9) Furnish French forces as ordered by SHAEF.

5. Organization.

a. During initial phases of 'ECLIPSE' organization of forces and command channels will be those that are previously in effect.

b. During subsequent phases:

(1) For areas, sectors and organization of portions of GERMANY, assigned to 6th Army Group, see Annex 1, Maps A,B,C, and D.

(2) Troop List will be prepared at a later date.

(3) 12th Army Group will relieve 6th Army Group. Command and control channels during final phase of 'ECLIPSE' will be designated by 12th Army Group.

c. Additional Personnel.

Specialist personnel for post-hostilities functions are being trained under the supervision of ETOUSA. This personnel is divided into three categories, as follows:

(1) Personnel to be formed into Operational Teams similar to G-5 Military Government Teams.

These teams are being trained for specific localities. It is contemplated that once a team is in its specific locality, it will remain there, passing from the control of one commander to another, until it comes under control of the final District Commander or is relieved by personnel of another nationality. These teams are being trained for duties in connection with evacuation of prisoners of war, disbandment of the German Army, control of refugees and displaced persons, technical intelligence, censorship, counter-intelligence, border control, disarmament, and disposal of enemy war material. It is contemplated that these teams will be attached to Armies as their targets are about to be uncovered. Coordination will be effected through the various staff sections responsible for their activities.

(2) Personnel to be available as augmentation to existing staffs for the supervision and planning of post-hostilities activities.

Personnel for each general and special staff section having special post-hostilities functions, is at present being trained. This personnel will be available to Armies for the reinforcement of Army, Corps, and Division Staffs as soon as it completes its training. Until called forward, this personnel is available to the Armies to which it will eventually be assigned to conduct such studies and to initiate such planning with regard to post-hostilities matters as may be desired. T/O's may be exceeded. In order that adequate numbers of this type of personnel may be trained, Armies should submit their requirements for this type of personnel as early as possible.

(3) Personnel for Static Liaison Staffs.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

There will be set up for each Military District in the U.S. Zone, a small static liaison staff consisting probably of only one or two officers for each general and special staff section. This staff will be especially trained for the Military District to which assigned. It will be introduced as part of the staff of the Army first overrunning the District Headquarters; and will then remain at the District Headquarters, becoming successively part of the staff of each District Commander until it is finally absorbed into the staff of the Commander assuming final responsibility for the district. The purpose of this small liaison staff is to furnish to each successive District Commander detailed information and advice concerning the District, to assist in maintaining continuity of policy in District matters, to act as custodian of all records and documents pertaining to the District until they can be handed over to the final District Commander.

6. Operations.

a. Seventh Army.

(1) Occupy the NURNBERG-REGENSBERG area and the MUNICH area as rapidly as possible and protect L of C thereto. Reinforcement of a Corps of 3 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armored Division will be made available by Third Army to assist in seizing and occupying the NURNBERG-REGENSBERG area.

(2) After occupation of above areas, be prepared to advance to gain contact with RUSSIAN forces and Allied forces from ITALY.

(3) Occupy the area MANNHEIM-HEILBRONN-BRUCHSAL if not already occupied.

(4) Extend control to the German frontiers.

(5) Complete occupation of BAVARIA and develop its organization as a Military District.

(6) Prepare to move certain units to be designated later to continental processing centers for redeployment.

b. First French Army.

(1) Initially occupy the KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART-BRUCHSAL area and protect the Seventh Army L of C from the southeast.

(2) Seal the GERMAN - SWISS frontier.

(3) Occupy the east bank of the RHINE South of KARLSRUHE. Prepare to furnish two (2) divisions for occupational duty under 21st Army Group and two (2) more divisions under 12th Army Group in the state of BADEN.

(4) Initiate occupation, and organization of Military Government of the states of WURTTEMBERG and BADEN until relieved by forces of 12th Army Group.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEXES		TO BE PREPARED BY
No. 1	Operations Maps	G-3
No. 2	Intelligence and Counter-intelligence	G-2
No. 3	Military Government (Including Refugees and Displaced Persons)	G-5
No. 4	Administration and Disarmament	G-4
No. 5	Allied Prisoners of War Control and Disbandment of German Armed Forces. Control of Political Internees and War Criminals	G-1
No. 6	Signal Communication	CSO
No. 7	Engineer Plan	Engr
No. 8	Publicity and Psychological Warfare	PWS
No. 9	Redeployment	G-1
No.10	Troop List	G-3

ADDITIONAL ANNEXES WILL BE ISSUED AS NEEDED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 'A'

REFERENCES

a. SHAEF - Operation 'ECLIPSE' - Appreciation and Outline Plan, SHAEF (44) 34, dated 10 November 1944.

b. SHAEF - 'ECLIPSE' Memoranda:

No. 1. Instrument of Surrender: Orders to German Military Authorities to supplement instrument: sanctions in event of delinquency.

No. 4. Air lift.

No. 6. Signal Communications and RADAR.

No. 7. Intelligence Occupational Requirements and Plan.

No. 8. Evacuation of Prisoners of War in Greater GERMANY.

No. 9. Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces and short term disposal of surrendered war material.

No.10. Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces.

No.11. Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces and short term disposal of surrendered Naval war material.

No.13. Digest of Military Government considerations for GERMANY.

No.14. Control of Displaced Persons.

No.15. Psychological Warfare Requirements and Plan.

No.16. Public Relations Considerations and Plan.

No.17. Disbandment of the German Forces.

No.18. War Criminals and Security Suspects.

c. Handbook Military Occupation of GERMANY

d. Unit Commanders Handbook, GERMANY.

e. Handbook for Military Government in GERMANY.

f. 12th Army Group Outline Plan Operation 'ECLIPSE'.

- -

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 'A'

REFERENCES

a. Handbook, Military Occupation of GERMANY

b. Unit Commanders Handbook, GERMANY

c. Handbook for Military Government in GERMANY

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX NO. 1

OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'

HQ 6TH ARMY GROUP

5 FEBRUARY 1945

This ANNEX consists of 5 Operations Maps Designated as Maps A, B, C, D and E.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Annex #1 to Inclosure #1, Ltr
Hq 6th Army Group, file AG 014/E C-O,
dtd 5 Feb 45, sub: "Operation 'ECLIPSE'".

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MAP "A" ANNEX NO 1

OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'
HQ. 6TH ARMY GROUP. 5 FEBRUARY 1945

.125/FEB 45/6AG 6042

PRIMARY PHASE

ADVANCE TO SEIZE IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AREAS.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES .....

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ JAN 45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



MAP "B" ANNEX NO 1

OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'

HQ. 6TH ARMY GROUP. 5 FEBRUARY 1945

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES . . . . .

PRIMARY PHASE

ADVANCE TO SEIZE IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AREAS, CONTINUED.

SECONDARY OBJECTIVES . . . . .

.125/FEB 45/6AG 6043

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC. 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ JAN 45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



MAP "C" ANNEX NO 1
OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'
HQ. 6TH ARMY GROUP. 5 FEBRUARY 1945

MILITARY DISTRICT BOUNDARY.....

.125/FEB 45/6AG 6044

SECONDARY PHASE

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ JAN 45

WITHDRAWAL & REDISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS

FIRST FRENCH ARMY WILL WITHDRAW INTO FRANCE AS IT IS RELIEVED BY THIRD ARMY. TWO FRENCH DIVISIONS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THIRD ARMY FOR THE FINAL OCCUPATION OF BADEN.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



MAP "D" ANNEX NO 1

OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'

HQ. 6TH ARMY GROUP 5 FEBRUARY 1945

INTERNATIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY . . . .

.125/FEB 45/6AG 6045

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ JAN 45

ORGANIZATION OF U.S. ZONE INTO MILITARY DISTRICTS.

BRITISH FORCES WILL RELIEVE NINTH AND FIFTEENTH ARMIES.

MILITARY DISTRICT BOUNDARY . . .

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ JAN 45

MAP "E" ANNEX NO 1

OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION 'ECLIPSE'

HQ. 6TH ARMY GROUP 5 FEBRUARY 1945

ORGANIZATION FOR FINAL OCCUPATION ESTIMATED 15 MONTHS AFTER "A" DAY.

INTERNATIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY . . . .

MILITARY DISTRICT BOUNDARY . . .

.125/FEB 45/6AG 6046

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Copy No: 26

~~TOP~~ - SECRET

E-F-O

Reg No. 132

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff A-3

DOWNGRADED BY AUTHORITY
WAR DEPT. JCS Control
Agency dtd 21 May 45 & Wdtcy
Date NOV 17 1944
Capt USAF

: ~~TOP~~ - SECRET :
: Auth: CG 1 TAC AF:
: Date: 14 March 45:
: Init: REF :
: R. E. F. :

A.P.O. 374, U.S. Army
14 March 1945.

SUBJECT: General Plan for Tactical Air Cooperation with Sixth Army Group for Operation ECLIPSE.

TO : Commanding Generals:

XII Tactical Air Command, A.P.O. 374, U.S. Army,
42nd Medium Bombardment Wing, A.P.O. 374, U.S. Army,
First French Air Corps.

1. PURPOSE:

To designate the tactical missions and probable deployment of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) upon collapse or surrender of Germany.

2. GENERAL INFORMATION:

Operation ECLIPSE will become effective upon an announcement of a date to be known as "A" Day. "A" Day is defined as follows:

a. When the German Government and/or the German High Command formally signs an instrument of surrender,

OR

b. When the major portion of the German Forces opposing us has capitulated or has been overpowered.

3. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. It is assumed that the Sixth Army Group on "A" Day will be deployed generally along the RHINE between MAINZ and the SWISS Border.

~~TOP~~ - SECRET

Copy "B"
SECRET
TS 836B
#9482

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Ltr., Hq. 1st TAC AF, subj; "Gen'l Plan for Tactical Air Cooperation with Sixth Army Grp., for Opns., "ECLIPSE", cont'd:

b. That the Sixth Army Group will promptly secure the STUTTGART area and rapidly penetrate to NURENBURG, and thence to MUNICH.

4. MISSIONS:

The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) to continue to furnish air cooperation to the Sixth Army Group in its advance and occupation of assigned areas by maintaining a tactical air threat to the German Forces in contact with, flanking, or astride the axis of advance; conducting frequent air reconnaissance and air demonstration flights over Allied Prisoner of War Camps in the area of operations; and being prepared for offensive action against possible sporadic resistance.

a. Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command will:

(1) Continue to provide air effort and cooperation to the 7th Army in its advance and occupancy of the NURENBURG - REGENSBURG area and the MUNICH area.

(2) Be prepared for forward displacement of units to cover the advance of the 7th Army and the final deployment of the entire Command in the above areas.

(3) Be prepared to cooperate with the 7th Army in the occupation of BAVARIA or other assigned areas.

b. Commanding General, First French Air Corps will:

(1) Continue to provide air effort and cooperation to the First French Army in its advance and occupation of enemy territory.

(2) Be prepared for forward displacement of units to cover the advance of the First French Army and the final deployment of the entire Command in the Occupational area.

c. Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing will:

(1) Execute air missions as outlined in paragraph 4., above, covering the advance and occupation of the assigned areas by elements of the Sixth Army Group.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Be prepared to move the Wing, including French Air Force units under its operational control, to the KARLSRUHE - STUTTGART - BRUCHSAL area.

(3) Be prepared to furnish air effort to elements of the Sixth Army Group in their advance and occupation of enemy territory.

By command of Major General WEBSTER:

NED SCHRAMM,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Commanding General,
For Operations.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't., C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Special)

	Copies No:
CG, XII Tactical Air Command -	1-10
CG, 1 French Air Corps -	11-15
CG, 42nd Medium Bomb. Wing -	16-23
CG, USSTAF -	24-25
SHAEF (FWD) -	26-27
CG, Ninth Air Force -	28-29
CG, 6th Army Group -	30-33
1st TAC AF (Staff) -	34-40

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

:S-E-C-R-E-T:
:Initials MRH:
:28 March 1945:

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

APO 757 (Main)
28 March 1945

AG 014.1-1 (Germany) GE-AGM

SUBJECT: French Participation in Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender

TO : Headquarters, 21 Army Group
Commanding General, 6th Army Group, APO 23, U.S. Army
Commanding General, 12th Army Group, APO 655, U.S. Army

Attached for your information is a copy of letter, this headquarters, subject as above, dated 11 January 1945.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

H. H. NEWMAN
Colonel, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl:
As stated.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Ltr, Supreme Hq, AEF AG 014.1-1 (Germany) GE-AGM, subject "Directive for Military Government of GERMANY Prior to Defeat or Surrender", dated 9 November 1944.

DATE RECEIVED
REC'D
MADE
INTELL

SECRET

L-4053
PL-1276

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY

SECRET

11 January, 1945

SUBJECT: French Participation in Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army Group.

1. This directive is supplementary to SHAEF Directive AG 014.1-1 (Germany) CE-ACM, 9 November 1944 on Military Government of GERMANY prior to defeat or surrender.

2. The Commanding General, First French Army, will, under your command, be responsible for Military Government in territories of GERMANY occupied by the First French Army in the course of military operations and within his area of operational responsibility. Such Military Government operations will be carried out in conformity with the Directive of 9 Nov 44 as hereby supplemented and modified, and with Military Government instructions of general application issued by Supreme Headquarters.

3. In order to promote uniformity with respect to Military Government operation under your command, French personnel will be attached to the G-5 Staff at Sixth Army Group under the AC of S, G-5, in such numbers, ranks, and with such assignments and degree of integration as you may determine to be necessary and appropriate, and in coordination with appropriate French authorities.

4. You will provide US officers to be attached to HQ, First French Army and subordinate echelons as you may deem necessary, to assist the Commanders in the interpretation and execution of policies of Supreme Headquarters as transmitted by you.

5. Military Government operations in the field, in the area of responsibility of CG, First French Army, will be carried out by French personnel to the extent available. This personnel will be supplemented by US personnel to the extent necessary to ensure continuity of Military Government operations when the area in question ceases to be the area of operations of the First French Army. If French and US personnel are operating in a common German area of administration, the senior officer of the nationality of the responsible Army Commander shall normally be deemed the senior officer for purposes of dealing with the civil authorities.

6. A direct channel of communications is authorized with respect to matters of French personnel and internal administration between the Commanding General of the Mission Militaire aux Affaires Allemandes of the Etat-Major General de la Defense Nationale (M.M.F.A.), and such French Units as he may determine to be appropriate.

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPY

SECRET

7. Except as stated in paragraph 6 hereof, communications from French Staffs and Units to Commanding General, Mission Militaire aux Affaires Allemandes, will be made to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, through the normal command and technical channels, and from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Mission Militaire aux Affaires Allemandes. Communications from the Mission Militaire aux Affaires Allemandes will similarly be made to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and thence through normal command and technical channels.

8. In areas of GERMANY occupied by forces under command of Commanding General, First French Army, proclamations, laws and ordinances, as well as other official documents now or hereafter provided to be in English, may be in French as well as in English in accordance with detailed instructions. The Military Government Gazette - GERMANY, shall be published in French as well as in English in such areas.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652



DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
12TH ARMY GROUP

(FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT)

VOLUME I
SUMMARY

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

370.2 (AG) 31 July 1945

SUBJECT: Final After Action Report.
THRU : Commanding General, US Forces European Theater, APO 887.
TO : The Adjutant General.

1. In order that a final after action report might be prepared and published for Headquarters 12th Army Group upon its disbandment, each staff section has submitted a report of activities covering the period from activation as Headquarters First US Army Group on 19 October 1943 through 14 Juli 1944, when this headquarters became Headquarters 12th Army Group, to date of disbandment, 31 July 1945.

2. This report has been prepared in fourteen volumes, as follows:

Volume I — Basic report (a summary of the activities of the headquarters from date of activation to date of disbandment).
Volume II — G-1
Volume III — G-2, Parts I through IV
Volume IV — G-2, Parts V through VII
Volume V — G-3
Volume VI — G-4
Volume VII — G-5
Volume VIII — AG
Volume IX — Hq Comdt, Sp Trs
Volume X — Chap, Fin, IG, JA, PM, Sp Sv
Volume XI — AAA, Armd, Arty, Sig, CWS
Volume XII — Engr, Ord, QM, Trans
Volume XIII — Med
Volume XIV — P & PW

3. This report is classified as restricted.

FOR THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEFS OF STAFF SECTIONS

1 August 1944		8 May 1945
Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley	Commanding	Gen Omar N. Bradley
Maj Gen Leven C. Allen	Chief of Staff	Maj Gen Leven C. Allen
Brig Gen Robert W. Hasbrouck	D/Chief of Staff	Brig Gen Henry B. Lewis
Lt Col Eldon L. Bailey	Sec Gen Staff	Col Eldon L. Bailey
Col Joseph J. O'Hare	G-1	Brig Gen Joseph J. O'Hare
Brig Gen Edwin L. Sibert	G-2	Brig Gen Edwin L. Sibert
Brig Gen A. Franklin Kibler	G-3	Brig Gen A. Franklin Kibler
Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses	G-4	Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses
Col Cornelius E. Ryan	G-5	Brig Gen Cornelius E. Ryan
Brig Gen Henry B. Lewis	Adjutant General	Col Charles R. Landon
Brig Gen John H. Hinds	Artillery Officer	Col Thomas B. Hedekin
Col Edwin K. Wright	Armored	Col Edwin K. Wright
	Chaplain	Lt Col Morgan J. O'Brien
Col John C. MacArthur	Chemical	Col Patrick F. Powers
Col Patrick H. Timothy	Engineer	Brig Gen Patrick H. Timothy
Lt Col Paul G. Hommeyer	Finance	Maj Eugene R. Melton
Col Harry J. Karakas	Headquarters Comdt	Col Harry J. Karakas
Lt Col Walter B. Cramer	Inspector General	Col Frank G. Ringland
Col Claude B. Mickelwait	Judge Advocate	Col Claude B. Mickelwait
Col Harold A. Nisley	Ordnance	Brig Gen Harold A. Nisley
Col Clifford R. Powell	P & PW	Col Francis J. Fitzgerald
Col Claud E. Stadtman	Provost Marshal	Col Claud E. Stadtman
Col James W. Younger	Quartermaster	Brig Gen James W. Younger
Col Garland C. Black	Signal	Brig Gen Garland C. Black
Lt Col Francis E. Conder	Special Service	Col Thomas M. Crawford
Col Alvin L. Gorby	Surgeon	Col Alwin L. Gorby
Col Calvin L. Whittle	Transportation	Col Calvin L. Whittle
Brig Gen Charles R. Doran	Commanding General, Special Troops	Brig Gen Charles R. Doran

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INTRODUCTION

1. ORIGINS.

a. Operation "Overlord" — the plan for the invasion of France and the defeat of Germany in the West — as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain at Quebec in the summer of 1943, contemplated large American forces sufficiently predominating within the Allied expeditionary force to bring about the surrender of the German armed forces. After successful completion of the first phase of the invasion through Normandy, in which only one American army was to participate, the newly arriving United States armies were to to be placed under a single American commander and headquarters, whose mission it would be to conduct field operations in a designated geographical sphere under direct command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Such a headquarters was activated in October 1943 and named First US Army Group. Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley was assigned to command the Army Group, in addition to commanding the First US Army.

b. Although organization of the Army Group headquarters was of concern to the War Department, considerable interest in the matter was displayed also by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), which hed in mind a General Headquarters (CHQ), patterned after the GHQ which had been activated by the War Department in the United States in 1940.

c. As conceived by ETOUSA, the GHQ was to have been vested with all-inclusive administrative functions normally carried out by a Theater Headquarters as well as over-all operational functions of a senior field headquarters conducting large-scale combat operations and logistics.

d. Final instructions on the question of an army group headquarters — in contradistinction to a GHQ — was received at ETOUSA in September. Writing to the Theater Commander the US Army Chief of Staff directed that an Army Group headquarters, devoted to planning for and commanding in the field a number of American armies, be organized in the United Kingdom. To command the American Army Group (and the First US Army), the Chief of Staff named Lt Gen O. N. Bradley.*

* From the unpublished History of 12th Army Group (Vol I), by Captain Albert Norman.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. COMMAND.

a. Headquarters First US Army Group (FUSAG) was activated on 19 October 1943, with station at London, England, by General Order 74, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 16 October 1943. On the day of its activation, Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley assumed command of the new headquarters pursuant to General Order 1, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 19 October 1943.

b. On 14 July 1944, Headquarters 12th Army Group was activated by General Order 73, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 14 July 1944, and had transferred to it all units and personnel then assigned and attached to First US Army Group, "except those specifically excepted." On the same day, General Bradley assumed command of 12th Army Group. The quoted phrase was inserted in the General Order as a part of the "Overlord" cover plan, to create in the mind of the German High Command the impression that the First US Army Group — which nominally remained in existence under a new commander — was being used to build up Allied forces in the United Kingdom for a main assault landing on the Pas-de-Calais coast of France. First US Army Group continued in existence — on paper only — until 18 October 1944, when it was deactivated by General Order 104, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 18 October 1944, after the cover plan had proved a success.*

c. Pursuant to authority contained in a letter from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, dated 25 July 1944, Headquarters 12th Army Group published General Order No. 3, dated 1 August 1944, assigning, effective that date, the First and Third US Armies to 12th Army Group. On the same day, General Bradley relinquished command of the First US Army and assumed operational command of 12th Army Group. The Army Group, however, remained under the over-all operational control of Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, who was then responsible for all ground force operations in Northern France.

d. On 1 September 1944, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force became operational, assuming direct command of all field operations. 12th Army Group was relieved of responsibility to 21 Army Group and made responsible direct to the Supreme Commander.

* op. cit.

e. Headquarters 12th Army Group ceased to exist on 1 August 1945, pursuant to General Order 177, Headquarters United States Forces European Theater (USFET), dated 1 August 1945.

f. A detailed account of operations of the headquarters, problems encountered and means developed for their solution, is contained in a series of volumes (numbered II through XIV) under the headings of the several General and Special Staff Sections.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

I. G-1 SECTION*

1. GENERAL

a. Brigadier General James E. Wharton was assigned Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on 22 October 1943. Of immediate concern was the necessity for establishing the personnel requirements to permit the Headquarters and Headquarters Special Troops to function efficiently, both in their planning and in their operational missions. In addition, there were the G-1 planning responsibilities for the administrative support of two operations then under consideration: "OVERLORD" — the plan for the invasion of the Continent of Europe, and "RANKIN," Case "C" — the plan for operations in the event of a pre-invasion German collapse.

b. To meet these problems most effectively and to expedite the handling of routine G-1 matters, General Wharton organized G-1 Section personnel into branches and delegated specific responsibilities to each. The Personnel Branch made early and continuing studies of the personnel needs of the various staff sections, and based on results of those studies alimotments of grades and ratings were procured from Theater Headquarters and qualified personnel secured.

c. G-1 was charged with drafting and coordinating plans on all G-1 matters included in the Army Group mission. To carry out this planning responsibility, the Replacement and Prisoner of War Branch formulated personnel reinforcement plans for the support of operations. Casualty estimates were prepared in coordination with the Army Group Surgeon and an estimate of reinforcement needs of the ground forces from D-Day to D + 209 was computed and used by Theater Headquarters as a primary basis for setting up of a reinforcement flow from the United States. The personnel shipping list, required daily to maintain an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements to the continent from D + 15 to D + 89, was submitted to the G-3 Section for inclusion in the shipping priority tables. Procedures were worked out for the close support of each corps and army by reinforcement installations. In addition, plans for the collection, the handling and the evacuation of prisoners of war were formulated in conjunction with the Provost Marshal. The Miscellaneous Branch prepared plans for all other G-1 matters, chiefly for such matters as burial and graves registration, postal services, special service activities, and awards and decorations. A continuing study of the troop list was made to insure that an adequate and timely flow of such G-1 service units as Special Service Companies, Finance Disbursing Sections, Army Postal Units, Graves Registration Companies, Military Police Units and American Red Cross clubmobile groups was maintained.

d. Upon the Plans Branch devolved the responsibility of editing these G-1 plans and of bringing them into harmony with the assault phase plan of First US Army, then operationally under Headquarters 21 Army Group. The final plans were published on 19 April 1944, as part of the Joint Administrative Plan — United States Forces, Operation "OVERLORD," which served as the administrative guide to the armies comprising the Army Group.

e. On 2 May, Colonel George A. Miller was announced Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, during the temporary absence of Brigadier General Wharton. Shortly thereafter, G-1 representatives formed part of the US Administrative Staff at 21 Army Group. This staff was headed by Brigadier General Raymond G. Moses, the Army Group Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Its mission was to coordinate all plans for the American forces with those of the British forces for the period during which American forces would be under the command of 21 Army Group.

f. Immediately following D-Day, the G-1 increment at 21 Army Group (Main) began compiling the daily report of the previous day's casualties, strengths, prisoner of war captures and reinforcements received. While American forces were under British control, this information was submitted as part of the 21 Army Group daily situation report.

g. On 14 July, Brigadier General (then Colonel) J. J. O'Hare was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Headquarters 12th Army Group. To cope more effectively with the operational problems then confronting G-1, a general reorganization of branch responsibilities was inaugurated. This new delegation of branch responsibilities remained relatively stable until the dissolution of the headquarters.

2. OPERATIONS BRANCH

a. The coordination of all necessary revisions of plans and the preparation of the G-1 portion of administrative orders and instructions were carried out by the Operations Branch. All required reports on G-1 matters were also prepared, the most important being the G-1 Daily Summary, which provided the fastest information available to the Army Group Commander on strengths, casualties, prisoner-of-war captures and reinforcements of all armies, corps and divisions under his command. In addition, the G-1 administrative map, showing locations of all major headquarters and installations of G-1 interest, was maintained. All internal matters of section administration were also handled by this branch.

* For detailed study see Volume II

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. The Operations Branch formulated and supervised the execution of a policy for the reservation of accommodations in army areas for all installations not under army commanders' control.

3. MORALE BRANCH.

a. The primary function of the Morale Branch was processing of recommendations for awards that required action by higher headquarters and handling of necessary details in conjunction with the offer of foreign awards and decorations to members of the Army Group. In order to establish a uniform guide for making awards for gallantry in action and meritorious service, a quota system was devised, based on the number of combat days of a unit the size of an infantry division.

b. Secondary only to the processing of recommendations for awards and decorations was the supervision and coordination of the establishment of rest camps in the army areas, and the granting of leaves, furloughs and passes to recreational areas and leave centers located in the Communications Zone. The first leave center to be placed in operation was Paris, in October 1944. Soon after that, centers wers opened in the United Kingdom, Brussels and on the French Riviera.

c. The assignment of American Red Cross clubmobile groups was made by this branch in conjunction with the Regional Executive, American Red Cross. Establishment of Red Cross Clubs and "Donut Dugouts" in the army areas was planned so that maximum benefit would be obtained from available resources. American Red Cross field directors and hospital workers operated under supervision of the units to which they were attached.

d. Post exchange, postal service, special service and graves registration matters were normally handled directly between Commanding Generals of armies and the Commanding General, Communications Zone, in accordance with standing operating procedures. This headquarters maintained a supervisory interest only. The only exception to this rule was the allotment of special service companies to the armies, allocation of which was controlled by this headquarters.

4. PERSONNEL BRANCH.

a. The Personnel Branch made a continual study of personnel requirements for T/O and non-T/O organizations within the command and aided in the procurement of authorized augmentations to headquarters of armies, corps and

divisions. A survey of available qualified personnel as "spare" regimental and battalion commanders was carried out and the personnel procured.

b. Normally, the Personnel Branch was concerned only with reclassification cases involving colonels. Such officers were interviewed at this headquarters and were reassigned without formal reclassification when the facts in the case warranted it.

c. Promotions to and within general officer grades were processed once each month. Recommendations for promotion to the grade of colonel were processed as received. Promotions below the grade of colonel were handled by armies, except for personnel of this headquarters and units directly under its control.

d. Armies were authorized to take final action on battlefield appointments to the grade of second lieutenant and were encouraged to take full advantage of this authority to commission deserving men in combat units. Authority for direct appointment of warrant officers was initially delegated to armies, but this authority was withdrawn by the Theater Commander in August 1944, and appointments to Warrant Officer, Junior Grade, were suspended. After lifting this suspension, authority for final action on such appointments was retained at Theater Headquarters.

5. REINFORCEMENTS BRANCH.

a. After the invasion of Normandy, estimates of battle reinforcement requirements for six months in advance, based on actual experience loss rates, and a ground force troop build-up, were submitted monthly to Theater Headquarters by the Reinforcements Branch. The desired percentage composition, by arm and service, of the reinforcements required was also submitted to Theater Headquarters for use as a basis for stocking reinforcement depots.

b. Priorities by which the Ground Force Reinforcement Command would furnish reinforcements to the major ground force commands were normally published approximately twice a month. These allocations were based on the factors of current personnel shortages, reinforcement stockage in army depots, estimated flow of hospital returnees to each army and future tactical requirements. During the latter part of August, the flow of hospital returnees was considerably greater than the units could absorb. Special priorities were established for the return of this personnel, based on length of service with their respective organizations.

c. A critical shortage of infantry reinforcements developed during November, and by 15 December this shortage of infantry riflemen amounted to 17,581.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Brigadier General O'Hare and the Chief of the Reinforcements Branch comprised members of a group that went to the War Department in December to point out the seriousness of the situation. As a result of the Washington conference, the supply of infantry reinforcements was expedited and increased in January 1945 and in subsequent months. The infantry conversion training program for general assignment of Communications Zone and Air Force personnel, established in January 1945 by Theater Headquarters, also did much to alleviate the infantry shortage.

d. In November 1944, Theater Headquarters, on Army Group recommendation, established the policy whereby units actually engaged in combat could requisition reinforcements, based on estimated losses, 48 hours in advance. This policy cut down the time lag in supplying the reinforcements.

e. Quotas for the Theater Infantry Officer Candidate School and other infantry training schools, established in January, were received and allotted to the armies.

f. During March, thirty-three provisionally organized rifle platoons, composed of colored enlisted personnel who had been retrained as infantry riflemen, were received. These platoons were assigned initially on the basis of one platoon per rifle company and not more than three platoons per division.

g. In order to give the front line combat soldier every consideration in the furlough rotation program to the United States, a policy was established in March whereby over 90% of the personnel returning to the Zone of the Interior monthly for 45 days' rest, relaxation and recuperation were drawn from lettered companies of infantry units or from other personnel who were habitually in close contact with the enemy.

h. Quotas for the return of personnel to the Zone of the Interior, under provisions of War Department Readjustment Regulations 1-2, were received from Theater Headquarters and were allocated to subordinate headquarters on the basis of the percentage of personnel having adjusted service rating scores of 85 and above.

i. An important continuing function of the Reinforcements Branch was the coordination of reinforcement procedures between the armies, Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command, and Theater Headquarters. This coordination became more vital when the system of command and control of reinforcement depots and forward battalions reverted from the armies to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. Deficiencies noted in the established reinforcement procedures were made the subject of corrective recommendations.

6. MISCELLANEOUS BRANCH

a. G-1 miscellaneous matters were reviewed in the light of operational needs, brought up to date, and consolidated for inclusion in 12th Army Group's Administrative Standing Operating Procedure (ADSOP). Plans, policies and directives for investigating reported violations of the Geneva Conventions and the apprehension, interrogation and detention of war criminals were initiated and promulgated.

b. Implementation of nonfraternization policies, directed by SHAEF, included distribution of SHAEF policy down to include companies; the publication of the booklet "Special Orders for German-American Relations," and the establishment of a plan for orienting all troops through agencies available to the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section under G-1 supervision.

c. From December 1944 through most of May 1945 matters pertaining to the recovery, maintenance and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war were handled.

d. Considerable attention was given to various reports of looting, pillaging and wanton destruction by Allied troops in liberated countries. Command letters were disseminated to all subordinate headquarters.

e. G-1 "ECLIPSE" planning, setting forth administrative policies to be effective upon the surrender of Germany, were initiated and carried through by the Miscellaneous Branch, including reviews of other staff plans, publication of a series of drafts of the G-1 Annex to the "ECLIPSE" Plan, and discussions with representatives of SHAEF and of US Group Control Council. As background for this planning, a Miscellaneous Branch officer attended a special disarmament school in London.

f. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, the disbandment of German disarmed forces was begun. Initially, only priority occupational categories were discharged, i. e., agricultural workers, miners, transportation workers and other key personnel. Later, general disbandment was authorized. Arrangements were made with the Russians for repatriating their prisoners of war; with Allied Forces Headquarters (which conducted operations in Italy) for sending 100,000 German soldiers from Italy to Germany; with SHAEF for sending 130,000 German soldiers from Norway to Germany; with Communications Zone for sending 60,000 hospitalized German soldiers from France to hospitals in Germany; and with 21 Army Group for initiating the inter-zone transfer of German soldiers between the United States and British zones. By the end of July 1945 it was estimated that disbandment of the German Army in the United States Zone would be approximately 75 per cent completed.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

II. G-2 SECTION*

1. Under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, the Section handled all intelligence matters for the armies and the Army Group during both the planning and operations phases. G-2 Section was divided into the following branches: —

a. Administration Branch. This branch handled all matters pertaining to personnel assigned or on duty with the Section.

b. Intelligence Branch. It briefed the General and Special staffs on all matters pertaining to enemy activity. The air portion of the Branch supplied data on the German Air Force and controlled photo cover. It also controlled photo cover before D-Day, in addition to making terrain studies concerning those portions of the beaches that were later to be utilized for operations. It prepared publications concerning G-2 activity and was in general the agency that evaluated reports concerning enemy activity. It also collected and disseminated all intelligence matter to higher and subordinate commands.

c. Counter-Intelligence Branch. During the preparation phase of the work on the invasion this branch was responsible for the security of the headquarters as well as for the preparation of lists of enemy agents who were known to be in areas to become operational. A plan was also set up whereby all CIC agencies and units in the Army Group would be controlled by the Branch. It initiated action and coordinated this action with Allied counterespionage units in suppressing enemy intelligence activity before D-Day and during the entire operational period.

d. Foreign Liaison Branch. This branch carried on liaison with various Allied units and headquarters actively engaged in preparing for the invasion. It was later responsible for all members of foreign units attached to American combat formations within the Army Group.

2. The above four units formed the G-2 Section before D-Day. The work of each was devoted primarily to making plans and preparations for the time when the Army Group would become operational. When the headquarters was split in three echelons, the G-2 Section, with the exception of a small part of the Administrative Branch, was located at the Tactical Headquarters. The functions of the various branches became diversified from what they had originally been, and this resulted in numerous changes in order to cope with current and future situations.

* For detailed study see Volumes III and IV.

3. The Air Branch, formerly associated with the Intelligence Branch, became divorced from that branch and became known as G-2 (Air). It coordinated aerial photo requests and disseminated all information obtained from photos. It had attached to it several photo interpretation units from the Military Intelligence Service.

4. The Intelligence Branch edited and published G-2 reports, daily cables, weekly intelligence summaries and similar publications. In addition, it evaluated information from units in the field and agents' reports.

5. The Counterintelligence Branch had the comparatively simple task of picking up German agents left behind for the purpose of getting information concerning Allied troop movements and intentions on the basis of preparations made before D-Day. Enemy agent activity was hastily neutralized.

6. Foreign liaison became increasingly important as larger areas of the occupied countries were liberated. The Foreign Liaison Branch aided much in coordinating personnel problems of Allied units attached to American combat formations.

7. A definite need arose for an agency to plan for future operations with respect to occupied Germany in the event of an unconditional surrender. For this purpose, a Plans Branch was formed, which began a study of conditions inside Germany. It took an active part in formulating and putting into effect Operation "ECLIPSE."

8. A special unit known as the Target Branch, or "T" Branch, was organized in early 1944. This unit was organized to isolate and secure intelligence and counterintelligence targets. Each team from this organization, which was attached to a combat unit, consisted of a small task force.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

III. G-3 SECTION*

1. GENERAL

The G-3 Section of the headquarters was established on 22 October 1943, and Brigadier General A. Franklin Kibler assigned on that date as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. He occupied this position throughout the life of the headquarters.

2. PLANNING PHASE

a. From its beginning until 1 August 1944, when the Army Group Headquarters became tactically operational, the G-3 Section was primarily concerned with planning for Operations "OVERLORD" and "RANKIN." On 29 November 1943, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate), forerunner of Supreme Headquarters, issued a basic directive to the Army Group and to 21 Army Group, specifying the responsibilities of each with respect to "OVERLORD," the operation to defeat the German armed forces. This directive was later suplemented and modified by further orders from COSSAC and from the Supreme Commander. With respect to the main functions of the Army Group G-3, the problem of planning "OVERLORD" was set within the following framework:

b. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, was charged jointly with the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, with planning the operation and with its execution until such time as the Supreme Commander would allocate an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First United States Army Group. The tasks allotted to the latter consisted of working in close cooperation with 21 Army Group during the planning and execution of the operation; of working in close consultation with Headquarters ETOUSA and with the British Service Ministries for the mounting of the operation; of preparing for the establishment of First Army Group Headquarters on the Continent when so ordered by the Supreme Commander, and from that time on being responsible for operations on the Western Front within the sphere assigned to it. For the work with the 21 Army Group suitable staff personnel were attached to the British Army Group.

c. As a part of its "OVERLORD" planning responsibilities, First United States Army Group was charged with the preparation of build-up priority tables, which established the order in which all United States troops would move to the Continent from D 15 to D 90, and which provided the basis for the control of the build-up of American forces on the Continent. The Commanding General, First United States Army Group was also requested to supply detailed plans, in collaboration with 21 Army Group and Ninth Air Force, for his assumption of command of the Army Group and for the tactical employment of the units that would be assigned to it. Regarding the allotment of troops for carrying out the early phases of the invasion, Headquarters ETOUSA was ordered to place under command of 21 Army Group the First US Army, several Ranger battalions, and a supply and maintenance organization to support the American forces until such time as the First United States Army Group would become operational. As an integral part of the operation it was believed necessary to stage deceptive military operations. To this end, the Army Group was instructed to work in close consultation with Headquarters ETOUSA and 21 Army Group in the preparation and execution of a cover plan. In order to place First United States Army Group in contact with resistance groups inside enemy-held territory, Headquarters Special Operations Executive-Special Operations was instructed to appoint missions to both the First US Army Group and First US Army.

d. With respect to "RANKIN" (a plan for the liberation of German-held territory in Western Europe and for the occupation of Germany in the event of a German collapse or surrender before "OVERLORD" was launched) the Army Group was charged with preparing all portions of the plan that applied to the United States field forces. The G-3 Section was responsible for completing the operational portions of both of the foregoing plans and for coordinating all such planning within the Army Group headquarters.

e. Initially, the G-3 Section was organized for these purposes into an Operations and Plans Branch, an Organization and Equipment Branch, an Air Branch and an Airborne Branch. From time to time, the structure of the Section was modified to adapt it to the changing situation, either by revising the functions of the branches or by increasing or decreasing the number of personnel assigned to them. Thus, the Airborne Branch was dissolved in March 1944 and airborne matters later transferred to a special staff section. As the date for the establishment of an operational headquarters approached, the organization of a liaison service with other headquarters became necessary. Accordingly, such a service was established first as a separate staff section, and later, in May, as a branch of the G-3 Section. Because Headquarters 12th Army Group exercised no command functions during the planning phase, except those pertaining to a few assigned special troop units, no training branch was required during most of that phase. During that period one or two officers were designated to handle passive air defense matters and such training matters as might arise. Later, on

* For detailed study see Volume V.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

14 June, it was necessary to establish a complete training branch, whose principal function was the collection, collation and dissemination of battle experiences and combat lessons learned from them.

3. OPERATIONAL PHASE

a. On 1 August, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, assumed command of the First and Third US Armies on the Continent, and the Army Group Headquarters became operational. Thereafter, until the end of hostilities, the G-3 Section performed the normal duties of an operations section in combat. During this period it was principally concerned with tactical studies and estimates, plans and orders based thereon and recommendations relative to the assignment of troop units and allocations of equipment. In addition, it was engaged in the preparation of plans for the occupation of Germany after the cessation of hostilities and in the collection, collation and dissemination of battle experiences and combat lessons until 11 November, on which date most of the personnel and principal functions of the Training Branch were transferred to Headquarters ETOUSA.

b. Not assigned to the G-3 Section, but under the operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, was a British Phantom Detachment (detached from 21 Army Group). This detachment, established throughout the Army Group, collected operational information from subordinate units and expedited its transmittal to the armies and to the Army Group Headquarters. Late in 1944 the organization and training of a comparable United States unit was initiated under G-3 supervision. This unit, known as the Army Group Liaison Detachment, had just become operational at the end of hostilities.

c. During the period August 1944 to the cessation of hostilities, the Army Group headquarters operated in three echelons: A Tactical Headquarters, a Main Headquarters, and a Rear Headquarters. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and elements of the Section (the Special Plans Branch and portions of the Operations, Liaison, Plans and Troops Branches, with a total average strength of 15 officers and 18 enlisted men) were on duty with the Tactical Headquarters. The Air Branch (with an average strength of 12 officers and 6 enlisted men) operated at Headquarters Ninth Air Force. The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and the remainder of the Section (the Organization and Equipment Branch and portions of the Operations, Liaison, Plans and Troops Branches, totalling an average of 30 officers and 44 enlisted men) functioned at Main Headquarters. Until its transfer to Headquarters ETOUSA, the Training Branch was located at Rear Headquarters.

4. POST-HOSTILITIES PHASE

Following the cessation of organized resistance, the activities of the G-3 Section were directed primarily to problems relating to the complete occupation of all portions of Germany in rear of our then existing front lines; to the redistribution of our troops into the final United States zone of occupation and the Bremen Enclave; to the introduction of US troops into and the occupation of the US sector in Berlin; to the redeployment of field forces to the United States or other theaters; and to the preparation of reports on various aspect of the campaign in Western Europe. No material changes in the organization of the G-3 Section were made during this period, except for the gradual decrease in personnel and the final elimination of branches as their functions were discontinued.

5. FUNCTIONS OF BRANCHES

a. Activities of the G-3 branches during the operational period were briefly as follows:

(1) *Plans Branch.* This branch made studies and recommandations for the Army Group Commander as to the desirability and feasibility of operations that might contribute to the accomplishment of the mission assigned to the Army Group. It formulated broad outline plans for contemplated operations in order to assess the resources required and to give the Army Group Commander an indication of a way in which such operations might be undertaken. It kept subordinate planning staffs informed of plans under consideration in order to assist them in their detailed planning, and it coordinated their plans. Although generally considered a function of the Operations Branch, the Plans Branch of the Army Group prepared all Letters of Instruction for pending operations and all other combat instructions pertaining to operations in progress or to be undertaken.

(2) *Special Plans Branch.* This branch planned and directed cover and deception activities for 12th Army Group and conducted the necessary staff training in the preparation. It also rendered advice regarding the training of all troops involved in the execution of these plans.

(3) *Operations Branch.* The Operations Branch prepared and presented reports on combat operations within the 12th Army Group sphere of control. To this end it held daily briefings for the Commanding General and other officers of the headquarters; it prepared situation reports, G-3 reports, and summaries; maintained G-3 operations maps, including data posted in the Map Room and in the Chief of Staff's Conference Room; and supervised and coordinated G-3 liaison activities.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) *Liaison Branch.* Under the supervision of the Operations Branch, the Liaison Branch maintained close and continuous liaison on ground force matters with higher, parallel and subordinate headquarters, so as to insure the prompt flow of all pertinent operational information into this headquarters.

(5) *Organization and Equipment Branch.* This branch coordinated matters of supply and equipment with operational requirements; it established priorities for allocation of equipment as well as requirements for special items. It also acted on changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment.

(6) *Troops Branch.* The branch established priorities for the assignment of combat units, allocated such units to the armies, and coordinated troop movements into and between army areas.

(7) *Air Branch.* The Air Branch advised the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (and G-2), on policies relating to air support and tactical and photographic reconnaissance. To this end it maintained close liaison with corresponding agencies of other headquarters and with appropriate sections of the major Air Force commands; it collaborated with other agencies in the preparation of material dealing with various phases of air-ground cooperation. It assisted the Plans Branch in preparing air-ground provisions of operational plans and directives; it advised the Plans Branch as to suitable demands to be made on the Air Forces for air support; and it served as an intermediary between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and appropriate air staffs on all matters pertaining to air-ground cooperation and support.

(8) *Training Branch.* During the period 14 June to 11 November 1944, the Training Branch exercised staff supervision over the normal training functions of the G-3 Section, but was primarily engaged in the collection, collation and dissemination of battle experiences and combat lessons based on combat operations of all ground forces under 12th Army Group command.

(9) *The Passive Air Defense Officer* advised the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, and his staff on all matters pertaining to passive air defense planning, operations, and training. He also coordinated civil defense matters with passive air defense activities and supervised passive air defense staff training.

(10) *The Information and Education Officer* exercised general supervision over the Army education programm within 12th Army Group. To this end, he maintained close contact with the Information and Education services of Theater Headquarters, the Army Information-Education Staff School, and the Army Information and Education officers.

IV. G-4 SECTION*

1. Throughout the campaign leading to the defeat of the German armed forces logistics played a paramount role, greatly influencing tactical and strategical decisions. The G-4 Section was organized as a General Staff Section of Headquarters First US Army Group on 23 October 1943. During the months prior to D-Day the Section devoted its primary efforts to planning for operations "OVERLORD" and "RANKIN — Case C." Also, together with elements of several other General and Special Staff Sections of the Headquarters, the G-4 Section comprised the US Administrative Staff at Headquarters 21 Army Group (British) and as such was responsible for coordinating US administrative plans and early operations on the Continent with those of the British forces.

2. From D-Day to V-E Day the principal logistical factor affecting operations was transportation, and although many other items entered the logistical picture, the transport factor was predominant and controlling. Except for the period from 1 September to 8 November 1944, supplies of all classes were generally available and adequate to support full scale operations. The most serious shortage of supplies existed during the Autumn of 1944, when Quartermaster Class III and Ordnance Class V supplies were critical. Initially there was a shortage of service troops as a result of the curtailment of their build-up in favor of combat troops. As the operation progressed, excessive delays in the equipping of service units after their arrival on the Continent delayed their employment. The major problems with which the G-4 Section was concerned during the occupational phase pertained to the readjustment of the armies into their final zones of occupation and the redeployment of units.

3. During the early period of Continental operations — from 6 June to 31 July — the status of supply and other G-4 activities was generally satisfactory. Although the planned build-up of supplies and service troops was not accomplished, there were sufficient supplies to meet adequately the major demands of the combat troops; and the deficiencies in service troops were not felt measurably as long as operations were confined to the Cotentin Peninsula. The build-up of service troops was intentionally curtailed to permit the accelerated shipment of combat troops. Severe channel storms cancelled all beach discharges for a period of four days at the end of the second week of operations, seriously jeopardizing logistical support and resulting in a very small safety factor of reserves until the setback was overcome. Abnormal requirements for certain types of supplies were the primary causes for most of the critical

* For detailed study see Volume VI.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

shortages during that period. The problems involved in the movement of these critical items were largely overcome by a special cross-Channel ferrying service, called the "Red Ball Express," and by the early inauguration of an Air Transport Service. It was found that the standing operating procedure governing air transport was entirely too cumbersome, and this headquarters initiated a new procedure, greatly simplifying the mechanics of air supply. The shallow depth of the bridgehead resulted in highly congested traffic circulation and limited space for storage of supplies. Transportation facilities, however, proved adequate to meet requirements. Evacuation of casualties to the United Kingdom was carried out with little difficulty by LST's, hospital carriers, and air transport. Cherbourg was captured later than anticipated, and its port facilities were only in the process of being developed at the close of the period. Supplies were moved over the beaches and through minor ports.

4. From 1 to 27 August logistical aspects changed considerably. 12th Army Group assumed over-all control of United States tactical and administrative operations on the Continent and the US Administrative Staff at Headquarters 21 Army Group had returned to 12th Army Group late in July. As the Third Army become operational, it rapidly fanned out to the east and west. Lines of communication became progressively elongated and the inadequacy of service units, especially truck companies, was evident. Emphasis, however, continued to be given to the build-up of combat troops. With the exception of chemical warfare and medical supplies varying degrees of insufficiency in all classes developed at one time or another during this period. In order to realize the maximum benefit from all available truck transport, one-way through routes, called "Red Ball Routes," were developed from the beaches to the supply points of the advancing armies. Depots of the First Army were displaced from the St. Lo to the La Loupe area. Third Army had no orthodox service area until late in the period when it, too, began to build up supplies in the La Loupe area. The VIII Corps, operating in the Brittany Peninsula, was designated as a separate command under this Headquarters, with direct supply channels. Air supply, though insignificant in comparison with over-all figures, was of particular value in delivering Classes I and III, the most urgently needed of the critical supplies. The heavy demands placed on the available truck companies increased proportionately the maintenance requirements, which were difficult to meet due to the inadequacy of service units. The rehabilitation of railroads progressed slowly. This was due to the policy of phasing back service units. After the fall of Paris on 27 August, it became apparent that road transportation had reached practically its limit and that operations would

soon have to be retarded until such time as railroad and Class III pipeline facilities could be developed and could assume a larger share of the load in the forward movement of supplies. Acting on the advice of this Headquarters, original plans for the development of main rail lines were radically changed, and Communications Zone engineers devoted their attention to the more rapid construction of one pipeline out of Normandy instead of the three parallel lines originally planned.

5. From 28 August to 30 September the First and Third Armies continued their rapid advance across France and became disposed generally along the Siegfried Line in the north and the Moselle River in the south. The speed of advance was governed by the quantity of food and gasoline that could be supplied the leading elements, the halt being finally caused by increased enemy resistance, the need for organization for further offensive action and for improvement of capacity for logistical support. Normal logistical support during this period was not possible. Lines of communication were severely overtaxed, and there were practically no reserves in the armies' depots. Daily tonnages delivered to the armies, however, increased somewhat toward the close of the period, principally owing to improvements in the rail system, which was developed rapidly on a limited scale to the east of Paris. Because of severe damage done to rail crossings of the Seine and terminals and bridges in the vicinity of Paris, the city itself became a bottleneck in rail operations. Available air supply facilities were particularly beneficial in transporting gasoline to forward elements. The Class III pipeline project proceeded slowly, primarily because of a shortage of transport. First Army established a service area in the vicinity of Liege, and Third Army dumps were moved to the Chalons-Sommesous area and finally to the Verdun-Nancy area. Because of the lack of sufficient transportation, a system of tonnage allocations became necessary within the stated ability of Communications Zone to haul supplies to the armies.

6. The period from 1 October to 7 November 1944 was characterized by a static situation along the front lines, during which time every effort was made to improve the transportation network and to build up supplies to allow resumption of the offensive. Early in October it became apparent that the critical Class V stocks in Communications Zone were practically exhausted. Because of this condition, together with the fact that the supply status of other items was similarly serious as a result of Communications Zone's inability to deliver items desired, the decision was made temporarily to halt further major offensive operations. At this time the Communications Zone began establishing closer support of army areas and the build-up of stocks in the Advance Section. Com-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

munications Zone depots and supply points. In line with this decision, a credit system for Class V was established, whereby only that ammunition physically available in Communications Zone's forward depots would be allocated to the armies. Although the system of allocating tonnages served its desired end, it had the inevitable result of cutting off the flow of items not deemed essential at the moment for continuing the advance, and stocks in the armies became unbalanced. Rail crossings over the Seine were completed and railway rehabilitation to the east and northeast of Paris progressed appreciably, greatly improving the rail situation behind the armies. Maximum demands were placed on available truck companies, and air transport was useful. The pipeline project continued to advance satisfactorily.

7. Although the supply position remained unfavorable in a number of important items, it was decided that the over-all logistical situation was such that major offensives could be sustained on 8 November. The period from 8 November to 16 December was marked by continuous improvement in the G-4 picture. This was due to greater tonnage imports, increased rail facilities and improved distribution methods. Some desirable changes in supply procedure were instituted. Tonnage allocations to armies were abolished; a 10-day requisition period procedure for all supplies, except Class V, was established, with Communications Zone responsible for the movement to army depots. Army service areas were displaced forward. Rail development, which was excellent, was centered in the north in anticipation of large tonnage receipts from Antwerp, which was opened to United States traffic in the latter part of November. The development of a Class III pipeline system from Antwerp, in the direction of Maastricht, was initiated with first priority. Air delivery continued to be helpful despite frequent bad weather. Shortage of equipment in the staging areas prevented the proper flow of service troops in proportion to combat troops.

8. On 16 December the enemy launched his strong counteroffensive, apparently aiming to split the American forces and to destroy the vital supply installations that were built up in the Liege-Namur area, in Belgium. The ability of the armies to cope successfully with the serious enemy threat was largely a result of the improvement made in the logistical situation in the period just prior to the German attack. This improvement continued almost uninterruptedly throughout the offensive. First and Ninth Armies were placed under the operational control of 21 Army Group, though administrative control remained unchanged. It was necessary for First Army to evacuate its forward dumps to keep them from being overrun, and, as a precautionary measure, it also evacuated its rear area dumps. Actual materiel losses were largely confined to T/E equipment in the hands of forward units. Shifting the axis of logistical support for the Third Army, which was attacking from the south of the "bulge" area, imposed awkward, but not insurmountable, difficulties on the supply and evacuation system. The shift was facilitated expeditiously by promptly obtaining a number of truck companies from Headquarters Communications Zone. The rapidly changing tactical situation necessitated frequent interarmy transfers of service troops. Throughout this most critical phase, this headquarters worked particularly closely with the Communications Zone, lending guidance in the location and establishment of new supply depots, in matters relating to the movement of troops and supplies and on other logistical problems necessary to the proper administrative support of the armies.

9. During the period from 22 February to 14 March 1945 the armies closed to the Rhine in the zone north of the Moselle River and First Army elements seized the Rhine bridge at Remagen, thus establishing a limited bridgehead. Rail nets were adequate and railheads for all armies were well forward. Tonnage capacities from the Paris and Antwerp areas to depots in the Verdun and Liege areas, respectively, became greater than the reception capacities. The over-all supply position, with the exception of a few critical items, was good, and there was no question of the ability logistically to support all armies. Priorities for building up supplies were given to the north, as planning contemplated that the Ninth Army would make the initial crossing of the Rhine into the industrial Ruhr. Ninth Army stock-piled reserves in the Munchen-Gladbach area. The pipeline from Antwerp was dispensing substantial quantities of gasoline east of Maastricht, thus alleviating tank car requirements along the axis. The Cherbourg line was extended to Chalons-sur-Marne, with high priority for its extension toward Verdun. Supply operations were conducted with the logistical support beyond the Rhine in view.

10. During the period from 15 to 23 March 1945 the armies prepared for and launched their coordinated offensive across the Rhine, resulting in the complete encirclement of the Ruhr industrial area by 4 April. Although rail lines were pushed rapidly forward toward the Rhine, they were inadequate to support the rapid advance of the armies. Consequently, more reliance was placed on motor transport and air lift. During the portion of this period up to 29 March very few planes were available, but following that date air support contributed vital assistance in supplying critically needed supplies to forward elements. Resistance, on the whole, was moderate, so that demands for supplies other than food and gasoline were not heavy. The status of Class I supplies

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

began to become critical due to the release of large numbers of recovered Allied prisoners and displaced persons and it became apparent that stocks of food on the Continent and "on order" in the United States would be insufficient to feed these large numbers. Captured and indigenous stocks were used wherever possible and rigid control was placed on the use of army stocks. Pipeline facilities in the north were extended across the Rhine to Wesel, and in the south they were being pushed rapidly forward. The rapid advance of the armies, the assignment of an operational role to the Fifteenth US Army, and the flow in incoming divisions increased the requirements for the limited number of available service troops. 12th Army Group was assigned area control in Germany, and Advance Section Communications Zone performed its functions in Germany without an assigned area responsibility. The rapid advance did not permit the establishment of normal Advance Section depots in that country.

11. During the period from 5 April to 9 May the "Ruhr Pocket" was cleared, United States forces advanced rapidly to the east and southeast, establishing contact with the Soviet Army, and hostilities ceased. Rail bridges across the Rhine were completed and, although on a limited scale, rail rehabilitation to the east was accomplished expeditiously. In anticipation of the rapid advance of the armies and heavy requirements for motor transport, arrangements had been made to borrow 180 truck companies from the Communications Zone. Air supply established an impressive record in carrying supplies forward and returning large numbers of casualties and Allied ex-prisoners of war. In general, the supply situation was satisfactory, although, because of the ever increasing numbers of recovered Allied ex-prisoners, displaced persons, and German prisoners, the food situation became even more critical. The service troop basis during this period was nearly completed and, with the exception of certain specific types, the available support was generally adequate.

12. From 10 May until the dissolution of the Headquarters, the status of supply and other G-4 matters was satisfactory. With the exception of a few critical items, sufficient supplies of all classes were available to meet the requirements of the armies. Permanent supply depots, located to provide more efficient support to the armies in their occupational role, were being constructed and stocked. Temporary supply installations were closed out, and the Communications Zone turned over its functions in Germany to the armies and to Theater Headquarters. The service troop program was initiated immediately after hostilities ceased. By 30 July, approximately 50 per cent of the service troops with the Army Group had been withdrawn. The units available

to operate in occupied areas were reduced to a minimum. The evacuation of recovered Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons was being carried out satisfactorily. While there was noteworthy improvement in the over-all transportation situation throughout the period, there was, nevertheless, insufficient transportation to fill the requirements of the enormous demands of the troop redeployment program. A shortage of rolling stock for the railroads and an excessive number of deadlined motor vehicles were the primary causes of this insufficiency.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

V. G-5 SECTION*

1. Responsilibity for Civil Affairs and Military Government was originally vested in the Civil Affairs Section, First US Army Group, upon the organization of the Headquarters. This was implemented by the arrival of eighteen officers, one Warrant Officer and twenty-six enlisted men. This Section became a General Staff Section in May, 1944.

2. The original mission of the Section was to prepare plans for and to exercise supervision over activities dealing with civilian populations, local government, the necessary functions involved in supply, law and order, public health, utilities services, care and control of refugees and displaced persons, and public finance and property control. This mission was modified and broadened during succeeding periods to include all matters involving relations with civil agencies and individuals. It had the normal staff responsibilities to the Army Group Commander and to other General and Special Staff Sections.

3. The Section was originally organized in four branches — namely, Government Affairs, Economics-Supply, Operations and Personnel, and Administration. This was broadened at a later date to provide for separate branches to deal with legal affairs, public health, public safety, displaced persons, and finance. Within these branches, specialist officers assumed responsibility for technical subjects, the number of such specialized subjects eventually reaching 125. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 and the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 exercised over-all supervision and coordinated the work of the branches through the Executive Officer.

4. Originally, and until 6 June 1944, the work of the Section was primarily that of planning. The first plans made were those under "RANKIN — Case C," which contemplated the possibility of an early German collapse. These were completed about 1 March 1944. The opposite eventuality was contemplated under plans for "OVERLORD". However, much of the ground work was common between them. The Civil Affairs Annex to First Army Group's "OVERLORD" plan was completed about 5 April 1944. Great benefit to the final operation resulted from the thorough exploration of possibilities under both above mentioned plans.

5. With the approach of D-Day and the advance of the First US Army to an operational status, the Section took an active part in preparing the Army for its combat role vis-a-vis Civil Affairs. Through the Army G-5, attachment

* For detailed study see Volume VII.

was made of approximately fifty Civil Affairs Detachments from the European Civil Affairs Division, comprising approximately 500 officers and 1,300 enlisted men. A similar attachment was made to Third US Army, effective 15 June. Arrangements were made to earmark and forward to the Continent 50,270 tons of Civil Affairs supplies. Detachments were supplied with proclamations, "invasion money" and flags.

6. Commencing with the invasion of Normandy, the Section began to exercise close staff supervision of initial operations by Civil Affairs elements and to observe closely the experiences of these units for such lessons as might be beneficially applied in future operations.

7. At the time of the St Lo breakthrough the need for detachments to be deployed in French towns was accelerated, and a rapid requisitioning was made. This process was further accelerated when Third US Army advanced into Brittany in early August.

8. The first echelon of the G-5 Section arrived on the Continent 12 July and was joined by the rear echelon at Perriers on 6 August.

9. The activities of the Section included the following:

a. Close liaison with and supervision of Civil Affairs activities by armies.

b. Preparation of the Daily Civil Affairs Summary for the information of interested headquarters.

c. Control of detachments released by Communications Zone for reassignment to armies and their reattachment as army boundaries changed.

d. Support of army requisitions for Civil Affairs supplies.

e. Close staff coordination of functional specialties, many of which (viz., public utilities) transcended army boundaries.

f. Future planning for further operations in liberated territories and for operations in occupied territory.

10. In anticipation of operations in Germany, the 2nd and 3rd European Civil Affairs Regiments were called forward to the Continent early in September. This step was closely followed by the disassociation of the integrated British-US elements in the detachments.

11. As of 1 September, the food situation in the Paris area was eased by a daily allocation of 1,500 tons of food from military supplies, until local transport could be organized by the French. Some food was imported by air from the United Kingdom. By the time of the completion of the liberation of Paris, 10,000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies (food) had been landed, 1,070.8 tons of which had been distributed. Ten tons of enemy medical supplies had been captured and distri-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

buted to the needy. At the same time, sixty-three detachments were deployed in the Cotentin and Brittany Peninsulas, and police departments in French towns re-established. Courts were opened and violators of proclamations and notices prosecuted.

12. Between the day of liberation of Paris and 1 October, United States armies pushed rapidly to the German frontier. Detachments were redeployed in accordance with the advance, only key cities being supplied with detachments after they passed to Communications Zone.

13. While an estimated one million refugees were handled in France and smaller numbers in Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland during the liberation phese, they were rapidly absorbed by French communities. A limited number of United Nations displaced persons were found in France, and these were accommodated in camps and generally moved to ther rear.

14. During the period 1 October to 15 December 1944 more extensive studies and plans were made in the Section for operations leading offensively into Germany. This planning was thorough and rigid and made fullest use of experience gained in operations up to that time.

15. With the commencement of the German offensive in the Ardennes on 16 December, this Section coordinated the withdrawal of Civil Affairs and Military Government detachments and made immediate arrangements for the handling of any refugees who could not be accommodated in their own areas by the armies. The limitation of the German advance resulted in a stabilization of the refugee situation before any considerable number of refugees had left the confines of Belgium and Luxembourg. However, plans had been perfected for handling any anticipated number that might prove to be forced into France.

16. With the resumed advance into Germany, the Section passed rapidly from a Civil Affairs to a Military Government status. The functional branches executed the prepared plans. Supply allocations were checked and supplies called forward, enabling the armies to build stockpiles. Re-establishment and de-Nazification of local government by the armies was supported and coordinated by this Headquarters. Policies calling for the reopening of banking institutions and for the proper use of available funds were put in force and closely supervised by the Section. Law and order was restored, military courts were appointed, and the administration of justice begun.

17. Large numbers of displaced persons were encountered at this time, and requisitions for personnel for their care and control were renewed. Close coordination was maintained with the armies, particularly governing movements

of displaced persons. In the early stages of operations in Germany, approximately 20,000 Eastern European displaced persons were moved into liberated territories to remain as a military commitment and later to be returned to Germany.

18. As of 12 March, an embargo on the movement of eastbound European displaced persons into liberated territory was announced by this Headquarters and was enforced continuously after that date. In the mean time, 12th Army Group's rear boundary had moved forward, so that the transition to Military Government was complete.

19. Restoration of trade and industry in those categories that were of value to the military forces was emphasized in Germany. This was particularly true of coal mining.

20. Fifteenth Army became operational early in March and was supplied with personnel drawn from this Headquarters and the armies for its G-5 Section. By successive steps it took over the Rhineland and occupied a portion of the Ruhr, this Headquarters exercising coordination as that Army assumed Military Government functions.

21. As operations progressed east of the Rhine, the shortage of Military Government personnel became acute. This shortage had been foreseen and requisitions made in November 1944. In view of plans for the eventual take-over by the British of the northern Rhineland, Westphalia and Hannover, a total of thirty-two British Military Government detachments were supplied by 21 Army Group, and attached to armies and deployed in those areas.

22. Inereasing numbers of displaced persons were freed as the Third Army thrust southeastward into Bavaria, the First Army into Saxony and the Ninth Army into Anhalt. The critical problem of the care and control of nearly 4,000,000 displaced persons stretched the available personnel to the utmost. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) staff, which had been scheduled to be available 1 March 1945 was delayed by shipping priorities until 1 May and later. In the interim, spearhead UNRRA teams, only 55% full strength, were called forward. Fifty of these teams were with the armies by 20 April. By 10 May there were 120 such teams with the armies. Three hundred and seventy-five Allied liaison officers for repatriations were also with the armies, taking care of their own nationals, but assisting generally in displaced persons work. In addition, twenty-six French MMLA (Mission Militaire Liaison Administratif) teams, in the process of being absorbed into UNRRA, were taken into Germany and used in handling displaced persons.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

23. Early in April the supply of Military Government detachments was completely exhausted, the area of 12th Army Group having extented in all directions. Authority was obtained and given to the armies to organize provisional Military Government detachments. Approximately 150 such detachments were quickly organized and deployed. The bulk of these were later withdrawn as other Allies advanced to their zones.

24. By the middle of the same month it became apparent that conditions of collapse or surrender had materialized in most of the areas of Germany. It was therefore ordered that the Military Government portion of the plan "ECLIPSE" be applied wherever practicable. This resulted in economy of manpower and advanced greatly the program of Military Government.

25. With the German surrender, Military Government of the static phase was extended to cover all areas of 12th Army Group. The full plan, including all functional specialties, was put into effect. Necessary transition steps to the final organization, with Eastern and Western Military Districts, under Headquarters United States Forces European Theater, were rapidly taken between 9 May and 10 July.

26. Repatriation of displaced persons proceeded apace. In April, approximately 140,000 displaced persons, mostly Western Europeans, were repatriated. In May, over 890,000, including a large proportion of Eastern Europeans, went back to their homelands. In June, 1,210,000 were repatriated.

27. Of approximately 4,200,000 displaced persons uncovered by 12th Army Group, more than 2,700,000, or 95% of those immediately repatriable, had been repatriated by 10 July 1945; over 500,000 more had been turned over to the British, Russians, and French as they advanced to their national zones; of the balance, approximately 200,000 were scheduled to move through already organized channels. About 200,000 Hungarians and Roumanians were expected to be repatriable in a few month's time. The balance were Poles and stateless individuals.

28. On the instance of this Headquarters, the Commanding General, United States Forces European Theater, took over all responsibility for Military Government as of midnight 10—11 July 1945.

VI. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION*

1. GENERAL.

a. Headquarters, First US Army Group was activated on 19 October 1943. The Adjutant General's Section was established on 21 October 1943. Brigadier General Henry B. Lewis, USA, served as Adjutant General from its inception until his appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff on 21 September 1944. Colonel Charles R. Landon, AGD, succeeded him and served as Adjutant General until the disbandment of the headquarters on 1 August 1945.

b. The organization of the headquarters, the establishment of administrative procedures and policies, the selection and training of personnel, the control and successful discharge of administrative functions and the intelligent comprehension of the ever-changing requirements, demanded planning, study and adjustment. Accepted headquarters procedures were applied and recognized staff functions and doctrines invoked, but adjustments and revisions were made in the beginning in an attempt to anticipate needs of future operations and subsequently to satisfy the complex ramifications of administration developing from the missions assigned to the Army Group.

c. Although the mission of the Headquarters was largely tactical and although administration was reduced to the minimum consistent with efficient operation, the size and scope of the tasks assigned, the demmands made by higher echelons, and the operations undertaken created administrative problems and office activities that frequently were laid at the threshold of the Adjutant General. Papers had to be so routed and filed as to provide various agencies with only that information which they required and still not involve the headquarters in administrative detail. Management of administrative matters centered in the Deputy Chief of Staff. The accomplishment of these administrative matters, their actual delimitation, comprehension, and consummation was assigned to the Adjutant General as the administrative executive of the Commanding General. Complete cooperation with the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Secretary, General Staff, insured reduction of duplication, avoided conflicting instructions, and helped simplification.

d. The Section performed for the Headquarters the customary office routine of coordinating, routing, checking and authenticating orders and correspondence, maintaining the office of record, and attending to all matters pertaining to officer personnel; furnished the following services: publication, postal, MRU, statistical and visitors' accommodations; and performed such additional related

* For detailed study see Volume VIII.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

functions as were required from time to time, including the writing of the Army Group history and assisting in the control of records resulting from the disbandment of the German armed forces.

e. The Adjutant General established the office procedures for the Headquarters, including handling of all official correspondence and routing of correspondence, reports and other papers to the staff section having primary interest, and maintenance of the records and suspense files of the headquarters. All official correspondence, except that requiring the personal signature of the Army Group Commander (or, in his absence, of the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff) was signed by the Adjutant General or an Assistant Adjutant General.

2. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.

a. The Adjutant General's Section was authorized initially 26 officers, 6 warrant officers and 52 enlisted personnel. This was revised in the early part of 1944 to 19 officers, 7 warrant officers and 85 enlisted personnel. It was increased during the planning phase to 25 officers, 6 warrant officers and 110 enlisted personnel and further increased during the "Eclipse" phase to 36 officers, and 137 enlisted personnel. Regardless of the nature of the work of a headquarters, whether planning, administrative or tactical, there is no appreciable difference either in the mission or in the variety of business passing through an Adjutant General's office. As long as any work exists which requires individuals to issue written instructions and to keep records, either for current use or historical reference, or to receive and send out letters, the work consistently continues at a certain minimum level requiring the services of a specified number of officers and enlisted men regardless of the nature of the mission assigned the headquarters. Obviously, the addition of any specialized functions or duties, or an increase in the size of other staff sections demands an increase automatically in AG personnel to insure a prompt and efficient performance of such additional work. Equally obviously, this personnel must be provided coincidentally with the increased load.

b. The Section was divided originally into Administrative, Operations, and Personnel branches. The Executive and Historical Branches and the Visitor's Bureau were added at a later date.

c. The Administrative Branch was divided into Mail and Distribution Center, Top Secret Control, Central Records, and Cables Groups. It was responsible for receiving and dispatching all official mail; furnishing courier and messenger service for the headquarters; establishment and operation of the Top Secret

Control procedure for the handling and maintenance of an office of record, which included a permanent file of all papers as well as a policy and precedent file for the Headquarters as a whole; and furnishing all incoming and outgoing cable service.

d. The Operations Branch was divided into Correspondence, Publications, and Troop Statistics Groups. It was responsible for routing and processing miscellaneous correspondence, verifying staff coordination, typing and preparing for dispatch outgoing correspondence (other than those processed by Personnel Branch) and cables and maintaining Headquarters suspense for incoming and outgoing papers; securing printing service and furnishing reproduction by multilith, mimeograph, photostat, black and white and gelatin processes, reproduction of blank forms and publications of higher and lower headquarters as required; preparing, editing, and proofreading all publications, including telephone directory and Headquarters Regulations; furnishing drafting service for the Headquarters, including charts, graphs, signs and drawings; maintaining a distributing agency for the Headquarters and Special Troops and in certain cases for subordinate commands; maintaining a Headquarters library of publications from the War Department, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Headquarters ETOUSA, Headquarters Communications Zone and Army Group publications; providing and supplying information concerning troop movements and location of ground force units; and preparing statistical studies.

e. The Operations Branch likewise was responsible for supervision of MRU policies and activities throughout the Army Group, the activities of the 37th MRU, the supervision of general postal policies and matters pertaining to the Army Group and the operations of APO 655. To this were later added the supervision of the Engineer Reproduction Detachment.

f. The Personnel Branch handled all personnel matters, consisting of registration of officers; preparation of efficiency reports, casualty reports, personnel correspondence, rosters and requisitions; effected assignments and transfers to units and to other arms and services; issued travel and temporary duty orders and orders for rotation to the United States; handled promotions and demotions, reclassification, resignations and other separations, disciplinary cases and awards and decorations; and prepared special orders.

g. The functions and activities of the Visitors' Bureau were assigned to this section 28 June 1944. The chief responsibilities of the Bureau were to receive and provide accommodations for all visitors to this Headquarters and to coordinate the visits with interested staff sections, or, in many cases, to plan itineraries and arrange clearance into army areas. High officials from the War Department,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

committees from the Senate and House of Representatives and groups of prominent civilians were accommodated during their visits to this Headquarters. In the latter phase of its operation, the Visitors' Bureau operated two large hotels, accommodating a daily average of 150 visitors. A dining room served a daily average of 300 visitors.

h. The Visitors' Bureau became a separate branch of the Adjutant General's Section on 1 May 1945. Coincident with its establishment as a special branch, the Visitors's Bureau became responsible for the organization and operation of an air transportation service for officers of this Headquarters and for visitors. An airline, comprising six C-47 aircraft, was formed, and daily flights were made to all army and army group headquarters, Supreme Headquarters, Theater and Communications Zone Headquarters, and to leave areas. A monthly average of approximately 2,500 passengers were flown.

i. The Executive Branch was established on 14 December 1944. It was comprised of the executive officer, chief clerk and two enlisted assistants, and was charged with the coordination of policies in the operation of the Section, the administration of personnel, and discharge of property responsibility to include procurement, transfer, exchange, repair and salvage of items of equipment.

j. The Historical Branch was formed on 4 January 1945, when Captain Albert Norman arrived to assume his duties as Army Group Historian and of writing the official history of the Army Group. At the time of the inactivation of the Headquarters, a 300-page volume, dealing with the inter-Allied plans for the invasion and the role United States forces were to play on the Western Front, and covering the period 1943 — 1 August 1944, was completed. The volume received the approval of the Army Group Chief of Staff.

k. The 37th Machine Records Unit was attached to the Headquarters on 31 January 1944 and furnished machine records service for Army Group troops, including various divisions assigned to the Headquarters from time to time. It maintained a troop status file, a G-2 Counterintelligence Branch "suspected persons" file; a file on awards issued by subordinate commands; a code name directory; a Headquarters telephone directory; and a file of field grade officers. It prepared weekly station lists and troop lists with daily changes, statistical strength reports or studies and other miscellaneous reports and analyses. During the Ardennes battle it serviced, in addition to its normal duties, six divisions scattered from Holland to Switzerland and from the German border to the Atlantic Ocean and assigned to four different armies.

l. The 585th and 135th Army Postal Units conducted the operation of APO 655 under the supervision of the Operations Branch. The 135th APU was not assigned until 6 September 1944.

m. Technical supervision of the Engineer Reproduction Detachment was assumed by the Operations Branch on 9 May 1945, when reproduction work became almost entirely administrative, map requirements having ceased.

3. PLANNING PHASE.

a. During the first few months, the Section assisted in the pre-invasion operational plans with which the Headquarters was concerned. Administrative and Headquarters policies and procedures were established and implemented through Headquarters Regulations and other publications to facilitate the proper functioning of the Headquarters upon the opening of the operational phase. Just before midnight, on 14 March 1944, some of the Headquarters buildings, in London, were subjected to incendiary bombing by enemy planes. The buildings in which the Section was located were damaged by fire, resulting in heavy property loss. All records, however, were saved and operations continued with little loss of time.

b. A detachment from First US Army Group was attached to 21 Army Group to perform the administrative functions relating to the United States forces placed under the temporary command of 21 Army Group. This Section sent a representation to the 21 Army Group Main Headquarters on 30 April 1944, and to the Rear Headquarters on 16 May. The Adjutant General's Section at Main Headquarters, 21 Army Group, consisted of one officer and three enlisted men, and at Rear, of four officers and fifteen enlisted men.

c. Members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) were first assigned to this Section on 14 June 1944. In August, after the Army Group became operational and was divided into TAC, Main and Rear echelons, the WACs arrived on the Continent and were all assigned to the Rear echelon. Staff sections in the other echelons formerly having WAC personnel transferred them to Rear echelon in exchange for enlisted men. A large portion of the WAC personnel of the Headquarters thus found its way into the Adjutant General's Section. This resulted in the loss of a large number of trained enlisted men and required rapid training of the newly assigned women in order to maintain uninterrupted operations. This was accomplished without difficulty and the WAC personnel assumed their full share of responsibility. They were a decided asset.

d. Headquarters First US Army Group became Headquarters 12th Army Group on 14 July 1944. During this month the headquarters commenced moving

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to the Continent. Frequent moves and lack of proper office space prevented all of the reproduction equipment from being placed in operation. It was not utilized fully until the Headquarters arrived in Verdun in September.

4. OPERATIONAL PHASE.

a. The Adjutant General's Section continued its normal operations when the Headquarters assumed command of the First and Third US Armies on 1 August 1944. It was represented at each of the three echelons that were then organized, and continued to furnish normal services under difficult conditions and with a pressing need for additional personnel demanded by the three echelon division.

b. The Adjutant General was located with the majority of his personnel at the Rear echelon, where the bulk of the AG Section work was accomplished. The Assistant Adjutant General at the Main echelon supervised the activities of the Section there and at the TAC echelon.

c. The volume of work increased considerably when the Headquarters became operational and it was then found necessary to operate some of the groups on a regular 24-hour basis. Cable facilities were continuously overburdened, with the result that cables were not infrequently dispatched by other means. Wherever possible the messageform was used in lieu of cables to ease the cable load. These messageforms were dispatched by air and given high priority in handling. Demands on publication, MRU and postal services rose sharply. A further striking growth occured when the Headquarters was located for many months in Verdun. These requirements could be traced to the growth of other staff sections, notably G-5, and added responsibilities assigned by higher headquarters.

5. "ECLIPSE" PHASE.

This phase had commenced even before the cessation of hostilities in Europe. It brought with it increased administrative work incident to redeployment of units and personnel, disbandment of the German Army and documentation of its personnel, adjustment of personnel records, preparation of final reports, increased correspondence and cables. The increased demands were complicated by the loss of trained and experienced personnel within the Section through return to the United States for rotation and discharge, through the policy of granting leaves, furloughs, and weekly holidays, and through encouragement of participation in athletic programs and other forms of recreation.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

The operations of the Section have demonstrated the necessity for adequate and properly trained personnel (both officers and enlisted personnel), the need for positively coordinating and continually eliminating and limiting administrative matters in an Army Group headquarters, the necessity for prompt and efficient distribution and routing of official mail and the processing of outgoing cables and correspondence, the provision of proper security control and adequate record files, the necessity for elastic reproduction facilities and distribution of publications together with adequate MRU and postal services and provision of visitors' accomodations. Experience again demonstrates that the Adjutant General, unlike a special staff section, furnishes services and administrative facilities for an entire headquarters and rarely, if ever, for the benefit of one section. His primary duty is to assure the smooth operation of the Headquarters by facilitating the transaction of everybody's business. He does this by operating the many odds and ends of administrative facilities that are common to all or many sections, and acting as a coordinating go-between with those he does not operate. He is the logical source for controlling, coordinating and accomplishing Headquarters administration under the supervision of the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff. Any administrative function which falls within this broad scope is properly in his sphere.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

VII. HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT*

1. When the Army Group Headquarters was activated, the Headquarters Commandant was confronted with the problem of setting up his organizational framework to allow for expansion. He immediately estimated the space, equipment, and supply requirements, and determined the nature of service units that would be necessary. The Headquarters was established in Bryanston Square, London, and through the efforts of mess, supply, and service personnel, operating directly under the Headquarters Commandant, functioned smoothly from the beginning.

2. In January 1944, Headquarters Special Troops was established, and it assumed administrative control of all troops. The Headquarters Commandant retained operational control of Headquarters Company, Car Company, and Utilities Platoon.

3. Once the Headquarters was firmly established, preparations had to be made for movement to the Continent and operation in the field. A "Special List of Equipment" was prepared and frequently revised. A plan for field operation in three echelons was devised and practice field operation conducted.

4. Movement to the Continent was accomplished in three increments, plus an advance party. The movement began on 5 July 1944 and was completed on 5 August.

5. After initially locating at Colombieres, France, the Headquarters was divided into three echelons: TAC, Main, and Rear. These three echelons operated close in the wake of the armies as they moved across France and Germany, TAC echelon moving most frequently and operating in closest contact with the armies.

6. Main and Rear echelons reunited at Wiesbaden, Germany, on 4 May 1945, and TAC echelon joined them on 1 June. At Wiesbaden, the Headquarters turned in field equipment and later was disbanded. It turned over all installations and most of its equipment to Headquarters, United States Forces European Theater (USFET).

* For detailed study see Volume IX.

VIII. HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS*

1. Headquarters Special Troops, First US Army Group, was activated on 19 October 1943, with the mission of providing housekeeping facilities for First US Army Group.

2. As the Army Group headquarters grew, the duties Special Troops was called upon to perform increased correspondingly. In the months that followed, "housekeeping" included procuring and assigning enlisted personnel for Army Group staff sections; billeting and feeding Army Group personnel; moving the Headquarters; furnishing transportation for staff officers; directing training, discipline and administration; providing security and police protection; signal facilities, religious services and post exchange supplies; and eventually furnishing special service, and information and education facilities.

3. Upon its activation, the Headquarters consisted of three officers and eleven enlisted men, with Lt Col Harry J. Karakas in command, and was located at 20 Bryanston Square, London. By the end of October, although there were still only three officers in the organization, enlisted personnel had increased to forty-eight. As problems continued to grow and to become more complex, the organization continued to expand, until on 4 July 1945 there were forty-one officers and 207 enlisted men assigned and attached to the Headquarters.

4. Growth of the Headquarters, however, was gradual. For some time, Special Troops was permitted by Headquarters First US Army Group to carry certain personnel above the authorized allowance, and it was not until 22 April 1944 that a new distribution of grades and ratings was approved, giving the organization twenty-one officers and thirty-eight enlisted men. Need for further expansion was recognized in succeeding months and in October, Special Troops was allowed another substantial increase in grades and ratings.

5. Headquarters Special Troops played an essential part in the life of the Army Group from the very beginning. In order to function properly, the Army Group Headquarters needed additional personnel. Special Troops procured enlisted personnel for all the staff sections. Special Troops took over Bryanston and Montagu Squares and Norfolk Crescent for billets and office space, converted Bryanston Square Park into a car park, and established four enlisted men's messes and one officers' mess in the area.

6. On 14 March 1944, Bryanston Square was caught in a German incendiary raid. Five office buildings and three buildings used for billets were destroyed

* For detailed study see Volume IX.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and three enlisted men injured. There were no fatalities and the loss of equipment was not serious.

7. Colonel Herbert H. Harris, then Commanding Officer of Special Troops, directed deployment of military personnel in the area and arranged for hot food for the bombed-out soldiers and fire fighters, for the guarding of salvaged equipment, and for temporary billeting of personnel in nearby American Red Cross clubs.

8. The office used by Special Troops for its headquarters was burned out in the raid, but within twenty-four hours the organization was back to near normalcy in new quarters, while the job of locating new billets for the bombed-out enlisted men and for additional men and a WAC Detachment went on uninterruptedly.

9. As the invasion date approached, Special Troops began to prepare for its mission of moving the Army Group Headquarters to the Continent. To aid in this preparation, practice moves of the Headquarters and its component units were staged from London to nearby Warfield Park during the month of May, to determine the amount of transportation that would be needed and to gain experience in operations with the Headquarters divided in echelons.

10. Brigadier General Charles R. Doran assumed command of Headquarters Special Troops on 13 May 1944 and remained in command for the duration of its existence.

11. When movement to the Continent began, Headquarters First US Army Group was redesignated Headquarters 12th Army Group and, accordingly, Special Troops, First US Army Group was renamed Special Troops, 12th Army Group.

12. Those who were left behind when the first increment of Special Troops left London on 16 July 1944 for the Southampton marshalling area, were exposed, like other residents of the British capital, to intensified robot plane attacks, which had begun on 13 June. None of the Headquarters personnel were injured and the Headquarters suffered no material damage.

13. The initial increment of Special Troops landed on Omaha Beach on 22 July and proceeded from there by motor transport to the Army Group Command Post between Colombieres and Trevieres, where it remained until 1 August 1944, when the Headquarters moved south. On this relocation, the Headquarters was divided into two echelons: Main, at Periers, and Rear, at St Sauveur-de-Lendelin. Special Troops headquarters was established as part of the Rear echelon.

14. During the first fifteen days of August the Headquarters moved its remaining units and detachments from the United Kingdom to France, with twenty complete organizations locating in the Army Group area between the fourth and the tenth day of the month and the remaining personnel of Special Troops joining the Command on 10 August.

15. It was at this time that Special Troops had its real baptism of supervisory control. Constant assignment, attachment, and reassignment of units took place on an unprecedented scale. In addition, many situations which could not have been solved in London now presented themselves as the Headquarters and its units found itself operating under field conditions. An outstanding example of this was the problem of providing bathing and housing facilities for the WAC Detachment, and it became apparent that special considerations would have to be made for the women in the Headquarters on later moves.

16. As the pace of the Allied drive across France increased, so did the rapidity of the Headquarters' moves. The next relocation was to Laval, France, a move that extended from 21 to 24 August. Hardly had the troops found their way around town, when Paris fell and 12th Army Group and Special Troops moved again -- this time 185 miles by road to Versailles. Here, on 5 September, Special Troops occupied Camp de Satory, a comfortable French military post in the suburbs of the city, and here for the first time the Headquarters was faced with the problems that arise when a military organization is billeted in or near a large city.

17. While at Versailles, personnel of the Headquarters had their first opportunity to visit Paris — but not for long. On 16 September Main echelon moved to Verdun and two days later Rear and Special Troops relocated in Caserne Niel, in that city.

18. While in Verdun, Special Troops was charged, for the first time, with conducting ceremonies for Army Group Headquarters. On Armistice Day, General Doran delivered the keynote address at a commemorative service at the Meuse-Argonne American cemetery, Verdun. Later, Special Troops arranged for ceremonies at which British, French, and Luxembourg awards were presented to 12th Army Group personnel, as well as for parades at which medals and plaques were bestowed on units and personnel of Special Troops.

19. During the German counteroffensive through the Ardennes, Special Troops became tactically operational for the only time in its history. On the night of 22 December, with the enemy advance threatening the city of Luxembourg, General Doran was charged with the defense of Verdun, guarding of

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the Meuse River bridges from that city to Commercy, and if the enemy drive should continue unchecked, defense of the west bank of the river.

20. The Headquarters immediately went on a 24-hour-a-day operational basis. Utilizing 12th Army Group and Communications Zone troops in the area, as well as small units attached to Special Troops for the defensive mission, necessary reconnaissance was performed, bridges were mined, communications laid to strategic points; road blocks, traffic control posts and gun positions established and manned, and motorized patrols maintained an aggressive coverage of all roads within a five mile radius of the city. In addition, the Headquarters Liaison Squadron provided an air patrol during daylight hours, a striking force was mobilized for defense against a surprise enemy attack either from the air or on the ground, and constant liaison was maintained with French forces in the area.

21. Within the Headquarters area, plans were made for withdrawal to the west if necessary, including the evacuation of personnel and equipment, and the destruction of property which could not be moved.

22. On 26 December, the 513th Airborne Infantry Battalion was ordered to Verdun and Special Troops was relieved of responsibility for the defense of the area, although Special Troops continued to maintain road blocks in the vicinity of the Headquarters and Special Troops Military Police continued to patrol the Verdun area until the emergency had passed.

23. While the struggle for the Siegfried Line stalled the American armies during the first part of 1945, 12th Army Group's progress across the Continent also bogged down, and the Headquarters remained in Verdun until 1 May.

24. On that date, the Headquarters moved to Wiesbaden, Germany. With the entry into enemy territory came a host of new situations. Special Troops was called upon to provide for the security of Army Group Headquarters on an unprecedented scale, to assist Military Government in supplying coal for the city's utilities, to aid in policing of the comunity, and to enforce the civilian curfew and the Theater nonfraternization policy. After V-E Day, celebrated with laudable restraint by military personnel in the city, there came an increased need for off-duty leisure time activities, and Special Troops was charged with furnishing Special Service and Information and Education facilities to 12th Army Group Headquarters. Special Troops acquired and operated a swimming pool, a golf course, tennis courts, a river boat, athletic fields, and theaters, while information and education activities were expanded to include a school, "on-the-job" training, and increased emphasis on correspondence courses. The Post Exchange operated by Special Troops continued to enlarge its facilities, and by the end of June it had in operation separate officers' and enlisted men's branches, as well as a large cafe patronized by 400 to 500 enlisted men and women each evening.

25. As Special Troops, 12th Army Group, neared the end of its existence, it devoted its principal efforts to the redeployment of troops to the Pacific and to the radjustment of troops within the command.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

IX. CHAPLAIN*

1. When the Army Group Headquarters was organized, a T/O provided for three chaplains. At that time there was a definite scarcity of chaplains in the European Theater, with the result that thirteen months elapsed before one was assigned to the Headquarters staff. During the interim, ample opportunities were provided to the Headquarters personnel to attend religious services conducted by civilian clergymen or army chaplains attached to other units. Shortly after D-Day, two chaplains were assigned to Special Troops. These officers provided religious services not only for their own troops, but for Headquarters personnel as well.

2. The Chaplain's Section, Hq 12th Army Group, was activated 1 November 1944, in Verdun, France, with the assignment of Chaplain Morgan J. O'Brien. The mission of the Section was to maintain liaison with army and Theater chaplains on policies affecting the Corps of Chaplains; to act in an advisory capacity to all members of the armed forces on religious, morale, and welfare problems; to supervise the spiritual welfare of this command; to conduct religious services; and to make recommendations as to assignments and transfers of chaplains.

3. Armistice Day, November 11, was commenorated by the holding of memorial services at the American World War I Military Cemetery at Romagne, France.

4. This Section called a meeting of all chaplains in the Verdun area in order to coordinate religious services so that units without chaplains could have weekly services. With the influx of German PW's in the area, a survey was made to determine if any clergymen were included in their number. In some camps, as many as six clergymen were found, while others had none. The Army Group Chaplain assisted the Provost Marshal in screening the clergymen and also in assigning them to camps, so that all PW's were provided with religious services by their own clergymen, thus leaving American chaplains free to devote all their time to American troops. Through the cooperation and generosity of the French clergy, the Section was able to provide equipment — such as Mass kits and Communion sets — for the German clergymen.

5. By conferring with Army chaplains and the Theater Chaplain, a study was made of the needs of evacuation and field hospitals which had a T/O calling for only one chaplain. The following plan was put into practice as a result of these conferences: The field hospitals, when they were functioning during combat and well up front, close to the combat area where emergency operations were performed on the wounded men, had one of the chaplains from division headquarters stay at the field hospital in order to be constantly available. For evacuation hospitals, the following was the procedure: a chaplain from the division that was being served by the hospital, or from units attached to that division, was sent for one day to be on duty at the hospital, then he was relieved by another chaplain, and the rotation was thus kept up. In this way, the chaplain got to see men of his own division as they were being hospitalized, and he was also given relief for one day from the strain of front-line duty.

6. For the members of Army Group TAC, stationed in Luxembourg, a midnight Mass was said at one of the local churches on Christmas. Similar services were held at Rear and Main headquarters.

7. As a result of a conference with the Senior Chaplain, Advance Section Communications Zone, religious supplies were made available at Army Group for all chaplains in the area. Thirty-five members of the Corps of Chaplains attented a memorial service for deceased chaplains. At a meeting after the services the nonfraternization policy of the army and the best means of making it effective were discussed.

8. Memorial services were conducted in the Catherdral of Verdun for the late President Roosevelt. At this service, the bishop of Verdun expressed the sympathy of the French people.

9. Nordhausen and Buchenwald concentration camps were visited for the purpose of providing spiritual consolation for the dying. On investigation, eight clergymen were found among the inmates at Buchenwald, and two at Nordhausen. The Army Group Chaplain made arrangements with the commandants of these camps for the men to be placed on cheplain's status and also provided them with the necessary equipment for religious services.

10. On 1 May, the Headquarters moved from Verdun, France, to Wiesbaden, Germany. Two badly damaged stores were renovated and furnished as an office and chapel.

11. The chapel was used for the first time for a Thanksgiving service on V-E Day. It was dedicated to "Our Lady of Victory." In the vicinity of the Headquarters, a Polish displaced persons camp with thousands of inmates, obtained two Polish priests from Dachau concentration camp, where they were was located. For the spiritual guidance of these people the Chaplain's Section obtained two Polish priests from Dachau Concentration Camp, where they were held prisoner by the Germans.

12. Daily religious services were held in the Headquarters Chapel. Sunday services were held in a theater and in the Red Cross "Kurhaus" building.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

X. FINANCE SECTION*

1. The Finance Section was organized on 4 December 1943, with the assignment of Major Paul G. Hommeyer, FD, as Finance Officer. The Section was originally authorized two officers and four enlisted men, but this strength proved inadequate during the planning stage and the allotment was changed to provide for two officers, one warrant officer, and six enlisted men. Later, the authorized strength was reduced to one officer, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men. Major Eugene R. Melton, FD, assumed the duties of Finance Officer on 17 October 1944, when Lt Col Hommeyer was returned to the United States to be relieved from active duty.

2. Functions assigned to the Finance Section were as follows: advisory service to the Commanding General on all finance and fiscal matters; administrative supervision over all finance officers not assigned or attached to armies; preparation of all finance and fiscal plans; coordination on matters concerning two or more armies and between armies, the Theater Fiscal Director, and the Fiscal Director of Advance Section Communications Zone; promotion of savings through the cash sale of war bonds; and preparation of all allotment and insurance applications.

3. The principal duty of the Assistant Finance Officer was the preparation of all finance and fiscal plans. In the preparation of these plans it was necessary to hold numerous conferences with the finance officers of armies and the Theater Fiscal Director. Although several plans were prepared, the only ones used were "OVERLORD" and "ECLIPSE." In general, all troops were paid on time, funds were properly safeguarded, and every individual received a partial payment prior to his departure for the Continent. Principal difficulties encountered resulted from the failure of other headquarters to coordinate their plans with this Headquarters and Theater Headquarters. As an example, the Theater Fiscal Director was not aware of plans of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to stamp all currency then in circulation and to convert it later into a new issue of Luxembourg and Belgian Francs. The result of the lack of coordination in this case was that troops in Luxembourg did not have any spendable money for a period of several days. This situation was remedied by this Section by contacting the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who furnished postal employees to assist a US Finance Officer in stamping approximately five million dollars worth of Belgian francs. The stamped Belgian francs were then furnished to the troops by splitting a 20-man disbursing section into four teams of cashiers.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

4. Prior to the cessation of hostilities plans were prepared for operation "ECLIPSE," the plan of operations after the defeat of Germany. The plan called for closing all German finance officers' accounts and opening of new accounts under the supervision of the US officers charged with disbandment of the German Army. The plans called for payment of Wehrsold (army pay) to all members of the Wehrmacht and of discharge pay, amounting to eighty Reichsmarks, to each enlisted man. The payment of Wehrsold could not be effected until 1 July 1945 because of the shortage of currency in some areas. Discharge pay could not be paid in some areas because discharge commenced too rapidly, and it was not felt that payment should in any way interfere with disbandment. Plans also called for a Wehrmacht Fiscal Branch, for the supervision of all Wehrmacht finance officers and for the audit of all vouchers paid by them. This branch was organized in July, using civilian personnel.

5. The administrative branch was charged with normal administrative functions, in addition to assignment and attachment of finance disbursing sections. During most of the operation, all Finance Sections were attached to this Headquarters and further attached to armies. Later, all sections were assigned to this Headquarters and further assigned to armies. During the period in which sections were attached, they were treated as orphans, resulting in low morale and general deterioration of the sections' functions. After sections were assigned, there was a noticeable improvement in morale and of general efficiency. During operations, there were adequate finance sections available at all times to insure the prompt payment of all troops. Upon cessation of hostilities, many difficulties were encountered. Demands of the Assembly Area Command and the staging areas for Finance Sections was so great that it became physically impossible to pay all troops. Though many sections employed civilians and received an authorized overstrength to help alleviate the situation, it was still impossible to pay all troops on time.

6. The prime difficulty encountered by all sections was exchanging funds. Each time troops moved from one country to another it was necessary to effect a complete conversion of all monies in the possession of troops. Many sections required as many as four cashiers, working full time, when T/O's did not provide for cashiers. In addition to conversions, all finance officers had very large collections. It was not at all unusual for a finance officer to have collections far in excess of his disbursements.

7. Due to the number of currencies in use and the lack of a checking account, it was necessary for all finance officers to carry tremendous amounts of cash on hand. Most finance officers kept in their personal possession ap-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

proximately one million dollars in cash. The tables of equipment did not provide sufficient safes to hold such amounts, so that most finance officers had to use improvised wooden boxes for the storage of funds. During the early stages of operations, only one funding office was provided, which was usually several hundreds of miles from division disbursing officers. Later, this Section requested "Advance Section Communications" Zone to provide several centrally located funding officers, which helped somewhat to remedy the situation.

8. One of the problems that was faced, which was not expected during the planning period, was the payment of Allied troops other than American. Many allied officers and enlisted men were attached to American forces, and except for the British, no plans were made for their payment. This Section, through agreement with the Fiscal Director, made arrangements for payment by the use of "Spearhead" deposits.

9. Captured enemy funds and funds found in prisoner of war cages presented a serious problem. Im most prisoner of war cages there were no records to indicate to whom the funds belonged. Finance officers found it physically impossible to count funds turned in to them. Some finance officers refered to captured funds and funds found in prisoner of war cages in terms of tons rather than amounts. This Section made arrangements with the Theater Fiscal Director to have such funds shipped to the Central Disbursing Officer, without taking them into the accounts of the disbursing officer.

10. Fiscal functions presented no problem as far as this Headquarters was concerned. The amount of expenditures by this Headquarters for military intelligence and entertainment was negligible. Most supplies and services required were obtained by requisitioning.

11. Within the armies the situation was somewhat different. Each time a unit was transferred from one army to another it was necessary to cancel one allotment of funds and issue a new one. This situation could have been avoided only by having direct allotment of all funds from a central agency.

12. It was not the policy of this Headquarters to stress savings during the campaign. It was the policy to have every facility available to those who desired to save. This proved very effective, as the amount of cash retained by combat troops was often as low as five per cent of their pay, while the over-all amount for the entire 12th Army Group was about eleven per cent.

13. The Section sold war bonds for cash and through the preparation of war bond allotment forms. Allotment forms were also processed for all officers of the Headquarters.

XI. INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTION*

1. The Inspector General's Section was established in London on 4 May 1944.

2. Inspectors General assigned to this Headquarters functioned under the immediate direction and control of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. At the time of the establishment of this Section, routine preparation for overseas movement (POM) inspections of all units of Special Troops were made to insure their readiness to perform efficiently on the Continent.

3. Upon movement of the Headquarters to the Continent, and upon activation of Headquarters 12th Army Group, the constant movement of troop units in combat areas presented many varied problems. Investigations were made of cases involving morale, discipline and efficiency of troop units, black market activities, misbehavior of soldiers before the enemy, illegal currency transactions, looting and pilfering, dispersal of art objects, desecration of church property, destruction of business enterprises, and the treatment of prisoners of war.

4. The Inspector General was originally charged with the investigation of war crimes perpetrated by the enemy against United States soldiers and with the investigation of alleged violations of the Geneva Convention.

5. Inspections of money accounts, the soldier voting program, and other routine matters continued in combat areas without interruption or delay.

6. Constant supervision, assistance, and advice was given to Inspectors General of armies and divisions and a system of replacement and training of junior officers in Inspector General's work was inaugurated. This provided an efficient and well-trained group to perform the complex and important final inspections necessitated by redeployment and discharge of thousands of troops from this Theater.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XII. JUDGE ADVOCATE'S SECTION[1]

1. The Judge Advocate's Section of the Headquarters was activated on 15 November 1943 and Colonel Clarence E. Brand, JAGD, named Army Group Judge Advocate. A tentative strength of two colonels, one major, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men was authorized for the Section. Colonel A. P. Miceli, JAGD, reported for duty as Executive Officer in December.

2. The first few months after activation were devoted primarily to planning. Since an Army Group, and consequently an Army Group Judge Advocate, were at that time innovations in the military organizational scheme, the entire problem of organization, personnel, and equipment was one that had to be envisioned and provided for without reference to precedent. Among other difficulties encountered was the destruction of the Section's equipment on 14 March 1944 as a result of enemy aerial action. The task of rebuilding began immediately.

3. Colonel H. W. Jones, JAGD, was appointed Army Group Judge Advocate on 4 May 1944, relieving Colonel Brand. Numerous plans, evolved within the Headquarters during the pre-invasion period, were submitted to the Army Group Judge Advocate for consideration and recommendation. The many and varied problems anticipated in a liberated Europe, involving among others, war criminals, prisoners of war, displaced persons, military justice, Allied military tribunals, and other international law problems, were studied and coordinated with other staff sections.

4. Colonel C. B. Mickelwait, JAGD, relieved Colonel Jones on 22 June. Colonel Mickelwait originated a request for — and obtained — general courts-martial jurisdiction for the Commanding General, First US Army Group, and subsequently, upon the redesignation of that headquarters, for the Commanding General, 12th Army Group. General courts-martial jurisdiction was likewise obtained for the Commanding General, Special Troops.

5. Prior to D-Day, at a conference in the office of the Army Group Judge Advocate, attended by the Judge Advocates of the major ground forces and Air Force installations, a proposed SOP for military justice during Continental operations, based largely on the Army Group Judge Advocate's prior combat experience, was drafted and later submitted to the Theater Judge Advocate and Theater Commander for approval. This proposed SOP was adopted.

6. The Section departed from London on 1 August, arrived in France on 4 August and began operations near Periers, France, the following day. On 23 August the office moved to Laval, France; on 5 September to Versailles; on 18 September to Verdun; and, finally, on 1 May 1945, to Wiesbaden, Germany.

7. Soon after its arrival on the Continent, the Section was reorganized and the various branches, i. e., Administrative, Military Justice, Military Affairs, International Law, and War Crimes, began to function under the direction and supervision of the Army Group Judge Advocate, with Colonel W. D. Partlow, Jr., JAGD, as Executive Officer. The original authorized strength of the Section had been steadily augmented until it aggregated a strength of fortyseven officers and seventy-eight enlisted men. The activities of the various branches during the period of Continental operations were as follows:

a. *Administrative Branch:* The administrative officer directed and instructed all enlisted personnel in matters of procedure and office routine, supervised and coordinated clerical and administrative matters between the various branches, and maintained the necessary records and rosters pertaining to Section personnel. This branch furnished typing and stenographic service to the Section and during combat operations was responsible for the packing and security of Section equipment on all tactical movements of the Headquarters.

b. *Military Justice Branch:* The Army Group Judge Advocate, in his capacity as legal advisor to the Army Group Commander, was charged with general supervision of the administration of military justice within the command. Close suvervision of all general court-martial jurisdictions was maintained, monthly reports required, liaison encouraged, and periodical reports and recommendations made in this regard. In order to insure protection to those soldiers suffering from battle exhaustion, action was taken to have every accused charged with a "combat" offense screened and cleared by a psychiatrist prior to trial. Information circulars designed to disseminate matters of interest to Judge Advocates of this command were published and distributed to the various general court-martial jurisdictions. At various intervals reports were rendered to the Army Group Commander as to the administration of military justice within the command.

c. *Military Affairs:* This branch furnished opinions and advice on the application and interpretation of United States laws, as well as War Department and Theater regulations and instructions affecting army administration and personnel. Legal assistance was rendered to Headquarters personnel on various matters pertaining to personal and domestic affairs.

d. *International Law:* (1) The International Law Branch rendered opinions on the application and interpretation of the rules of land warfare, including the handling and treatment of prisoners of war, paroles, protected personnel, use

[1] For detailed study see Volume X.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of requisitions, seizure of public property, punishment of prisoners of war and spies, and the use of reprisals. Advice was also funished to other staff sections and subordinate units on questions involving international law and the rules and customs of war. Coordination was maintained with appropriate staffs of our Allies in this regard.

(2) In July 1944 a request was prepared for authorization for the appointment of military commissions with jurisdiction in cases affecting the security or efficiency of our forces in combat. This authorization was granted by the Theater Commander and has proved effective in decreasing the activity of spies, the improper use of the United States Army uniform by the enemy, and sabotage and similar offenses. In August, the Army Group Judge Advocate prepared and published regulations covering the conduct of such commissions. Despite a paucity of precedence in this field, these regulations, fixing the jurisdiction and procedure of such commissions, have stood the acid tests of campaign practice and may be regarded as a model in this field. The availability of such judicial procedures for swift and effective justice has fortified the confidence of our troops and increased their safety and security.

(3) Among other questions of international law, which became a responsibility of this Section subsequent to its activation, were those pertaining to Military Government and the administration of martial law in occupied territory. Included in such questions was the review of records of trial in which death sentences were imposed by Military Government courts and which it was the responsibility of the Army Group Commander to confirm prior to execution. Likewise, the claims of residents of liberated territories to property located in occupied territory posed many difficult legal problems for this Section. Problems relating to civil affairs resulting from agreements between the United States and liberated countries were referred to this branch for opinion, as well as legal questions pertaining to the conduct of Military Government by this command in occupied territory.

e. *War Crimes Branch*: Early in September 1944 the responsibilities of the United States Government as to the apprehension, detention, and trial of war criminals was recognized. The necessity for thorough investigation of such crimes, perpetrated upon United States nationals and nationals of Allied and liberated countries, was apparent. As a result of research and study conducted in this branch under the supervision of the Army Group Judge Advocate as to the prosecution of persons suspected of violations of the laws of war, specific procedures for the investigation and reporting of all war crimes coming to the attention of members of this command were devised and promulgated.

Under that directive, the War Crimes Branch processed approximately 1,500 separate reports of investigation involving violations of the laws and usages of war by the enemy. A number of these cases were tried and hundreds of others were in process for early trial when the Headquarters was dissolved. These cases involved hundreds of thousands of victims of all nationalities, and each report of investigation was designed for utilization in the prosecution of Nazi perpetrators of war crimes. Approximately 325 members of this Headquarters were engaged in the active investigation of war crimes throughout the area of the 12th Army Group, and close liaison was maintained with 21 Army Group and the French Government in this connection. This branch has served as the focal point for higher authority in this regard, such as the United Nations War Crimes Commission, the War Department, members of Congressional delegations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). As our forces began to overrun concentration camps, such as Buchenwald, Dachau, and others, a central depository for bulky evidence, accumulated there and at other places, was established. This evidence was safeguarded for use in other investigations involving not only petty war criminals, but also those who were responsible for the general long-term policy of annihilation of other peoples, practiced by the Germans during the period of Nazi rule. This center has functioned efficiently and effectively, and there have been attached to this branch, with offices at the Evidence Center, French, Polish, Yugoslavian, Belgian, Czechoslovakian and other foreign war crimes liaison investigating teams, concerned primarily with those crimes perpetrated against nationals of their respective countries. This branch has laid the foundation for the ultimate meting out of justice to hundreds of thousands of war criminals who have perpetrated crimes against the laws of humanity during the Nazi era.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XIII. PROVOST MARSHAL'S SECTION*

1. The Provost Marshal's Section was organized by Colonel Claud E. Stadtman, Infantry, immediately after he reported for duty as Provost Marshal on 9 November 1943. Since the Army Group Headquarters had no prescribed table of organization for the Section it was necessary to draw up such a table immediately and to obtain the necessary key personnel and office equipment. This was accomplished during November and December.

2. The organization was designed to permit, initially, the planning of Provost Marshal and Military Police requirements for operations on the Continent for the armies, and, later, coordination and supervision of the armies' activities after the Army Group became operational. It was never contemplated that the Section should directly operate Military Police units or be directly responsible for their administration. Therefore, it was not considered that a large, elaborately organized Section was required. The organization adopted provided for an Executive and Administrative Branch, a Provost Branch, and a Prisoner-of-War Branch.

3. Lt Col E. M. Rudolph, CMP, reported to the Provost Marshal on 1 February 1944 and was appointed Executive Officer. He served in that capacity till the Headquarters was dissolved.

4. Initially, the Section was responsible for the planning of all military police activities for Operations "OVERLORD" and "RANKIN" and for coordinating this planning with the First US Army and 21 Army Group. This phase continued from the time of organization to 1 August 1944. At that time the 12th Army Group, which had landed on the Continent during the latter part of July, became operational, commanding the First and Third US Armies. Both supervision and coordination of Military Police activities in the two armies were conducted by personnel of this Section. In September, when the Ninth US Army began operations under the command of 12th Army Group, supervision and coordination of all military police activities were carried on also with that army. In March 1945, supervision and coordination of Military Police activities were extended to include the Fifteenth US Army.

5. From V-E Day, this Section, in addition to its normal functions of supervision and coordination of Provost Marshal and Military Police activities, planned the redeployment of military police units and the troop basis of units to be employed by the occupational forces.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

6. Details of the Provost and Prisoner of War Branches follow:

a. *Provost Branch.* (1) The Provost Branch was established in the Section during the first week of December 1943. Lt Col (then Major) Paul Philips, Infantry, was appointed Chief of Branch. The Branch was charged with planning all matters pertaining to military discipline, law and order, road traffic control, and criminal investigation for Operations "RANKIN" and "OVERLORD." It was also charged with matters pertaining to the Military Police troop basis and training and supply of military police units other than escort guard.

(2) Considerable attention was paid to the drafting and publication of a standing operating procedure on road traffic regulation and control (later published as ETO SOP #50) and a standing operating procedure governing the relation between Provost Marshals and civil affairs officers (later published as ETO SOP #12). In both these major fields existing directives were inadequate. Concurrently, considerable work was done with the G-1 Section in the planning for and publication of administrative directives on matters pertaining to discipline, apprehension and return of stragglers and personnel absent without leave, and for the evacuation of general prisoners.

(3) Initially, only one officer (the Branch Chief) was assigned to the Branch. Subsequently (in the Spring of 1944) two additional officers, Major Richard E. Barrett, CMP, and Capt George J. Adams, CMP, were assigned.

(4) During the first two months of Operation "OVERLORD" the branch Chief was attached to Headquarters 21 Army Group as a member of the US Administrative Staff there, where he handled the coordination of US provost matters with the British.

(5) In August, the Provost Branch launched into actual staff supervision of the towns assigned to it. Constant contact with the appropriate General Staff Sections of the Headquarters, the Theater Provost Marshal, and with the armies' Provost Marshals was maintained on all matters having to do with maintenance of discipline, law and order, and road traffic control. In addition, supervision of criminal investigation activities in the armies was assumed. The job largely consisted of constanly endeavoring to bring about uniformity of method in the armies, providing assistance to them in the solution of their operational problems, and looking out for their interests in matters of supplies and equipment peculiar to Military Police units.

(6) A basic troop basis of two Military Police battalions and two criminal investigation sections per army, plus one Military Police company per corps, established during the planning phase, was effected for all armies. In early 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a:: additional Military Police battalion was obtained for each of the three operational armies.

(7) In November 1944, as a part of a general reduction of the Headquarters, the Branch was reduced to one officer. This was insufficient to allow efficient operation, and finally, in May 1945, the Branch again was increased by two officers. Lt Col E. Barrett returned to the Branch to handle traffic matters. Major Benjamin F. Lehman, CMP, was transferred to the Branch from the Theater Provost Marshal's office to handle police matters. In addition, Captain William G. Yerg, CMP, was placed on detached service with the Branch and took over all criminal investigation matters. This resulted in a workable-sized Branch.

(8) From V-E Day onward, until the dissolution of the Headquarters, the Branch concerned itself mainly with the redeployment of Military Police units and the establishment of static Military Police operational methods in the armies.

b. *Prisoner of War Branch:* (1) This Branch was established in the Section during the first week of December 1943, and Lt Col (then Major) Karl F. Moessner, CMP, was detailed as Branch Chief. The Branch was charged with planning all matters relative to prisoners of war, civilian internees, and escapers and evaders for Operations "RANKIN" and "OVERLORD." It was also charged with responsibility for the MP escort guard troop basis and the training and supply of these troops. The Branch initially contained only one officer (the Branch Chief), but was supplemented by two additional officers, Major S. B. Paine, CMP, and Capt J. G. Allen, CMP, in May 1945, when the retention of prisoners of war in the army areas greatly increased the amount of technical supervision and administration necessary.

(2) The main problem during hostilities was that of maintaining prompt and rapid evacuation of prisoners of war from the armies to Communications Zone installations in the rear in order that the burden of supplying, guarding, and administering prisoners of war would not hamper operations. Continous efforts were directed to persueding the armies to site prisoner of war enclosures at locations where adequate rail and highway routes were available to Advance Section Com-Z, the evacuating agency, and to insuring that sufficient escort was on hand to accomplish evacuations.

(3) At the cessation of hostilities, the armies were no longer able to evacuate prisoners of war to Com-Z, but were required to receive and hold all disarmed German forces in army, corps and division enclosures for screening and eventual release or internment. At this time, the Branch was chiefly concerned with problems relative to the operation of static prisoner of war enclosures and to coordination necessary in transfers of prisoners of war among the US armies and between US armies and Allied armies when the area boundaries were adjusted to conform to those of final occupational zones and districts.

(4) During the months of March, April, and May 1945, the Branch acted in an advisory capacity to G-1 on matters perteining to recovered Allied military personnel. Several field trips were made to insure that existing SHAEF and Theater Headquarters directives relative to the handling of these people were being followed.

(5) Contact was maintained throughout operations with appropriate staff sections of this Headquarters, Theater Headquarters and with the army Provost Marshals in order to solve immediate and future problems in prisoner of war activities.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XIV. SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION*

1. This report covers the period 1 December 1944 to 21 June 1945. The Special Services Section at all times operated under the supervision of G-1 and not as an independent special staff section.

2. There is no record of the activity of this Section prior to 1 December. The Section consisted of one officer and two enlisted men and functioned chiefly as the Special Services Section for Headquarters 12th Army Group, rather than as one administering to the needs of the subordinate major units within the Army Group.

3. Subsequent to 1 December 1944 the same type of duties were performed, plus a routine relaying of requests from armies to higher headquarters.

4. On 20 April 1945 the Section was reorganized with a view of assuming its normal functions immediately upon the announcement of V-E Day. A new Special Services Officer, Colonel T. M. Crawford, Infantry, was appointed and instructed to expand the Section to the extent necessary to serve the major subordinate commands. Considerable effort was necessary to separate the specific duties of the new Section from those of the Morale Section of G-1, and from the Information and Education functions.

5. A comprehensive plan of Special Services activities was drawn up, implementing War Department and European Theater directives.

6. First emphasis was placed upon an athletic program, as it was immediately recognized that the cessation of hostilities, plus the stringent nonfraternization policy, would immediately result in a letdown of soldier activity, with a consequent major amount of free time which would have to be filled. To this end, Theater Headquarters was asked to delineate a definite athletic policy and the exact status of the supply of athletic equipment. Next, athletic officers of subordinate units were assembled early in May and a definite program of athletic sports prescribed. Every effort was made to facilitate the manner in which supplies would flow from warehouse to user.

7. After the indicated program had had a chance to get started, the athletic officers were again assembled on 7 June and given more detailed directives as to seasonal sports, awards, interarmy competition, and other incidentals leading to individual Theater championships. Armies reported that athletic equipment was beginning to arrive. Many problems had to be solved subsequent to V-E Day, owing to the highly involved shifting of all corps and divisions, both in assignments and geographically.

8. On 10 June, the entire Special Services Section, consisting of nine officers, was ordered to merge with the Special Services Section, ETOUSA, and moved to Paris to join that Headquarters. The Special Services Section of 12th Army Group ceased to exist on 21 June.

* For detailed study see Volume X.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XV. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SECTION*

1. At the time of the formation of the Headquarters, an antiaircraft planning staff was authorized consisting of one lieutenant colonel, one major, and two enlisted men. Personnel was drawn from the Antiaircraft Section, Headquarters ETOUSA. On 1 February 1944, Brigadier General Claude M. Thiele was appointed Chief of the Antiaircraft Artillery Section, First US Army Group.

2. Considerable time was spent preparing the AAA Plan for Operation "OVERLORD" and perfecting rules of fire and restrictions to flying, which would allow AAA and the air forces maximum freedom of action with minimum risk to friendly forces. The over-all policy and rules for engagement were published by SHAEF, and on 8 April the final Joint Operations Plan — US Forces, Operation "OVERLORD" was approved by First US Army Group, Ninth Air Force and the Commander, Western Naval Task Force. The AAA Annex of this plan covered the SHAEF policy with regard to command and control of AAA and the rules of fire were published by Headquarters First US Army Group as the first AAA Operations Memorandum

3. The strength of the AAA Section for the operational stage was set at ten officers, one warrant officer, and twelve enlisted men. Personnel arrived in April and May. Original planning called for the attachment of certain American AAA units in rear of Army areas to 21 Army Group prior to the time Headquarters First US Army Group would become operational. To assist in the administration of such units, four officers and four enlisted men from the AAA Section were attached to GHQ AA Troops, 21 Army Group, in April 1944.

4. On 14 July, all personnel of the AAA Section were transferred from Headquarters First US Army Group to Headquarters 12th Army Group. As Operation "OVERLORD" progressed the rear area of the United States zone was at no time under the direct control of 21 Army Group, and consequently no American AAA units were attached to GHQ, AA Troops. All personnel attached to 21 Army Group returned to the AAA Section shortly after Headquarters 12th Army Group became operational on 1 August.

5. At an early date, it was decided to publish an AAA information bulletin, covering matters of general interest. This publication, the "AAA Notes," proved to be a valuable medium of keeping units informed of AAA operations and of sending information of interest to higher headquarters. In October, the publication of "AAA Notes" was discontinued by this Headquarters, but a weekly

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

AAA activity report was submitted to Headquarters ETOUSA for inclusion in the ETOUSA AAA Notes. This Section also published a weekly AAA Order of Battle, showing the disposition of AAA units in 12th Army Group.

6. One of the early problems encountered on becoming operational was the establishment of so-called Inner Artillery Zones (IAZ). The necessity for IAZ's arose out of the inadequacy of movememnt of liaison information from the Aair Forces and of the extreme vulnerability of certain high priority ground installations to enemy air attack. Requests for IAZ's were made to this Headquarters from armies and then forwarded to SHAEF for further approval and publication. The majority of requests were approved. However, in September, certain aircraft corridors were defined by Allied Expeditionary Air Force, which were kept free from restricted zones. At the same time it was agreed that the number of IAZ's would be kept to a minimum consistent with adequate AAA protection.

7. In the matter of supply for AAA units, spare parts for the radar SCR-584 and M-7 power plant presented the greatest problems. In the early stages the supply of radar spare parts was especially critical, particularly in Third Army. At times it seemed certain that sets would go off the air because of a lack of spare parts. The situation improved somewhat in September, when a signal subdepot was established in Paris, but it was still critical in October owing to a lack of technically trained personnel in the depots, which resulted in considerable difficulty in the identification of parts. In November, the Chief Signal Officer, ETOUSA, sent personnel to the United Kingdom to locate additional radar spare parts, and as a result of these efforts the situation improved by the end of the year and was never serious thereafter. The problem presented by the lack of spare parts and repair facilities for the M-7 power plant, while not as critical as that of the lack of radar spare parts, was nevertheless very serious. It was not until the final stages of the campaign that facilities were established for the overhauling of these units.

8. The demand for aircraft recognition material was out of proportion to the supply, and this Section made efforts to secure such material for the armies. Some success was achieved in December 1944, but it was still apparent that the requirements had not been met. During the early part of 1945, however, a considerable amount of recognition material was procured and distributed.

9. Early in November, the AAA defenses of Antwerp and Brussels were given first priority for supply. This priority was maintained until the Spring of 1945. Occasionally it worked hardship upon army AAA units, particularly

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

in the supply of such items as radar spare parts, M9 directors, and new equipment. POZIT ammunition was released in December 1944; and while Antwerp units had priority on this, adequate allocations were made to cover all requirements of the armies.

10. During the rapidly-moving situation in August 1944, the inadequacy of early warning information from Air Force sources became apparent. Therefore, attempts were made to procure early warning radar sets for AAA troops in order to provide organic early warning. These attempts were unsuccessful, but the rapid advance in the closing months of the campaign again proved most emphatically that some means of obtaining early warning had to be organically provided for AAA troops, inasmuch as Air Force sources were not prepared to fulfill this requirement.

11. After the arrival of AAA units on the original Army Group troop list, about 1 September 1944, the chief concern of this Section with regard to troops was to expedite the arrival of AAA units still in the United Kingdom and those due from the United States. Considerable confusion arose when certain AAA units, orginally scheduled for arrival on the Continent directly from the United States, were rerouted to the United Kingdom. In many such cases the unit equipment was not routed correctly and long delays resulted in equipping the units. After such experiences it was decided to stage all succeeding units in the United Kingdom. Fortunately, enemy air activity during the months of September, October, and November was light and the flow of units was restored to a satisfactory rate by the beginning of December, at which time the need for AAA troops became more urgent. AAA units continued to arrive until the beginning of March, when the 12th Army Group AAA troop basis was completed.

12. At the time this Headquarters became operational army rear boundaries were drawn. All AAA troops in 12th Army Group were assigned to armies. AAA defense of rear areas passed to Communications Zone and was delegated to IX Air Defense Command. The question of the protection of airfields in army areas was a source of much contention, although it had originally been decided that armies would defend all installations, including airfields, in their areas. A novel policy was established whereby the Air Force AAA units would be attached to the armies for operations only, but it was found that in many cases AAA units so attached had to be logistically supported by the armies.

13. At the time of the Ardennes counteroffensive, a number of rear area AAA units were attached to First US Army to augment existing AAA and

ground defenses in Belgium. The usual difficulties in supplying these units were experienced as a result of their attachment for operations only, but assistance was furnished by the army. This form of attachment was still considered unsatisfactory by the Ninth Air Force, and in January 1945 a new system was put into effect whereby a so-called Army Group Rear Air Boundary (AGRAB) was established. This boundary did not necessarily coincide with the army rear boundaries. Responsibility for AAA defense forward of the AGRAB rested with the Army Group, while defense of all installations behind it was the responsibility of IX Air Defense Command. All IX Air Defense Command units attached to armies were relieved from such attachment, and when reinforcement was needed in the army areas the AGRAB was moved forward to allow army AAA units to be moved up. The basic motive in the establishment of this boundary, however, was to allow IX Air Defense Command to retain control of its units in army areas. As a means for reinforcing armies it proved awkward and highly inflexible.

14. In December 1944 and January 1945 a considerable number of air attacks on friendly troops and installations by friendly type aircraft were made. However, no definite information was ever obtained to confirm the possibility that the Germans were using Allied aircraft and, as a result, the policy of holding fire in such cases was continued. Ninth Air Force was permitted to conduct investigations of such incidents and measures for identification of friendly troops were intensified.

15. In February it was decided that experiments with the SCR-584 for mortar location should be carried out. Since this radar already was being employed by antiaircraft units, it was decided that AAA units should furnish the personnel for such experiments, although the final tactical use would devolve upon the field artillery. Consequently, a school was set up by Fifteenth US Army in March and three teams were trained for each of the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies. Ironically enough, these teams never had an opportunity to make use of their training in the European Theater since they completed the course in April, during the final stages of the campaign.

16. On 23 April, Colonel John W. Davis was announced as Antiaircraft Officer, vice Brigadier General Claude M. Thiele, relieved.

17. Following the cessation of hostilities, a conference of AAA officers was held to discuss methods for obtaining information from units on the basis of conclusions reached during operations on the Continent and to make recommendations for improvements in the T/O & E's. It was decided that the Theater

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AAA Officer should submit a questionnaire to all AAA units and that the completed questionnaires be analyzed and then forwarded to Army Group forces.

18. At this time AAA was called upon to furnish a large number of personnel for duty with the Communications Zone. Such duty included operation of military railway services, guarding and processing of German PW's, and assistance in the operation of assembly area centers. By the middle of June, a considerable proportion of the antiaircraft units of 12th Army Group had been shifted to Communications Zone, and on the 25th, at the request of the Antiaircraft Officer, the AAA Section was dissolved as a Special Staff Section of Headquarters 12th Army Group. One antiaircraft officer was delegated to handle future Army Group antiaircraft matters under the G-3 Section.

19. In this campaign, AAA units assigned to the armies of 12th Army Group were given an opportunity to show their capabilities against a determined and well organized enemy air force as well as to engage in numerous successful ground actions. How well they accomplished their mission against the enemy air force can best be expressed in figures. Over 3,000 German aircraft were confirmed as having been destroyed or probably destroyed by the AAA units of the armies of 12th Army Group, and of this total more than two thirds were definitely destroyed.

XVI. ARMORED SECTION*

1. The Armored Section was organized and activated as a Special Staff Section of the Army Group pursuant to authority contained in General Order No. 8, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 8 March 1944. The activation of the Section was a direct result of a conference held in the office of the Theater Commander, in London, on 26 February, regarding the specialized problems involved in the training, maintenance, supply, and operations of the large amount of armor that was to be utilized in Operation "OVERLORD". Present at this conference were General Omar N. Bradley, First US Army Group and First US Army Commander, and Colonel Edwin K. Wright, who was later designated Chief of the Armored Section.

2. The functions of the Armored Section were outlined in a memorandum entitled Functions of the Armored Section, Headquarters First US Army Group, 22 March 1944.

3. Immediately following its activation the Section operated in two echelons. The forward echelon — consisting of the Chief of Section, one technical officer, one warrant officer and two enlisted clerks — functioned with the Royal Armored Corps Branch of Headquarters 21 Army Group, initially located at St Paul's School, Hammersmith, London. The main echelon, consisting of the remainder of the Section, functioned with Headquarters First US Army Group, located at Bryanston Square.

4. During the period prior to D-Day, in carrying out its assigned function, the Armored Section was particularly concerned with maintaining direct contact and liaison with armored units being processed and trained in the United Kingdom; with the conduct of training and experimentation in specialized armored equipment (mine exploders, special assault equipment, etc.), both American and British; with problems involved in the establishment of suitable reserves of armored equipment; with the conduct of special firing and ammunition tests; and with the coordination of US and British armored units in preparation for the assault on the Continent.

5. On 26 April the forward echelon of the Section moved with Main Headquarters, 21 Army Group, to Southwick (Portsmouth), where it was placed in a better position to assist in the processing, final training, and marshalling of

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Allied armored elements being prepared for the assault and build-up phases of the invasion.

6. During the period from 6 June to 1 August, Colonel Wright, Chief of the Armored Section, and Major General G. W. Richards, Chief of the Royal Armored Corps Branch, 21 Army Group, alternated each week between Southwick and the Continent. When functioning at their post on the Continent they operated from the Tactical Headquarters of 21 Army Group, near Mosles, six miles northwest of Bayeux. This method provided for the maintenance of close contact with Allied armored units being marshalled for the build-up in the United Kingdom and France, at the same time retaining personal contact with Allied armored units already ashore in France.

7. When 12th Army Group became operational, both echelons of the Armored Section were joined with the Main Headquarters at St. Sauveur-Lendelin. From that date until the inactivation of the Headquarters the entire Armored Section functioned as a part of Main Headquarters, with stations progressively at Laval, Versailles, Verdun, and Wiesbaden.

8. During the same period, the Section continued to carry out the functions outlined in the original directive to the Section. However, many specific points of interest augmented the routine functioning of the Section, and they are discussed in detail in the Armored chapter of this report (vol. XI).

9. Shortly after the activation of the Section, a similar section, with identical functions, was established in First US Army. The close liaison between that Section and our own greatly facilitated the operations of armor in the early days of the campaign and established a system of mutual cooperation that was invaluable in the handling of armored matters. Based on the experience of First US Army, both the Ninth and Fifteenth Armies established armored sections as Special Staff Sections of their headquarters prior to the dates on which they became operational. It became habitual practice for each corps headquarters to establish a small corps armored section by the utilization of personnel detailed from Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the particular armored group assigned to the corps. The War Department soon recognized the necessity for armored sections in corps and higher headquarters and provided for them in changes to the T/O & E's of corps and armies, under date of 20 January 1945. Thereafter, the Armored Sections became integral members of the Special Staff at the army headquarters.

10. Since the end of hostilities, the Armored Section has furnished technical and operational assistance in the redeployment of armored units and in the establishment of the armored occupational troop basis. A final function was the summarizing of technical, logistical, and operational reference data on armor for further study and research by the Armored Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and for the information of other theaters of operations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XVII. ARTILLERY SECTION*

1. The Artillery Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group, was for a long period the Artillery Section, Headquarters ETOUSA. As such, it was called upon, especially during the planning phase, to aid in the solution not only of Army Group problems but also of Theater problems.

For purposes of this discussion the work of the Artillery Section is divided into two phases: planning and operations.

2. PLANNING.

a. During the planning period, the Artillery Section had two main functions: to solve known deficiencies in artillery organization, equipment, and training and to foresee possible future artillery requirements so that proper preparation would prevent future deficiencies.

b. During the same period, the Section was organized in four branches: Air, OP Operations, Munitions and Equipment, and Administration. One officer was attached to the British 21 Army Group as an artillery liaison officer.

c. The Artillery Officer initiated action to augment and revise the artillery troop basis. This resulted in an increase from thirty-two battalions to a total of 176. Major revision was an increase in the number of 8" howitzer battalions from twelve to twenty-eight and a corresponding decrease in the number of 155mm howitzer battalions from sixty-four to forty-eigth.

d. The Artillery Section aided the Artillery Branch, G-3, SHAEF, in the preparation and distribution of the Field Artillery Liaison Notebook. This booklet was designed to facilitate the work of British/US units when supporting troops of the other nationality. It was distributed down to battalions.

e. The Section also aided in the preparation of a Theater estimate of ammunition expenditures from D-Day through December 1944. This estimate was sent to the War Department in early April. Although the quantities listed were never delivered to the guns, the estimate itself proved correct.

f. Section staff members recognized the apparent shortage of T/O forward observers in field artillery units and initiated action which resulted in the addition of forward observer sections to divisional artillery battalions — three per light battalion and one per medium battalion. A similar request for observers for nondivisional light and medium artillery was disapproved. A recommendation providing for antitank subsections in the artillery headquarters of divisions and

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

corps and in the artillery sections of armies was made. These were to be provided by a special allotment of grades and ratings over and above T/O.

g. The Army Group Artillery Officer averted a critical shortage of graphical firing tables by procuring homemade ones from the Field Artillery School.

h. The Artillery Section, representing First US Army Group (and Theater Headquarters) worked with First and Third US Armies and developed policies covering the responsibilities for the supply and maintenance of field artillery aircraft.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. The organization of the Section during the operations phase was similar to that during the planning phase, except that for a short while the Section included an Intelligence and Information Branch. This branch was highly desirable. However, a shortage of personnel forced its abandonment. Also during this phase, the Section no longer maintained a liaison officer at 21 Army Group.

b. During operations, the Artillery Officer was the adviser to G-3 on the distribution of artillery and tank destroyer units. No artillery was retained under Army Group control.

c. The Section adopted a policy of considering a tank destroyer battalion as a semiorganic unit of a specific division. This improved teamwork.

d. The Artillery Officer was intimately associated with the development of an Army Group ammunition policy and was a strong advocate of the system adopted in October and November whereby credits were allocated to armies and forecasts of future allocations made to permit planning. The Artillery Officer was also the adviser to G-3 on the division of artillery ammunition among armies. The policy was to divide ammunition on the basis of the number of active and inactive divisions and of the tactical situation rather than to divide the ammunition on a "per gun" basis. This was believed to be sound, since the most important thing was to have the greatest number of rounds land in front of the most active division. The Army Group massed ammunition, not guns. Had it been possible, it would have been ideal to have massed both.

e. The Artillery Section did considerable research (including test firing) to determine gunnery problems incident to the introduction of Pozit Fuze to ground action. The results of this research were made available to the armies and, as an aid to development, were also made available to the ordnance Pozit experts from the United States.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. The Section originated and coordinated a program which resulted in the conversion of almost all towed tank destroyer battalions to self-propelled tank destroyer battalions. Battle experience showed the towed tank destroyer a poor substitute for the self-propelled one. A program to provide countermortar radar teams for artillery was fostered. During April, Fifteenth US Army conducted a school for these teams. At the close of the campaign, each corps had received one trained and equipped countermortar radar team.

g. The Section coordinated the movement of 600 T/E field artillery aircraft from England to the Continent during the first five months of combat. These aircraft were flown by Field Artillery pilots from Air Force bases in Britain. The Section also coordinated delivery to the armies of replacements of Field Artillery aircraft (and pilots) and initiated action to provide various modifications to Field Artillery aircraft. Notable among these modifications was the development of a lightweight radio case and the provision of plexi-glass inclosures to provide improved vision.

XVIII. SIGNAL SECTION*

1. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION.

a. The Headquarters' Signal aspect of the over-all planning included coordination with Supreme Headquarters, 21 Army Group, First and Third US Armies, and other associated commands in the layout and engineering of the main line wire network on the Continent; the allocation of radio frequencies and call signs; provision of visual, pigeon, and messenger (air and motor) communication; and the drawing up of operating procedures suitable to combined, joint, and intraservice operations. During the planning stage, signal communication for Headquarters First US Army Group was provided by agencies of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, augmented by a limited-scale signal center operated by personnel of the 302d and 305th Signal Operation Battalions.

b. When the Army Group moved to the Continent, initial signal communication to serve the Headquarters consisted primarily of hastily constructed open wire and spiral four lines, upon which carrier systems to provide maximum facilities were installed, together with limited motor messenger service. As rapidly as sections of the French open wire and underground cable systems were rehabilitated they were immediately included in the main network. The rapid advance of our troops following the St. Lo breakthrough imposed an ever increasing traffic load, far beyond the capacity of the limited wire network. To meet this overload, high frequency point-to-point radio circuits were established between this Headquarters and those of the two armies, together with very high frequency radio links employing the AN/TRE-1, 3 & 4 equipment, to provide additional voice and teletypewriter channels. At the same time, greater demands were made on motor messenger service. In several instances, motor messenger runs covered 700—800 miles, which represented a major accomplishment in view of the road conditions at that time. It was during this phase of operations that the Headquarters was divided into three operating echelons, each served by a signal center and with established signal communication among all.

c. The relatively static situation which prevailed when the Allied armies reached the Siegfried Line made possible the consolidation and enlargement of the signal communication facilities at the Headquarters and between the Headquarters and the armies under its command. The added construction of open wire lines and rehabilitation of existing open wire and underground cable

*For detailed study see Volume XI.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

systems were accomplished during this period and provided an extensive and reliable main line wire network, thus reducing the load on radio and motor messenger means. At the same time, existing operating procedures were perfected and new ones initiated, among which was the procedure for use on the administrative tape relay network beetween principal elements of the command. By the beginning of the Ardennes counteroffensive on 16 December 1944, wire and VHF communication was so extensively established that communication was maintained with subordinate units even at a time when the enemy overran and interrupted the principal lateral 20-wire open wire line between Aubange and Jemelle and the underground cables between Jemelle and Liege, in Belgium. Such an interruption necessitated the rerouting of wire circuits and motor messenger runs through rear areas west of the Meuse River, and implementation of the existing signal communication means by additional point-to-point radio circuits and air messenger runs. With the restoration of a more favorable tactical situation in January 1945, signal communication was restored on the same extensive scale as had existed before the breekthrough. The establishment of the Remagen bridgehead and the subsequent rapid push by our forces through Germany again presented signal communication problems similar to those encountered in the race across France. Again it was not possible to maintain wire construction and underground cable rehabilitation to a degree sufficient to maintain contact with the fast moving armies. The gaps thus formed were satisfactorily bridged by VHF and SHF radio links and resort was had to increased motor and air messenger runs. All during this period, traffic loads continued to grow, taxing signal center operating personnel and facilities to the utmost.

d. Upon the cessation of hostilities, primary emphasis was placed on the occupational military wire network and the orderly development of facilities to serve fundamental civilian requirements. Radio was relegated to a stand-by means of communication. Motor and air messenger services were maintained on a scale sufficient to handle traffic of low precedence and to locations with which electrical communication had not yet been established.

2. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.

The Signal Intelligence Branch of the Signal Section planned and coordinated organization of corps signal service companies (RI), established policies and supervised the activities of all signal radio intelligence units assigned or attached to 12th Army Group, and coordinated all matters of signal security and signal intelligence with Supreme Headquarters, Theater Headquarters, Communications Zone, and Allied Force Headquarters. Distribution was made of all codes and ciphers for the United States ground forces under the command of this Headquarters. Numerous enemy intelligence prisoners of war were sent to interrogation centers of Theater Headquarters, to the United Kingdom, and to the United States. Enemy equipment intelligence service for the Army Group was supervised, including the selection of targets and liaison of all army units with higher headquarters for the purpose of research intelligence. As the campaign lengthened, large quantities of enemy equipment were made available to our forces and personality targets achieved major importance. All radio countermeasure activities for the ground forces were controlled, including the regulation of radio traffic levels and circuit silence periods. Problems of interference and jamming were investigated and dealt with by means of special investigation units designed for countermeasures of radio controlled devices of the enemy.

3. SIGNAL REQUIREMENTS.

a. During the planning period, in London, the principal supply problem of the Section consisted of the preparation of signal projects for Continental operations and the coordination of all United States forces planning for Operation "NEPTUNE." Additional activities in connection with Operation "NEPTUNE" included recommendations for signal supply levels, preparation of signal logistical factors, and coordination with the Air Force on matters pertaining to signal supply. The Signal Section reviewed daily tonnage allocations set up for the pre-scheduled supply to the Continent and expedited receipt of signal project supplies for units of the Headquarters' signal service.

b. Emergency Signal supply requirements were processed and submitted to Headquarters Communications Zone for priority air and boat dispatch to the Continent. After arrival on the Continent, staff liaison visits were made and allocation problems settled by arbitration between signal staffs. After Advance Section Communications Zone and Third US Army became operational, signal stocks, which were in short supply from the United Kingdom, were made available from the First US Army stocks. Problems arising from such difficulties as late and uneven arrivals of daily pre-scheduled shipments from the United Kingdom and of effecting delivery of signal supplies from the Normandy beaches to advance units were overcome by the use of such expedients as the Red Ball Express, wherein a daily minimum tonnage was allocated by each army for signal supplies. Also, a series of signal conferences were initiated weekly for the purpose of coordinating requirements. A signal depot was estab-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

lished under the control of the Signal Officer, 12th Army Group, and proved to be of great value in supplying signal troops assigned to this Headquarters during operations. The processing of new Tables of Organization and Equipment, changes to T/O and E's, special lists of equipment (SLOE) signal projects, the introduction of new equipment, and the handling of all signal personnel matters constituted a major portion of activities during this period.

c. The supply situation continued to improve considerably during operations in Germany, and Advance Section Communications Zone entered actively into supply functions and was able to supply armies on a ten day requisitioning cycle. Items of signal equipment, the lack of which was considered operationally significant, were incorporated in a "critical signal items" list, from which Communications Zone was able to furnish the Signal Section with availability reports. Allocations were made to armies in accordance with relative operational requirements. As sizeable stocks of German signal equipment were uncovered, it became necessary for the Signal Section to coordinate all activities on the collection, identification, and rehabilitation of this equipment in Germany.

4. PHOTOGRAPHY.

a. During the planning phase of the Headquarters, the Photographic Group of the Section cooperated with the Army Pictorial Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Headquarters Communications Zone, in over-all photographic plans. Particular attention was paid to photographic coverage of D-Day operations and the actual landings of American forces on the Continent. At this time the only photographic organization available was the 165th Signal Photographic Company assigned to First US Army, which began covering American troops in action. All photographic activities were coordinated between Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the Army Pictorial Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Communications Zone, and armies of the Army Group. This included setting up a film return system, whereby transmission of exposed film to the Army Pictorial Service laboratory in London was expedited and prints and critiques forwarded to the armies. During the Northern France phase of operations, photographic coverage was greatly expanded. Expanded coverage for the Headquarters was handled by units of the 326th Signal Service Company (Photographic) and the 167th Signal Photographic Company. Special coverage was also made for the Headquarters' staff sections.

b. With the opening of the Germany phase of operations, Signal Corps photographers were covering combat operations of First, Third and Ninth US

Armies, plus any special coverage required by this Headquarters. Arrangements were made for photographers to view their work and receive technical aid. Radio-photo enabled prints to be released in the United States on the same day they were shot, and photography in color was also instituted. The 168th Signal Photographic Company was assigned to Ninth US Army, and later the 198th Signal Photographic Company arrived and was assigned to Fifteenth US Army. At the peak of operations there were five Signal Photographic Companies and one Signal Service Company (Photographic) in 12th Army Group. With the final collapse of German resistance, considerable coverage was given to war crimes, concentration camps, release of prisoner and surrender negotiations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XIX. CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION*

1. The Chemical Warfare Section was set up in October 1943, with Lt Col A. Leggin as Acting Chemical Officer and Liaison Officer from the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare, Headquarters ETOUSA.

2. During the remaining months of 1943 and January 1944, activities were confined to organizing the T/O and T/E for the Section, establishing over-all chemical warfare policies, and computing logistical supply data.

3. In February 1944, Lt Col Leggin was assigned to First US Army Group as Acting Chief Chemical Officer and the Section formally activated. Activities were confined to acquiring personnel for the Section, to liaison with First US Army in working out details for chemical warfare plans for the invasion, and to attending demonstrations of chemical warfare materiel.

4. The building occupied by this Section was destroyed on the night of 14 March 1944 by enemy action, as a result of which all records, files, and equipment were lost.

5. Colonel John C. MacArthur reported to this Headquarters as Chemical Officer on 1 April 1944. The remaining officers and enlisted men reported for duty during the remainder of the month.

6. On 16 May a detachment, consisting of two officers and two enlisted men, was attached to 21 Army Group to coordinate British-American chemical warfare activities during the initial stages of the invasion. During this period, supply plans of First US Army were reviewed, computations of chemical warfare ammunition for all units made, reserves for supplies established, and intelligence studies brought up to date.

7. Colonel MacArthur visited the combat areas on the Continent for a study of the 4.2" chemical mortar and the chemical warfare situation during the early phase of the operations.

8. The main detachment of this Section arrived on the Continent 22 July 1944 and the rear echelon on 2 August. After the complete Section had arrived, a detachment of one officer and one enlisted woman was placed in the Rear Headquarters and the remainder of the Section of three officers and five enlisted men at the Main Headquarters.

9. The initial duties of the Signal Section were to study the supply and troop situation and to make rearrangements to the satisfaction of the two armies then under Army Group control.

* For detailed study see Volume XI.

10. During the Germans' Ardennes offensive two smoke generator companies were converted from rear area static units to tactical troops to screen vital targets and bridges required for the movement of troops. Reconversion of these troops required new techniques and equipment. However, this was accomplished with a minimum of delay.

11. During August, the Section moved with the rest of the Headquarters to Laval and then Versailles, France.

12. A more lenient policy regarding the carrying of chemical warfare equipment was published during September. Troops were not required to wear impregnated clothing; gas masks could be held in regimental storage; and all other protective equipment had to be turned in to depots.

13. The Section moved to Verdun on 10 September.

14. A study was made late in September on the bottleneck which had developed in getting chemical warfare supplies up to forward army areas from rear area depots. This study entailed a check of all operations, from the issuance of a requisition by an army to the final delivery of the item to the troops.

15. Colonel Mac Arthur was relieved as Chemical Officer on 4 October 1944 and assigned to duty with the War Department.

16. A new T/O was received for the Section on 13 October, reducing the Section to two officers and three enlisted men.

17. A conference was held on 8 October with chemical warfare officers of 21 Army Group and 6th Army Group to coordinate chemical warfare activities on the whole of the Western Front.

18. Colonel Patrick F. Powers joined this Headquarters as Chemical Officer on 27 October.

19. Change #5 to ADSOP, 12th Army Group, regarding the carrying of chemical warfare protective equipment was published on 23 December. This policy required that all units in front of division rear boundary carry the gas mask and contents of the gas mask carrier and maintain full chemical warfare protective equipment.

20. Chemical warfare intelligence activities increased during October. Consequently, additional technical intelligence teams were obtained, information regarding possible enemy toxic installations disseminated to all units, and prisoner of war questionnaires prepared.

21. Mechanized flame throwers were made available to the Army Group, resulting in the establishment of a basis of issue and allocations. Instructors from the United States were detailed to all units using the weapon to give instruction in its use.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

22. During the Ardennes campaign, a revision of the assignments of chemical mortar battalions was made. A complete study of the losses in chemical warfare equipment was also compiled.

23. Due to the increased interest in chemical warfare and the tactical situation at this time, the Intelligence Officer of this Section was attached to G-2 for the preparation of weekly chemical warfare intelligence reports.

24. During January, a revised requirement for chemical warfare ammunition for the next six months was submitted. The unanticipated expenditures of CWS Class V items caused a large increase in the requirements of the Army Group. Maintenance day-of-supply figures were also prepared.

25. A conference of representatives of all chemical mortar battalions was held 11 January 1945 to study various tactical procedures and difficulties encountered by the battalions.

26. All CWS Class V items were placed under an allocation system effective 17 January, owing to the critical shortage of these items.

27. Brigadier General Bullene, from the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, visited the chemical mortar units of this command to study the causes of barrel bursts in the 4.2" chemical mortars.

28. During the month of March, all CWS units in the Army Group were visited by members of this Section.

29. A change in ADSOP, 12th Army Group, regarding disposition of captured enemy toxic ammunition was drawn up on account of the large amount of enemy toxic materiel captured. All installations were visited by members of this Section and reports compiled for higher headquarters.

30. During April, a Mortar Location Radar School was in operation in conjunction with Headquarters Fifteenth US Army, using 4.2" chemical mortars.

31. Revised flame thrower fuel, smoke, and protective equipment requirements were compiled during this period.

32. Upon the cessation of hostilities, all credits and allocations of CWS Class V items were cancelled, a revised policy on carrying protective equipment issued, and studies on the redeployment of chemical warfare troops submitted.

33. Colonel Powers was relieved from duty with this Headquarters as Chemical Officer on 25 May 1945, Lt Col Leggin taking over as Acting Chemical Officer.

34. Activities after 1 June 1945 were confined to redeployment of troops and compilation of reports on supply, captured enemy equipment and toxic ammunition, and recommendations regarding CWS troops and units.

XX. ENGINEER SECTION*

1. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.

a. The Engineer Section was organized late in January 1944 with an approved strength of fifteen officers and forty-three enlisted men, which was later reduced by eight enlisted men. The final strength proved sufficient for proper functioning within the Headquarters, but limited somewhat the freedom of officers to make field technical inspections. After early adjustments, the final organization was set up to include branches on administration, topography, intelligence, troops and operations, and engineer service.

b. The fact that the Army Group Headquarters was to be primarily a tactical rather than an administrative one determined the manner of functioning of the Special Staff sections. It was apparent from the outset that the control of mapping and map distribution presented a special problem entirely unlike that of supply generally. Accordingly, the Topographic Branch was made to exercise close technical control over army mapping and map distribution activities and to maintain close liaison with the Communications Zone and with British survey agencies. The Intelligence Branch was made to operate in a normal manner in making terrain and special studies, but having no field information sources under its direct control it was merely made to assure that basic intelligence was disseminated properly and that field engineer intelligence was supplied to higher headquarters and distributed laterally to other army groups. The Troops and Operations Branch, in addition to advising on the practicability of plans from the engineer viewpoint, recommended the assignment of available engineer troop units, the basis of issue of newly developed equipment, and changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment. The principal functions of the Engineer Service Branch consisted of advising on the practicability of engineer logistical support, recommending allocation of critical items of supply, and following up unfilled army requisitions for critical items. Minor functions included advice on fire-fighting planning and on real estate acquisition procedures.

2. PRE-OCCUPATIONAL PERIOD.

a. In addition to the usual growing pains of a newly-activated organization there existed the problem of developing a proper concept of the manner in which recognized engineer functions should be performed at Army Group level. Personnel for all branches was procured as individuals, except in the case of

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the Topographic Branch, which was procured as a complete unit from the United States. Branch functions were defined, a technical library, including basic engineer intelligence files, was quickly acquired, and action was completed on the organization of the Map Reproduction Detachment, which was attached to the Engineer Section for operational control.

b. Since the First US Army had been placed under 21 Army Group for operations, engineer liaison officers from Headquarters 12th Army Group were attached to the Chief Engineer, 21 Army Group. This action later facilitated transfer of engineer technical control to 12th Army Group, even though under the British system the Army Group has administrative as well as technical-tactical responsibilities. Assistance was rendered the First Army by checking to insure that it received all engineer intelligence available and by assisting it in technical inspections of its topographic units.

c. Close contact with the Theater Chief Engineer and with British survey agencies was maintained and a part taken in the drafting of plans for mapping and map distribution, which facilitated later assumption of control by the Army Group.

d. Within the Headquarters, activities included making terrain and special studies of prospective areas of operations. A study of the road and waterway net of the Contentin Peninsula was the basis for determination of the phasing-in of heavy engineer bridging and other supplies during the build-up period. Failure of the Germans to execute demolitions there to the extent expected made possible the provision of a more than ample cushion of bridging material for operations subsequent to the breakthrough from the beach areas. Among other studies made was one covering the north coast of Brittany and the immediate hinterland; one of the valley of the lower Loire; and another of the Quiberon Bay area and Belle Isle. In connection with the last, detailed studies of roads and of depths and bridge clearances of inland waterways disclosed the practicability of moving small landing craft overland for possible Quiberon area operations. Other activities included recommendations on assignments of engineer units to armies, furnishing files of engineer intelligence to newly arriving army headquarters, recommending changes in drafts of Supreme Headquarters' operational memoranda pertaining to the Engineers, and writing the "Engineer Annex" of the Army Group's plan for "OVERLORD," which was correlated with plans of Theater Headquarters and Ninth Air Force. The Section also prepared a series of basic outline maps of Western Europe and supervised the Engineer Map Reproduction Detachment in lithographing

and waxing of overprints needed for the G-3 Daily Situation Reports and for logistical and other maps required by various staff sections.

3. OPERATIONAL PERIOD.

a. Incident to the inauguration of the Headquarters' operational phase, the most important problem was the determination of the proper distribution of available engineer units between the First and Third Armies. The insufficiency of engineer combat battalions in the Theater was overcome partly by the agreement of Communications Zone to attach three General Service Regiments to the Third Army. The regiments remained attached until after V-E Day. Considerable and frequent shifting of engineer units between armies was required throughout operations. To meet the anticipated shortage of engineer troops, a call was made on the War Department to send to Europe combat battalions then in training, completion of the training to be assumed by the Theater. As these battalions arrived they were trained in rear areas, under a general program formulated by the Army Group Engineer.

b. Activities of the Troops and Operations Branch involved study of the capabilities of newly designed equipment and recommendations as to their issue; study and planning of road nets to support operations; issue of technical instructions regarding road damage expected to occur during spring thaws; studies on ways and means of solving the problem of using narrow standard bridges when these were the only ones available to transport the wider tanks and transporters being issued; study of the effects of flooding from the Roer River dams; planning and arranging for the use of naval landing craft and N.L. pontoons in the Rhine River crossings; initiating the design of booms for protection of bridges against floating mines and swimmer attack; and initiating the establishment of a flood prediction service for Rhine River operations.

c. The rapid advance after the breakthrough from Normandy introduced a critical situation in the supply of maps. This was caused by the failure of arrival of advance area maps from the United States on time and by enemy action whereby large shipments were lost. The problem was solved by air dispatch of 200 tons of maps and by utilizing Paris commercial printing establishments which, fortunately, had sufficient paper stocks on hand. As the front became stabilized and it developed that 1:25000 scale maps required revision, an extensive map revision program was initiated -- and completed — covering territory as far east as Kassel, Germany, by March of 1945.

d. Engineer intelligence functions followed the established practice of preparing terrain and other special studies. By study of air coverage, assault

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

crossing sites on the Seine, Aisne and Marne were selected. Photo coverage of the Meuse, Moselle, Rhine, and less important streams were furnished the armies, and engineer intelligence was furnished to the 6th Army Group covering its probable areas of operations. Much unpublished data on Germany than was available in England was brought to the Continent by air couriers, collated, reproduced, and distributed to armies. In collaboration with the Office of the Chief Engineer, ETOUSA, hydrologic studies of the Rhine were made and distributed. In April 1945 attention was forcused on the German "Redoubt Area," necessitating the distribution of road and bridge reports on that area. Closing operations required the dissemination of engineer intelligence on Czechoslavakia and Austria.

e. Initial supply interests after 1 August concerned rectification of the unequal distribution of supplies which had resulted from placing Communications Zone stocks on the Continent under First Army control. Following the advance across France, transportation shortages and long lines of communication necessitated allocation of maintenance tonnages to armies. Supply of heavy engineer equipment fared none too well under this system. Officers were dispatched to follow consignments through from base depots to destination. As a result, certain difficulties, especially in documentation, were encountered. Corrective recommendations were made and approved, which effected improvement in engineer supply. Operations disclosed that small parts, furnished with standard bridge sets, frequently were lost. Action towards establishing special maintenance factors for these corrected the difficulty. Other supply activities included direct control of allocation of lumber to armies; direct allocation of the somewhat limited supply of antitank and antipersonnel mines during the Ardennes battle; increase of Continental stocks of the M-2 treadway bridge to meet Rhine crossing requirements; clarification of split-service responsibility in the supply of engineer Class V items; and correction of deficiencies in spare part supply procedure in the armies. The early exercise of foresight in planning for Rhine crossing equipment bore fruit. Engineer supply support proved ample in all crossing zones.

f. During this period, the Engineer plan for operations "ECLIPSE" was evolved.

4. AFTER V-E DAY.

It was necessary to supplement engineer plans for operation "ECLIPSE" by arranging for heavy shipments of engineer materials from the armies to the Communications Zone for support of Com-Z's redeployment responsibilities. As a result of early listing of engineer intelligence targets, considerable topographic data and engineer equipment for research were shipped to Theater Headquarters. Production of materials needed for the occupation and redeployment was initiated and progressed with a fair degree of success. Action was initiated on the opening of minimum navigation channels on the Rhine in the United States area between Coblenz and Karlsruhe.

5. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

a. A discussion of certain general characteristics and deficiencies in engineer organization, equipment, procedure, technique and training is included in the Engineer Annex to this report. Most of these matters have been made the subject of separate letters to the War Department. However, it is desired to emphasize here the more important conclusions arrived at.

b. The engineer Army Group type of organization is basically sound and should be retained, although administrative functions of Group headquarters should be limited and more clearly defined.

c. The split-service responsibility of the Air Force and Engineers in the matter of control of mapping photography should be placed entirely with the Engineers.

d. Map distribution means were inadequate. T/O &E's should provide special units for the job.

e. Engineer depot personnel and equipment were inadequate. The organization should be expanded.

f. Means of communication provided for Engineer combat group headquarters and combat battalions were inadequate. More and greater range radio sets and more operators should be provided.

g. Divisional Engineer combat battalions should have a fourth lettered company.

h. T/O's of engineer units should provide for operators for a two-shift operation of certain items of heavy engineer equipment.

i. Control of the recording of minefields was not entirely satisfactory. In each Theater a central records office should be maintained.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

XXI. ORDNANCE SECTION*

1. The Ordnance Special staff Section was formed on 6 March 1944. Until that time all ordnance matters were handled by a representative from the Office of the Chief Ordnance Officer, Headquarters Services of Supply, ETOUSA. This representative never established an office at Headquarters First US Army Group, but was available for planning purposes, for attending conferences involving ordnance and for advising on ordnance matters.

2. During the planning period from 6 March until 1 August, when the Army Group became operational, the Ordnance Section prepared logistical calculations covering the reserve and maintenance requirements of all classes of ordnance supplies and submitted bids for ordnance tonnage. Each draft plan was evaluated as to adequacy from the standpoint of ordnance service. Recommendations were made covering the required priority shipping of ordnance service units from the United Kingdom to France.

3. Also during this period, an attempt was made to foresee, insofar as was possible, the nature of future operations and to plan an operating procedure which would result in a minimum of interference with the operations of the armies and at the same time provide necessary information to permit this Section to exercise the necessary control and keep the Army Group Commander advised of the status of ordnance supply.

4. Following the assault landing on D-Day, the Ordnance Section made every effort to obtain up-to-the-minute information on the status of ordnance supplies on the Continent. At the beginning, this information was obtained by maintaining the closest contact with the Ordnance Officer, ETOUSA, who received requests for critical supplies direct from the Ordnance Officer, First US Army. After approximately two weeks, the Section began to receive copies of supply reports regularly from the First Army Ordnance Officer. These reports enabled this Section to keep G-4 informed as to the rate at which supplies were built up and as to the status of supply of certain critical items of ammunition and Class II supplies.

5. Prior to the time Headquarters 12th Army Group became operational the supply of ammunition and of Ordnance Class II and IV items was handled by Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone (ADSEC), which then was under direct control of First US Army. All supplies on the Continent were considered as belonging to First US Army, since that army was then the senior US Army headquarters on the Continent. Owing to bad weather and insufficient unloading facilities, ordnance supply did not reach the volume that had been planned. For supplies other than ammunition, First US Army relied almost entirely on what it had brought along. Only very small amounts of equipment were on hand in ADSEC depots. As for ammunition, the expenditures during the first two weeks of July increased to such an extent that the meager reserves were being depleted. As a result, it became necessary to ration ammunition items in order to restrict expenditures.

6. When Third US Army became operational on 1 August, ADSEC was relieved from control of First US Army and came under the control of 12th Army Group, thus becoming responsible for supplying both the First and Third US Armies. As a result of the shortages, it became necessary for 12th Army Group to allocate between the two armies the available ammunition and items of equipment which were in short supply.

7. First US Army had been adequately equipped with ordnance general supplies and with ordnance service troops for the assault phase. Projects for Continental operations (PROCO) adequately took care of excess equipment needed for the landing operations. From the start, the Third US Army was short of ordnance service units, since their shipment to France was phased back to permit the rapid build-up of combat divisions. Also, due to conditions in the marshalling area many of its ordnance units arrived entirely without or with only a small portion of their basic load of supplies and spare parts. In general, Third Army combat units were provided with T/E equipment but Third Army ordnance units were almost completely without their authorized reserve. Nor did Third Army have any additional equipment such as was provided First US Army under PROCO projects.

8. The month of September was characterized by overextended lines of communication and practically no reserves in army or ADSEC depots. Although there was an increase in daily tonnage delivered, principally on account of improvement in the rail system, the only sizeable reserves were in the vicinity of the Normandy ports and beaches. Total hauling capacities were not sufficient to build up army reserves, much less to establish reserves in ADSEC and rear areas of the Communications Zone.

9. Following the race across France to the Siegfried Line, the month of October was characterized by a general building up of supplies for the coming offensive to the Rhine. There was an improvement in general supply discipline

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

during this period. Units were not allowed to go back to the beaches to grab equipment and spare parts. All ordnance equipment unloaded on Omaha and Utah beaches was sent directly to Depot 0-644, in Paris. Depot 0-619, near Cherbourg, handled the equipment from Cherbourg harbor only. When requisitions could not be filled at Depot 0-644, the items were back-ordered to Depot 0-619. Equipment was slowly moved from Cherbourg to Paris in order to facilitate deliveries to army depots.

10. Early in October the armies began to send requisitions for such items as ammunition for the 105mm M2 and 105mm M3 howitzers. It became apparent that the ammunition reserves, which had been dwindling ever since August, had at last been depleted. Until that time rationing had been on expenditures rather than on issues. There were approximately thirty-five ships of ammunition off shore, but unloadings had been drastically reduced across the beaches due to adverse weather, and sufficient berths at Cherbourg had not been allocated for the discharge of ammunition. It was agreed that a credit system of ammunition control would have to be started. The armies were advised of the situation and told they could not expect any more ammunition until the first of November over and above what they physically had on hand and what was on shipping order to them. Heretofore, all ammunition coming ashore had been shipped direct to the armies and, as a result, ADSEC stocks were practically nonexistent. Under the credit system put into effect, the armies' allocation of tonnage was used to fill ADSEC stocks. At the same time, as much ammunition as possible was to be moved forward from the Normandy depots. In the future, armies were to draw all Class V ammunition from ADSEC depots against established credits, and credits were to be written only against ammunition physically present in forward depots. The forward depots, from which 12th Army Group was to be supplied, were located at Liege, Verdun, and Soissons.

11. In conjunction with the credit system it was necessary to inform the armies on the future availability of ammunition. Beginning with the first of November, thirty-day forecasts to the armies were initiated. These forecasts were revised every ten days, so that the armies might always know what amount of ammunition would be available for the next thirty days.

12. A general offensive to the Rhine was started on 7 November and continued until 16 December. By the end of this period ordnance general supplies in the armies had been built up until they were in the best of conditions since D-Day. With the exception of certain items in critical short supply, all armies

had received their authorized T/E equipment, plus authorized reserves. The stringent restrictions on ammunition expenditures which were imposed during October had permitted the building up of stocks in forward ADSEC depots. The credit system, as established during October, was operating smoothly, and even though an offensive was in operation, the army tonnages were maintained at a constant level and the tonnages in forward ADSEC depots were building up.

13. The German winter counteroffensive started on 16 December 1944. At the beginning, battle losses in major items were extremely high. Immediately after the German breakthrough ordnance was given first priority on the movement of combat vehicles. Daily loss reports from armies were consolidated by this Section and forwarded to Headquarters Communications Zone, which in turn released equipment that was available. The Communications Zone kept in close contact with the Zone of the Interior, and as battle losses were reported they were immediately relayed to the United States for replacement shipments to Europe.

14. Until the time of the breakthrough the emphasis on shipping ammunition forward had been for heavy artillery pieces. With the change in the tactical situation, critical shortages of mines, small arms ammunition, antitank rockets and demolition supplies developed. Mines were available in rear depots and approximately 500,000 were shipped forward by express shipments. All available machine gun ammunition in the rear was brought forward but still proved inadequate to meet the high expenditures. Two boats loaded with antitank rockets and small arms were called into port and given first priority of discharge. The items thus unloaded were sent by "Red Ball" shipment to forward depots. Credits had been previously established, so that as soon as the items arrived they were reconsigned forward to the armies.

15. On the first of January 1945 the critical items of ammunition were allocated by SHAEF to 12th and 21 Army Groups. This allocation was in the form of rates which had been determined for each type of weapon. These rates were known as the "SHAEF Maintenance Supply Rates." 12th Army Group was allowed ammunition on the basis of the rate for each type of weapon, times the number of weapons of that type in the Army Group, times the number of days for which each allotment was intended. In order to balance stocks on hand, each army group was allowed an allotment for twenty-seven days for all weapons at the specified rates. The difference between these 27-day supplies and the quantities already on hand allocated to the armies as of 1 January, were either added to, or substracted from, the January allowance, depending upon

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

whether army stocks were smaller or larger than the calculated 27-day allowance.

16. With the elimination of the "bulge" late in January, army stocks of ordnance Class II, IV and V were built up in forward depots to support the coming offensive to the Rhine.

17. By 1 March, the stocks of ordnance Class II, IV and V were in satisfactory condition in all armies, and from then on till the cessation of hostilities the main problem was one of transportation.

18. After 9 May, the main task of the Ordnance Section consisted of redeploying ordnance units and shipping equipment. Extra burdens were placed on the armies by the early redeployment of ordnance units and also as a result of heavy demands made on the Army Group by Communications Zone for ordnance troops to carry out the redeployment program set up by the War Department.

XXII. QUARTERMASTER SECTION*

1. Following the activation of the Army Group, the Quartermaster Section was established as one of the Special Staff sections. It was initially headed by Lieutenant Colonel Murdock K. Goodwin, Quartermaster Corps, formerly with the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, Headquarters ETOUSA of Operations. Gradually, throughout the winter and early spring, additional officers and enlisted men were assigned to the Section. Colonel James W. Younger, QM, formerly Quartermaster, Army Ground Forces and Second US Army, reported for duty and was designated Chief of Section on 8 April 1944. By the end of April, several other officers, especially selected by Colonel Younger, had reported for duty.

2. Early Army Group activities embraced not only planning for forthcoming operations but also the establishment of the missions, functions and interrelationships of the various staff sections. When it was decided that the First US Army Group would be primarily tactical and not administrative, it became evident that the mission of the Quartermaster Section would be chiefly to coordinate and supervise, in consequence, the solution appeared to be that of a small but well qualified staff section. When the decision was made that the Communications Zone would operate directly under Theater Headquarters and not under the Army Group the decision was strengthened still further.

3. In the joint operation to establish a lodgment area on the coast of France, First US Army, under British 21 Army Group control, was to take part in the landing and was to be responsible for all American activities on the far shore during the initial phase of operations. First US Army, already organized in the United Kingdom, by early Spring had largely completed all its detailed planning. It was necessary, therefore, for the Army Group staff sections merely to screen these plans and to offer such additional advice as appeared necessary. Headquarters Third US Army on the other hand did not arrive in the United Kingdom until March 1944, and many of its units were still in the United States. Much of the Army Group's planning, therefore, had to do with the details of operation for Third US Army. Although the advance party of Headquarters Ninth US Army actually arrived before the invasion started, its particular assignment and mission was not initially decided upon and depended largely upon the outcome of early operations. Likewise, no detailed planning was done in connection with the employment of Fifteenth US Army.

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. Early Quartermaster studies included the assignment and phasing-in of Quartermaster service units, levels of all classes of supply and their build-up, and policies governing the methods of operation. As a technical guide, experience gained in the North African campaign, in Italy, and to a lesser extent on maneuvers in the United States was studied and analysed.

5. In order to administer U. S. Quartermaster Corps troops which were to operate under British control, the QM Section was made a part of the US Administrative Staff at Headquarters 21 Army Group a few weeks before the start of active operations. This assignment in no way relieved the QM Section from its normal responsibilities in connection with the First US Army Group. The United States Administrative Staff actually functioned until the Army Group became fully operational on 1 August 1944.

6. The Quartermaster Section arrived in France on 22 July. Control and supervision of QM operations until that date was exercised through the exchange of messages and reports received from the Continent. Initially, First US Army controlled all supplies that had been landed, and it was not until the latter part of July, after the port of Cherbourg had been captured and was in operation, that Communications Zone began to function. Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone, then took over a portion of First US Army's supplies at the ports and beaches and supply procedure was established on a conventional basis. Third US Army elements were beginning to arrive and, although Third Army did not become operational until 1 August, its build-up of reserves began.

7. At the time of the breakout at St Lo, substantial reserves in all classes of supply had been built up to satisfactory levels, and there was a steady flow of incoming shipments. After the breakout, the advance was so rapid that supply became increasingly difficult. It was not possible to restore the railway system in France as rapidly as the advance progressed, and service unit support, particularly truck companies, had not been brought to the Continent in proportion to combat elements. By the time the Seine was reached in the latter part of August orthodox supply procedures had been abandoned, but through the combined efforts of all agencies, and with every means available, support was maintained to continue the pursuit of the retreating Germans.

8. By early September, Third US Army was beyond Nancy, facing Metz, and First US Army had swept through Belgium and was close to the Siegfried Line, but the greatly extended lines of communication broke under the strain and further advance was impossible until additional supplies could be brought for-

ward. There were ample stocks of reserves of all classes of supply at the ports and beaches, but operations were governed by the amount of transport available. The almost complete destruction of the French railroad system by the Allied air forces and the retreating Germans made it necessary to rely largely on motor transport and supply by air. Every available piece of motor transport was put in operation on a "round-the-clock" basis; and still tonnage requirements could not be met. It became necessary at this time to make tonnage allocations to each army.

9. The next four months witnessed a gratifying build-up of supplies, both in the armies and in the Communications Zone. During this period, the armies themselves were relatively static, although the Third US Army was able to push on to the Siegfried Line and First US Army to hold its wedge into Aachen. Ninth US Army was assigned a sector on First Army's left and the army built up by assigning to her certain units from First Army and some newly-arrived units from the United States. Throughout the period, lack of service unit support was evident, although operations were not actually hindered. Early in the period, the Continental supply of Class III became extremely critical and the Quartermaster Section devoted much time and thought to its improvement. Ultimately, however, the supply and distribution of gasoline became highly effective.

10. The surprise German counterthrust through the Ardennes in December found the armies in a splendid supply position and they in turn were well supported by the Advance Section Communications Zone. This fact contributed materially to holding the enemy and driving him back. Third US Army, in the south, was suddenly shifted to the north, at the shoulder of the Ardennes bulge, and it is significant that in the establishment of many new supply points, and the abandonment of others, the operation was supported effectively. No large supply points fell into the hands of the enemy, although losses in unit and individual equipment were heavy. Refitting of combat units to replace battle losses was successfully accomplished without strain on the supply system.

11. Not only were operations handicapped by unusually heavy autumn rains causing swollen rivers, road failures, and a denial of the use of open fields for storage areas, but winter conditions were also unusually severe. Distribution of winter clothing and equipment had been slow, although large quantities were in the port areas awaiting transportation inland. Lack of interior depots retarded the flow and distribution of Class II and IV supplies, and a considerable effort had to be exerted during the early part of the winter in equipping the troops. Men did not actually suffer from lack of clothing, but rather from lack

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of uniformity in the type of clothing and, as a result, intensive studies were made, which led to Theater Headquarters recommending to the War Department certain types of cold weather clothing and equipment for use in the future.

12. As if to compensate for the adverse weather in autumn and winter, spring broke early and enabled the armies to reach the Rhine sooner than expected. Starting in February, and with the momentum gained by forcing the Germans back in the Ardennes bulge, the drive into the heart of Germany proceeded with good speed. The early stages of this drive were easily supported by the vast stocks of supplies which had been brought up in preparation. As the columns fanned out after crossing the Rhine, conditions began to approach those of the early campaign in northern France. The problem of restoring railroads in Germany again necessitated the maximum use of motor and air transport. This time, however, there were considerably more carriers available and the situation did not become acute. First and Ninth US Armies gained their objectives several weeks before the German surrender on 9 May 1945, but Third US Army was still on the move when the capitulation came, and supplying it became more and more difficult. The vast numbers of German prisoners taken, together with the release of even greater numbers of displaced persons, placed a tremendous burden on the supply system, particularly in the matter of Class I supplies, and the abnormal use of operational rations threatened to exhaust stocks on hand on the Continent. Following the surrender, better control over the over-all food situation was gained and more stocks of German foodstuffs were found than had been anticipated.

13. After the cessation of hostilities, many of the earlier problems ceased to exist and operations no longer had to be conducted under the stress of battle. When it was announced that 12th Army Group would be dissolved and its functions and responsibilities taken over by Theater Headquarters, inventories of supplies were taken and many reports and records completed. Brigadier General Younger (promoted from Colonel on 13 April 1945) was assigned to Theater Headquarters on 13 June and Colonel Hazeltine designated Chief of Section.

XXIII. TRANSPORTATION SECTION*

1. The Transportation Section was activated on 12 December 1943 and consisted of one officer, who was assigned and working with the Movements Branch, G-4 Section. On 1 March 1944, the Section, complete with four officers and four enlisted men, assumed its responsibilities as outlined in its activation order: to advise the Commanding General and General Staff on all matters pertaining to the Transportation Corps and to maintain liaison with transportation staff sections of subordinate commands and other transportation agencies. This entailed a review of Transportation Corps responsibilities for the planned invasion of the Continent and the subsequent transportation capabilities for logistical support of tactical operations.

2. The Transportation Section reviewed several proposed plans for Transportation Corps activities on the Continent and analysed likely Transportation Corps functions. Close liaison was maintained with the G-4 staff of First US Army and assistance given in the preparation of logistical studies of motor truck transportation requirements to support initial assault operations in Normandy.

3. Later, the Transportation Section, as part of the US Administrative Staff of Headquarters 21 Army Group, continued its assigned functions, integrating them with the over-all Allied plan for the invasion of the Continent. After D-Day, and while still a part of the US Administrative Staff of 21 Army Group, the Section maintained current records of movements to and from the Continent and continued its studies of transportation capabilities to support the current tactical operations.

4. When the Army Group became operational, the Section, to accomplish its mission of keeping abreast of transportation operations by highway, rail and water, maintained close liaison with the armies, with Headquarters Forward and Advance Sections, Communications Zone, and with the port of Cherbourg. Following the breakout at St. Lo, the speed of our advance increased considerably. The necessity for rapid rehabilitation of the rail net from Cherbourg and beaches to support the armies' forward movement was immediately realized. Also, it was found that motor transport then on the Continent was not sufficient to provide adequate build-up of supplies behind the rapidly advancing armies. The Transportation Section made strong recommendations for an increase in engineer general service regiments and the phasing-in of additional truck

* For detailed study see Volume XII.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

companies to assure maximum support in the rehabilitation of the rail net and to provide additional lift for the movement of supplies by motor transport. The over-all transportation operations were observed very closely in relation to the tactical operations. From time to time, logistical studies were made to ascertain the ability of the transportation system to support tactical operations. Current records were maintained of port and beach discharge of vehicles, personnel, and supplies, as well as the tonnages delivered to the armies via truck transportation and rail.

5. With an increase in motor traffic on an exceedingly good road network in France, the need for regulation and control of road movement was early recognized. The policy for such control and regulation was initially developed prior to D-Day and subsequently revised to fit operations on the Continent. The Transportation Section was responsible for contributing to the development of the announced policy for traffic regulation and control, which was published as a Theater directive. This included the establishment of supply routes to each Army and controlling all movements over them.

6. As tactical operations progressed and the armies fanned out in easterly and westerly directions from the base of the Cotentin peninsula, the lines of communication were stretched to their maximum and much planning was necessary to keep supplies moving to all elements of the tactical forces. As the drive shifted eastward, increased stress was placed on rehabilitation of rail lines from Laval toward Paris. Every effort was made to make use of all major and minor rail lines even though it necessitated long detours to get around major rail demolitions. At times, when continued progress of rail rehabilitation was retarted for the reconstruction of major bridges, motor transportation was relied upon to its maximum ability to furnish the necessary supplies to the armies. The long haul from the beaches and Cherbourg, with consequent increased turn-around of rail and truck transportation, continued to retard the ability to provide reserve supplies for the armies. However, with a pooling of all available motor truck transportation and the establishment of the express "Red Ball" motor transport system, increased tonnages of supplies were furnished the Armies as they advanced to the north into Belgium.

7. As the campaign progressed, and the tactical plan contemplated breaching the Siegfried Line at widely separated points, plans were developed to provide the armies with supply build-up which would permit an all-out drive through the Siegfried Line, with the Rhine River as an objective. To support this tactical plan it was necessary to standardize the rail operation to assure regularly

scheduled supply trains to reach armies daily. At the same time, all available motor truck transportation was assembled to carry the supplies forward from railheads behind the armies to army service areas and, in many cases, as far forward as division supply points. While building up supplies behind the armies for the contemplated drive trough the Siegfried Line, the rail net was hastily rehabilitated; and for the first time it became possible to establish railheads as far forward as corps and, in some cases, division areas. With the combination of increased use of rail facilities and the "Red Ball" motor transport system, a build-up of supplies in the forward Advance Section Com-Z dumps was accomplished to a total of approximately 400,000 tons. It was realized at this time that the effect of Allied bombing and demolition on the rail system had created a critical shortage of rail equipment.

8. With a turn-around time of twenty days from Cherbourg to army railheads, more than 20,000 cars were required to be under load or returning to provide the necessary daily maintenance and reserve for the field armies. To obtain maximum use of the limited rolling stock, the Transportation Section was in constant touch with the armies, the Advance Section Communications Zone, and the Office of the Chief of Transportation in an effort to speed up the unloading in the army areas and to release all empties to the rear.

9. Prior to the crossing of the Rhine it was anticipated there would be few, if any, rail bridges remaining. Plans were therefore made to make maximum use of all available motor truck transportation to support the armies as they established bridgeheads on the Rhine. This plan called for establishing a separate highway supply line behind each army, with sufficient truck companies to carry supplies forward a distance of one to two hundred miles beyond the Rhine. Sufficient truck transportation was made available to move a maximum of 24,000 tons daily on a one-day turn-around and with a proportionate decrease in this tonnage as the distance increased beyond the Rhine. In addition to a final total of 179 2½-ton truck companies operating in support of the armies at the peak of this operation, there was a tanker fleet of 17 companies, capable of carrying over 4,000 tons of POL daily on a one-day turn-around.

10. With the possibility of bridging the Rhine at Wesel in the north and Mainz in the south, movement of supplies by rail was again studied in an effort to obtain maximum use of this means of transport, thus relieving the severely increased burden placed on motor truck transportation. As the rail bridges were being constructed and our operational forces continued beyond the Rhine

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

toward the Elbe, the rail net west of the Rhine was rehabilitated at strategic locations, so that upon completion of the bridges it was possible to move supplies by rail as far forward as division supply points. As a result of the increased use of the railroads, motor truck transportation requirements decreased proportionately and it was finally possible to provide much needed maintenance for a large percentage of the trucks that had been in use in the Theater.

11. During the four months of the German campaign prior to V-E Day, the Transportation Section was engaged in planning for operations "ECLIPSE." Conferences with the armies of 12th Army Group, Headquarters 6th Army Group, and Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone were held to ascertain transportation responsibilities that should be set forth in the plan. A proposed transportation organization and outline of functions to be performed was finally approved and submitted to the armies. This transportation organization was to have been a Transportation Corps staff attached to each army commander's staff for the purpose of advising on all transportation matters when operation "ECLIPSE" would begin.

12. Following V-E Day, moving displaced persons, Allied prisoners of war, and shifting of personnel for redeployment involved transporting millions of persons. This presented a very difficult problem in transportation. Whereas prior to this time all movements had been generally in one direction — forward in support of the armies — it now became necessary to shift personnel and supplies in all directions. After a number of conferences, involving higher headquarters and most of the Army Group General Staff, plans were developed whereby, with a the aid of system of exchanging persons, proper documentation and reception, distribution points, and allocation of transportation facilities, it was possible to move hundreds of thousands of persons daily, far in excess of the original estimate. That this task was accomplished as planned was due largely to the rapid rehabilitation of the rail net within Germany and the employment of Germans in operational positions.

XXIV. MEDICAL SECTION*

1. The Medical Section was activated as a Special Staff Section by paragraph 1, General Order No. 9, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 26 December 1943.

2. The early weeks were devoted to routine office organization, to collecting and studying pertinent directives, circulars, and other material from the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon and the War Department, and to establishing liaison with other agencies in Headquarters First US Army Group, SHAEF, the Office of the Chief Surgeon, and the British 21 Army Group.

3. This was followed by a period of intensive planning for the medical support of various operations. All phases of medical support needed for the landings in France were considered. Recommendations were made for the use of LST's and hospital carriers for casualty evacuation, and property exchange and other related problems were studied. Also during this time, much effort was allotted to studying and advising the Preventive Medicine Branches of the First and Third US Armies on their preventive medicine plans; to establishing close liaison and good working relationships with army surgeons; and to visiting army headquarters frequently for the purpose of becoming familiar with army preventive medicine and professional problems. This office acted as a direct link and agency for interpreting field conditions between the Theater Chief Surgeon and the army Surgeons.

4. During the period from 16 May to 6 July 1944, the Medical Section functioned as a part of the US Administrative Staff (Rear) of 21 Army Group. The plans and the administrative orders of US troops attached to the British Army Group were screened, and recommendations for phasing-in of units, hospital carriers, trains, etc., promulgated. During the initial phase of the landings, all emergency air shipments of medical supplies were coordinated with Communications Zone.

5. On 7 July 1944, the Medical Section returned to First US Army Group control and preparations were made for movement to the Continent. The Section landed in France on 22 July 1944.

6. The Medical Section entered its operational phase on 1 August.

7. From the time the American armies broke out of the Cotentin peninsula until the cessation of hostilities, the distances from the front lines to the general hospitals on the Continent in most cases were too great for the patients to be

* For detailed study see Volume XIII.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

evacuated by motor ambulance. Air evacuation, when weather permitted, proved to be the solution to this problem and was considered the ideal one. It was felt that a certain number of transport planes should have been allocated entirely for this type of work. In doing so, many of the problems that arose, because evacuation was only incidental to air supply, could have been overcome. Not least among the problems that arose was the lack of property exchange. With each patient who was evacuated by air one litter and at least three blankets were lost. This placed a severe strain on the stocks of these items in the forward areas. With planes used exclusively for evacuation this property exchange would have been a simple matter. It was also felt that airfields should have been designated for supply and evacution every fifty to seventy-five miles of advance.

8. After rail lines became operational, hospital trains were used extensively. They were the only means of evacuation to the Communications Zone when weather kept the aircraft grounded. In addition to the regular hospital trains brought to the Continent,. French rolling stock was converted and used for evacuation.

9. Medical units in general were present in adequate numbers to support the combat troops properly. There were times when the 12th Army Group had fewer ambulance companies than were considered desirable; and for those units that were present, great difficulty was experienced in obtaining ambulances to replace those lost in combat. Although every effort was made by the Surgeon to correct this situation, there were three medical companies on V-E Day that still had not received their T/E allotment.

10. Medical supplies were generally adequate throughout the whole of "OVERLORD." Initially, whole blood was in short supply, and during this time the Army Group Surgeon allocated the amount that was available to the armies. After the institution of a program of flying whole blood directly from the United States, there was always an adequate supply and no allocation was necessary. Movement of medical supplies forward was somewhat of a problem at times. Items critically needed were flown to forward airstrips. Others were sent forward in hospital trains and by medical units going from the beaches to the army areas. During the Ardennes campaign, a considerable amount of medical equipment was lost, which was replaced without delay from stocks in army depots and from ADSEC depots in the Liege area. At no time were operations impeded by a lack of medical supplies.

11. The Surgeon instituted studies which, it is believed, will be of great value in planning future operations. Maintenance factors were determined for

each item in the medical supply catalogue. These factors were derived from records kept by Third Army and covered a five-month period of operations. Likewise, a continuous study was made of T/O & E's of medical units. Recommendations on desirable changes were made and, in some cases, entirely new T/O & E's were proposed.

12. With the beginning of difficult fighting in the approach to the Siegfried Line, and with the onset of winter, two major medical problems manifested themselves, viz., combat exhaustion and trench foot. Through the medium of "Health of Command Reports" and personal conferences with G-1 of this Headquarters, the extreme importance of these conditions were presented as command problems and command responsibility for their control emphasized. Casualties from trench foot became so great and such a general problem that drastic steps were necessary to control it. The Commanding General was informed of the situation by letter and by a personal visit of the Surgeon. This resulted in personal letters to each army commander from General Bradley, and, in addition, a directive from his headquarters. Following upon these procedures, and with much support from the Communications Zone's Preventive Medicine Division and from the Chief Quartermaster as to the supply of winter clothing, rates of trench foot decreased greatly. However, subsequent increases, as the winter progressed, required additional measures, which took the form of trench foot control teams in each army and the appointing of trench foot noncommissioned officers in each company-size organization. With the waning of the winter season and the application of these drastic control measures, trench foot ceased to be a serious problem.

13. As the move into Germany progressed and the Rhine River was reached typus fever was discovered — first in the Cologne area. Comprehensive control measures in the form of dusting with DDT powder, immunization, and the use of case finding teams brought this epidemic under control. As the campaign progressed into Germany east of the Rhine and concentration camps and other foci of typhus were uncovered, the disease spread and small outbreaks occurred in many localities. To prevent the spread of the disease west of the Rhine, a cordon sanitaire was established along the natural barrier of the Rhine. Dusting stations were set up and all nonmilitary personnel going westward dusted.

14. The handling of displaced persons presented numerons problems. Sanitation in DP camps was poor, and many potentially hazardous communicable disease situations were brought under control. A Public Health nurse organization was established and Public Health nurses deployed to DP camps to

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

assist in the many problems, such as child and maternity welfare, feeding, dispensary organization, sanitation, and many others. As the displaced persons and other public health problems were encountered in large areas, it became necessary to employ military medical units for their control. Military Government was inadequately equipped and staffed to meet these problems. Consequently, steps were taken to have Military Government personnel, equipment and supplies put under the control of the Surgeons of the various echelons. Public Health staffs in each army were placed on the Surgeon's staffs, and a coordinated effort made to utilize all facilities and personnel for medical and public health problems. The results of this arrangement ably demonstrated the necessity for unified effort and single control of all health problems, whether military or civilian.

15. After V-E Day, this Section was concerned chiefly with the withdrawal into the final US zone of occupation, redeployment of medical units, and planning for the medical service of the forces comprising the occupation.

XXV. PUBLICITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SECTION*

1. The Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P & PW) Section was activated 29 December 1943 under the provisions of General Order 99, Headquarters ETOUSA. It consisted initially of seventy-eight officers, two warrant officers, and sixty-eight enlisted men. In March 1944, this strength was divided in half — a staff section consisting of twelve officers, one warrant officer and twelve enlisted men and a provisional Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment under operational control of the Army Group P & PW Officer, consisting of the remaining personnel.

2. The Section, headed by the P & PW Officer, reported directly to the Chief of Staff. The dual function of the P & PW Section resulted from the overall planning which had preceded the formation of the Army Group headquarters. The principal public relations function was to provide facilities for release of news and information to the world press concerning the operations of the Command. Psychological warfare was the projection of information and propaganda to enemy troops, to enemy civilians behind the lines, and the control and dissemination of information in occupied territories. Both public relations and psychological warfare relied on the same media: press, radio, public address equipment, photography, and all types of printed matter. Both required the same types of specialist personnel and both had as their primary concern the dissemination of information of interest to the public. It was determined, therefore, to coordinate the maintenance and use of facilities and to centralize the flow of news and information through one staff section designed to assure its complete and proper treatment.

3. The troops (and equipment) necessary to perform the P & PW mission were assembled from various sources and formed into a provisional battalion, reorganized on 8 March 1944 under T/O & E 30-46 (dated 22 January 44), and designated the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion.

4. The 72nd Publicity Service Battalion consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (to which the 5th MRB Co was later attached) and a Headquarters Company containing communications, service, and administrative personnel to service press camps and to work in battalion administration.

5. Miscellaneous personnel, attached to 12th Army Group for special purposes, and some additional grades and ratings authorized for Publicity and Psychological Warfare assignments, were grouped in the provisional P & PW

* For detailed study see Volume XIV.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Detachment. The 72nd Publicity Service Battalion and the P & PW Detachment were attached to Special Troops, 12th Army Group, for administration. When the 12th Army Group responsibility extended to occupied portions of Germany, two units, called District Information Services Control Commands, were attached from SHAEF to 12th Army Group under the operational control of the P & PW Officer to organize and control the German press, radio, theater, and all other media of information within Germany.

a. *Publicity:* (1) Facilities provided for war correspondents included a direct communications system, housing, mess, transportation, briefing, current summaries of military and political news, and a press courier system for handling of film and press copy not transmitted by electrical means.

(2) Press camps were established at each army, usually near to army headquarters and at points such as Paris and Bremen. Personnel and equipment for establishment of all press camps were provided from the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion and placed on detached service with the major subordinate unit. Communications in the P & PW network consisted of three electrical means: teletype, radio, and high speed commercial radio transmitting directly to New York. A courier system, for rapid handling of news copy and film to Paris and London, was implemented within the Army Group area by motor courier and liaison planes. Normally, five press camps were in operation, accommodating approximately two hundred war correspondents throughout the Army Group area. More than twenty-two million words were transmitted to the newspapers and radio stations in the United States and Great Britain over the P & PW networks.

(3) An average of one hundred voice brodcasts weekly were made by war correspondents representing the Allied radio networks. Army Signal Corps photographers and accredited war correspondent photographers furnished more than ten thousand photographs weekly from the 12th Army Group zone of operations, which were developed and censored at London and made available to all news agencies through a pool of mutual contribution. Likewise, all army areas were covered by newsreel and army motion picture teams, whose censored films were made available through a newsreel pool in London.

(4) "Hometown" individual items concerning decorations, awards, promotions, and like matters totalled approximately 270,000 during the operational period.

b. *Press Censorship:* More than one hundred thousand submissions (nearly thirty million words) were processed by field press censors at Army Group

and armies. Nearly fifty thousand photographs were censored, though the bulk of news photography was transmitted undeveloped to London. Censorship in the armies was a responsibility of the Army Group Commander, who, through the P & PW Officer, appointed a qualified assistant as press censor. The assistant for press censorship arranged for security clearance of matters affecting Army Group tactical operations, maintained liaison with SHAEF and other censorship authorities, supervised the activities of all field press censors in the Army Group area, prepared censorship guidances on matters of Army Group interest, and furnished periodic "Trend of Copy" reports for the information of the Army Group and Army Commanders.

c. *Psychological Warfare:* (1) Combat psychological warfare closely supported all major tactical operations. More than 568 million leaflets were dropped in enemy rear areas. In addition to that, fifty-three million leaflets were designed and printed monthly in the 12th Army Group area on mobile printing equipment for artillery fire and fighter-bomber pin point targets.

(2) Combat public address units were available to army commanders on call. The number maintained in readiness for tactical employment was based on the number of corps in the line. The number of missions performed and the number of prisoners taken has never been determined, for the public address units mounted on light vehicles and on medium tanks were constantly moving from place to place at the front, making various appeals based on latest intelligence reports. However, many thousands of prisoners stated that they had heard these broadcasts and through them were finally convinced that further resistence was futile.

(3) Radio broadcasting and technical personnel assumed control of radio stations at Cherbourg, Rennes, Paris, and Luxembourg, putting them in operation as soon as they could be repaired. Radio Luxembourg reached all of Europe in several languages, and for four months, in addition to its regular broadcasts, the transmitter was the source of a highly successful "black" propaganda program in the vernacular of the Rhineland. During the Ardennes offensive, Belgian programs, countering intense German propaganda, kept the Belgians informed of the true situation and averted panic and mass evacuations. American Forces Network troop broadcasting transmitters were operated by Psychological Warfare technical personnel. In occupied Germany, radio transmitters at Trier, Saarbrucken, Koblenz, Stuttgart, Cologne, Frankfurt, Nurnberg, Leipzig, and Munich were taken under control.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Guidance and aid was given to the re-establishment of newspapers in France and Belgium. During the first few days of liberation in an area, public address units touring the towns and villages gave short summaries of news and other civil affairs announcements.

(5) In occupied Germany, weekly newspapers were established in ten large cities under the supervision of press control teams. Distribution to the area surrounding the publication center was accomplished without delay. A maximum circulation of four and a half million copies of each edition reached every part of the US areas of occupation. A weekly newspaper for displaced persons was published in four languages and more than four million copies circulated.

d. *Special Plans:* Under the P & PW Officer the Special Plans Subsection prepared news releases, radio scripts, drafts of public addresses, and information concerning the nonfraternization policy, with a view to wide publicity in newspapers for troops, magazines, and radio broadcasts.

e. *Visitors' Bureau:* During the planning period, the Visitors' Bureau was a responsibility of the P & PW Officer. However, when Headquarters 12th Army Group became operational on the Continent, this function was transferred to the Adjutant General's Section.

London, England

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



TAC Headquarters
Langley AFB, Va.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Rear Headquarters
Verdun, France

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Main Headquarters
Verdun, France

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Wiesbaden, Germany

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



MOVEMENT OF EAGLE HEADQUARTERS
OCTOBER 1943 —— JULY 1945

INCL. NO 2, FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HQ COMD'T. SECTION

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF HQ COMD'T. 7 12 45

Reproduced by Eng. Reprod. Det. 13 A Gp

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ARCHIVES
AAF
HISTORICAL OFFICE
588.01
1-22-X

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



9969-2A

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

G-1 SECTION
12TH ARMY GROUP

REPORT OF OPERATIONS
(FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT)

VOLUME II

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING PHASE OF THE G-1 SECTION

1. GENERAL 9
2. PERSONNEL BUILD-UP 9 — 11
3. PLANNING ACTIVITIES 11 — 13

PART II

OPERATIONS PHASE

1. ORGANIZATION 14
2. OPERATIONS BRANCH 14
   a. Reports 14 — 15
   b. Administrative Matters 15
   c. Accommodations 15
3. MORALE BRANCH 16
   a. Awards and Decorations 16 — 17
   b. Leaves, Furloughs and Passes 18 — 20
   c. American Red Cross 20 — 21
   d. Special Service 21
   e. Graves Registration 21 — 22
   f. Religious Matters 22
   g. Postal Service 22
4. PERSONNEL BRANCH 22
   a. Allotment 22
   b. Procurement and Assignment 22 — 23
   c. Reclassification of Officers 23 — 24
   d. Promotions 24 — 25
   e. Average Time in Grade 25
   f. Appointments 25 — 27

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. REINFORCEMENT BRANCH 27
a. Estimate of losses 27
b. Allocation of Reinforcements to Armies 28 — 31
c. Allocation of Reinforcements to Army Groups 31
d. Theater Infantry Retraining Program 31 — 32
e. Theater Officer Schools 32
f. Arm and Service Composition of Reinforcements 32 — 35
g. Coordination of Reinforcement Procedures 35 — 36
h. Combat Officer Overstrength 36
i. Control of Reinforcement Installations 36
j. Hospital Returnees 36 — 38
k. Colored Rifle Platoons 38
l. Overstrength for Occupational Tasks 38
m. Transportation of Reinforcements 38 — 39
n. Personnel Readjustment 39

6. MISCELLANEOUS BRANCH 39
a. Violations of the Geneva Conventions 39 — 40
b. War Crimes and War Criminals 40 — 45
c. Non-Fraternization 45 — 50
d. Allied PW (RAMP) and US/British Civilian Internees 50 — 52
e. Enemy Civilian Internees 52 — 53
f. Discipline, Maintenance of Law and Order 53 — 54
g. Looting and Pilfering 54
h. Aliens Among US Forces 54 — 55
i. Finance 55 — 56
j. Stragglers 56
k. Escapers and Evaders 56
l. Enemy Prisoners of War 56 — 57
m. Disbandment of the German Armed Forces 57 — 61

ANNEXES:*

		PAGES
1	Organizational Chart of G-1 Section as of 2 November 1943	ff. 62
2	Organizational Chart of G-1 Section as of 20 September 1944	ff. 62
3	Organizational Chart of G-1 Section as of 9 July 1945	63
4	Comparative Tables of Allotment of G-1 Section Personnel	64
5 & 6	Tables of Distribution of Non T/O Grades to FUSAG, armies, corps and divisions, 12 June 1944	65, 66
7	Extract from FUSAG Joint Administrative Plan for Operation "OVERLORD", 19 April 1944	67
8	Ltr. 322 (G-1), Subject: "Estimate of Battle Replacement Requirements", First U. S. Army Group, 27 March 1944	71
	1 Inclosure: Estimated Replacement Requirements and Replacement Flow (US to ETO) D — 30 to D — 209	ff. 72
9	Estimated Casualties for 23 and 24 July to 2400 hours and cumulative to same dates	73
10	G-1 Daily Summary as of 6 August 1944	76
11	G-1 Daily Summary as of 15 December 1944	80
12	G-1 Daily Summary as of 31 December 1944	84
13	G-1 Daily Summary as of 26 January 1945	88
14	G-1 Daily Summary as of 8 May 1945	93
15	G-1 Daily Summary as of 18 May 1945	98
16	G-1 Daily Summary as of 19 May 1945	104
17	G-1 Daily Summary as of 18 July 1945	107
18	Ltr. 685 (G-1), Subject: "Reservation of Locations in Army Areas", Hq 12th Army Group, 30 November 1944	109
19	Chart on Awards and Decorations	ff. 109
20	Ltr. 220.711 (CG), Subject: "Rotation of Combat Soldiers", Hq 12th Army Group, 14 March 1945	110
21	Time in Grade Survey on Promotion of Officers	111

* page 62.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PAGES

22 Ltr, 704 (G-1) Subject: "Estimate of Battle Losses March 1945 to September 1945", Hq 12th Army Group, 18 February 1945 112
3 Inclosures.
Inclosure 1: Comparison of Estimated Battle Casualties with Actual by Month, 16 February 1945 113
Inclosure 2: Actual Battle Casualties Versus Estimated, 16 February 1945 114
Inclosure 3: Estimated Build-Up of 12th Army Group (exclusive of Airborne Divisions) (1 February through 30 September 1945) 16 February 1945 115

23 Graph showing the difference between the estimated and actual casualties for both battle and non-battle casualties on a daily and cumulative basis ff. 115

24 Carrier Sheet — Analysis of Casualties by Divisions, 7 June 1945 116
1 Inclosure: Table showing an analysis of battle and nonbattle casualties within infantry and armored divisions for period D Day to D + 346 (18 May 1945) 117

25 Ltr, 322 (G-1), Subject: "Establishment of Personnel Replacement Priorities", Hq First US Army Group, 6 June 1944 121

26 Ltr, 322 (G-1), Subject: "Establishment of Personnel Replacement Priorities", Hq First US Army Group, 14 July 1944 122

27 Two Carrier Sheets and Table — Allocation of Infantry Reinforcements to Armies, 7 January 1945 124

28 Memorandum, Shortage of Armored Force Officer and Enlisted Replacements, Hq 12th Army Group, 28 October 1944 128
2 Inclosures:
Inclosure 1: Comparison of Armored Force Officer Replacement Requirements with Total Available Supply for period: 25 October to 31 December 1944, dated 28 October 1944 129
Inclosure 2: Armored Force Enlisted Replacement Requirements with Total Available Supply for period: 25 October to 31 December 1944, dated 28 October 1944 130

28a Memorandum, Infantry Riflemen Replacement Requirements to Support Divisions for 30 days, Hq 12th Army Group, 13 October 1944 131
Appendix: Sources of Infantry Riflemen Replacements, Hq 12th Army Group, 13 October 1944 132

PAGES

28b Carrier Sheet — "Infantry Officer Replacements, 22 November 1944" 133
Table — Comparison of Infantry Officer Replacement Requirements with Total Available Supply for Period 20 November to 31 December 1944 134

29 Memorandum to General Eisenhower, Hq 12th Army Group, 15 December 1944 135

30 Carrier Sheet — War Department Conference, 18 January 1945 137

31 Infantry and Armored Enlisted Reinforcement Requirements 12th Army Group, 18 to 31 March and 1 to 30 April 1945. Infantry and Armored Divisions by Army Groups, 11 April 1945 139

32 Hq 12th Army Group Reinforcement Requirements by Arm/Service, D Day to 30 April cumulative 141

33 Ltr, AG 200.3/1 RCGA, Subject: "Officers Authorized as Excess", Hq ETOUSA, 9 November 1944 143
Ltr, AG 210.3/2 x 322 RCGA, Subject: "Overstrength for Each 4.2 Chemical Mortar Company", Hq ETOUSA, 17 November 1944 144

34 Ltr, 705 (G-1), Subject: "Priorities for Return of Hospital Returnees to their Former Units", Hq 12th Army Group, 8 September 1944 145

35 Ltr, 383 (G-1), Subject: "War Criminals", Hq 12th Army Group, 13 February 1945 146

36 War Criminals Bulletins 1, 2, 3 and 4, Hq 12th Army Group 149

37 SHAEF Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany 154

38 Ltr, 091 (G-1), Subject: "Non-fraternization Policy", Hq 12th Army Group, 30 September 1944 159

39 Ltr, 014.13, Subject: "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany", Hq 12th Army Group, 1 May 1945 160

40 Ltr, 014.13 (G-1), Subject: "Policy, Relationship between Allied Occupying Troops and Inhabitants of Germany", Hq 12th Army Group, 15 November 1944 165
1 Inclosure: Items to be Developed in Orientation Programs 168

41 Special Orders for German-American Relations 169

42 Pocket Guide to Germany *(outside cover)* 170

43 Ltr, AG 210.3/1 MPM-GA, Subject: "Military Personnel Having Relatives in Occupied Germany", Hq ETOUSA, 15 May 1945 171

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

		PAGES
44	Ltr, 014.13 (G-1), Subject: "Non-fraternization", Hq 12th Army Group, 4 December 1944	173
45	Ltr, 014.13 OpGA, Subject: "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany", Hq ETOUSA, 4 June 1945	174
46	Article from Daily Mail — 3 February 1945 — "Three Frauleins Tried for Luring GI Joes"	175
47	Ltr, AG 091-1 (Germany) GE-AGM, Subject: "Non-fraternization by Germans", SHAEF, 10 March 1945	177
48	Ltr, AG 400.12-1 GAP-AGM, Subject: "Shopping in Germany", SHAEF, 15 May 1945, with 1st Indorsement Hq 12th Army Group, 21 May 1945	178
49	Extracts from ADSOP, Hq 12th Army Group, 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 8	180
50	Annex 7 to accompany 12th Army Group Plan for Operation "ECLIPSE"	183
51	Ltr, AG 091.1-1 CAP-AGM, Subject: "Treatment of Enemy Diplomatic and Consular Officials in Germany", SHAEF, 28 February 1945	185
52	Extracts from ADSOP, Hq 12th Army Group, 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 9	186
53	Ltr, 386 (G-1), Subject: "Protection of Property Belonging to Allied Nations", Hq 12th Army Group, 14 February 1945	188
54	Ltr, Subject: "Misbehavior of Allied Troops", Hq 12th Army Group, 2 April 1945	189
55	Extract from Hq Memo 89, Hq 12th Army Group, 1 October 1944, Subject: "Identification of Allied Personnel Attached to 12th Army Group"	190
56	Extracts from ADSOP, Hq 12th Army Group, 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 9	191
57	Extracts from ADSOP, Hq 12th Army Group, 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 7	193
58	Extracts from ADSOP, Hq 12th Army Group, 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 7	194
59	Annex 7, 12th Army Group Plan for Operation "ECLIPSE", 4 May 1945	196
60	Ltr, 388.3 (G-1), Subject: "ECLIPSE" — Administration of the German Disarmed Forces", Hq 12th Army Group, 25 February 1945	207
61	Paraphrase of Cable QX-20189 — 7 May 1945	209
62	Paraphrase of Cable QX-20303 — 9 May 1945	210
63	Paraphrase of Cable QX-20469 — 12 May 1945	211
64	Paraphrase of Cable QX-20496 — 13 May 1945	213
65	Paraphrase of Cable QX-20886 — 19 May 1945	215
66	Paraphrase of Cable Q-20887 — 19 May 1945	216
67	Messageform 370.01 (G-1), Subject: "Discharge of German Forces", 22 May 1945	217
68	Paraphrase of Cable QX-21501, 26 May 1945	218
69	Paraphrase of Cable QX-23423, 9 June 1945	219
70	Ltr, 383.6 (G-1), Subject: "Disbandment of Disarmed German Forces", Hq 12th Army Group, 18 June 1945	220
71	Paraphrase of Cable Q-24338, 20 June 1945	221
72	Messageform 383.6 (G-1), Subject: "Release of Allied Nationals Held by Germans", 27 June 1945	222
73	Ltr, 383.6 (G-1), Subject: "Release of French Personnel Serving with German Military and Para-Military Organizations", 6 July 1945	223
74	Ltr, 383.6 (G-1), Subject: "Interzone Transfer of Discharged Disarmed German Forces and Prisoners of War Between British and US", Hq 12th Army Group, 27 June 1945	224
75	Ltr, 383.6 (G-1), Subject: "Shipment of Prisoners of War", Hq 12th Army Group, 5 July 1945	227
76	Carrier Sheet, Subject: "Shipment of German POW from Com Zone into Germany for Discharge", 12 July 1945	228
77	Ltr, 091.711 (G-1), Subject: "Disbandment of German Armed Forces", Hq 12th Army Group, 12 July 1945	230

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT

G-1 SECTION

PART I

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING PHASE

1. *General*

a. This headquarters, activated in October 1943, was the first army group to be formed in the United States Army. As a result, when Brigadier General James E. Wharton was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on 22 October 1943, he found himself faced with several unique G-1 problems. Of immediate concern was the necessity for establishing the personnel requirements to permit this headquarters and Special Troops to function efficiently, both in their planning and operational missions. In addition, and of paramount importance, were the G-1 planning responsibilities for the administrative support of two operations then under consideration — "OVERLORD", the plan for large scale landings on the continent of Europe, and "RANKIN C", the plan for operations in the event of a pre-invasion German collapse.

b. To meet these particular problems most effectively and also to expedite handling of routine G-1 matters, General Wharton formed the G-1 Section personnel into branches and delegated specific responsibilities to each (Annex 1).* After the headquarters became operational in August 1944, and G-1 responsibilities clarified, the section was reorganized to meet these new operational requirements (Annex 2).* Then, after V-E Day, when the emphasis shifted from operations to readjustment and redeployment, the branches of the G-1 Section were again reorganized (Annex 3).* During the whole period of operations, the grades and ratings authorized for the G-1 Section were changed from time to time as conditions warranted (Annex 4).*

2. *Personnel Build-up*

a. Immediately upon activation in October 1943, of Headquarters and Special Troops, FUSAG, under T/O 300-1-2-3, it became evident that the personnel authorized under these tables would not be adequate for either the planning or operational phases. A table of distribution was therefore drawn up by the Personnel Branch for the requirements of the planning phase, and a request submitted to Headquarters European Theater of Operations for non-T/O grades to cover personnel requirements over and above the provisions of T/O

* See pages ff. p. 62.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

300-1-2-3. This request totaled 188 officers, 12 warrant officers, and no enlisted grades. Of the number requested, only 40 officer and 12 warrant officer grades were available, and these were allotted by letter, Headquarters ETOUSA, 12 December 1943.

b. As "OVERLORD" planning progressed, and the mission of the headquarters was somewhat clarified, it was possible to prepare reasonably firm estimates of personnel requirements of Headquarters and Special Troops, FUSAG, in its operational role. These estimates were presented in the form of a request, to Headquarters ETOUSA for additional non-T/O grades, and by ETOUSA letter dated 15 March 1944, a total of 431 officers, 35 warrant officers, and 1030 enlisted personnel were authorized. Requirements for augmentation of the headquarters of First and Third US Armies and the corps and divisions thereof, together with additional requirements made on this headquarters by higher headquarters, made necessary an additional request for non-T/O grades, which were approved by the War Department in message WAR-18103 dated 3 April 1944. On 5 April 1944, the Chief of Staff approved a table of distribution of 513 officers, 41 warrant officers, and 1137 enlisted men for Headquarters and Special Troops, FUSAG. The additional grades were allotted to First and Third US Armies on the basis of 59 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 90 enlisted men for each army headquarters, 2 officers and 1 enlisted man for each corps headquarters, and 1 officer and 3 enlisted men for each division headquarters.

c. In anticipation of the arrival of new armies, corps, and divisions in the theater, and their eventual assignment to army group, a request was dispatched to Headquarters ETOUSA on 30 May for additional non-T/O grades to permit their augmentation for the special requirements of this theater, including Air-Ground Liaison, Artillery Antitank, Photo Interpretation, Publicity and Psychological Warfare, Passive Air Defense, Armored and Provost Marshal functions. Grades were subsequently allotted for this requirement, and were allotted to subordinate units as available.

d. Numerous changes in the internal distribution of grades within the command were made necessary by changing requirements, and these changes continued throughout the planning phases. Under date of 12 June, this headquarters published a table of distribution of non-T/O grades to FUSAG, armies, corps and divisions, which table was in effect, with minor changes, at the time this headquarters became operational on 1 August 1944 (Annexes 5 and 6).*

e. The initial cadre of personnel for army group headquarters was drawn from personnel assigned to Headquarters ETOUSA. Additional personnel

* pages 65, 66

were required immediately for the headquarters and for Special Troops. In the early stages the bulk of the work of the Personnel Branch, in addition to planning for future operations and securing authorization for required personnel, was in the field of selection and procurement of the most highly qualified officers who could be made available in the theater, and subsequently in preparing requisitions by qualification to be filled in the Zone of Interior.

f. It became apparent early to senior commanders that the shortage of officers qualified to command regiments and battalions in combat operations, and the losses which would be sustained among these officers, necessitated the formation of a pool of officers who could be given "on the job" command training in combat and would be immediately available as replacements. Recommendations for such commanders were solicited throughout the theater, and the Personnel Branch made surveys and prepared studies from which the best qualified officers could be selected. "Spare" regimental commanders were first authorized by the War Department in message R-2, dated 29 February 1944, on the basis of one per division. "Spare" battalion commanders were subsequently authorized on the basis of two per division by 1st Ind, Hq ETOUSA, dated 22 May 1944. After qualified personnel available in the theater had been selected and assigned, the remainder required to fill needs then current were requested from the War Department.

3. Planning Activities

a. The general planning mission given this headquarters by SHAEF and 21 Army Group was the preparation and coordination of administrative plans for the support of all US Forces on the continent after the assault phase D to D + 15. G-1 in turn, was charged with drafting and coordinating plans on all pertinent G-1 matters.

b. To carry out this planning responsibility, the Replacement and Prisoner of War Branch formulated personnel reinforcement plans for the support of operations. An extract of the reinforcement paragraph of the Joint Administrative Plan for operation "OVERLORD" is shown in Annex 7.* One of the guiding principles pertaining to reinforcement planning was that one reinforcement battalion (separate) would be established on the continent for, and in close support of, each army corps as directed by armies, and that one reinforcement depot for each army would be established on the continent as early as practicable to operate under army control. This plan also provided that a reserve of reinforcements would be built up on the continent as soon as

* page 67

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

practicable, and further, that the installations of the Field Force Replacement System (later designated Ground Force Reinforcement Command) would be established on the continent under the supervision of the Communications Zone as required for the supply of reinforcements. Another important feature of this plan was that the responsibility for arming and equipping reinforcements was definitely settled on the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

c. In order to help effect an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements to the continent, advance estimates of battle casualties and net battle reinforcement requirements were made for a least six months ahead and submitted to theater headquarters. Theater then consolidated both battle and non-battle reinforcement requirements and submitted a requisition to the War Department, thereby enabling the War Department to take the necessary steps to make available these reinforcements in the required numbers by arms and services and on the dates specified.

d. The first estimate of battle reinforcement requirements submitted by First US Army Group to theater headquarters for support of Operation "OVERLORD" is contained in letter, Headquarters First US Army Group, AG 322 (G-1), subject: "Replacement Estimates for Field Forces", dated 26 January 1944. This estimate was later superseded by the estimate of battle casualties and net battle reinforcement requirements contained in letter, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 27 March 1944 (Annex 8).* This 27 March 1944 estimate was based on revised operational plans and reflected a large increase over the previous estimate of battle losses. Estimate of the airborne casualties for period D Day to D + 3 was prepared by the Reinforcement Branch, with the aid of representatives from the airborne divisions and by use of experienced airborne casualty factors published by SHAEF. The airborne estimate is contained in the 27 Marh 1944 letter (Annex 8).*

e. On the basis of Headquarters First US Army Group's estimate of reinforcement requirements contained in Annex 8, together with army group Surgeon's estimate on evacuation policies on the Continent, an estimate of the personnel shipping lift to be reserved for daily shipments of reinforcements during the period D + 15 to D + 41 was prepared by the Reinforcement Branch and submitted to G-3 about 10 April 1944. These figures were used by G-3 in setting up shipping priority tables covering that period. Similar estimates of the daily reinforcement shipping lift required during period D + 41 to D + 90 were subsequently prepared and submitted to G-3 about the latter part of April for incorporation in appropriate shipping priority tables.

* page 71

f. The Replacement and Prisoner of War Branch also formulated plans in conjunction with the Provost Marshal regarding the collection, handling, and evacuation of prisoners of war.

g. The Miscellaneous Branch prepared plans for all other G-1 matters, chiefly as regards burial and graves registration, postal services, special service activities, and awards and decorations. In addition, plans were worked out jointly with the British on such matters as reciprocal police powers, allied prisoners of war in enemy hands, and stragglers, insofar as they affected the British. During this period this branch made a continuing study of the troop lift to insure that an adequate and timely flow was maintained of such G-1 service units as Special Service Companies, Finance Disbursing Sections, Army Postal Units, Graves Registration Companies, Military Police Units, and ARC Clubmobile Groups.

h. Upon the Plans Branch devolved the responsibility for editing these plans and bringing them into harmony with the assault phase plan of First US Army and with plans of 21 Army Group. The finally approved plans were published 19 April 1944, in the Joint Administrative Plan to Operation "OVERLORD" which served as the administrative guide to all member armies of the group.

i. On 2 May 1944, Colonel George A. Miller was announced Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, during temporary absence of Brigadier General Wharton. Shortly thereafter, G-1 representatives formed part of the US Administrative Staff at both echelons of 21 Army Group, with the mission of providing close coordination of G-1 interests during the final planning phase and the opening operational phase of the invasion of Normandy.

j. Immediately following D-Day, the G-1 increment at 21 Army Group MAIN began compiling a daily report of previous days casualties, strengths, prisoner of war captures, and reinforcements received data. While US Forces were under British control, this information was submitted as part of 21 Army Group daily situation report — "A" SITREPS. Through the medium of these reports, pertinent information pertaining to US continental operations was supplied to the G-1 Section at FUSAG, who in turn furnished the information to all interested staff sections. A copy of the US portion of the "A" SITREPS for 23 July 1944 is attached as Annex 9.*

* page 73

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

OPERATIONS PHASE

1. ORGANIZATION

On 1 August 1944, 12th Army Group became operational on the continent. Brigadier General (then Colonel) J. J. O'Hare was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on the same date. To cope more effectively with the operational problems now confronting G-1, a general reorganization of branch responsibilities was effected (Annex 2).* This new delegation of branch responsibilities remained relatively stable during the entire period of operations.

2. OPERATIONS BRANCH

a. *Reports.*

(1) All required reports on G-1 matters were prepared by this branch. Initially, these included the weekly G-1 Periodic Report and a weekly Strength Report, but SHAEF cancelled these reports early in September 1944, when all the required information was submitted daily in the G-1 Daily Summary.

(2) The G-1 Daily Summary, issued continuously from 6 August 1944 to the dissolution of this headquarters, constituted the fastet information available to the Army Group Commander on strengths, casualties, prisoner of war captures, and reinforcement status of all armies, corps and divisions under his command. Information as of midnight covering the previous twenty-four hours was submitted daily by all headquarters immediately subordinate to 12th Army Group. All figures were consolidated by divisions, by corps for corps troops only, by army for army troops to include all attached units. Figures for corps and army troops were broken down into combat troops and service troops. All combat troop figures reflected daily changes, while service troop figures were adjusted weekly. During periods of fast moving military situations, the information was estimated for any units temporarily out of contact. All necessary adjustments to reflect any later and more accurate information were made in the cumulative casualty figures. The casualty figures as rapidly reported in the G-1 Daily Summary were found to be less than 4% off from the machine records figures. The summary was given wide distribution to the staff sections of this and higher headquarters.

* ff. page 62

(3) The first G-1 Summary published (6 August 1944) is attached as Annex 10.* In addition, summaries covering key dates of the "Battle of the Bulge" are also included — as of 2400 hours, 15 December 1944, the day before the Germans struck (Annex 11);* 31 December 1944 (Annex 12);* and 26 January 1945, the termination date of the "Battle" (Annex 13).* The situation at the cessation of hostilities is reflected in the summary for midnight 8 May 1945 (Annex 14).* The last full scale G-1 Summary published was as of midnight 18 May 1945 (Annex 15),* and included casualty information of the Seventh US Army, transferred to 12th Army Group control a few days before.

(4) Beginning with the issue of 19 May 1945, the G-1 Summary was simplified to provide information only on strength data and the progress of the disbandment of the disarmed enemy forces. The Summary as of 2400 hours, 19 May is attached hereto (Annex 16)* and also latest published Summary available, as of 2400 hours, 18 July 1945 (Annex 17).*

b. *Administrative Matters.*

The coordination of all necessary revisions of plans and the preparation of the G-1 portion of administrative orders and instructions were carried out by the Operations Branch. In addition, the G-1 administrative map showing locations of all major headquarters and installations of G-1 interest was maintained. All internal matters of section administration were handled.

c. *Accommodations.*

The Operations Branch formulated and supervised the execution of a policy for the reservation of accommodations in army areas for all installations not under army commanders' control. A copy of basic policy letter in regard to reservation of locations is inclosed as Annex 18.* To facilitate tactical air-ground cooperation, army commanders were given authority to reserve locations for installations of their supporting tactical air force. The general policy of this headquarters was to authorize direct contact with armies for all accommodation matters except those relative to moves of major headquarters.

* page 76 and ff.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. MORALE BRANCH

a. *Awards and Decorations.*

(1) The consistent achievement of the high standard of performance of duty required of corps and divisions in combat indicated that appropriate recognition as regards awards and decorations should be given as early as practicable. Therefore, the Morale Branch recommended that after six weeks of successful command in combat, corps and division commanders could be recommended for award of the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL; artillery commanders, assistant division commanders, and chiefs of staff of corps and divisions, could be recommended for award of the LEGION OF MERIT. This recommendation was approved by the Theater Commander and the War Department. The Army Group Commander also adopted a policy which precluded the approval of more than one award each of the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL and LEGION OF MERIT to any one individual for meritorious service or conduct in this theater.

(2) During the first part of the campaign, each army was permitted to establish such bases as each desired for making awards for gallantry in action. It became apparent, however, that an uniform basis would have to be established for the army group as a whole. On 8 January 1945, each army was advised that the following quotas were considered appropriate — for each week in offensive combat for a unit the size an infantry division:

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS	.025 of 1%
SILVER STAR	.25 of 1%
BRONZE STAR MEDAL	.55 of 1%

(3) The above figures constituted a guide by which the number of awards could be measured from time to time, and it was not intended that merited awards be denied. In order to provide a similar guide for awards of the BRONZE STAR MEDAL in recognition of meritorious service for a unit the size of an infantry division, .25 of 1% was considered appropriate.

(4) Actual awards for gallantry in action and meritorious service made under this policy by units under jurisdiction of this headquarters are shown on the attached charts (Annex 19).*

* If page 109

(5) To obtain a uniform basis for, and thereby to insure greater equality in the award of decorations to personnel of this headquarters for meritorious service, a quota was established 18 January 1945, after a thorough study of the functions and responsibilities of each section. The principles used in establishing this quota were accepted by the various army commanders and used in dertermining allotments within army headquarters.

(6) Offer of foreign decorations to United States personnel in any substantial quantity was first made by the French Government on 11 September 1944, and on 14 October 1944 subordinate units were directed to submit recommendations for the award of the Croix de Guerre and Legion d'Honneur to this headquarters on the following basis:

(a) Army headquarters for every 100 days of combat on the continent:
25 Legion d'Honneur, 50 Croix de Guerre.

(b) Corps headquarters for every 100 days of combat on the continent:
15 Legion d'Honneur, 30 Croix de Guerre.

(c) Divisions or units of comparable size:

(1) For every 100 days of combat on the continent:
15 Legion d'Honneur.

(2) For every two days of combat on the continent:
1 Croix de Guerre.

(7) In November, 2,731 recommendations for these awards were submitted to higher headquarters for consideration.

(8) This offer was subsequently followed by similar offers of awards from the Luxembourg and Belgian Governments for units that had been responsible for the liberation and defense of those countries. Field Marshal Montgomery, on behalf of the British Government, made sizeable numbers of immediate combat awards to individuals of the First, Third and Ninth US Armies, as well as staff awards to army group headquarters. Awards were also made by French, Dutch and Czechoslovakian Governments in recognition of services rendered in the repatriation of nationals and liberated prisoners of war. In return, immediate combat awards were made to individual members of the armed forces of the various Allied Nations during the entire campaign.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. *Leaves, Furloughs and Passes.*

(1) In the initial stages of the campaign on the Continent, army commanders were authorized to place cities and towns "on limits" to military personnel and grant passes for not more than forty-eight consecutive hours. It became apparent very early, however, that facilities must be provided so that troops could be withdrawn from combat for a longer period of rest, and at the request of Commanding General, First US Army, a rest area was established in France in the Barneville-Carteret area by Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone. This area was ready for occupancy by 2 August 1944, with a capacity for 20,000 troops and a planned ultimate capacity of two divisions. The St. Lo break through occurred during this period, however, and the facilities were abandoned before they could be used.

(2) The rapid advance across France following the break-through precluded establishing any large scale rest areas, each division using such means as were immediately available to give troops relief from combat. With the stabilization of the front in September 1944, each army inaugurated a program of establishing rest camps within its own area, and the Commanding General, Communications Zone, commenced the establishment of recreational areas and leave centers in the rear areas. The first of these recreational areas to be opened was Paris and this command was allotted an initial quota of 900 every forty-eight hours, commencing 22 October 1944. Quotas to the various armies were allotted by this headquarters on the basis of the number of days divisions under its jurisdiction had been in combat. This method was subsequently changed and quotas for welfare accommodations were allotted entirely on a strength basis, each army receiving its proportionate share. At the request of this headquarters, theater granted authority, on 12 January 1945, to extend these passes to seventy-two hours. The second recreational area to be opened was Brussels, Belgium, on 28 January 1945, where this command was authorized to send 293 officers and enlisted men every Sunday and Wednesday.

(3) In order to afford relief from combat for general officers and senior field officers, including staff officers of combat units, seventy-two hours temporary duty in the United Kingdom was authorized on 9 November 1944. Army commanders were permitted to send their officers in such numbers as desired, dependent upon the amount of available air transportation.

(4) The first leaves, other than emergency leaves for compassionate reasons to be authorized, were to Great Britain for seven days exclusive of travel time, the first group of 250 departing 1 February 1945. Each individual was permitted to travel to any destination within Great Britain he so desired. The second leave center to be opened was the United States Riviera Recreational Area in the French Riviera District. Seven day leaves and furloughs were also authorized, with the first group departing by air 23 March 1945, and scheduled rail service being placed into operation 26 March 1945. The initial air lift totaled 1056 individuals per week and the rail lift totaled 1824 individuals per week. All transportation for personnel travelling on leave, furlough and pass, was provided without cost to the individual.

(5) Great difficulty was experienced in providing adequate rail transportation for recreational purposes after the Siegfried Line was breached. Army commanders would not permit leave train railheads to be moved forward while units were actively engaged with the enemy, and after cessation of hostilities, density of rail traffic would not permit any forward displacement. The situation, however, improved so that by 10 July 1945, the ultimate location of leave railheads were in Kassel, Nürnberg, and Munich, Germany.

(6) In order to take advantage of War Department authority to return individuals to the United States on temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, the Theater Commander put into operation in December 1944, a plan whereby personnel from this command were given a thirty day period of temporary duty at any point in the United States they so desired. On 29 November 1944, 12th Army Group was allotted its first quota of 1375 individuals for return to the United States during the month of December. This quota was allotted to the various armies based on the number of days divisions under its jurisdiction had been in combat on the continent. By this method, armies having the largest number of divisions which had been in combat the longest received the bulk of the quotas. To assist in reducing the number of casualties resulting from combat fatigue, the Commanding General, on

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

14 March 1945, directed that 90% of returning personnel be from lettered companies of infantry and other individuals who are habitually in close contact with the enemy over long periods of time (Annex 20). Effective 14 March 1945, War Department, having found thirty days to be inadequate, increased the period to be spent in the United States to forty-five days.

(7) The Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, issued instructions that effective 21 May 1945, all personnel, except key personnel, specifically requested for return to their units then in the United States on temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, would remain in the US and would be dropped from unit rolls. 12th Army Group was authorized to return a total of 19,075 individuals under this program, of which approximately 17,000 were dropped from unit rolls in accordance with theatre instructions.

c. *American Red Cross.*

(1) Control of all American Red Cross matters during the planning phase and initial stages of the operation was retained by Commanding General, Communications Zone. As our lines of communication were extended it became necessary for a closer relationship between the American Red Cross and 12th Army Group, and on 1 December 1944, an ARC Regional Executive office for 12th Army Group was set up in Verdun, France. This permitted 12th Army Group to deal directly with American Red Cross representatives and insured a more effective Red Cross welfare program.

(2) The desirability of providing mobile Red Cross welfare service for front line units was realized, and 10 Clubmobile Groups were formed by the American Red Cross. These groups originally consisted of 31 American Red Cross girls, 8 clubmobiles, 1 cinemobile, two 2½ ton supply trucks, one ¾ ton truck, one ¼ ton truck and 2 mobile generators. The first clubmobile group landed on the continent 14 July 1944, and was followed by nine more. As the number of troops in the army group increased it became necessary to make clubmobile groups more flexible. Consequently, during December 1944, each group was split into two equal sections. These sections were able to accompany the corps and divisions to which attached, at times serving personnel within two or three miles of the front lines.

* page 139

(3) To supplement the clubmobile group, static clubs were established as rapidly as possible in rest camps and the rear areas of armies. Locations of these clubs were in the most suitable accommodations available, in some instances the finest buildings of the town being utilized. American Red Cross field directors and hospital workers generally accompanied the units to which attached.

d. *Special Service.*

(1) Special Service activities were operated by the armies with technical assistance and supplies being furnished by Communications Zone. A very small special service section was maintained at this headquarters for the purpose of providing liaison with army special service officers and Communications Zone.

(2) Allocation of Special Service Companies was controlled by this headquarters and initially was made on the basis of one company per corps and one company per army headquarters. As the number of armies and corps increased it became necessary to allot the eleven special service companies available to 12th Army Group on the basis of one per corps.

(3) "Stars and Stripes" began distribution on a gratuitous basis with 75,000 copies of the liberation issue 14 June 1944 (D+8), being supplied. Delivery of papers on day of issue commenced 19 June 1944. Delivery remained on a gratuitous basis to combat personnel on a 1—5 ratio until 1 June 1945, at which distribution was on a subscription basis.

e. *Graves Registration.* (See also Quartermaster Annex.)

(1) The operation of Graves Registration Service was the responsibility of the Army Commanders and the Commanding General, Communications Zone and was under the technical supervision of the various quartermasters. Each army was responsible for graves registration service within its own area, and as the rear boundaries were moved forward the responsibility for sweeping the battlefield areas and caring for established cemeteries passed to the Commanding General, Communications Zone.

(2) To serve as an object lesson to all Germans for their participation in atrocity crimes, armies were directed on 21 April 1945, to cause decent and reverent burial of all persons of all nationalities who were victims of atrocities. This was also to include the disinter-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ment of this personnel who had been buried in pits. Cemeteries were established in a central site so as to be in public view and consecrated by Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish Chaplains. All German males irrespective of their station in life were used in digging the individual graves.

f. *Religious Matters.* (See also Chaplain's Annex.)

(1) During the planning phase and first of the campaign, this headquarters did not have a Chaplain Section — each army administering its own religious matters. On 1 November 1944, a section was organized with the mission of maintaining liaison with army and theater chaplains on matters of policy affecting the Chaplain Corps.

g. *Postal Service.* (See also Adjutant General's Annex.)

(1) Operation of the Army Postal Service was the responsibility of the Commanding General, Communications Zone, with the various armies handling the administrative details direct. As a result, this headquarters acted only in a supervisory capacity.

4 PERSONNEL BRANCH

a. *Allotment.*

On 12 October 1944, the Chief of Staff approved a recommendation prepared by the Personnel Branch at the direction of the AC of S, G-1, providing for a reduction of approximately 15% in the authorized strength of Headquarters 12th Army Group (64 officer and 79 enlisted grades), and a new Table of Distribution was published, effective that date. Subsequent changes in the T/Os of armies, corps, and divisions eliminated the necessity for a portion of the non-T/O grades allotted, and they were withdrawn and reverted to the War Department. As of 23 June 1945, the allotment of non-T/O grades to this command, excluding grades allotted for Civil Affairs activities in armies, corps, and divisions was 807 officers, 42 warrant officers, and 1960 enlisted.

b. *Procurement and Assignment.*

(1) By keeping in close touch with the requirements of the armies during the operations, the Personnel Branch was able to prepare advance requisitions for additional regimental and battalion commanders for newly arrived divisions, and to replace losses

incurred in operations. As a result, while the supply of qualified combat commanders for regiments and battalions was always limited, the shortage never became acutely critical.

(2) Armies were delegated authority to reassign enlisted personnel and all officers, except general officers, to other armies of the command, when mutually agreeable to both commanders. Consequently the Personnel Branch was primarily concerned with reassignments in which commanders did not mutually agree, and those which involved transfer into and out of the command.

(3) As United States Forces advanced into Germany, and it became apparent that large areas which were not included in the final US Zone of Occupation would be controlled by US units, the need for large numbers of additional Military Government personnel arose, since the Military Government personnel available in the theater was only sufficient for the final US Zone. The Personnel Branch was largely concerned with action to obtain an overstrength authorization for personnel to form Provisional Military Government Detachments. This overstrength permitted armies to refill units from which this personnel was withdrawn, and not impair the units' combat effectiveness. As US Forces withdrew to the Final Zone of Occupation, and the need for Provisional Military Government Detachments decreased, this personnel was assigned to European Civil Affairs Division to fill existing vacancies, and the surplus was returned to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

c. *Reclassification of Officers.*

(1) Recommendations for reclassification of officers were processed under the provisions of AR 605-230 and pertinent theater circulars. During the initial period of operations, one officer was made available to each corps from the Theater Reclassification Board to assist in the administrative preparation of necessary papers.

(2) Authority was delegated to armies to issue orders to send officers, except General officers and Colonels, to the Theater Reclassification Board upon determination at army level that formel reclassification proceedings were justified. Papers forwarded to this headquarters on such officers were indorsed to Headquarters ETOUSA without reference to G-1, except in unusual cases. Colonels on whom reclass-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ification proceedings were approved by armies, were sent to this headquarters [illegible] with reclassification proceedings, for interview, and reassignment if feasible and appropriate.

d. *Promotions.*

(1) Recommendations for promotion to and within General officer grades were acted upon once per month. Armies submitted recommendations so as to assure their arrival at Headquartes 12th Army Group by midnight on the 20th day of each month. Upon receipt, such recommendations were written up in brief form, and in order of recommended priority from the armies, submitted to the Army Group Commander.

(2) After careful consideration of each individual case by the Army Group Commander and upon his final selection of those officers to be recommended to the Supreme Commander, a letter listing officers in orders of recommended priority was prepared. The recommendations in the cases of those not selected by the Army Group Commander were returned to the army commander concerned, advising him that those individuals had not been selected for recommendation to the higher headquarters. Upon receipt of notification as to the individuals finally selected by the Supreme Commander, the armies were notified and the papers on those individuals not finally selected for recommendation to the War Department were returned to Headquarters 12th Army Group and in turn were sent back to the army concerned.

(3) Under the theater policy, promotions to the grade of Colonel were effected by Headquarters European Theater of Operations. Armies were permitted to submit recommendation at any time. Upon receipt of the recommendation the case was carefully checked to determine that the individual was qualified and eligible for the promotion and recommendation as made to the Army Group Commander. In cases where approval had been recommended, the indorsement was prepared for his signature. In cases where disapproval had been recommended and the Army Group Commander concurred in that recommendation, the paper was returned to the Adjutant General who placed proper indorsement of disapproval and the file returned to the army concerned.

(4) The Commanding Generals of 12th Army Group and each army under that command were permitted, under the theater policy, to

effect promotions up to and including the grade of Lieutenant Colonel in the cases of officers assigned to units directly under their command. Promotions were authorized on the 1st and 16th day of each month normally, but battlefield promotions up to and including the grade of Lieutenant Colonel were authorized at any time.

(5) Promotions in Headquarters 12th Army Group were made only on the first of each month for units directly under its command. Recommendations were submitted so as to reach the headquarters by midnight on the 20th day of each month. They were administratively checked by the Adjutant General and turned over to the G-1 Section, where a check was made to determine that the officers were qualified and eligible for promotion and a brief outline was prepared in each case concerning promotions to and within the field grades and submitted to the Chief of Staff with G-1 recommendations for final decision. On promotions within company grades, authority was delegated to the Group G-1 to make final decisions theron.

(6) Promotions of Warrant Officers, junior grade, to the grade of Chief Warrant Officer were based upon seniority plus efficiency and were broken down into two categories for promotions — the first being individuals who were assigned under Tables of Organization and the second being those individuals who were assigned under Table of Allotment. The reason for this policy was to prevent doing injustice to those Table of Organization units being continually shifted in and out of the command. Without this policy their percentage would have been used to promote those Warrant Officers on a Table of Allotment status, who by remaining static on Table of Allotment assignments, would have blocked authorized Table of Organization promotions.

e. *Average Time in Grade.*

An over-all study was made as to the average length of time spent in the grade held prior to the promotion to the current grade and the results thereof are shown on the attached chart (Annex 21).*

f. *Appointments.*

(1) Authority was granted to armies to appoint 2d Lieutenants to fill existing vacancies within combat units and every effort was made to encourage the armies to take full advantage of this power. As

*page 111

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

an inducement to make such appointments, authority was given to appoint twenty 2d Lieutenants per division every three months over and above the commissioned strength authorized. Many units took advantage of this authority. The results were very satisfactory both with respect to obtaining needed commissioned personnel and as a morale factor among the combat soldiers. During December 1944 when the officer shortage became acute, it was necessary to have a representative visit each of the armies in order to encourage additional appointments. At no time did officer personnel exceed the authorized total because full advantage was never taken of the officer overstrength authorized.

(2) Routine appointments were authorized but recommendations had to be submitted through channels to the Theater Commander. As a result there were delays in some cases of from six to ten weeks. The results in these cases proved unsatisfactory, since it reduced the morale of the organization and required it to function without the service of a needed officer. Every effort was made to expedite those cases. They were continually followed, but appointments under this authority were rarely handled in an expeditious manner. As a result, many appointments that should have been handled as routine were made as battlefield or combat appointments.

(3) Authority for appointment of warrant officers was initially delegated to this headquarters and to the armies. Under this authority, appointments of qualified enlisted personnel to Warrant Officers, junior grade, were processed expeditiously to fill existing vacancies. In August 1944, appointments to this grade were suspended pending the publication of a new War Department Circular. This restriction prevented the appointment of many deserving enlisted men to fill existing Table of Organization vacancies. The restriction on appointments of Warrant Officers, junior grade, was lifted in January 1945, but appointment authority was not delegated below the level of theater headquarters. Applicants who were recommended for appointment by boards of officers within the armies and who passed the final technical examination which was furnished by theater headquarters were placed on the theater eligible list. The applicants were appointed to fill requisitions submitted to theater headquarters which could not be filled from other available sources. The result of this procedure was a

slowing down in the processing of appointments although it permitted a control to be exercised at theater headquarters in limiting the number of warrant officers in the theater.

5 REINFORCEMENT BRANCH.

a. *Estimate of Losses.*

(1) Following the invasion of the continent, the long range estimates of combat losses were based on actual experience loss rates, ground force troop build-up, and on future operational plans. A typical six month advance estimate of combat losses, including certain backing papers used in its preparation, is shown in Annex 22.* Annex 23* contains a graph showing the comparison between the estimated and actual casualties for both battle and non-battle casualties on a daily and a cumulative basis. The graph also illustrates how non-battle casualties were directly influenced by, and were usually directly proportional to, the number of battle casualties sustained.

(2) The daily sick and non-battle casualty rate expressed in hospital admissions per thousand per day is particularly important from a command stand-point. These daily hospital admission rates by armies were computed regularly. Also important from a command standpoint are analyses of casualties by divisions, including the number of combat days for each division. These analyses were prepared approximately once every thirty days and submitted to the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. A typical analysis of this type together with the accompanying carrier sheet is shown in Annex 24.*

(3) One of the most important procedures in accurately estimating net battle reinforcement requirements was the computation of the number of wounded hospital returnees that would actually be returned to duty with ground force units. In the preparation of these estimates of wounded hospital returnees by months, the actual wounded hospital admissions, returned to duty factors based on actual theater experience and the current evacuation policy, were all used. In order to check the accuracy of these estimates, comparison was made at regular intervals with reports showing the number of personnel actually being returned from hospitals to ground force units. This procedure served as a constant guard against overestimating the number of hospital returnees.

* pages 112—117

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. *Allocation of Reinforcements to Armies.*

(1) Headquarters ETOUSA letter, AG 220. 3R Subject: "Allocation Priority for Replacement Personnel", dated 4 June 1944, designated the Commanding General, First US Army Group, as being responsible for determining and announcing the allocations and priorities on reinforcement personnel to the US ground force units, including units and installations attached to armies both in the United Kingdom and on the continent. On the basis of this letter, Headquarters First US Army Group published a letter dated 6 June (Annex 25),* which established the priorities by which the Ground Force Reinforcement Command would furnish reinforcements to the ground forces for operation "OVERLORD". These priorities remained in effect until 14 July 1944, when they were superseded by letter, Headquarters First US Army Group, dated 14 July 1944 (Annex 26),* the principal feature of which gave both First and Third US Armies No. 1 priority on reinforcements effective at the time Third US Army became operational on the continent. Later, all armies that were operational on the continent were given equal priority in obtaining reinforcements.

(2) Reinforcements allocations were based on a number of factors such as current personnel shortages, reinforcement stockage in army depots, estimated flow of hospital returnees to each army and future tactical requirements as determined by G-3. Therefore, in order that this headquarters might properly regulate the flow of reinforcements to army depots, a daily report from armies containing the following information was necessary:

(a) Current personnel shortages by officers and enlisted men in those branches wherein the flow was being regulated. The experience of this army group indicated that shortages within infantry and armored forces were most keenly felt and, therefore, required close observation.

(b) Reinforcement stockage on hand in army depots, including the forward battalions, by officers and enlisted men. It was essential to have the information listed under (1) and (2) above reported promptly by armies and to represent the best possible estimate of the actual situation as of 2400 hours the previous day. It was far better to have estimates of the current situation immediately available, even though only 75% to 80% accurate, than to have 100% accurate reports that reflected the situation 2 to 4 days previous. This was particularly true in a fast-moving campaign.

(3) In addition to the above daily report from armies, the following daily report from Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command was necssary when making reinforcement allocations to armies: report showing estimated time of arrival of new reinforcements in army depots for at least 15 days in advance. Reports included only those branches on which this headquarters was actually making allocations to armies. This flow of new reinforcements would, for the most part, be based on army group's allocation of reinforcements to the armies. It was extremely important that this headquarters pass on to each army the best estimate possible as to the number of new reinforcements that could be expected to arrive in their respective army depots by days for 15 days in advance, if possible.

(4) A typical recommendation prepared by the Reinforcement Branch on the allocation of infantry reinforcements to armies is shown in Annex 27.* As soon as G-1 received notification of the approved allocation, Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command was notified immediately of the desired allocations to armies in order to make necessary shipping arrangements for forwarding these reinforcements to the appropriate army depots. Allocations were made only on new reinforcements. The hospital returnees were automatically returned to the army of origin.

(5) About the middle of July 1944, the stockage level on infantry reinforcements became critically low. Although this situation was soon alleviated by infantry reinforcement arrivals from the US, steps were taken at that time by theater headquarters, upon recommendations form First US Army and 12th Army Group, to requisition 28,000 infantry riflemen reinforcements for immediate shipment to this theater, and to change the September reinforcement flow from the US so as to be composed 85% infantry of which 70% would be infantry riflemen. From the start of the St. Lo offensive on 25 July 1944, to the end of the heaviest fighting in this particular campaign, the stockage of reinforcements was always adequate to support operations.

* pages 120—121

* page 124

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(6) In order to further guard against possible short supply of reinforcements, particularly in infantry and armored forces, in connection with future operational plans, the Reinforcement Branch often made, in addition to the long range estimates of reinforcement requirements shown in Annex 22,* what might be termed "short term estimates of reinforcement requirements" based partly on knowledge of operational plans for the next 60 to 90 days and also on the most recent casualty experience factors. When these studies (See Annex 26* for typical examples) indicated that a critical shortage was likely to occur in the near future, theater headquarters was so informed and requested to take action to remedy the situation. In order to prepare such studies, army group headquarters received from theater headquarters the latest information regarding the War Department's estimate of the reinforcements they could furnish this theater, by arm and service monthly, for the next three to six months.

(7) In spite of the storm warnings flown by this headquarters, shortages of reinforcements, particularly infantry riflemen, developed in November 1944 and continued to increase in the month of December. On 15 December, the infantry riflemen shortage in 12th Army Group was 17,581. The critical nature of this riflemen shortage was brought to the attention of the Theater Commander by the Army Group Commander just prior to the German Ardennes offensive in mid-December with specific recommendations as to corrective measures that should be taken immediately (See Annex 29).* The infantry riflemen under strength of 17,581 on 15 December meant that the average infantry and armored division was at approximately 78% of its authorized strength in infantry riflemen.

(8) The AC of S, G-1, of this headquarters and the Chief of the Reinforcement Branch, G-1 Section, were members of a group from this theater who went to the War Department in the latter part of December to point out the serious nature of the reinforcement situation and further, to do everything possible to increase and expedite the flow of infantry and armored reinforcements to this theater. A memorandum which summarizes the result of this Washington conference on reinforcements is contained in Annex 30.* The following action was taken by the War Department to increase and speed the flow of the January and February reinforcements to this theater:

(a) Reduced the training from 17 to 15 weeks.

(b) Reduced the furlough prior to being sent overseas from 10 to 5 days.

(c) Transported these men to their homes by air for this furlough and returned them to ports for shipping. In addition, the induction rate was increased from approximately 80,000 to 150,000 monthly.

c. *Allocation of Reinforcements to Army Groups.*

When in November 1944 it became necessary to make reinforcement allocations to the army groups within this theater, these allocations were made by the G-1 and G-3 Sections of SHAEF and were based on a number of factors, including current understrength, reinforcements on hand in army depots, estimated casualties, estimated hospitals returnees and total troop strength. All of the above factors were usually assembled in final form in the presence of G-1 representatives of each army group and G-1 representatives of the Communications Zone. The G-1 and G-3 Sections of SHAEF then decided on the actual allocation of reinforcements to the army groups. Pertinent information which the G-1 representative of 12th Army Group had on hand at one of these conferences mentioned above is outlined in (Annex 31).*

d. *Theater Infantry Retraining Program.*

Since the War Department's capabilities for furnishing infantry reinforcements during the months of February, March, April, May and June did not equal 12th Army Group's estimates of infantry reinforcement requirements for these months, theater headquarters established a program for retraining, as infantry, personnel from non-combat units. This conversion training was carried out by the Ground Force Reinforcement Command and began about the end of January 1945. The 12th Army Group was required to submit reports to theater headquarters showing the number of personnel eligible in non-combat units for this infantry conversion training. No quotas, however, were ever given to this command for conver-

* page 112 and pp. ff. 128

* page 139

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

sion training, and consequently no personnel were turned in to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command for this purpose. Prior to the establishment of the conversion training course under operation of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, Third US Army conducted an infantry retraining program of their own and thereby converted 6500 service-type personnel to infantry.

e. *Theater Officer Schools.*

Inasmuch as the War Department could not meet the demands of this theater for infantry officer reinforcements, and since the deficiency could not be met solely by combat appointments, theater headquarters took steps to establish an infantry officer candidate school during the latter part of January 1945. In addition to the officer candidate school, two other schools, one of three weeks' duration for giving fundamental officer training to infantry Lieutenants appointed in combat, and the other of eight weeks duration for giving those 2nd or 1st Lieutenants in branches other than infantry a refresher training course to qualify them for combat duty as infantry officers, were opened. Quotas for these schools were received by 12th Army Group and were in turn alloted to the armies of this command.

f. *Arm and Service Composition of Reinforcements.*

(1) One of the primary functions of the Reinforcement Branch was the determination of the desired percentage composition by arm and service of the reinforcements to be furnished for the ground forces and the submission of this information to theater. Theater, in addition to using this information in preparing monthly reinforcement requisitions on the War Department, forwarded these arm and service percentages to the War Department in order that the reinforcement training program in the Zone of Interior could be geared properly to meet our reinforcement requirements.

(2) On 24 April 1944, Headquarters First US Army Group made the recommendation to theater that reinforcements furnished for this command be on an arm and service percentage basis as shown in column 1 of the table below. Based on actual experience within the ground forces covering period D Day to 19 August 1944, a detailed study was prepared to determine the desired composition by arm and service of all reinforcements for this command. This study with appropriate recommendations was submitted to theater headquarters on 31 August 1944. Recommended percentages by arm and service are shown in column 2 of the table below. Those percentages remained in effect until November when the percentage distribution was changed to that shown in column 3. The only change effected here was a reduction of 1.2% in the infantry percentage and a corresponding increase in armored requirements. The final arm and service distribution recommended by this headquarters was submitted to theater headquarters 9 January 1945 and is shown in column 4 below.

PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION BY ARM AND SERVICE DESIRED ON REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE GROUND FORCES

	April 1944	August 1944	Nov 1944	Jan 1945
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
INF	70.3	83.0	81.8	82.3
ARMD FORCE	5.6	5.8	7.0	6.8
FA	7.2	2.8	2.8	3.0
TD	2.4	.7	.7	.7
CAV	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2
CAC	1.9	.4	.4	.3
TOTAL ARMS	88.4	93.7	93.7	94.3
CE	5.3	2.4	2.4	2.5
MD	3.0	2.6	2.6	2.6
SC	1.0	.4	.4	.2
ORD	.5	.2	.2	.1
QMC	.6	.4	.4	.1
CWS	.4	.1	.1	.1
MP	.2	.1	.1	.1
TC	.6	.05	.05	—
BI	—	.05	.05	—
TOTAL SERVICES	11.6	6.3	6.3	5.7
GRAND TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) It was found that the most accurate means of determining the desired arm and service distribution on ground force reinforcements was by analyzing the monthly or bi-monthly reports submitted by armies, showing by arm and service, officer and enlisted men, the number of reinforcements requisitioned by units of their command. This method, in addition to being an accurate reflection of the actual reinforcement demands of the units, was also the most expeditious means of obtaining a measurement of the reinforcement requirements by arm and service. Tables containing numbers and percentages on reinforcements by arm and service based on this method are attached as Annex 32.*

(4) The MRU casualty reports by arm and service were another source of data which aided in determining the desired arm and service spread on reinforcements. These reports, while highly accurate, reflected a considerable time lag, particularly as regarded front line units. Still another source of data which was used to a minor extent in determining the desired arm and service spread on reinforcements was the Ground Force Reinforcement Command's weekly reinforcement shipment report which showed the number of reinforcements shipped weekly to armies by arm and service, by new reinforcements and hospital returnees, by officers and enlisted men. This type report must be used with care for, in the event the reinforcement depot stockage levels are low and the depots cannot fill the requisitions on hand, it can be seen that this report would then give a distorted picture so far as actual reinforcement demand by arm and service is concerned.

(5) In order to keep a close check on personnel shortages within each army by each arm and service, a weekly unfilled requisition report containing the following information was first obtained from armies on 31 January 1945:

(a) Personnel shortages within each arm and service by officers and enlisted men. (This information was based on unfilled requisitions on hand.)

(b) Reinforcement stockage on hand in army depots, including forward battalions, by arm and service, by officers and enlisted men, which can be applied against shortages reported under (a) above.

* page 141

(6) To furnish information of a similar nature and in the form required by higher headquarters, the unfilled requisition report was rescinded in March 1945 and superseded by a bi-monthly personnel shortage and overage report, showing the personnel shortages or overages actually existing within each arm and service throughout each army. In conjunction with shortage and overage reports from armies, it was essential to have up-to-date and accurate reinforcement stockage reports showing reinforcements available in army depots and in rear depots.

g. *Coordination of Reinforcement Procedures.*

(1) Another highly important function of the Reinforcement Branch was the coordination of reinforcement procedures between the armies, Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command and theater headquarters. Close liaison was maintained with army G-1 Sections in order to become familiar with their problems such as the return of hospitalized personnel to their former units, time lag between the requisitioning for personnel reinforcements and the actual receipt of this personnel by units, return to duty of limited assignment personnel, transportation problems regarding reinforcements and numerous other problems which arose from time to time.

(2) Also, close liaison was established between army group headquarters and Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command. The Reinforcement Command was informed immediately of transfers of units between armies in order to route hospital returnees properly. Information pertaining to transfer of corps between armies was particularly important since the Reinforcement Battalion which normally supported a certain corps usually remained with it. Liaison officers from the Reinforcement Command provided the following essential information:

(a) Latest stockage reports showing reinforcements on hand in the army depots and in rear depots.

(b) Up-to-date flow schedule showing infantry and armored reinforcement arrivals in army depots projected at least 15 days in advance.

(c) Weekly report of reinforcements assigned to armies by arm and service, by officers and enlisted men.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) When deficiencies were noted in the established reinforcement procedures, army group headquarters made constructive recommendations to theater. A typical example was army group's recommendation in November 1944, that the time lag between submission of personnel requisitions and the actual arrival of the reinforcements could be reduced by allowing the units engaged in combat to requisition in advance for losses estimated to be incurred during subsequent 48 hours.

h. *Combat Officer Overstrength.*

Based on recommendations from the Army Group Commander to General Marshall in October 1944, a combat officer overstrength in 1st or 2d Lieutenants was authorized in November 1944, by the War Department (Annex 33).* This overstrength, which actually represented an advance issue of officer reinforcements, was established primarily for the purpose of providing junior officers an opportunity for gaining combat and troop leadership experience before actually taking over a platoon or battery.

i. *Control of Reinforcement Installations.*

Prior to mid-July, the army depot ("Army" Depot is a term used to refer to the reinforcement depot in immediate support of an army) and the forward reinforcement battalions were all under the control of First US Army. However, around the middle of July, First US Army relinquished control of its army depot to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. Shortly afterwards, the forward battalions in First US Army's area were also placed under the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. Although Third US Army's army depot was under control of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command and never under Third US Army control, it was not until October 1944 that this army depot's forward battalions were relieved from attachment to Third US Army upon recommendation from this headquarters. It was believed that the most efficient system of control was to put both the army depots and their forward battalions under control of the Reinforcement Command.

j. *Hospital Returnees.*

(1) Around the end of August, due to the heavy fighting that occurred in the latter part of July and early part of August, the flow of

* page 143

hospital returnees into reinforcement depots and battalions was unusually heavy. Since fighting was comparatively light in the latter part of August, the flow of hospital returnees at this time greatly exceeded the demands for personnel and consequently the reinforcement installations accumulated a very large stockage of these returnees. It was, therefore, necessary to establish priorities for return of this personnel to their former units. With the approval of theater headquarters, a letter establishing such priorities (Annex 34)* was dispatched to the Commanding General, Ground Force Reinforcement Command. The priorities were, in general, based on the principle of giving preferential return to those individuals from an organization who had served the greatest length of time as members of that organization.

(2) In the latter part of January 1945, the policy was established by theater headquarters whereby all general assignment enlisted hospital returnees are returned automatically to their former units. In March 1945, due to officer shortages existing in practically all branches, this policy was extended temporarily to include all general assignment company grade officers.

(3) It is believed that all general assignment hospital returnees and all limited assignment hospital returnees other than infantry should be returned automatically to their former units whenever possible. During static warfare an overstrength may be created within certain units by this procedure, particularly if these units have sustained large numbers of casualties during the preceding months. However, it has been the experience in this theater that hospital returnees being held in reinforcement depots awaiting vacancies in their former organizations serve no useful purpose and their morale is materially lowered by long periods of waiting even under the best of conditions. In the event there is a critical shortage of reinforcements in the Reinforcement Command and certain units have created a substantial overstrength by this automatic return of hospital returnees, transfer of the most newly arrived reinforcements from these units with the overstrength can be made by armies to those units wherein there are acute shortages. Armies were instructed to look ahead regarding this matter of automatic hospital returns and to guard against assigning new reinforcements

* page 145

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to those units which will definitely receive large numbers of hospital returnees in the near future.

k. *Colored Rifle Platoons.*

During March 1945, 12th Army Group received 33 provisionally organized rifle platoons composed of colored enlisted personnel who had been retrained as infantry riflemen. These platoons were all placed initially with divisions under command of First US Army. One qualified white platoon leader and one white platoon sergeant were furnished by the divisions for each colored infantry rifle platoon they were to receive. This personnel was sent to the training area prior to completion of the retraining of the colored personnel in order that these officers and noncommissioned officers could join their platoons approximately 10 days prior to completion of the retraining period. Although these colored platoons were initially 10% overstrength, additional reinforcements were not available, and consequently losses eventually had to be replaced by cannibalizing some of these platoons. Initially, not more than one platoon was assigned per rifle company and not more than three platoons per division.

l. *Overstrength for Occupational Tasks.*

Authority for an overstrength of 37,600 personnel was obtained from theater headquarters in April 1945, for the purpose of providing additional personnel for occupational tasks, such as guarding of prisoners of war and enemy war material, control of displaced persons and military government jobs. This overstrength was allocated to armies with the stipulation that it represented an initially authorized overstrength only, and that requisitions would not be submitted to maintain it. Another provision regarding this overstrength was that in the event reinforcements were not available to meet future operational combat needs, then this overstrength would be withdrawn from units to which assigned and transferred to meet these combat requirements. Suggestion was made to armies that consideration be given to rotation of combat exhausted personnel to rear area jobs, replacing them with this overstrength.

m. *Transportation of Reinforcements.*

It has been apparent from combat experience in this theater, especially during a breakthrough, that the reinforcement installations, through lack of sufficient transportation, were unable to move their own units forward or to move reinforcements forward as rapidly as the situation demanded. The armies furnished material assistance on numerous occasions in the transportation of reinforcements as well as in the movement of reinforcement installations. At certain times, however, when transportation for reinforcements was urgently needed, the Reinforcement Command was unable to produce the necessary transportation, and the armies, due to extended supply lines, were not in a position to help. Additional vehicles should be added to the Tables of Equipment for reinforcement installations.

n. *Personnel Readjustment.*

In connection with personnel readjustment, the Reinforcement Branch assisted the armies in solving problems encountered in the readjustment of personnel. Certain matters of policy were co-ordinated with theater headquarters. Quotas for return of personnel to the ZI under provisions of War Department Readjustment Regulations 1 2 were received by Headquarters 12th Army Group from theater and were allocated to the armies of this command and to Special Troops, this headquarters, on the basis of the number of personnel in each command having ASR scores of 85 and above.

6. MISCELLANEOUS BRANCH

a. *Violations of the Geneva Conventions.* (See also JA Annex.)

(1) In August 1944, it became necessary to investigate and report to SHAEF upon alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions by German military personnel, which began to filter in from the armies in the field. These violations ranged from reports of murder and mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war, to improper use of Red Cross symbol to disguise German combat vehicles and alleged atrocities against civilians of liberated countries prior to liberation by the AEF.

(2) Initially, the Inspector General, this headquarters, was designated as the investigating agency. Incoming reports were routed from G-1 to JA, who inspected them for legal sufficiency and then forwarded them to IG with his recommendations as to the necessary additional items which should be included in the report of investigation by IG.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) In September, SHAEF designated a prescribed form on which to collect information to establish prima facie cases required by a SHAEF Court of Inquiry. This court was activated under SHAEF G-1 auspices for the double purpose of (1) furnishing a report of cases to the United Nations War Crimes Commission as a basis for inclusion of the names of perpetrators on a list for later apprehension, or to provide a complete report for transmission to the national authorities concerned for appropriate action, and (2) to furnish the War Department with evidence of such violations as a basis for protest to the enemy through diplomatic channels with appropriate publicity in proper cases. The establishment of such a court and the necessity for approaching such investigations and reports from a legal standpoint resulted in transferring the responsibility for investigating alleged violations of Geneva Conventions from the IG to the JA Section, this headquarters. Instructions were issued to all armies relative to preparation of reports of such incidents as came to their attention containing any evidence having probative value to a reasonable man.

(4) Initially, the Army Group Commander was responsible for the investigation of all alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions which came to his attention. The investigation of such reports required that investigating officers collect evidence from other areas, such as Communications Zone and the United Kingdom. Later, this headquarters was authorized by SHAEF to wrap up and send to SHAEF those cases involving crimes against citizens of liberated countries without further investigation by this headquarters. Alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions were necessarily closely connected with war crimes and later became integrated with war crimes investigations.

b. *War Crimes and War Criminals.* (See also JA Annex.)

(1) For the purposes of clarifying terms new to the service, the following definitions were originated by this headquarters:

(a) *War Crimes* are violations of the laws and usages of war of general application and acceptance, including acts in contravention of directives and conventions dealing with the conduct of war as well as other acts against persons and property which outrage common justice or involve moral

turpitude, committed in connection with military operations or occupation, with or without orders or sanction by governments or commanders.

(b) *War Criminals* are those who have committed war crimes or who have ordered, directed, or countenanced the commission of war crimes, without regard to their nationality or the capacity in which they acted. The subject of war crimes and war criminals was known to be closely connected with alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions, and therefore the JA Section, this headquarters, under supervision of G-1, was designated as the staff section responsible for handling these matters.

(2) By letter 7 September 1944, subject: "War Criminals — Eenemy and Liberated Territory — All Operations in NW Europe", the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, was directed to apprehend and hold in custody such war criminals as were notified to him by SHAEF and those who came to his notice from other sources. He was also directed to collect and record all available evidence of their acts, and forward such evidence to SHAEF. Courts were not to be set up to try such persons but they were to be held pending orders from the Supreme Commander as to their disposition. Those war criminals known to be among prisoners of war or civilian internees already held or to be held by 12th Army Group during the course of the war were to continue to be treated as prisoners of war or civilian internees and evacuated under normal procedure. "War Criminals", as used in this directive, included —

(a) Those whose names were on the lists of suspects supplied under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander.

(b) Those who were members of a general category designated to the Supreme Commander under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as war criminals.

(c) Those who were suspected of war crimes -i.e., in respect to whom commanders received evidence of their responsibility for flagrant violations of the laws and customs of war in friendly or enemy territory, committed prior to the occupation or liberation of such territory by the Allied Forces.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Not included as war criminals were those persons who violated the provisions of the Supreme Commander's proclamations, ordinances, or regulations, or those persons charged with the commission of offenses against the laws and usages of war on the field of battle immediately before capture. These classes of persons come under the jurisdiction of military commissions appointed by the army commanders under authority of Commanding General, 12th Army Group.

(4) During the operation, activities pertaining to war crimes and war criminals were necessarily limited to investigating those crimes which came to the attention of this command, either through army channels or down from higher headquarters. Such investigations were made in connection with our investigations of alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions. During November the volume of business increased to a point where it was deemed necessary to augment army and army group staffs for the purpose of conducting war criminal investigations. This was done, and the following personnel were attached:

12th Army Group	—	2	officers,	2	enlisted men
First US Army	—	5	„	5	„ „
Third US Army	—	5	„	5	„ „
Ninth US Army	—	5	„	5	„ „

(5) On 25 November 1944, G-2, this headquarters, directed the G-2s of all armies to forward all evidence, documents and photographs of German atrocities to the appropriate G-1 Section. It was considered from the first that the completion of evidence against war criminals would involve interrogating many thousands of persons, such as Allied prisoners of war, German prisoners of war, displaced persons, German civilians, and our own troops in Germany as well as in liberated countries. Investigations must necessarily be expedited in order to collect evidence before witnesses were dispersed. Due to the shortage of officer personnel within the theater, this headquarters, as well as subordinate headquarters, was required to conduct such investigations with extremely limited and entirely insufficient personnel. Under the SHAEF provision that each country would be obliged to investigate cases involving war crimes against its own nationals, arrangements were made to allow French investigators from the French Ministry of Justice to enter the army group area for the purpose of conducting such investigations.

(6) In January 1945, this headquarters received SHAEF "ECLIPSE" Memorandum No 18, subject: "War Criminals and Security Suspects". As a result, this headquarters issued a letter, file 383 (G-1), subject: "War Criminals", dated 13 February 1945 (Annex 35),* which was later incorporated into Annex 7, Operation "ECLISPE", Part D, War Criminals. It was agreed with G-2 that matters pertaining to security suspects would be handled by G-2.

(7) In February 1945, War Criminal Bulletin No 1 (Annex 36),* originated in this headquarters for distribution to all troops of this command with a view toward bringing to the attention of all concerned the fact that war crimes and violations of the Geneva Convention were being actively investigated by this command and that war criminals would be adequately punished for those crimes. It was believed that this would tend to offset the tendency of the average combat soldier to take the law into his own hands, as well as further the orientation of troops relative to the non-fraternization policy. War Crimes Bulletin No. 1 was followed monthly by Bulletins Nos. 2, 3, and 4 (Annex 36).*

(8) In the latter part of February 1945, a War Crimes branch was established in the JA section of this headquarters under the supervision of G-1. Similarly, a War Crimes branch was established in the JA section of each army. Necessary action was taken to procure additional personnel from ETOUSA to build up this War Crimes branch, and the investigating personnel considered necessary for post-war activities. In addition, armies were urged to earmark and train such personnel as were available within their commands.

(9) On 1 May 1945, prosecution of matters pertaining to war crimes and war criminals was transferred from SHAEF to ETOUSA. At this time, ETOUSA began to provide investigating teams for each army to augment such personnel as was already available to them. The principle was established that each country must be responsible for the final investigation of war crimes alleged to have been committed against its own nationals. However, it was still necessary to report to SHAEF the preliminary investigation which came to

* Pages 146—149

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the attention of the Army Group Commander. At this time, it was considered necessary to obtain the services of 89 officers and 103 enlisted men, including investigating teams furnished by ETOUSA for the purpose of carrying on this work. Such personnel were requested from ETOUSA. Foreign representation within army group included French, Yugoslav, Russian, Polish, Belgian, Dutch, and Luxembourg. The French Government sent forward, at our request, a number of French detectives to assist in the apprehension of war criminals. These were sent to armies. Provision was made for holding in protective custody such anti-Nazi Germans who may be discovered to have evidence against war criminals. Instructions were issued to the armies that still and motion pictures be utilized to the fullest extent practicable as exhibits in reports of investigations of war criminals, for the purpose of recording for civilization the history of horror written by more than five years of German atrocities. It was also strongly urged that all staff agencies make full use of Judge Advocate and Inspector General personnel for the purpose of collecting evidence prior to the dispersal of witnesses.

(10) In April 1945, SHAEF established a Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS) in Paris for the purpose of keeping a record of all Germans arrested as war criminals or falling within automatic-arrest categories, and to publish a wanted list containing the particulars of all Germans wanted by the Allied nations for war crimes and all persons wanted as security suspects.

(11) Instructions were issued to the armies in June 1945, that detained German war criminals, security suspects, and members of other arrest categories would be provided only minimum clothing, accomodations, and medical care commensurate with health and hygiene, and rationed on a scale to be determined by Army Commanders but not exceeding 1500 calories per day. All rations, clothing, accommodations, and medical care would be provided from German resources. All luxury furnishings would be removed from accommodations in the event hotels were used for housing. In late June, arrangements were initiated to establish in Wiesbaden a War Crimes Detention Center for the purpose of holding

such war criminals and witnesses as may be necessary to come under interrogation by personnel of this headquarters.

(12) On 2 July 1945, USFET relieved the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, of all responsibility in connection with the collection and perpetuation of evidence relative to war crimes. Responsibility for apprehension, identification and detention was retained.

(13) Following data indicates volume of war crimes cases experienced by this headquarters:

Month	Number of New Cases Monthly	Cumulative Cases
November 1944	9	37
December	20	57
January 1945	10	67
February	32	99
March	83	182
April	78	260
May	459	719
June	639	1,358

c. *Non-Fraternization.* (See also P & PW Annex.)

(1) Simultaneously with the issuance of General Eisenhower's policy, "Relationship Between Allied Occupying Troops and Inhabitants of Germany" (Annex 37),* the Supreme Commander directed that the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, in consultation with other United States Commanders, prepare necessary instructions to give effect to the policy. It was also directed that orders and instructions on this subject issued by commanders of other elements of Allied occupying forces in occupied Germany would conform to those issued by the Commanding General, 12th Army Group.

(2) Initial action to give effect to the policy was the publication by this headquarters of a letter to subordinate commanders dated 30 September 1944, subject: "Non-Fraternization Policy" (Annex 38),* outlining the SHAEF policy and listing prohibited acts. Meanwhile, staff conferences were conducted with a view toward complete implementation of the Supreme Commander's directive.

(3) As a result of these staff conferences a policy was evolved (Annex 39)* and coordinated with all US Commands, including the Commanding General, 6th Army Group; Commanding General, Com-

* pages 154—160

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

munications Zone; Commanding General, US Strategic Air Force; and Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe. This policy contained numerous provisions regarding leaves, furloughs, passes, recreation, and other items considered appropriate during the occupation of Germany. Because of the inclusion of such material, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, decided to postpone the issuance of this policy. It later developed that considerations involving possible recision of the non-fraternization policy and the publication of ETOUSA readjustment and redeployment plans and policies, resulted in the decision that our policy as prepared would not be issued. Meanwhile, the approach to implementation of the non-fraternization policy pending issuance of our prepared policy took two forms: (1) issuance of command directives to subordinate commands, and (2) preparation of data for the express purpose of orienting troops. Provisions for troop orientation consisted of a directive to P & PW Section, this headquarters, directing that they be responsible, under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, for informing the troops of the mission of the occupying forces, the attitude toward German people, standard of conduct required, characteristics of the German people, and the vital necessity for non-fraternization. Appropriate media for disseminating this data were through command channels and through normal publicity channels, including "Stars and Stripes", "Yank", "Army Talks", American Forces Network and posters (Annex 40).* In order for the P & PW Section to accomplish the above it was necessary to assign additional personnel to P & PW Section.

(4) A pamphlet entitled, "Special Orders for German-American Relations", and containing a personal covering letter from the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, was prepared and distributed to each individual in this command, in compliance with the Supreme Commander's directive, commanders of other major US Forces commands issued the same pamphlet to their troops, the only difference being that the covering letter was signed by the commander concerned (Annex 41).* Later, in March 1945, a War Department booklet entitled, "Pocket Guide to Germany" was distributed to troops of 12th Army Group on the basis of one booklet for two men. In order to offset material contained therein referring to arguments, alibis, marriage, greetings, and conversational

* pages 165—168

phrases, which might be construed by the reader to indicate a relaxation of the non-fraternization policy, a note was printed and pasted on the outside cover of each booklet (Annex 42).*

(5) It was recognized that difficulties concerned with the enforcement of the non-fraternization policy would materially increase after the cessation of hostilities. Consideration was given to the establishment of uniform penalties throughout the command but this idea received considerable opposition and was therefore never effected. The concept of relieving members of US occupational forces who have close relatives in Germany was initiated by this headquarters, approved by SHAEF, and later published in the form of a directive by Headquarters ETOUSA [Annex 43].* This was indorsed to armies.

(6) Excerpts from theater morale reports dealing with violations of the non-fraternization policy, culled from censored letters, were forwarded to armies for their information relative to the effectiveness of non-fraternization within their commands. Names of individuals were not included, and no disciplinary action was taken as a result of these reports.

(7) On 4 December 1944, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group issued a letter, subject: „Non-Fraternization", to all organization commanders pointing out the reasons that Germans cannot be accepted as members of the family of civilized nations and urging that we must continue to enforce non-fraternization orders (Annex 44).*

(8) Considerable discussion was entered into among staff sections within 12th Army Group as well as staff sections within Headquarters ETOUSA relative to the apparent discrepancy between the non-fraternization policy and the current theater policy on the establishment of prophylactic stations and the issuance of prophylactic materials in Germany. G-1 took the view that due to the great numbers of people in Germany with whom soldiers were privileged to fraternize with impunity, there was no conflict between the two policies. This view was later officially confirmed by the theater directive issued 4 June 1945 (Annex 45),* which was indorsed to armies.

(9) The Surgeon's Health of the Command Report of May 1945, indicated that the VD rate was rising and the issuance and use of

* pages 170—174

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

prophylactic materials was falling. This indicated that in the minds of many people the apparent conflict between these two policies still existed. However, it was considered that relaxation of the non-fraternization policy authorizing conversation in streets and public places, issued on 14 July, would automatically correct this abnormality.

(10) Early in the evolutionary period of 12th Army Group, plans for implementing the non-fraternization policy, this section proposed that Military Government legislation provide for punishment to Germans who fraternized with US personnel comparable to punishment of the US personnel in such cases. Higher headquarters did not see fit to approve of such a policy. After publicity of a summary court case (Annex 46),* in which the accused were found not guilty, SHAEF published a directive on 10 March 1945, which stated that action for enforcement through the issuance of orders to the Germans or prosecution of them for attempts to fraternize should be discontinued (Annex 47).* This was indorsed to armies.

(11) Continued experience with enforcement of the non-fraternization policy indicated that the terms "German" and "Germans" as used in that policy should be defined. As a result, the following definition was given by this headquarters: "The terms 'German' and 'Germans' as used in the non-fraternization policy are intended to include all persons who dwell or reside permanently in Germany, regardless of their nationality, as well as all Nazi collaborators and nationals of countries who have been allied with Germany in war against the Allies and who may temporarily be within the geographical limits of Germany".

(12) An unusual number of rape cases arose early in March 1945, as the armies penetrated deeper into Germany. Allegations were made against both black and white soldiers, many of whom were considered by their commanders to be of excellent character. It appeared that the Germans were deliberately making use of such allegations in order to discredit the American soldier and cause difficulties within the command. Of many cases of alleged rape, investigation showed that in only a few was any force involved. After the investigation of a great number of these alleged rape cases,

* pages 175—177

it was concluded that the meaning of the term in the German mind was not the same as the meaning of the term in the American mind, and a result, in some instances, the allegation of rape was withdrawn after the American meaning of the term was explained.

(13) Considerable difficulty was encountered in the enforcement of non-fraternization by the publication of uncontrolled articles in "Stars and Stripes" and other papers which tended to place in the mind of the soldier the idea that the non-fraternization policy is overwhelmingly unpopular, cannot be enforced, and implying that strict adherence thereto was not necessarily required by reasonable persons.

(14) By 1st Ind to a SHAEF letter of 15 May 1945 (Annex 48),* this headquarters instructed all armies to take steps toward building up organizations to enable PX installations to put on sale a wide range of German goods with a view toward eliminating the temptation of soldiers to shop for presents or souvenirs in German stores.

(15) Official and unofficial recommendations were made to the Supreme Commander that the non-fraternization policy be rescinded. No action was taken on these recommendations, although they expressed the unanimous opinion of nearly all of our higher-ranking commanders. On 10 June, this headquarters published instructions to armies relaxing the non-fraternization policy to the extent of authorizing association with small children.

(16) The difficulties involved in securing detailed reports of all non-fraternization cases precluded the possibility of amassing intelligent statistics. The majority of non-fraternization offenders were disciplined by summary court and punished under the 104th Article of War. In addition, the unpopularity of the non-fraternization policy with some officers who not only closed their eyes to fraternization of their subordinates but also violated non-fraternization rules and regulations themselves, contributed toward the difficulties of making a statistical analysis of the actual enforcement problem. However, staff visits by members of G-1 Section rather firmly established the conclusion that although clandestine fraternizing was unquestionably widespread, by and large the enforcement of the non-fraternization policy was effective throughout the

* page 178

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

command. The policy of non-association on terms of equality and friendship with the Germans appeared to be having the desired effect of impressing on them their war guilt. Sufficient progress had been made on this point so that on 14 July 1945, USFET further relaxed the non-fraternization policy by authorizing US personnel to engage in conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public places.

d. *Allied PW (RAMP)* and US/British Civilian Internees.*

(1) Prior to December 1944, activities of this headquarters consisted of laying plans for handling Allied PW and US/British Civilian Internees and disseminating to armies information obtained from SHAEF including strengths of "RAMP" camps in Germany and maps showing locations. Plan for handling "RAMP" was published as a directive in ADSOP, this headquarters, dated 18 October 1944 (Annex 49).** During the pursuit through France a few hospitalized "RAMP" of various nationalities left behind by the retreating Germans were found and evacuated throught medical channels.

(2) Beginning in November 1944, this headquarters began to call forward SHAEF PWX personnel for attachment to this headquarters and to armies as needed. The maximum number of such personnel of all nationalities working for this command was reached in April 1945 and were attached as follows:

	Officers	EM	
Hq, 12th Army Group	5	3	
First US Army	22	40	
Third US Army	36	32	
Ninth US Army	83	81	
Fifteenth US Army	13	12	
In addition to the above	49	60	were attached to Seventh US Army
Total	208	228	

(3) By 31 July, all attached SHAEF PWX personnel engaged in RAMP work had been returned to SHAEF.

* Recovered Allied Military Personnel

** page 180

(4) During December 1944, coordinating action was taken with ADSEC, Com Z to evacuate to rear areas approximately 3,000 "RAMP," mostly Russians, overrun in hospitals by Third US Army in the METZ—SAARBRUCKEN area. This was at variance with the "stay-put" policy in which overrun "RAMP" were to be required to remain in their camps until arrangements could be made for their evacuation. However, evacuation was necessary due to fighting around hospitals and camps.

(5) From February 1945, until well after the cessation of hostilities (25 May 1945) "RAMP" were overrun and evacuated in increasing numbers. Arrangements were made by this section to utilize returning air supply planes for evacuating US, British and some French "RAMP" to Com Z. As of 15 June 1945, total "RAMP" overrun were 920,272. As of 9 July 1945, total "RAMP" evacuated, 828,561. The difference of 91,711 represents those eastern Europeans who could not be evacuated. Methods of evacuation and total numbers evacuated by 12th Army Group as of 9 July 1945 were as follows:

Air	— 291,939
Rail	— 303,150
Motor	— 233,472
Total	828,561

(6) On 9 July 1945, the following "RAMP" were still held by 12th Army Group, pending arrangements for evacuation:

ARMY	Poles	Yugoslavs	Greeks	Czech	Albanians	Russians	Total
Third	7,476	—	—		—	—	7,476
Seventh	6,366	4,630	143		87	—	11,226
Fifteenth	—	28	25		—	8	61*
Total	13,842	4,658	168		87	8	18,763

(7) In addition to the above, many "RAMP" who did not obey the "stay-put" orders were collected and evacuated through Displaced

* Handed over to the French on 9 July 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Persons channels, except US and British personnel, who were evacuated through "RAMP" by air. Following the Rhine crossing when many "RAMP" camps were being overrun, this headquarters took action on numerous requests from the War Office, War Department, SHAEF, ETOUSA, and other headquarters concerning the whereabouts and special evacuation of individual "RAMP". It also coordinated many details between armies and SHAEF, ETOUSA, and the other army groups.

(8) US and British civilian internees were given the same priority of treatment as US and British "RAMP". This headquarters called forward consular officials from SHAEF for identification of persons claiming to be US or British civilians who had been interned by the Germans. Following their identification, disposition was made in accordance with SHAEF desires.

e. *Enemy Civilian Internees.* (See PM Annex.)

(1) Coordinated instructions on handling enemy civilian internees were issued to armies in the form of Part C, Annex 7, Operation "ECLIPSE" (Annex 50).*

(2) On 5 March 1945, this headquarters indorsed to armies SHAEF instructions on handling diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with any of the United Nations who may be found in Germany (Annex 51).* From time to time appropriate action was taken on handling of captured consular officials of Japan, Spain, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

(3) As of 16 June, numbers of enemy civilian internees, exclusive of war criminals and security suspects among disarmed German forces, held by 12th Army Group were as follows:

Third US Army	—	9,144
Seventh US Army	—	3,162
Ninth US Army	—	14,626
Fifteenth US Army	—	5,335
Total		32,267

* pages 183—185

(4) By 12 July 1945, these figures had increased as follows:

Third US Army	— 25,914	(8 camps)
Seventh US Army	— 17,907	(4 camps)
Total	— 43,821	

(5) Detention report forms were received in relatively few numbers from SHAEF. It was therefore necessary for this section to initiate action in June 1945, to reproduce 150,000 forms.

f. *Discipline, Maintenance of Law and Order.* (See also PM Annex and JA Annex.)

(1) Administrative instructions on maintenance of law and order were published in ADSOP, this headquarters, dated 16 October 1944 (Annex 52).* The bulk of the actions by this headquarters in regard to discipline and law and order consisted of forwarding to the appropriate commander for necessary action such instructions as were published by higher headquarters. In addition, individual cases received at this headquarters were either referred to the IG for investigation or forwarded to the appropriate commander.

(2) On 23 October 1944, the armies were advised that general prisoners convicted by courts martial on the continent whose sentences of confinement were ordered served in this theater would be sent to the Seine Disciplinary Training Center in Paris. Those whose place of confinement was designated within the US would be sent to the Seine Disciplinary Training Center pending evacuation. On 24 February 1945, the armies were advised that the Disciplinary Training Center for confinement of general prisoners would be the Loire Disciplinary Training Center.

(3) On 3 January 1945, this headquarters published a letter to armies providing rules and regulations for the hunting of game in the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Generally, hunting of game in France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Luxembourg was by specific invitation or subscription to a hunting license, or both. Hunting of all game in Belgium was prohibited.

(4) Numerous complaints of carelessness by our troops in treating Allied property resulted in the publication to armies of a com-

* page 186

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

mand letter dated 14 February 1945, requesting that immediate and continuing attention be given to discipline and control of troops (Annex 53)."

(5) On 16 April 1945, a letter from SHAEF, subject: "Use of Extracts of Personal Letters Received Through Censorship" was indorsed to armies. This letter provided that extracts of personal letters indicating individual violations of the existing orders against looting or fraternizing or other rules and regulations should never be used as a basis for direct action.

(6) From time to time instructions were issued to subordinate commands concerning the manner of handling disciplinary cases involving personnel of Allied troops attached to 12th Army Group. Generally, the personnel concerned were apprehended and turned over to the proper national governments through senior liaison officers connected with this headquarters.

g. *Looting and Pilfering.* (See PM Annex.)

(1) Original instructions issued by this headquarters consisted of Par 9g (6) ADSOP, dated 18 October 1944, which were as follows: "Commanders of all echelons will take every precaution and institute forceful measures to prevent looting and pilfering of military supplies, including captured enemy equipment and supplies, especially at depots, rail and truck heads, and dumps".

(2) No special cases of looting and pilfering of US military supplies were brought to the attention of this headquarters. However, numerous complaints of looting and pilfering by US forces were brought to our attention by British, French, and Belgian authorities. Action in these cases involved forwarding to the appropriate commander for investigation and report. On 2 April 1945, the Commanding General sent to army commanders a letter calling attention to the personal responsibility of commanders of all echelons in preventing looting and pilfering on the part of members of their commands (Annex 54)."

h. *Aliens Among US Forces.*

(1) The policy on aliens among US Forces was set forth in ETOUSA Circular 24, 2 March 1945, and ETOUSA Circular 83, 27 July 1944. Authority was given in certain cases for units of this command to retain selected French individuals acting as guides and interpreters

* pages 188, 189

for them as long as the unit concerned was operating in France, but that such individuals should be returned to the French authorities when the unit moved to German soil.

(2) By Headquarters Memo 89, dated 1 October 1944, this headquarters published instructions concerning the identification of Allied personnel attached to 12th Army Group. (Annex 55)."

(3) In March 1945, this headquarters called forward for attachment to armies, 150 Netherlands interpreters from the Netherlands Government. Upon request of armies, steps were taken with the Netherlands Government to have this personnel regularized in the Netherlands Army. ETOUSA was requested to coordinate with the Netherlands Government such administrative matters as pertained to the Netherlands interpreters attached 12th Army Group, to include pay, discipline, uniforms, etc. In July 1945, the majority of these interpreters were returned to the Netherlands Government as surplus.

i. *Finance.* (See Finance Annex.)

(1) Policies and instructions on finance matters were published to subordinate commands in Par 9 f, ADSOP, this headquarters, dated 18 October 1944 (Annex 56)."

(2) Inasmuch as the Finance Director, ETOUSA, controlled and established general policies relating to theater finance matters, this headquarters in conjunction with theater, established the following policy relative to the issuance of assignment or movement orders affecting finance units:

(a) ETOUSA agreed to request concurrence of this headquarters before assigning or reassigning finance units within this command. This was to be accomplished through G-3, this headquarters.

(b) G-3, this headquarters, before giving concurrence would request recommendations from G-1.

(c) G-1 would, when necessary, request recommendations from the finance officer.

(3) On 13 March 1945, this headquarters requested all major subordinate commands to submit a survey as of 1 March 1945 of the pay status of enlisted personnel in combat and service units under their commands so as to present an accurate cross-section of the

* pages 190, 191

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

current pay status. In addition, a general statement of the results of this survey was required in which each reporting headquarters expressed an opinion as to whether or not conditions were considered satisfactory. All comments indicated that the pay status was satisfactory.

(4) Miscellaneous matters pertaining to illegal possesion of large amounts of foreign currency obtained from black market operations, sales of stolen and/or pillaged Government supplies, thefts of personal effects of casualties and prisoners of war, and transaction with prisoners of war were routed to appropriate commanders for necessary investigation.

j. *Stragglers.* (See PM Annex.)

Instructions to subordinate commands were published in Par 7 b. ADSOP, this headquarters, dated 18 October 1944 (Annex 57).* The collection and handling of stragglers presented no major difficulties, and only minor coordinating action through the Provost Marshal was necessary.

k. *Escapers and Evaders.* (See PM Annex.)

(1) Instructions relative to the handling of escapers and evaders were contained in Par 7 c, ADSOP, this headquarters, dated 18 October 1944 (Annex 58).*

(2) The plan for using Ground Force Reinforcement System installations for the return of escapers and evaders to their units or for evacuation to United Kingdom proved unsound, and this branch was called upon to coordinate a great many individual cases. The whole matter should have been coordinated by Headquarters ETOUSA in order to effect smoothness of operation between 12th Army Group, Communications Zone, and 21 and 6th Army Groups. ETO SOP No 58, dated 3 April 1945, was published too late in the operational period to be of any real value in regard to the handling of escapers and evaders.

l. *Enemy Prisoners of War.* (See PM Annex.)

(1) From 6 June 1944 to 15 May 1945, 2,783,446 prisoners of war were taken by 12th Army Group. For more complete statistical breakdown of prisoners of war taken and for operational details of the PW collection, handling and evacuation, see PM Annex. Information

* pages 193, 194

on numbers of Disarmed Enemy Forces taken after 8 May 1945 and on procedures and policies for disbandment are contained in Disbandment of German Armed Forces paragraph below.

(2) Protected personnel were handled in accordance with provision of Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. Armies were authorized to retain PWs, including protected personnel, for temporary labor for a period not to exceed seven days. Permanent PW labor was requisitioned from Com Z.

(3) On 30 June 1945, 12th Army Group accepted responsibility for operation of all PW enclosures in Germany. Seventh US Army took over 125,917 PW from CONAD and Fifteenth US Army took over 179,503 PW from ADSEC. On 10 July 1945, 129,064 prisoners of war were turned over to French Forces by the Fifteenth US Army, and 44,975 (PWs and Disarmed Enemy Forces) were turned over to the French by the Seventh US Army.

m. *Disbandment of the German Armed Forces.*

(1) In October 1944, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group was charged by the Supreme Commander with developing and implementing plans for disbanding the German armed forces in the American occupational zone. In order to secure orientation for this project, representatives of all General Staff Sections attended a three-weeks course at a special Disarmament School in London during November 1944.

(2) Plans for disbandment were purposely kept in a fluid state because of the rapidly changing tactical situation. During the early planning stages, it was contemplated that there would be a general surrender of the German forces when the Allied forces reached the borders of Germany or, at the latest, when the Allied forces reached the Rhine. Had this assumption been correct, most of the German armed force administrative machinery would be intact and could have been used for disbandment purposes by merely throwing the recruitment and conscription machinery into reverse under Allied supervision and control.

(3) With the passage of time, however, it became increasingly obvious that there would be no surrender as such and that the Allies would be forced to fight into, and perhaps through, Germany. Such a procedure would most certainly disrupt or destroy all German

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

administrative machinery, in which event we would be forced to set up a complete Allied disbandment procedure. The initial disbandment plan published by this headquarters was issued 27 February 1945 as First Draft, Part E, Annex 7, 12th Army Group Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE". The final plan evolved as Third Draft, Part E, Annex 7, dated 12 April 1945, with an amendment dated 4 May 1945 (Annex 59).*

(4) In view of the fact the Commanding General, 12th Army Group was charged with disbandment of the German armed forces without regard to branch of service, close cooperation with the US Navy and the US Army Air Force became necessary. Since the initial American occupational zone did not include any coastal areas, it was anticipated that few German naval personnel would be encountered and no specific plans were formulated for their disbandment. It was, however, anticipated that large numbers of German air force personnel would be overrun by the advancing ground force. To meet this contingency, a detailed agreement was concluded with the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, who was charged with air force disbandment and disarmament responsibilities in the American zone (Annex 60).*

(5) On 7 May 1945, troops of this command were holding 472,041 prisoners and, with hostilities practically over, instructions were issued to armies to commence disbandment proceedings (Annex 61).* In the initial disbandment directive, as well as in all succeeding directives, the discharge of SS personnel, war criminals, and security suspects was expressly prohibited and careful G-2 screening was emphasized. The initial directive limited dischargees to those employed in agriculture, coal mining, and transportation.

(6) Prior to 9 May 1945, all prisoners were being evacuated to transient prisoner of war cages operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone west of the Rhine. On 9 May 1945, it became obvious that transportation facilities could not continue to function in handling the great increases in prisoners. Accordingly, a directive was issued to the effect that prisoners would no longer be evacuated, but would be held in army areas as Disarmed Enemy Forces (DEF). Prisoners held by Communications Zone and by Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC) would continue to be considered as prisoners of war (Annex 62).*

* pages 196—210

(7) The disbandment program was ready to operate except that no forms for documentation were available. Armies were authorized to reproduce forms locally to meet this emergency (Annex 61).* Progress was slow in the beginning, chiefly because of the large number of DEF which had to be concentrated and maintained. On 16 May, the number of DEF under 12th Army Group control stood at 1,380,960.

(8) On 12 May 1945, armies were authorized to discharge women DEF (Annex 63) and on 13 May new instructions were issued pertaining to the discharge of men (Annex 64).* At the beginning it was believed to be advisable to restrict discharges by each army to those individuals who had permanent residence in the respective army area. The reason for this decision was that it was felt that the armies were trying to organize disbandment procedure as they discharged and that confusion would result if one army attempted to discharge individuals who resided in the area controlled by another.

(9) By 19 May 1945, it became evident that each army was definitely oriented in disbandment procedure and that each had settled into a definite and distinct pattern. Authority was then given for one army to discharge into territory controlled by another (Annex 65).* The details of this operation were delegated to the commanders concerned, with no attempt being made to establish a definite army group policy. This plan proved to be so successful that it was later adopted to a limited extent in connection with discharges to the areas controlled by the British and French.

(10) As the result of the heavy influx of prisoners incident to the closing days of the war, ADSEC, on 19 May, was holding approximately 700,000 prisoners of war west of the Rhine. Rations became scarce and, as the armies had no objections, ADSEC was given permission to discharge into army areas. Again the details were left to the commanders concerned (Annex 66).*

(11) Instructions from Supreme Headquarters which had been incorporated in 12th Army Group plans anticipated that PW and DEF held by one-zone commander who resided in another zone of occupation would be transferred to the zone of residence prior to discharge, but as the result of experience gained by the command in inter-army transfer, it was held that it would be more efficient to accomplish all documentation, including the discharge certificate, prior to transfer. This obviated the necessity of the receiving agency's

* pages 209—216

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

setting up an administrative organization at the point of [illegible] resulted in a request to Supreme Headquarters for permission to amend current instructions pertaining to inter-zone transfer (Annex 67).* Supreme Headquarters granted permission for all documentation to be completed by the transferring agency, but prescribed that the discharge certificates should not be given to the individuals concerned prior to the individuals' coming under control of the receiving agency. Armies were given permission to discharge in the French Zone of Occupation on 28 May (Annex 68).*

(12) As the personnel operating discharge centers became more and more proficient, efforts were made by 12th Army Group to increase the number of categories which could be discharged. Authority was given on 9 June 1945 for the discharge of DEF who had received maximum hospitalization (Annex 69).* On 18 June, the Supreme Commander was asked to grant authority for general discharge of all labor categories (Annex 70).*

(13) By the middle of June 1945, the Third US Army was holding approximately 697,000 DEF, and because of the extreme shortage of captured enemy food stocks, it was imperative that this army maintain the highest possible discharge rate. Because of this necessity, the Third US Army was authorized to suspend the preparation of a majority of the prescribed disbandment forms (Annex 71 and Annex 59).* Under this system, Third US Army reached a rate of 35,000 discharges per day.

(14) During the month of June, a conference was held with AFHQ representatives at Bolzano, Italy to establish a procedure for exchange of PW and DEF between SHAEF and AFHQ. The outcome of this conference was a SHAEF directive to the Third US Army to establish a reception center at Munich to receive 100,000 PW from Italy, at the rate of 3,000 per day and distribute them throughout the American and British zones. In reverse, the directive called for Italy-bound transferees from the American and British zones to be shipped to Munich for staging prior to shipment over the Brenner Pass.

(15) It was discovered that we held considerable numbers of DEF of nationalities other than German, many of them of Allied nationality. On 27 June, a plan was offered the Governments of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands providing for the release

* Pages 218—221; Annex 59, p. 186

without discharge, of DEF of Allied nationality to their respective governments (Annex 72).* The French Government was the first to agree to the proposal, and armies were informed of the arrangements on 6 July (Annex 73).* Upon receipt of agreements from the other governments, armies were similarly notified.

(16) In a series of conferences negotiations were conducted with 21 Army Group for the transfer of PW and DEF between American and British zones. These negotiations culminated in a directive to armies 27 June and movement actually commenced on 10 July (Annex 74).*

(17) On 30 June, ADSEC and Continental Advance Section (CONAD) ceased operations and approximately 250,000 PW held by those commands came under the control of the Seventh and Fifteenth US Armies. Thus for the first time, 12th Army Group controlled both PW and DEF. The French took over the territory held by the Fifteenth US Army on 10 July and all PW held by Fifteenth US Army (129,000) reverted to French control.

(18) In order to meet American commitments to Allied governments to turn over PW qualified for labor, Communications Zone on 5 July requested immediate shipment of 54,000 PW to designated enclosures in France and Belgium. Necessary instructions were transmitted to Seventh US Army the same day (Annex 75).*

(19) Although Communications Zone was calling on this command to furnish PW necessary to meet Allied commitments, we were requested to receive from Communications Zone, for discharge, PW who could not be transferred to Allied governments, because they were not qualified for labor. At a conference 10 July, arrangements were made for immediate shipment and discharge of approximately 30,000 of these physically unfit PW (Annex 76).*

(20) The necessary authority having been received from the Supreme Commander, instructions were issued 12 July for general discharge (Annex 77 and Annex 70).*

(21) As of 16 July, units of this command had discharged 1,541,460 PW and DEF, and were holding 700,263. As of the date of dissolution of this headquarters, discharging and all inter-army, inter-zone, and inter-theater movements were continuing, and control of the disbandment procedures passed to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater.

* pages 220—250

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEXES

(1—77, inclusive)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF 2 NOVEMBER, 1943



ANNEX 1

Volume II, 12th Army Group Final After Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1944



ANNEX 2

Volume II, 12th Army Group Final After Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF 9 JULY 1945

G-1 SECTION

AC OF S, G-1
Brig Gen J. J. O'Hare

EXECUTIVE
Col C. Van Way

OPERATIONS BRANCH

Personnel:

Lt Col F. D. Shepherd
WO JG N. V. Taylor

Functions:

1. Preparation of G-1 Annexes, G-1 Section Administrative Orders.
2. Maintenance of administrative situation maps.
3. Preparation of casualty reports and G-1 Periodic Reports.
4. Coordinating reports required by 12th Army Group from lower units.
5. Operation of G-1 Distribution Center and Top Secret Control.
6. G-1 Journal and related records and reports.
7. Safeguarding of classified documents.
8. Supply and transportation for G-1 Section.
9. Internal administration of G-1 Section.
10. Planning internal arrangements for Section offices.
11. Graphs and charts pertaining to all branches.
12. Liaison and coordination between Corps, Armies and this headquarters.
13. Shelter and accommodations.
14. Approval prior to publication of any document requiring reports to be submitted by lower units.

PERSONNEL BRANCH

Personnel:

Col. J. A. Wilson
Lt Col. B. T. Rose
Lt Col. N. R. Clark
Lt Col. J. R. Turner
Major J. Q. Wood

Functions:

1. Appointment and enlistment.
2. Assignment and reassignment.
3. Discharge and retirement.
4. Classification and reclassification.
5. Maintain current information on location and stockage of Reinforcements by arm-service.
6. Requisition and transfers.
7. Readjustment of Personnel. Redeployment and Demobilization.
8. Reinforcements and co-ordination of Reinforcement procedure between Armies, Hq GPRG, and Hq ETOUSA.
9. Promotions and demotions.
10. T.O, T/A, and T/D.
11. Marriage.

MORALE BRANCH

Personnel:

Col. J. L. Ames
Lt Col. J. I. Ladd
Major W. L. Brockfield
Capt. W. O. Wade
Lt. J. C. Scott

Functions:

1. Post Exchange.
2. Postal Service.
3. Red Cross.
4. Religious matters.
5. Special Services.
6. Vice Conditions.
7. Leaves, Furloughs and Passes.
8. Awards, citations and decorations.
9. Uniform and its wear.
10. Graves Registration.

MISCELLANEOUS BRANCH

Personnel:

Col. O. F. Kolbek
Lt Col. C. J. Hackett
Major J. H. Robertson

Funktions:

1. Sanitation.
2. Prisoners of War and Stragglers.
3. Prisoners of War in Enemy Hands.
4. Aliens among US Forces.
5. Discipline.
6. Fiscal matters.
7. Law and Order, maintenance of (including reciprocal police powers and refugee control).
8. Interest, common to G-1 and G-5.
9. War Criminals.
10. Non-Fraternization.
11. US and British Civilian Internees.
12. Allied Nationals.
13. Violations of the Geneva Convention.

ANNEX 3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

COMPARATIVE TABLES OF ALLOTMENT OF G-1 SECTION PERSONNEL

As of 12 December 43

OFFICERS Grade	Authorized	Grade	ENLISTED Authorized
Brig Gen	1	1	1
Col	8	2	4
LtCol	6	3	4
Maj	6	4	8
Capt	1	5	5
WO	1	6	1
	23		29

As of 12 June 44

Brig Gen	1	1	
Col	7	2	
LtCol	7	3	Same as for
Maj	8	4	12 Dec 43
Capt	2	5	
WO	2	6	
	27		

As of 12 October 44

Brig Gen	1	1	6
Col	6	2	4
LtCol	6	3	4
Maj	6	4	9
Capt	1	5	3
WO	2		
	22		26

As of 11 November 44

Brig Gen	1	1	
Col	6	2	6
LtCol	6	3	4
Maj	6	4	4
Capt	1	5	9
WO	2	6	2
	22		27

As of 3 July 45

Brig Gen	1	1	5
Col	6	2	4
LtCol	6	3	7
Maj	5	4	10
Capt	1	5	2
WO	2		
	22		28

ANNEX 4

DISTRIBUTION OF NON T/O GRADES, FUSAG, ARMIES, CORPS & DIV

	GENERAL OFF	COLONEL	LT COLONEL	MAJOR	CAPTAIN	1ST LIEUTENANT	2ND LIEUTENANT	TOTAL	WARRENT OFF	GRADE 1	GRADE 2	GRADE 3	GRADE 4	GRADE 5	GRADE 6	GRADE 7	TOTAL	AGGREGATE
HQ & HQ DET SP TROOPS	1	1	2	5	6	4	3	21	1	5	6	3	11	11	2	1	43	65
HQ COMPANY SP TROOPS				10	6	14	1	23			6	13	38	49	75	101	440	463
P & PW DET			3	12	20	38		63		12	8	4	17		10		50	113
E E I DET			1		12	12		25			1	3	12	16			6	11
ENG REP DET					1	1		2			1	1	8		3	3	32	34
VISITORS BUREAU		1	1	3		2		7		1	1	1	12	16	1		6	13
POST EXCHANGE DETACHMENT						1		1			1		4				21	22
ARMY PHOTO INTERP DET					1	1		2			1		9	16	2		31	33
TOTAL SP TROOPS FUSAG	1	1	6	30	52	73	4	168	1	18	25	25	112	92	93	145	652	752
HQ & HQ DET FUSAG	1	1	6	30	52	73	4	168	1	18	25	25	112	92	93	145	652	772
TOTAL FUSAG	1	1	6	30	52	73	4	168	1	18	25	25	112	92	93	145	652	772
HQ FUSA		1	2	5	6	4		18		2	3	3	12	9	6	3	38	56
CORPS					6	6		12					6				6	18
DIVISIONS					6			6					6				6	12
TOTAL		1	2	5	18	10		36		2	3	3	24	9	6	3	50	86
HQ TUSA		1	2	5	6	4		18		2	3	3	12	9	6	3	38	56
CORPS					12			12					4				4	16
DIVISIONS						11		11					11				11	22
TOTAL		1	2	5	18	15		41		2	3	3	27	9	6	3	53	94
AGGREGATE	1	2	8	35	70	88	4	209	1	20	28	28	139	101	99	148	705	914

ANNEX 5

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION OF GRADES AND RATINGS
HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT FUSAG

	GEN OFFICER	COLONEL	LT COLONEL	MAJOR	CAPTAIN	1ST LIEUTENANT	2ND LIEUTENANT	TOTAL COMM OFF	WARRANT OFF	GRADE 1	GRADE 2	GRADE 3	GRADE 4	GRADE 5	GRADE 6	GRADE 7	TOTAL ENLISTED	AGGREGATE
CG & AIDES	1	1	1	2				5					3				4	9
C of S	1			1	2			4		1							1	5
DC of S	1	1			2			4				1					1	5
S of GS	1		1	1	2			5	1	1		3	1				5	11
G-1	1	1	2	8	2		2	16	2	1	4	4	7	5	1		22	40
G-2	1	1	10	13	17	4	1	47	4	1	8	8	13	3	2		36	87
G-3	1	1	19	23	17	6	2	69	4	1	11	4	15	16	7	2	56	129
G-4	1	1	10	10	11	12	1	46	2	1	8	3	7	8	7	1	35	83
G-5	1	1	5	2	4	1		14	1	1	4	4	6	2	1		18	33
A G	1	1	5	5	5	5	2	24	6	3	6	6	28	11	8	2	69	99
AIRBORNE		1	1	1				3					1				1	4
AIR CONTROL GP	1	1	2	1	4	5	4	16		1			1				2	18
ANTI AIR			2	3	2	1		8	1	1	2	2	3	1			10	19
ARMORED		1	1	1				3										3
ARTY			2	2	5	3		12										12
BU O GP			1	4	5	2	3	15										15
CHAPLAIN				2				2										2
CWS			1		2	2		5										5
ENGINEER			4	4	3	3	1	15										15
FINANCE			2		2			4										4
I G			1	2		1		4										4
JA				1				1										1
MEDICAL			2	2	2	2		8										8
ORDNANCE			2	2	2	2		8										8
PM			2	1				3										3
P & PW			2	2	2	2		8										8
QM			1	2	2	1		6										6
SIGNAL	1	1	8	12	12	8	2	44	6	1	2	2	4	1			10	60
SPEC SECTION			2	5				7										7
SPEC SERVICE				1	1			2										2
TRANS			1	1	1	1		4										4
TOTAL	9	9	78	108	104	59	18	385	27	12	51	46	98	47	26	5	285	697

ANNEX 6

12 JUNE 1944

6. PERSONNEL
f. Replacements

Extract from
FUSAG, Joint Administration Plan
[illegible]
19 April 1944

(a) FM 100—10 dated 15 November 1943, will, in general, govern the supply of replacements to the field forces. Flow of replacements and replacement requisitions are shown diagramatically on Page No 4.

(b) One headquarters and headquarters detachment replacement battalion (separate) and four replacement companies will be established on the continent to function for and in close support of each army corps as directed by armies.

(c) As soon as practicable, a reserve of replacements will be built up on the continent. One headquarters and one headquarters company replacement depot and two replacement battalions for each army, in addition to those in (b) above, will be established on the continent as early as practicable to operate under army control. These depots will be built up to hold an operation reserve of replacements as soon as the situation permits. Normal requisition on these depots will be effected as soon as the depot stockage permits. Armored vehicle crew replacements will be requisitioned separately.

d) Installations of the Field Force Replacement Systems will be established on the continent as required for the supply of replacements to armies, Communication Zone, and army group reserve. Elements of the Armored Replacement Depot will be displaced crosschannel at the earliest practicable date after D+30. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, is charged with preparation of detailed plans and provision of lift for establishing elements of the Field Force Replacement System, other than those specified in (b) and (c) above, on the continent. These plans will be coordinated with Headquarters FUSAG. It is probable that replacement shipments will be made from U S direct to the continent beginning approximately D + 90.

(e) Commanding General, Army Group, will establish credits amd priorities for replacement to the Communications Zone while operating under army group control, and to armies, army group reserve, army group headquarters troops

(f) Provided they are physically qualified for duty with units to which assigned prior to hospitalization, individuals, upon completion of hospitalization, will normally be returned through replacement channels to their units in all cases in which the unit has not been transferred from the theater of operations. This personnel will not be carried as overstrength, but will be charged against replacement requisitions from the unit or organization to which forwarded.

(g) All replacements will be forwarded from replacement depots with complete individual equipment and weapons.

ANNEX 7

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. Replacements sent forward into army areas will be completely equipped, including individual weapons. Until such time as the Communications Zone can assume this responsibility, all replacements will be shipped from the United Kingdom to the Continent with complete equipment, including individual weapons.

2. Replacements shipped from US direct to the Continent will be armed and equipped in the Communications Zone before being sent forward into army areas.

3. Army Commanders will make provision for re-equipping and re-arming stragglers, hospital returns, and other casuals remaining within the army area prior to their return to their respective units either directly or through the replacement system.

(h) Airborne units will be dependent upon overstrength for initial replacement of jumper personnel. Non-jumper personnel may be requisitioned through normal replacement channels.

(2) **Formations/Organizations** of one Ally serving with another.

(a) British reinforcements to British formations serving under US

1. Units and all formations will deal directly with GHQ 2nd Echelon, British or Canadian, as appropriate.

2. GHQ 2nd Echelon, after coordinating all demands, will order reinforcements forward from the appropriate reinforcement group or depot.

3. The British reinforcement group or depot will coordinate with movement control who will forward reinforcement into US line of communication in accordance with normal US movement procedure.

4. Appropriate British or Canadian headquarters will furnish to the US Army or Communication Zone Commander concerned information as to proposed shipments in order that arrangements in para (c) below may be made.

(b) US Replacements for US units serving under British.

1. The headquarters of each US organization serving immediately under a British or Canadian headquarters will consolidate all its unit requisitions by shipping destination and transmit direct to Headquarters, US Field Force Replacement System on the continent, except in the case of units assigned to US armies or communications zone temporarily detached for service with the British. In the excepted case units will continue to submit requisitions and receive replacements through normal channels.

2. Headquarters US Field Force Replacement System on the continent will forward replacements into British lines of communications at points to be designated by British movement control.

3. A report of the total number of replacements included in consolidated requisitions will be furnished to British or Canadian headquarters under which the U S organization is serving.

(c) Priority for shipment, arrangement for reception of reinforcements/replacements after arrival at the appropriate points on respective lines of communication, and other details will be prescribed by the army or Line of Communications /Communications Zone Headquarters under which the formation/organization is serving.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



HEADQUARTERS FIRST US ARMY GROUP
APO 655

322 (G-1)

27 March 1944

SUBJECT: Estimate of Battle Replacement Requirements

TO: Commanding General, ETOUSA.

1. Revised estimate by months of net battle replacement requirements for Field Forces and SOS for operational period D to D+209 (see Col 6, inclosure No. 1) are forwarded herewith in accordance with par 3c, letter AG 322/86 MGA, Hq ETOUSA, 16 January 1944, Subject: "Combat Replacement System for the Field Forces, ETOUSA" and supersedes that made by letter AG 322 (G-1), this headquarters, subject: "Replacement Estimate for Field Forces" 28 January 1944. Normal attrition requirements as computed by SOS, ETOUSA for both FF and SOS have been added to give overall replacement requirements excluding Air Forces. (see Col. 10, inclosure No. 1)

2. Recommend that these estimates be prepared in the form of a letter to the War Department to be carried by Col. H. W. Wilkinson, who is familiar with the background of the computation and who is departing for the US about 28 March 1944. Letter should be substantially as follows:

1. Forwarded herewith by officer courier are revised estimates of replacement requirements, exclusive of filler and rotation personnel, for the months of June through December 1944 inclusive.

2. Estimates as given in inclosure No. 1 represent net replacement requirements from the US for all Field Forces and SOS in the ETO. Requirements reflect complete absorption within theater of all battle casualties returning to duty.

3. The following additional points constitute the basis for computation of enclosed long range estimate of replacement requirements.

a. Monthly requirements are based on present operational plan for the period D to D + 60.

b. For the purpose of arriving at a troop build-up on the continent subsequent to D + 60, the following assumptions have been made:

(1) That all Field Forces in the ETO as of D+59 will have been committed to the continent as of D + 89.

(2) That 30% of total Field Force and SOS troops committed to the continent as of D + 89 will consist of SOS troops.

(3) That all Field Force and SOS troops arriving in ETO between D+60 and D + 89 will be committed to the continent between D + 90 and D + 134.

ANNEX 8

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) That subsequent to D+89, all Field Force and SOS troops arriving in ETO will come direct from U S to continent, and that the monthly shipping of Field Forces and SOS units after D+89 will amount to 120,000 personnel, (4 divisions per month with a divisional slice of 30,000).

4. If battle losses develop as shown in inclosure No. 1, the monthly replacement flow as set up on March 1944, ETOUSA Force Troop Requirement Chart, will meet these requirements through D+89 and still maintain a substantial reserve. However, at about D+90 the replacement pool stockage will be inadequate to meet total replacement requirement in the subsequent 30 day period. It is contemplated that representatives from this theater, in conference with the War Department, will discuss the possibility of increasing the monthly flow of replacements beginning about D+30 (as recommended in par 5 below) in order to cover shortages that may develop about D+90 or 120 and to assure that sufficient replacements are held in the theater to maintain a reserve of approximately 25,000.

5. Recommend that replacement flow from July to November, inclusive, be increased to 35,000 per month as shown in col (13), inclosure No. 1, to provide replacement reserves shown in col (15), inclosure No. 1."

For the Commanding General:

H. B. LEWIS
Brig. Gen. U. S. A.
Adjutant General

1 Incl

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

t to D + 89, all Field Force and SOS troops arriving in ETO
ontinent, and that the monthly shipping of Field Forces and
mount to 120,000 personnel, 4 divisions per month with a

lop as shown in
, ETOUSA Force
and still maintain
ckage will be made
od. It is contempl
partment, will disc
ng about D + 30 to
elop about D + 90
r to maintain a

lacement flow fro
n in col (13), inclo
No. 1."

For the Comman

No. 1, the monthly replacement
quirement Chart, will meet these
ential reserve. However, at about
meet total replacement requirement
representatives from this theater,
ssibility of increasing the monthly
cided in par 5 below) in order to
t to assure that sufficient replace-
of approximately 25,000.

to November, inclusive, be increased
1, to provide replacement reserves

eneral

H. B. LEWIS.
Brig Gen U. S. A.
Adjutant General

ESTIMATED REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND REPLACEMENT FLOW (US TO ETO)
D — 30 to D + 209

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Month	Troop Build-Up On Continent (FF and SOS)		Total Replacement Requirements (FF and SOS)								Replacement Flow by Months		Balance in Pool (Prev Estimate Repl Requmts against Repl Flow)	
			Battle Replacements				Normal Attrition		Total Replacement Requirements					
			Present Estimate			Prev Estimate of Net Battle Replacement Requirements								
	Present Estimate	Previous Estimate	Total Battle Casualties	Wounded Returns to Duty	Net Battle Replacement Requirements		Present Estimate	Previous Estimate	Present Estimate	Previous Estimate	As Set up on Mar '44 Eto Force TRP Requmt Chart	Recommended Repl Flow	Using Repl Flow on Mar '44 Eto Force Tpt Requmt Chart	Using Recommended Repl Flow
May							7405	7405	7405	7405	35860	35860	50300*** 78755	50300*** 78755
Jun	572797	400000	76376**	4924	71436**	52000	6304	7036	77750	59405	35000	35000	56005	56005
Jul	848664	562200	47835	12891	34943	21900	6906	8160	41849	28636	35000	35000	20156	20156
Aug	1139876	680800	50213	18342	31871	16854	7754	9485	39625	25911	31000	35000	18531	21731
Sept	1341576	800800	46489	21020	25469	14000	8368	10160	33837	23485	32000	35000	16694	25694
Oct	1502357	920800	53036	22141	30895	19000	8346	11100	39241	29160	27800	35000	3253	21453
Nov	1622357		56743	23725	33018		8169	12100	41187		33300	35000	2634	15266
Dec	1742357		60020	25444	34576		8521	13000	43097		37800	37800	7931	9069
Totals	1742357		390705	128487	262218		61773	78446	323991		265760	283660		

* Includes those that do not land.
** Includes 9170 Airborne troop casualties.
*** Represents Replacement Pool Stockage 1 May 1944.
Note: -- Figures entered under "previous estimate" represent, in each case, the basis for estimated requirements contained in letter, AG 200.3 HQ ETOUSA, 4 Feb 1944.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 9

Serial		Remarks
1	ESTIMATED CASUALTIES	

a. For 23 July (D + 47) to 2400 hrs and cumulative to same date

UNIT	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Total Battle Cas		Sick & Non-Battle Injured	
	D + 47	Cum	D + 47	Cum	D + 47	Cum	D + 47	Cum	D + 47	Cum
V CORPS TROOPS		183	2	734	—	36	2	953	2	431
2 INF DIV	1	607	9	2576	2	233	12	3416	23	887
5 INF DIV	2	25	10	168	—	6	12	199	10	131
VII CORPS TROOPS		376	2	1751	—	126	3	2253	15	632
1 INF DIV		440		1521	—	279		2240	25	1961
2 ARMD DIV		70	1	434	—	21	1	725	1	540
3 ARMD DIV	3	188	9	887	—	54	13	1129	25	380
4 INF DIV	2	1489	2	6312	1	323	5	8174	49	723
9 INF DIV	14	598	35	4161	—	124	49	5083	65	1279
30 INF DIV	2	605	18	3410	3	95	23	4110	40	811
VIII CORPS TROOPS	2	60	7	498	4	23	13	521	17	104
79 INF DIV	4	622	84	4506	—	255	88	5383	42	250
90 INF DIV	14	1381	120	5957	463	838	597	8176	121	729
8 INF DIV	5	389	23	1748	—	61	30	2188	11	195
83 INF DIV	2	827	89	4544	1	114	47	5485	25	623
4 ARMD DIV		25	75	277	—	9	75	311	16	151
XIX CORPS TROOPS		100	1	516	—	31	1	647	11	193
29 INF DIV	7	1532	4	5783	—	602	11	7917	18	1364
35 INF DIV	8	300	34	1695	7	142	46	2137	55	743
ARMY TROOPS		143		1004		74		1221		4
TOTAL FIRST ARMY	78	10169	474	48412	381	3456	928	62037	558	12400
82 A/B DIV		765		3326		1217		5308		
101 A/B DIV		648		2174		866		3688		
ADV SEC COM Z		53		445		198		696		
TOTAL U.S.	78	11635	474	54357	381	5737	928	71769	558	12400

Information from First Army G-1 Summaries.

Cumulative figures for all Corps Troops include casualties for Corps (Service) Troops for **6 June — 15 July inclusive only.**

Army Troops totals include cumulative casualties for **6 June — 15 July inclusive only.**

Adv Sec Com Z include all casualties on units reported by First Army **up to 1 July only.** (Incomplete)

Cumulative totals as of 2400 hrs 9 July.

— SUMMARY —

Total Battle Cas	71769
Total Non-Battle Cas	12400
Total Casualties	84169

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Serial		Remarks
1	ESTIMATED CASUALTIES (Cont'd)	

b. For 24 July (D + 48) to 2400 hrs and cumulative to same date:

UNIT	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Total Battle Cas		Sick & Non-Battle Injured	
	D + 48	Cum	D + 48	Cum	D + 48	Cum	D + 48	Cum	D + 48	Cum
V CORPS TROOPS		113	2	584		24	7	721	4	293
2 INF DIV		609	7	2583		231	7	3423	18	905
5 INF DIV		25	3	171	1	7	8	203	16	131
VII CORPS TROOPS		378	7	1768		126	7	2272	53	442
1 INF DIV		463		1595		224		2282	29	2023
2 ARMD DIV		70	3	437		21	3	528	20	569
3 ARMD DIV		165	2	612		31	2	808	16	324
4 INF DIV	27	1561	77	6422		363	104	8346	25	740
9 INF DIV	18	815	150	5310		120	168	5245	70	1349
30 INF DIV	15	618	64	3463	1	95	80	4176	25	819
VIII CORPS TROOPS	2	62	13	441	4	23	19	526	8	108
79 INF DIV	5	627	25	4531		254	30	5412	20	770
90 INF DIV	6	1337	39	5832		688	45	7857	15	744
83 INF DIV	25	852	144	4688	1	115	170	5655	34	658
5 ARMD DIV	3	28	13	290		9	16	327	2	151
8 INF DIV		394	11	1768	4	34	15	2196	10	72
XIX CORPS TROOPS	8	108	12	533	2	32	22	673	7	179
29 INF DIV		1646		5693		576		7915	17	1371
35 INF DIV	3	303	14	1714	1	780	18	2197	37	750
ARMY TROOPS		143		1004		54		1201		3
TOTAL FIRST ARMY	112	10317	595	58439	14	3207	721	61963	426	12401
82 A/B DIV [a]		765		3326		1217		5308		
101 A/B DIV [a]		648		2174		866		3688		
								70959		
ADV SEC COM Z		53		445		198		696		
TOTAL US	112	11783	595	54384	14	5488	721	71655	426	12401

(Same as for Serial 1 a above)

SUMMARY

Total Battle Cas	71655
Total Non-Battle Cas	12401
Total Casualties	84056

Serial		Remarks
2	ESTIMATED STRENGTH — For Division only	

	Effective Str 2400 hrs 22 July	Effective Str 2400 hrs 23 July	Effective Str 2400 hrs 24 July
1 INF DIV	15523	15498	15668
2 INF DIV	15006	14968	14975
4 INF DIV	14741	14912	14700
5 INF DIV	14209	14212	14367
8 INF DIV	13441	13470	13735
9 INF DIV	13588	14339	13437
29 INF DIV	14611	14873	14883
30 INF DIV	13643	13721	13906
35 INF DIV	13566	13521	13813
79 INF DIV	13568	13732	13793
83 INF DIV	13481	13999	13817
90 INF DIV	14027	13535	13545
2 ARMD DIV	15909	15909	15909
3 ARMD DIV	15548	11188	14700
4 ARMD DIV	10637	10546	10539

Information from First Army G-1 Summaries.

3	REPLACEMENTS DISPATCHED OVERSEAS [a]	
	a. Cumulative to 2400 hrs 24 July (D+48) 95900	[a] Information from BUCO. In addition to overstrength shipments.
	b. Replacement Units dispatched on 21 July (D+45): Hq/Hq Det, 14 Repl Depot 39 Repl Bn (sep) w/4 Cos 85 Repl Bn (sep) w/4 Cos	
4	PRISONERS OF WAR	Information from First Army G-1 Summaries.

Reported Captured to 2400 hrs 22 July (D+46)	50749
Captured on 23 Jul (D+47)	26
Captured on 24 July (D+48)	23
Total reported captured to 2400 hrs 24 July (D+48)	50798

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

7 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

G-1 Daily Summary as of 6 August 1944

Estimated Effective Strength	567000
Casualties:	
Killed in Action	15932
Wounded in Action	73460
Missing in Action	5438
Captured	1039
Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	18202
Total Casualties	114071
Replacements assigned previous 24 hours	1397
Prisoners of War	77059

J. J. O'HARE
Colonel, GSC
AC of S., G-1

ANNEX 10

ANNEX 10

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP APO 655

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 6 August 1944 is/submitted for your information.

Unit	Effective Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total		Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
TWELFTH ARMY GRP																		
Hq & Spec Trs																		
FIRST ARMY																		
Hq & Army Trs																		
V CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	10841							79	1146	16	21	45	1256	1514	1			
Corps Trs	14077									5	9	24	1000	1816	524	2	2	
2 Inf Div		1	13	11		25	39	255	734	21	15	24	451	3010				
								18	316	71	89	289	6003	1710	1579			
								942	6683					9955				
VII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	16612							217	1235	16	17	45	1514	580	1			
Corps Trs	16612	From G-1 Periodic Reports to 29 July					10	362	1349	22	103	24	1816	2322	524	2	2	
1 Inf Div	14803	3	9	1	1	13	10	559	2212	13	248	6	3010	511				
3 Armd Div	15329			(not reported)				290	1328	8	86	8	1710	1205	1579	120	120	
4 Inf Div	14276	24	193	1		128	39	1848	7639	94	480		9955		102			

(Pub 2799)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq. Twelfth Army Group

Unit	Effective Strength	Daily Battle Casualties				Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Casualties	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VII CORPS (Cont'd)																	
9 Inf Div	12973	33	229			253	1111	3719	5	96	62	6998	2166	66	85	72	13
30 Inf Div	13728	3	25			28	911	5161	57	353	11	6436	1246				
XIX CORPS																	
Hq & Serv Trs	13977	From G-1 Periods Reports to 29 July				10	67	743	9	15		825	406	3	6	6	9
Corps Trs	15232	1	7	2		9	15	616	72	37		804	725	129	79	80	
2 Armd Div	12975	41	181	5		227	323	1336	72	72		1731	189	15	18	9	
28 Inf Div	12705	5	43	1		49	157	1012	83	85		1254	2002	112	111	111	
29 Inf Div	12762	43	189	8		240	2032	2792	44	305	271	10409					
PROV RANGER GROUP	2153						98	212		39		349	1				
FA Gp Hq	66						1					1	4				
552 FA Bn	531																
266 FA Bn	535																
Total First Army	170875	154	790	29		973	9516	33333	490	2070	698	55517	13156	968	442	421	22
THIRD ARMY																	
5 Inf Div	13434	2	9	3		14	147	1016		80	10	1253	195				6

(Pub 2799)

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq, Twelfth Army Group

Unit	Effective Strength	Daily Battle Casualties				Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Casualties	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS																	
Corps Trs	11656	1	1			2	73	322		14	6	369	348	3	12	12	
83 Inf Div	13162	28	92	28		148	1081	3955		148		5891	4579	168	392	441	
4 Armd Div	10571	10	45	14		69	151	579		93	19	773	705	20	483	483	
6 Armd Div	10875	5	22	7		34	53	217		48		337	397	9	77	77	
8 Inf Div	13395	3	25	3		10	457	2331		92		2880	569		626	626	
XV CORPS																	
Corps Trs	7781	2	9	3		14	2	2		3		3	83	1	12	12	
5 Armd Div	16596	4	36	11		55	257	492		222	24	40	54	17	113	113	
79 Inf Div	14120	8					1627	6566		660	215	5891	996		215	215	
90 Inf Div	13769						506	2996	88	322		9068	996	211			
35 Inf Div	12543											3728	1341				
Total Third Army	131343	58	219	69		346	4849	25817	88	1692	274	31772	5036	429	1853	1985	
82 Air Borne Div							916	3314	26	995	2	5057					
101 Air Borne Div		(NOT ON CONTINENT)					651	2256	2	741	65	3723					
GRAND TOTAL	302211	212	1009	98		1319	6412	29032	706	3438	1039	39869	18201	1397	2295	2506	22

J. J. O'HARE
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-1

(Pub 2799)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

G-1 Daily Summary as of 15 Dec 1944

Estimated Effective Strength	800,000
Casualties:	
Killed in Action	40,981
Wounded in Action	175,413
Missing in Action	16,793
(Cumulative Month's Missing—2641)	
Captured	3,598
Cumulative Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	144,609
Total Casualties	381,394
Replacements:	
Assigned Previous 24 Hours	1,757
Total Replacements Assigned to Units	299,745
Unassigned Replacement Stockage in Battalions (as of 1800 hrs 13 Dec 1944)	3,509
Prisoners of War	411,863

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-1.

ANNEX 11

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP APO 655

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 Hours 15 December 1944 is submitted for your information.

ANNEX 11

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP	11826	12109		1			1	45	2				2	13		2		17	571
Hq & Spec Trs	14184	13666											96	229				325	733
94 Inf Div	1897	1850											34	27				61	107
Atchd Trs																			
FIRST ARMY	47091	46724	Adjusted to 9 December										90	334	2	23	12	459	4021
•Hq & Serv Trs	31477	31355	Adjusted to 9 December										233	768		114	1	1116	1845
•Combat Trs																			
V CORPS	3058	3019	Adjusted to 9 December										12	72	18	4	1	89	459
Hq & Serv Trs	25202	24790	1	7			8	49					199	2316	39	204	31	3150	3125
Combat Trs	14184	13300	8	110	14	1	133	220					2139	7882	381	48	374	10443	5668
2 Inf Div	14184	12801	5	30	35		70	87					1508	6813	95	521	61	8903	3647
8 Inf Div	14184	13424	5	52	29		86	46					37	383	9	95		515	259
78 Inf Div	14184	13642	7	30			30	58					88	333		11	8	390	1179
99 Inf Div																			
VII CORPS	7886	7828	Adjusted to 9 December										90	459	2	65		614	639
Hq & Serv Trs	26745	26159	6	10	2		18	37					711	2642	18	69	23	3445	2766
Combat Trs	14184	13213		2			2	34					1399	7166	25	793	222	9594	8568
1 Inf Div	14515	14407						22					1599	4708	24	62	30	6599	3858
3 Armd Div	10729	9784		30	5		37	28					373	1881	54	109	61	2524	1629
5 Armd Div	14184	13597	25	29	11		45	82					2160	10734	31	449	657	14000	9433
9 Inf Div	14184	12485	26	163	62		251	97					1979	8731	225	311	124	11165	3972
83 Inf Div	14184	13222	5	17	4		25	66					727	3197	207	267	67	4258	2459
104 Inf Div																			
VIII CORPS	2626	2476	Adjusted to 9 December					33					12	12		88		14	145
Hq & Serv Trs	17949	17828											201	872				1161	1810
Combat Trs																			

• Note: (see page 3)

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 Hours 15 December 1944

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)																			
4 Inf Div	14184	12934						27	2963	14243	198	806	27	18039	7192				
9 Armd Div	10729	10691						7	14	56		7		97	346				
28 Inf Div	14184	14254		4			4	29	1409	6881	3	602	686	9578	4683				
106 Inf Div	14184	13926		6			6	38	3	26				29	192				
Total First Army	354071	341659	64	490	162	1	717	960	18206	80543	1330	4648	2385	105782	67535	592	414	305	136
THIRD ARMY																			
Hq & Serv Trs	50565	49932	Adjusted to 9 December						140	207	2	161		508	4789				
Combat Trs	15102	14693	Adjusted to 9 December						17	36	1	23		76	669				
III Corps																			
Hq & Serv Trs	1900	1908							1	2				3	54	1			
Combat Trs	1441	1412							6	21				27	75				
26 Inf Div	14184	12669						31	920	3513	124	705	5	5143	4364	29			
XII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	4510	4574						1	17	47				64	377	10			
Combat Trs	30488	29441	1	7			8	29	441	1606	2	162	24	2283	3027	41			
4 Armd Div	10729	9002						152	742	2426	29	286	1	3445	2424	23			
6 Armd Div	10729	10330						38	577	1883	3	68	9	2537	3054	39	13	13	
35 Inf Div	14184	12237	4	71	76		151	45	1606	8334	126	1075	33	11098	5959	85	49	103	9
80 Inf Div	14184	13998			1		1	11	1509	5564	1	1168	9	8300	5171	945			
87 Inf Div	14169	13218	65	123	12		200	59	102	454	193	193		749	133	2	32	57	
XX CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	6954	6966						5	36	170	2	8	1	235	425	9			
Combat Trs	28803	28329	7	13			20	50	402	1655	22	67	16	2160	2511	24	10	10	
5 Inf Div	14184	14215						21	1095	5411	167	1003	15	7524	6630		5	4	3
10 Armd Div	10729	8789						19	126	1017	8	81	1	1225	1329	5			
90 Inf Div	14184	11976	14	25			39	59	2317	10177	64	664	442	13609	4130	24	127	154	3
95 Inf Div	14184	11929	12	36	9		57	12	658	3594	178	753		5045	1024	28	155	155	
Total Third Army	271223	257518	103	275	98		476	522	10952	46117	922	6417	556	64022	46145	965	391	469	15

Page 2

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 Hours 15 December 1944.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
NINTH ARMY																			
Hq & Serv Trs	33453	33010	Adjusted to 13 December						5	38		1		44	851				
Combat Trs	15112	15052						8	12	68				80	670	7			
XIII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	4538	4092	Adjusted to 13 December						18	125		1		144	151				
Combat Trs	21979	21450		4			4	16	238	882	5	42	2	1164	1760	6			
7 Armd Div	10729	10623						11	429	2293	2	712		3434	2235	1			
84 Inf Div	14184	12914		2	41		43	4	503	1761	254	666	3	2933	1502	20	2	2	
102 Inf Div	14184	13046	4	6			10	42	487	1620	18	158		2265	1375	24			
XVI CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	3001	2842	Adjusted to 13 December																
Combat Trs	6733	6707						5		1				1	27				
XIX CORPS															293				
Hq & Serv Trs	4016	3878	Adjusted to 13 December																
Combat Trs	23088	22678							19	29				49	338				
2 Armd Div	14315	14341		1			1	19	486	1772		152	1	2419	2510	23			
29 Inf Div	14184	13451		2			2	26	731	3603		176	11	5521	3901	54			
30 Inf Div	14184	14031		8			8	18	3520	14192	110	862	387	18961	6671	34			
								35	2590	9657		968	214	13426	4005	33	1	1	
Total Ninth Army	193800	188285	4	23	41		68	184	9038	36041	389	5738	624	49441	26200	193	3	3	
Units no longer under control of Twelfth Army Group									2673	12443		1938	33	17137	3338				
GRAND TOTAL	847001	815087	171	789	301	1	1262	1677	40981	175413	2641	16793	3598	236785	144609	1755	808	804	157

* NOTE: Cumulative casualty figures of First Army Troops have been adjusted to accord with corrected information received from that army.

Page 3

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, G-C,
AC of S, G-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

1 January 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

G-1 Daily Summary as of 31 Dec 1944

Estimated Effective Strength	853,000
Casualties:	
Killed in Action	46,039
Wounded in Action	195,636
Missing in Action	33,318
(Cumulative Month's Missing - 19,489)	
Captured	5,209
Cumulative Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	165,535
Total Casualties	445,737
Replacements:	
Assigned Previous 24 Hours	4,756
Total Replacements Assigned to Units	335,939
Unassigned Replacement Stockage in Battalions (as of 1800 hours 29 Dec 44)	5,297
Prisoners of War	431,671

CHARLES W. VAN WAY, Jr.,
Colonel, GSC,
Actg AC of S, G-1.

ANNEX 12

84

ANNEX 12

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP APO 655

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2600 hours 31 December 1944 is submitted for your information.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP	12085	12063						3	642	2			
Hq & Spec Trs	14184	13568						10	892				
94 Inf Div	1897	1828							132				
Atchd Trs													
FIRST ARMY	49032	48527			Adjusted to 23 December			5	4413				
Hq & Serv Trs	22472	22262			Adjusted to 23 December				1202				
Combat Trs	10720	9849							2225				
5 Armd Div													
V CORPS	3101	3060			Adjusted to 30 December				208				
Hq & Serv Trs	25864	25995	1	4		1	5		3662				
Combat Trs	14184	13896	1	13		38	14		9242				
1 Inf Div	14184	12106	3	12	2	222	17		6445				
2 Inf Div	14184	13961	2	21	1	444	24		10295				
9 Inf Div	14184	10776	1	9		658	10		1994				
99 Inf Div						136							
VII CORPS	7772	7840			Adjusted to 30 December				692				
Hq & Serv Trs	20664	21397	2	5	1	8	8		2137				
Combat Trs	14388	14515		3		11	3		4191				
2 Armd Div	14335	14515		2	1	30	3		4967				
3 Armd Div	12963	14184		21		682	28		4572				
83 Inf Div	13509	14184		24	2	124	33		1677				
84 Inf Div						5							
XVIII A/B CORPS	1193	1268			Adjusted to 30 December				32				
Hq & Serv Trs	31749	30463	1	5	1	7	7		2662				
Combat Trs	9682	10720		3		24	3		2397				
7 Armd Div	13579	14184	1	24			25		4721				
30 Inf Div	12954	14184	3	20	1		24		266				
75 Inf Div													

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 31 December 1944

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XVIII A/B CORPS (Cont)																		
82 A/B Div	10175	9760	2	14			16	89	514	99	99		702	547				
106 Inf Div	14184	5219		2			2	416	1248	7001	7001		8661	423				
Total First Army	52238	32139	31	164	9		204	17876	74330	11386	2659	109702	67670	2216	149	151	6

NOTE: First Army reports the current daily battle and non-battle casualty **totals only.** The breakdown of these totals to respective units is estimated by this headquarters because of one-day time lag in receipt of report. Appropriate adjustments are made in cumulative figures when complete report received.

THIRD ARMY																		
Hq & Serv Trs	53592	48926	Adjusted to 23 December															
Combat Trs	16085	15159	Adjusted to 23 December															
III CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	2229	2132	1				1	149	217	2	161		527	5307				
Combat Trs	17588	16378						33	116	169	131		280	795				
4 Armd Div	10720	10389	13	65	11		89							80	1			
6 Armd Div	10720	10805	1	13			14	2	864	17	35		4	1865	69	3		2
26 Inf Div	14184	13192	12	150	17		179	219	2664	95	352	23	1171	2733	2	30	3	30
35 Inf Div	14184	13269	9	153	288		450	858	1923	7	67	1	3855	3322	47	83	95	
104 Inf Div	14184	11262	10	66	17		93	595	4007	226	796	75	2292	3945	1	51	23	28
								934	9133	524	1425	35	5742	6618	38	34	7	77
XII CORPS								1790	1957	477	477	1	2754	445	385			
Hq & Serv Trs	2657							319										
Combat Trs	16666	15571											14	209				
* 90 Armd Div	10720	9159	9	1			10	2	12	2	2		1432	1580	6	6	1	99
11 Armd Div	10720	10137	10	200			210	117	381	701	735	199	2295	584				
17 A/B Div	8556	8545						199	974	1115	1122		416	26				
* 28 Inf Div	14184	9274			5		5	16	400					11				
87 Inf Div	14184	11686	2	29	8		39	1722	7758	1682	2081	1699	13249	5961	37	160	1	99
								267	1041	262	262		1564	1094	4			
XII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	4736	4499						20	62		1		83	354				
Combat Trs	31791	29296	3	17			20	594	2208	34	225	9	3036	3768	22	1	1	
4 Inf Div	14184	13864	2	6			8	3285	1471	517	969	35	18760	7769	103	1	1	
5 Inf Div	14184	13954	2	13	3		18	1209	6384	280	1111	15	8719	7401	835	1	1	

* Notes: (see page 3—center)

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 31 December

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XII CORPS (Cont)																		
80 Inf Div	14184	14001	15	15	3		33	69	747	65	1747	9	9929	5995	746	9	41	1
XX CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	5704	5681																
Combat Trs	20272	18295	2	1			3	50	150	7	7	1	198	422	4			
10 Armd Div	10720	9043						367	1536	66	66	10	1989	2220	4			
90 Inf Div	14184	14171						1574	10285	235	235	1	2038	1855	18			
95 Inf Div	14184	13867	3	18			2	2228	3814	813	813	442	13896	4560	14	13	21	19
Total Third Army	373710	344935	85	758	353		1196	28515	6749	13252	2492	112192	69189	2323	947	193	254	

* Includes strength and casualties of CC "B" (9 Armd Div) and 112 RGT 28 Inf Div) attched to XVIII A/B CORPS

NINTH ARMY																		
Hq & Serv Trs	33042	32335	Adjusted to 26 December															
Combat Trs	13088	12936																
XIII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	4315	4050	1	1			2	11	44	1	1		56	1170				
Combat Trs	23229	22653						20	203	11	11	2	283	944				
29 Inf Div	14184	13660	1	6			7	67	127	1	96		148	133				
102 Inf Div	14184	12979	1	9			2	20	626	8	89	2	995	1663	17			
XVI CORPS								4	14253	99	869	405	19031	6054	59			
Hq & Serv Trs	1592	1450	Adjusted to 26 December					180	1715	37	148		2418	1622	45			
Combat Trs	2135	2115						3564										
XIX CORPS								555										
Hq & Serv Trs	4123	3960	Adjusted to 26 December															
Combat Trs	20072	19551	16	4			20	22	37	58	133	6	2159	2567	1			
8 Inf Div	14184	13295	5	9			14	400	1620	132	458	182	5435	4182	27			
28 Inf Div	14184	14128	3	1			4	1423	7232	466	466	10	7196	1096	41			
104 Inf Div	14184	13677	3	8			11	196	3196	100	458	17	1653	2882	14	1	1	
Total Ninth Army	178957	169278	29	93			122	758	39984	1230	3581	625	39656	23852	215			
Units no longer under control of Twelfth Army Group									12543	1988	3388	33	17127	3138				
GRAND TOTAL	970011	868531	145	935	362		1492	105486	19489	33176	5269	280202	165565	4756	947	193	260	

CHARLES W. VAN WAY, JR.
Colonel, GSC
Actg AC of S, G-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

27 Jan 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 hrs 26 Jan 1945

Estimated Effective Strength	875,000
Casualties:	
Killed in Action	51,961
Wounded in Action	222,090
Missing in Action	37,358
(Cumulative Months' Missing—4785)	
Captured	7,072
Cumulative Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	208,427
Total Casualties	526,908
Reinforcements:	
Assigned Previous 24 Hours	3,422
Total Reinforcements Assigned to Units	417,612
Unassigned Reinforcement Stockage in Battalions (as of 1800 hrs 24 Jan 1945)	4,585
Prisoners of War	461,012

J. J. O'HARE.
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-1.

ANNEX 13

ANNEX 13

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP APO 655

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945 is submitted for your information.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties					Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total		Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total		Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP																		
Hq & Spec Trs	13839	13231						3	24	84	27	52	11	160	801	7		
66 Inf Div	14184	12910						4	258	115	1	510		894	104			
Atchd Trs	3246	3161						3	35	32	1	25		92	195			
FIRST ARMY																		
Hq & Serv Trs	46800	45647	Adjusted to 20 January					7	126	488	18	67	9	690	5623			
Combat Trs	17640	16807	Adjusted to 20 January						126	539	1	570	3	1238	1761			
5 Armd Div	10720	10480							442	2248	2	153	60	2903	2508			
V CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	3478	3149	Adjusted to 20 January						17	99	6	20	2	138	261			
Combat Trs	25669	24928						21	699	2912	224	268	180	4059	4558			
1 Inf Div	14184	13507	5	24			3	23	1455	8338	56	877	522	11193	10792			
2 Inf Div	14184	13789		17			2	31	2284	9165	32	56	1611	12461	7376			
9 Inf Div	14184	14024	1	3			1	22	2269	11113	20	493	658	13333	11191			
99 Inf Div	14184	13381	4	18			2	18	495	1887		399	143	2874	2696			
VII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	8310	8191	Adjusted to 20 January					3	24	84	27	69	8	728	803			
Combat Trs	16161	15505	2				2	4	258	115	1	96	17	2745	2284			
2 Armd Div	14515	13984						5	35	32	1	25	1	587	5708			
3 Armd Div	14515	14105						3				182	17	8069	4598			
83 Inf Div	14184	13389	2	1			2	1				252	31	11533	6475			
XVIII A/B CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	1425	1354	Adjusted to 20 January					24	106	553	27	512	124	13722	50	6		
Combat Trs	34126	32154	4	20			4	44	711	2995	99	661	10	4379	3955			

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)												
87 Inf Div	14184	14001						20				
XII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589										
Combat Trs	28943	27569										
4 Armd Div	10729	10550						2				
4 Inf Div	14184	13925					5	15				
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	9	8	10		27	85				
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1	5		7	42				
80 Inf Div	14184	13554		27	1		28	69				
XX CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631										
Combat Trs	21007	18959		1			1	1				
94 Inf Div	14184	13169		1			1	15				
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	1	73			74	32				
Total Third Army	377024	356925	33	373	18		424	591		627	325	297
NINTH ARMY												
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	12808	12642										
XIII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	25067	24451	1	8		9	18					
29 Inf Div	14184	14059						15				
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	5	21		26	52	13				
XVI CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	Adjusted to 24 January									
Combat Trs	241	228										

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)												
87 Inf Div	14184	14001						20				
XII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589										
Combat Trs	28943	27569										
4 Armd Div	10729	10550						2				
4 Inf Div	14184	13925					5	15				
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	9	8	10		27	85				
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1	5		7	42				
80 Inf Div	14184	13554		27	1		28	69				
XX CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631										
Combat Trs	21007	18959		1			1	1				
94 Inf Div	14184	13169		1			1	15				
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	1	73			74	32				
Total Third Army	377024	356925	33	373	18		424	591		627	325	297
NINTH ARMY												
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	12808	12642										
XIII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	25067	24451	1	8		9	18					
29 Inf Div	14184	14059						15				
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	5	21		26	52	13				
XVI CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	Adjusted to 24 January									
Combat Trs	241	228										

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)													
87 Inf Div	14184	14001	482	1623	266	449	6	2560	1957	1			
XII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589	27	82	5	1		110	476	8			
Combat Trs	28943	27569	625	2331	18	195	18	3178	6064	50			
4 Armd Div	10729	10550	966	2847	112	369	1	4123	3156	18			
4 Inf Div	14184	13925	3608	14599	90	802	115	19124	9140	374	1	1	
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	1312	7302		919	17	9755	8209	360	23	21	2
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1				2	124	1			
80 Inf Div	14184	13554	1910	7483	75	1626	9	11028	7267	44	158	139	87
XX CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631											
Combat Trs	21007	18959	56	142	1	6	1	205	433	3			
94 Inf Div	14184	13169	351	1466	502	55	15	1887	2728	13			
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	172	852	27	503		1527	1502	364	71	75	32
			929	4141		574		5644	1919	43	23	3	
Total Third Army	377024	356925	17570	73787	3060	12129	845	104501	72496	1883	627	325	297
NINTH ARMY													
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	23	86			2	113	1851	3			
Combat Trs	12808	12642	135	353	14		2	504	814				
XIII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	6	30	1			37	198	5			
Combat Trs	25067	24451	20	64	32		2	118	2328	11			
29 Inf Div	14184	14059	204	1575	766		334	2880	7256	11	1	1	71
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	353	1863	145				1935	21			
XVI CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	1	4					46				
Combat Trs	241	228							293	1			

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)												
87 Inf Div	14184	14001						20				
XII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589										
Combat Trs	28943	27569										
4 Armd Div	10729	10550						2				
4 Inf Div	14184	13925					5	15				
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	9	8	10		27	85				
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1	5		7	42				
80 Inf Div	14184	13554		27	1		28	69				
XX CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631										
Combat Trs	21007	18959		1			1	1				
94 Inf Div	14184	13169		1			1	15				
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	1	73			74	32				
Total Third Army	377024	356925	33	373	18		424	591		627	325	297
NINTH ARMY												
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	12808	12642										
XIII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	25067	24451	1	8		9	18					
29 Inf Div	14184	14059						15				
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	5	21		26	52	13				
XVI CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	Adjusted to 24 January									
Combat Trs	241	228										

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)													
87 Inf Div	14184	14001	482	1623	266	449	6	2560	1957	1			
XII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589	27	82	5	1		110	476	8			
Combat Trs	28943	27569	625	2331	18	195	18	3178	6064	50			
4 Armd Div	10729	10550	966	2847	112	369	1	4123	3156	18			
4 Inf Div	14184	13925	3608	14599	90	802	115	19124	9140	374	1	1	
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	1312	7302		919	17	9755	8209	360	23	21	2
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1				2	124	1			
80 Inf Div	14184	13554	1910	7483	75	1626	9	11028	7267	44	158	139	87
XX CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631											
Combat Trs	21007	18959	56	142	1	6	1	205	433	3			
94 Inf Div	14184	13169	351	1466	502	55	15	1887	2728	13			
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	172	852	27	503		1527	1502	364	71	75	32
			929	4141		574		5644	1919	43	23	3	
Total Third Army	377024	356925	17570	73787	3060	12129	845	104501	72496	1883	627	325	297
NINTH ARMY													
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	23	86			2	113	1851	3			
Combat Trs	12808	12642	135	353	14		2	504	814				
XIII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	6	30	1			37	198	5			
Combat Trs	25067	24451	20	64	32		2	118	2328	11			
29 Inf Div	14184	14059	204	1575	766		334	2880	7256	11	1	1	71
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	353	1863	145				1935	21			
XVI CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	1	4					46				
Combat Trs	241	228							293	1			

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)													
87 Inf Div	14184	14001	482	1623	266	449	6	2560	1957	1			
XII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589	27	82	5	1		110	476	8			
Combat Trs	28943	27569	625	2331	18	195	18	3178	6064	50			
4 Armd Div	10729	10550	966	2847	112	369	1	4123	3156	18			
4 Inf Div	14184	13925	3608	14599	90	802	115	19124	9140	374	1	1	
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	1312	7302		919	17	9755	8209	360	23	21	2
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1				2	124	1			
80 Inf Div	14184	13554	1910	7483	75	1626	9	11028	7267	44	158	139	87
XX CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631											
Combat Trs	21007	18959	56	142	1	6	1	205	433	3			
94 Inf Div	14184	13169	351	1466	502	55	15	1887	2728	13			
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	172	852	27	503		1527	1502	364	71	75	32
			929	4141		574		5644	1919	43	23	3	
Total Third Army	377024	356925	17570	73787	3060	12129	845	104501	72496	1883	627	325	297
NINTH ARMY													
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	23	86			2	113	1851	3			
Combat Trs	12808	12642	135	353	14		2	504	814				
XIII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	6	30	1			37	198	5			
Combat Trs	25067	24451	20	64	32		2	118	2328	11			
29 Inf Div	14184	14059	204	1575	766		334	2880	7256	11	1	1	71
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	353	1863	145				1935	21			
XVI CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	1	4					46				
Combat Trs	241	228							293	1			

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)												
87 Inf Div	14184	14001						20				
XII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589										
Combat Trs	28943	27569										
4 Armd Div	10729	10550						2				
4 Inf Div	14184	13925					5	15				
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	9	8	10		27	85				
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1	5		7	42				
80 Inf Div	14184	13554		27	1		28	69				
XX CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631										
Combat Trs	21007	18959		1			1	1				
94 Inf Div	14184	13169		1			1	15				
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	1	73			74	32				
Total Third Army	377024	356925	33	373	18		424	591		627	325	297
NINTH ARMY												
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	12808	12642										
XIII CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	Adjusted to 23 January									
Combat Trs	25067	24451	1	8		9	18					
29 Inf Div	14184	14059						15				
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	5	21		26	52	13				
XVI CORPS												
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	Adjusted to 24 January									
Combat Trs	241	228										

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)													
87 Inf Div	14184	14001	482	1623	266	449	6	2560	1957	1			
XII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	4985	4589	27	82	5	1		110	476	8			
Combat Trs	28943	27569	625	2331	18	195	18	3178	6064	50			
4 Armd Div	10729	10550	966	2847	112	369	1	4123	3156	18			
4 Inf Div	14184	13925	3608	14599	90	802	115	19124	9140	374	1	1	
5 Inf Div	14184	13427	1312	7302		919	17	9755	8209	360	23	21	2
26 Inf Div	14184	13793	1	1				2	124	1			
80 Inf Div	14184	13554	1910	7483	75	1626	9	11028	7267	44	158	139	87
XX CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	6686	6631											
Combat Trs	21007	18959	56	142	1	6	1	205	433	3			
94 Inf Div	14184	13169	351	1466	502	55	15	1887	2728	13			
95 Inf Div	14184	14056	172	852	27	503		1527	1502	364	71	75	32
			929	4141		574		5644	1919	43	23	3	
Total Third Army	377024	356925	17570	73787	3060	12129	845	104501	72496	1883	627	325	297
NINTH ARMY													
Hq & Serv Trs	35046	34278	23	86			2	113	1851	3			
Combat Trs	12808	12642	135	353	14		2	504	814				
XIII CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	5323	4115	6	30	1			37	198	5			
Combat Trs	25067	24451	20	64	32		2	118	2328	11			
29 Inf Div	14184	14059	204	1575	766		334	2880	7256	11	1	1	71
102 Inf Div	14184	13647	353	1863	145				1935	21			
XVI CORPS													
Hq & Serv Trs	1660	1327	1	4					46				
Combat Trs	241	228							293	1			

* Under Operational Control of Fifteenth Army.

Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 25 January 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
VIII CORPS (Cont)													
7 Armd Div	10729	10299	552	2948	39	1369	222	5125	3871	32			
87 Inf Div	14184	14001	2913	11276	205	1222	214	15625	5853	35			
90 Inf Div	14184	13264	445	1767	105	338	21	2529	2758	52			
79 Inf Div	14184	11832	222	1356	10	215		1793	1641	31			
83 Inf Div	9961	9536	889	3192	45	425	419	4925	2237	22			
84 Inf Div	14184	13625	141	1481	326	7326		9248	1164	29			
106 Inf Div	14184	6825											
Total First Army	84276	81361	35	182	4			221	464				
XVIII A/B CORPS													
(Cont)													
7 Armd Div	10729	10299	8	31	4			43	32				
30 Inf Div	14184	14264	3	17				20	35				
75 Inf Div	14184	11832	3	21				25	52				
82 A/B Div	9961	9536							31				
84 Inf Div	14184	13625	5	22				27	22				
106 Inf Div	14184	6825	1	11				12	20				
Total First Army	84276	81361	35	182	4			221	464				

Unit	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
THIRD ARMY											
Hq & Serv Trs	59229	56438	Adjusted to 20 January								
Combat Trs	13865	13268	Adjusted to 20 January								
* 8 Armd Div	10720	10423	2	10		12	6	6			
* 9 Armd Div	10720	10170									
III CORPS											
Hq & Serv Trs	2255	2243	1	5		1	2	17			
Combat Trs	22336	20521	2	5		1	2	17			
6 Armd Div	10729	10429		39	1	5	1	46	90	99	132
17 A/B Div	12362	9949	1	13	1	15	1	31	174	105	
26 Inf Div	14184	13350	10	40		50			91	91	
35 Inf Div	14184	13554									
134 FCT only)	6072	3661									
99 Inf Div	14184	14108	5	59		64	6	65	16		44
VIII CORPS											
Hq & Serv Trs	4357	4129	Adjusted to 20 January								
Combat Trs	13671	11492							13		
11 Armd Div	10729	10090							12		

* Notes: (see page 3—Centerl

NOTE: First Army reports the current daily battle and non-battle casualty totals of these totals to respective units is estimated by this headquarters because of one-day time lag receipt of report. Appropriate adjustments are made in cumulative figures when complete report is received.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 26 January 1945

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XIX CORPS			Adjusted to 23 January																
Hq & Serv Trs	3925	3934						18	22	36	1	1	1	60	474	21			
Combat Trs	24357	23995						21	321	1347	1	45		1713	2792	68		1	
8 Inf Div	14184	13780		6			6	23	1720	7402	20	260	285	9667	6819	11	1		
28 Inf Div	14184	13494		5	2		9	23	310	1413	54	499		2222	1536	18			
104 Inf Div	14184	13741	1	1			2	29	843	3369	1	392	16	4620	3407		1		
Total Ninth Army	178247	173681	7	43	2		52	136	7725	31299	78	2213	642	41879	27411	159	74	3	71
FIFTEENTH ARMY			Adjusted to 20 January																
Hq & Serv Trs	5602	5485							1	12		13		26	43				
Combat Trs	3276	2895							12	87		329		428	212				
XXII CORPS			Adjusted to 20 January																
Hq & Serv Trs	447	542													2				
Combat Trs	112	111						1	1					1	1				
Total Fifteenth Army	9436	8906						1	14	99		342		455	258				
Units no longer under control of Twelfth Army Group									6466	31288		6527	2193	46474	19479				
GRAND TOTAL	937252	886115	75	598	24		697	1202	51961	222090	4785	37358	7072	318481	208427	3422	876	897	382

J. J. O'HARE
Brigadier General, GSC.
AC of S, G-1.

Page 4

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

9 May 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 hrs 8 May 1945.

Estimated Effective Strength 1,220,000

Casualties:

Killed in Action	74,174
Wounded in Action	297,561
Missing in Action	34,644
(Cumulative Month's Missing—235)	
Captured	10,176
Cumulative Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	328,559
Total Casualties	745,114

Reinforcements:

Assigned Previous 24 Hours	7,522
Total Reinforcements Assigned to Units	688,498
Unassigned Reinforcement Stockage in Battalions (as of 1800 hrs 4 May 1945)	11,787

Prisoners of War 2,608,621

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-1.

ANNEX 14

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 14

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP APO 655

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

G-1 Daily Summary as of 1600 hours 8 May 1945 is submitted for your information.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties							Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total		Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total				Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
12th ARMY GROUP																				
Hq & Spec Trs	16541	16319						5	60	106		23		189			17			
FIRST ARMY																				
Hq & Serv Trs	53358	51575	Adjusted to 28 April						169	574		44	21	808		8368				
Combat Trs	29765	29269	Adjusted to 28 April						237	1003		52	34	1326		3818				
Total First Army	83123	80844							406	1577		96	55	2134		12186				
THIRD ARMY																				
Hq & Serv Trs	65927	63964	Adjusted to 5 May						371	337		241	1	850		8171	575	426	220	206
Combat Trs	27590	26444	Adjusted to 5 May						283	868		221	41	1413		3234	420	342	342	
76 Inf Div	15229	15231						14	2	4				6		802		310	332	43
III CORPS																				
Hq & Serv Trs	8745	2710												32		217	30	1185	1652	1358
Combat Trs	22239	21488							5	17		513	21	3084		3564	14	380	380	
4 Inf Div	14189	13933						12	414	1936	5	806	116	21496		17663				
14 Armd Div	10723	10648						41	4349	16225	1	8		158		171	6	2919	2919	
99 Inf Div	14189	14329						8	14	136	1	421	598	6083		5722		330	330	
								12	1130	3934	4									
V CORPS																				
Hq & Serv Trs	2435	2101							19	94		14		127		253	11	3270	3270	
Combat Trs	25414	25208						1	897	3322	3	315	204	4738		6803		2500	2500	
2 Inf Div	14189	14256	2	1			3	14	1973	11468	13	951	631	15003		13832		1176	4948	5
9 Armd Div	10723	11227		1			1	27	2999	10924	2	109	1054	15066		10-05				
16 Armd Div	10723	11035	2	2			2	4	549	2198		1194	11	3952		1376				
97 Inf Div	14189	14256						21	178	655		76		12		523	269	592	2207	
								17		12				919		559		2558	1743	4590

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 8 May 1945

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties							Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total		Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total				Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XII CORPS																				
Hq & Serv Trs	5971	5960							46	128		2		173		538		3	3	
Combat Trs	25995	24473							231	2589		211	3	3576		5988		162	162	
5 Armd Div	10723	11090							123	2246		503	45	5988		6475		1159	1159	
5 Inf Div	14189	14280							2082	9278	11	1056	1	12911		10860		2329	2329	323
11 Armd Div	10723	10599							600	2542		50	101	5192		1799	50	506	506	506
26 Inf Div	14189	14601							1675	7353	5	817	117	9982		6529		1036	1036	
90 Inf Div	14189	13944							2962	14002	2	1052	442	18458		9012		614	1815	445
XV CORPS																				
Hq & Serv Trs	5999	5967							70	242			6	318		1063	89	39	39	
Combat Trs	23513	22976							676	2690	1	156	3044	4346		9205	101	47	75	
79 Armd Div	10723	10868							86	362		58		506		5919				
35 Inf Div	14189	14023							185	756	21	108	10	1059		1312	138	122	4	918
83 Inf Div	14189	14273							95	351	15	36	11	586		18681	166	117	280	36
80 Inf Div	14189	14676							2612	10795		236	297	14334		10786	27	81	199	68
																	2	116	116	116
Total Third Army	111293	107860	2	5	4		11	360	26334	107474	88	6626	3812	147246		123623	2565	11671	29719	11586
NINTH ARMY																				
Hq & Serv Trs	47198	46167																		
Combat Trs	13394	13383																		
2 Armd Div	14313	14753																		
VII CORPS																				
Hq & Serv Trs	6625	6508																		
Combat Trs	21953	21656																		
3 Armd Div	14313	14360																		
8 Armd Div	10723	10794																		
9 Inf Div	14189	14496																		
69 Inf Div	14189	14253																		
104 Inf Div	14189	14447																		

Unit	Daily Battle Casualties						Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties							Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total		Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total				Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs							1	46										
Combat Trs							25	231										
5 Armd Div							4	123										
5 Inf Div							16	2082										
11 Armd Div							4	600										
26 Inf Div							10	1675										
90 Inf Div							20	2962										
XV CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs							4	70										
Combat Trs							28	676										
79 Armd Div								86										
35 Inf Div							21	185										
83 Inf Div							25	95										
80 Inf Div							33	2612										
Total Third Army					11		360	26334										
NINTH ARMY																		
Hq & Serv Trs																		
Combat Trs																		
2 Armd Div																		
VII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs							6	47										
Combat Trs							16	214										
3 Armd Div								1984										
8 Armd Div							13	104										
9 Inf Div							16	803										
69 Inf Div							3	2540										
104 Inf Div							9	259										
							12	2305										
							22	308										
								1242										
								5306										

** Note: See page 4—Center)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 8 May 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
**VIII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	3183	2985		Adjusted to 5 May					8	52		9		69	361				
Combat Trs	23598	23444						21	616	2113	2	986	47	3762	4753	149	207	205	7
6 Armd Div	10723	10962						21	1163	4164		147	7	5481	6966	65	140	240	100
76 Inf Div	14189	14369						22	666	2196		264		3126	2264	61	3750	2497	1511
87 Inf Div	14189	14426		3			3	17	1085	4096	2	596	22	5799	5784	71	4654	1777	3521
89 Inf Div	14189	14417						14	219	690	3	95	1	1005	877	172	1277	1284	16
XIII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	5908	5763		Adjusted to 5 May					40	172		2		214	636	27			
Combat Trs	37894	36990						34	1111	3393		185	44	4733	6513	27	33	33	34593
5 Armd Div	10723	10656						5	547	2768		177	62	3554	3487		515	515	
30 Inf Div	14189	14260						15	3421	12960		766	543	17690	8182	19	61	61	
35 Inf Div	14189	14282						4	2371	11381		1194	460	15406	10006	12			3379
83 Inf Div	14189	14225						16	2735	11678		547	288	15248	8584	4			
84 Inf Div	14189	14278						4	1235	4586		416	424	6561	3179		79		16030
102 Inf Div	14189	14334						14	1026	3516	125	297	20	4859	3808	8	164	28043	
XVI CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	5389	5357		Adjusted to 1 May					22	40		1		63	577				
Combat Trs	25574	25454						17	527	1478		122	7	2129	4129	33	4	4	29
29 Inf Div	14189	14572						9	3717	15403	1	464	525	20109	8582				
75 Inf Div	14189	14170						9	854	2478				3292	2811		513	660	2458
79 Inf Div	14189	14428						9	1869	4473		499		6841	4497	60	7		7
95 Inf Div	14189	14471						8	1113	4783		405	67	6368	3663	2			
XVIII A/B CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	2962	2951		Adjusted to 5 May					7	41		3		51	146				
Combat Trs	16758	15858						8	244	996	1	55	2	1297	2068				9673
7 Armd Div	10723	10811						12	870	4174	4	1160	44	6248	4247				58130
8 Inf Div	14189	14051						19	2235	10370	1	518	335	13458	7373	21			22011
82 A/B Div	13065	13592		1			1	8	13	285	8	119		457	482	240			42294
XIX CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	4908	4919		Adjusted to 1 May					17	58		1		86	942				330188

Page 3

* Note: (see page 4—center)

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 8 May 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XIX CORPS (Cont)																			
Combat Trs	12876	12819						6	345	1288		50	7	1690	2766				
78 Inf Div	14189	14897						12	1540	5951		468	12	7971	4280				
Total Ninth Army	554416	554874		4			4	399	39182	153984	147	11390	4001	208563	161280	1079	11938	36042	44339
FIFTEENTH ARMY									** Operational Control										
Hq & Serv Trs	28508	28059		Adjusted to 8 May					9	18		8		35	253				
Combat Trs	13785	13084		Adjusted to 5 May					12	49				61	467	40			
66 Inf Div	14189	14074		4			4	6	804	262		3	23	1092	767	4	47	60	
*106 Inf Div	24189	17573						5	460	1570		6168	15	8213	2302	3803			
XXII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	4120	3896		Adjusted to 5 May						4		17							
Combat Trs	23025	22637						12	77	181		2	3	21	126				
17 A/B Div	13065	13794						8	564	1473		129		268	943	5	2	6	7
*94 Inf Div	14564	15006						3	802	3842		963		2166	715	38	23	32	
XXIII CORPS														5607	5070		92	274	
Hq & Serv Trs	4552	4385		Adjusted to 5 May						3				3	53				
Combat Trs	22032	21692						1	34	212		250	7	503	854	1	13		25
*28 Inf Div	14564	15046	1	1			2	12	1833	8455		2495	2242	15025	7274		4	4	
Total Fifteenth Army	176592	169256	1	5			6	47	4595	16069		10040	2290	32994	18824	891	181	376	25
Units no longer under control of 12th Army Group									* Includes authorized overstrength										
									4595	18351		3469	12	25429	11230				
GRAND TOTAL	1271966	1259153	3	14	4		21	811	74174	247561	255	34644	10176	416555	328559	2122	128838	66128	585004

Page 4

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655—

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 hrs 18 May 1945.

Estimated Effective Strength	1,565,000
Casualties:	
Killed in Action	86,515
Wounded in Action	359,253
Missing in Action	44,641
(Cumulative Month's Missing 187)	
Captured	
Cumulative Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	11,175
	426,013
Total Casualties	963,597
Reinforcements:	
Assigned Previous 24 Hours	5,818
Total Reinforcements Assigned to Units	26,708
Unassigned Reinforcement Stockage in Battalions (as of 1800 hrs 14 May 1945)	10,411
Prisoners of War	3,405,695

J. J. O'HARE.
Brigadier General, GSC.
AC of S, G-1

ANNEX 15

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP APO 655

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 hours 18 May 1945 is submitted for your information.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
12thARMYGROUP																			
Hq & Spec Trs	16469	15033						8	58	108		19		185	1688	11			
THIRD ARMY																			
Hq & Serv Trs	67030	66230							285	356		238	1	889	8494				
Combat Trs	21980	21969							292	990		226	41	1549	3529				
III CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	2456	2591						3	5	17		19	20	22	227	23			
Combat Trs	25615	24980						22	646	1953		435	121	3114	3950	232			
4 Inf Div	14089	14664						13	4388	10385		860	11	22455	13991				
9 Armd Div	10670	11291						21	549	2198		194		3932	1459	11			
97 Inf Div	14089	14150						15	178	669		87		934	384				
99 Inf Div	14089	14694						26	1130	3954		421	598	6103	5884				
V CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	2183	2130						3	22	57		14		133	279	11			
Combat Trs	23732	23454						29	877	3241		395	205	4628	6137	91			
1 Inf Div	14089	15373						19	1573	11448		951	631	15003	15002	1			
2 Inf Div	14089	14296						16	2099	10924		109	1035	15066	10818	20			
16 Armd Div	10670	11026						15		12				12	291				
XII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	5651	6125						3	52	129		2	3	176	582	1			
Combat Trs	24485	23998						29	725	2550		209	49	3528	3855	111			
4 Armd Div	10670	11726						19	1238	6246		503	1	3988	4508	381			
5 Inf Div	14089	15024						19	2083	9278		913	101	12475	11012	851			
11 Inf Div	10670	10954						18	614	2562		90		3216	1921	87			
26 Inf Div	14089	14895						12	1678	7379		760	159	9956	6895				
90 Inf Div	14089	14572							2963	14068		1902	442	18460	9157				

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 8 May 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XX CORPS																			
Hq & Serv, Trs	5720	5851						5	71	245			6	322	838	14			
Combat Trs	27405	26629						59	604	3499									
9 Inf Div	14089	14639						3	2905	14066		198	22	4623	5880	52			
13 Armd Div	10670	11101						2	105	366		792	868	18631	15233				
14 Armd Div	10670	10820						4	457	1998		22		493	246	19			
65 Inf Div	14089	14432						25	186	757	12	422	29	2896	1400				
71 Inf Div	14089	14244						30	145	599	14	99	10	1052	1250	24			
80 Inf Div	14089	14821						14	2164	10795	16	31	13	788	1081	76			
												654	397	14460	11012	52			
Total Third Army	439375	447169						371	30152	125316	92	10687	4758	170929	145545	2392	48880	103137	24613
SEVENTH ARMY																			
Hq & Serv Trs H & Serv & Combat Trs	73610	72022						70	87	414		172	116	789	22756	33			
VI CORPS																			
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	34441	34729																	
10 Armd Div	10670	10923						33	175	790	1	179		1144	5484	41			
36 Inf Div	14089	14373						10	710	3400	3	586	1	4697	3684				
44 Inf Div	14089	13939						19	1523	8480	14	1056	179	11238	14919	19			
45 Inf Div	14089	14090						19	1008	4650	5	434	19	6111	7637	43			
103 Inf Div	14089	14081						35	1519	7246	7	1436	266	10458	15991	190			
								32	582	3276	6	662	23	4543	4826	116			
XV CORPS																			
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	25318	24587																	
3 Inf Div	14089	13987						20	230	831	4	96	7	1164	3914	31			
20 Armd Div	10670	10607						32	2412	9489	10	1070	70	13101	15299	4			
42 Inf Div	14089	14110						27	9	66		1		3	319	2			
101 A/B Div	12979	13603						22	333	1800	5	1459	6	3598	2351				
								7	32	154		5	2	193	768	4			

Page 2

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 18 May 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Daily Sick & Non-Battle Injuries	Cumulative Battle Casualties: Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total	Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War: Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
XXI CORPS																			
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	31446	32743																	
12 Armd Div	10670	10565						3	84	319	2	34	6	443	1074	41			
63 Inf Div	14089	14559						13	517	2257	6	659	3	3436	2540	15			
86 Inf Div	14089	13849						10	735	3417	4	332	63	4547	3472	2			
86 Inf Div	14089	14469						17	84	653		21	2	760	473				
100 Inf Div								24	533	3667		589	1	4790	7425	83			
Total Seventh Army	336605	337236						397	10624	50909	67	8791	764	71088	112932	630		1446	44225
NINTH ARMY																			
Hq & Serv Trs	93288	92036	Adjusted to 16 May																
Combat Trs	40718	41061	Adjusted to 18 May																
2 Armd Div	14454	14083							201	699		42	19	961	13786				
									431	1541		52	35	2059	6008				
								8	1102	5331		253	65	6751	7116	13			
VII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	6474	6326																	
Combat Trs	22388	22295	Adjusted to 12 May																
5 Armd Div	10670	10763							104	597		23	2	726	1111				
8 Armd Div	10670	11064						28	651	2297		80	18	3046	3820	56			
69 Inf Div	14089	14520						32	547	2768		177	62	3554	3592	540			
104 Inf Div	14089	14910						8	260	1015		38		1313	1141	43			
								22	309	1191		55	1	1556	1791	16			
								21	1284	5305		385	27	7011	6398	4			
VIII CORPS																			
Hq & Serv Trs	3183	3027																	
Combat Trs	24444	23932	Adjusted to 16 May																
6 Armd Div	10670	11340							8	52		9		69	378				
76 Inf Div	14089	14418						19	624	2131	1	966	21	3742	5063	11			
87 Inf Div	14089	14588						9	1169	4198		152	7	5526	7290	23			
89 Inf Div	14089	14468						20	667	2197		262		3126	2430	6			
								36	1103	4110	2	306	30	5555	6032	116			
								16	222	692	1	91	1	1006	1047	19			

Page 3

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2600 hours 15 May 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
			Adjusted to 16 May															
XIII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	7369	7162						82	174		1		207	806	27			
Combat Trs	37086	36358						741	2827		168	38	3554	6038	383			
30 Inf Div	16089	14867						3345	12960		753	353	17691	8347	9			
83 Inf Div	16089	14760						2735	11628		547	288	15248	8732				
84 Inf Div	16089	14365						1235	6486		416	434	8561	3955				
102 Inf Div	16089	14450						1034	3522		161	150	4867	3958				
XVI CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	5316	5365						49	54		124	2	56	622	29			
Combat Trs	27162	26432						45	1681	1	452	10	2290	4378	560			
29 Inf Div	14089	14736						3749	15603		1101	526	20111	8665	3			
35 Inf Div	14089	14617						2333	11382			660	15406	10082	102			
75 Inf Div	14089	14862						588	2970		96		3954	5062	64			
79 Inf Div	14089	14642						2475	10701		1699	65	14875	8582	1			
95 Inf Div	14089	14595						1138	6783		394		6350	3834				
XVII A/B CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	2962	2956						7	54		3		51	157	1			
Combat Trs	14580	13876						159	652		38	1	850	1719				
7 Armd Div	10620	11178						887	5475	1	1650	39	6150	4452	397			
8 Inf Div	14089	13998						2239	10370	1	514	355	13458	7598	91			
82 A/B Div	12979	13555						53	286	8	117		456	673	22			
XIX CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	2835	2848	Adjusted to 16 May					15	22		1	1	39	615	37			
Combat Trs	26161	25601						519	1852		76	10	2457	3969				
3 Armd Div	14454	15035						2564	7331		95	139	10105	6017	17			
70 Inf Div	14089	15563						665	2674		666	21	3966	4235				
78 Inf Div	14089	15592						1547	5958		371	14	7809	4367				
Total Ninth Army	638046	645864						37569	150085	25	11814	3354	202813	172659	2523	611		683805
								667										

Page 4

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2600 hours 8 May 1945.

Unit	Authorized Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties					Cumulative Battle Casualties						Cumulative Sick and Non-Battle Injuries	Replacements	Prisoners of War		
			Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Total	Killed	Wounded	Current Month's Cumulative Missing	Total Cumulative Missing To Date	Captured	Total			Captured	Evacuated	On Hand
			Adjusted to 12 May															
FIFTEENTH ARMY																		
Hq & Serv Trs	30951	29520											45	363	7			
Combat Trs	19282	17956	Adjusted to 12 May										63	550				
66 Inf Div	14089	14062	Adjusted to 16 May									1	1098	859				
106 Inf Div	14089	13471										19	8163	2508				
												15						
XXII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	5021	3982	Adjusted to 12 May										21	131	13			
Combat Trs	20459	22592										3	278	1100				
17 A/B Div	12979	14212											2166	854	20			
94 Inf Div	14089	15161											5607	3263	206			
XXIII CORPS																		
Hq & Serv Trs	4739	4536	Adjusted to 12 May										5	63	7			
Combat Trs	19442	21851										1	2	967	4			
28 Inf Div	14089	14910											3	8936	12			
Total Fifteenth Army	161329	170276												2562	88	44	65	
Units no longer under control of 12th Army Group																		
GRAND TOTAL	1501824	1622578	1	2			3	1395	8653	1	6641	1175	301584	602015	5818	6929	1188	1452588

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-1

Page 5

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

G-1 Daily Summary as of 2400 hours 19 May 1945 is submitted for your information.

UNIT	T/O Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties	Disarmed Forces		
				Discharged Daily	Cumulative Discharged To Date	On Hand
12TH ARMY GROUP						
Hq & Spec Trs	16469	16009				
THIRD ARMY						
Hq & Serv Trs	67551	67181				
Combat Trs	20204	20253				
III CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2456	2590				
Combat Trs	25645	25040				
4 Inf Div	14089	14800				
9 Armd Div	10670	11281				
97 Inf Div	14089	14122				
99 Inf Div	14089	14719				
V CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2183	2128				
Combat Trs	23732	23471				
1 Inf Div	14089	15434				
2 Inf Div	14089	15399				
16 Armd Div	10670	11017				
XII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	5651	6120				
Combat Trs	24485	24033				
4 Armd Div	10670	11720				
5 Inf Div	14089	15357				
11 Armd Div	10670	10939				
26 Inf Div	14089	14885				
90 Inf Div	14089	14544				
XX CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	5720	5854				
Combat Trs	26549	25946				
9 Inf Div	14089	14437				
13 Armd Div	10670	10989				
14 Armd Div	10670	10814				
65 Inf Div	14089	14426				
71 Inf Div	14089	14222				
80 Inf Div	14089	14795				
Total Third Army	437264	445506		13768	34646	724274
SEVENTH ARMY						
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	77052	75473				
VI CORPS						
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	34524	35206				
10 Armd Div	10670	11124				
36 Inf Div	14089	13977				
44 Inf Div	14089	13906				
45 Inf Div	14089	13838				
103 Inf Div	14089	14254				

ANNEX 16

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 19 May 1945.

UNIT	T/O Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties	Disarmed Forces		
				Discharged Daily	Cumulative Discharged To Date	On Hand
XV CORPS						
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	25318	24464	1K			
3 Inf Div	14089	13977				
20 Armd Div	10670	10593				
42 Inf Div	14089	14152				
101 A/B Div	12979	13575				
XXI CORPS						
Hq & Serv & Combat Trs	27873	29376				
12 Armd Div	10670	10576				
63 Inf Div	14089	14569				
86 Inf Div	14089	13950				
100 Inf Div	14089	14519				
Total Seventh Army	336557	337523	1K			221254
NINTH ARMY						
Hq & Serv Trs	93288	92036				
Combat Trs	40718	41061				
2 Armd Div	14454	14075				
VII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	6474	6326				
Combat Trs	22388	22290				
5 Armd Div	10670	10694				
8 Armd Div	10670	11001				
69 Inf Div	14089	14502				
104 Inf Div	14089	14891				
VIII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	3183	3027				
Combat Trs	24444	23917				
6 Armd Div	10670	11332				
76 Inf Div	14089	14398				
87 Inf Div	14089	14562				
89 Inf Div	14089	14451				
XIII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	7369	7162				
Combat Trs	37086	36338				
30 Inf Div	14089	14795	2W			
83 Inf Div	14089	14740				
84 Inf Div	14089	14361				
102 Inf Div	14089	14340	3W			
XVI CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	5316	5365				
Combat Trs	27162	26420				
29 Inf Div	14089	14727				
35 Inf Div	14089	14613				
75 Inf Div	14089	14844				
79 Inf Div	14089	14626				
95 Inf Div	14089	14580				
XVIII A/B CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2962	2946				
Combat Trs	14089	13870				
7 Armd Div	10670	11162				
8 Inf Div	14089	13980				

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 19 May 1945

UNIT	T/O Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties	Disarmed Forces		
				Discharged Daily	Cumulative Discharged To Date	On Hand
XVIII A/B CORPS (Cont)						
82 A/B Div	12979	13540				
XIX CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2835	2848				
Combat Trs	26161	25580				
3 Armd Div	14454	15022				
70 Inf Div	14089	15540				
78 Inf Div	14089	15492				
Total Ninth Army	638046	645454	5W	500	500	683805
FIFTEENTH ARMY						
Hq & Serv Trs	30051	29520				
Combat Trs	13282	17276				
66 Inf Div	14089	14070				
106 Inf Div	14089	17456				
XXII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	4021	3982				
Combat Trs	20459	22581				
17 A/B Div	12979	14212				
94 Inf Div	14089	15131				
XXIII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	4739	4536				
Combat Trs	19925	22320				
28 Inf Div	14089	14920				
Total Fifteenth Army	161812	176704				
GRAND TOTAL	1590148	1621196	1K 5W	14268	35456	1629333

Page 3

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-1

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

MEMORANDUM TO: The Army Group Commander

G-1 Daily Summary, as of 2400 hours 16 July 1945 is submitted for your information.

UNIT	T/O Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties	Disarmed Forces		
				Discharged Daily	Cumulative Discharged To Date	On Hand
12th ARMY GROUP						
Hq & Serv Trs	13646	14019				
THIRD ARMY						
Hq w Serv Trs	67516	66456				
Combat Trs	28937	27473				
II CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2839	2868				
Combat Trs	22489	22033				
11 Armd Div	10670	9718				
42 Inf Div	14092	14154				
65 Inf Div	14092	13382				
101 A/B Div	12979	13460				
XII CORPS*						
Hq & Serv Trs	5722	5780				
Combat Trs	32999	31391				
4 Armd Div	10670	11611				
83 Inf Div	14092	14136				
90 Inf Div	14092	16026				
102 Inf Div	14092	15234				
XV CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	4195	3960				
Combat Trs	28575	27932				
1 Inf Div	14092	16594				
6 Armd Div	10670	8673				
9 Armd Div	10670	10354				
76 Inf Div	14092	11152				
99 Inf Div	14092	16785				
XX CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	6009	6010				
Combat Trs	39569	37752				
9 Inf Div	14092	15004				
10 Armd Div	10670	8023				
14 Armd Div	10670	8397				
45 Inf Div	14092	15857				
71 Inf Div	14092	14574				
80 Inf Div	14092	14292				
103 Inf Div	14092	11358				
XXII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	3819	3781				
Combat Trs	15582	15961				
8 Armd Div	10670	9421				
16 Armd Div	10670	8143				
26 Inf Div	14092	14567				
79 Inf Div	14092	14195				
94 Inf Div	14092	15589				
Total Third Army	582315	572073		11120	1242402	467028
SEVENTH ARMY						
Hq & Serv Trs	100302	97205				
Combat Trs	51224	50568				

ANNEX 17

Page 1

* see f. n. page 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-1 Daily Summary, Hq 12th Army Group as of 2400 hours 18 July 1945.

UNIT	T/O Strength	Assigned Strength	Daily Battle Casualties	Disarmed Forces		
				Discharged Daily	Cumulative Discharged To Date	On Hand
SEVENTH ARMY (Cont)						
2 Armd Div	14454	15078				
29 Inf Div	14092	14080				
VI CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2552	2531				
Combat Trs	45611	48300				
1 Armd Div	10670	4769				
7 Armd Div	10670	9518				
12 Armd Div	10670	8496				
36 Inf Div	10492	14089				
63 Inf Div	14092	14466				
84 Inf Div	14092	14534				
100 Inf Div	14092	14747				
106 Inf Div	14092	20459				
XIX CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	4246	4219				
Combat Trs	46058	46663				
3 Armd Div	14454	15128				
3 Inf Div	14092	14322				
5 Armd Div	10670	8249				
69 Inf Div	14092	14080				
70 Inf Div	14092	15489				
78 Inf Div	14092	15465				
XXI CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	2205	2156				
XXIII CORPS						
Hq & Serv Trs	1780	1851				
Total Seventh Army	466880	466962		1005	189162	117870
			P.W.s		6463	97169
NINTH ARMY						
*Hq & Serv Trs	2506	2994			103041	
FIFTEENTH ARMY						
Hq & Serv Trs	3129	3126				
Combat Trs	1602	1580				
Total Fifteenth Army	4731	4706	P.W.s		33215	
GRAND TOTAL	1070078	1060754		12125	1534605	584898
			P.W.s		39678	97169

* Latest figures available. Unit enroute to assembly area.

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC.
AC of S, G-1.

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

30 November 1944

685 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Reservation of Locations in Army Areas.

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, APO 887

1. Letter 685 (G-1), this headquarters, 22 August 1944, subject as above, and TWX this headquarters, Ref QX-10866, 19 September 1944, subject as above, are rescinded.

2. The Commanding General, 12th Army Group, is responsible for the reservation of locations within army areas for all installations other than those under command of army commanders.

3. In order to expedite handling of requests for locations, permission is granted for direct contact with armies in the following cases:

a. Commanders of tactical air commands in direct support of an army are authorized to deal directly with the army concerned for the reservation of all locations.

b. Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, may deal directly with the army concerned for the reservation of locations for installations in direct support of that army, such as dumps, depots, maintenance and repair shops, etc.

c. Commanding General, IX Air Force Service Command, may deal directly with the army concerned for the reservation of locations for all air force installations in direct support of that army, such as dumps, air field construction and maintenance units, essential signal installations, etc.

d. In the cases where direct dealing with armies is permitted (a, b, and c, above), requests will conform to the provisions of the current accommodation directives of the armies concerned.

4. Requests for locations for all major headquarters will be submitted through this headquarters. Such requests will contain a brief description of the area or building, its locations by coordinates, its approximate location with reference to the nearest town shown on a map (scale 1:100,000), and date of desired occupancy. A sketch should be made in the case where an area is to be occupied.

5. Prior concurrence of the army concerned will be secured by this headquarters before granting requests submitted in accordance with Par 4, above.

6. Clearance will be obtained from Army concerned before making reconnaissance of sites in army area.

For the Army Group Commander:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

ANNEX 18

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12Th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

15 March 1945

220.711 (CG)

SUBJECT: Rotation of Combat Soldiers.

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters First US Army, APO 230.

1. In my opinion, the principal purpose of returning personnel to the United States for rest, relaxation and recuperation is to furnish some relief for men suffering from combat fatigue, and is not designed to give such return to men just because they have been away from home for a long time. The same general policy is followed by the Air Force.

2. It is my desire, therefore, that approximately 90% of returning personnel be from lettered companies of infantry and other individuals who are habitually in close contact with the enemy over long periods of time.

3. In order to maintain lettered infantry companies at maximum efficiency, Division Commanders are authorized to transfer personnel from these units to other units of their command immediately prior to their departure to the United States, provided that such transfers do not create overstrengths, other than previously authorized, in these units. When the man returns from the United States, he will retain this new assignment unless he specifically requests a return to his old company.

4. It is desired that personnel be informed of this policy prior to their departure for the United States.

O. N. BRADLEY,
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding.

ANNEX 20

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 21

TIME IN GRADE SURVEY ON PROMOTION OF OFFICERS*

	Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel	Major to Lieutenant Colonel	Captain to Major	First Lieutenant to Captain	Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant
Army Group	19 months - 10 days	17 months - 1 day	16 months - 23 days	12 months - 23 days	16 months - 6 days
Army	25 months - 18 days	17 months - 6 days	17 months - 10 days	14 months - 12 days	15 months - 22 days
Corps	15 months - 15 days	17 months - 23 days	18 months - 26 days	16 months - 12 days	13 months - 16 days
Divisions	25 months - 8 days	15 months - 20 days	21 months - 5 days	14 months - 7 days	14 months - 21 days
Brigades and Regiments	17 months	16 months	15 months	11 months	12 months
Groups	22 months	16 months	17 months	12 months - 5 days	16 months - 15 days
Battalions		15 months	12 months - 15 days	14 months	15 months - 15 days
Companies				13 months - 15 days	14 months - 15 days

* see page 25

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

704 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Estimate of Battle Losses March 1945 to September 1945.

TO: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with provisions of Ltr, Hq European Theater of Operations, AG 320.2R subject: "Overseas Replacement System - Estimates, Reports and Requisitions" dated 1 June 1944, the following estimated data on battle losses for months of March 1945 through September 1945 are submitted:

MONTH OF	TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES	WOUNDED RETURNS TO DUTY	NET BATTLE REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
March	72477	16918	55560
April	78990	25583	53337
May	77190	23173	54017
June	74880	25599	49281
July	77376	26129	51247
August	77376	25388	51988
September	74880	25382	49498

2. Estimated data on battle casualties, wounded returns, and net battle reinforcement requirements in par 1 above supersede estimate for these months as contained in Ltr, Hq 12th Army Group, 704 (G-1) dated 25 January 1945, subject: "Estimate of Battle Losses March 1945 to August 1945."

3. Estimated battle losses for airborne divisions are not included in above table.

4. Wounded hospital returns shown in column (3) of above table have been computed using experienced theater factors. Wounded returns include all limited assignment wounded returns other than Infantry, and all general assignment wounded returns.

For the Army Group Commander:

C. E. HAYS,
Lt Col., AGD,
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 22

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

16 February 1945

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED BATTLE CASUALTIES WITH ACTUAL BY MONTHS

Month of	Estimated Battle Casualties	Actual Battle Casualties
June 1944	*58 224	24 105
July	**47 835	47 423
August	50 213	39 196
September	46 489	30 937
October	53 036	20 064
November	56 743	47 924
December	61 807	59 584
January	73 160	37 986
February (1 to 14 incl.).	33 040	9 828

* Includes estimated drowned figure of 16 726

** Includes estimated drowned figure of 665

Note: Above figures are exclusive of airborne casualties.

Inclosure 1, Annex 22.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Inclosure 2, Annex #2

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

16 February 1945

Month of	Actual Battle Casualties Versus Estimated								
	Actual Battle Casualties			Estimate now in Effect			Proposed new Estimate		
	Battle Casualties	Avg Per Day	% Battle Loss Per Day	Battle Casualties	Avg Per Day	% Battle Loss Per Day	Battle Casualties	Avg Per Day	% Battle Loss Per Day
July 1945	47 423	1 529	.385	47 834	1 543	.389			
August	39 196	1 263	.210	50 213	1 620	.269			
September	30 937	1 032	.154	46 489	1 500	.225			
October	20 064	647	.091	53 036	1 711	.240			
November	47 924	1 598	.208	56 743	1 830	.238			
December	59 584	1 986	.246	61 807	1 994	.250			
January 1945	37 986	1 225	.142	73 160	2 360	.249			
February (1 to 14 Feb)	9 828	702	.075	33 040	2 360	.222	72 478	2 338	.20
March				72 478	2 338	.20	73 920	2 464	.20
April				73 920	2 464	.20	77 190	2 490	.20
May				77 190	2 490	.20	74 880	2 496	.20
June				74 880	2 496	.20	77 376	2 496	.20
July				77 376	2 496	.20	77 376	2 496	.20
August				77 376	2 496	.20	74 880	2 496	.20
September									

Note: Above actual and estimated casualty figures do **not** include any Airborne Division Losses.

Inclosure 3, Annex #2

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

ESTIMATED BUILD-UP OF TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
(EXCLUSIVE OF AIRBORNE DIVISIONS)
(1 FEBRUARY THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1945)

16 February 1945

Estimated Arrivals in Army Area		Total Authorized Strength, Twelfth Army Group		
Month of	Number of Arrivals	Date	Strength	Average Monthly Strength
February	14,032 — 71st Infantry Division 10,666 — 13th Armored Division 10,666 — 16th Armored Division 10,666 — 20th Armored Division 95,200 — Supporting Troops 141,230	1 February	*1,004,600	1,075,215
		28 February	141,230 1,145,830	
March	14,032 — 86th Infantry Division 14,032 — 97th Infantry Division 48,308 — Supporting Troops 76,372	31 March	76,372 1,222,202	1,184,016
April	20,000 — Supporting Troops	30 April	20,000 1,242,202	1,232,202
May	6,000 — Supporting Troops	31 May	6,000 1,248,202	1,245,202
June	———	30 June	1,248,202	1,248,202
July	———	31 July	1,248,202	1,248,202
August	———	31 August	1,248,202	1,248,202
September	———	30 September	1,248,202	1,248,202

*Includes the 28th and 75th Infantry Divisions and the 10th Armored Division.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CARRIER SHEET HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Must remain with attached papers

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH. USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAPER.

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECTS: Analysis of Casualties by Divisions. Enter File Classification AG:
CofS CG	G—1	7 Jun	1. Attached is a table showing an analysis of battle and non-battle casualties within Infantry and Armored Divisions which includes those casualities sustained on continent, including southern France, and while under control of 6th Army Group and/or 12th Army Group, for period D Day to D + 346 (18 May 1945).

2. The combat divisional days shown in the attached table represent in each case the total number of days a division has sustained battle casualties, according to G-1 reports received daily from the armies.

3. The Infantry Divisions having the nine highest nonbattle casualty rates and those having the nine highest battle casualty rates (exclusive of the 106th Infantry Division) were as indicated below:

Infantry Divisions	Avg. No. Battle Casualties per Combat Div-Day	Infantry Divisions	Avg. No. Non-Battle Casualties per Div-Day
29th Infantry Div	83.1	45 Infantry Div	57.7
28th "	83.1	3d "	57.2
4th "	75.1	36th "	53.9
9th "	70.6	9th "	44.4
30th "	62.7	1st "	40.4
83d "	62.5	80th "	38.6
80th "	60.5	4th "	37.7
79th "	60.0	100th "	36.6
90th "	59.9	87th "	36.1

4. It is noted that the Infantry Divisions having the five highest non-battle casualty rates are the 45th, 3d, 36th, 9th and 1st, all of which fought in North Africa.

5. The 4th, 9th, 1st, 29th, and 3d Infantry Divisions all sustained casualties which amounted to more than 200% of their T/O strength.

6. For your information.

/s/ J. J. O'HARE
/t/ J. J. O'HARE
Brigadier General, GSC.
AC of S, G-1

1 Incl: Chart.

2. G-1	SGS	10 Jun	Noted by CG /s KRD

ANNEX 24

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

Inclosure 1, Annex 12

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP APO 655

BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES WITHIN INFANTRY AND ARMORED DIVISIONS

(Includes only those casualties sustained while on Continent, including Southern France, and while under control of 6th Army Group and or 12th Army Group — D Day to D + 346 (18 May 1945)

Divisions	** Date landed on Continent	Days on Continent: Total Div-Days	Days on Continent: Combat Div-Days	Days on Continent: % Combat Div-Day	Battle Casualties: Total	Battle Casualties: AVG No. Per Combat Div-Day	Non-Battle Casualties: Total	Non-Battle Casualties: AVG No. Per Divisional-Day	Total Casualties: Total	Total Casualties: % of T/O Strength
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(INFANTRY DIVISIONS)										
4 Inf Div	D	347	299	86.2	22453	75.1	13091	37.7	35545	252.3
9 " "	D+5	343	264	77.0	18631	70.6	15233	44.4	33864	240.4
1 " "	D	347	292	84.1	15008	51.4	14002	40.4	29005	205.9
29 " "	D	347	242	69.7	20111	83.1	8665	25.0	28776	204.2
5 " "	*D×	277	233	84.1	13101	47.3	15299	55.2	28400	201.6
90 " "	D+2	345	308	89.3	18460	59.9	9457	26.5	27617	196.0
45 " "	*D×	277	230	83.0	10558	45.5	15991	57.7	26449	187.7
35 " "	*D×	277	227	81.9	11238	49.5	14919	53.9	26157	185.7
30 " "	D+8	339	282	83.2	17691	62.7	8347	24.6	26038	184.8
2 " "	D+2	345	303	87.8	15056	49.7	10818	31.4	25884	183.7
35 " "	D+32	315	264	83.8	15400	58.4	10082	32.0	25488	180.9
80 " "	D+62	285	239	83.9	14560	60.5	11012	38.6	25472	180.8
28 " "	D+48	299	196	65.6	15904	81.1	8936	29.9	24840	176.4
83 " "	D+19	328	244	74.4	15248	62.5	8732	26.6	23980	170.2
5 " "	D+36	311	270	86.8	12475	46.2	11012	35.4	23487	166.7
79 " "	D+9	338	248	73.4	14875	60.0	8582	25.4	23457	166.5
8 " "	D+28	319	266	83.4	13458	50.6	7598	23.8	21056	149.4
26 " "	D+105	242	199	82.2	9956	50.0	6895	28.5	16851	119.6
44 " "	D+112	235	190	80.9	6111	32.2	7637	32.5	13748	97.6
104 " "	D+96	251	178	70.9	7011	39.4	6396	25.5	13407	95.1
78 " "	D+172	175	134	76.6	7890	58.9	4367	25.0	12257	87.0
100 " "	*D×+74	203	163	80.3	4790	29.4	7425	36.6	12215	86.7
99 " "	D+152	195	151	77.4	6103	40.4	5884	30.2	11987	85.1
87 " "	D+180	167	134	802	5555	41.5	6032	36.1	11587	82.2
94 " "	D+96	251	183	72.9	5607	30.6	5203	20.7	10810	76.7
106 " "	D+185	162	63	38.9	8163	129.6	2508	15.5	10671	75.7
95 " "	D+105	242	151	62.4	6370	42.2	3834	15.8	10204	72.4
84 " "	D+150	197	152	77.2	6561	43.2	3250	16.5	9811	69.6
103 " "	*D×+74	203	147	72.4	4543	30.9	4826	23.8	9369	66.5
102 " "	D+112	235	178	73.6	4867	28.1	3958	16.8	8825	62.6
70 " "	*D×+127	150	83	55.3	3966	47.8	4235	28.2	8201	58.2
63 " "	*D×+127	150	119	79.3	4547	38.2	3472	23.0	8019	56.9
75 " "	D+193	154	94	61.0	3954	42.1	4062	26.4	8016	56.9
42 " "	*D+127	150	106	70.7	3598	33.9	2351	15.7	5949	42.2

Page 1

* see note page 2.
** Dates are those on which Divisions (except 1st, 2d, 4th, and 29th Inf Divs) completed landing. Source: G-1 Daily Situation Reports.

(cont.)

Divisions	** Date landed on Continent	Days on Continent: Total Div-Days	Days on Continent: Combat Div-Days	Days on Continent: % Combat Div-Day	Battle Casualties: Total	Battle Casualties: AVG No. Per Combat Div-Day	Non-Battle Casualties: Total	Non-Battle Casualties: AVG No. Per Divisional-Day	Total Casualties: Total	Total Casualties: % of T/O Strength
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(INFANTRY DIVISIONS — CONTD)										
76 Inf Div	D+224	123	95	77.2	3126	32.9	2430	19.8	5556	39.4
69 " "	D+234	113	65	57.5	1556	23.9	1791	15.8	3347	23.8
65 " "	D+234	113	55	48.7	1052	19.1	1250	11.1	2302	16.3
89 " "	D+234	113	49	43.4	1006	20.5	1047	9.3	2053	14.6
66 " "	D+203	144	91	63.2	1098	12.1	849	5.9	1947	13.8
71 " "	D+245	102	49	48.0	788	16.1	1081	10.6	1869	13.3
97 " "	D+271	76	31	40.8	535	30.1	384	5.1	1318	9.4
86 " "	D+273	74	34	45.9	760	22.4	473	6.4	1233	8.8
(Totals & Avge)		9659	7296	75.5	373951	51.3	283116	29.3	657067	
(ARMORED DIVISIONS) (OLD TYPE)										
3 Armd Div	D+19	328	231	10.4	10105	43.7	6017	18.3	16122	111.5
2 " "	D+5	342	223	65.2	6751	30.3	7116	20.8	13867	95.9
(Totals & Avges)		670	454	67.8	16856	37.1	13133	19.6	29989	
(ARMORED DIVISIONS) (NEW TYPE)										
6 Armd Div	D+47	300	226	75.3	5526	24.5	7290	24.3	12816	120.1
7 " "	D+67	280	172	61.4	6150	35.8	4352	15.5	10502	98.4
4 " "	D+39	308	230	74.7	5988	26.0	4508	14.6	10496	98.4
10 " "	D+117	230	124	53.9	4697	37.9	3684	16.0	8381	78.5
5 " "	D+51	296	161	54.4	3554	22.1	3592	12.1	7146	67.0
12 " "	D+161	186	102	54.8	3436	33.7	2540	13.7	5976	56.0
9 " "	D+118	229	91	39.7	3952	43.4	1459	6.4	5411	50.7
11 " "	D+197	150	96	64.0	3216	33.5	1921	12.8	5137	48.1
14 " "	*D×+83	194	133	68.6	2896	21.8	1400	7.2	4296	40.3
8 " "	D+218	129	63	48.8	1313	20.8	1141	8.8	2454	23.0
13 " "	D+241	106	16	15.1	493	30.8	256	2.3	739	6.9
20 " "	D+259	88	8	9.1	76	9.5	319	3.6	395	3.7
16 " "	D+259	88	2	2.3	12	6.0	231	2.6	243	2.3
(Totals & Avgs)		2584	1424	55.1	41309	29.0	32683	12.6	73992	

Page 2

* D× refers to D Day for landings in Southern France (15 August 1944)
** Dates are those on which Divisions (except 1st, 2d, 4th, and 29th Inf Divs) completed landing. Source: G-1 Daily Situation Reports.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP APO 655

BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES WITHIN INFANTRY AND ARMORED DIVISIONS

(Includes only those casualties sustained while on Continent and under control of 12th Army Group. Total Divisional Days and Combat Days are Computed on similar Basis. D Day to D+346 — 18 May 1945)

Divisions	** Date landed on Continent	Days on Continent			Battle Casualties		Non-Battle Casualties		Total Casualties	
		Total Div-Days	Combat Div-Days	% Combat Div-Days	Total	AVG No. Per Combat Div-Day	Total	AVG No. Per Divisional-Day	Total	% of T/O Strength
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
				(INFANTRY DIVISIONS)						
9 Inf Div	D+4	343	254	77.0	18631	70.6	15233	44.4	33864	240.4
4 " "	D	293	260	88.7	21496	82.7	11792	40.2	33288	236.3
1 " "	D	347	292	84.1	15003	51.4	14002	40.4	29005	205.9
29 " "	D	347	242	69.7	20111	83.1	8665	25.0	28776	204.2
90 " "	D+2	345	308	89.3	18460	59.9	9157	26.5	27617	196.0
30 " "	D+8	339	282	83.2	17691	62.7	8347	24.6	26038	184.8
2 " "	D+2	345	303	87.8	15066	49.7	10818	31.4	25884	183.7
80 " "	D+62	285	239	83.9	14460	60.5	11012	38.6	25472	180.8
35 " "	D+32	306	260	85.0	15381	59.2	9907	32.4	25288	179.5
83 " "	D+19	328	244	74.4	15248	62.5	8732	26.6	23980	170.2
5 " "	D+36	311	270	86.8	12475	46.2	11012	35.4	23487	166.7
28 " "	D+48	264	170	64.4	15025	88.4	7547	28.6	22572	160.2
8 " "	D+28	319	266	83.4	13458	50.6	7598	23.8	21056	149.4
26 " "	D+105	242	199	82.2	9956	50.0	6895	28.5	16851	119.6
104 " "	D+96	251	178	70.9	7011	39.4	6396	25.5	13407	95.1
78 " "	D+172	175	134	76.6	7890	58.9	4367	25.0	12257	87.0
99 " "	D+152	195	151	77.4	6103	40.4	5884	30.2	11987	85.1
87 " "	D+180	163	131	80.4	5482	41.8	5935	36.4	11417	81.0
79 " "	D+9	195	132	67.7	6779	51.4	4599	23.6	11378	80.8
94 " "	D+96	251	183	72.9	5607	30.6	5203	20.7	10810	76.7
106 " "	D+185	162	63	38.9	8163	129.6	2508	15.5	10671	75.7
95 " "	D+105	242	151	62.4	6370	42.2	3834	15.8	10204	72.4
84 " "	D+150	197	152	77.2	6561	43.2	3250	16.5	9811	69.6
102 " "	D+112	235	173	73.6	4867	28.1	3958	16.8	8825	62.6
75 " "	D+193	133	82	61.7	3212	39.2	2928	22.0	6140	43.6
76 " "	D+224	123	95	77.2	3126	32.9	2430	19.8	5556	39.4
69 " "	D+234	113	65	57.5	1556	23.9	1791	15.8	3347	23.8
65 " "	D+234	113	55	48.7	1052	19.1	1250	11.1	2302	16.3
89 " "	D+234	113	49	43.4	1006	20.5	1047	9.3	2053	14.6
70 " "	D+197	47	—	—	—	—	1975	42.0	1975	14.0
66 " "	D+203	144	91	63.2	1098	12.1	849	5.9	1947	13.8
71 " "	D+245	81	39	48.1	603	15.5	978	12.1	1581	11.2
95 " "	D+271	76	31	40.8	934	30.1	384	5.1	1318	9.4
86 " "	D+273	62	30	48.4	743	24.8	357	5.8	1100	7.8
44 " "	D+112	19	—	—	—	—	46	2.4	46	.3
INF DIVS (Totals & Avgs		7504	5584	74.4	300624	53.8	2000686	26.7	501310	

** Dates are those on which Divisions (except 1st, 2d, 4th, and 29th Inf Divs) completed landing. Source: G-3 Daily Situation Report.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP APO 655

BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES WITHIN INFANTRY AND ARMORED DIVISIONS

(Includes only those casualties sustained while on Continent and under control of 12th Army Group. Total Divisional Days and Combat Days are Computed on Similar Basis. D Day to D+246 — 18 May 1945.)

Divisions	** Date landed on Continent	Days on Continent			Battle Casualties		Non-Battle Casualties		Total Casualties	
		Total Div-Days	Combat Div-Days	% Combat Div-Day	Total	AVG No. Per Combat Div-Day	Total	AVG No. Per Divisional-Day	Total	% of T/O Strength
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
				(ARMORED DIVISIONS) (OLD TYPE)						
3 Armd Div	D+19	328	231	70.4	10105	43.7	6017	18.3	16122	111.5
2 " "	D+5	342	223	65.2	6751	30.3	7116	20.8	13867	95.9
Totals & Avgs		670	454	67.8	16856	37.1	13133	19.6	29989	
				(ARMORED DIVISIONS) (NEW TYPE)						
7 Armd Div	D+67	280	172	61.4	6150	35.8	4352	15.5	10502	98.4
4 " "	D+39	308	230	74.7	5988	26.0	4508	14.6	10496	98.4
6 " "	D+47	289	221	76.5	5473	24.8	7021	24.3	12494	74.8
5 " "	D+51	296	161	54.4	3554	22.1	3592	12.1	7146	67.0
9 " "	D+118	229	91	39.7	3952	43.4	1459	6.4	5411	50.7
11 " "	D+197	150	96	64.0	3216	33.5	1921	12.8	5137	48.1
10 " "	D+117	177	83	46.9	3246	39.1	2244	12.7	5490	32.9
8 " "	D+218	129	63	48.8	1313	20.8	1141	8.8	2454	23.0
13 " "	D+241	91	15	16.5	488	32.5	172	1.9	660	4.0
12 " "	D+161	5	4	80.0	129	32.3	81	16.2	210	1.3
20 " "	D+259	66	2	3.0	5	2.5	205	3.1	210	1.3
16 " "	D+259	88	2	2.3	12	6.0	231	2.6	243	2.3
14 " "	D+322	22	11	50.0	44	4.0	—	—	44	.3
Totals & Avgs		2130	1140	53.5	33570	29.4	26927	12.6	60497	

** Dates are those on which Divisions completed landing. Source: G-3 Daily Situation Reports.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS FIRST U. S. ARMY GROUP
APO 655

6 June 1944

322 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Establishment of personnel replacement priorities.

TO: GOC-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (Attn.: D MGA)
Commanding General, First US Army
Commanding General, Third US Army
Commanding General, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, ETOUSA
Commanding Officer, Replacement System, ETOUSA.

1. Under the provisions of secret letter, Headquarters ETOUSA, AG 322/86 MGA, 16 January 1944, subject: "Combat Replacement System for the Field Forces, ETOUSA", as amended, and paragraph 6f (1) (e) Joint Administrative Plan, Headquarters FUSAG, 19 April 1944, as amended, there are hereby established priorities for the furnishing of replacements to ground forces for Operation "OVERLORD", as indicated in paragraph 2 below. Allocation of specific replacement credits to major headquarters will be made at a later date as the situation warrants.

2. Until further notice the following priorities for filling requisitions for personnel replacements by the Commander of the Replacement System, ETOUSA, are established effective immediately upon receipt of this letter:

a. **First Priority** - To Commanding General, First US Army. To maintain all assigned and attached organizations at authorized strength (including units of the VIII Corps and Advance Section, Communications Zone).

b. **Second Priority** - To Commanding General, First US Army. To fill advance requisitions for replacements required through D + 14.

c. **Third Priority** - To Commanding General, Third US Army. To maintain all assigned and attached organizations at authorized strength.

d. **Fourth Priority** - To all other commanders. To bring and maintain assigned and attached organizations listed for movement to the continent to authorized strength.

3. It is contemplated that priorities given in paragraph 2, above, will be revised or allocations established when:

a. First Army rear boundary is established, or,

b. Third Army becomes operational on the continent.

4. Priorities for assignment and/or shipment as between subordinate units will be established by Army and such other commanders as may be assigned or attached to the Army Group.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ H. B. LEWIS
/t/ H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General.

ANNEX 25

HEADQUARTERS FIRST U. S. ARMY GROUP
APO 655

14 July 1944

AG 322 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Establishment of Personnel Replacement Priorities.

TO: C-in-C, 21 Army Group (D/MGA)
Commanding General, First US Army
Commanding General, Third US Army
Commanding General, Ninth US Army
Commanding General, Forward Echelon, Com Z, ETOUSA
Commanding General, Replacement System, ETOUSA.

1. Under authority contained in letter, Hq ETOUSA, file AG 220.3R, subject: "Allocations and Priorities for Replacement Personnel", dated 4 June 1944, the following priorities for furnishing of replacements to U. S. Field Force Units, including units and installations attached to armies, are hereby established as indicated in paragraph 3 below. Priorities listed in paragraph 3 of this letter supersede those previously established by letter, Hq FUSAG, file 322 (G-1), subject: "Establishment of Personnel Replacement Priorities", dated 6 June 1944.

2. Present indications are that no overall shortage of replacements is likely to occur. However, in the event a critical shortage in replacements develops for any arms or services, the Commanding General, Replacement System, ETOUSA, will immediately notify Commanding General, FUSAG who will then make any necessary allocations of replacement credits for these critical arms or services.

3. a. Until Third US Army becomes operational on the continent the following priorities for filling requisitions for personnel replacements by the Commanding General of the Replacement System ETOUSA are established, effective immediately upon receipt of this letter:

(1) **First Priority** - To Commanding General, First US Army. To maintain all assigned and attached organizations at authorized strength and to maintain replacement battalions under army control at a replacement level of at least 1,000 but not to exceed 2,500 per battalion.

(2) **Second Priority** - To Commanding General, Third US Army. To maintain all assigned and attached units at authorized strength.

(3) **Third Priority** - To all other Field Force Commanders, including Commanding General Ninth US Army. To bring and maintain all assigned and attached organizations listed for movement to the continent at authorized strength.

b. At such time as Third US Army becomes operational on the continent the following priorities will apply:

ANNEX 26

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AG 322 (G-1) Establishment of Personnel Replacement Priorities (Cont'd)

(1) **First Priority -** Maintenance at all assigned or attached units of the First and Third U S Armies on the continent at authorized strength.

(2) **Second Priority -** To Commanding General, FUSAG: To maintain Special Troops, FUSAG, and such Army Group Reserve units as may be assigned or attached at authorized strength.

(3) **Third Priority -** Maintenance in replacement battalions under First Army control and establishment in replacement battalions on the continent under Third Army control of a pool level of at least 1,000 per battalion, but not to exceed 2,500 per battalion.

(4) **Fourth Priority -** To Commanding General, Third US Army. To maintain Third Army units in UK listed for movement to continent at authorized strength.

(5) **Fifth Priority -** To all other Field Force Commanders including CG Ninth US Army. To bring and maintain all assigned and attached organizations at authorized strength.

3. c. Priorities above do not apply to replacements qualified for assignment to Airborne Divisions or to those who may volunteer for paratroop training who will continue to be assigned to Airborne Divisions in accordance with existing instructions.

4. Priorities for assignment and for shipment as between subordinate units will be established by Army and such other Commanders as may be assigned or attached to the Army Group.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ C. R. LANDON
/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel AGD
Actng Adj General

CARRIER SHEET HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
Must remain with attached papers.

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAPER.

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECTS: Allocation of Infantry Reinforcements to Armies. Enter File Classification AG:
1. G-3	G-1	7 Jan 1945	BTR/Ext. 550

1. Information received from Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, this date, indicates that new infantry reinforcements will become available to Twelfth Army Group as follows:

Date	New Infantry Reinforcements
7 January	4,400
11 "	4,600
16 "	9,700
19 "	8,900
23 "	10,800
24 "	6,200
28 "	7,600
Total	52,200*

* Includes 2,600 reinforcements retained as infantry on continent.

2. In addition to the above 52,200 new infantry reinforcements, Twelfth Army Group units will continue to receive their hospital returnees. Infantry hospital returnees are presently being returned to Armies at the rates indicated below:

First Army	433 per day
Third Army	248 " "
Ninth Army	145 " "
Fifteenth Army	not known

If the above rates continue for the remainder of January, Armies will receive infantry hospital returnees during period 7 to 31 January in the numbers indicated below:

First Army	10,825
Third Army	6,200
Ninth Army	3,625
Fifteenth Army	not known

3. SHAEF has directed that those units designated as SHAEF Reserve be given a priority on reinforcement as high as that given any other unit under Twelfth Army Group. Armies have been so notified.

4. The Ground Force Reinforcement Command is establishing a provisional reinforcement depot to support units under the command of Fifteenth Army.

5. Information available at the present time indicates that the composition of Fifteenth Army is as follows:

28 Infantry Division	9th Armored Division
66th Infantry Division	8th Armored Division

ANNEX 27

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

it is considered that the best time to fill up the units assigned to Fifteenth Army is at the [illegible] when they have the maximum time to be absorbed and indoctrinated before being committed to action. However, it is anticipated that hospital returnees will make a large contribution to rebuilding these divisions. Therefore, it is recommended that these units be immediately filled to within 1,000 of their authorized infantry strength. This procedure is recommended regardless of which divisions are assigned to the Fifteenth Army from units in combat.

6. The table below shows the infantry understrength within Armies, and also shows the number and percent of divisions within each Army as of 5 January 1945:

	INFANTRY UNDERSTRENGTH		DIVISIONS WITHIN ARMIES	
	No.	%	No.	%
First Army	*—7,424	26.3	*12	35.3
Third Army	—10,244	36.3	13	38.2
Ninth Army	—4,193	14.9	5	14.7
Fifteenth Army	—6,355	22.5	4	11.8
Total All Armies	—28,216	100.0	34	100.0

* Does not include 106th Infantry Division.

7. It is recommended, after consideration of percentages listed above and the expected flow of hospital returnees to each Army for the remainder of January, that Ground Force Reinforcement Command be instructed to ship infantry reinforcements to Armies on the following percentage basis:

First Army	32%	(approximately	16,704	reinforcements)
Third Army	50%	"	26,100	"
Ninth Army	8%	"	4,176	"
Fifteenth Army	10%	"	5,220	"

/s/ CHARLES W. VAN WAY, Jr.
Colonel, GSC
Acting AC of S, G-1

CARRIER SHEET HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
Must remain with attached papers

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH USE. ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAPER.

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECTS: Allocation of Infantry Reinforcements to Armies. AFK/jtc Enter File Classification AG:
2. G-1 thru C/S	A. C. of S G-3	10 Jan 1945	1. G-3 feels that operational considerations dictate some modification in the recommended percentage allotments to Armies as indicated below:

a. The percentage allotted to the Fifteenth Army appears to be correct considering the high priority which must be accorded to divisions in SHAEF Reserve.

b. Percentage allotted to the Ninth Army appears to be high compared to First and Third Armies. Ninth Army should have small battle losses during the period under consideration. It is assumed that its non-battle losses will be roughly balanced by the returnees from hospitals. Therefore, if its allotment is as large a percentage as indicated by 1-G1s losses should be almost fully replaced, which is not believed to be possible with other Armies. G-3 feels, therefore, the percentage allotted to the Ninth Army should be reduced to 5%.

c. In the case of the First and Third Armies, it is believed that each of these Armies will have approximately the same percentage of its divisions actively engaged; in other words, the activity factor of these two armies should be about equal. The allotments that these armies should have should be in proportion to their numbers of divisions with due consideration being given to percentage understrength. The ratio of divisions in First and Third Armies is 13 to 15, (not counting the 106th Division). The ratio of percentage understrength is roughly the same; therefore, it is believed that the percentage allotments to these two armies should be: First Army 40%; Third Army 45%.

d. Recapitulating, the percentages recommended by G-3 are:

First Army	40%
Third Army	45%
Ninth Army	5%
Fifteenth Army	10%
Total	100%

/s/ A. F. K.

3. G-1	C/S	10 Jan 1945	Approved as follows: 1 Army 38% 3 Army 47% 9 Army 5% 15 Army 10% /s/ Allen

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

7 January 1945

Based on recommendations of G-1 for the allocation of reinforcements to Armies and assuming that casualties will continue at the same rate as for the last twelve days and that hospital returnees will continue at present average, the following results are obtained

	First Army	Third Army	Ninth Army	Fifteenth Army	Total
	32%	50%	8%	10%	100%
Infantry Reinforcements to Armies based on percentages	16,704	26,100	4,176	5,220	52,200
Estimated Infantry Hospital Returnees	10,825	6,200	3,629	Unknown	20,654
Total Infantry Reinforcements	27,529	32,300	7,801	5,220 (?)*	72,854
Current Understrength in Infantry	−7,424	−10,244	−4,193	−6,355	−28,216
Balance to meet losses for remainder of January	20,105	22,056	3,608	1,135 (?)*	44,638
Estimated Infantry Casualties 7 to 31 January, inclusive	20,000	27,500	5,000	Unknown	52,500
Estimated Shortage in Infantry as of 2400 hours 31 January	105	5,444	1,392	1135	7,862

*Due to unknown hospital returnee factor

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

28 October 1944

MEMORANDUM: Shortage of Armored Force Officers and Enlisted Replacements

TO: Colonel WILSON

1. Study has been made with objective of determining just how long the present stockage of Armored Force Replacements, supplemented by an estimated number of hospital returns, will last

2. Estimated Twelfth Army Group Battle and Non-Battle replacement requirements through 31 December are based on current (1 to 23 Oct) replacement requirement rate of 67 per divisional day. This rate may very likely be **exceeded** in November and December. Estimate is further based on assumption that current (8 to 14 Oct) percentage Armored Force loss (7.3%) will continue.

3. Incl. No. 1 indicates that stockage on Armored Force officer replacements will be down to about 100 near the end of November. Incl. No. 2 shows that stockage on Armored Force enlisted replacements will be comparatively low around the first week in December. When the undersigned checked with Lt. Col. Arneson on this probable future shortage of Armored Force replacements, he stated that they had submitted special requisition to the Zone of Interior for 850 Armored Force enlisted replacements and were trying now to expedite their delivery to this theater. This 850 is in addition to 2000 Armored Force enlisted replacements already on requisition for December. Lt. Col. Arneson was informed that our calculations indicate a probable shortage in Armored Force Replacements in late November or early December.

4. Recommend that G-1, ETOUSA, be contacted again on or about 30 October to determine status of special shipment of 850 Armored Force replacements and to strongly recommend that 2000 Armored Force enlisted replacements and 337 Armored Force officer replacements scheduled for December arrival be given necessary priority to arrive first week in December.

J. Q. W

2 Incls

ANNEX 28

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

28 October 1944

COMPARISON
ARMORED FORCE OFFICER REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITH TOTAL AVAILABLE SUPPLY
FOR PERIOD: 25 OCTOBER TO 31 DECEMBER 1945

Month of	Available Armd Force Officer Repl			12th Army Group Net Armored Force Officer Reqmst			Shortage (—) or Overage (+)
	Present Stockage in UK & Cont 21 Oct	Shipments From ZI	Total Available	Net Battle* and Non-Battle Reqmts	Advance** Issue off Repls to Tank Cos	Total Net Neqmts	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
25 to 31 Oct	316	—	316	39	138	177	+ 139
November	—	130	269	170	—	170	+ 99
December	—	337	436	201	—	201	+ 235

*Based on current (1 to 23 Oct) replacement requirement rate of 67 per divisional plus assumption that % Armd Force losses will continue at present ratio (7.3%) of total replacement requirements, and further that Armored Force officer replacement requirements will be 5.0%) of total Armored Force replacement requirements. (GFRS reports covering 10 Sep to 14 Oct show off. % to be only 4% of total Armored Force repl reqmts.)

**Represents 50% of total authorized advance issue of Armored Force officer replacements.

Incl. No. 1

28 October 1944

COMPARISON OF
ARMORED FORCE ENLISTED REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITH TOTAL AVAILABLE SUPPLY
FOR PERIOD: 25 OCTOBER TO 31 DECEMBER 1944

Month of	Available Armored Force Enlisted Replacements			12th Army Group Net Armd Force Enl Repl Reqmts* Battle & Non Battle	Shortage (—) or Overage (+)
	Present Stockage in U & C 21 Oct	Shipments From ZI	Total Available		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
25 to 31 Oct	4 108	—	4 108	593	+ 3 515
November	—	—	4 515	2 370	+ 1 145
December	—	2 850	3 995	3 035	+ 960

* Based on current (1 to 23 Oct) replacement requirement rate of 67 per divisional day plus assumption that % Armored Force losses will continue at present ratio (7.3%) of total replacement requirements and further that Armored Force **enlisted** replacement requirements will be 95.0% of total Armored Force replacement requirements. (GFRS reports covering 10 Sep to 14 Oct show enlisted % to be 96% of total Armored Force replacement requirements).

Incl No. 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP REAR
APO 655

13 October 1944

MEMORANDUM: Infantry Riflemen Replacement Requirements to Support Divisions for 30 Days.

TO: Colonel O'HARE.

1. The objective of the following study was to determine, based on experienced replacement requirement rates, the number of Infantry Riflemen replacements necessary to support all three Armies for 30 days starting 24 October, and thereby also determine if standard Infantry Riflemen stockage of 36,473 in pool of 70,000 should be increased in order to have on hand estimated requirements for 30 days.

2. Estimated Infantry Riflemen replacement requirements shown in par 3 below were based on the following assumptions:

a. That by 24 October there will be 18 Infantry Divisions and Armored Divisions operational and in combat. This is based on latest G-3 information. (At present there are 15 Infantry and 6 Armored Divisions in combat.)

b. That supply situation will have reached a level whereby all these divisions (18 Infantry and 8 Armored) can be supported in combat for 30 days.

c. That replacement requirement rate of 97 per divisional day (based on operation experience during period 25 July to 15 August — see Estimated versus Actual Battle Casualty chart which indicates that high casualties were sustained during this period) will be necessary to give adequate replacement support for the divisions. It is believed that this rate of 97 per divisional day is not excessive in view of the fact that experienced rate for entire period D day to D + 120 (4 Oct) was 98 per divisional day.

d. That as of 15 November there will be 20 Infantry Divisions and 10 Armored Divisions operational and in combat.

e. That Infantry replacement requirements will be 80% of total and further that Infantry Riflemen requirements will be 70% of total Infantry requirements.

3. Estimated Infantry Riflemen replacements required for 30 days' combat subsequent to 24 October are as follows:

Total Repl Reqmts per Div Day	Total Div Days	Total Repl Reqmts	Inf Repls Reqmts	Inf Rifle Repl Reqmts
97	808	78,376	62,701	43,891

CONCLUSION: From above estimated Infantry Riflemen replacement requirements it is believed that present standard pool stockage of 36,473 riflemen should be increased to 44,000 or more after 1 November if it is desired to have on hand 30 days' requirements.

J. A. W

See attached sheet for sources of Infantry Riflemen Replacements.

ANNEX 28a

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP REAR
APO 655

13 October 1944

SOURCES OF INFANTRY RIFLEMEN REPLACEMENTS

1. **HOSPITAL RETURNEES.** It is estimated (based on actual experience for September) that approximately 10,950 Infantry Riflemen replacements can be obtained from hospital returnees during period 24 October to 24 November.

2. **RETRAINING PROGRAM IN UNITED KINGDOM AND CONTINENT.** At present there are approximately 14,000 replacements in training in United Kingdom and Continent for conversion to Infantry Riflemen. It is estimated that approximately 10,000 of these will become available during period 24 October to 22 November. (This is pure guess — GFRS will have figures on this.)

3. **REPLACEMENT SHIPMENTS FROM THE ZONE OF INTERIOR.** During October 14,000 Infantry Riflemen will be shipped to this theater, according to information available at G-1, Twelfth Army Group.

4. **PRESENT STOCKAGE IN GROUND FORCE REPLACEMENT POOL.** This figure on 8 October was approximately 30,000. (Includes stockage in United Kingdom and Continent.)

APPENDIX, ANNEX 28a

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CARRIER SHEET HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP

Must remain with attached papers

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAPER

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECTS: Infantry Officer Replacements. Enter File Classification AG:
G-3 SHAEF	G-1	1944 22 Nov	

1. The War Department approved only 650 of the 2,500 Infantry replacement officers requisitioned for November by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U S Army. All of these 650 have arrived in this theater. The War Department has further stated that they can furnish only 550 of the 3528 Infantry officers requisitioned for December. The flow of Infantry officers after 1 January 1945 is uncertain, but indications are that January and February arrivals will be about 550 per month.

2. The total Infantry officer replacements (general assignment replacements and casuals available in the European Theater of Operations as of 20 November amounted to **1,827**, according to information received from the Ground Force Replacement System. (See colm 2 of inclosure.)

3. Attached inclosure shows a comparison of the total available supply of Infantry officer replacements with the estimated net requirements for the remainder of November and for the month of December.

4. The estimated net Infantry officer replacement requirements shown in colms 5 and 6 of inclosure were produced by using a total replacement requirement (all arms, services and Officers and EM) rate of **98** per divisional day. It is believed that this rate is not excessive in view of the fact that between 8 and 20 November the average number of replacements assigned per divisional day was **99**. For period 25 July to 15 August the average replacement requirement rate was **97** per divisional day. Net Infantry Officer requirements for Army Groups shown in colms 5 and 6 of inclosure take into account hospital returnees during these periods.

5. The net total requirements indicated in colm 9 of inclosure include the Infantry officers required to meet the authorized advance issue of one lieutenant per combat Infantry Company.

6. A comparison between total Infantry officers available (colm 4 of inclosure) with the total requirements (colm 9) shows that if divisions are to be kept at authorized Infantry strength, 324 infantry officers must be produced between 20 and 30 November within this theater by direct appointments; and that for the month of December, 2,943 Infantry officers must be produced within this theater. (See colm 10 of incl.) To obtain all of the additional Infantry officers from direct appointments would require a rate of 26 direct appointments per month per division for period 20 to 30 November, and an increased rate of approximately 75 per month per division for December. For the months of August, September, and October direct appointments were actually made at an average rate of approximately ten per month per division.

J. J. O'HARE
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-1

1 Incl.: Chart
ANNEX 28b

133

COMPARISON OF INFANTRY OFFICER REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITH TOTAL AVAILABLE SUPPLY FOR PERIOD: 20 NOVEMBER TO 31 DECEMBER 1944

PERIOD	Available Infantry Officer Repls.	Estimated Net Inf. Officer Replacement Reqmts.				Direct Apmts Required to Meet Shortage (Colm 9 Less Colm 4)	No Required per Month per Division
		Available Infantry Officer Repls.		** Net Requirements for Army Groups			
	Total Stockage in G	Shipments from ZI	Total Available (Sum colms 2 & 3)	Twelfth Army Group	Sixth Army Group		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(11)
20 to 30 Nov	* 1827	0	1827	969	252	0	0
1 to 31 Dec	0	550	550	2829	723	2943	75

PERIOD	Estimated Net Inf. Officer Replacement Reqmts.			
	Available Infantry Officer Repls.			
	Mis. Gen. Pool	Adv. Issue Inf. Combat Off. Repls.	Net Total Reqmts.	Total Direct Apponts. Required
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
20 to 30 Nov	0	*** 960	2151	324
1 to 31 Dec	150	150	3693	2943

* As of 20 November 1944

** Based on Replacement Requirement rate of 98 per divisional day and experienced factor of 81.8% for Infantry.

During period 8 to 20 November an average of 99 replacements were assigned per divisional day within Twelfth Army Group.

During period 25 July to 15 August this rate averaged 97 per divisional day within Twelfth Army Group.

*** Assumption has been made that the Divisions now within Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups have received 25% of their authorized advance issue of Infantry combat officer replacements.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655

15 December 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : General EISENHOWER.

1. As of 2400 hours 13 December the understrength in Infantry, Infantry Rifle, and Armored Force, by Armies, was as follows:

	Total Infantry Understrength	Infantry Rifle Understrength	Armored Force Understrength
First Army	— 6 726	— 6 609	— 564
Third Army	— 9 050	— 8 049	— 750
Ninth Army	— 3 293	— 2 923	— 145
Total	—19 069	—17 581	—1 459

The two divisions that are the most understrength in Infantry Riflemen at the present are the 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions with an Infantry Riflemen under strength of 1,590 and 1,388, respectively, as of 13 December. The total understrength within Twelfth Army Group is now 30,327.

2. We are understrength this amount as the result of the following:

a. Action by the War Departement in cutting requisitions submitted by the European Theater of Operations, based on battle casualty estimates by Twelfth Army Group and non-battle estimates by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

b. The shipping of replacements at such a late date as to prohibit their being used in the month for which they were requisitioned. Tab "A" shows the readiness dates of the December requisition, and it can be seen by these dates that some of the replacements requisitioned for use in December will not actually be available until the 22d of January, since thirty days must be added to the readiness date to take care of shipping, and the processing through the Replacement System.

3. The number of replacements that was requisitioned by units of Twelfth Army Group for the month of November was 80,484, whereas the total number of replacements actually received was only 67,978, causing an understrength of 12,506. Tab "B" shows comparison between our estimated casualties, the actual casualties, and the replacements actually received by Twelfth Army Group units for the months of October, November, and the period 1 to 12 December. Tab "C" shows graphically a comparison between our estimated battle and non-battle casualties and the actual casualties sustained.

4. The total understrength of 30,327, compared to Twelfth Army Group's total authorized strength of 841,596, does not appear to be a critical condition to anyone who does not realize that 81.8% of all casualties are Infantrymen, and that 70% of all Infantry casualties are Riflemen. However, to the users of replacements who understand this, and know that

the total number of Riflemen in an Infantry Division and an Armored Division (new type) is 3,240 and 954 respectively, this is a critical condition. It means that the average Infantry and Armored Division is currently approximately 78% of its authorized strength in Infantry Riflemen with no immediate prospect for improvement. While a Division can enter offensive combat with its strength in Infantry Riflemen at this figure, I feel definitely that it cannot continue in its offensive roll after this strength reaches 50% of its authorized strength in this vital category. I believe that it should be apparent, therefore, that our planned "All out" January 1st offensive will not be as powerful as the number of Divisions involved would seem to indicate.

5. I recommend that:

a. The War Department ship replacement at an early enough date so that they may be used in the month for which they were requisitioned. I make this recommendation even to the extent that, if necessary, replacements be given priority in shipping over units.

b. The numbers and categories of replacements requisitioned by European Theater of Operations be filled.

c. The War Department immediately exert every possible effort to make up the present understrength.

O. N. BRADLEY
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CARRIER SHEET HQ. 12TH ARMY GROUP
Must remain with attached papers

NUMBER EACH MEMO IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH. USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAPER.

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECTS: War Department Conference. Enter file Classification AG:
C/S and CG	G—1	18 Jan 1945	1. Results of the conference with the War Department were very satisfactory. We are at the present probably the greatest understrength that we will ever be.

2. In order to increase and speed the flow of January and February reinforcement the War Department took the following action:

a. Reduced the training time from 17 to 15 weeks.

b. Reduced the furlough from 10 to 5 days.

c. By air, transported these man to their homes for this furlough and returned them to ports for shipping.

d. Increased the number of infantrymen that were to arrive in this theater during the month of January by 15,000, making an approximate total of 70,000 for January arrival.

3. They increased the induction rate from approximately 80,000 to 150,000 monthly. However, this will not affect this theater prior to July.

4. Listed in Tab "A" is the estimated capability of the Zone of Interior to provide ground and service type reinforcements for arrival in ETO in February, March, April, May, and June.

5. Since these figures do not equal the estimated battle casualties for these months, it can be seen that the theater retraining program must be greatly accelerated.

6. SHAEF has already directed the Air Force to turn in 10,000 enlisted men for retraining as infantry riflemen and 20,000 from Communications Zone troops. The Air Forces and the Communications Zone will be called on for the releasing of additional men to be retrained as infantry riflemen, and it is believed that some of the noncombat troops of the Army Group will also be taken by SHAEF for retraining. These men will not be replaced, with the exception that whatever limited assignment personnel is available will be furnished to replace these men. SHAEF has asked the War Department for 25,000 limited assignment personnel for this purpose.

7. The retraining program will be of four weeks duration. The retraining capacity of 20,000 is now filled. However, this capacity is being greatly expanded. Fifty qualified officers and one hundred enlisted men are being sent to this theater from the Zone of Interior to aid in retraining.

ANNEX 30

8. The ability of the Zone of Interior to furnish officers is not sufficient to equal the demand; therefore, an officer candidate school is being established and an all-out effort will be made to increase battlefield appointments. A quota and standards for selection of candidates to the officer candidate school will be given by SHAEF. A cadre of 25 officers and 50 EM is being sent to this theater from Benning to assist in this training.

9. To as great an extent as is possible, limited assignment officers of this theater will be returned to the United States for relief of general assignment officers there, so that as great a number of general assignment officers as is possible may be sent here.

10. The War Department was so satisfied with the results of this conference that they immediately ordered in personnel from all other theaters for the same type conference.

11. It is SHAEF's objective to have all units of the two Army Groups at T O strength and to have as large a pool as is possible in the rear of the two groups by 1 April.

J. J. O'HARE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-1

1 Incl: Tab "A"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INFANTRY AND ARMORED ENLISTED REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
18 TO 31 MARCH AND 1 TO 30 APRIL 1945.

REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS	18 TO 31 MARCH		1 TO 30 APRIL	
	Infantry	Armored	Infantry	Armored
Shortages at beginning of period	*9510	**1050	0	1737
Estimated Battle Casualties	25600	2025	57850	4570
Estimated Non-Battle Casualties	17550	1073	39100	2390
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	52660	4148	96950	8697
REINFORCEMENTS AVAILABLE				
Available stockage in Army Depots at beginning of period	11229	366	11614	0
Estimated Hospital Returns	15530	1231	39920	3178
(Battle)	(4430)	(480)	(12570)	(1334)
(Non-Battle)	(11100)	(751)	(27350)	(1844)
New Reinforcements to become availabe in Army Depots	***37515	880		
TOTAL AVAILABLE	64274	2411		
ESTIMATED SHORTAGE AT END OF PERIOD	0	—1737		

* Includes shortage of **5607** Inf enlisted men within 106th Infantry Division.

** Estimated Armored shortage as of 17 March. Armored shortage reported as of 10 March was **818** enlisted men.

*** GFRC informs that 5000 to 7000 of these reinforcements will propably not be available in Army Depots before 1—7 Apr.

ANNEX 31

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

11 April 1945

INFANTRY AND ARMORED DIVISIONS
BY ARMY GROUPS

(Basis: As presently assigned to Army Groups)

INFANTRY DIVISIONS	No.	%	Designation of Units
Twelfth Army Group	33	79%	1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 26, 28, 29, 30, 35, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 95, 99, 97, 102, 104, 106.
Sixth Army Group	9	21%	3, 36, 42, 44, 45, 63, 100, 103, 4.
Total Infantry Divisions	42	100%	

ARMORED DIVISIONS			
Twelfth Army Group	12	80%	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 20
Sixth Army Group	3	20%	10, 12, 14
Total Armored Divisions	15	100%	

INFANTRY AND ARMORED DIVISIONS		
Twelfth Army Group	45	79%
Sixth Army Group	12	21%
Total Inf & Armd Divisions	57	100%

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS BY ARM/SERVICE

CUMULATIVE

Arm/Service	D Day to 31 Jul		D Day to 2 Sep		D Day to 30 Sep		D Day to 28 Oct		D Day to 30 Nov		D Day to 31 Dez		D Day to 31 Jan	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
INF	71 170	79.5	109 641	78.9	142 459	78.3	162 717	77.4	227 073	77.3	288 334	76.0	337 257	74.5
ARMD FORCE	3 216	3.6	6 665	4.8	9 335	5.1	10 934	5.2	14 862	5.1	18 582	4.9	22 458	5.0
FA	4 009	4.5	5 458	3.9	7 126	3.9	8 586	4.1	11 668	4.0	16 575	4.4	20 691	4.6
TD	488	.6	1 119	.8	1 797	1.0	2 338	1.1	3 445	1.1	4 906	1.3	6 875	1.5
CAV	1 014	1.1	2 099	1.5	2 945	1.6	3 832	1.8	5 218	1.8	8 327	2.2	10 134	2.2
CAC	724	.8	997	.7	1 317	.7	1 743	.8	2 591	.8	3 236	.8	5 215	1.1
CE	3 252	3.6	4 265	3.1	5 663	3.1	6 916	3.3	9 388	3.3	13 839	4.6	18 176	4.0
MD	2 714	3.0	4 593	3.3	5 966	3.3	6 640	3.2	9 076	3.1	11 580	3.1	13 662	3.0
SC	712	.8	980	.7	1 261	.7	1 334	.6	2 626	.9	3 360	.9	4 398	1.0
ORD	487	.5	671	.5	912	.5	1 127	.5	1 485	.5	1 800	.5	2 864	.6
QMC	1 051	1.2	1 450	1.0	2 136	1.1	2 471	1.2	3 933	1.3	5 349	1.3	6 851	1.5
CWS	139	.2	191	.1	227	.1	302	.1	414	.1	727	.2	1 021	.2
MP	292	.3	402	.3	513	.3	796	.4	1 363	.5	1 735	.5	2 196	.5
TC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	18	—
BI	276	.3	380	.3	689	.3	799	.3	935	.3	1 131	.3	1 446	.3
TOTAL	89 544	100	138 911	100	182 346	100	210 535	100	294 077	100	379 484	100	453 262	100

ANNEX 82

(cont.)

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS BY ARM/SERVICE

CUMULATIVE

Arm/Service	D Day to 28 Feb		D Day to 31 Mar		D Day to 30 Apr							
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
INF	380 536	73.7	423 756	72.9	458 599	72.1						
ARMD FORCE	24 957	4.8	28 795	4.9	32 086	5.0						
FA	23 854	4.6	27 970	4.8	31 813	5.0						
TD	8 556	1.7	9 190	1.6	9 948	1.6						
CAV	11 150	2.2	12 359	2.1	13 753	2.2						
CAC	6 173	1.2	7 478	1.3	8 654	1.4						
CE	22 562	4.4	26 556	4.6	29 449	4.6						
MD	15 697	3.0	17 807	3.1	19 593	3.1						
SC	5 707	1.1	6 745	1.2	7 854	1.2						
ORD	3 350	.6	4 097	.7	4 790	.8						
QMC	7 888	1.5	9 302	1.6	10 499	1.7						
CWS	1 365	.3	1 907	.3	2 048	.3						
MP	2 700	.5	3 082	.5	3 476	.5						
TC	122	—	188	—	249	—						
BI	1 883	.4	2 397	.4	3 385	.5						
TOTAL	516 500	100.0	581 629	100.0	636 196	100.0						

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

9 November 1944

AG 200.3 1 RCGA

SUBJECT: Officers Authorized as Excess.

TO: Commanding Generals.
Each Army Group
Each Army

1. To insure uniform interpretation concerning the number of lieutenants authorized as an advance issue of officer replacements, cited in our messages EX 54119, dated 13 October 1944 and EX 61452, dated 8 November 1944, this table is published:

Type Unit	No. Lts Authorized as Overstrength						
	Inf	FA	CE	Armd F	Cav	TD	Total
Infantry Division	42	12	1		1		56
Armored Division (T/O 17, 12-2-44)	12	9	1	13	5		40
Armored Division (T/O 17, 1-3-44)	12	9	1	19	5		46
Non-Div Tank Bn (T/O 17-25)				4			4
Non-Div Tank Bn (T/O 17-15)				3			3
Non-Div FA Bn		1					1
Non-Div Cav Sq (Rcn) (Mecz)				1	4		5
Non-Div Combat Engr Bn			1				1
Non-Div TD Bn (T/O 18-25)					1	3	4
Non-Div TD Bn (T/O 18-35)						3	3

2. The Commanding General, Ground Force Replacement System, will honor initial requisitions within available resources to the extent permissible without depleting overall replacement pools to a level where replacement needs cannot be met at any time.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/ *R. B. LOVETT*,
/t/ R. B. LOVETT,
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

ANNEX 33

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

17 November 1944

AG 210.3 2 x 322 RCGA

SUBJECT: Overstrength for Each 4.2" Chemical Mortar Company.

TO: Commanding General, 12th Army Group, APO 655.

1. An advance issue of one lieutenant for each 4.2" Chemical Mortar Company in Chemical Battalions, Motorized, is authorized. This authorized overstrength is made to insure the availability of replacement officers trained in combat to lead combat experienced troops.

2. This letter will be quoted as authority for the submission of each requisition. Initial requisitions will be honored by the Ground Force Replacement System within available resources. In the filling of the requisition, replacement pools will not be depleted to the extent where replacement needs cannot be met at any point. Requirements which cannot be immediately met under these conditions will be met as soon as overall replacement stockage permits.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/ *J. ROBERTSHAW*
/t/ J. ROBERTSHAW
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP REAR
APO 655

8 September 1944

705 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Priorities for Return of Hospital Returnees to their Former Units.

TO: Commanding General, Ground Force Replacement System, APO 583.

1. Since hospitalized personnel are now being evacuated from the hospitals and returned to the Replacement System at a greater rate than T/O vacancies are occurring due to the fact that casualties are now running at a much lower rate, it will not be possible to return to his former unit each person who has been hospitalized. Therefore, preference for return to a unit should be given to a soldier who has served with a particular unit the greatest length of time.

2. In view of the above, it is recommended that the following priorities be established to govern order of return of hospitalized returnees to their former units:

Priority No. 1:

Any personnel who originally came over with a particular organization, either in a T/O position or as part of the original authorized overstrength for assault divisions. This group will be held in Replacement System, pending assignment to their former units, as long as supply and demand will permit.

Priority No. 2:

Any personnel who became a member of an organization on the continent and remained with that organization for a minimum period of thirty days. This group will be held in Replacement System, pending assignment to their former units, for a period of thirty days, supply and demand permitting.

Priority No. 3:

All other personnel not covered by Priority No. 1 and No. 2 above. This group will be held in Replacement System, pending assignment to their former units, for a period of fifteen days, supply and demand permitting.

3. Priorities in paragraph 2 above do not affect current policy of returning, without reference to T/O position vacancies, all field grade officiers of all units, and enlisted personnel of the first three grades of non-divisional units.

For the Army Group Commander:

/s/ *H. B. LEWIS*
H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

ANNEX 34

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

13 February 1945

383 (G-1)

SUBJECT: War Criminals.

TO: Commanding General, First US Army, APO 230.
Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Ninth US Army, APO 339.
Commanding General, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408.
Commanding General, 66th Infantry Division, APO 454.
Commanding General, Special Troops, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655.
Commanding Officer, "T" Force, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655.

1. Reference:

a. Par 5 (c), Chapter I, Part I, Handbook for Military Government in Germany, dated December 1944.

b. Letter, this headquarters, 092.2 (JA), subject: "Violations of Provisions of the Geneva Convention and Laws and Usages of War by Enemy Forces", dated 6 January 1945.

2. Army commanders, and military district commanders when military districts are established, are responsible for the apprehension, identification, detention and investigation of persons suspected of having committed war crimes, including perpetrators of atrocious acts against civilians of Allied and liberated countries, or against members of the armed forces of the Allies, within their zone of advance and occupation, in accordance with the following instructions:

a. **Coordination.** G-1 will be the staff section responsible for coordinating plans for and supervision of activities concerning war criminals.

b. **Apprehension.** All appropriate personnel such as combat, intelligence, counter-intelligence, military police, military government and civilian police will be employed in the apprehension of war criminals. Counter-intelligence personnel normally will be required to arrest only those war criminals in whom there is also a counter-intelligence interest.

c. **Identification** will be accomplished by the apprehending agency or by the commander of the camp in which the war criminal is discovered or to which he is sent for detention. Method of identification will be to complete in triplicate a detention report and fingerprint the war criminal. See Par d (3) below.

d. **Detention.**

(1) Detention reports to include fingerprints will be completed in triplicate on all war criminals, and distributed as follows:

ANNEX 35

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(a) One copy to G-1 Division, SHAEF.

(b) One copy to JA Section, Twelfth Army Group.

(c) One copy retained.

(2) In cases where such persons are transferred between enclosures on the continent after a detention report has been completed, the date and place to which they are transferred will be notified to G-1 Division, SHAEF, on the appropriate form. The copy of the detention report normally retained at the enclosure will accompany the prisoner to the new enclosure.

(3) Detention reports and other forms will be printed by SHAEF and distributed to all interested parties together with detailed instructions.

(4) During the period of current operations —

(a) All persons detained as war criminals will be granted the protection and privileges afforded by the Geneva Convention to prisoners of war.

(b) Pending further instructions, prisoners of war and civilians, identified as war criminals, will be segregated at their place of detention from other prisoners of war or civilian detainees. This does not apply to war criminals detained by counter-intelligence personnel for counter-intelligence reasons.

(c) Enemy prisoners of war identified as war criminals will be detained for the period of time necessary to complete the detention report and the report of investigation contained in reference Par 1 b above and then evacuated to Communications Zone through normal PW channels. Detention reports and reports of transfer will be handled as in 2 d (2) above.

(d) Pending further instructions, war criminals other than prisoners of war will not be evacuated to Communications Zone.

(5) During the "ECLIPSE" Period —

(a) Pending further instructions, all war criminals will be concentrated in camps separate from other prisoners of war, and a further segregation will be made of those specifically charged with criminal acts.

(b) All such persons will be kept under strict military discipline and will perform all the work necessary to maintain their camps.

(c) Those who are located in detention or concentration camps in Germany will, as far as possible, be maintained from German resources. If this should prove impracticable, rations will be issued on a scale not exceeding, 2,000 calories per man per day.

e. **Investigation.**

(1) Until further instructions, procedure governing the investigation of war crimes will be as outlined in letter this headquarters, file 092.2 (JA)

(Ltr, Hq Twelfth Army Group, file 383 (G-1), 13 February 1945, Subj: War Criminals)

subject: "Violations of Provisions of the Geneva Convention and Laws and Usages of War by Enemy Forces", dated 6 January 1945.

(2) Any miscellaneous information bearing upon war crimes or criminals which may come to light from CI interrogation, prisoner of war interrogation, military government activities, and which does not warrant investigation as in (1) above, will be promptly preserved in the form of sworn statements by the witness or, if the witness refuses to testify under oath, in a sworn statement by the interrogator and such other witnesses as are present when the evidence is given. Such evidence will be forwarded through channels to this headquarters.

3. Only those war criminals will be tried who are accused of such violations of the laws and customs of war as threatened the security or impaired the efficiency of the forces under the command of the Army Group Commander. Trial of such persons will be as follows:

a. In liberated countries:

(1) Civilians, unless this headquarters orders otherwise, will be handed over for trial to the national authorities of the country on whose soil the crime was committed, in accordance with the agreements made with such countries and existing directives.

(2) The trial of military personnel will be by U S military commission in accordance with Circular No 14, this headquarters, 2 October 1944, as amended by Circular No 21, this headquarters, 28 December 1944.

b. In GERMANY:

Civilians and military personnel may be tried by a military commission or a military government court, provided that when the crime is committed in territory in which military government has, at the time, been established, trial will normally be by a military government court.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

Information copies to:
Supreme Commander, AEF
CG, ETOUSA
G-1, Hq 12th AGp
G-2, Hq 12th AGp
G-3, Hq 12th AGp
G-4, Hq 12th AGp
G-5, Hq 12th AGp
JA, Hq 12th AGp
PM, Hq 12th AGp
IG, Hq 12th AGp

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

WAR CRIMES BULLETIN

NUMBER 1 17 February 1945

1. This is a factual letter giving proven cases of war crimes committed by the Germans. It is an answer to the question, "What are we doing about war crimes?"

2. These cases are actually briefs--held for the day when the men proven guilty by investigation will be called upon to pay for their crimes. Investigations of each of these crimes have been completed within the last 30 days. Each case is supported by sworn statements made before an investigating officer by other officers, enlisted men and civilians.

WAR CRIME (JA-43)

3. A German unit entered Stavelot, Belgium, on 19 December 1944, and herded a group of Belgian civilians into a barn, shot them and set fire to the barn. Prisoners of war admitted doing this but claimed it was "by order" of their officer. Evidently the same order included the search of a house which resulted in the murder of two children playing in a back room and of an old woman found stabbed and shot to death sitting in her chair. Investigation is complete, and all allegations are supported by sworn statements. They will pay.

WAR CRIME (JA-41)

4. A German officer lined up six captured American soldiers new Ligneuville, Belgium, on 17 December 1944, and shot five of them through the back of their heads with a pistol. One man escaped by making a dash for it. Sworn statements support all evidence. This German officer will pay.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE

5. Reports of war crimes are not propaganda or gossip, but are facts. Each month a bulletin of war crimes will be made of some of the cases proven beyond question. War criminals will be punished.

6. These war crimes were made possible by the German people's support of a government that fed on terrorism and aggression from the beginning. Any degree of friendliness with Germans proves that you are willing to overlook or forget the war crimes they committed or approved. Keep away from all Germans. DON'T FRATERNIZE!

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, GSC, Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION "H"

ANNEX 36

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

WAR CRIMES BULLETIN

NUMBER 2 12 March 1945

4. During the Battle of the Ardennes, the Germans again showed the world how Nazis fight, how they regard the rules of warfare and how they respect humanity.

2. The two crimes reported below have been investigated and all facts are supported by sworn statements. These cases are briefs--held by the United States Army until the day when these German war criminals will be brought to trial.

WAR CRIME (JA-68)

3. On 24 December 1944, six German soldiers entered a home in Odeigne, Manhay, Belgium. They searched the home for food and clothing, taking what they wanted. Upon leaving, they ordered the Belgian owner of the house to come with them. His wife and ten year old son followed him to the door and saw the Germans shove a pistol into his mouth and fire it. The Belgian fell dead across the steps of his home. This German unit is known. The guilty men will be brought to trial as war criminals.

WAR CRIME (JA-79)

4. At 1330 hours, 17 December 1944, ten American soldiers of "D" Company, 38th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division were surrounded in a barn near Krinkelt-Rocherath, Belgium, by three German tanks and about 75 infantrymen. The Americans who were cut off without adequate supplies of food or ammunition surrendered. They were lined up against the wall of the barn, searched and then shot by their German captors. Three of the Americans escaped by falling to the ground and feigning death. The bodies of the other seven were found on 5 February 1945, lying where they had fallen. This German unit is known. The guilty men will be brought to trial as war criminals.

THE GUILTY

5. The German soldiers responsible for these and the many similar war crimes will be brought to trial. But all Germans who tolerated or supported the Nazis through more than 14 years of terrorism, aggression and war must bear a part of the responsibility for these atrocities. Don't overlook their guilt. DON'T FRATERNIZE!

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

(Pub. 7365)

DISTRIBUTION "H"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

WAR CRIMES BULLETIN

8 April 1945

NUMBER 3

In War Crimes Bulletins 1 and 2 you read all about how German soldiers massacred helpless civilians and prisoners of war. It made pretty rough reading, particularly when you know that every word printed is true and is supported by sworn statements from reputable witnesses.

Just in case you have tucked away in your minds the thought that German women are different from German men, let us tell you of the "RHINE MAIDENS"

WAR CRIME (JA-23)

Below is a quotation from the sworn statement of a very reputable person who actually witnessed the act of violence described.

".....I went over to where this American plane had fallen.....I noticed four American soldiers; three seemed to be dead and one was still moving. He..... indicated to me that both of his legs were broken between the knee and the thigh... Blood was flowing from his nose and he appeared to be suffering great pain..... five or six women jumped upon this wounded aviator. One of them punched him in the face several times with her fist, and tore his hair, shaking his head from side to side, throwing much blood out of his mouth and nose. Another woman jumped upon his chest and started jumping up and down. The others grabbed his arms and legs and seemed to be literally trying to tear him apart. While two of the women pulled his broken legs apart I saw another woman kick him several times in the testicles. I saw several of these women kick him in various parts of the body, head and face. During all of this the aviator groaned and seemed to be suffering excruciating pain. While these women were performing these acts to the wounded aviator a great crowd gathered and lent encouragement by shouting 'Give it to him! Tear him apart!' I stayed there for about five minutes and could stand it no longer. I then remarked to a woman who was standing next to me that those acts were bestial, to which the woman replied, "It is not bestial enough for those gangsters!"

One of the women was described as being young and having black, wavy hair and big black eyes.

WHO WERE THEY

These women were ordinary Germans--Germans weaned on aggression, intolerance, hate. Remember the "RHINE MAIDENS" next time you meet a "friendly" German girl.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. K. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "H"

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

WAR CRIMES BULLETIN

9 May 1945

NUMBER 4

When a German hangs a sheet out of his window, you should make sure the sheet has not been freshly laundered and merely been hung out to dry.

The German (man, woman and child) has demonstrated time and again that he can hide more sadistic, inhuman cruelty behind a white sheet — presumably of surrender — or an ingratiating smile than it is possible for civilized human beings to imagine. The bland statement, "I was ordered to do it", is all he needs as a salve to his conscience — releasing him of all blame or guilt for the commission of the most heinous crimes such as the two incidents reported below in the form of extracts from sworn statements of eye witnesses.

THE MAYOR GOES TO WAR
WAR CRIME (Ja-71)

"During the latter part of 1944, I was walking down the main street of M, Germany when I noticed an American prisoner being escorted down the street by two German soldiers in the direction of the house of Doctor H. As the prisoner reached the corner of Doctor H's house, an automobile driven by Hans J. stopped nearby and J. was the only occupant. J. dismounted from the vehicle and rushed over to the American and told the prisoner that he had shot German women and children. The American did not answer. J. then caught the American by the lapel of the jacket, threw him to the ground and then proceeded to kick the American about the body. I was about five yards away at this time and when I made the remark, 'Child of man', J. turned away from the prisoner and caught me by my coat. He then hit me in the face. In this scuffle, J's gun dropped from his holster to the ground. J. turned around, picked up his gun, walked over to the American lying on the ground and shot him through the back of the head. I was afraid that J. might shoot me so I had to leave the scene of the incident at this time." J. was the mayor of M.

THEY CRAWLED LIKE WORMS
WAR CRIME (Ja-170)

"During the time that the 18,000 prisoners were being done away, another shipment of 8,000 arrived. Since no facilities were available for these men, not to mention food or other provisions, they were simply caged in in the open and machine gun towers were erected and the prisoners were held in this enclosure without food or water and here they starved. After approximately one week I was detailed with other comrades to haul corpses out of the cage. I have seen many terrible things during my stay in Concentration Camp K, but this was definitely the worst. Human beings were crawling around like worms. I saw with my own eyes that the living ones had started to eat their dead comrades. Fourteen days after the erection of the cage all were dead."

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The reason for disguising the names of persons and places is obvious. We know who the perpetrators are. We also know they will not be too difficult to find if they are not forewarned. We intend that they shall be brought to trial. DON'T FRATERNIZE.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "H"

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

POLICY ON RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED OCCUPYING FORCES AND INHABITANTS OF GERMANY

1. GERMAN ATTITUDE AND PROPAGANDA

a. The German mental attitude during the previous occupation of Germany ranged from hatred, through friendliness, to fawning subservience. In the coming occupation, ad attitudes of mind may be encountered, differing with persons and localities, and changing from time to time. However, because of this war's greater air-bombing damage and possibly ground combat within Germany, and because of the intense Nazi indoctrination, German hatred may be far deeper and more universal than in 1918. Also, the whole country will be occupied, as compared to only a small fraction in 1918.

b. The German conception of themselves as a "Master Race" has been too deeply implanted to be eradicated outright; many Germans will accept defeat as only a temporary phase of a continuing struggle, and strong efforts will no doubt be directed towards regaining a commanding position in Europe. Plans for underground continuation of the struggle are believed to exist.

c. Aside from initial resistance by any German military forces not immediately under control, the occupying forces must be prepared for civil disorders, including sniping and assaults on individuals, sabotage, provoked riots, perhaps even organized raids. Hidden arms will undoubtedly be available.

d. Later there is likely to be deliberate, studied and continuous effort by the Germans to influence the sympathies and thoughts of the occupying forces, with a view to minimizing the consequences of defeat and preparing the way for a resurgence of German power. Propaganda in widely differing forms may be expected. It will probably endeavor to weaken the Allied solidarity; to undermine the Allied determination to exercise supervision and enforce the surrender terms; to induce a reduction in the occupying forces; and to lower Allied morale and military effectiveness.

e. While open propaganda through press and radio will probably be ineffective because of Allied supervision, it is expected that word-of-mouth propaganda, under the direction of underground agencies, will be attempted unceasingly by the population wherever it contacts Allied personnel. Its methods will include attempts at fraternization by civilians (especially by children, women, and old men); attempts at "soldier-to-soldier" fraternization, and social, official, and religious contacts. The propaganda may include appeals to generosity and spirit of fair play; appeals to pity for victims of devastation; appeals to racial and cultural similarities between Germans and Anglo-Saxons; organization of sympathy for an allegedly misled and oppressed people and its starving children; sowing of

ANNEX 37

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

discord between British and American Forces and between them and the Russians; and attempts to prove that Nazism was an alien idea implanted against the general will in the cultured and unaggressive minds of Germans. The propaganda will be universal, insidious, and dangerous, and will require extensive means to avoid and combat it.

2. GENERAL CONDUCT

a. Allied personnel will so conduct themselves in their relations with the inhabitants of Germany as to command respect for themselves and for the countries which they represent.

b. The Germans, as a nation, hold the armed forces and all things military in deep respect. A high standard of conduct and discipline must therefore be maintained by Allied personnel.

c. Acts of violence committed when not on the lawful course of military duty are forbidden, as are acts of pillage and oppression. If such transgressions occur, offenders will be severely punished.

3. DRINKING

Strict measures to control the consumption of liquor by Allied personnel will be exercised by commanders. Cases of drunkenness will be firmly dealt with.

4. NON-FRATERNIZATION

Definition: "Non-Fraternization" is the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings. However, non-fraternization does not demand rough, undignified or aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has characterized Nazi leadership.

5. GENERAL POLICY OF NON-FRATERNIZATION

a. There will be no fraternization between Allied personnel and the German officials or population.

b. This policy of non-fraternization is necessary in order to emphasize the relationship between the occupation forces and themselves and to circumvent their efforts to defeat the objects of our occupation. They must learn this time that their support and tolerance of militaristic leaders, their acceptance and furtherance of racial hatreds and persecutions, and their aggressions in Europe have brought them to complete defeat, and have caused the other people of the world to look upon them with distrust.

6. ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMANS IN OFFICIAL CONTACTS

a. Allied personnel dealing with Germans on official business will be just, but firm. They will adopt an attitude of stern courtesy. They will make it clear by words and attitude that immediate compliance with orders and instructions will be required and enforced. In official, as in personal matters, there must be no fraternization. The definition laid down in para. 4 above, applies to both.

b. Contacts on official matters with Germans, both military and civilian, will be restricted to the minimum necessary to insure adequate supervision of execution of the surrender terms and other official business. There will be no entertaining, "official" or otherwise.

c. Germans holding or appointed to official positions, such as police, administrative or military positions, will be made to understand that they hold office by consent of Allied authorities, and only so long as they conform to Allied instructions and requirements.

7. ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES IMPLEMENTING "NON-FRATERNIZATION"

The policy of non-fraternitazion will be implemented by the adoption of the following measures:

a. Segregation in Quarters

The billeting of officers or men in the homes of the population is forbidden. Separate Quarters for troops will be obtained by the use of permanent barracks, schools, and other public buildings, by requisition of hotels, private buildings and houses, or by the use of hutted or tented camps. Permanent quarters will be so located as to minimize contact with the German population.

b. Marriage

Marriage with Germans or personnel of other enemy countries is prohibited.

c. Religious Services

Whenever possible, church services conducted by Allied chaplains will be provided. When this is not possible, attendance at German churches will be permitted; in such cases, separate seating will be provided for the troops.

d. Restrictions on Contacts

The following must be prohibited: visiting German homes; drinking with Germans; shaking hands with them; playing games or sports with them; giving or accepting gifts; attending German dances or other social events; accompanying Germans on the street, in theaters, taverns, hotels, or elsewhere (except on official business); discussion and arguments with Germans, especially on politics or the future of Germany.

e. Execution and Enforcement

Commanders will take energetic action to implement and execute the policies and instructions contained in this section. Uniform enforcement of non-fraternization is especially important throughout the zones of the Allied Armies.

8. ORIENTATION OF TROOPS

Prior to their arrival in Germany, Commanders will take all practicable measures to inform their troops as to:

a. The mission of the occupying forces, their attitude towards the German people, and the standard of conduct required of them.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. The characteristics of the German poeple, their probable attitude towards the forces of occupation, and the types of propaganda which they are liable to employ. Emphasis should be laid upon the necessity for non-fraternization and the means by which this policy is to be effected.

9. TRAINING AND RECREATION

a. Policy.

The policy of segregation from the civilian population is a difficult one to maintain, entailing as it does considerable sacrifice upon the part of our troops of many of the amenities to which they are accustomed. Every endeavor must be made by commanders to provide a full and varied program of training, education, and recreation with which to occupy the time of the troops, interspersed by as frequent periods of leave as are permitted by oporational conditions.

b. Military Training

Military Training must continue as vigorously as practicable and consistent with maintenance of morale. The highest state of discipline and smartness must be attained

c. Education

General educational work should be undertaken, to cover subjects of general culture and military or civilian utility (arts, sciences, handicrafts, etc).

d. Recreation

(1) Recreation under control of Allied forces will be strongly encouraged. All facilities practicable will be provided.

(2) Forms and means of such recreation may well include:
Military competitions and shows.
Athletic sports, including tournaments.
Entertainments:
Motion pictures and theater, the latter including both professional and military amateur talent.
Restaurants, cafes, cafeterias, canteens and beer gardens.
Service clubs, with facilities for reading, writing, games, radio, refreshments, dancing, entertainments, etc.
Development of other forms of entertainment, including as many bands as can be made available.

(3) **Facilities**

Commanders are authorized to take over suitable local entertainment facilities wholly or partly and to prescribe, in accordance with the circumstances of each case:

(a) Allied attendance at separate hours.

(b) Exclusive Allied use.

(4) **Recreation Centers**

Recreation centers ("leave centers"), well organized, staffed and equipped should be established, preferably outside of Germany, where the men will have greater freedom from restraints imposed by non-fraternization. Planning therefor should be initiated shortly after the surrender in order that the centers may be ready early.

e. Leaves

Initially, the situation will not permit a liberal leave policy. Leaves for over 48 hours' duration will normally be for destinations outside of Germany. Neither then nor later will leaves be granted if they entail staying at private houses, hotels, or other establishments controlled by Germans. However, with arrangements for recreation centers and improvement of the military situation, it is expected that leave policy will be liberalized as soon as practicable. Leaves, however, will still be primarily for destinations outside of Germany, to leave centers or to home countries.

f. Womens Services

It is desirable that, as early as the situation permits, the Womens Services whether belonging to the forces, or a voluntary character (Red Cross, Y. W. C. A., etc) should be included in the occupying forces, and in relatively large numbers.

10. APPLICATION TO ALLIED PERSONNEL

The provisions of this memorandum will apply to all personnel of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, including Army, Navy, Air Forces, and all civilians under military control.

Reproduced:
Hq 12th Army Group
27 Oct 1944
JHE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

30 September 1944

091 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Non-fraternization policy.

TO: Commanding General, First US Army, APO 230.
Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Ninth US Army, APO 339.
Commanding General, Special Troops, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655.

1. Now that Allied armies are within or approaching the boundaries of Germany, the Supreme Commander has directed that a policy of non-fraternization with the German population be strictly enforced from the outset. The Germans are basically a disciplined people, who have deep respect for things military, and who hold weakness in contempt. In order to impress upon the German mind the finality of their defeat, a high standard of discipline **must** be maintained by all Allied personnel.

2. "Non-fraternization" is the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings. Pending issuance of more complete instructions by this headquarters, the following will be observed:

a. All personnel of this command will strictly adhere to a policy of non- fraternization with German officials or population.

b. There will be no entertaining, "official" or otherwise.

c. Quarters will be located so as to minimize contact with the German population.

d. The following acts are prohibited:

(1) Marriage with Germans.
(2) Visiting German homes.
(3) Drinking with Germans.
(4) Shaking hands with Germans.
(5) Playing games or attending social events with Germans.
(6) Giving to or accepting gifts from Germans.
(7) Accompanying Germans on streets, in theaters, taverns, hotels, or elsewhere (except on official business).
(8) Talking with Germans (except on official business).

e. Each commander will take steps immediataly to insure that all personnel in his command thoroughly understand the aboce policy and prohibitions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANDON
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

ANNEX 38

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

1 May 1945

014.13

SUBJECT: Policy on Relations Between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany.

TO: All U S Commanders.

1. Reference letter, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, subject as above, 12 September 1944.

2. The following instructions are to implement the subject policy:

a. Orientation of Troops

A comprehensive program for the orientation of troops has been developed and material on this subject is being disseminated by means of motion pictures, radio, "Stars and Stripes", "Army Talks", posters, and booklets. Commanders will take all practicable measures to insure that maximum use is made of this orientation material as it becomes available.

b. Security

The Commanders of occupying forces, in addition to being prepared at all times for any necessary military operations, will be prepared to deal effectively with hostile activities which may include sniping at and assaults upon individuals, sabotage, riots, organized raids, subversive propaganda, and deliberate passive resistance. Commanders will issue appropriate instructions for prompt and effective action to be taken as required to quell any riot or disturbance or to deal with any other act in the occupied territory inimical to the occupying forces.

c. General Conduct

(1) All personnel will so conduct themselves in their relations with the inhabitants of Germany as to command respect for themselves and their country.

(2) It is well known that the Germans, as a nation, have a deep respect for armed forces and all things military. Therefore, increased emphasis must be placed on military courtesy, discipline, and personal appearance of all ranks.

(3) New uniforms will be requisitioned by Commanders. Supply of uniforms and facilities for the proper care and cleaning of articles of the uniform will be provided when situation permits. Class "A" uniforms will be issued and worn by all ranks while off duty, as soon as the facilities permit.

ANNEX 39

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Acts of violence not in the lawful course of duty, looting, pillage, or malicious injury to persons or property are forbidden. Private property rights will be respected, including the security of inhabitants in their dwellings. The offenses of looting and pillage are forbidden both by the Rules of Land Warfare and the Articles of War, the death penalty being authorized for such violations.

d. Drinking

Strict measures to control the consumption of liquor by Allied personnel will be exercised by Commanders. Cases of drunkenness will be firmly dealt with.

e. Non-Fraternization

(1) The terms "German" and "Germans" as used in this policy include all persons who dwell or reside permanently in Germany, regardless of their nationality, as well as all Nazi collaborators and nationals of countries who have been allied with Germany in war against the Allies and who may temporarily be within the geographical limit of Germany.

Until such time as the situation will permit the recognition of those persons who are not considered Germans, the policy of non-fraternization will apply to all civilians in Germany.

(2) Segregation in Quarters

Billeting of officers or men in the homes of Germans is forbidden. Separate quarters for troops will be obtained by the use of permanent barracks and other public buildings, by the requisition of hotels, private buildings, and houses, or by the use of hutted or tented camps. Permanent quarters will be so located as to minimize contact with the German population. Schools and other academic buildings will not be occupied by troops except in the case of military necessity.

(3) Religious Services

A complete program of normal religious activity will be conducted for all military personnel. This should include the use of suitable churches and the development of music and choirs. When this is not possible, attendance at regular services conducted in German churches will be permitted; in such cases, however, separate seating will be provided for all military personnel.

(4) Restrictions on Contacts

All acts of friendliness, or which might be interpreted by Germans as friendliness, are prohibited. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Marriage with Germans or personnel of other enemy countries.
(b) Visiting German homes.
(c) Shaking hands with Germans.
(d) Drinking with Germans.
(e) Playing games or attending social events with Germans.
(f) Giving gifts to or accepting gifts from Germans.
(g) Accompanying Germans on streets, in theater, taverns, hotels, or elsewhere (except on official business).
(h) Discussions and arguments with Germans.

(5) Execution and Enforcement

(a) Commanders will take energetic action to implement and execute the policies and instructions contained in this directive. This requires not only the highest of enforcement by members of the Corps of Military Police but also involves a realization on the part of each officer and enlisted men that he has a personal responsibility in regard to the enforcement of these provisions. Commanders will insure that officers and enlisted men are given clear and simple instructions as to their responsibilities.

(b) All Commanders will make continuing inspections of conditions to insure that the spirit as well as the letter of the Supreme Commander's directive is being carried out.

(c) Necessary personal business may be transacted with Germans but will be kept to the essential minimum. Care will be taken to keep such contacts on a strictly impersonal basis so that no action or speech involved may be interpreted by the Germans as an indication of friendliness.

(d) Uniform enforcement of non-fraternization is of utmost importance. It is obvious that lack of such uniformity will be injurious to the all-over effectiveness with which non-fraternization is prosecuted. Therefore, Commanders will insure that necessary action to accomplish this is taken, to include reference to the next higher command when the situation requires, whenever questions or matters arise as to which there is any doubt concerning the uniform procedure to be followed.

f. Attitude Toward Germans in Official Contacts

All persons having official contacts with Germans must conduct themselves in an exemplary manner.

g. Training and Education — Post Hostilities

(1) Training and educational plans will be based on a 48-hour work week. The free time will be on Sunday for the greatest practicable percentage of the personnel.

(2) Training programs and schedules will provide for organized athletics.

(3) Eductional activities will be included as a part of training, in accordance with letter ETO, AG 350 OpGC, subject: "Army Education Program — Post Hostilities", 2 April 1945. Appropriate directives will be issued by this headquarters at a later date.

(4) Each organization and unit will designate an historical officer, and compilation of the history of the unit or organization concerns and its participation in active combat will be instituted.

h. Savings Program

The present Theater Soldier Savings program will be continued and encouraged.

i. Recreation — Post Hostilities

(1) All personnel will be encouraged to participate in recreational activities.

(2) Responsibility for the execution of the recreational program rests with Commanders. Each will provide from the means at his disposal all facilities and personnel practicable and necessary to develop a well-rounded program.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Recreation centers will be established in areas that will offer the maximum opportunity for rest and relaxation. Facilities will be apportioned on a pro-rata basis. Commanders will establish such recreation centers within their areas as are deemed necessary for the welfare of the command.

(4) Equipment and materials used in athletic and recreational programs will be requisitioned according to SOP No 7, Hq ETO, 19 March 1945, purchased through Army Exchange Service or local sources, or improvised. Although certain training aids will be made available by the War Department, it is expected that individual initiative will cause maximum economy through improvisations.

(5) This headquarters will supervise and coordinate all activities between major commands.

(6) Recreation will include:

(a) Military Competitions and Shows

1. Competitions and shows will allow for both individual and organizational participation. Competitions will be conducted so that championships are established at each level up to and including Army Group. All championship winners will be acknowledged by suitable awards, trophies, and publicity.

(b) Athletic Sports and Tournaments

1. The basis for the athletic program will be the conduct of activities in a manner that will require the full effort of personnel during the time allotted. Participation rather than spectatorship will be encouraged. For this reason the emphasis will be placed on intramural contests rather than championship competitions, particularly within smaller units such as companies, battalions, regiments, and groups.

2. Teams participating in championship competitions should be selected at each level with as wide a representation as possible from the organizations composing the unit. This will assist in stimulating the greatest amount of unit spirit behind each team.

(c) Entertainment

1. Entertainment plans will include motion picture shows, USO shows, professional shows, soldier shows, reviews, operettas, "stunt" shows, concerts, musicals, etc.

2. Restaurants, cafes, cafeterias, canteens, soda fountains and beer gardens operated by or under direction of military personnel will be made available and will be controlled by Commanders.

3. Service clubs will be established by the American Red Cross in all principal military centers.

4. Free use will be made of all military bands, orchestras, drum and bugle corps, dance and novelty bands, glee clubs, and choruses.

5. The American Forces Radio Network will be utilized to the fullest extent.

6. The "Stars and Stripes" newspaper and the "Yank" magazine will continue to be published.

7. Facilities will be established by all units to promote special talents and hobbies in Arts and Crafts.

8. Commanders are authorized to take over suitable local entertainment facilities wholly or partly and to prescribe, in accordance with the circumstances of each case, Allied attendance at separate hours or exclusive Allied use.

j. Leaves, Furloughs, and Passes — Post Hostilities

(1) Leaves and Furloughs

The following leave and furlough policy is established and will become effective at a date to be announced.

(a) Initial leaves and furloughs will be limited to a maximum of seven days until all personnel has been afforded an opportunity to avail themselves of the privilege. Subsequent leaves and furloughs will conform to pertinent Army regulations and directives from this headquarters. Leaves and furloughs granted will be exclusive of travel time.

(b) A roster showing the approximate date that members of units will become entitled to leaves and furloughs will be prepared in order that all personnel may be informed of their status. Leaves and furloughs will be granted unless the military situation is of sufficient urgency to prevent. As they become eligible for leaves and furloughs it is desired that personnel be urged to avail themselves of the opportunity.

(c) Maximum use will be made of available air transportation in transporting personnel to and from leave, furlough, and rest centers.

(d) Leaves and furloughs for over seventy-two hours duration will normally be for destinations outside of Germany. No leave or furlough will be granted which will involve staying in private homes, hotels, or other establishments controlled by Germans.

(2) Passes

A very liberal pass policy will be instituted as soon as the situation will permit. Passes may be granted for overnight or up to seventy-two consecutive hours, provided that such absence will not entail the staying at private houses, hotels, or other establishments controlled by Germans. Organized sight-seeing parties involving the use of Government transportation are desirable and will be used to the maximum extent.

k. Women's Services

As early as the situation permits, Women's Services, whether belonging to the forces or of voluntary character, will be included in the occupying forces, and in relatively large numbers.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

014.13 (G-1) 15 November 1944

MEMO: Policy, relationship between allied occupying troops and inhabitants of Germany.

TO: Chiefs of staff sections.

1. Reference: SHAEF letter, 12 September 1944, subject as above, and Annex A of same letter.

2. Pursuant to paragraph 8, Annex A, referred to above, practical measures will be taken to inform the troops of:

a. Mission of the occupying forces.

b. Attitude towards the German people.

c. Standard of conduct required of them.

d. Characteristics of the German people, their probable attitude towards the forces of occupation and the types of propaganda which they are likely to employ.

e. Vital necessity for non-fraternization.

3. The Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, Twelfth Army Group, will be responsible for the accomplishment of the above under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Twelfth Army Group.

4. The program of orientation should be based on the following fundamental principles:

a. That non-fraternization orders are directed against Germany and the German people as measures made necessary by their past conduct.

b. Punitive measures; however, the word "punitive" will not be used; "corrective measures" will be substituted therefor.

c. Emotional as well as intellectual appeals will be made.

d. We must be fair, but firm.

5. Items to be developed in the orientation program through appropriate media are contained in Appendix A, attached hereto.

6. The means to effectuate this orientation program should be:

a. Through command channels. (1) A monthly series of letters, prepared by Publicity and Psychological Warfare, will be distributed to unit commanders down to companies reasserting the major points of the program and stressing the necessity of rigid observance of the order.

(2) Material bearing on the subject will be prepared in two different copy lengths by Publicity and Psychological Warfare, generally on a weekly basis. This material will be dispatched for use in unit newspapers and mimeographed sheets when such publications are authorized.

b. Through normal publicity media.

ANNEX 40

(1) **Stars and Stripes.** (a) By frequent publication of news stories which serve to emphasize the points made in the special orders for German-American relations.

(b) By frequent editorials stressing these same points.

(c) By the publication of material prepared by Publicity and Psychological Warfare, stressing special phases of the program which may require additional emphasis from time to time.

d) By the preparation of occasional cartoons illustrating some of the points of the program.

(e) By the careful exercise of editorial judgment in the consideration of any material which might militate against this program.

(2) **Yank** Magazine. By the same as b (1), (a), (d) and (e) above.

(3) Allied forces radio. (a) In the very near future, brief talks by General Eisenhower, General Bradley and other commanders on the subject of the special orders will be recorded and should be broadcast at any appropriate time.

(b) The use of careful editorial judgment in news broadcasts and programs of comment so that the orders are presented positively and that nothing will militate against their effectiveness.

(c) The inclusion in news broadcasts of material prepared by Publicity and Psychological Warfare, emphasizing various points of the orders.

(d) The use of three to four station-break announcements daily, stressing the points of the orders.

(e) The use of brief dramatized announcements and programs based upon the points of the "special" battle orders.

(f) The development of one or two radio programs to point out that there is nothing in the order which interferes with a soldier's practice of his religion.

(4) **Army Talks** should develop the theme comprehensively, point by point, over a period of several weeks. Talks should be divided into talks of a general nature for all troops in the theater and talks on specific points for distribution only to troops actually in the area where the orders apply. These more specific talks should be released to units shortly before they are scheduled to enter Germany.

(5) Regular news releases. (a) Weekly releases prepared by Publicity and Psychological Warfare will be dispatched for inclusion in unit newspapers and mimeographed sheets when such publications are authorized. Stories wil be of two types: for units actually in Germany and for units in other parts of the theater. Each of the stories will be supplied in two lengths so that it can be readily adapted to any newspaper format.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) Weekly releases and suggestions prepared by Publicity and Psychological Warfare for the **Stars and Stripes** and **Yank.**

(c) Weekly releases prepared by Publicity and Psychological Warfare to serve as background for broadcasts by the American Forces Network.

(6) Posters. Posters should be used extensively, sub-divided into those for units actually in Germany and those for other units in the theater.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjudant General

1 Incl — Appendix A

ITEMS TO BE DEVELOPED IN ORIENTATION PROGRAMS

1. To remember always that Germany, though conquered, is still a dangerous enemy nation.
2. Never to trust Germans, collectively or individually.
3. To defeat German efforts to poison my thoughts or influence my attitude.
4. To avoid acts of violence, except when required by military necessity.
5. To conduct myself at all times so as to command the respect of the German people for myself, for the United States and for the Allied cause.
6. Never to associate with Germans.
7. To be fair, but firm with Germans.
8. Mental attitude of Germans towards our forces.
9. "Master Race" conception. Continuing struggle to regain commanding position in Europe.
10. Underground movement.
11. Efforts by the Germans to influence the sympathies and thoughts of the occupying forces with a view towards minimizing the consequences of defeat.
12. Propaganda to weaken Allied solidarity and to lower the morale of the occupying forces.
13. Maintenance of a high standard of conduct and discipline by Allied troops in order to meet the respect with which Germans regard the military.
14. Avoiding acts of pillage and oppression except in the normal course of military duty.
15. Drunkedness (directly related to 13, above).
16. Non-fraternization — i. e., the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, while at the same time avoiding characteristics of Nazi leadership.
17. Necessity for non-fraternization.
18. In view of the necessity for non-fraternization, prohibition of the following: visiting German homes; drinking with Germans: shaking hands with Germans; playing games or sports with them; giving/accepting gifts to/from Germans; attending German dances or social events; accompanying Germans on the street, in theaters, taverns, hotels or elsewhere (except on official business); discussion and argument with Germans, especially on politics or the future of Germany; marrying Germans.
19. Sacrifice of accustomed amenities caused by segregation of troops from the civil population.
20. Program of leaves and furloughs, education and recreation.
21. Military training necessary to maintain smartness and morale.
22. Women's services in occupying forces.

Appendix A

ANNEX 40

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Headquarters
Twelfth Army Group

Europe

I need not speak of your past accomplishments, other than to say you have reflected great credit upon yourself and your command.

We are now fighting on German soil and we are in contact not only with the soldiers of our enemy but also civilians of Germany. As conquerors, we must now consider our relations with the people of Germany.

It is imperative that you do not allow yourself to become friendly with Germans, but at the same time you must not persecute them. American soldiers can and have beaten German soldiers on the field of battle. It is equally important that you complete the victory over Nazi ideas.

To guide you I have issued these special "battle" orders. They may appear to lead along a narrow path, but they are NECESSARY. You personally must prove to the German people that their acceptance of Nazi leadership is responsible for their defeat, and that it has earned for them the distrust of the rest of the world.

O. N. Bradley

LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY
COMMANDING

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

1. To remember always that Germany, though conquered, is still a dangerous enemy nation.

a. It is known that an underground organization for the continuation of the Nazi program for world domination is already in existence. This group will take advantage of every relaxation of vigilance on our part to carry on undercover war against us.

b. The occupational forces are not on a goodwill mission.

2. Never to trust Germans, collectively or individually.

a. For most of the past century, Germany has sought to attain world domination by conquest. This has been the third major attempt in the memory of men still living. To many Germans, this defeat will only be an interlude a time to prepare for the next war.

b. Except for such losses of life and property suffered by them, the Germans have no regrets for the havoc they have wrought in the world.

c. The German has been taught that the national goal of domination must be attained regardless of the depths of treachery, murder and destructions necessary. He has been taught to sacrifice everything — ideals, honor, and even his wife and children for the State. Defeat will not erase that idea.

3. To defeat German efforts to poison my thoughts or influence my attitude.

a. The Nazis have found that the most powerful propaganda weapon is distortion of the truth. They have made skillful use of it and will redouble their efforts in the event of an occupation in order to influence the thinking of the occupational forces. There will probably be deliberate, studied and continuous efforts to influence our sympathies and to minimize the consequences of defeat.

b. You may expect all manner of approaches — conversations to be overheard, underground publications to be found; there will be appeals to generosity and fair play; to pity for victims of devastation; to racial and cultural similarities; and to sympathy for an allegedly oppressed people.

c. There will be attempts at sowing discord among Allied nations; at undermining Allied determination to enforce the surrender; at inducing a reduction in occupational forces; at lowering morale and efficiency of the occupying forces; at proving that Nazism was never wanted by the "gentle and cultured" German people.

4. To avoid acts of violence, except when required by military necessity.

For you are an American soldier, not a Nazi.

5. To conduct myself at all times so as to command the respect of the Germann people for myself, for the United States, and for the Allied Cause.

a. The Germans hold all things military in deep respect. That respect must be maintained at all times or the Allied Cause is lost and the first steps are taken toward World War III. Each soldier must watch every action of himself and of his comrades. The German will be watching constantly, even though you may not see him. Let him see a good American Soldier.

b. Drunkenness will not be tolerated. Penalties will be severe.

6. Never to associate with Germans.

a. We must bring home to the Germans that their support of Nazi leaders, their tolerance of radical hatreds and persecutions, and their unquestioning acceptance of the wanton aggressions on other nations, have earned for them the contempt and distrust of the civilized world. We must never forget that the German people support the Nazi principles.

b. Contacts with Germans will be made only on official business. Immediate compliance with all official orders and instructions and surrender terms will be demanded of them and will be firmly enforced.

c. American soldiers must not associate with Germans. Specifically, it is not permissible to shake hands with them, to visit their homes, to exchange gifts with them, to engage in games or sports with them, to attend their dances or social events, or to accompany them on the street or elsewhere. Particularly, avoid all discussion or argument with them. Give the Germans no chance to trick you into relaxing your guard.

7. To be fair but firm with Germans.

a. Experience has shown that Germans regard kindness as weakness. Every soldier must prove by his actions that the Americans are strong. This will be accomplished if every soldier treats the Germans with firmness and stern courtesy at all times.

b. Firmness must be tempered with a strict justice. Americans do not resort to Nazi gangster methods in dealing with any people. Remember, your fair but firm treatment of the German people will command the proper respect due a member of a conquering nation.

ANNEX 41

POCKET GUIDE TO

This booklet is issued in the interest of informing you about the country you occupy. Nothing contained herein should be considered a relaxation of the Non-Fraternization Policy.

Keep faith with the American soldiers who have died to eliminate the German warmakers.

DO NOT FRATERNIZE

Germany

ANNEX 42

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

APO 887
15 May 1945

AG 210.3/1 MPM-GA

SUBJECT: Military Personnel Having Relatives in Occupied Germany.

TO: Commanding Generals,
US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
Each army group
Communications Zone
Each army
XVIII Corps (Airborne)
Assembly Area Command
Bremen Port Command
United Kingdom Base, Communications Zone
European Division, Air Transport Command
Ground Force Reinforcement Command
Section Commanders, Communications Zone
Commanding Officers,
European Civil Affairs Division
Military Intelligence Service
Headquarters Commandant

1. Letter, this headquarters, file AG 210.3/2 x 220.3 MPGA, subject as above, dated 29 Mar 1945, is rescinded.

2. Occupation forces in Germany will not include military personnel having relatives of a certain degree of consanguinity residing in Allied-occupied enemy territory. Personnel having relatives in Allied-occupied enemy territory of the degree of consanguinity indicated below will not be assigned to occupation forces, except as provided herein, and in the event such personnel are already on duty with occupation forces, they will be transferred as provided for in paragraph 3, below:

Blood Relations	Relations by Marriage
Grandparents	Husbands
Parents	Wives
Brothers or half brothers	Fathers-in-law
Sisters or half sisters	Mothers-in-law
Sons	Brothers-in-law
Daughters	Sisters-in-law
Uncles	
Aunts	

ANNEX 43

3. Commanding generals of major commands, numbered air forces, Communications Zone sections, base sections and bases, and separate commanders who have personnel in the above category will transfer such personnel to another organization in their command not engaged in occupation duties, or in the event such action is not appropriate, to the Reinforcement Depot designated by the Commanding General, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, for assignment outside Germany. Exceptions may be made in cases of individuals possessing special qualifications essential to occupation duties. The approval of the Army (District) Commander will be required in each individual case. The problem will be simplified if such individuals are stationed at places removed from their relatives in Germany. Although the difficulty of insuring that such action is taken in all cases is recognized, it will be the aim of responsible commanders to do so.

4. Such new assignments will not be made the basis for reduction in grade of either the transferred personnel, or personnel of the organization to which assigned. Any resulting surplus in grade will be absorbed by normal attrition. Upon transfer as provided for herein, appropriate notation, including name and address of the relative concerned, will be made on the individual's WD AGO Form No. 66-1 (Qualification Card) or WD AGO Form No. 24 (Service Record), and copies of transfer orders will be furnished this headquarters.

5. The authority contained herein will not be used for the purpose of taking disciplinary or corrective action against violators of the non-fraternization policy.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER:

R. B. LOVETT,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "D"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655, US Army

4 December 1944

014.13 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Non-Fraternization.

TO: All Organization Commanders, Twelfth Army Group.

1. A subject which is going to hound us from now on is that of non-fraternization with the German civilians. Right now, of course, it is of less importance than some other things which contribute more directly to winning the war. It may not be as important at the moment, for instance, as getting overshoes for our men or enforcing steps to prevent trench foot, but, nevertheless, we must continue to enforce non-fraternization orders. As we press further into Germany, this subject will increase in importance until, when we are an Army of occupation, it will become one of our greatest problems.

2. The education of our soldiers as to the necessity for non-fraternization must be continuous. We must emphasize that we are not just fighting Hitler and his crowd; we are fighting the whole German nation. This is a total war. It is each one of the German people who has made it that kind of a war. If they had not been led by Hitler, they would have been led by someone else with the same ideas. The German people relish war, and are determined to use it until they rule the world and impose their way of life on us.

3. This war is not a sporting proposition. We must not treat the Germans as we would our opponents in a football game after the final whistle. We do not want to play a return game next year or in twenty years.

4. The German people will tell us that they did not want to commit all the atrocities of which they are guilty. They did not want to treat conquered people as shamefully as they have. They will tell us that they were **ordered** to do so. This is a poor excuse. Certainly, our soldiers would not have committed such atrocities no matter how many orders had been issued for them to do so.

5. These crimes must be shared by the whole German nation. Each German civilian must be made to realize that we cannot forgive such conduct. Until they have proven by many years of proper dealing that they again merit some consideration and trust, they cannot be accepted as members of the family of civilized nations.

O. N. BRADLEY
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

ANNEX 44

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

GAL/GHS/rm
APO 887
7 June 1945

AG 014.13 OpGA

SUBJECT: Policy on relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany.

TO: Commanding Generals:
US Strategic Air Force in Europe
Each Army Group
Communications Zone
Each Army
XVIII Corps (Airborne)
Assembly Area Command
Bremen Port Command
United Kingdom Base, Communications Zone
European Division, Air Transport Command
Ground Force Reinforcement Command
Section Commanders, Communications Zone
Service Commanders, Communications Zone
Commanding Officers:
European Civil Affairs Division
Military Intelligence Service
Headquarters Commandant, APO 887

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 2b, Section I, Circular 59, this headquarters, dated 2 May 1944, providing that disciplinary and punitive measures will not be taken for the contraction of venereal disease, except in instances of wilful concealment of infection.

2. The contraction of venereal disease or the facts concerning prophylactic treatment will not be used, directly or indirectly, as evidence of fraternization or as evidence of violation by the individual of the policy on non-fraternization with the inhabitants of Germany.

3. The foregoing policy is not to be deemed as relaxing the rule against fraternization nor to prohibit disciplinary action in appropriate cases where proof of fraternization may be established by evidence from sources other than those contained in paragraph 2 above.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER:

R. B. LOVETT
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION "D"

ANNEX 45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Daily Mail — 3 Feb 45

THREE FRAULEINS TRIED FOR 'LURING' GI JOES

From Rhona Churchill
Stolberg, Germany.

Leonie Fuchs, a short-skirted, high-heeled young refugee from battered Cologne, stood before the Summary Court judge, Captain Jacob Johnson, here to-day accused of "acting in a manner prejudicial to the good order of members of the (Allied) Armed Forces."

In other words, she was accused of inviting two American soldiers into her house after dark — the first case of its kind in Occupied Germany.

During the past weeks Army officers have been much concerned with the problems of fraternization and the growing number of German women of doubtful reputation who are secretly inviting soldiers to visit them after dark.

The case of Leonie Fuchs was a test case, brought in the hope of finding a means of enforcing the Army's non-fraternization order from the civilian side.

Silent witnesses were the two Americans concerned — young boys who an hour earlier had been convicted by a military court of fraternising with Leonie Fuchs, and each fined — 7 10s, and sentenced to 31 days.

Accused with Leonie were her two girl friends, Katherina Hupertz and Maria Gerhardt, and Maria's mother.

'On Doorstep'

The prosecution, conducted by a 22-years-old Ohio law student, indicated, but failed to prove, that Leonie stood on her doorstep at dusk and invited the two soldiers to return with cigarettes later that night.

Undisputed evidence was that the two soldiers had called at the house at nine o'clock and had been found in an upstairs flat at 11.30 by military police.

The four German women were defended both by German and American counsel.

Lt R. W. Fleming, former concilator of Washington's War Labour Board, defending, said: "We know there is a non-fraternization law for soldiers, but that fact is nowhere written into the law for civilians."

"We must show these people that we are just. If they are to be found guilty it must be under a direct law telling them that they must not be friendly to our soldiers."

Describing the case as "very important," the judge said: "The question is to what extent we may hold civilians responsible for an act which has not been specifically posted to them as forbidden.

"There is no evidence that these civilians knew of the existence of an Army non-fraternization order. This court therefore finds them not guilty.

ANNEX 46

"But it directs that the accused take notice now that association with members of the American Forces is forbidden and may be used as such in future cases."

'Many not caught'.

After the case I spoke to the officer of the two men. He said: "These boys were caught because thay did not know the ropes. Many of our boys go frequently to German homes at night.

"Neither combat nor non-combat troops are immune from the temptation to fraternize.

"I realise the necessity for non-fraternization but if it is to be obeyed the boys must have regular short leaves in non-German towns where they can fraternize with the local population.

"Otherwise fraternization will be driven underground.

"Most boys who fraternize with German girls do so because they are lonely and homesick."

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

APO 757 (Main)
10 March 1945

AG 091-1 (Germany) GE-AGM

SUBJECT: Non-Fraternization by Germans

TO: Headquarters, 21 Army Group
Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655
Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, APO 23

1. A number of instances have recently occurred of action looking to punishment of Germans as a means of enforcing the policy of non-fraternization of members of the Allied Expeditionary Force with Germans as established by the Supreme Commander's letter, subject "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" dated 12 September 1944, and Appendix 'A' thereto.

2. Such action is contrary to this policy. Non-fraternization is an internal policy of the Allied Expeditionary Force to impress upon the Germans the prestige and superiority of the Allied Armies and to demonstrate to the Germans the fact of their complete defeat. To enforce that policy by punishing Germans is contrary to the reasons underlying it.

3. Accordingly, the non-fraternization policy should be enforced solely through normal military disciplinary methods. Action for enforcement through the issue of orders to the Germans or prosecutions of them for attempts to fraternize should be discontinued.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

H. H. NEWMAN
Colonel, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "Z"

ANNEX 47

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 400.12-1 GAP-AGM

APO 757 (Main)
15 May 1945

SUBJECT: Shopping in Germany.

TO: Headquarters, 21 Army Group
Commanding General, 6th Army Group, APO 23, US Army
Commanding General, 12th Army Group, APO 655, US Army
Commanding General, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, APO 887.

1. Administrative Memorandum No. 6, this headquarters, gave permission to members of the Allied Expeditionary Forces to make pruchases of certain goods in Germany. Consideration has been given to the effect of such permission on the policy of non-fraternization.

2. It is appreciated that troops going into a new country have a natural desire to make purchases of local goods as presents or souvenirs and that although "shopping" involves the risk of fraternization, its prohibition would probably lead to attempted evasion with many consequent evils.

3. In order to reduce the risk of fraternization, steps should be taken as soon as possible to build up organizations to enable PX and NAAFI installations to put on sale a wide range of German goods. By wholesale buying it should be possible to sell such goods at prices considerably lower then those ruling in the shops.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

s/ H. H. Newman
H. H. NEWMAN
Colonel, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

ANNEX 48

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(Basic: Ltr, SHAEF (Main), File AG 400.12-1 GAP-AGM, dated 15 May 1945, subject: "Shopping in Germany.")

400.12 (G-1) M/Ljc

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP, APO 655, US ARMY, 21 May 1945.

TO: Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403, US Army.
Commanding General, Seventh US Army, APO 758, US Army.
Commanding General, Ninth US Army, APO 339, US Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408, US Army.

For your information and compliance with paragraph 3 of basic communication.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

J. H. BLOSS
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

with

APPENDIX 48

Extracts from ADSOP, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 8.

. . . . . .

f. **Allied Prisoners of War.** It is apparent that under the current operation advancing armies will uncover or overrun Allied Prisoner of War camps and hospitals in their zones of action. Pending further orders Allied Prisoners of War recaptured in such camps or hospitals will be handled according to the following instructions:

(1) Command and Control

(a) Armies will be responsible for command, administration, supply, and evacuation of Allied PW camps within their zone of action. G-1 will be the responsible staff agency.

(b) All camp occupants who do not "stay put" in these camps will automatically become displaced persons and will be a responsibility of Civil Affairs. G-1 will be the staff agency responsible for formulating arrangements for identifying, if possible, those displaced persons who claim to be Allied PWs or US or British civilian internees. Those so identified will be turned over to the nearest Allied PW camp under local arrangements to be made between the camp commanders concerned. Those who remain unidentified will be handled as displaced persons but will be screened by counterintelligence personnel prior to release.

(2) PWX Representatives

(a) PWX contact officers will be attached by Army Group to each Army for orientation and will, as soon as a PW camp is overrun, move into the camp to enforce a "stay put" policy and coordinate administration and evacuation under Army direction.

(b) A PWX representative will be attached to G-1, 12th Army Group, in order to advise on PWX matters and to call forward additional PWX contact officers as required by the Armies.

(c) When a Wehrkreis headquarters is overrun, a PWX liaison detachment will be dispatched on call to 12th Army Group, to coordinate the evacuation of camps within the Wehrkreis under Army direction.

(3) Maintenance. Each Army is responsible for ensuring that PW of all nationalities in PW camps within its zone of action are maintained. Army technical staff and PWX contact officers will determine quantity of food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., which are necessary. PWX contact officers will obtain all possible advance information as to the location, composition, and condition of PW camps in the Army's zone of action to permit timely planning and procurement of supplies by the Army technical staffs.

(4) Medical

(a) Armies will be responsible that adequate medical service is provided to personnel in PW camps. PWs of any nationality whose condition requires evacuation

ANNEX 49

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

through medical channels will be so evacuated, except that PWs of nationalities other than US and British will not be evacuated beyond the Continent.

(b) All personnel uncovered in PW camps will be deloused prior to evacuation from camps. See Par 9h(2)(c)2 for delousing methods to be applied.

(5) **Evacuation**

(a) Sick and wounded through Army medical channels to Communications Zone.

(b) US and British PW and Civilian Internees by Communications Zone to the U K on notification to Advance Section, Communications Zone by Army.

(c) Balance of Allied PW will remain in camp until further instructions by this headquarters.

(d) Normal enemy Prisoner of War channels will not be used.

(e) Available air transport should be utilized.

(f) If evacuation is by rail from a railhead within the Army area, Army will transport evacuees to the railhead.

(6) **Welfare**

(a) Special Service facilities, including motion pictures, libraries, periodicals, newspapers, and athletic equipment will be provided by the Army Special Service Officer if sufficient time permits. Periodicals and newspapers will include unit sets of magazines, bulk magazines, Stars and Stripes, Yank, and any other newspapers being furnished to troops at that time.

(b) The Army Special Service Officer will utilize Special Service Companies attached to Army for the above purpose if practical.

(7) **Pay.** If practicable US and British PW will be paid an advance in accordance with the following schedule:

(a) US — Officers:	£	20 or equivalent
EM:	£	5 or equivalent
(b) British — Officers.	£	5 or equivalent
EM:	£	5 or equivalent

(8) **Postal.** Air mail letter cards will be distributed at all camps under PWX arrangements to enable US and British PW to write home immediately. There will be no incoming mail.

(9) **Documentation.** In accordance with SHAEF policy, under supervision of PWX representative, at PW camps or other installations, as applicable.

(10) **Interrogation.** Mass interrogation of Allied PWs for intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes is not contemplated. However, a few may posses information of value, particularly regarding the identity and activities of War Criminals and members

of the enemy intelligence services, and the PWX representative will consult with the camp commander in order to determine if any such one is present in the camp. Interrogation of such special personnel may be conducted by the PWX representative or by an IS 9 (WEA) detachment, one of which operates with each Army, or by counter-intelligence personnel.

(11) **Miscellaneous**

(a) All evacuated PW camps will be left intact for use as staging camps or assembly areas for other nationalities of PW who cannot be evacuated immediately. Any camps not needed for PW purposes will be turned over to Military Government for use as DP centers.

(b) Camp supplies, office equipment, Red Cross supplies (which include clothing, food, books, and sports equipment), and all records will be taken over by Armies and disposed of under instructions issued by PWX.

(c) Guards, if necessary, will be provided by Army.

(12) **Reports**

(a) Reference letter 12th Army Group, 383.6 (G-1) 22 August 1944, subject "Recovered Allied Prisoners of War".

(b) In addition to the above, when a camp is overrun a report will be submitted to Headquarters 12th Army Group as early as practicable, showing numbers of Allied PW and Civilian Internees by nationality.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 7

To Accompany Twelfth Army Group Plan
for
Operation 'ECLIPSE'

C. ENEMY CIVILIAN INTERNEES

1. Reference.

a. Annex No 2.

b. Letter this headquarters, 383 (G-1), subject: "War Criminals", dated 13 February 1945 (Part D this Annex).*

2. Categories.

a. During Operation 'ECLIPSE' it will be necessary to intern in Germany certain categories of civilians, such as:

(1) War criminals. (See Part D, this Annex).*

(2) Persons on counter-intelligence black lists, and certain categories of officials who may be arrested and interned by reason of appointments held. (See Reference 1 a, above).

(3) Security suspects. (See Reference a a, above).

3. Estimate of Numbers to be Interned.

a. It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of persons who will migrate into the US Zone from the Russian Zone, or the amount of duplication between CI black lists and other categories. For planning purposes the following estimates are given:

(1)	Twelfth Army Group zone of advance —	
	(a) Internees of counter-intelligence interests	75,000
	(b) War criminals and others	25,000
		100,000
(2)	Sixth Army Group zone of advance —	
	(a) Internees of counter-intelligence interest	50,000
	(b) War criminals and others	15,000
		65,000

4. Internment Camps.

a. Army commanders will be responsible for establishing and administering internment camps to accommodate civilian internees arrested in their zone of advance.

b. G-1 will be the staff section responsible for coordinating plans for and supervision of activities relating to the establishment and administration of such internment camps.

c) Maximum use will be made of existing facilities such as German concentration camps, evacuated Allied prisoner of war camps, etc. All internment camps will be secure against escape of internees.

ANNEX 50

* not included in Report.

d. In the event no suitable facilities are available, army commanders will be prepared to construct necessary camps to accommodate internees.

e. Essential requirements of these camps are:

(1) Location generally in the vicinity of large population centers, and, if practicable, spaced equidistant from each other within Army/Military District area.

(2) Capacity of each camp — 5,000 to 10,000 internees, preferably 7,500.

(3) Arranged to permit segregation of internees of CI interest from other internees, and segregation of males from females.

(4) Accommodations for solitary confinement of approximately 50 intrernees per camp.

(5) Accommodations for a camp reception center at which incoming internees may be processed. (See Par 6 below).

f. Maximum use will be made of German supplies and civilian internees for international maintenance and administration.

5. Counter-Intelligence Staff.

It is anticipated that a counter-intelligence staff consisting of approximately 4 officers and 18 enlisted men will be permantly located at each internment camp for counter-intelligence duties connected with the camp.

6. Processing.

a. Each person arrested and brought to the camp will be screened by appropriate personnel to determine if the person should properly be interned. An appropriate receipt will be given to the individual who delivers the arrestee. If accompanied by an arrest report, receipt may be accomplished on escort's copy (second copy).

b. Arrestees will be registered by name, identification number, and date of arrival. Identification numbers should be prefixed by the camp designation.

c. Property and evidence delivered with internees will be safe-guarded.

d. Provisions of Par 2 d, reference 1 b above, will apply to all persons interned without exception.

e. Interpreters as are necessary will be secured from army sources.

7. Release of Internees.

a. Security suspects interned in conformity with the SHAEF prescribed arrestee categories are not to be released from internemnt except upon approval by SHAEF.

b. War criminals will not be released, but will be held pending further instructions.

c. Other internees may be released on the authority of army commanders when further internment is deemed unnecessary.

d. When an internee is released, notification of such release will be distributed to each recipient of detention report. (Par 2 d, reference 1 b above).

END (PART C)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 091.1-1 GAP-AGM

APO 757 (Main)
28 February 1945

SUBJECT: Treatment of Enemy Diplomatic and Consular Officials in Germany

TO: Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, APO 23
Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655
Headquarters, 21 Army Group

1. The following treatment will be accorded to diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with any of the United Nations who may be found in Germany.

2. Bona fide diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of missions of Japan and Siam will, with their families and staff, be taken into honorable custody and held for further disposition. All such persons claiming diplomatic, consular or other status should be required to show adequate proof that they are entitled to it.

3. The so-called diplomatic, consular and other representatives of Republican Italy, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia, Croatia, Nanking, Manchukuo, the Laurel Regime in the Philippines or of any other puppet government found on German territory, will, unless arrested under the terms of Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Directive for Military Government in Germany, dated 9 November 1944, Annexure III, Section 1, paragraph 5(a), be held in custody as civilian internees pending further instructions as to their disposition.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

/s/ *H. H. NEWMAN*
/t/ H. H. NEWMAN
Colonel, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - Each addressee
3 - G-1 Division
2 - AG Records

091.1 (AG-O)

Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, 5 March 1945.

TO: Commanding General, First US Army, APO 230.
Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Ninth US Army, APO 339.
Commanding General, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408.
Commanding General, 66th Infantry Division, APO 454.
Commanding General, Special Troops, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655.

For your information and guidance.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

WALTER SCZUDLO
WALTER SCZUDLO
Lt Col., AGD
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 51

Extracts from ADSOP, Headquarters 12th Army Group,
dated 18 October 1944, Section II, Par 9

.....

g. Maintenance of Law and Order.

(1) Military.

(a) Military, Naval, and Air Force police of all Forces of the Allied Expeditionary Forces are authorized and empowered by Supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to maintain order, enforce authority, and make arrests within the area of his command on the Continent without regard to nationality of the military personnel concerned or the service to which they belong. Commanders will publish the provisions of this order to all members of their respective commands.

(b) Whenever practicable, arrests will be effected by the military police of the same nationality as the offender. Whenever it is necessary for the military police of one Ally to arrest an offender belonging to Forces of another Ally, the offender will be turned over to the nearest organization (Army, Navy, or Air Force, as the case may be) of the Ally to whose Forces the offender belongs, together with a report of the circumstances.

(2) Power to arrest, military and civilian, in liberated and occupied territories.

(a) Liberated Territories.

1. Military police have the power to apprehend and take custody of civilian persons charged with or believed to have committed offenses affecting the military - ETO SOP D4 12, Civil Affairs, Section d, Par (1). This includes:

a. The power to arrest or search any civilian person suspected of having committed or being about to commit any offense under any proclamation, ordinance, notice, or order of the Allied Force.

b. The power to enter and search any place and seize and take away any property for the purpose of investigating any such offense or arresting the offender or preventing any such offense where there are grounds for believing that it is intended to be committed.

2. Indigenous police officers in liberated countries may arrest Allied military personnel for offenses against the indigenous law but must deliver such persons into custody of Allied military police as soon as possible.

(b) Occupied Countries.

1. All members of the Allied Forces are empowered to arrest all persons committing acts prejudicial to military government or the security of the Allied Forces, or in breach of any military government legislation. They should avoid becoming involved in the arrest of persons for minor breaches of the law except insofar as it may be necessary for the military police to interfere to maintain the authority of the civil police.

ANNEX 52

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

2. All members of the Allied Forces have the power to enter and search or take away any property for the purpose of investigating any offense set forth in Par 1 above.

3. Indigenous police authorities have no power to arrest Allied military personnel.

(3) Maintenance of relations between military personnel and inhabitants of liberated and occupied countries.

(a) Liberated countries. Commanders will impress upon each individual in their respective commands that the conduct of the individuals will influence the immediate and post-war attitude of the liberated countries toward his own. Each member of this command will so conduct himself as to reflect credit on his service and nation.

(b) Occupied countries. A policy of non-fraternization will be published by this headquarters.

(4) Confinement of military prisoners. Circular 73, Hq ETOUSA, 22 June 1944, title, "Disciplinary Training Centers", will govern as to policy and procedure except as modified by Circular 11, 12th Army Group, 4 September 1944.

(5) Women's Army Corps.

(a) Womens' Army Corps personnel are subject to arrest by military police. Regular CMP personnel will perform this function and WAC military police normally will not be appointed.

(b) The arresting agency will notify at once the nearest WAC detachment headquarters of the fact of apprehension of a member of the WAC and she will be turned over to such detachment, together with a full report of circumstances.

(c) Members of the WAC will not be confined, either temporarily by an arresting agency or permanently by a receiving agency, to a guardhouse, stockade, disciplinary barracks, military prison, or to any building or stockade where male officers or enlisted men are confined, other than in hospitals.

(6) Prevention of Looting and Pilfering. Commanders of all echelons will take every precaution and institute forceful measures to prevent looting and pilfering of military supplies, including captured enemy equipment and supplies, especially at depots, rail and truck heads, and dumps.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

386 (G-1) 14 February 1945

SUBJECT: Protection of Property Belonging to Allied Nations

TO: Commanding General, First US Army, APO 230.
Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Ninth US Army, APO 339.
Commanding General, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408.
Commanding General, 66th Infantry Division, APO 454.
Commanding General, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, APO 655.

1. I have recently been hearing about incidents that have occurred in which Allied troops have been careless in their manner of treating property belonging to Allied nationals. In some cases buildings have burned down because troops left the buildings without extinguishing fires. In other cases private property owned by our Allies has been wantonly destroyed and pillaged.

2. We are a conquering army, but we are not a pillaging army. We do not destroy property unless the enemy forces us to do so. When our men perform such acts in liberated countries, it gives rise to adverse public opinion. I regret that private property which was not destroyed during the German occupation should suffer as a result of undisciplined acts of troops who are members of the liberating army.

3. Prevention of such acts lies in discipline and control of your men. I desire that you give this matter your immediate and continuing attention.

O. N. BRADLEY
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding

ANNEX 53

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Misbehavior of Allied Troops.

TO: Commanding General, First US Army, APO 230.
Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Ninth US Army, APO 339.
Commanding General, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408.

1. An amazingly large number of incidents have been reported to me in which troops of this command have been accused of looting, pillaging, wanton destruction, rape, and other crimes indicating a lack of consideration for personal and property rights. These incidents are reported to have taken place both in liberated territory and in Germany. They indicatea lack of discipline which cannot be tolerated.

2. I look upon this matter as a personal responsibility of commanders of all echelons. All officers and noncommissioned officers are, therefore, enjoined to take the most energetic steps to bring this situation under control without further delay. Offenders will be brought to trial promptly.

3. It is the intention of the Allies that the occupation of Germany shall be carried out in such a manner as to impress upon the inhabitants the fact that their conquerors are superior to them not only in military prowess, but in their moral standards. This object can only be attained by the maintenance of discipline throughout the occupying forces at the highest possible level.

4. The contents of this letter will be published to all units down to and including companies, will be read to all personnel of your command, and will be posted on all organization bulletin boards. Commanders are reminded that they are responsible for the discipline and conduct of their units.

O. N. BRADLEY,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

ANNEX 54

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

Hq Memo 89 — 1 October 1944

Section

Identification of Allied personnel attached to Twelfth Army Group iV

IV-IDENTIFICATION OF ALLIED PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP.

1. The attention of interested staff sections is invited to Circular 83, paragraph 9, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, 27 July 1945, which provides for the issuance of identification passes to Allied personnel attached to the US Army in this theater in the capacity of liaison officers, military observers, etc.

2. This headquarters, upon proper request from the chief of the staff section or unit concerned, will prepare and issue such passes for Allied personnel who are attached to Twelfth Army Group.

a. Request will be addressed to the Adjutant General, and the following data will be furnished:

(1) Name, rank and nationality (if appropriate, serial number and identity card number will be included).

(2) Places or areas to which it is desired that personnel concerned be allowed to proceed; for example: "All points within Twelfth Army Group sector"; "All points within Third US Army sector"; or "Headquarters First US Army".

(3) Places or areas to which it is desired that personnel concerned be allowed to return; for example: "All points within Twelfth Army Group sector"; or "Headquarters Twelfth Army Group".

(4) Inclusive dates during which it is desired that the pass be effective.

b. Passes issued by this headquarters are good only within such places or areas within the Twelfth Army Group sector as are indicated on the pass itself. They will not provide any identification outside the Twelfth Army Group sector.

c. It is the responsibility of the staff sections concerned to take up and return to the Adjutant General for cancellation all passes of Allied personnel upon their relief from attachment or duty with Twelfth Army Group.

(200.2 AG-P)

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
/s/ *C. R. Landon*
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "D"

ANNEX 55

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Extracts from ADSOP, Headquarters 12th Army Group,
dated 18 October 1944. Section II, Par 9.

f. **Finance**

(1) The types of currencies employed on the Continent and the rates of exchange will be as announced from time to time by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

(2) Dollar and Sterling currency will not be legal tender on the Continent and all personnel will be prohibited from accepting British or US currency. Any person violating this order is subject to trial by court-martial.

(3) All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions and all exports and imports of currency by any member of the Armed Forces are prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as may be issued under authority of CG, ETOUSA.

(4) The exchange of currency for all personnel leaving the Continent will be made at the point of debarkation or elsewhere as directed. However, Finance Officers will exchange limited amounts for individuals leaving the Continent under orders.

(5) Finance Officers will exchange funds for personnel moving from one country to another on the Continent.

(6) Re-supply of currency for all troops on the Continent will be through Finance Officers designated from time to time by the Fiscal Director, Communications Zone.

(7) All payments by Finance Disbursing units will be in cash until banks are functioning and depositories designated which will make possible payment by check. Banks will not be used by Finance Officers until such banking facilities are approved by the CG, ETOUSA. Checks drawn on the Treasurer of the US will not be used for local payment.

(8) Payments to Allied personnel will be made in accordance with Headquarters, ETO SOP No. 11.

(9) Procurement. Local procurement will be effected in accordance with ETO SOP No. 10, 1 April 1944 as changed, except that ETO SOP 10 G (Germany), 15 December 1944; ETO SOP 10 F (France), 16 December 1944; ETO SOP 10 B (Belgium), 19 December 1944 ETO SOP 10 L (Luxembourg), 12 January 1945; and such other ETO SOPs as may be issued for separate countries will govern in those countries.

(10) In all Cases where Finance Officers find it impracticable to make payment on local procurement vouchers due to movement, limited currency supply, lack of knowledge of terms for indefinite quantity supply contracts, or other reasons, such local procurement vouchers will be forwarded for payment to the Central Disbursing Office, or such other static finance office as directed by the Commanding Officer of units to which the Finance Officers concerned are attached.

(11) (a) Unit funds held in cash may be deposited with any Finance Officer as Spearhead Deposits.

ANNEX 56

(b) Unit and similar funds deposited in registered bank accounts in the UK need not be withdrawn. Additional deposits may be made with any Finance Officer who will transmit funds to the bank by PTA. Checks drawn on these funds will be negotiated only through United States Army Finance Officers.

(12) Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with Finance Officers. Finance Officers will make the maximum use of these funds as a source of currency re-supply.

(13) Army Postal Officers will turn in their cash receipts to the nearest Finance Officer.

(14) All military personnel located in or entering the combat zone may make Spearhead Deposits in amounts of One Hundred Dollars ($ 100.00) or more. Such deposits may be cashed on demand with any Finance Officer.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. **Stragglers**

(1) Stragglers and personnel absent without leave will be turned over to the US military police and forwarded by the military police to their respective units by the most expeditious means except when the distance to the unit makes such action impracticable. In the excepted cases, stragglers and men absent without leave will be returned to their respective units through normal replacement channels.

(2) Any straggler from one Allied Force collected by another will be turned over as directly and expeditiously as practicable to the nearest organization of the Ally concerned. In cases where disciplinary action appears to be warranted, a report of the circumstances under which the straggler was collected will be turned over with him to the organization to which he is returned. When escorts are required, they will normally be provided by the Allied Force to which the stragglers belong. US organizations other than replacement installations, receiving stragglers under the provisions of this sub-paragraph will turn them over to the military police as provided in Par (1) above.

c. **Escapers and Evaders.**

(1) Escapers are Allied personnel who have been captured by and subsequently escaped from the enemy and made their way to Allied coatrolled territory.

Evaders are Allied personnel who have evaded capture by the enemy and made their way to Allied controlled territory.

(3) All escapers and evaders will be immediately conducted to a place in the Army Area to be determined by each Army for interrogation and identification.

(4) Adequate measures will be taken by Armies to insure that escapers are provided proper care and treatment.

(5) Military escapers of the AFE who have been in enemy captivity for a period exceeding two months will be evacuated to the UK.

(6) Military escapers of the AEF who have been in enemy captivity for a period not exceeding two months and all evaders of the AEF whose present organizations are on the Continent will, after being interrogated and identified by IS9 (WEA), be returned to their units as follows:

(a) US Personnel

1. All air force personnel — by arrangements made between Armies and Hq USSTAF.

2. Ground force personnel — through nearest replacement depot, except where Armies desire to return those persons direct to their units.

(b) All British Commonwealth personnel — to British Lines of Communication through nearest replacement depot.

(c) Members of Allied forces such as Russian, French, Belgian, Polish, Czech, Dutch, Greek, or Norwegian will be dealt with as displaced persons and turned over to Civil Affairs.

(d) Members of French resistance groups will be treated as civilians and handled by Civil Affairs. Organizers and key members will be referred to Counter-Intelligence.

(7) Escapers and evaders will be kept segregated from enemy PW at all times and will not be guarded by armed escorts except in cases of suspects.

(8) Pay

(a) Officers. Payment will be made to officers in the regular manner on their certified pay voucher, Form No 336.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) Enlisted Personnel. Service records, affidavits, and payrolls will be accomplished as directed under Par 13, AR 345—155, as amended by Change 4, and payments made in the regular manner on enlisted pay vouchers/payrolls prepared from these temporary service records and affidavits.

(c) British Commonwealth Personnel. After identity has been established, payments may be made to British Commonwealth personnel in accordance with Par 12, ETO SOP No 11 — Finance.

(9) For purposes of expediting the flow through a replacement system, all escapers and evaders routed through the system must have clearance papers issued by G-2 and a paper designating the Army, Corps, Division and/or unit to which bearer is to be sent. Every effort will be made to facilitate the proper routing of this personnel to its destination.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

370.2 (G-1) 4 May 1945

SUBJECT: Annex 7, 12th Army Group Plan for Operation "ECLIPSE"

TO: See Distribution List, 12th Army Group 'ECLIPSE' Plan

1. The attached Draft of Sections I to IV inclusive of Part E, Annex 7, supersedes corresponding parts of the First Draft Plan issued by this Headquarters. Superseded parts should be destroyed.

2. The balance of Part E, Annex E, remains in effect.

FOR THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER

1 Incl: As stated above.

C. R. Landon
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

ANNEX 59

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 7

To Accompany 12th Army Group Plan

for

Operation 'ECLIPSE'

E. DISBANDMENT OF GERMAN DISARMED FORCES

FOREWORD

The object of the disbandment procedure prescribed in this annex is to disband completely the German Armed Forces and associated para-military organizations as expeditiously as practicable, consistent with having the disbandment take place in an orderly and controlled manner, and with due regard to needs of employing certain of the disarmed German forces on reconstruction work, destruction of fortifications, and disposal of enemy war materials and plants in Allied, liberated, or occupied territory. Secondary objects of disbandment are:

a. To prevent evasion of demilitarization.

b. To convince the German nation of the Allied determination to allow Germany no further recourse to armed force.

c. To screen military personnel, from a security viewpoint, particularly with a view to arresting war criminals and others ordered to be detained.

d. To obtain and dispose of German military records as ordered by higher authority.

e. To provide non-Germans with discharge papers showing service and physical condition at discharge.

f. To avoid an unacceptable strain on the economic system of the country.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. Responsibility and Assumptions on Existing Conditions.

a. The disbandment of the German disarmed forces and certain paramilitary organization will be the responsibility of Army Group/Zone commanders, Army/Military District commanders will be responsible for the planning, organization, and execution thereof within their districts.

b. The Army/Military District commanders will be responsible for administration, documentation, and discharge of members of all three services and certain para-military services (see Sec IV, Par 1), calling upon the Navy and Air Force for such staff as they may require. There will be Navy and Air Force representation at Army Group/Zone and Army/Military District levels.

c. As it is not possible at the present time to forecast the conditions which will prevail in GERMANY at the conclusion of hostilities, the plan has been based on the following assumptions:

Inclosure, Annex 59

(1) That hostilities will have been carried some distance into GERMANY and that, as a consequence, the Territorial System of the GERMANY Army and Air Force administration will have been seriously impaired.

(2) That conditions within GERMANY will be such as to preclude the use of small bodies of Allied personnel in places where adequate protection cannot be provided.

(3) That the GERMANY Armed Forces will be speedily moved into, or attached to, Concentration Areas, to facilitate control and administration. This will not apply to:

(a) Those held in permanent Prisoner of War Camps.

(b) Those held in frozen units of the GERMAN Navy and Air Force, who will be the administrative responsibility of the Allied Naval and Air Force authorities respectively, but who will be affiliated to Concentration Areas for purposes of discharge.

(c) Those left "in situ" for administrative purposes, whom it may be convenient to control and administer through Wehrkreis or other Headquarters, rather than through concentration areas.

Personnel other than those held in Prisoner of War Camps and members of units of the Waffen SS (whose officers will be in the arrest category), will be under the control of their own officers working under Allied supervision and will be administered through GERMAN Armed Forces channels.

(4) That the discharge of that portion of the GERMAN Armed Forces available for discharge will be required to be effected with the least possible delay consistent with an orderly return to civil life, in order to obviate the possibility of large-scale desertion. Provision has been made for the discharge of certain priority categories before the redeployment of the Armies of occupation is complete, and the scheme may be further extended to cover general discharge should circumstances demand it.

(5) That a period of anything from two to six months will elapse before the Armies of Occupation can be fully redeployed into their respective Zones and Military Districts.

(6) That the disbandment of the GERMAN Armed Forces will be made without utilizing the GERMAN machinery. At the same time it does not preclude the use of such GERMAN machinery and records as may exist.

2. Restrictions on Discharge.

a. No discharges will be accomplished until receipt of instructions from this headquarters that release of personnel may begin.

b. Discharge will be subject to the following prior calls upon the manpower of the German disarmed forces:

(1) The demands for German service personnel to carry out essential labor for the Allied Forces in occupation.

(2) The demands from the governments of Allied and liberated countries for labor for purposes of reconstruction.

(3) German service troops may be retained for labor as long as necessary to insure a satisfactory administration of Germans awaiting disbandment and Allied PW.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

awaiting evacuation, the handling of German war material, and to meet such other German military commitments as may be required by the military authorities.

c. For restrictions on discharge of Waffen SS personnel, see Sec IV, Par 1 d.

d. The Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, will not discharge or move from Fifteenth Army area in France any members of the German disarmed forces or para-military organizations listed in Sec IV, Par 1 a, until receipt of further instructions from this headquarters.

3. General Principles.

a. Personnel will be discharged to the locality of family residence, if both it and the area of responsibility of the last competent recruiting office are recorded as being in the same zone. If they are in different zones, the area of responsibility of the last competent recruiting office will govern for the purpose of discharge or inter-zone transfer, subject to inter-zonal agreement.

b. The Army Group/Zone commander will be responsible for the discharge of all personnel who are resident within his zone, whether they are located within it on the cessation of hostilities or subsequently transferred to it. Zone of residence will be determined as in a, above. (See Sec IV, Par 3).

c. Discharge will be geared in general to the ability of the area concerned to receive the discharged personnel.

d. The fullest possible use will be made of German military personnel working under Allied supervision in carriyng out every stage of the documentation and discharge procedure.

e. The discharge of that portion of the German disarmed forces available for discharge will be effected with the least possible delay consistent with an orderly return to civilian life, in order to lessen the possibility of large scale desertion.

f. Statistical analyses will be required as follows:

(1) By service (Army, Navy, Air Force) and para-military organizations.

(2) By rank (officers, officials, enlisted) and sex.

(3) By industrial and professional groups showing location (of concentration area), residence, and availability for discharge.

(4) Of non-Germans by nationality.

SECTION II — OUTLINE OF PLAN

1. Steps in Plan.

a. Army commanders will be responsible for performing primary disarmament of all German armed forces in their respective zones of advance, for moving German disarmed forces into concentration areas, for administration (including essential supply) of German disarmed forces, and for initiating disbandment documentation. Within concentration areas Waffen SS personnel and certain other personnel in whom there is intelligence, CI, and war criminal interest will require special provisions for guard, segregation, and restriction.

b. As soon as practicable nominal rolls and statistical reviews (rosters and returns) will be prepared for all personnel awaiting disbandment under the control of Army/Military District commanders. These reports will be prepared under Allied direction by German officers in charge, using the forms appended hereto as inclosures. Instructions to start documentation will be issued by this headquarters.

c. After nominal rolls have been prepared, non-Germans will be **statistically** segregated from Germans in national groups as far as may be practicable to await disposal by their respective governments. In addition, Russian nationals will be physically segregated and accorded special treatment under terms of the UK-USSR, US-USSR agreement (signed 12 Febr 1945).

d. In order to effect the collection and registration of deserters, stragglers, and personnel of the German armed forces who have disbanded themselves or been disbanded without authority, the Supreme Commander will publish a general order requiring all such personnel to report by a certain date to selected centers to be located by Military District commanders. It will be provided that those reporting will not be subjected to disciplinary action for desertion or other stated irregularities, but that failure to comply with the order will entail severe penalties.

e. Certain priority categories of personnel will first be released. Those categories will be prescribed by the Supreme Commander and by the Zone Commander.

f. Thereafter general discharge may begin. The flow will be regulated by coordination between disbandment staffs and military government staffs.

SECTION III — DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS

1. Assembly into Concentration Areas.

a. For economy in the utilization of personnel for control purposes, it is considered that concentration areas should normally be large enough to accommodate at least 15,000 individuals. Army/Military District commanders are authorized to deviate from this principle if, in their opinion, circumstances warrant.

b. Concentration areas should not be located near air fields, arms and ammunition dumps, supply dumps, or other similar installations.

c. Army/Military District commanders are responsible for providing adequate guard and administration for all concentration areas established by them or located within their respective zones until relieved by another commander. German service personnel may be used to every extent possible in carrying out administrative functions. It is expected that each concentration area will be sufficiently organized by units or formations to accomplish its own documentation (Area Control Forms P. 1, P. 2, P. 3, and P. 4), using German personnel under Allied supervision.

2. Documentation.

Nominal rolls, statistical reviews, and weekly reports will be prepared and disposed of as follows: Control Forms P. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are designed to include all personnel under Allied Control whether they are the responsibility of the Allied Services for discharge

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

through the Services machinery or for other disposal. Control Forms P. 5 and 6, however, are designed exclusively for disbandment purposes and restricted to personnel to be discharged through Service machinery.

a. Nominal Rolls.

(1) Area Control Forms P. 1 and P. 4 will be accomplished and forwarded to Army/Military District headquarters.

(a) **Area Control Form P. 1** (See Incl 1): A periodical nominal roll to be prepared in quadruplicate for each military or para-military unit or organization of each service: e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, Volkssturm, RAD, NSFK, etc. Personnel will be listed alphabetically by rank, sex, and service.

Distribution — Original and first copy to Army/Military District Headquarters.
Second and third copies retained at concentration area or lower headquarters.

(b) **Area Control Form P. 4** (See Incl 4): A personal data sheet prepared in triplicate for all personnel, male and female.

Distribution — Original to Army/Military District headquarters, which will maintain a locator file therefrom.
First and second copies retained at concentration area or lower headquarters.
One copy transferred with the individual, when and if transferred within the Army/Military District.

When forwarded to Army/Military District headquarters, these forms will be arranged in the same order as the personnel listed on Area Control Form P. 1.

b. Statistical Review.

(1) **Area Control Form P. 2** (See Incl 2): A periodical strength analysis showing service or para-military organization, broken down into officers, officials and enlisted personnel, male and female. This form will accompany Area Control Forms P. 1 and P. 3 to Army/Military District headquarters. Its use is optional, and for that reason no printed forms will be furnished.

(1) **Area Control Form P. 3** (See Incl 3): A periodical increase and decrease statement showing all changes since last submission, broken down into officers, officials and enlisted personnel, male and female, and the resulting current strength. This return will be submitted at such intervals as the Army/Military District commander may decide. These forms will be completed initially for all units or organizations on the same basis as nominal rolls (see Par 2 a (1) (b), this section, (above) and will be submitted to concentration area headquarters. Each concentration area headquarters will prepare a consolidation of these forms, supporting this consolidation by the appropriate Area Control Forms P. 4 for each increase (except for personnel acquired through transfer within the Army/Military District) and for each decrease. Such Area Control Forms P. 4 will be indorsed to show

change of status of personnel. Area Control Forms P. 3, their consolidation and supporting papers, will then be forwarded to Army/Military District headquarters, accompanied by Area Control Form P. 2, to show current strength.

(3) **District Area Control Form P. 5** (See Incl 5): A return of German nationals held in the Army/Military District by industrial or professional group, location, residence, and availability. Prepared from data shown on Area Control Form P. 4, but dealing exclusively with personnel to be discharged through service machinery for disbandment.

(4) **District Area Control Form P. 6** (See Incl 6): Return of non-German nationals by nationality and service. This form is designed to show the number of non-German nationals under Allied Services control, but deals exclusively with personnel to be discharged through service machinery for disbandment. Any subsequent breakdown of these totals which may be required will be dependent upon policy decision.

c. SHAEF will print and distribute all forms except Area Control Form P. 2.

d. Weekly Reports.

(1) The following reports will be prepared by Army/Military District headquarters and submitted to Army Group/Zone headquarters weekly as of 2400 hours Saturday.

(a) **District Control Form P. 2:** A consolidation of Area Control Forms P. 2.

(b) **District Control Form P. 3:** A consolidation of Area Control Forms P. 3. (No Control Forms P. 4 need be attached).

(c) **District Control Form P. 5.**

(d) **District Control Form P. 6.**

3. Labor Demands.

German service personnel will not be provided for labor purposes until they have been subjected to initial documentation; i.e., until Area Control Forms P. 1 and P. 4 have been prepared.

After initial documentation, German service personnel may be used for labor as needed.

c. German service personnel used for labor in Army/Military District areas will be carried for administration by their parent concentration area or will be attached to another concentration area.

d. Labor used in liberated countries in ETOUSA will be transferred to the Communications Zone for administration.

e. No individual in whom there is CI interest, whether specific or because he belongs to a prescribed category, will be used for labor outside of concentration areas.

f. No individual in whose case all interrogation is not completed will be used for labor outside of concentration areas.

4. Discharge of Personnel not used as Labor for Allied Forces in Occupation or in Liberated Countries.

a. Will normally take place at concentration area.

b. Begins on receipt of directive from Army Group/Zone commander.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. Certain priority categories of personnel will first be discharged. These categories may include

(1) Personnel for work in certain public utility services.

(2) Personnel for work in transportation services.

(3) Personnel for work in certain classes of building trades.

(4) Agricultural workers.

Such other specialist personnel as may be required by Zone Commanders.

d. Only those residing in US Zone will be discharged.

e. Counter-intelligence staffs will be given prior information on proposed discharges, in order that they may carry out such checks as they deem advisable.

f. In order to avoid the spread of infectious diseases, medical examination of all personnel will be carried out immediately prior to discharge.

g. A discharge certificate (Control Form D. 2) will be given to each individual discharged. Notes and instructions known as Control Form D. 1 will be read by each individual before he fills out PERSONAL PARTICULARS of discharge certificate. Medical officer will fill out Part II. Discharging officer will fill out Part III and stamp with suitable seal. "Day of discharge" is defined as the day on which Part III of the individual's discharge certificate is signed by the Allied discharging authority.

h. Upon receipt of the discharge certificate, each individual will be required to hand in his pay book and any other papers of a service nature which are in his possession. Such documents and Control Form P. 1, which each relate to a number of individuals, will be temporarily by units, but care must be taken to insure that they are removed to Allied custody as soon as their function is completed. At the time of discharge each individual will be informed that he will be required to produce his discharge certificate at destination in order to obtain his civilian ration cards and any other documents he may be required by military government to hold.

i. Pay

(1) Army pay (WEHRSOLD), calculated in the normal way, according to the relevant pay group, made up to and including the day of discharge and for half a month thereafter, will be paid to each man or woman on discharge.

(2) Disbursement of funds by the German Service Authorities will be the subject of scrutiny by Allied Authorities on every possible occasion.

(3) No claims for over or under payment of pay or allowances, brought either by the German Service Authorities or by individual Germans will be recognized by the Allied Authorities.

j. Rations and a travel warrant for journey from place of discharge to destination will be provided for each individual discharged.

k. For clothing to be retained at discharge, see See IV, Par 6.

l. Discharged personnel will be dispatched to their homes by rail or road transportation if possible. Troops will not be permitted to march home in formed bodies.

5. Each Army Military District commander will operate an interrogation center where detailed interrogations will be conducted. It will be necessary to conduct cursory interrogations of all personnel held in concentration areas in order to select individuals for detailed interrogation and to identify those who are prescribed for arrest. No individual will be discharged until all interrogation in his case is completed.

SECTION IV — MISCELLANEOUS

1. Para-Military Organizations.

a. The personnel listed below will be discharged through the armed forces' machinery:

(1) Members of the WAFFEN SS.

(2) Members of all units of RAD, male and female, serving with the armed forces.

(3) Officers and Guards of the OT.

(4) Regular GAF personnel in the HEIMAT FLAK.

(5) Members of all units of NSKK.

(6) Members of all units of NSFK.

(7) Such other para-military personnel as it may prove necessary to discharge through the armed forces' machinery.

b. Pending further instructions, members of para-military organizations other than those listed in 1 a above, who are not required to be detained for security or other reasons, will be treated as other German civilians and will NOT be disbanded under this Plan.

c. If an individual is identified as an active member of two or more para-military organizations, he will be disposed of as a member of the one in which he was of most value to the Nazi Party. This may be determined by a combination of the three factors given below. In cases of serious doubt, counterintelligence advice should be obtained. Factors to be considered are:

(1) The organization in which the individual holds highest rank.

(2) The organization which itself is of relatively highest rank in Nazi hierarchy.

(3) The organization in which the individual was actively engaged at the time of his apprehension.

d. Highest priority will be given to primary disarmament and control of the Waffen SS and extraordinary precautions will be taken in connection therewith. After primary disarmament, all Waffen SS officers and non-commissioned officers of the rank Scharfuehrer and above will be arrested and interned. All Waffen SS units will then be completely disorganized as units and the personnel will be attached for all purposes to Wehrmacht units. In effecting this attachment care will be taken to insure that a **minimum number** of individuals who previously served together in the same unit are attached to the same Wehrmacht unit. Wehrmacht commanders will be held responsible for the conduct of this personnel and will be instructed to distribute them evenly throughout their Wehrmacht units so that the total number of Waffen SS personnel in any one unit never exceeds twenty-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

five percent of the total unit strength. Personnel records of Waffen SS personnel attached to Wehrmacht units as above prescribed will be segregated; no such Waffen SS personnel will be discharged until disposition has been made of all officers and non-commissioned officers of their units of the rank of Scharfuehrer and above and clearance for discharge has been obtained from this headquarters.

2. German Naval and Air Force Personnel.

a. The US Navy and Air Force may request Ground Force commanders to furnish German Naval and Air Force personnel for labor in connection with disarmament. Such requests should be granted, the tactical situation, extent of documentation, and transportation facilities being considered.

b. The Navy and Air Force will be responsible for the administration of all German personnel furnished them. In all cases involving the transfer of the Navy or Air Force and the Ground Force, sufficient German administrative personnels should be transferred to administer the transferees.

c. The US Navy and Air Force will normally deliver all members of the German forces held under control to Ground Force concentration areas, or such other designated installations as may be mutually agreed upon, prior to discharge of the personnel concerned.

3. Volkssturm.

Members of the German People's Levies (Volkssturm) who are NOT held in custody as prisoners of war and who are NOT in uniform will, after disarmament, be treated as other German civilians and will NOT be disbanded in accordance with this Plan. Those taken into custody in uniform will be disbanded as members of the German disarmed forces. For this purpose an armband need not be considered as uniform.

4. Interzone Transfer.

a. The transfer of personnel from Army Group Zone to another will be effected under the direction of Supreme Headquarters. Personnel who are transferred will become the responsibility of the receiving zone for discharge, wich include the issue of discharge certificates.

b. The following documents will accompany personnel transferred to other zones:

(1) Area Control Form P. 4 — all three copies.

(2) All individual personnel records held in the unit and all military documents normally in the possession of the individual.

(3) A medical certificate that the individual is free from vermin and infectious and contagious disease.

5. Disposal of Non-German Personnel.

a. Non-German personnel will be of five types:

(1) Allied nationals who can be returned to their own countries at the conclusion of hostilities.

(2) Allied nationals who, for any reason, cannot be returned to their own countries for the time being.

(3) Nationals of neutral States.
(4) Nationals of countries allied with Germany
(5) Co-belligerents.

b. Non-Germans will be statistically and, where convenient, physically segregated from Germans in National Groups to await disposal by their respective governments.

c. Austrians (that is, personnel whose last competent recruiting office is in Austria), will be treated in the same way as Germans.

6. Clothing.

a. Each individual will be allowed to retain, without payment, whether transferred or discharged, the following items of German clothing:

(1) 1 Field Cap.
(2) 1 Field Jacket.
(3) 1 Pair Trousers.
(4) 1 Belt and Buckle.
(5) 1 Pair Shoes or Boots.
(6) 1 Pair Suspenders (if desired)
(7) 1 Overcoat.
(8) 2 Undershirts.
(9) 2 Pairs Drawers.
(10) 2 Shirts.
(11) 2 Pairs Socks.
(12) 2 Handkerchiefs.

b. In addition to the above, one blanket per man may be issued.

c. Deficiencies of clothing in relation to the scale in a and b above may be made up from local supplies, if any are available.

d. All insignia and badges of rank will be removed from clothing retained, prior to the departure of the individual.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

25 February 1945

388.3 (G-1)

SUBJECT: 'ECLIPSE' — Administration of the German Disarmed Forces.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, APO 696.
Attention: Director, Plans and Disarmament.

1. As the result of a conference at your headquarters 21 February 1945, it is understood that the following lines of action are agreed upon for the administration and discharge of disarmed members of the German Air Force.

a. It is desirable that when GAF installations are overrun by the advancing ground forces, the GAF personnel found in such installations be "frozen" and held at the installations pending the arrival of US Air Force personnel.

b. US Air Force personnel will be moved forward as rapidly as possible to take over the GAF installations and personnel, and will perform all documentation prescribed by SHAEF 'ECLIPSE' Memorandum No. 17.

c. In the event insufficient GAF personnel are present at a GAF installation when such an installation is taken over by the US Air Force, a request will be made of the appropriate ground force commander that the required GAF personnel be furnished from concentration areas or other sources available to the ground force commander. This personnel will be furnished as soon as practicable, the tactical situation, extent of documentation, and transportation facilities being considered.

d. The US Air Force will be responsible for all administration required by SHAEF 'ECLIPSE' Memorandum No. 17 for members of the disarmed German forces held under air force control.

e. The US Air Force will deliver all members of the disarmed German forces held under air force control to ground force concentration areas, or such other designated installations as may be mutually agreed upon, prior to discharge of the personnel concerned. Normally, all discharging of personnel will be accomplished by ground force commanders.

f. In all cases involving the transfer of German personnel between the air force and ground force, sufficient German administrative personnel will be transferred to administer the transferees.

2. Your confirmation of the above is requested.

For the Army Commander:

WALTER SCZUDLO
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 60

388.3 1st Ind.

HQ NINTH AIR FORCE, APO 696, US ARMY, 3 March 1945

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth US Army Group, APO 655, US Army.

Division of responsibilities for administration of the German Disarmed Forces as outlined in paragraph 1, basic communication, is concurred in by this headquarters, and planning will proceed on the basis of these agreements.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ C. M. Seebach
/t/ C. M. SEEBACH
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, First US Army
CG, Third US Army
CG, Ninth US Army
CG, Fifteenth US Army

Date: Ref No.: QX-20189

Orig by: G-1/AG-P Precedence: Priority

Deliver by:

Information to:

Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF QX-20189.

Under the following conditions and procedures, members of surrendered German forces under your control may be discharged:

a. Only individuals for employment in agriculture, coal mining and transportation, preferably in the neighborhood of their homes, may be discharged.

b. Retention of those individuals to be discharged longer than to complete forms P 4 and D 2 is not necessary.

c. As prescribed in Part E, Annex VII, 12th Army Group "ECLIPSE" Plan, forms P 4 and D 2 will be made out.

d. Reproduction locally of forms P 4 and D 2 must be made pending receipt of printed forms from SHAEF.

e. Until an individual has been subjected to a careful G-2 screening, he will not be discharged.

f. No member of the SS, individuals falling within security suspect or war criminal classes will be discharged.

g. Only those individuals residing in the US Zone may be discharged.

ANNEX 61

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, First US wrmy (Rear) Date: 092351 May 1945 Ref No: QX-20303
CG, Third US Army (Rear)
CG, Ninth US Army (Rear) Orig by: G-1/AG-P Precedence: Priority
CG, Fifteenth US Army (Rear)
CG, ADSEC, Com Zone

Deliver by

Information to:

Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE QX-20303.

1. As distinguished from units, individuals will be either formed into units or attached to surrendered German units for administration and control.

2. Prisoners of war now held in Germany by ADSEC will remain under ADSEC control and will continue to be treated as prisoners of war.

3. Surrendered individuals and German units will be treated as disarmed German forces and held under army control and not transferred to ADSEC control.

ANNEX 62

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Third US Army
CG, Seventh US Army
CG, Ninth US Army
CG, Fifteenth US Army

Date: 122355 May 1945
Orig by: G-1/OFK/AGO

Ref No.: QX-20469
Precendece: Op Priority
Deliver by: 130800

Information to: CG, 6thArmy Group

Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE QX-20469

1. The discharge of women members of German armed forces and women members of those para-military arganizations listed in paragraph 1 a (2) to 1 a (7), Section IV, Part E, Annex VII. Operation Plan "ECLIPSE", this headquarters, is authorized under the following provisions:

a. Those women falling within security suspect or war criminal classes will not be discharged.

b. Those members of the SS will not be discharged.

c. Women civil internment camp guards and non-German women will not be discharged.

2. Compliance with table C, Chapter V, 12th Army Group Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, dated 10 April, is strictly required.

3. Prospective dischargees' names will be checked against master roster of wanted persons in Germany prior to discharge of individuals concerned.

4. Such women as required for administration purposes may be retained.

5. Places at disposal of medical authorities may be medical women personnel.

6. Confined only to listing of such particulars as necessary to ascertain destination on discharge and to keep check on number discharged will be the documentation of women.

7. Outline contained in Part E, Annex VII, with following amendments, will be followed in discharge procedure:

a. Any women whose destination on discharge as indicated by her last competent recruiting office or home address is within your troops occupation area may by discharged by you. This headquarters will be furnished number of women whose destination on discharge is in area occupied by another United States Army or 21 Army Group.

ANNEX 68

b. Discharge for residence within area now occupied by your troops, those women whose residence on discharge would normally be within Russian Zone may be made by you, if you so desire.

c. Personal documents of military nature in possession of women will be withdrawn and form D. 2 issued. Form D. 2 will not be issued those in possession of civilian identity documents.

d. Paragraphs 4 i, Section III, Part E, Annex VII, will be deleted. The sum of 60 Reichmarks will be paid to all women officers discharged irrespective of rank and the sum of 30 Reichmarks to all enlisted women released.

e. Upon discharge, form D. 2 will not be issued until further notice. Reproduce locally form D. 2 until receipt of printed forms. After consultation with Military Government, instructions as to where and to whom women will report on discharge will be issued.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Third US Army Date: 131015B May 1945 Ref No.: QX-20496
CG, Ninth US Army
CG, Ninth US Army Orig by: G-1/OFK/AGO Precedence: Op Priority
CG, Fifteenth US Army
Deliver by: 131 100 B May

Information to: CG, 6th Army Group Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE QX-20496

1. Rescinded is QX-20189, this headquarters, and following substituted therefor:

Disarmed German forces may be discharged by you, including members of paramilitary organizations listed in Par 1 a (2) to 1 a (7), Section IV, 3rd Draft, Part E, Annex VII, "ECLIPSE" Plan, this headquarters, falling with in following priority categories: Urgently required agriculture workers, coal miners, transport workers and such other key personnel.

2. All security suspects, war criminal classes, SS, or non-German personnel will not be discharged.

3. Required is strict compliance with Table G, chapter 5, Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, published by Twelfth Army Group, dated 10 April.

4. Prior to discharge of individuals concerned, names of all prospective dischargees will be checked against master roster of wanted persons in Germany.

5. Disposal of allied nationals, captured while serving in German armed forces, will continue in accordance with letter, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, AG 383-2 GAP-AGM, 2 December. Further instructions for disposal of non-Germans will follow.

6. Observed to the maximum extent possible will be provisions of Part E, Annex VI, subject to following amendments until further notice.

a. Instructions contained in letter, this headquarters, 388.3 (G-1), reference prisoner of war registration forms, subject "Disbandment of German Armed Forces", dated 10 May, will be followed, in addition to Part E, Annex VII, prescribing documentation.

b. Those persons falling within priority categories above and whose last competent recruiting office lies within area occupied by your troops may be discharged by you.

ANNEX 64

c. Paragraph 4 i, Section III, Part E, Annex VII, is deleted. The sum of 60 Reichsmarks will be paid all officers discharged irrespective of rank and the sum of 30 Reichsmarks to all enlisted men discharged.

7. Consideration must be given to capacity of area to absorb laborers employed in industrial areas such as coal miners. Food, shelter and public safety facilities should be given particular attention.

8. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force will forward by 14 May, supply of P. 4 forms and Central Registry Prisoner of War forms. As they become available, further consignments will be made.

9. Form D. 1 will not be issued upon discharge until further notice. Reproduce locally forms P. 4 and D. 2 and Central Registry Prisoner of War forms until receipt of printed forms.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Third US Army
CG, Sevent US Army
CG, Ninth US Army
CG, Fifteenth US Army

Date: 192255 May 1945

Orig by: G-1/AG-P

Ref No. QX-20886

Precedence: Priority

Deliver by:

Information to:

Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE QX-20886.

1. Surrendered Germans of the categories prescribed, reference our cables QX-20469 and QX-20496, who are residents of areas now occupied by other US Armies may be discharged by Army Commanders.

2. By mutual agreement between Army Commanders concerned, arrangements for movement and reception of discharged persons will be made. All road movements will be in accordance with ETO SOP 50. Being advised is CG, ADSEC, that mutual agreement between CG, ADSEC and Army Commanders will govern the receipt in army areas of personnel discharge by him.

ANNEX 65

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Advance Section, Communication Zone

Date: 192254 May 1945

Orig by: G-1/AG-P

Ref No: Q-20887

Precedence: Priority

Deliver by:

Information to:

Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE Q-20887.

1. No objection by this headquarters to receiving such discharged German Prisoners of War as you may be authorized to discharge, in US Army areas.

2. It is requested that necessary arrangements by agreements be made between yourself and respective army commanders. Armies have been advised. Desireable all road movements be in accordance with ETF SOP 50 within army areas.

ANNEX 66

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGEFORM

File: 370.01 (G-1) Date: 22 May 1945

From: Hq 12th Army Group Branch: Misc Section: G-1

APO 655, US Army

Oo: Supreme Commander, AEF (Main), APO 757.
Attention: G-1 Division.

1. Subsequent to the redeployment of allied forces into their respective zones in Germany and Austria, it is recommended that members of the German Armed Forces who are to be transferred from one zone to another be discharged prior to such transfer.

2. In view of the fact that a certain amount of documentation will have been performed on such individuals prior to transfer, it is believed it is appropriate that documentation be complete to include the issuance of a discharge certificate. It is felt also that the receiving agency will be able to handle such personnel more expeditiously if it is not necessary to complete documentation which has previously been initiated by the forwarding agency.

3. Prior to final redeployment of national forces it is recommended that authority be granted for US and British Commanders to make local arrangements in regard to which agency will complete the discharge. This matter has been discussed by telephone with 21 Army Group informally.

4. Request that Par 14 of SHAEF 'ECLIPSE' Memorandum 17 be amdended accordingly.

FOR THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER.

/s/ *J. H. Bloss*
/t/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 67

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Third US Army
CG, Seventh US Army
CG, Ninth US Army

Date: 281909B May 1945 Ref. No: QX 21501

Orig by: G-1/OFK/AGO Precedence: Routine
Deliver by:
Security:

Information to:
Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE QX-21501.

1. By agreement between you and Commanding General, First French Army, those members of disarmed German forces whose last competent recruiting offices are in territory now occupied by First French Army may be discharged.

2. Discharged Germans will under no circumstance, without prior concurrence of Commanding General, First French Army, be moved into area occupied by French Forces.

ANNEX 68

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Third US Army
CG, Seventh US Army
CG, Ninth US Army
CG, Fifteenth US Army

Date: 091748B June 45 Ref. No: QX-23423

Orig by: G-1/AG-P Precedence: Priority

Deliver by:

Information to: Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE QX-23423.

Authorization is granted to discharge disarmed Germans who have received maximum hospitalization and now held in hospitals or enclosures, such as blind, amputees, long term hospital cases, etc., under the following conditions:

a. They must have someone in whose care they can be placed or a home to go to.

b. Current screening requirements for security and complicity in war crimes must be passed.

ANNEX 69

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

383.6 (G-1)

18 June 1945

SUBJECT: Disbandment og Disarmed German Forces

OT: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Fwd)
Attention: G-1

1. At the present time we are discharging under appropriate instructions from your headquarters the following categories of disarmed german forces:

a. Coal miners.

b. Agricultural workers.

c. Transport workers.

d. Such other key personnel as are urgently required.

e. Medical cases who have received maximum hospitalization.

2. War criminals or security suspects, members of the SS, and non-Germans are not subject to discharge.

3. In view of the critical shortage of German food stocks it is imperative that the number of disarmed Germans held in concentration areas be reduced to a minimum. Authority is therefore requested to discharge all labor categories of disarmed German forces held by this command except persons indicated in Par 2 above.

4. it is further reguested that arrangements be made to transfer to Russian control all disarmed Germans held by this command who reside in the Russian zone.

FOR THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

Memo for Record:

Authorization has been received from SHAEF to discharge only farmers, miners, transport workers, and certain key categories, and individuals who have received maximum hospitalization. SHAEF "ECLIPSE" Memo 17 states that SHAEF will make arrangements for interzone transfers.

ANNEX 70

O. F. K.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Action to: CG, Third US Army Date: 201838 June 45 Rel No: Q-24338

Orig by: G-1/JJO/AG-O Precedence: Priority

Deliver by:

Information to: Security:

Approved for transmission by:

THIS IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE Q-24338.

1. Authority is granted because of emergency situation existing in the area of Third Army to suspend for Third Army only until further orders, requirements of Part E, Annex VII, Twelfth Army Group "ECLIPSE" Plan as to the preparation of the following documents: Control Forms P. 3, P 5 and P. 6.

2. Necessary steps, however, will be taken to provide administrative machinery at some future date for the preparation of these forms when orders are received. Control Form P 2 is optional under Paragraph 2 b (1), Part E, Annex VII, Twelfth Army Group ECLIPSE Plan, to which your attention is invited. This headquarters does not require the use of form P. 2. Your F-6321 is answered by this cable.

ANNEX 71

221

MESSAGEFORM

File: 383.6 (6(G-1)

From: Hq 12th Army Group Branch: Misc Date: 27 June 1945
APO 655, US Army Section: G-1

TO: Head, SHAEF Mission (France)
Head, SHAEF Mission (Netherlands)
Head, SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg)
Head, SHAEF Mission (Belgium)

1. Reference Disbandment Directive No. 4 (SHAEF letter, same subject, AG 388.3-1 GAP-AGM, 5 June 1945), which provides for release to Governments of France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium of all nationals of those countries who are held as Prisoners of War or as members of the disarmed German forces or as disarmed personnel of certain para-military organizations, the following plan is offered for your concurrence.

2. It is requested that you:

a. Name a reception point within your respective national territories, preferably one already in use for other classes of repatriates.

b. Arrange to receive and to receipt for your nationals to the Commanding Officer of the escourt guard detachment who will deliver them under armed guard to the reception point agreed upon.

c. Set a date, preferably not later than 5 July 1945, on which such movements can be commenced.

3. This Headquarters will:

a. Clear each movement with you in the same manner as is now being done by this headquarters in the repatriation of your other nationals.

b. Notify you 24 hours in advance of the first movement, which will be made on or after the agreed date for commencement.

c. Deliver to such representative as you may designate at the agreed reception point a nominal roll showing date, place of release, wehrnummer, and home address of each individual. No further documentation is contemplated.

d. Continue to hold such of your nationals who are wanted as war criminals by a country other than your own or who have such counterintelligence interest as to make their release inappropriate.

4. Your earliest reply is urgently requested.

For the Army Group Commander:

/s/ *L. Sokolower*
/t/ L. SOKOLOWER
Captain, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 72

222

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

M/jr
6 July 1945

383.6 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Release of French Personnel Serving with German Military and Para-Military Organizations.

TO: Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Seventh US Army, APO 758.
Commanding General, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408.

1. You are authorized to release to the Government of France all French nationals who are held as prisoners of war or as members of the disarmed German forces, or disarmed personnel of those para-military organizations listed in Par 1 a, Sec IV, Part E, Annex 7 to 12th Army Group Plan for Operation 'ECLIPSE'.

2. No person of counterintelligence interest will be released without the approval of the appropriate AC of S, G-2. No person who is wanted as a war criminal by a country other than his own will be released under this authority.

3. Normal disbandment documentation is not required. Each shipment will be accompanied by a nominal roll showing name, date of release, place of release, Wehrnummer, and home address of each individual. One copy will be handed to the receiving Government and the second copy, duly signed by the receiving Government, will be retained as a receipt for all persons handed over. These receipted copies of nominal rolls will be forwarded to army group headquarters.

4. Destination of shipments — Centre de Chalons-sur-Saone.

5. You will furnish escourt guards for trains from point of origin to destination.

By Command of General BRADLEY:

JOHN J. LATELLA,
Major, AGD,
Asst Adj Gen.

ANNEX 73

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

383,6 (G-1) 27 June 1945

SUBJECT: Interzone Transfer of Discharged Disarmed German Forces and Prisoners of War between British and U.S.

TO: Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Seventh US Army, APO 758.

The following arrangements have been made between this headquarters and Headquarters 21 Army Group for the interzone transfer of discharged disarmed German forces and prisoners of war.

1. Target date to begin movement — 5 July 1945 unless notified to contrary.
2. One transfer point to be used — HANNOVER.
3. Numbers transferred and received daily —
   Third Army — 3,000
   Seventh Army — 2,000.

This headquarters will be advised by Armies when daily commitment can no longer be filled.

4. Documentation.

a. **By US Forces for residents in British Zone.**
   (1) POW forms completed and forwarded to CROWCASS.
   (2) One copy P. 4 completed and given to transferee.
   (3) One copy D. 2 completed **except signature of discharging officer** and given to transferee. British will sign their own discharge papers.
   (4) Transferees should be warned that they will be held accountable for both P. 4 and D. 2 forms on arrival in British Zone.

b. **By British Forces for residents in US Zone.**
   (1) POW forms completed and forwarded to CROWCASS.
   (2) One copy P. 4 completed on each transferee. P. 4s for each shipment will be delivered in bulk by Military District to US liaison officer at Hannover who will direct appropriate returning transport to deliver to Military District Headquarters concerned.
   (3) One copy D. 2 completed, including signature of British discharging officer under following typed statement: "**Discharged by authority CG, 12th Army Group**", and given to transferee.

5. Categories to be discharged.

ANNEX 74

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

All categories, male and female, except: SS, security suspects, non-Germans, sick and wounded. (Latter category will be handled by medical evacuation procedure arranged between Surgeon 12th Army Group and Surgeon 21 Army Group).

6. Segregation for transfer

All shipments will be segregated by Regierungsbezirk. The following Regierungsbezirke are in the British Zone:

BRAUNSCHWEIG	HILDESHEIM	SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
AACHEN	HANNOVER	MÜNSTER
ARNSBERG	HILDESHEIM	OLDENBURG
AURICH	KÖLN	OSNABRÜCK
BRAUNSCHWEIG	LIPPE	SCHAUMBURG-LIPPE
DÜSSELDORF	LÜNEBURG	SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
HAMBURG	MINDEN	STADE

7. Dischargees to US Zone

Returning US transportation will carry British dischargees, fully documented as stated in Par 4 b above, segregated by Regierungsbezirk, to a point or points within the Regierungsbezirk, selected by the Army concerned from which discharges will walk to their homes. Such point or points will be selected and reported to this headquarters by 3 July 1945. The following Regierungsbezirke are in US Zone:

Eastern Military District (Third Army)	Western Military District (Seventh Army)
MAINFRANKEN	KARLSRUHE
NIEDERBAYERN/OBERPFALZ	KASSEL
OBERBAYERN	MANNHEIM
OBERFRANKEN und MITTELFRANKEN	WIESBADEN
SCHWABEN	WÜRTTEMBERG

8. Rations

a. Each transferee to the British Zone will be accompanied by two days' rations on delivery at Hannover. These may be delivered in bulk or carried separately by each man.

b. Each dischargee to the US Zone will carry on his person two days' rations on entering returning US transportation.

9. Overnight accommodations for US convoy personnel, including rations and fuel for the return journey, will be provided by British at Hannover.

10. Advance notice

Advance notice of each shipment will be telephoned to office of Chief of Transportation at Wiesbaden for transmission to BARLYCORN, not later than departure of convoy.

11. Liaison Officers

a. The office of Chief of Transportation has provided a US liaison officer to BARLYCORN.

b. Seventh Army will provide a US liaison officer experienced in discharge procedure, to the British transfer center at Hannover by 1 July 1945. He will spot check documentation of all transferees, both US and British, route returning dischargees to Regierungsbezirke in US Zone (see Par 7 above), dispatch P. 4s bundled in bulk to the appropriate Military District Army Headquarters, and perform other appropriate liaison duties.

By Command of General BRADLEY:

/s/ C. R. LANDON
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

Info copy to:
21 A Gp A (Wehr)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

M/tjc
5 July 1945

383.6 (G-1)

SUBJECT: Shipment of Prisoners of War

TO: Commanding General, Seventh US Army, APO 758.

1. It is desired that you ship 54,000 prisoners of war to the communications Zone prisoner of war enclosures listed below, shipment to be completed on the date specified, or as near thereafter as possible:

CC PWE # 26	Mons, Belgium	27,000	14 July
CC PWE # 13	Anarge, France	10,000	10 July
CC PWE # 21	Champagne, France	17,000	10 July

2. Inasmuch as the prisoners of war concerned will be transfered to the Governments of France and Belgium, shipment of the following types of personnel is prohibited:

a. SS

b. Individuals over 50 years of age.

c. Individuals under 18 years of age.

d. Individuals who are not German nationals.

e. Individuals who are not physically fit for labor.

f. Individuals who are classed in automatic arrest and security suspect categories.

g. War criminals, suspected war criminals, and necessary witnesses for the prosecution of war criminals.

h. Individuals presently held in army detention or interrogation centers.

3. Individuals shipped under this authority may include those whose residence is in the Russian Zone of occupation.

4. No documentation or disbandment procedure is required.

5. Estimated time of arrival of each shipment will be given by you to Commanding General, Communications Zone, attention Provost Marshal, as far in advance as possible. You will furnish guards and rations to destination and make necessary transportation arrangements.

By Command of General BRADLEY

J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col. ADG
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 75

Shipment of German POW from Com Z into Germany for Discharge.

1. G-2 G-1 M/8684
G-4 12 July 1945
AG
PM
Trans
OCOT (Fwd)
Med

Salient features of meeting held 10 July 1945 at 1400, re transfer of German POW from Com Z into Germany, are noted below for your information.

1. Lt Col F. A. Moulton, TPM USFET, explained the reason for requesting 54,000 German POW be shipped to Com Z to turn over to France and Belgium, in view of Com Z's desire to discharge certain German POW into Germany, as follows:

a. After turning over certain employables to the French and Belgians a commitment of 54,000 additional employables remains to be filled. Com Z does not have such employables to turn over to the French and Belgians.

b. Com Z has approximately 30,000 German POW who live in the US Zone in Germany who are not employables but who are subject to discharge under SHAEF disbandment directives.

c. The reason POW and not disarmed enemy forces were needed to turn over to the French and Belgians is because it is easier to turn over processed people quickly and USFET desires that these people be turned over to the French and Belgians as fast as possible.

2. Seventh Army pointed out that 3,000 German POW are being shipped by rail to Com Z daily for the next 15 days.

3. For planning purposes the following receiving railheads were designated:

Third Army —	Regensburg
—	Wurzburg
Seventh Army —	Heilbronn
	Lollar

4. G-4 this headquarters will determine the exact location of the receiving railheads from the Armies and transmit this information to Com Z.

5. Categories.

Com Z will include in shipments into US Zone only those categories that are dischargable under the current disbandment directives and will not include the following: Persons between the ages of 18 and 50 who are physically fit for labor; non-Germans; persons in automatic arrest categories; security suspects; war criminals.

6. Rates of Flow.

Maximum rates of flow as follows:

Third Army — 3,000 a day
Seventh Army — 6,000 a day.

Com Z indicated that these maximum figures would probably not be filled.

ANNEX 76

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

7. The procedure contained herein should be continued in effect for those personnel coming in from the States. Com Z expects PWs from the States to arrive through French ports but not in any considerable numbers before November or December 1945.

8. All screening will be done by Com Z. Army Commanders may initiate additional screening at receiving railheads if considered desirable.

9. Segregation.

Personnel shipped to a railhead will include only those persons living in Landkreise serviced by that railhead. Armies will notify this headquarters names of Landkreise serviced by each railhead. This information will be transmitted to Com Z.

10. Documentation.

Com Z will complete all documentation, to include --

a. CROWCASS, directly to Paris.

b. Two copies of P. 4 and one copy of D. 2, bundled in bulk by Landkreise and forwarded with each shipment. Armies will give to each man his D. 2 and one copy of his P. 4. The other copy of P. 4 will be sent to the appropriate Military District headquarters.

11. Com Z will furnish guard from origin of shipment to receiving railhead. Further guard will be furnished by Armies concerned.

12. Com Z will furnish rations for the trip to the receiving railhead. Further rationing will be provided by Armies concerned.

13. Notification of shipments to appropriate offices will be given in accordance with current SOPs.

14. All pay accounts of PWs will be completed by Com Z prior to shipment. Armies will be required to pay each discharged POW in accordance with current disbandment directives.

15. Medical Considerations.

Armies will accept dischargees from Com Z on the assumption that they have been medically cleared as indicated on the discharge certificate. Any additional medical examinations if desired will be made by Armies concerned.

16. No liaison personnel are considered necessary between Armies and Com Z.

17. Shipments swill start as soon as Armies designate definite railheads and names of Landkreise serviced by those railheads. This information will be furnished Com Z direct by Armies, with information to 12th Army Group.

J. J. O'HARE
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-1

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

091.711 (G-1) 12 July 1945

SUBJECT: Disbandment of German Armed Forces.

TO: Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General, Seventh US Army, APO 758.

1. The Supreme Commander has authorized general discharge of German nationals held as prisoners of war disarmed enemy forces, including members o those para-military organizations listed in paragraphs 1a (2) to (7), Section IV, Part E, Annex 7, 12th Army Group Plan, Operation "E", except as outlined in paragraph 2, below.

2. Persons falling within the following categories will not be discharged or otherwise released:

a. Automatic arrest categories and individual security suspects.

b. War Criminals.

c. Members of the SS.

d. Individuals whose residence is in the Russian Occupational Zone.

3. Documentation will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Part E, Annex 7, 12th Army Group Plan, Operation "E", in addition to which the CROWCASS POW Form will be completed and forwarded to CROWCASS, APO 887, US Army.

4. With respect to members of German service units, our attention is invited to SHAEF TWX S-95322, dated 5 July 1945.

By Command of General BRADLEY:

M. E. TAYLOR
Capt, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

ANNEX 77

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

G-2 SECTION

PARTS I–IV

12TH ARMY GROUP

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

(FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

VOLUME III

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

VOLUME III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction to G-2 Section Report	V
PART I — Intelligence Branch Report	1
Study No. 1 — Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe	3
Chapter I Invasion: The Battle of Normandy	6
Chapter II St. Lo: The Breakthrough in Normandy	11
Chapter III Encirclement at Argentan	13
Chapter IV Battle of Northern France	15
Chapter V The Fall Campaign	17
Chapter VI The November Offensive	22
Chapter VII The Ardennes Offensive	25
Chapter VIII Offensive to the Rhine: 9 February to 7 March 1945	30
Chapter IX The Crossing of the Rhine	43
Chapter X The Battle of the Ruhr	45
Chapter XI Divisions encountered on the Western Front from 6 June 1944 — 9 May 1945	48

ANNEXES *(in separate binder)*

Annex A — "D" Day, German Dispositions in Western Europe
Annex B — German Dispositions Prior to Normandy Breakthrough
Annex C — Liberation of Paris
Annex D — Winter Line Along the West Wall
Annex E — The Ardennes Battle *(Front Line as of 1 Jan 45)*
Annex F — The Ardennes Battle *(Front Line as of 8 Jan 45)*
Annex G — Offensive for the Rhine
Annex H — The Rhine Crossed
Annex I — Envelopment of the Ruhr
Annex J — Two Weeks Before Capitulation

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

		Page
Study No. 2 —	*A Report of Operations of the Enemy Terrain and Defense Section*	49
Chapter I	Introduction	51
Section I	Purpose of the Report	51
Section II	Method of Presentation	51
Section III	Acknowledgements	52
Chapter II	Review of Operations	53
Section I	The Terrain and Defense Section	53
Section II	Operations Prior to Invasion	53
Section III	Operations in Normandy	56
Section IV	Operations Across France	58
Section V	Operations in Western Germany	60
Section VI	Operations in Germany	64
Chapter III	Evolution of Techniques	69
Section I	General Conclusions	77
Section II	The Primary Mission	77
Chapter IV	Conclusions	77
Section I	General Conclusions	77
Section II	The Primary Mission	77
Section III	Analysis of the Primary Mission	78
Section IV	Secondary Missions	82

PLATES AND APPENDICES
(in separate binder)

Plates:

1. Index of Terrain Studies (Map)
2. Generalized Enemy Terrain (Western Germany)
3. Terrain Models (Photographs) *
4. Defense Overprint (Koeln Plan)
5. Defense Overprint (Echternach Area)

Appendices:

A. Terrain South of the Ruhr
B. Terrain in the Pfalzer Bergland
C. The Trier Area
D. Terrain Appreciation of the Redoubt
D-1, Compartmentation
D-2, Avenues of Approach
E. Maginot Inundation System
F. Erft River Defense Line.

* With text, opposite page 66

		Page
Study No. 3 —	*A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch)*	104
Introduction		106
Chapter I —	Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group	108
Chapter II —	Organization of Intelligence at Army Level	115
Chapter III —	G-2 Operations on Army, Corps and Division Level	133

CHARTS AND TABLES

Organizational Chart, Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group		107
Proposed T/O for G-2 Section, Army — submitted by First Army		122
Proposed T/O for G-2 Section, Army — submitted by Ninth Army		130
PART II — Air Branch Report		161
INTRODUCTION		163
A. The Photo Group		163
B. The Situation Group		166
C. The Target Intelligence Group		167
D. Reconnaissance Effort, Ninth Air Force		169
E. Communications Network for Reconnaissance Results		169
F. Explanatory Comments (for Annex F)		169
G. Cooperation with the Director of Reconnaissance and Photography		170
H. Translating Ground Force Requirements into Air Force Capabilities		171
I. Requirements Beyond Air Force Capabilities		171
ANNEXES		
A. Organization Chart	opposite page	163
B. Table Showing Requests for Photography placed for Units indicated	opposite page	164
C. Tactical Reconnaissance Summary No. 1		165

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

D. G-2/G-3 (Air) Radio Nets . . . . . opposite page 167
E. Chart: Reconnaissance Effort 9th Air Force . . . . opposite page 170
F. Chart: Channels of Communication . . . . . opposite page 171

In separate binder:

G. Map: Photo Reconnaissance Flown at the Request of the 12th Army Group
H. Map: Photo Reconnaissance Requested by G-2 (Air) 12th Army Group
I. Map: Photo Interpretation Area, 12th Army Group
J. Map: Area in which Defense Overlays Were Furnished to Armies
K. Map: Photography Furnished Armies

PART III — Foreign Liaison Branch Report 172

PART IV — Plans Branch Report 177

FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT

G-2 SECTION

INTRODUCTION

The activities of the G-2 Section for the period October 1943 — July 1945 inclusive, are covered in detail in the following pages (Volumes III and IV). In the interests of clarity, the material has been divided into types of activity, each represented by a separate report listed under the heading of the G-2 Branch supervising that activity.

It is hoped that this report will afford a comprehensive insight into the intelligence operations of a major campaign.

Volume III

PART I — Intelligence Branch Report
" II — Air Branch Report
" III — Foreign Liaison Branch Report
" IV — Plans Branch Report

Volume IV

" V — Target Branch Report
" VI — Censorship Branch Report
" VII — Counter Intelligence Branch Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART I

G-2 INTELLIGENCE BRANCH REPORT

HQ. 12TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INDEX

	Page
Study No. 1 — "Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe"	3
Study No. 2 — "A Report of Operations of the Enemy Terrain and Defense Section"	49
Study No. 3 "A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch)"	104

NOTE: The following reports from groups within the Intelligence Branch, G-2, have been selected as being representative of its activities during the past 21 months. Study No. 1, "Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe", was drawn up by the Order of Battle Group as a summary of enemy operations from D-Day; while Study No. 2, "A Report of Operations of the Enemy Terrain and Defense Section" presents a complete history of that section since its inception. Study No. 3, "A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch)" deals in itself with the activities of the branch. While all three were written following the close of hostilities on the European continent, each offers a review of typical functions of the Branch preceding that date.

Study No. 1

DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

6 JUNE 1944 — 9 MAY 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE

The following report is not intended to represent a complete study on the campaign resulting in the Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe. However, it does represent the last report prepared by the Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, 12th Army Group, on Enemy Operations. In it an attempt is made to trace the broad outline of events leading to the ultimate unconditional surrender of Germany. Time alone can provide the material with which a complete history of the campaign in the West can be written, for it will be months before all of the necessary documents of the German Army, so essential for a full comprehension of the reasons motivating enemy action, are available for a complete study of the defeat of the German Wehrmacht.

Study No. 1

INDEX

Chapter		Page
I	Invasion: The Battle of Normandy	6
II	St. Lo: The Breakthrough in Normandy	11
III	Encirclement at Argentan	13
IV	Battle of Northern France	15
V	The Fall Campaign	17
VI	The November Offensive	22
VII	The Ardennes Offensive	25
VIII	Offensive to the Rhine: 9 February — 7 March 1945	30
IX	The Crossing of the Rhine	33
X	The Battle of the Ruhr	35
XI	Divisions encountered on the Western Front from 6 June 1944 to 9 May 1945	38

ANNEXES

(in separate binder)

Annex	
A	D Day, German Dispositions in Western Europe
B	German Dispositions Prior to Normandy Breakthrough
C	Liberation of Paris
D	Winter Line Along the West Wall
E	The Ardennes Battle *(Front Line as of 1 Jan 1945)*
F	The Ardennes Battle *(Front Line as of 8 Jan 1945)*
G	Offensive for the Rhine
H	The Rhine Crossed
I	Envelopment of the Ruhr
J	Two Weeks Before Capitulation

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER I

INVASION: THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY

On 6 June 1944 the Allies landed in Normandy and the invasion of Europe had commenced. The Germans were manning France at that time with 58 divisions. Normandy was being held by five divisions and one brigade, and the area of Northwestern France into which the attacking Allies were driving — that area bounded on the east by the Seine River and the south by the Loire River — had 17 enemy divisions including three Panzer-type composing the Seventh German Army under the command of Generaloberst Dollman. Of the 58 enemy divisions in Western Europe at that time, ten were Panzer or Panzer Grenadier, 17 were field divisions, 24 were limited-employment divisions, and 7 were field training division. This was the force available to the enemy in the West, to man the Atlantic Wall and throw any invasion back into the sea.

Allied air interdiction had already practically isolated the battle area from the rest of France. The bridges across the Loire and Seine had been under constant air attack, and many had already been destroyed prior to D-Day, thus hampering enemy movement. Of the nine railway bridges across the Seine between Paris and the sea, eight had been destroyed; and of the ten highway bridges which had been attacked, five had been destroyed and one seriously damaged. Thus, any reinforcement of the Seventh German Army from south of the Loire or from the FIFTEENTH Army along the Pas de Calais was seriously hampered.

The blow was struck. Complete tactical surprise was gained. Rundstedt's G-2 was in Berlin at the time, and even after the initial landing had been made there was some question in the minds of the enemy as to whether the invasion had really commenced or whether it was simply a diversionary effort. This question in the mind of the German High Command may have resulted in some hesitancy in ordering reserves brought from other parts of France. There was also fear that another major landing might be made on the Pas de Calais, and the enemy failed to move any sizable body of troops from this area until the breakthrough out of Normandy and it was too late. These factors combined with the air interdiction of the Seine and Loire bridges may well have been the three most decisive factors in allowing the Allies to establish a bridgehead successfully. Only one incident marred the invasion. By a pure freak of coincidence the enemy was holding anti-parachute exercises in the Neptune area at the time of the landing. The 6th Parachute Regiment was in Carentan at the time and held out there against American troops for one week preventing the link-up of our

forces in the Isigny-Carentan area with those between Carentan and Montebourg.

On the initial landing American forces on the right of the Allied landing smashed into the 352 and 91 Infantry Divisions, while the British and Canadian forces on the left ran into 716 Infantry Division quickly followed by the 21 Panzer Division. The enemy had been holding 21 Panzer in reserve to the southeast of Caen, and when the landing was made it was rushed into the battle to hold the city. The 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler-Jugend) was to the east of Caen in the area around Lisieux and was immediately rushed into the battle in an effort to throw the Allies back into the sea, with the 711 Infantry Division being engaged in the fighting to the east of the Orne estuary.

As the American drive continued to the north and Carentan was wrested from the enemy on 12 June, elements of two more enemy divisions came into the fight — 243 Infantry Division crossing the Cotentin Peninsula from the Coutances-Lessay region where it had been at the time of the landing, and 709 Infantry Division coming down from Cherbourg in an effort to prevent the capture of Montebourg. During the first week Panzer Lehr Division moved from the Chartres region to oppose the British forces around Caen, and 346 Infantry Division was moved over from the Pont L'eveque area against the British left flank.

By the end of the first week twelve enemy divisions plus one independent regiment and one motorized brigade were opposing the Allies. Of these, 352 Infantry Division already had been badly battered in the early fighting, while the 91, 243 and 709 Infantry Divisions were attempting vainly to slow the drive on Cherbourg being made by VII US Corps. 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (Götz von Berlichingen) was just starting to move into the Carentan area to support 6 Parachute Regiment, having made a quick trip from the Thouars area, and the advance elements of 3 Parachute Division were contacted north of Caumont as Dollmann started to move troops from Brittany to counter the Allied build up. Trains with anti-aircraft protection observed moving east from Morlaix confirmed the belief that the entire 3 Parachute Division was destined for commitment. The 30 Schnelle Brigade was also being engaged on the American front. Six enemy divisions, three of them Panzer, had arrived in the line against the British and Canadian forces where the enemy was striving desperately to prevent a breakthrough into the good tank country around Falaise. Of the divisions against the British, 716 Infantry Division had been considerably battered in the initial landing, but was being backed by 21 Panzer and 12 SS Panzer.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

with Panzer Lehr, 346 Infantry and 711 Infantry completing the enemy order of battle.

At the end of the first week in Normandy the First US Army had taken 7,015 prisoners, and the morale of the enemy troops was surprisingly low. Naturally the shock of the invasion and the blow at being taken prisoner affected the statements of the Germans, but the complete absence of the Luftwaffe, lack of German artillery support as opposed to the mass US Artillery, the early appearance of our tanks, and the early consolidation of our bridgehead and advance inland had apparently all contributed to a wave of defeatism.

On 14 June the Germans, making a desperate effort to stop the drive on Cherbourg, threw in a desperate counterattack to recapture the ceiiars of the badly damaged village of Montebourg. The 77 Infantry Division, the second to come from Brittany, arrived from St. Malo to come into the line north of Carentan to attempt to keep our troops from cutting the Cotentin Peninsula. It was closely followed by 275 Infantry Division which arrived in the line in the Montmartine area the following day. This division had left St. Nazaire for the invasion area on D-Day but took nine days to get to the front. It was detrained at Foligny where it lost all of its ammunition and supplies as a result of Allied air bombing, and was then marched to the front, arriving in a state of exhaustion. The enemy's build-up showed signs of frantic haste as bits and pieces of divisions were committed to the line as they arrived in the area. The pressure was such that apparently the enemy was unable to build up any reserve with which to mount a counterattack.

VII US Corps continued its drive to cut the Peninsula and isolate Cherbourg and by the 16th had reached St. Sauver le Vicomte. By 2300 on the 17th the 9 US Infantry Division had cut through the 84 German Corps and the Cherbourg Peninsula by pushing to the coast at Portball, and the stage was set for the drive on the port. Elements of 353 Infantry Division arrived on the front and took over the remnants of 352 Infantry Division which by this time had been so badly cut up that it was unable to operate any longer as a division. Isolated in the area around Cherbourg were approximately 30,000 enemy troops including elements of the 77 and 91 Infantry Divisions which had been split when our forces cut the Peninsula, and the remnants of the 243 and 709 Infantry Divisions. In addition to these divisional elements there were another 4,000 troops in Cherbourg itself composed largely of naval personnel.

Thus, two weeks after D-Day the Cherbourg Peninsula had been cut, and the enemy had committed 19 divisions and one brigade plus numerous miscellaneous units to battle. Of these divisions, 12 were now committed against First US

Army, and the enemy strength against Second British Army had increased to 7 divisions, as elements of 1 SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) started to arrive in the line after being transported from the Ghent region.

The third week was one of slow compression of the enemy forces into Cherbourg. By the end of the week First US Army had taken 17,899 prisoners and buried 3,595 enemy dead. By the 26th the city and port had been captured, and General von Schlieben and Admiral Hennecke captured. Von Schlieben revealed that he had ordered the city defended to the last by the isolated groups of enemy troops, even though the group which he was with gave up after offering slight opposition. No new enemy divisions were committed into action during the third week although intelligence reports indicated that 9 SS Panzer Division (Hohenstaufen) was on the move towards the area and already had elements west of Paris, and that 10 SS Panzer Division (Frundsberg) was also on its way. Both of these divisions had been rushed to the Russian Front at the time of the Soviet breakthrough around LVOV. From southern France came reports that 276 and 277 Infantry Divisions were moving north, and 2 SS Panzer Division (Das Reich) was apparently attempting to make its way north from the region of Toulouse but was being continually harassed by the French Maquis. 276 Infantry Division, before it was committed, was forced to march 100 miles from Le Mans to the front, all movement by rail or road being completely blocked by the Allied Air Forces.

Six new enemy divisions arrived against the Allied bridgehead during the fourth week of operations, three of these being SS Panzer Divisions. By 3 July a total of 25 divisions and one brigade had been committed by the enemy against the Normandy bridgehead — a total which was nearly half the number of enemy divisions in France and the Low Countries on D-Day. On 28 June, 2 SS (Das Reich) Panzer Division was committed against the British, and the following day in conjunction with 9 SS Panzer Division launched the first serious enemy counter-attack since the landing. This was followed the next day by more enemy efforts to drive the British forces back, but the Germans lost 42 tanks in the attempt. Elements of 10 SS Panzer Division were committed against the British forces on 3 July as the enemy threw in an equivalent of nearly 8 Panzer divisions in an effort to hold and compress the bridgehead. By 1 July all of the Cherbourg Peninsula north of a line Carentan-St. Sauver Le Vicomte had been cleared of the enemy with the capture of the last Germans holding out in the Cap de La Hague region. First US Army had taken 44,917 prisoners and buried 4,487 enemy dead by the end of the first month in Normandy.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The following week saw von Kluge replace von Rundstedt as The C-in-C West, and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Paul Hausser replaced the lete Generaloberst Dollmann as the Commanding General of the Seventh German Army. General Dollmann had been killed in Allied air attacks. Two new divisions arrived in the line in Normandy, 277 Infantry Division after a long and tedious journey from southern France having had to follow a circuitous route due to Allied air interdiction, and 5 Parachute Division moving eastwards from Brittany. American pressure southwards on the Cotentin Peninsula commenced and Le Haye du Puits was captured on 8 July. Enemy reaction was prompt to the threat of the American forces to drive down out of Normandy and 2 SS Panzer Division crossed the Peninsula to the threatened area. At the end of the week, on 10 July, Panzer Lehr Division also left its position on the front of the Second British Army and crossed the front calling attention to its progress by no attempt at radio silence. Lehr attempted to throw in its weight in the Carentan area where in conjunction with 17 SS Panzer Division it launched strong but futile counter-attacks. In the fighting around Caen British forces encountered stiff resistance from 12 SS Panzer Division, but by 9 July had thrown the Hitler-Jugend back and captured the major portion of Caen including the bridge across the Orne River intact. British patrols captured the first of the enemy swimming saboteurs encountered in the Western campaign as a German naval officer was taken prisoner while trying to destroy the Orne bridge. Rommel tried to buck up the troops, according to prisoners' statements, by telling them that great masses of troops and tanks were on their way to Normandy and that the Allies would be thrown back into the sea in 60 days.

With Allied preparations directed mainly towards building up tanks and supplies on the beachhead for the big breakthrough, progress was slow during the next two weeks. St. Lo was wrested from the enemy by 29 US Infantry Division after a tenacious fight against 3 Parachute Division and the revamped 352 Infantry Division. The British drive southeastwards from Caen ran into stiff enemy resistance along the Caen-Lisieux road. Two more new infantry divisions arrived on the front in the form of 271 and 272, both of which had come from the Western Mediterranean area. These divisions moved into the front between Caen and Caumont where the Germans were desperately trying to prevent a breakthrough, and were endeavoring to extricate Panzer divisions from the line to be held in tactical reserve. Enemy strength in the West had by this time increased to 65 divisions, compared with 58 on D-Day. (See Annex A.)

CHAPTER II

ST. LO: THE BREAKTHROUGH IN NORMANDY

On 24 July all preparations were complete for the assault in an attempt to break out of Normandy. Flights of heavy bombers smashed at the enemy positions in the Marigny area, and the following morning the tanks and infantry drove into his line. Stiff resistance was encountered as the enemy tried to hold the Periers-St. Lo road. By 27 July enemy resistance had been broken and Coutances was captured. The enemy's appreciation of the true situation was only gradually dawning. Two more divisions started moving towards the battle from the area of Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais. The 326 Infantry Division had moved into the line in the Caumont area thus allowing 3 Parachute Division to take over a smaller sector in attempting to hold our breakthrough attacks in the St. Lo region. The enemy continued to cling stubbornly to the salient that extended east from Le Haye du Puits to the Vire, but the breakthrough was accomplished.

The Germans had delayed too long in bringing their reinforcements to Normandy. Brittany had already been denuded of troops. When the American armored columns struck southwards out of Normandy towards Rennes there was no defense in depth. The withdrawal from Normandy became too hasty to permit any withdrawal to an organized line. The high ground north of Coutances, an obvious defense position, was quickly compromised, and American armor was across the Sienne River south of Coutences before the enemy could react. Good defensive positions along the See River south of Avranches and the Selune at the foot of the Cotentin Peninsula were lost to the Germans in a similar fashion. With almost all of their armor concentrated on the western end of the line against the British and Canadian forces around Caen, the enemy had lost all opportunity to hold the Allies in Normandy and the front was fluid. Another Panzer division arrived on the front as 116 Panzer (formerly 179 Panzer Training Division) was rushed into the battle from the Mantes-Gassicourt region, and the 84 Infantry Division was sent to the battle across the Seine from the Fifteenth Army. Thirty-two divisions now opposed the Allies.

There was little opposition in the center of the Brittany Peninsula as American armor swept westwards unchecked. Sporadic opposition developed around Rennes but was quickly overcome, and the Germans were forced to fall back into the coastal fortress positions of Brest, St. Malo, Lorient and St. Nazaire. By 7 August the Germans had regained control over their units sufficiently to

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

mass a counter-attack with five Panzer divisions in an effort to break through to Avranches and cut the forces to the south off from their source of supplies in the Normandy Peninsula. The attack was launched by 116 Panzer, 2 Panzer, 1 SS Panzer, 2 SS Panzer and 17 SS Panzer Divisions and succeeded in retaking Mortain, but VII US Corps contained the attack and the German efforts had been stopped. Allied air forces went to work on the enemy Panzers in the Mortain area and the Germans suffered terrific losses in men and equipment. By this time some eight enemy divisions had been destroyed in the two months since the Allies had landed on the Continent — 77, 91, 243, 275, 352 and 353 Infantry Divisions, 16 GAF Division and 5 Parachute Division. The 165 Training Division had been sending a steady flow of reinforcements to the front and was no longer considered capable of fighting as a unit. With the battle raging at Mortain, the Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais had been summoned to send more reinforcements for a "now-or-never fight" and 85, 89 and 331 Infantry Divisions and 6 Parachute Division made their way into the battle area under great difficulties as the air force constantly harassed all of their movements by day. Two more divisions moved up from southern France as 708 Infantry Division left the Nantes area to try to stop the American drive at Mayenne, and 9 Panzer Division, having arrived north from Nimes, was encountered at Le Mans. (See Annex B.)

CHAPTER III

ENCIRCLEMENT AT ARGENTAN

But even the frantic arrival of fresh blood on the battle scene couldn't slow the Allied drive or prevent the encirclement. American forces drove north to Argentan, and after a bloody battle, British forces finally took Falaise and drove south to complete the encirclement on 19 August of the enemy forces estimated at nine infantry and six Panzer divisions. The balance of the enemy forces fled eastwards towards the Seine in confusion, and for several days there appeared a strong possibility that a second envelopment movement by American armor driving north along the west bank of the Seine might trap another substantial enemy force. Meanwhile, the American armor continued to drive eastwards towards Paris liberating Dreux, Chartres and Chateauneuf. No appreciable resistance opposed our patrols probing towards Paris.

The German Armies in the West faced a decisive defeat. Only seven divisions remained in the Fifteenth Army which had been pinned to the Pas de Calais by the threat of another Allied landing. Four were crossing the Seine to the west, 48, 49 and 344 Infantry, and 17 Luftwaffe, to come to the aid of the forces at Mortain. The Allies completed the encirclement at Falaise-Argentan and made the presence of these divisions more a burden on the Germans escaping across the Seine to the east. Trapped in the debacle at Falaise were the bulk of 84, 271, 276, 277, 326, and 363 Infantry Divisions, and 1 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 2, 9 and 21 Panzer Divisions, with elements of 2 SS, 12 SS, 116 Panzer and 89 and 331 Infantry Divisions also cut off in the pocket. Far to the west, isolated from the battle and forming the first of the fortress pockets, so characteristic of the German policy of holding on to critical features to the very end to deprive the Allies of their use, were the 2 Parachute, 343 and 366 Infantry Divisions in Brest, and 265 Infantry Division and a large assortment of Naval troops in St. Nazaire and Lorient. To the south 16 Infantry Division (upgraded from 158 Training Division) was trying to come in against the flank of the Third US Army but was being engaged and held at ahe Loire in the Orleans sector.

By 22 August the last of the enemy resistance in the Falaise-Argentan pocket had ceased. The enemy had lost 60,000 to 70,000 in killed and captured, and enormous amounts of equipment, guns, tanks, motor vehicles, had been destroyed or captured. The balance of the enemy forces was retreating in disorder across the Seine. However, von Kluge had been successful in withdrawing a considerable portion of his armor before the Falaise gap had been closed, while the less mobile infantry had been sacrificed in holding the escape

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

route open. All that week of August 20—26 the enemy had been withdrawing forces across the Seine to the east utilizing every available ferry and pontoon despite almost continuous Allied air assault. At Elbeuf elements of 344 Infantry, 6 Parachute and 17 Luftwaffe Divisions tried to hold, but at Mantes-Gassicourt the 79 US Infantry Division was across the Seine and enlarging their bridgehead despite frantic efforts of 49 Infantry and 18 GAF Divisions to contain it.

In Paris only token resistance was offered to the approaches of the Allies from the west, spearheaded by the 2nd French Armored Division and 4 US Infantry Division. A week of fighting the French resistance forces in the capitol had weakened the enemy's determination to resist. After a token show of resistance on the outskirts of the city and in the Palais de Justice, elements of the 6 Parachute and 48 Infantry Divisions, plus a considerable portion of garrison troops, laid down their arms. Paris was liberated on 25 August, and the city went wild after four and onehalf years of German occupation.

To the south of Paris the Germans fought stiffly to prevent the Third US Army from crossing the Seine, vigorously defending communications centers such as Montargis, Melun and Fontainebleau. But all were taken by 25 August and General Patton's forces swept on towards Germany. Meanwhile on the southern flank Operation Anvil had struck on 15 August and the American and French forces under General Patch were driving rapidly northwards along the Rhone Valley. French Maquis forces were harassing the enemy throughout Central France, and the Germans started to try to extricate their forces in southwestern France through an ever-narrowing escape corridor. By 26 August the number of enemy divisions in France and the Low Countries had dropped to 48, as 84, 271, 276, 277, 326 and 363 Infantry Divisions and 3 Parachute Division were dropped from the enemy order of battle as a result of the mauling they had received in the Falaise-Argentan gap. The SS divisions, too, had been badly hit and 17 SS Goetz von Berlichingen Division was moving towards the Metz area to rest and refit. (See Annex C.)

CHAPTER IV

BATTLE OF NORTHERN FRANCE

The race across eastern France started. Enemy units fleeing across the Seine were soon moving along roads parallel to those used by the advancing British and American forces. 12th US Army Group troops of the First US Army crossed the Seine in other places north of Paris and swiftly drove forward across the Somme, Aisne and Meuse, driving the enemy before them towards Belgium and the German frontier. On the First U. S. Army front the first week of September saw the Germans driven out of both Maubeuge and Valenciennes and into a trap formed by two American columns converging at Mons, trapping some 30,000 enemy troops from 20 different divisions, with 6 Parachute, 245 Infantry, 348, 276 Infantry and 10 SS Panzer Divisions yielding particularly large numbers of prisoners. The Germans tried to block our advance across the Meuse, resisting our cavalry patrols with small arms and mortar fire, but failing to prevent crossings at Liege, Namur and on the right towards Luxembourg.

To the south the Third US Army ran into heavier resistance. Having swept forward south of Paris, General Patton's forces had swiftly taken Chalons sur Marne and Verdun and sent reconnaissance troops into Metz, but there the shortage of gasoline was felt and the forces had to be withdrawn again. The enemy taking advantage of our inability to pursue his beaten forces had started to build up forces along the Moselle River with particularly determined resistance at Thionville. Several attempts to cross the River in the Pont-a-Mousson area on 6 September, were repelled and enemy artillery laid down heavy fire on our reconnaissance troops. At Toul the Germans fell back on Nancy as the entire southern part of the front of 12th US Army Group started to solidify. The enemy was able to rush in replacement units to form a line against our advances for the first time since the breakthrough out of Normandy. South of the Loire the enemy hastened his evacuation of southwestern France under constant attacks from French Maquis and in front of the drive of the Seventh US Army up from the Mediterranean Coast. These efforts became more frantic as it became apparent that not much time was left to get the Nineteenth Army through the Belfort Gap or have it wiped out. In the West the seige of the fortress of Brest went on unabated, with intensive fighting developing as General Ramcke ordered the 2 Parachute Division to fight to the last man in an effort to prevent the port from being taken in usable condition by the Allies.

By 9 September the last of the 60 German divisions which were occupying positions in the West on D-Day had been committed to battle as 719 Infantry

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Division moved into the battle area from Western Holland. In addition, three newly-formed divisions were committed by the enemy in the Metz-Nancy area, and two mobile divisions badly needed by the Germans, who had taken such heavy losses in armor during the battle of France, arrived from Italy as 3 and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions were committed to the line to hold open the Belfort Gap.

By mid-September the greatest Allied problem in the Western Campaign was not so much the Germans, as supplies. The sweep across France from Normandy to Germany in five weeks had far outrun the beaches and limited port facilities of Cherbourg. Le Havre had fallen, but was in bad condition due to enemy demolitions and block ships. Brest, originally an important consideration in Allied plans, had been turned into a fortress by the enemy and Allied air and artillery were still hammering the obstinate defenders. British forces had taken Antwerp but the enemy still controlled both sides of the Scheldt estuary and until that was cleared the port would be useless to the Allies.

By 12 September the German frontier was crossed, as 1 US Infantry Division drove over the line south of Aachen. Resistance was initially light but stiffened as 49 Infantry and 9 Panzer Divisions arrived on the scene. The city of Luxembourg was liberated and almost all of the Duchy was freed except for the eastern fringes. On the northern port of the First US Army front east of Maastricht, enemy resistance stiffened, and for the first time in nearly two months the enemy held a continuous line along the entire 12th US Army Group front. On the Third US Army front the enemy reluctantly yielded ground and continued to improve defensive positions along the Moselle. Nancy was liberated, but enemy resistance continued in the Foret de Haye to the west. By 19 September the enemy forces were disposed generally along the Siegfried Line north of Trier to Aachen, and south of Trier along the Moselle River. The 12 Infantry Division had arrived on the front from East Prussia to be committed in the defense of Aachen, while 36 Infantry Division, formed from remnants, replacements and training units in Denmark, was committed in the Trier area. The enemy at this point started to throw into the battle improvised armor formations in the form of Panzer brigades — ad hoc formations hastily devised to meet the crisis and make up for the shortage of available Panzer divisions. These units lasted only a short time and, as they were cut up by Allied advances, were used to fill in the gaps in the existing Panzer divisions, and eventually became extinct.

CHAPTER V

THE FALL CAMPAIGN

By 19 September the remnants of the German Nineteenth Army had arrived in the Belfort Gap and linked up with the First German Army as a link-up was made between the Allied forces driving north from the Mediterranean Coast with those that landed in Normandy. To the north the Allied airborne landing in the Nijmegen-Arnheim area on 17 September encountered heavy enemy resistance as II SS Panzer Corps, controlling 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer Divisions, was encountered by 1 British Airborne Division in Arnheim, and Corps Feldt, with 406 z. b. V. Division, 47 Infantry and 6 Parachute Divisions, was quickly thrown into the battle. All along the line the enemy continued to pour men into the Siegfried Line in an effort to man it before the Allies could mount an allout effort to crack through the defense of the Reich. The Germans paid particular attention to strengthening the Aachen area where the first large German city was threatened with capture, and the First US Army appeared on the verge of breaking through to the Cologne Plain and the Rhine. Another new enemy division, 183 Infantry, which had been previously reported on the Eastern Front, arrived in the line to bolster the front north of Aachen. Heavy fighting continued in the south, particularly around Metz and Luneville, which the Germans recaptured after our forces had seized the town on 17 September. The enemy continued to patrol aggressively, even pushing patrols west of the Moselle River. To the west all resistance ended in Brest on 18 September, and General Ramcke and 36,388 other prisoners were taken. South of the Loire, General Eister, leader of a force of 19,536 Germans, including more than 700 officers who had been trying to make their way from the Bordeaux area back to Germany, found their way blocked by the Maquis. After being constantly harassed from the air and ambushed from all sides, they decided to yield to the Ninth US Army, then in position along the Loire, rather than be picked to pieces in a futile attempt to return to the Fatherland.

Along the Siegfried Line facing 12th Army Group the enemy massed a formidable array of armor to prevent any breakthrough to the Cologne Plain. In the Aachen-Stolberg area there were massed the remnants of seven Panzer divisions 1 SS, 2 SS, 12 SS, 2, 9, 116 and Lehr, two Panzer brigades, 105 and 106, and nine infantry divisions, 12, 19, 36, 49, 183, 275, 347, 348 and 353; one parachute division, 5; and two mobilization divisions, 176 and 526. This indicated the importance which the enemy placed at this time on preventing any American breakthrough to Cologne, the Rhine and the Ruhr.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

With furious fighting raging around Arnheim on the northern part of the front, the enemy continued to pour heavy reinforcements into the Nijmegen area with the intention of forcing the Allies back west of the Maas and south of the Waal Rivers. Two new training divisions — 180 and 190 — were committed to this battle; 361 Volksgrenadier Division arrived in the area, and 9 Panzer Division left the 12th Army Group front to move to the northern battle. The enemy realized full well that the gage had been thrown and that an Allied breakthrough across the Neder Rijn at Arnheim would mean a sweep across the North German Plain. The presence of II SS Panzer Corps at Arnheim, apparently waiting for the air-drop, well indicated the enemy's appreciation of our intentions. To the south the enemy continued to pour infantry into the Aachen area, obviously to relieve the elements of the Panzer divisions engaged in the area, for rest and refitting in Germany. The enemy's attempt to build up a strategic army in reserve commenced in earnest. In the Aachen area 246 Infantry Division moved into the line, having arrived from Germany, where it had refitted after last being on the Central Russian Front, to relieve elements of the SS Panzer divisions which had been fighting in that region.

During the last week of September activity along the front of First US Army was light, consisting mainly of artillery fire and patrolling. Enemy artillery appeared to be building up north and northeast of Aachen where the Germans were particularly sensitive to our patrolling. On the Third US Army front to the south the Germans resisted strongly all of our attempts to advance towards Saarbrucken and a captured order revealed that the Fifth Panzer Army was now opposing General Patton's forces. The "Ghost Division" 11 Panzer, which had fought a dogged defensive battle all the way from the Mediterranean Coast through the Belfort Gap, now left the southern part of the front to move up north and oppose the threat to the Saar, and 106 Panzer Brigade moved down from the Luxembourg area to oppose our salient towards Metz. The enemy continued to make daily counter-attacks consisting mainly of 100—200 infantry and 10 to 20 tanks.

By the end of the first week in October the Germans had definitely sealed off the Arnheim penetration, and British efforts to the north were being devoted primarily to attempting to extricate the remnants of the 1 British Parachute Division from across the Neder Rijn, where it had been cut to pieces by the 9 and 10 SS Panzer Divisions. To the south, 116 Panzer Division moved up from the Aachen area to attack the left flank of the Allied spearhead stretching north from Eindhoven through Nijmegen. Another new infantry division was thrown into the northern battle as 363 Infantry Division, which had been badly mauled in the battle of France, arrived at Arnheim after having been refitted at Warn-

Germany. Both 2 Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division had dropped out of contact, and were to remain missing from the front until the Ardennes offensive over two months later. Ninth US Army moved into the line on the northern part of the 12th Army Group front and found the only enemy formation of divisional size opposing it was 2 SS Panzer Division, which still had some elements committed to the line north of Aachen. Very determined resistance still met all attempts to move forward in the Aachen area, and prisoners from 246 Infantry Division stated that an order had been received from the Fuehrer that the city was to be defended to the last man. The fighting to the south centered around the fortress city of Metz, where an intensely bitter struggle was being waged for Fort Driant, which was being defended by OCS School Metz — officer candidates who had worked out all of their tactical problems over the very terrain on which they were now fighting with great skill. Elsewhere on the southern part of the front it appeared that the enemy's tank replacements were on a day-to-day basis when 4 US Armored Division captured an enemy tank which had only 50 kilometers on its odometer.

By 11 October the enemy's appreciation was that the threat of a British breakthrough into the North German Plains at Arnheim had been averted and that the biggest current danger was that of the American attack on Aachen. Consequently, a large amount of the enemy armor in the West converged from both the northern and southern extremities of the front on Aachen to attempt to block First US Army's penetration of the Siegfried Line north of Aachen. From the north 116 Panzer Division moved south to the Aachen area and elements of 1 SS and 2 SS Panzer Divisions which had sent some small battle groups to the Arnheim battle, came back down south to the Aachen area. On the Third US Army front the fighting continued to rage around Metz, but the enemy pulled 17 SS (Goetz von Berlichingen) Panzer Grenadier Division out of that area and left 462 z. b. V. Division and OCS Metz to hold the town. A new division arrived on the front when 416 Infantry Division moved into the line, having come from Denmark. By this shuffling of forces the enemy was trying to fill the gap caused by the movement of 3 Panzer Grenadier Division out of the line to head north, and by the attrition of his infantry forces which had almost continually been in the line since early September. Meanwhile, on the extreme northern part of the front, the enemy's Fifteenth Army in Western Holland was having difficulty in holding back the drive towards the Waal of the British and Canadian Armies which were trying to get Antwerp cleared.

Despite the enemy's determination to hold Aachen, the city was encircled by 16 October. Two Panzer-type divisions were rushed to the area to try to

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

break through to the encircled garrison, but despite strong counter-attacks by both 3 Panzer Grenadier and 2 Panzer Divisions, the city fell on 21 October. Prisoners rounded up in the city revealed that Hitler had ordered the city held at all costs and to the last man, but after the American ultimatum to surrender had been ignored, the terrific air and artillery bombardment laid down on the city weakened the will of the defenders to continue resistance. The enemy continued to build up strategic reserves in rear areas, and continuous work was being done on the area of the Cologne Plain between the Roer and Rhine Rivers. The Germans were particularly sensitive to all of our advances through the Huertgen Forest, where bitter fighting raged in the cold dank pine groves. It was becoming more and more apparent that the Germans were counting heavily on holding the Roer Dams, which controlled a sufficient volume of water to flood the Roer River valley and interrupt any Allied advance in that area. On the southern part of the 12th Army Group front the enemy continued to resist tenaciously along the Moselle and in Metz, with room-to-room fighting in progress in Maizieres-les-Metz. The paucity of enemy forces available for the defense of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar was indicated by the rapid shifting about of forces between the front of 6th Army Group, which was massed in front of the Belfort Gap, and the Third US Army front in the Metz-Nancy area.

Save for the bitter Arnheim-Nijmegen battle and the hard fighting around Metz and Aachen, the Western Front had been mainly static since the American forces swept up to the Siegfried Line in the first week of September. The best that the enemy had to offer had been small-scale counter-attacks primarily in company strength, and only occasionally in battalion strength. It was on 27 October that the enemy struck back in some strength for the first time since Mortain. With the Fifteenth Army in Northern Holland being pressed back to the Waal, the Germans apperently felt the situation in the north serious enough to launch a counter-attack in the Weert-Liesel area directed at Eindhoven. Either the enemy expected to relieve the pressure on the Fifteenth Army or else anticipated a British attack towards the Maas and the Rhine and were making a spoiling effort. The attack was made by two Panzer divisions, 9 and 15 Panzer-Grenadier, and had initial success due to the fact that 7 US Armored Division was holding a long front.

During the first three weeks in October the enemy had brought only one new division to the West, but during the last week of the month three new divisional units arrived. The enemy by now had succeeded in reorganizing his forces and the German Armies in the West once again were a formidable

opponent. After the German Seventh Army had been badly smashed at Argentan-Falaise, the German Fifteenth Army, badly depleted by trying to assist its western neighbor, was rolled back north by the advance of the British and Canadian forces along the Pas de Calais and into the Low Countries. From the south the First Army had sent its forces to the north to try to prevent the break-out of Normandy, and when it became apparent that the First Army itself was in danger of being cut off in southwestern France, made a dash to get through the Belfort Gap in front of the badly damaged Ninetheenth Army, which had been retreating from the Riviera in front of the drive of the Seventh US and First French Armies. Thus, when the Germans reached the Waal-Maas-Siegfried Line-Moselle-Belfort Gap line, they had one badly battered Army, the Fifteenth, holding in the north. The Seventh, First and Nineteenth could hardly pass under the name of Armies, and the Fifth Panzer was in only slightly better shape.

The enemy had blocked our advance through the West Wall and into Germany, a feat which was greatly facilitated by the speed of our previous advance, which had strung our supply lines to the limit and forced a necessary pause for regrouping and arranging new supply facilities. The Germans had also been assisted in the delays incumbent upon the opening of Antwerp as a supply port, delays brought about by stiff German resistance in Western Holland, by the clinging to Walcheren Island, and by the stubborn resistance around Bruges on the southern bank of the Scheldt Estuary. The reorganization of the German Armies during September and October of 1944 was carried out in three distinct phases: First, to halt the Allied advance and to man the West Wall, the enemy hastily formed battle groups from the broken divisions flooding back to Germany from the battle of France, brought numerous fortress battalions into the West Wall and rushed up training divisions from Wehrkreise in Western Germany at the expense of seriously damaging the Army's training system. The second phase was one of completing training in the line itself and of reorganizing these miscellaneous battle groups and some of the fortress battalions into disciplined and controlled divisions. During October established divisions or newly-formed division staffs absorbed many of these units. Battle groups and temporary divisions known only by the names of their commanding officers began to be replaced by recognized numbered divisions. The third phase was the withdrawal from the line of a large part of the Panzer force for complete resting and refitting. In disengaging these forces from the line and still retaining sufficient strength along the front to contain the Allied advance within reasonable limits, the enemy was greatly aided by weather which was unfavorable to Allied advance, and by Allied supply difficulties. (See Annex D.)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER VI

THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE

Early in November prisoners coming through the lines began to mention the name of a new Panzer Army being formed in the West — the Sixth SS — and it became apparent that the enemy was massing the units which he was reforming into one armored striking force. During the last week in October 269 Infantry Division arrived in Holland from Norway, 361 Infantry Division reappeared on the Third US Army front, and a reformed 91 Infantry Division, unheard of since it was destroyed in Normandy, arrived in the line in the First US Army area. The first week in November saw only one new division arrive as 18 Volksgrenadier was identified for the first time, moving into the line to relieve the last of the elements of 2 SS Panzer Division (das Reich), which went off to join the balance of Sepp Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army in the Paderborn area.

Efforts of the First US Army to get through the Huertgen Forest in early November met instantaneous enemy reaction, and 28 US Division was promptly counter-attacked by 116 Panzer Division on 4 November after it had launched its attack towards the Roer River dams. Elsewhere on the front there was little change. Mazieres-Les-Metz was finally taken, but the bitter fighting continued around the Metz fortresses. On 8 November Third US Army launched its offensive towards the Saar, smashing into the First German Army. The immediate result of the attack was that the enemy moved 11 Panzer Division from reserve back into the line. It was quickly followed by a northward movement of 21 Panzer, 106 Panzer Brigade and 361 Infantry Divisions to the threatened area. Heavy fighting raged along the Moselle as the enemy evidenced determination to hold this defensive line. Two new divisions moved into the front opposite First US Army along the front from Aachen to Trier as 272 Infantry Division was recommitted and 212 Volksgrenadier Division was moved from tactical reserve on the Russian Front into the line in the Trier area, relieving 336 Infantry Division which moved on south to face the attack of General Patton's troops. Two divisions in the West were destroyed during the first two weeks of November as 64 and 70 Infantry Divisions were wiped out defending the Scheldt Estuary.

By the beginning of the third week of November the Germans realized that a major American offensive was underway in the West. Third US Army troops were driving across the Moselle eastwards from Metz, and on 16 November the Ninth and First US Armies jumped off in a drive towards Cologne. When the northern attack was launched the enemy appeared to be somewhat stunned by the intensity of the air bombardment, which, reminiscent of the softening-up

air blow at St. Lo, had been laid on with both medium and heavy bombers. However, within two days the enemy reacted strongly and 9 Panzer Division fought back stubbornly against Ninth US Army, launching counter-attacks in platoon and company strength supported by tanks. On the Third US Army front the enemy fought a stubborn retreating action, with 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, a new formation, arriving on the front to bolster the sagging armor in the south. However, by 18 November the Germans in the south had been badly beaten and commenced large-scale and disorganized withdrawals to the north and the east towards the Siegfried Line. Metz was encircled despite the arrival of 21 Panzer Division from further south on the front. Three more enemy divisions arrived in the West during the week and the enemy was reaching deep into the Reich to pull the new troops to the battle, bringing 26 Volksgrenadier Division from Posen, 47 Infantry Division from Denmark, and 277 Infantry Division from Grafenwoehr, all to the First US Army front. Enemy strength in the West had reached a total of 66 divisions — 6 more than had been present on D-Day. The enemy had brought 18 divisions to the West in September, only 4 in October and 6 arrived in the third week in November as it became apparent to the German High Command that a big attack was in progress. All of the enemy's tactical reserve had been committed to the battle by 18 November, but the Sixth SS Panzer Army still lurked ominously in the background. Visual reconnaissance had shown heavy concentrations of troop trains moving into the Giessen area, and there was considerable training activity in the Osnabrueck region.

By the end of November intensely bitter fighting was raging along the 12th Army Group front, centering around the Aachen area in the north where the enemy was stubbornly resisting our efforts to reach the Roer River and its dams. To the south the Germans were pouring troops into the battle to parry the blow of the Third US Army towards the Saar Basin. On the southern flank 6th Army Group had opened its offensive through the Belfort Gap, and the Nineteenth German Army faced the alternatives of annihilation in the Vosges or retreat across the Rhine. During the month the enemy had brought 16 divisions to the Western Front — 10 infantry, 5 Panzer and 1 Panzer Grenadier. Despite the critical situation that was developing for the Germans with casualties approaching 100,000 for the month, they had still not committed Sixth SS Panzer Army, which loomed larger as a counter-attacking threat to our forces crossing the Roer once that river had been attained and its dams neutralized. There was no question but that the enemy regarded the Aachen offensive as the most critical. During November, to counter any Allied

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

exploitation of the break in the Siegfried Line in the Aachen area and to meet the threat to Cologne and the Ruhr, the Germans sent into the line in that area 5 infantry and 6 Panzer divisions. Some of these formed the Sixth SS Panzer Army, which had moved west across the Rhine into the immediate area of the battle but had remained uncommitted. Into the Saar battle the Germans had rushed 3 infantry, 2 Panzer and 1 Panzer Grenadier divisions. To the south, in a futile attempt to stop a blow anticipated too late, the Germans sent three infantry divisions and diverted Panzer Lehr and 25 Panzer Grenadier Divisions from Third US Army front to oppose the attack of 6th Army Group toward the Rhine between Karlsruhe and Basel.

Bad weather was hampering all of the Allied attacks at the end of November. The Ninth US Army succeeded in taking Linnich on 22 November, and First US Army captured Eschweiler the same day. Metz fell to Third US Army on 20 November after the encircled fortress city had been gradually reduced, but isolated forts filled with die-hard Nazis continued to resist. By the end of November Third US Army was closing up to the Siegfried Line on the northern part of its front and was encountering opposition from Maginot Line forts being utilized by the Germans on the right flank. The enemy's source of new divisions had apparently been strained, for four of the divisions formerly opposing 21 Army Group moved south, with 363 Infantry Division arriving in the Ninth US Army from Arnheim, 3 Parachute and 344 Infantry Divisions moving into the Huertgen Forest opposite First US Army, and 245 Infantry Division moving from Holland to the 6th Army Group area.

Throughout the first week in December very stiff fighting continued in the north on the approaches to the Roer River, with particularly bitter battles raging in the Huertgen Forest, where the enemy was determined to keep our forces away from the vital Roer Dams. Meanwhile, to the south, Third US Army was making excellent progress in its drive towards the Saar despite the best that the enemy could do. The Germans, in a desperate effort to keep our forces from reaching an unmanned Siegfried Line, threw in heavy counter-attacks with the limited Panzer forces available and used every possible device to hold the Maginot Line forts as outer defenses of the Saar. The enemy fought back desperately to regain a bridge captured intact at Saarlautern, using tremendous volumes of artillery fire and even resorting to explosive laden tanks in an effort to block off the bridgehead. Two new divisions arrived on the front during the first week in December, 326 Infantry from Denmark and 352 from Muenster, both being committed on the front of First US Army, where attrition was heaviest and where the enemy's build-up was greatest.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

On 16 December the Germans launched their biggest offensive since the beginning of the campaign in Western Europe. By taking full advantage of adverse weather conditions which restricted Allied reconnaissance, and by rigidly applying radio silence, the enemy had skillfully regrouped his forces. Simultaneous attacks were launched at five places along a seventy-mile sector of the Western Front. The skill in regrouping and launching the simultaneous attacks achieved a high degree of surprise. The element of surprise was heightened by the enemy's disregard of terrain in selecting the points of attack, and he threw armored forces into sectors considered ill-adapted for the use of tanks. The Germans' intelligence concerning our dispositions was, as usual, excellent. The attack was directed at a part of the line held in the north by two divisions seeing their first action — the 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions — and in the south against two divisions which had recently seen much action in the Huertgen Forest and were in a quiet sector of the line for rest and rehabilitation — the 28 and 4 Infantry Divisions. Ninth US Armored Division was backing up the line, but like the first two mentioned divisions, had yet to see action.

To maintain surprise as long as possible, the German attacks in many areas were initially light and had the appearance of reconnaissance in force. It was not until the night of 16—17 December that the Germans showed their hand completely and utilized airborne forces, making the greatest air effort since Normandy. The enemy had now thrown all of his available reserves into the battle. Supplies had been accumulated over a period of time. The transport of gasoline was given highest priority on roads in enemy hands to assure that the striking Panzer forces had abundant supplies. There was no question, however, but that enemy counted heavily on the surprise of his offensive resulting in the capture of our supplies to sustain his attacking forces.

The enemy's offensive into the Ardennes was launched along two principal axes. On the north Sepp Dietrich's newly-formed Sixth SS Panzer Army was committed to action for the first time as a unit. It was composed of the elite of the SS armored formations, spearheaded by 1 SS Panzer Division (Leibstendarte Adolf Hitler), 2 SS Panzer Division (Das Reich), 9 SS Panzer Division (Hohenstaufen) and 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler Jugend). This Army was given the mission of driving through Malmedy to Liege, to cut off the First and Ninth American Armies from the Armies to the south and to secure a position along the Meuse. Once this was accomplished, the German plan envisaged a continua-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

tion of the drive towards Antwerp to wrest this vital port from the Allies and to cut off the British and Canadian forces in Holland from the rest of the Allied forces. Sepp Dietrich's northern flank for his initial drive was protected by the Roer Dams, which the Germans continued to hold despite strennous efforts on our part to capture them. The Germans were well aware of the fact that we couldn't risk sending the Ninth Army across the Roer River to strike at their flank and capitalized on this protection. The southern drive was made by Manteufel's Fifth Panzer Army, spearheaded by the 2nd Panzer Division. Its mission was to drive straight through to the Meuse at Dinant and Namur and hold the southern flank of the drive. On the extreme south of the drive the German Seventh Army attacked into Luxembourg at Echternach in an effort to recapture the capitol of the Grand Duchy.

On 18 December the enemy continued to try to get through to Malmedy from Kesternich but was repeatedly thrown back by the First US Army. To the south spearheads of 1 SS Panzer Division managed to get through to Stavelot, where they encountered determined opposition from 82 US Airborne Division. The enemy made considerable gains around St. Vith, but was unable to capture this vital road junction as quickly as he would have liked because of the brilliant battle waged by Seventh US Armored Division. To the south the enemy succeeded in penetrating to the west between Bastogne and Houffalize, and cut off Bastogne from the south by crossing the Arlon-Bastogne road. By 21 December enemy Panzer units had penetrated to Samree, Laroche and Marcourt, but all efforts of 12 SS Panzer Division to capture Malmedy had been frustrated. Heavy attacks were being launched by 116 Panzer Division against beleaguered Bastogne, but 101 US Airborne Division successfully threw them back with heavy losses to the enemy. In Luxembourg the Germans captured Ettlebruck, but were held slightly to the south of the town and their penetration towards the city sealed off. On 22 December II SS Panzer Corps, with 2 and 9 SS Panzer Divisions, finally succeeded in wresting St. Vith from Seventh US Armored Division which fell back to the northwest to gain better defensive positions. A force of 20 tanks of 1 SS Panzer Division was trapped in La Gleize and wiped out. To the south the Germans pushed their southern spearhead to Rochefort but failed to budge Bastogne. By 23 December 12 SS Panzer Division gave up the effort to get through to Malmedy from the Rutgenbach-Waimes area and First US Infantry Division followed up their withdrawal. II SS Panzer Corps, having pushed through St. Vith and finding their way to Liege blocked by our forces containing 1 SS Panzer Division at Stavelot, started to swing south to work further to the west before striking northwestward again. Clear weather blessed the front

on 23 December and the Germans started to take territic casualties in motor transport and equipment as Ninth US Air Force planes started to comb the area searching for all movement by daylight. The enemy turned to night attacks, particularly around Bastogne, where the frenzy of the efforts to take the city was stepped up as Fourth US Armored Division started its drive north from Arlon towards the encircled city.

By the end of December the German preoccupation with Bastogne had cost him the initiative in the Ardennes offensive. Unable to break through in the north to Malmedy; stopped at Stavelot, and deprived of the vital communications center of Bastogne, the German drive to the west had been channelized into secondary roads which were hampering his supply problems to the extreme. It is impossible to separate the roles of stubborn Allied resistance and enemy logistic difficulties in upsetting the enemy breakthrough timetable. It is also impossible to distinguish between supply difficulties occasioned by inadequacy of transport to carry the gasoline and ammunition on the one hand, and the failure to clear sufficient roads on the other. After 25 December, though, it was clear that the enemy was unable to advance, and that his supply difficulties had become tremendous.

The enemy continued to pour troops and equipment into the battle throughout the month. On 24 December 9 Panzer Division, which had been held in reserve up until this time, tried to continue the attack with a westward thrust through Vaha, with strong efforts to drive westwards being mounted between Hotton and Laroche. On the southern part of the front 560 Infantry Division threw strong attacks against Bastogne from the east, while from the south elements of 5 Parachute Division, supported by Panzer Lehr Division, sought to broaden the corridor between Bastogne and Arlon. Concentric attacks against the city were launched from all directions on 24 December, with 15 Panzer Grenadier Division coming in from the west. On Christmas Day the elements of 1 SS Panzer Division pocketed at La Gleize were wiped out. Fierce fighting raged at Manhay, and 116 Panzer Division was stopped between Marche and Hotton. The enemy's furthest spearhead to the west, that of 2 Panzer Division, which the day before had succeeded in cutting the Ciney-Dinant road, was finally and decisively smashed and mopped up, as the bulk of the division was caught at Celles out of gasoline. The fighting was particularly bitter around Bastogne on Christmas Day, and 101 US Airborne Division took a heavy toll of the tanks and infantry of 15 Panzer Grenadier, Panzer Lehr and 26 Infantry Divisions. To the south, Fourth US Armored Division, driving north from Arlon, was rolling back the other Grenadier Regiment of 15 Panzer Division. On 26 De-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

cember II SS Panzer Corps, with Das Reich and Hohenstaufen, moved into the Manhay region to launch strong attacks to the northwest. For the next four days the enemy tried desperately to continue the momentum of his drive, but the way was blocked and the drive to the northwest definitely stopped. By 30 December the forces in the north went over to the defensive.

Bastogne was relieved on 26 December. The Germans, having lost the battle of Bastogne, concentrated their efforts on keeping the corridor through to Bastogne from the south as narrow as possible and on blocking our efforts to drive north to Houffalize -- a drive which threatened to cut off all German forces to the west and turn the Ardennes offensive into another Nazi debacle. For the next two weeks the Germans devoted their efforts to blocking on the north while building up their forces to the north of Bastogne in an effort to keep the Third US Army from breaking through. During the first week in January the enemy on the northern flank of the Ardennes salient was being gradually forced back through the difficult terrain over which the Germans fought for every defensible feature. Both to the east and west of Bastogne the enemy threw in all available forces in an effort to stop the advances towards Houffalize. Three of the four divisions of Sepp Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army turned south from their attempts to drive to the northwestward and were thrown in to assist the Fifth Panzer Army in holding around Bastogne. Meanwhile, on the southern part of the front, the enemy launched his Alsatian offensive, as 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier Divisions tried to drive southwestward from the Hagenau region in an effort to cut off Strasbourg from the north, and the German Nineteenth Army attempted to break out of the Colmar pocket.

During the second week in January enemy operations were primarily concerned with the salvage of the armored and motorized elements of the Fifth and Sixth SS Panzer Armies at the expense of the infantry divisions in the Ardennes salient. This was carried out under great difficulty, for while the weather was not the best possible for Allied air operations, the fighter bombers nevertheless were operational a large part of the time, giving the enemy no respite. The Germans lacked freedom of maneuver because of the constant Allied pressure, and a new menace to the Reich loomed up in the East as the Russians launched their winter offensive. The first indications that the enemy couldn't hold the Russians with the forces available in the East came less than a week after the Soviet forces jumped off on their winter offensive. The 711 Infantry Division, which for some time had been held in reserve on the Holland front, was identified by the Russians on the Eastern Front in the third week of January.

In the Ardennes the enemy concentrated his efforts primarily on preventing the Third US Army from driving back into Houffalize. On both the northern and southern extremes of the Ardennes salient west of Bastogne, the Germans reluctantly yielded ground as they were forced back across the Salm River and gave up St. Hubert to the south. However, by 15 January the First and Third US Armies had converged on Houffalize, and the Germans commenced to fall back slowly on St. Vith, counter-attacking continually. On the southern part of the front the enemy continued to defend successive river lines as the Third Army forces advanced first to the Wiltz and then to the Clerf Rivers. The enemy was losing 1,000 prisoners a day, and his Panzer forces were heavily in demand, not only to plug the line in the Ardennes, but also to assist the German forces in Alsace which had succeeded in making some gains towards Strasbourg from the north and south and could well use Panzer divisions to assist in their exploitation. The demands of the Russian Front, too, were becoming more pressing as the Soviet forces made sweeping gains, mauling German divisions in the process and increasing the demands made by the German High Command on the Western Front for Panzer reserves.

On 23 January the First US Army drove back into St. Vith and the Germans in the north were back to within a few miles of their start line. On the south Third US Army reached the Our River and the periphery of the Siegfried Line defenses. Sixth SS Panzer Army had by now left the front on its way to the Eastern Front, and although the enemy was still being aggressive in Alsace, he had, generally speaking, gone over to the defensive along the entire Western Front. By the end of the first week in February the enemy had pulled back into the Siegfried Line defenses, utilizing the terrain, villages as hedgehog positions, and every available device for defense. Some of the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line were found to be unmanned. The enemy strongly contested the advance of First US Army towards the Roer Dams- but was unable to stop the momentum that had been gathered. By 3 February the Urft River had been reached, and the enemy was forced again and again to recommit Panzer divisions of the Fifth Panzer Army despite desperate efforts to get this only remaining armor in the West out of the line to rest and refit before the big Allied offensive for the Rhine opened. The Alsatian offensive ended during the last week in January, and the Germans started wholesale withdrawals from that front to send divisions to the Eastern Front and to return 7 Parachute Division to Holland and its parent First Parachute Army. (See Annex E & F.)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER VIII

OFFENSIVE TO THE RHINE 9 FEBRUARY — 7 MARCH 1945

The battle of the Ardennes was over by the first week of February. The Russian offensive in the East had assumed such proportions that the Germans went completely to the defensive in the West. There was little alternative, inasmuch as the First and Third US Armies following the enemy out of the Ardennes, were keeping the Germans under constant pressure, and despite desperate efforts the enemy was unable to extricate any of his Panzer divisions from the line to rest and refit, although Rundstedt was sure that the date for the opening of our Rhine offensive was not far off. Rundstedt had already sent fifteen divisions to the Eastern Front. He knew that there would be little reinforcement available from Italy or Norway because of transportation difficulties, and could well have used the 100,000 men lost in the Ardennes.

By 10 February the threat which had been constantly facing our forces when they crossed the Roer River was removed. After extremely stiff fighting around Gemuend, the Germans were forced back to the Roer Dams. Aware of the fact that they could no longer hold the dams and thus threaten our forces to the north waiting to cross the river and drive on Cologne, the enemy decided to blow the dams, flood the river, and thus delay our attack for a week or two. On 10 February, as our forces drove up to the approaches of the dams, the Germans blew the outlets and flooded the river. All movement on the Ninth and First US Army fronts was effectively stalemated for the period as the flooded river prevented the continuation of the drive to the east.

In the Eifel, Third US Army, giving the enemy no respite, continued its drive into the Siegfried Line. Over 30 enemy divisions were now contained by the aggressive defensive being waged on 12th Army Group front, and although Rundstedt was constantly pulling out his Panzer divisions, the continued attack forced them back in as the Our, Sauer and Pruem Rivers were crossed. Elsewhere along the front, the German Nineteenth Army was finally driven out of the Colmar pocket, and all possibilities of a flank attack towards Strasbourg eliminated. Enemy movement during the second week of February was eastward and northward from the Eifel as the Germans tried to build up mobile reserves on the Cologne Plain to oppose the coming attack.

On 9 February the First Canadian Army launched the opening drive southeastward through the Reichswald towards Wesel. The result was to immediately attract divisions which had been waiting for the attack towards the

Rhine in the Cologne Plain. Both 15 Panzer Grenadier and 116 Panzer Divisions moved north to face the attack of the Canadians and British, and 8 Parachute Division moved north from the Roermand area to fall in line with 7 Parachute Division, which was just returning from the Alsatian battle. The pressure of the Third US Army through the Eifel continued to contain German divisions anxiously trying to break loose for the northern battle. During the third week in February the city of Pruem was taken and the pressure increased on Bitburg, one of the vital centers of communications in the Eifel. In the Saar-Moselle triangle, a limited-objective attack by 94 US Infantry Division started to turn into a rout as 11 Panzer Division received a hurry call to report to the Cologne area and moved out, leaving the badly battered 416 and 256 Infantry Divisions to hold. The enemy was using a deliberate economy policy in the West. Having exhausted considerable reserves of gasoline and ammunition in the Ardennes, the Germans were doing their utmost to conserve these critically short items in preparation for the coming defensive battle. German artillery fired on a considerably reduced scale, and on some days was almost totally inactive along the Roer River front, where the flooded river gave them temporary security. In the Eifel, tanks and self-propelled guns were used from dug-in positions to conserve gasoline.

On 23 February the main assault for the Rhine jumped off as Ninth US Army smashed across the Roer River with one corps of First US Army initially protecting its flank. The assault ran into stubborn enemy resistance, with machine-gun and artillery fire delaying the initial bridging attempts. The enemy had succeeded in getting the bulk of 9 Panzer Division to the battle area and it was rushed into the fight. 11 Panzer followed suit, although it had taken a beating from our Air Forces en route from the Trier area, and some of its elements had never succeeded in getting out of the Eifel. By the time the offensive was launched across the Roer, the Third US Army had pinched out the Eifel bulge, cleared the Saar-Moselle triangle, and seized bridgeheads across the Saar.

By 25 February Dueren had been captured, the Pruem and Nims Rivers had been forced and the German line west of the Rhine was in imminent danger of disintegration. Bitburg was captured on 28 February, and Trier fell on 1 March with the added advantage of an intact Moselle bridge which some negligent enemy demolition squad had failed to destroy. The Ninth US Army smashed through enemy resistance in its drive towards the Ruhr, capturing Muenchen-Gladbach and continuing towards Neuss, despite the fact that Panzer Lehr, 15 Panzer Grenadier Division and elements of other divisions which had been opposing the British-Canadian drive through the Reichswald had turned to face

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

them. After initially heavy resistance, the First US Army crossed the Erft River — last barrier before Cologne and the Rhine — and swept southwards towards Euskirchen, which was captured on 4 March. By the end of the first week in March the Germans were in full retreat and withdrawing their forces across the Rhine. Three of the five German Armies west of the Rhine had been severely crippled. In the Eifel the German Seventh Army had been smashed relentlessly back by Third US Army, while on the Cologne Plain the Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies had been cut to pieces. In the north First Parachute Army was moving eastward across the Rhine, battered. By 13 March 125,000 prisoners had been rounded up in the West since the British opened their offensive on 9 February. (See Annex G.)

CHAPTER IX

THE CROSSING OF THE RHINE

Cologne fell on 5 March, and the First US Army turned south to drive down the Rhine. On 7 March 9 US Armored Division, driving down the west bank of the river, found the railway bridge at Remagen still intact upon its arrival, and promptly took the opportunity to drive across the river and establish the first bridgehead over the Rhine. The same day resistance on the Third Army front disintegrated. 4 US Armored Division broke loose and smashed through to the banks of the Rhine and Moselle by 8 March. The enemy in the Eifel was cut to shreds and all signs of organized resistance started to disappear as Third Army rounded up some 40,000 prisoners.

The Germans poured troops to the Remagen area in an effort to contain the American bridgehead, but, despite a continual arrival of reinforcements, they were not only unable to hold the bridgehead but were forced to gradually give ground. Very heavy fighting raged for the Koeln-Frankfurt autobahn, and around Honnef and Honnigen at the extremes of the bridgehead. Meanwhile, on 13 March Third US Army opened the offensive into the Palatinate by driving across the Moselle River into the mountainous terrain of the Hunsrueck. The remnants of the German Seventh Army, which had fallen apart in the Eifel, attempted to put up some defense along the Moselle, but only in the vicinity of Trier were the Germans sufficiently able to take advantage of the terrain to put up even a holding action. 4 US Armored Division broke loose to reach Bad Kreuznach. On 18 March Koblenz fell, and the following day St. Wendel, in the heart of the Palatinate, was taken. On 19 March alone Third Army took 18,000 prisoners, and the destruction of the German Seventh and First Armies was nearing completion. The enemy divisions still in the Siegfried Line along the Saar facing the American Seventh and First French Armies started a hurried exit as General Patton's forces started driving down on them from the north. Kaiserslautern fell on 20 March, and the Rhine was reached and Mainz and Worms taken on 22 March. The Saar-Palatinate had been cleared and some 150,000 prisoners taken in ten day's time.

German strategy had become completely one of improvisation. All German forces had been driven east of the Rhine, but only the First Parachute Army in the Wesel area had possessed sufficient time to rest and bring up reinforcements. The Remagen bridgehead had attracted all other available divisions

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

in the West and kept the enemy from building up any force on the east bank of the Rhine.

On 23 March Third US Army crossed the Rhine. The 5 US Infantry Division crossed the River south of Mainz, while two days later the 87 US Infantry Division crossed south of Koblenz, followed by 89 US Infantry Division. On 23 March, too, the British and Canadian forces and Ninth US Army, with the aid, of an airborne landing, crossed the river in the Wesel area, and the Rhine barrier had been breached from Emmerich to Karlsruhe. (See Annex H.)

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF THE RUHR

On 26 March the First US Army opened its offensive out of the Remagen bridgehead. Despite the effort of the enemy to contain the bridgehead with one-half of the Panzer divisions and one-fifth of the infantry divisions in the West, 9 US Armored Division broke through the enemy ring and started to drive southeastwards to link up with the Third US Army. Meanwhile, to the south Darmstadt had been captured on 25 March and 4 US Armored Division had driven to the Hanau — Aschaffenburg area. Stiff enemy resistance was encountered there, with elements of three of the divisions which had been practically destroyed in the Palatinate offering stubborn opposition. On 28 March First and Third US Armies linked up, and together formed one giant spearhead in the Frankfurt gap pointed at Kassel.

The encirclement of the Ruhr took one week. On 23 March the Ninth Army drove across the Rhine in the north and the First Army broke out of the Remagen bridgehead. By 31 March 3 US Armored Division had driven north to the Paderborn area, where the first pitched battle since the break-out at Remagen occurred against SS troops and tank crews from the Bielefeld—Paderborn tank depots. The resistance of this ad hoc unit, known as SS Westphalia, was broken in three days, although the unit continued to fight until wiped out in the Harz pocket. On 1 April the Ruhr pocket was closed at Lippstadt by the meeting of 2 US Armored Division driving east from the Düsseldorf area, and 3 US Armored Division coming from the south.

Army Group B, with the bulk of the Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies, and elements of First Parachute Army, including a total of six corps and the major elements of 17 divisions plus some 100,000 flak troops, had been encircled in the Ruhr. The Germans were given no time to organize their defenses for a pocket battle. Initially, attempts were made to break out at Soest, with 116 Panzer Division driving from inside the pocket and SS Westphalia from the Bielefeld area, but all attempts were futile. Two of the parachute divisions from First Parachute Army offered strong opposition to attacks southwards towards the Ruhr River, but were eventually pushed back. On the southern flank, the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

strongest resistance was on the southeastern periphery where Panzer Lehr, 3 Panzer Grenadier and 9 Panzer Divisions, under Corps Bayerlein, tried to hold.

Field Marshal Model's forces in the Ruhr were able to hold out less than 18 days. By 18 April all organized resistance had ceased and the last of the 325,000 prisoners were being rounded up.

Meanwhile, with Army Group B encircled in the Ruhr, the best that the Germans could place against the eastward drive of 12th Army Group were quickly formed battle groups and divisions hastily grouped under newly-organized Armies. On 3 April Kassel, Gotha and Ohrdruf were taken, and the main headquarters of OKW in Thuringia overrun, with many valuable files captured. Eisenach fell on 6 April, and the end of the first week of the month saw 231,000 prisoners taken by 12th Army Group alone. On 10 April Hannover and Brunswick were captured, and the following day 2 US Armored Division reached the Elbe at Magdeburg. Resistance developed in the Harz Mountains, and prisoners told of a newly-formed Eleventh Army which was to hold the Harz area as a center of resistance.

Prisoners during the third week of April were being taken by 12th Army Group at the rate of 100,000 a day as German resistance in the West crumbled completely. On 16 April, the day that Third US Army reached the frontier of Czechoslovakia, 180,000 prisoners were taken by the Army Group, a figure which contrasted with prisoner hauls for the entire Western Front of 344,000 in September, 109,000 during the November offensive, 81,000 in February, 349,611 in March. That was the start of the debacle. In the six weeks from the first of March 1,200,000 prisoners had been taken on the Western Front: 750,000 by 12th Army Group in the first 16 days of April.

On 19 April the Harz Mountain region was encircled, and eventually over 50,000 prisoners were taken from the area, marking the end of the Eleventh German Army, one of the shortest careers of a German Army in the field. Panzer Division Clausewitz attempted to infiltrate through Ninth US Army to reach the Harz, with a faint possibility of recapturing Hannover, but after initial successes the division was smashed. On 25 April Russian forces met those of 12th Army Group at Torgau. First and Ninth US Armies entered on a stage of inactivity, waiting for the Russian forces to close with them, while Third Army drove southeastwards across the Regen and Danube Rivers. 6th

Army Group completed its drive through the Black Forest, and cleaned out the Mountain Redoubt around Salzburg.

By 9 May, when the war officially ended, principal activity on 12th Army Group front consisted of rounding up Germans fleeing from the advancing Russians. The German Armies opposing 21 Army Group in the north had surrendered, those in Italy had capitulated, and it remained only for a formal act to ratify an accomplished fact. Thus, eleven months and three days after invasion, and three months to the day after the preliminary assault through the Siegfried Line toward the Rhine, the German Army laid down its arms in unconditional surrender. (See Annex I and J.)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER XI

DIVISIONS ENCOUNTERED ON THE WESTERN FRONT FROM 6 JUNE 1944 TO 9 MAY 1945

Division Alpen	Partly formed div. Early Apr 45 in Württemberg. Absorbed by 2 Mtn and 212 Inf Divs.
Barenthin Prcht Div	Apr 45 in NW Germany.
Pz Div von Clausewitz	Middle of Apr 45 W of Elbe.
Division Donau	Apr 45 in S. Germany, known as "Shadow Division".
Div Erdmann	Prcht tps in Venlo area in Oct 44. Renamed 7 Prcht Div.
Div Hamburg	Partly formed div. Late Mar 45 in Ruhr. Absorbed by 180 Inf Div.
Div von Hobe	Staff with misc units. Late Apr 45 in S. Germany.
Div von Huetten	Middle Apr 45 on Elbe.
Div Kossuth	Late Apr 45 in S. Germany.
Pz Lehr Div	Encountered in Normandy. Badly mauled. Retreat across France. Reformed Sept-Nov. Counter-attacking in Upper Saar Valley late Nov; mauled again in Ardennes. Committed area Cleve; Remagen Bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
Div Potsdam	Middle of Apr W of Elbe. Destroyed in Harz pocket.
Div Rassler	Palatinate Mar 44. Renamed 616 Div z. b. V.
Police Div Rauter	Middle of Apr in Holland.
Div Scharnhorst	Middle of Apr W of Elbe.
Div Tettau	Div staff controlling misc tps in Holland since early Oct 44. Left for East Front in late Jan. Probably renamed 604 Div z. b. V.
Div Walther	Controlled misc units in Venlo area in Oct 44. Dissolved.

1 SS Pz Div	Normandy. Mortain pocket. Badly battered. Reformed in Westphalia in Oct. In Dec Ardennes. Left for East Front.
1 GAF Tng Div	Middle of Sept-middle of Oct in Belfort-Besancon area. Absorbed by other divs.
2 Naval Div	Apr 45 NW Germany.
2 Mtn Div	Late Jan 45 Colmar pocket. Reformed after being practically destroyed. Early Mar Moselle. Severely beaten. Apr 45 S Germany.
2 SS Pz Div	Normandy. Mortain pocket. Reformed in Westphalia Oct-Dec after having been badly battered. In Dec Ardennes. Left for East Front.
2 Pz Div	13 June, Normandy. Mortain pocket. Seine. West Wall. After being badly cut up, reformed in Bitburg area Nov-Dec. Ardennes. Cut up again. Heavy losses in Bitburg area. Darmstadt. Bayreuth. Czechoslovakia.
2 Prcht Div	Brittany. Middle of Sept 44 destroyed at Brest. Reformed in Holland. Feb in Arnheim area. Wesel bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
3 Pz Gr Div	Late Aug in E France. Oct Aachen. Badly mauled and reformed. Ardennes. Battle of the Roer River Dams. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
3 Prcht Div	Normandy. Destroyed in Mortain pocket. Reformed in Holland. Dec Dueren. Ardennes. Badly battered. Reformed. Early Mar severely mauled W of Rhine. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
5 Prcht Div	Destroyed in Normandy. Reformed in Holland. Ardennes. Badly battered. Reformed. Mar 45 severely beaten W of Rhine. Destroyed in Harz pocket.
6 Prcht Div	Late Aug W of Paris. Retreat through Belgium to Maas. Destroyed. Reformed in Holland. Oct-Nov along Maas. Wesel bridgehead. NW Germany till end.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6 SS Mtn Div	Counter-offensive in Hardt Mountains early Jan 45. Mar 45 Trier sector. Early Apr destroyed in Central Germany.
7 Prcht Div	Former Div Erdmann. Venlo area Nov-Dec 44. Alsace counter-offensive Jan 44. Wesel bridgehead Feb. Northwest Germany to the end.
8 Prcht Div	Took over units of 606 z. b. V. Div. Early Feb 45 in Roermond area. Wesel bridgehead. NW Germany to end.
9 inf Div	Ardennes. Badly battered. Bitburg breakthrough. Frankfurt. Destroyed W of Nuernberg early Apr.
9 Pz Div	Middle of Aug. W of Paris. Badly battered E of Paris. Reformed. Nijmegen in Sept. Oct. Venlo. Nov Aachen. Ardennes. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
9 SS Pz Div	Normandy. Mortain pocket. Battered. Retreat through Belgium and Holland. Arnheim. Reformed Oct-Dec in Westphalia. Ardennes. Severely beaten. Left for East Front.
10 SS Pz Div	Normandy. Mortain pocked. Battered. Mons pocket. Arnheim. Reforming in Holland and Westphalia Oct-Dec. Counter-offensive in Alsace middle of Jan. Left for East Front.
11 Pz Div	Covered retreat up Rhone Valley from S France in Aug 44. E of Nancy in Sept to Nov. Reformed. Saar-Moselle triangle. Jan. Feb battered W of Cologne. Remagen bridgehead. Area Plauen. Czechoslovakia.
11 Naval Div	W Holland Apr 45.
12 SS Pz Div	Normandy. Battered. Retreat France-Belgium. Reformed in Westphalia Oct-Dec 44. Ardennes. Battered. Left for East Front.

12 Inf Div	Aachen area middle of Sept to middle of Dec. Badly battered; reformed in line. Ardennes. Badly mauled. Reformed. Feb W of Cologne. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket
15 Pz Gren Div	Aug-Oct Lorraine. Venlo-Aachen area. Ardennes. Wesel bridgehead. NW Germany. Bremen.
16 Inf Div	Retreat from S France. Sept-Dec Vosges Mts. Severely mauled in Colmar pocket. Bitche. Destroyed in Black Forest.
16 GAF Div	Destroyed in Normandy.
16 Naval Div	Apr 45 in Holland.
17 SS Pz Gr Div	10 June. Practically destroyed in Normandy. Reformed in E France. Sept-Nov Metz area. Nov-Mar Lorraine-Saar. Retreat across S Germany into Alps to the end.
17 GAF Div	In Aug 44 destroyed in battle for Seine.
18 GAF Div	In late Aug destroyed on Seine N of Paris.
18 Inf Div	Nov-Dec 44 Eifel. Ardennes. Eifel. Coblenz. Absorbed by 26 Inf Div early in Apr 45.
19 Inf Div	Sept 44-Mar 45 Lorraine-Saar. Destroyed in Palatinate Mar 45.
21 Prcht Div	Apr 45 Holland.
21 Pz Div	Normandy. Mortain pocket. Sept-Dec Lorraine. Counter-offensive in Upper Alsace early Jan 45. Left for East Front.
25 Pz Gren Div	Middle of Nov-middle of Dec Lorraine. Counter-attack in Upper Alsace in Jan. Left for East Front.
25 SS Gren Div	Apr 45 S Germany.
26 Inf Div	Middle of Nov in Eifel. Ardennes. Eifel-Rhine. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Harz pocket.
30 SS Inf Div	Oct-Dec Belfort-Besancon area. Dissolved, Mar 45.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

30 Mob Brig	Destroyed in Normandy.
34 SS Gren Div	Holland Feb 45 to the end.
36 Inf Div	Trier area middle of Sept. Nov Lorraine-Saar. Hardt Mtns, Jan-Mar. Nuernberg. Austria.
38 SS Gren Div	Apr S Germany. Austria.
47 Inf Div	E of Seine. Destroyed in Mons pocket. Reformed in Denmark. Dueren middle of Nov. Badly beaten and reformed. Jan Upper Alsace. Apr Wurttemberg.
48 Inf Div	Middle of Aug W of Paris. Lorraine from Sept until destroyed there middle of Nov. Staff controlling misc. units destroyed in Black Forest Apr 45.
49 Inf Div	Late Aug 44 Seine. Aachen middle of Sept. Destroyed in Nov.
59 Inf Div	Early Sept Channel Coast. Bruges. Oct S of Maas. Badly battered. Reformed. Jan-Mar Roer River. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
62 Inf Div	Ardennes counter-offensive. Eifel. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
63 Inf Div	Apr 45 Holland.
64 Inf Div	Early Sept 44 N France. Bruges. Destroyed in Breskens area Oct 44.
70 Inf Div	Early Sept 44 Ghent. Destroyed on Walcheren Island Oct 44.
77 Inf Div	Destroyed in Normandy.
79 Inf Div	Ardennes counter-offensive. Eifel. Badly battered. Palatinate. S. Germany.
84 Inf Div	Early Aug 44 Normandy. Almost completely destroyed in Mortain pocket. Reformed. Oct 44-Mar 45 Reichswald. Severely mauled in Canadian attack on Cleve. Reformed. NW Germany.

85 Inf Div	Normandy. Badly battered. Reformed. " Lower Maas River Battle" Oct-Dec. Dec-Feb Roer River Dams. Absorbed by 3 Prcht Div Feb 45.
89 Inf Div	Normandy. Mortain pocked. Destroyed S of Seine Sept. Reformed. N Eifel Oct 44-Feb 45. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed. Staff controlling misc. units destroyed in Black Forest, Apr 45.
91 Inf Div	Destroyed in Normandy. Reformed. Eifel late Oct. Absorbed by 344 Inf Div late Nov.
106 Inf Div	Apr 45 area Karlsruhe. Destroyed in Black Forest.
116 Pz Div	Normandy. Argentan-Falaise gap. Aachen. Arnheim. Counter-attack against Schmidt early Nov. Reformed. Ardennes. Battered. Reformed. Cleve Feb. Reformed. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
136 Inf Div z. b. V.	Sept 44 Antwerp-Maastricht area, destroyed.
148 Tng Div	S France middle Aug 44. Franco-Italian Alps.
157 Tng Div	S France middle Aug 44. Franco-Italian Alps.
159 Inf Div	Retreat from Bay of Biscay. Very heavy losses. Reformed. Sept-Nov Besancon-Belfort. Upgraded from tng div to inf div. Colmar pocket. S of Coblenz Mar. Destroyed on Third Army Rhine bridgehead.
166 Inf Div	Late Mar. 45 Central Germany. Destroyed in Harz pocket.
167 Inf Div	Late Dec Ardennes. Severely beaten in Eifel. Destroyed in Central Germany late Mar 45.
172 Div NR	Destroyed Wiesbaden-Frankfurt late Mar. 45.
172 Div z. b. V.	Apr 45 NW Germany.
176 Inf Div	Upgraded from z. b. V. div late Nov. 44. Antwerp-Maastricht area early Sept 44. Roermond area Oct 44-Mar 45. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

180 Inf Div	Upgraded from 180 Tng Div in Nov 44. Sept 44-Feb 45 E of Maas River. Wesel bridgehead. Decimated. Reformed. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
183 Inf Div	Sept 44-Mar 45 Roer River. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
189 Inf Div	Upgraded from Tng Div in Nov 44. Aug 44 S France. Sept 44-Nov 44 Vosges Mtns. Colmar pocket. Severely beaten. Reformed. Apr S Germany.
190 Inf Div	Upgraded from Tng Div in Nov 44. E of Maas River, Sept 44-Mar 45. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
198 Inf Div	S France middle of Aug. Vosges Mtns Sept-Nov 44. Colmar pocket. Battered. Reformed. Mar Palatinate. S Germany.
212 Inf Div	Trier area Nov 44-Mar 45. Palatinate. S Germany.
226 Inf Div	Sept N France. Dunkerque to the end.
242 Inf Div	Destroyed in S France Aug 44.
243 Inf Div	Destroyed in Normandy.
244 Inf Div	Destroyed in S France.
245 Inf Div	Early Sept N France. Oct-Nov S of Maas River. N Alsace Dec-Feb. Reformed in Holland. Apr 45 NW Germany.
246 Inf Div	Oct 44-Jan 45 Aachen. Severely battered. Eifel Feb. Palatinate Mar. S Germany Apr.
256 Inf Div	Holland S of Maas River Oct-Nov. Dec 44-Jan 45 N Alsace. Feb Saar-Moselle triangle. Battered. S Germany.
257 Inf Div	Dec 44 Hardt Mtns. Haguenau area Feb. April S Germany.
265 Inf Div	Destroyed in Normandy. Elms in Lorient and St. Nazaire.
266 Inf Div	Elms destroyed in Normandy, bulk of div destroyed in Brest and Crozon Peninsula.

269 Inf Div	Nov 44 Vosges Mtns. Colmar pocket. Left for East Front Jan 45.
271 Inf Div	Battered in Normandy. Destroyed in Mortain pocket.
272 Inf Div	Normandy. Mortain pocket. Destroyed Aug-Sept N France. Reformed. Eifel Nov 44-Mar 45. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
275 Inf Div	Virtually destroyed in Normandy. Reformed. Aachen area Sept-Nov. Remnants absorbed by 344 Inf Div.
276 Inf Div	Destroyed in Normandy. Reformed. Jan Ardennes. Mar Eifel. Destroyed in Central Germany.
277 Inf Div	Normandy. Destroyed in Mortain pocket. Reformed. Nov Eifel. Remagen bridgehead. Absorbed by 272 Inf Div late Mar.
319 Inf Div	Bulk of div on Channel Islands for entire campaign. Elements in St. Malo.
325 Inf Div	NW Germany Apr 45.
326 Inf Div	Normandy. Destroyed in Mortain pocket. Reformed. Dec Eifel. Jan Ardennes. Battered. Eifel. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Central Germany.
331 Inf Div	Middle of Aug Normandy. Mortain pocket. Virtually destroyed W of Seine River. Elements in Holland from Oct on.
338 Inf Div	Late Aug 44 S of Paris. Sept-Nov Belfort area. Virtually destroyed. Reformed. Colmar pocket. Battered. Mar 45 Krefeld area. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
340 Inf Div	Late Nov 44 Roer River. Ardennes. Eifel. Remagen bridgehead. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
343 Inf Div	Elements in Normandy. Bulk of div destroyed at Brest and Crozon Peninsula.
344 Inf Div	Destroyed S of Seine late Aug 44. Partially reformed. Nov Roermond. Units taken over by 606 z. b. V. Div. Dec misc. components at Dueren. Destroyed.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

346 Inf Div	Normandy. Channel ports. Severe losses. Holland S of Maas. Reformed. Nov Lower Maas. Apr Arnheim area.
347 Inf Div	N France late Aug. Sept S of Aachen. Remnants absorbed by 275 Inf Div. Reformed. Saarbruecken area Nov 44-Mar 45. Destroyed in Thuringia.
348 Inf Div	Severely beaten in N France and Belgium Sept 44. Aachen. Left Western Front late Sept.
352 Inf Div	Destroyed in Normandy. Reformed. Dec-Feb Eifel. Remnants absorbed by 9 Inf Div. Apr 45 S Germany. Destroyed in Black Forest.
353 Inf Div	Virtually destroyed in Normandy. Sept Aachen area. Remnants absorbed by 275 Inf Div. Reformed. Eifel Oct. Dec Roer River. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
361 Inf Div	Late Sept Nijmegen. Oct-Jan Lorraine. Battered. Reformed. Apr Holland.
363 Inf Div	Normandy. Destroyed in Mortain pocket. Reformed. Oct Arnheim. Dec-Mar Roer River. Destroyed in Ruhr pocket.
404 Div z. b. V.	Saxony Apr 45.
405 Div z. b. V.	Dec 44-Apr 45 Baden. Renumbered 719 Inf Div Apr 45. Destroyed in Black Forest.
406 Div z. b. V.	Oct-Feb Geldern area. Eifel. Mar Roermond. Destroyed W of Rhine River.
409 Div NR	Apr 45 S Germany.
413 Div NR	Apr 45 Central Germany. Czechoslovakia.
416 Inf Div	Saar-Moselle triangle Oct 44. Severely beaten there in late Feb. Partially reformed. S Germany to the end.
462 Inf Div	Upgraded from Div NR. Lived and died in Metz area Sept-Nov 44.
465 Div NR	April 45 S Germany.
466 Div z. b. V.	Westphalia Mar 45. Destroyed in Central Germany.

467 Div NR	S Germany May 45.
469 Div NR	Apr 45 Central Germany.
470 Div z. b. V.	May 45 NW Germany.
471 Div NR	NW Germany Apr 45.
476 Div z. b. V.	Mar 45 W of Cologne. Destroyed in Harz pocket.
480 Div z. b. V.	April 45 NW Germany.
490 Div z. b. V.	April 45 NW Germany.
526 Inf Div	Sept Oct Aachen. Units absorbed by 347 and 89 Inf Divs.
553 Inf Div	Early Sept 44 Nancy. Lorraine. Virtually destroyed Nov 44. Reformed. Jan S of Karlsruhe. Mar Mannheim. Destroyed in Black Forest.
559 Inf Div	Sept 44 Lorraine. Virtually destroyed there Nov. Reformed. Saar counter-offensive. Jan-Mar Palatinate. S Germany. Destroyed in Black Forest.
560 Inf Div	Ardennes counter-offensive. Severely beaten. Eifel. Destroyed in Palatinate Mar 45.
604 Div z. b. V.	Jan 45 Holland. Left for East Front.
606 Div z. b. V.	Dec 44 Roermond area. Units taken over by 8 Prcht Div Feb 45.
616 Div z. b. V.	Formerly Div Raessler. Apr 45 S Germany.
650 Russian Div	Also known as 2 Russian SS Div. Apr 45 S Germany.
708 Inf Div	Aug 44 Laval. Mortain pocket. Severely beaten. Reformed. Vosges Mtns Nov-Jan. Destroyed in Colmar pocket.
709 Inf Div	Destroyed Cherbourg Peninsula.
711 Inf Div	Normandy, Channel ports. Severely beaten. Reformed. Holland S of Maas River. Left for East Front Jan 45.
712 Inf Div	N France early Sept. Antwerp. Battered. Reformed. Oct 44-Jan 45 Holland. Left for East Front.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

716 Inf Div	Virtually destroyed in Normandy. Reformed in S France. Retreat up Rhone Valley. Sept-Nov Vosges Mtns. Battered. Reorganized. Colmar pocket. Heavy losses. Reformed. S Germany Apr.
719 Inf Div	Early Sept Albert Canal. Holland S of Maas River. Battered. Reformed. Saarlautern area Dec 44-Mar 45. Virtually destroyed. 405 Div NR renamed 719 Inf Div. Destroyed in Black Forest.
805 Div NR	Upgraded from z. b. V. Div. Freiburg area Feb-Aug 45. Renamed 352 Inf Div.
905 Div NR	Upgraded from z. b. V. Div. Baden-Baden area Feb-Mar. E Palatinate. Absorbed by other divs late Mar 45.
Fuehrer Escort Brig	Encountered in Bulge. Badly beaten. Left for East Front in late Jan.
Fuehrer Gren Brig	Encountered in Bulge. Badly beaten. Left for East Front in late Jan.
Pz Brigades: 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113	Sept-Oct on all parts of front from Vosges Mtns to Arnheim. All destroyed or absorbed by Pz divs except 106 Pz Brigade which fought in Alsace until Feb and then went to Cologne area. It was destroyed in Ruhr pocket.

Study No. 2

A REPORT OF OPERATIONS

OF THE

ENEMY TERRAIN AND DEFENSE SECTION

OF THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Study No. 2

INDEX

Chapter		Page
I	INTRODUCTION	51
	Section I Purpose of the Report	51
	Section II Method of Presentation	51
	Section III Acknowledgements	52
II	REVIEW OF OPERATIONS	53
	Section I The Terrain and Defense Section	53
	Section II Operations Prior to Invasion	53
	Section III Operations in Normandy	56
	Section IV Operations Across France	58
	Section V Operations in Western Germany	60
	Section VI Operations in Germany	64
III	EVOLUTION OF TECHNIQUES	69
	Section I Terrain	69
	Section II Defenses	72
IV	CONCLUSIONS	77
	Section I General Conclusions	77
	Section II The Primary Mission	77
	Section III Analysis of the Primary Mission	78
	Section IV Secondary Missions	82

Plates: PLATES AND APPENDICES (in separate binder)

1. Index of Terrain Studies (Map)
2. Generalized Enemy Terrain (Western Germany)
3. Terrain Models (Photographs)*
4. Defense Overprint (Koeln Plain)
5. Defense Overprint (Echternach Area)

Appendices:

A. Terrain South of the Ruhr
B. Terrain in the Pfalzer Bergland
C. The Trier Area
D. Terrain Appreciation of the Redoubt
D-1, Compartmentation
D-2, Avenues of Approach
E. Maginot Inundation System
F. Ertt River Defense Line

* With text, opposite page 66

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

1. The report has been prepared to serve three purposes. The principal purpose is to assess the relative priority of the several assigned missions. A second purpose is to examine procedures in the light of experience and make recommendations. Finally, the report is intended to record the historical narrative of operations.

SECTION II. METHOD OF PRESENTATION

2. The historical record of operations of the Terrain and Defense Section is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of procedures and techniques. In Chapter 4 conclusions are drawn with respect to the priority of assigned missions. Recommendations and suggestions embodied in the conclusions are separated from the text and printed in italics in Chapter 4.

3. The report is designed for staff use. Typical examples of work are appended and referred to in the text. They are submitted more for the critical inspection of staff officers than as models of correct work. They illustrate evolutionary procedures which were never crystallized.

4. A more complete documentation is available in the official file of the Weekly Intelligence Summary of the 12th Army Group. Most of the original studies were prepared specifically as visual aids to staff briefings and have been destroyed. In lieu of documentation of these studies, the narrative account of operations in Chapter 2 has been extended to cover details in the preparation of such studies. In addition, Chapter 3 presents specific techniques.

5. Chapter 4, entitled Conclusions, may be considered a seperate summary of principles, responsibilities and procedures which are of especial interest to staff officers.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

6. The cooperation and confidence of staff officers of Headquarters 12th Army Group is acknowledged as a major contribution. Without this cooperation and confidence it would have been impossible to accomplish the assigned mission. If the Commander is accessible and receptive, if G-2 and G-3 have confidence in the section, if the Engineer and his staff are cooperative, and if the G-3 Plans Section is appreciative of the service rendered, then the section is in a position to give maximum service. Such cooperation is fully acknowledged at Headquarters 12th Army Group. The section is especially indebted to the Engineers and to G-2 (Air) for their contribution.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF OPERATIONS

SECTION I. THE TERRAIN AND DEFENSE SECTION

1. The Terrain and Defense Section was organized in London to operate under the Intelligence Branch of G-2, First United States Army Group (FUSAG). The Section performed staff duties pertaining to intelligence from 1 March 1944 to 8 May 1945.

2. The Section was headed by an officer who supervised all work and specialized in terrain appreciation. A second officer specialized in the study of enemy defense trends. Two draftsmen assisted. One of these enlisted men was trained to assists in terrain study, the other in defense, although both were used on tasks of urgent priority.

3. The Section was organized as follows:

1 Lieutenant Colonel	— Head of Section and Terrain Specialist.
1 Major	— Defense Specialist.
1 Tec 4	— Draftsman, especially Terrain.
1 Tec 4	— Draftsman, especially Defense.

4. The Section was held responsible for four duties: the evaluation and interpretation of enemy terrain and defense installations, advance reports covering Army Group Headquarters sites or bivouac areas, the operation map library for G-2 personnel.

SECTION II. OPERATIONS PRIOR TO THE INVASION

5. Work within the section was divided between routine procedure and special assignments. The officers examined a continuous flow of information. Fertinent items were filtered and fitted into a picture of the current situation. Other echelons received the same basic material in routine distribution, so that no dissemination was required except to the staff of Army Group. Defense information was plotted on a wall map. Trends bearing on enemy capabilities were identified and reported to the staff during daily briefings. Terrain information in the form of basic data bucked to the section was filed in a library. This information was used to prepare terrain appreciations as they were required. Reading and screening consumed more than 50 per cent of the time of both officers.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Prior to the invasion, terrain appreciations were prepared as special assignments ordered by the Deputy to A C of S, G-2. There were two types of report, one as an Annex to a Plan, the other as part of a blanket program to cover selected areas of Europe.

c. Both types of report followed the form prescribed in the Staff Officers Field Manuel (FM 101—5). The second type of report was prepared primarily for distribution to lower echelons as a form of service. Northern Europe was arbitrarily divided into a mosaic pattern of areas. Each of these areas were to be covered by a separate terrain report. Since terrain was not considered from a known or assumed situation, it was difficult to present "Critical Terrain Features" or "Tactical Effect of the Terrain". Terrain could not be evaluated with respect to an oriented approach, objectives, or subsequent line of action. The reports were, therefore, merely basic data rewritten. Since lower echelons already had the same basic data, and would examine it from the particular viewpoint of their own echelon, this service was discontinued at the time of the invasion.

b. Prior to the invasion it was assumed that the primary responsibility of the Terrain and Defense Section was to render service to lower echelons. Inter-staff responsibility was considered secondary. After the Army Group received tactical command these concepts were modified. Demands of tactical operation emphasized the importance of inter-staff service.

c. The data on which terrain appreciations were based were distributed through normal channels to all interested headquarters, including Army Group. The most valuable authorities were ISTD (Inter-Service Topographic Department) and NID (Naval Intelligence Division). Both were essentially British sources.

d. Prior to the invasion, G-3 Plans Section prepared plans of operations covering various supplemental and alternate phases of the basic operation "OVERLORD". Intelligence annexes to these plans included terrain and defense appreciations. These appreciations were unlike those prepared for general downward distribution since they were oriented with respect to an assumed operation. Approaches and corridors in one direction were of more interest than in any other direction. Studies were made of the Cotentin Peninsula, Normandy and Brittany. Studies involving amphibious and airborne operations were made of areas at St. Malo, Morlaix, Brest, Quiberon Bay, Belle Isle and the Loire Estuary. (See Plate 1.) Intelligence was submitted as a written report without the special emphasis of oral briefing, which was developed later.

7. Enemy defense information prior to the invasion was processed by TIS (Theater Intelligence Service). TIS was a joint British and American organi-

zation located in London to serve various headquarters. It was a clearing house for all kinds of information pertaining to order of battle, technical, target and defense intelligence. Among sources tapped were agents, escapees, evacuees, prisoners, signals, air reconnaissance and air photographs. Defense intelligence was distributed in periodic reports and by overprints. Defense overprints were prepared at various scales and frequently revised. The Terrain and Defense Section used TIS service as an authority on interpretation of trends and assessment of capabilities.

a. The same basic information upon which TIS based its study was also available to the Terrain and Defense Section. Photo interpretation reports provided the bulk of information. Reports submitted by CIU (Central Interpretation Unit) were the best of these.

b. TIS defense overprints were issued in at least three scales, 1:10,000, 1:25,000, and 1:50,000. The large-scale prints showed the defense crust of the Atlantic Wall in tactical detail. The small-scale overprints were actually "Installation" overprints, since defense items were generalized and their significance obscured by a mass of information pertaining to other installations. The "Martian Legend" was used. From a purely defense viewpoint, extraneous items included dumps, logistical installations, barracks, training areas, air defense and motor parks. These overprints were by far the best both in accuracy and in completeness of information produced at any time in the ETO.

c. Defense studies indicated that the Atlantic Wall was undergoing a steady reinforcement. Enemy effort was accelerated as "D" Day approached. The Pas de Calais sector received the priority of enemy attention. Nevertheless, the enemy strengthened all sectors. The Normandy coast received an increasing degree of attention. Beaches were mined, underwater obstacles were installed and mined, gun positions were casemated, pillboxes, minefields, tank traps and air landing obstacles were rapidly multiplied. Inundation assumed growing importance as a defense capability. Enemy fire-power covering the approaches was steadily mounting. Until "D" Day, however, nearly the whole enemy effort had been concentrated on the immediate coastal crust. There was no serious threat of defense in depth. This fact supported the view that the enemy considered his mobile reserves sufficient to handle any breach of the Atlantic Wall.

d. To evaluate and report these trends, the section maintained a defense situation map at 1:100,000 scale in the G-2 War Room. Unlike defense overprints, the wall-map showed only significant items of enemy defense against ground attack. The map had to serve two purposes: first, it was designed to permit

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

identification of definite trends; secondly, it was neat and orderly enough for use as a staff briefing aid. A cellulose acetate sector or template was stapled in position at each enemy battery location. This template showed graphically the number of guns, the arc of fire, the range, orientation and caliber. The density of these overlapping templates reflected the density of fire-power commanding various approaches. Other items shown on the wall-map were underwater obstacles, beach obstacles, generalized field works, inundation, airlanding obstructions, secret weapon sites and the general density of strongpoints.

e. Secret weapons ("Crossbow") were not believed to be capable of seriously interfering with "Overlord". All intelligence pertaining to "Crossbow" came from British sources, and was necessarily guarded. Satisfactory liaison with the British permitted adequate dissemination of this intelligence to the Army Group staff. The liaison was accomplished by an officer of the Terrain and Defense Section. British intelligence in this instance was amazingly accurate, particularly that pertaining to the pilotless aircraft. After the Normandy landings, the responsibility for secret-weapon intelligence was given to the Technical Intelligence Group of G-2.

8. Office accommodations in London were adequate. Terrain and Defense shared space with Order of Battle. It was not until after Army Group went into the field that the importance of adequate accommodation was appreciated.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY

9. The first field location of Headquarters 12th Army Group in Normandy was in an orchard near Colombieres. The section was unable to adjust its work immediately to field conditions. Other sections dealing in letter-size paper work found little difficulty, but the Terrain and Defense Section required facilities for the study of large-scale maps. A base map approximately ten feet square was assembled from 1:100,000 sheets to permit a study of terrain lying well in advance of operations. The map was spread on the ground outside the tent. Despite handicaps, work on this map was carried forward. Rivers were emphasized and their widths, condition of banks, crossings, depth and current velocity noted. Ridge lining brought out two types of ridges, geological formations cutting generally across watersheds, and watershed divides. Delineation of watershed divides is useful in selecting routes along which grades, bridges and defilade are generally minimized. Potential enemy defense lines were selected. Compartments, corridors and physiographic areas were outlined. The "going" categories were illustrated by density of cross-hatching. Staff briefing

had been discontinued since leaving London due to physical handicaps. However, time was not wholly lost, since familiarity with the terrain beyond the Bocage soon proved of value.

a. Work in the evaluation of defense trends was similarly handicapped. TIS had been discontinued. Original information which heretofore had been processed and evaluated by TIS was now sent as raw material to various headquarters. Duplication which had been dried up by the concentrated effort of TIS now re-emerged and continued to the end of hostilities. Some headquarters even rearranged this basic material and distributed the information. This added to the confusion. The Terrain and Defense Section directed its effort to the evaluation of information collected and disseminated by others. If trends or significant density of enemy effort was identified, the intelligence was brought to the attention of the staff.

10. a. When Headquarters 12th Army Group arrived in Normandy late in July, "Overlord" operations had not departed appreciably from planned phases. The headquarters moved to St. Sauveur in anticipation of a drive at St. Lo. By this time more adequate wall and tent space had been made available. The first terrain briefing to the Commanding General was given at St. Sauveur at the time of the St. Lo breakthrough. A new map at 1:100,000 scale was mounted at one end of the G-2 Situation Tent and the data from the analysis made at Colombieres was transferred. The area included only the eastern part of Brittany, the strategic Rennes Basin, the southern limits of the Bocage and characteristics of the rivers flowing south to the Loire. It showed the flat open Beauce country on the approaches to Paris. The breakthrough could be turned west to exploit Brittany as originally planned, or it could be turned east. The map showed the terrain to the east.

b. The rapid progress of our advance through Avranches to the base of the Brittany Peninsula invited serious consideration of a turn to the east. A slower advance would have assured the adoption of some of the many plans studied to reduce Brittany, either overland to Brest, or in conjunction with planned amphibious operations along the northern or southern coasts of the Peninsula. Instead of these, the advance spearheads turned east. The wide sweep through Laval and Le Mans by-passed the Bocage country with its intricate pattern of hedges, sunken roads, small patches of farms, woods, pastures and orchards. Spearheads now pointed direct toward Paris through the relatively excellent tank country of the Beauce, or in a position to turn northward up the compartments of the Loire tributaries, and with the Loire as flank protection to attack the enemy to the north and cut him off. The latter was done. Strong

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

enemy counter-attacks at Mortain were unsuccessful. Powerful enemy forces were cut off and destroyed at Falaise. Our subsequent turn to the east was so weakly opposed that terrain, though favorable to our advance, was not determinative.

c. The Seine was reached easily and the front broadened against this major obstacle. During the phase of exploitation from St. Lo to the Seine, the work of the section was almost entirely on terrain appreciation. Enemy defense positions had long since been assaulted and overrun. On suggestion of the A C of S, G-3, the original wall-map on which briefings had been based was transferred to the G-3 War Room, where it served to familiarize the whole staff with terrain capabilities, and where it could be gradually extended farther to the east. The 1:100,000 map scale proved ideal. Delineations on the map were made with broad-point speed-ball pens, in colored inks and with grease pencil in colors. Rivers and river characteristics were in blue. Ridges and divides were in brown. Physiographic areas were in green, possible defense lines were in red. Main routes were in orange.

d. This first actual experience in the potential value of oral briefing from a wall-map exhibit direct to staff officers suggested some revision in the concept of responsibility. This technique might be more effective at a tactical headquarters than the normal method of dissemination by means of written appreciations. When an Army Group tactical heaquarters was formed, it was decided to split the Terrain and Defense Section. The head of the section went forward with the tactical headquarters to advise the tactical staff on terrain and defense matters. The balance of the section remained at Main Headquarters to prepare formal written appreciations, and to serve lower units and "TAC" with estimates of defense capabilities. The first Tactical Headquarters was at St. James, where the Terrain and Defense Section was accommodated in the rear-third of a compartmented office van. A large platform of plywood permitted the assembly and study of six full basesheets at one time. These accommodations were satisfactory. It is the experience of the section that the volume and quality of work depended considerably on physical accommodations.

SECTION IV. OPERATIONS ACROSS FRANCE

11. From the Seine to the Meuse, terrain rather than defense dominated the attention of the section. The enemy was unable to stand on any of the possible defense lines. With the additional pressure of the Seventh U. S. Army coming up from the south, the withdrawal might have continued to the Rhine had our supply situation been adequate.

a. Enemy terrain and enemy defense tend to complement each other in their cumulative effect on capabilities. The construction of defenses against ground attack is an effort to reinforce a terrain weakness. The enemy would normally endeavor to balance these two factors over a wide sector and a deep zone. If successful in the nice apportionment of defense works, each sub-sector is commensurate with all others in potential military strength. During the retreat across France the enemy was unable to reinforce any natural line.

b. The composite strength of the enemy to resist at this time was an integration of his strength in troops, his defenses, and his use of terrain. Since weather favored the Allies, these three elements constituted the sum of his capabilities. Of these, there were no defenses. His order of battle was weak in terms of troops per unit length of an extending front. These two factors alone dictated a withdrawal, regardless of terrain. Despite shortening supply lines, his supply and logistical situation must have been chaotic. Our forces under these conditions negotiated the Argonne in hours, the same terrain which the enemy used in 1918 to hold our advance for many weeks. By September, some of the most difficult terrain of France and Belgium had been successfully negotiated. When terrain ceased to be the determinative factor in enemy capabilities, as it did here, some officers concluded that terrain appreciation is not essential to modern military operations.

c. During September our positions gradually cushioned against the Siegfried Line north of the Moselle, and the rather difficult terrain of Lorraine to the south. Our advances slowed up against delaying tactics by which the enemy was preparing to take full advantage of both terrain and defense, and weather, too, to permit a reorganization of his weakened forces and their redeployment. A rather static military situation ensued. The dominating element of strength north of Trier was the Siegfried Line. Terrain dominated the situation in Lorraine. Enemy order of battle dispositions began to resume a determinative significance in capabilities. The inter-relation between terrain and order of battle became noticeable. Forces were concentrated in or behind weak sectors. More rugged and better defended country was more thinly held. Mobility of enemy reserves permitted deployment of front-line troops in variable density. The three major elements of enemy strength — troops, terrain and defense — were skillfully apportioned, further slowing our advance at points of local attack.

d. Defense in depth was strengthened. In addition to the principle of defense in depth inherent in the Siegfried Line, the enemy developed other lines in the rear, improved the defense of towns and communication centers by work on concentric perimeter defense. These positions formed a hedgehog pattern in

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

considerable depth. Backwater inundation again began to assume importance as it had in Normandy. The theory and tactics of defense differed here from that of the Atlantic Wall. New tactical directives were issued. Behind the lines the enemy mobilized the civil population to perform tasks of military defense. The cumulative effect of these trends was to alter the relative defense capabilities of certain sectors. By December, the original terrain advantage of the Koeln plain to an invader was largely overcome by intensive work. (See Plate 4.) In addition, water impounded behind the dams of the upper Roer River constituted a serious threat to our operations into the Koeln plan. The masterful use of the Siegfried Line permitted an unusual economy of force, an economy which contributed to the creation of a growing force in reserve.

e. South of the Trier confluence the situation was more fluid. Our troops were obliged to fight through difficult terrain, assault and contain strong French positions associated with the Maginot Line (see Appendix E), and slowly come against the strongest sector of the Siegfried Line in the Saar Valley. Still farther south the 6th Army Group had similar problems, and even more difficult terrain. The season was well advanced — weather deteriorated. Along the Allied lines probing attacks continued against these stiffening positions, with slow and costly success. These scattered attacks continued until the Germans themselves, by launching an offensive in the Ardennes, finally brought a powerful concentration of Allied power on a single axis of a relatively small sector.

f. The rapid Allied advance across France and Belgium brought our lines in firm contact with defenses and with terrain about which little was known. During September, the section directed its effort to collecting and distributing all available information. French and British sources in Paris and London sent forward all known data on the Maginot and Siegfried positions. By prodigious efforts, the Engineers procured and printed maps, collected and overprinted defense data, and issued mosaics. The section began the collection of all available information on the geography, geology and physiography of Germany. Before the end of September the first generalized terrain appreciation of Western Germany was undertaken.

SECTION V. OPERATIONS IN WESTERN GERMANY

12. Terrain was certain to be an important factor in plans for operations in Western Germany. A generalized study would serve to illustrate the broad characteristics of landscape, and would narrow considerations for immediate operations within known and workable limits. The Engineer Section of Army

Group assisted and collaborated in a project to present such a generalized study. The 1:100,000 wall-map had by this time become standard for presentation of terrain. A map at this scale, however, could not be assembled to cover the whole of Western Germany. The 1:250,000 map was adopted, and mounted on the wall of a hotel room in Verdun. All known defense lines were shown in red. The characteristic compartmentation of Germany was demonstrated. Terrain in Germany is unusually favorable to defense of successive compartments. The magnitude of the Rhine as an obstacle was emphasized by engineer studies showing cross-sections, crossings and hydraulic characteristics. The Army Group and Army Commanders were briefed. Each sector and each corridor was separately discussed, beginning with the Belfort Gap in the south, including the Saverne Gap, the Landstuhl depression through the Kaiserslautern Gate, passages through the Palatinate and the Pfalzer Bergland, the Moselle Valley, the Koeln plain and the great plain of Northern Europe (see Plate 2).

a. Various corridors extending from these western gateways into Germany were identified and their military aspects analyzed. These corridors included the Rhine Valley in Alsace, the Kraichgau leading to Wurtemberg, the Rhine Rift valley extending northeastwardly through the Frankfurt area, the Hessian corridors of the Thuringia and Saxony, and the passages through the Jura, the Teutoburger and the Weser Hills via Porta Westfalica leading into the nothern plains (see Plate 2). Of the two major lines of action leading to Central Germany, 21 Army Group faced the northern corridor leading through the northern plains, while 12th Army Group faced the historic central routes via the Hessian corridor. As had been done with previous studies of this kind, the map was set up in the G-3 War Room after the briefing. The Engineer Section prepared small-scale copies for reproduction and dissemination to armies. This first look at the general terrain was the beginning of a series of much more intensive and detailed studies of critical areas.

b. By October the situation was relatively static. The volume of information bearing on enemy defense was constantly accelerating as a result of intensification of air and air-photo reconnaissance, and the ever mounting take of prisoners of war. Documents in particular contributed considerably to our knowledge of terrain, of defense schemes, and especially of changes in tactics. Information from OSS (Office of Strategic Services) also increased in volume. Much of this form of information came from ground sources, and was frequently of limited value due to failure to include all essential elements of information. It was particularly difficult to check by photo-reconnaissance due to inability to pinpoint locations where activity was reported.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. Enemy defense tactics were constantly changed. Most information on this subject came from document teams. The enemy concept of position defense [illegible] tied in closely with the organization and use of less experienced infantry. So-called "Fortress Units" were established in various roles, and in a deep echelon of command. Enemy doctrine was predicated on a conception of static defense of highly expendable troops, presumably brave enough to die, but not trained or skillful in delaying tactics. These fortress troops were organized as engineers, signals and lines of communication units. They were composed of comb-outs, para-military troops, foreigners and riff-raff. They were instructed but not well trained in defense of concrete pillboxes from an outside system of trenches, how to defend reverse slopes, and how to guard roadblocks and other static positions. The more elite units of the Wehrmacht and the SS were the mobile infantry, not so expendable. Static units remained in commitment, but the more elite units, such for example as the Panzer divisions troops, were committed only as needed, for short engagements. In withdrawing, elite troops were supposed to filter through a line of manned static defenses. The enemy recognized that retreating troops, if disorganized, cannot be expected to fall back into unoccupied positions and defend. The defense was prepared and manned.

d. By the end of the war, the order of enemy emphasis on terrain factors to be considered in defense was nearly the reserve of normal concepts. Obstacles came first, then concealment and cover, followed in sequence by considerations of communications, observation and fields of fire. This trend is toward guerilla warfare, using ambush, defilade and traps. These tactics were supplemented by the use of time-bombs, delayed-action explosives, booby-traps, mines, alarms and all kinds of devilish devices.

e. The original terrain advantage attached to an exploitation of the Koeln plain began to disappear with the strengthening of defenses (see Plate 4), with the increased threat of flood unless the Roer dams could be destroyed or contained, and with the assembly of parts of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in the immediate rear of this sector. These considerations caused a shift of Allied offensive interest to the immediate south, in the Ardennes-Eifel sector, where enemy order of battle was still thin, defenses were not too strong, and only terrain offered a serious obstacle to our planned operations.

(1) Analysis of this terrain revealed a possible line of penetration from the Schnee-Eifel northeastwardly along an axis through Euskirchen to the Koeln plain near Bonn, by-passing the Roer dams and the difficult Huertgen Forest, and flanking to the south the defenses of the Roer and Erft Rivers (see Appendix F). A successful negotiation of this approach would bring us into contact [illegible] on its flank, and would give us a foothold along the Rhine near Bonn.

(2) The Rhine obstacle in the reaches near Bonn and Koeln could be crossed. The flat flood plain east of the river favored air landings, especially opposite Bonn and north of the Sieg (see Appendix A). A bridgehead here, however, seemed to be hemmed in by formidable terrain. Movement into the rugged terrain south of the Ruhr was considered prohibitive if the enemy elected to defend vigorously. The only satisfactory exit from a bridgehead at Bonn was southeastwardly, climbing the relatively gentle south slopes of the Sieg River to the east of the Siebengebirge to attain the plateau of the Westerwald. The terrain lying between the autobahn and the main Reichstraße leading to Limburg was considered favorable. This portion of the Westerwald was the least formidable of all the terrain lying south of the Ruhr. The Ruhr objective could be approached only by a wide encirclement. Such exploitation would permit the First Army to join forces with the Third Army in the strategic Frankfkurt — Mainz — Darmstadt triangle, where a strong bridgehead would command the portal to the Hessian corridor and subsequent penetration into the interior of Germany.

(3) Studies of this type were made in advance of specific plans. The results were submitted to the Commanding General, to G-3 and G-3 Plans, and to those of the staff interested in future operations. G-3 Special Plans exploited terrain intelligence in their work. After briefings were made, the data was written up in a formal report, illustrated by appropriate maps and disseminated in the Weekly Intelligence Summary. Inter-staff dissemination, however, was considered a primary responsibility. Dissemination to other headquarters via the Weekly Summary served to appraise Armies of Army Group thinking and techniques, but was considered a secondary though important responsibility.

f. Photo interpretation was gradually developed into a valuable source of terrain information. The terrain study of the Kraichgau was specially reproduced by the Engineers at Army Group to demonstrate terrain evaluation by APID (Air Photo Interpretation Detachment), a branch of G-2 (Air). APID contributed information derived from a stereoscopic examination of air cover. Such studies were useful in assessing "going" conditions parallel with roads, identifying bottlenecks, and evaluating the density of woods cover. The terrain unit of APID was under direct operational instructions of the Terrain and Defense Section. The actual techniques used, however, were their own development, and while ingenius in application, they were too involved for general application. The Kraichgau study was reproduced merely to illustrate techniques, and was

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

not issued in the Weekly Summary. 6th Army Group ordered all copies of this report, the Kraichgau being in their area, and subsequently exploited by units of that group.

g. The enemy Ardennes offensive illustrates the inter-relation between terrain and weather. The section believed that the Ardennes would be unsuitable for an offensive by the Sixth SS Panzer Army. There were three reasons: first, it was winter: second, the road net is not good or extensive; third, terrain off the roads is difficult if vigorously defended. Nevertheless, the capability existed, and was duly pointed out by the head of the section on the occasion of the regular weekly meeting at which enemy capabilities were discussed, early in December. The capability was considered remote and of a low order. Weather had much to do with enemy failure. He had negotiated this country before, in good weather. He failed in poor weather and against a vigorous and mobile Army.

h. A special type of terrain analysis was ordered on two occasions: once at the time of the Falaise pocket, and once at the time of the Ardennes salient. The purpose of these studies was the same in each case, to interdict lines of retreat and create pockets. All roads, even field roads, were plotted on a large-scale trace. Strategic bottlenecks were identified in the resulting pattern of routes of withdrawal. These bottlenecks may have been caused by topography, defilade, gradients, bridges, intersections, or towns which could be reduced to rubble. A combined air and artillery interdiction plan was based on the study. At Falaise, the pocket was closed on a considerable bag. In the Ardennes, however, the closure was too late. The target section of G-2 (Air) collaborated in studies of this type.

SECTION VI. OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

13. Operations in Germany took on momentum immediately following the enemy failure in the Ardennes. The enemy had exercised his capability of attacking in the Ardennes. The major effect of this on our operations was to concentrate great power on a single axis of a small sector. This ended the period of probing.

a. If this power were to be used at or near its present position, the terrain opposite the 12th Army Group and along this axis was critical. The "schwerpunkt" of 12th Army Group was pointing at the Eifel.

b. Previous studies of the Eifel had revealed its peculiar development compared with other blocks of the middle Rhine Highlands. The road net is more ample than in the adjacent Ardennes. The roads are largely ridge roads. The ridges are more open than the valleys. Valley roads are defiladed both by

woods and slopes. Ridge routes, on the other hand, naturally crossed fewer streams, and these being small, are better drained (an important factor in winter), and in this case were flanked by relatively open country, permitting deployment off the roads. Finally, the Siegfried Line was weaker in the Eifel due to dependence on terrain, and moreover certain sectors were weaker than others (see Appendix C).

c. British attacks in Holland opened the Allied offensive of 1945. The enemy would be attacked from north to south in a succession of powerful blows. His reserve had been wasted in an offensive. The Second British Army took off. The Ninth US Army crossed the flooded Roer and swung north-eastwardly to the Rhine. The First Army crossed the Koeln plain to reach the Rhine on a broad front. The Erft defense position collapsed. The Third Army penetrated the weak sectors of the Siegfried Line in the Eifel and followed the ridges and upland of the Eifel avoiding the valley of the Moselle. Spearheads reached eastward and fanned out along minor ridges to reach objectives in the area of Koblenz. The Allies possessed all territory north of the Moselle and west of the Rhine, a necessary prelude to further operations across the Rhine.

d. Across the Moselle to the south, the Hunsruck was formidable if defended. The risk of negotiation of bad terrain was accepted due to enemy weakness. Three factors affected the enemy inability to defend. The Seventh Army was already attacking to the south. Enemy forces were weak and beaten. Enemy mobility was unequal to demands.

e. Third Army experience illustrates the interrelation between terrain and other elements of enemy strength. In Lorraine, enemy exploitation of terrain slowed the Army's advance to the Siegfried Line. When the line was reached, strong enemy defenses made further progress even slower. In the Eifel, on the other hand, enemy strength in troops declined, permitting a breakthrough despite terrain and organized defenses. In the Hunsruck, terrain offered the only potential difficulty to our advance, since the enemy could not take advantage of it, having neither men nor time enough. Modern warfare could be fought from a road map. Lorraine was forgotten. In assessing enemy capabilities, terrain is but one of several factors which must be considered in a conjunctive relation.

14. Operations to the east of the Rhine were growing more imminent as each successive Army from north to south moved forward. Plans for such operations had been laid. Representatives of Army Groups attended a meeting in mid-December to discuss future operations. The future Allied "main effort" was to be located. One of two alternative corridors would support this effort. One of

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

these corridors was the North European Plain, extending entirely across northern Europe from the Lowlands to Poland, and flanked to the north by the North Sea, and to the south by the German Highland. The other was the historic military and trade route across central Germany extending northeastwardly through the Rhine Rift Valley at the Frankfurt — Mainz — Darmstadt triangle and through the Hessian corridor and its portals to the east (see Plate 2). The relative military merits of these two passages were discussed.

a. Staff officers of the 12th Army Group at this meeting outlined a pattern of operations based on studies previously discussed in this report. A bridge at or near Bonn could be exploited to the southeast via Limburg to effect juncture with another Army effort up the Hessian corridor, closing with 21 Army Group in a wide encirclement of the Ruhr. In addition, these representatives were prepared to submit an opinion, based on terrain studies, that the effective military value of the northern corridor was limited. Any powerful line of action would be limited to the fringes along the foothills of the central highlands. While this was probably the best terrain for armored penetration into Germany, it was too narrow to support a strong effort, particularly in winter. About two-thirds of the width of the Northern Plain of Europe lies next to the sea, and despite a flat landscape, there are frequent bogs, extensive swamps and moors, a high water table, a dense and complicated pattern of glacial drainage, lateral river obstacles of unusual width due to subsidence and drowned valleys forming wide estuaries, and a topographic pattern imposed by glacial history which is extremely hetereogeneous. The Ems, Weser and Elbe are serious obstacles for many miles inland from the coast.

b. Before any final decision was reached, the Germans had decided they were capable of attacking in the Ardennes, and did. The terrain representative at the meeting was immediately recalled to Luxembourg to prepare intensive studies of terrain in the new salient. The question of future plans, and main effort, was decided by a subsequent event, the seizure of a bridge at Remagen.

15. Exploitation of the Remagen bridge depended partly on terrain conditions to the east. These conditions were known in detail, being the long-studied avenue from a bridgehead at Bonn southeastward to Limburg. The immediate terrain, however, directly in front of the bridge, was the rugged block of the Siebengebirge, the volcanic seven mountains famous in the romantic and scenic associations of the Rhineland. This was indeed an obstacle, but it was close to the planned bridgehead at Bonn, and it was close to the road to Limburg. How much of an obstacle was it? The Remagen bridge was seized on the 7th of March. A meeting was held that night in the office of the Commanding

Remagen Bridgehead

Moselle Bridgehead

PLATE 3
(Part I, Study No. 2)
Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

General of 12th Army Group. The accomplished fact of a bridge over the Rhine overshadowed the planned discussion. The head of the Terrain and Defense Section was ordered to attend the meeting to present terrain conditions affecting an expansion of the bridgehead. If this bridgehead were to be fully exploited, the main axis of Allied effort might be committed to a thrust through Central Germany.

a. An effort was required to dispell any feeling that the Remagen bridgehead was a nuisance. For weeks the staff had been considering a remarkably similar situation. A demonstration of the full implication was needed. The risk had to be understood.

b. The officers and men of the section prepared a laminated cardboard model of the bridgehead area (see Plate 3).* The job took about 50 hours of work by four men, and was ready the next day. The purpose was to demonstrate the unusually rugged range of the Siebengebirge lying immediately opposite Remagen, to identify points where the bridge was under enemy observation, to compare "going" conditions along several routes which traversed the obstacle, and to point out the relation of this obstacle to more distant objectives to the east. Once through and beyond the narrow barrier of mountains, the most advantageous line of action from a terrain point of view was the original axis of penetration of the Westerwald between Bonn and Limburg (see Appendix A).

c. There was a real need in this instance for the use of a model. Few staff officers realized the difficulty of the terrain close to the river, although all knew the advantage of the Bonn — Limburg axis. A series of snapshots and photographic views showing the skyline and landscape were attached to the model. These pictures were actually oriented with respect to the point of origin and the field of view. The completed exhibit served to demonstrate the rather serious character of the immediate terrain, and the strategic advantage of the autobahn lying beyond. In a sense, the Army Group Commander, and the Army Commanders, who attended the briefing, were warned of initial disadvantages and subsequent advantages of terrain. Even the Commander of Third Army admitted that the terrain was tough.

d. The bridgehead was actually exploited in great power. The enemy concentrated his strength to the north to protect the Ruhr. The First Army turned south and east, broke through, and joined with Third Army along the preconceived lines of maximum terrain advantage. Spearheads closed with elements of the Ninth Army near Paderborn to accomplish the wide encirclement of the Ruhr.

* opposite page 66

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

16. The only other use of laminated cardboard models traced from contour maps and cemented together was to demonstrate the difficult conditions to be encountered in a crossing of the Moselle and the Hunsruck. The model showed the Rhine Gorge and the crossings of the Moselle. It showed the deep dissections and wooded cover encountered in the Hunsruck. Its purpose was to aid in a calculation of the risk involved in a nice estimate of an unusual situation (see Plate 3).*

17. The last terrain appreciation prepared by the section covered the area of the so-called "Redoubt" in the Bavarian Alps and Western Austria (see Appendix D-1 and 2). The basic material on which this appreciation was based was an excellent report by ISTD. A comparison of the appreciation, written objectively from known or assumed approaches, lines of action and objectives, with the abstract basic statements of geography in the ISTD report, will demonstrate the difference between military appreciation pertaining to a given situation, and the basic material used in its preparation. The distinction is fundamental to an understanding of the problem of military analysis of terrain.

*opposite page 66

CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF TECHNIQUES

SECTION I. TERRAIN

1. The 1:100,000 maps of the G. S. G. S. 4416 series were extremely helpful to the section when preparing terrain studies. In order to use these maps for terrain purposes it was found necessary to accentuate certain details. Rivers and streams were outlined in blue up to the point where they were no longer an obstacle. The main roads were marked in yellow, and black hachures were used to indicate where the roads were in defilade. The water-shed divides were drawn on the map in a broken brown line. The physiographic areas were outlined in black and named. This basic type of terrain map was primarily used by the section itself for further terrain appreciation.

2. Another type of wall-map was prepared by the section to be used for briefing members of the staff. The scale of the map was either 1:250,000 or 1:500,000. Rivers were outlined and the physiographic areas shown as on the first type of map. A system of cross-hatching showed the comparitive difficulty of the terrain, which was obtained by a careful study of the 1:100,000 basic map and of terrain publications such as from ISTD. These maps were drawn up with some specific operation in mind, and the main corridors were shown by arrows along the routes of probable advance. The briefing value of the map was enhanced by displaying aerial and ground photographs of the areas in question with their location indicated. Enemy defense lines were also shown in red.

3. Terrain studies, to be reproduced in quantity and disseminated in the Weekly Intelligence Summary, were limited in size by the facilities of the Engineer Reproduction Detachment. Drawings of a maximum size of 35-inches square could be photographed, but the finished print was limited to 19" × 21". The Engineer Reproduction Detachment cooperated completely with the section, and often aided materially by advancing technical suggestions.

4. Several different types of terrain studies are described in the following paragraphs to show the gradual evolution of technique. However, it is impossible to draw up a definite set of rules applicable to all terrain problems.

a. Generalized Enemy Terrain (see Plate 2) was a study produced to acquaint the staff with the terrain of western Germany that would probably be

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

in 12th Army Group's sphere of operation. The original study was prepared for staff briefing using the type of wall-map previously discussed. The map was copied and reproduced by the Engineer Section. It showed the main rivers; priority roads and autobahnen; physiographic areas; confirmed and unconfirmed defense lines and prominent terrain obstacles. The terrain was divided into the following types by a system of cross-hatching: high, rugged mountainous obstacles, mountain obstacles, hills and plains. Traces were made on cellulose acetate from a 1:1,000,000 map, and the final product was reduced to a scale of 1:1,250,000. The Engineers used the Zipatone process for reproducing it. This map proved to be very popular and a second edition was produced later rectifying certain errors and intensifying the breakdown of the terrain area south of the Ruhr.

b. The next type of terrain study is illustrated by Terrain South of the Ruhr (see Appendix A) and military aspects of the terrain of the Pfalzer Bergland (see Appendix B). These studies could not commence until the 1:100,000 maps were prepared with the basic information as described above in paragraph 1. The acetate overlays were traced from a 1:500,000 map, and showed main roads, rivers, water-shed divides, canals and important cities. After the assumed lines of action were selected, profiles were calculated for them. These profiles were developed from the 1:100,000 maps and then reduced to correspond to the 1:500,000 maps. In later editions of this type of study, profiles were calculated both on the lines of proposed action and across them. Most of the value of this type of terrain study came from the accompanying write-up rather than from the graphic portrayal.

c. Since the foregoing type of terrain analysis was found to be too involved for the ordinary reader, a different type was produced as illustrated by the example of the Trier area (see Appendix C). A griblett brown reproduction of the base map, which was at a scale of 1:100,000, formed the background for this type of study. An overlay in blue showed the rivers and streams; a red overlay showed rail lines, defense lines and lines of action; and a black overlay showed roads and the comparitive difficulty of the terrain. Watershed divides were drawn in black ink on the base map so that when it was reproduced they appeared as a solid brown line. The degrees of difficulty of terrain were classed into categories of **very difficult**: shown by hachures; **difficult:** shown by solid crosshatching; **moderate to difficult**: shown by dotted crosshatching; and **moderate to easy:** shown by the absence of crosshatching. Very difficult terrain was considered to be that having an average slope of 15 per cent or greater.

This was calculated by an analysis of the contours of the 1:100,000 maps using a paper template giving the critical contour spacing. The other degrees of difficulty of terrain were caused either by woods or marshes. ISTD publications, which were printed to conform to the 1:100,000 map sheets, contained detailed information on the penetrability of woods and forests. However, when a terrain analysis was being made of an area that ISTD had not covered, it was necessary to use aerial and ground photographs to determine how much of an obstacle the woods in the area would be. The amount of difficulty that marshes would cause to cross-country movement was largely decided by a study of the 1:100,000 maps and considering such factors as the soil and photographic evidence. This type of study gave a good graphical representation of the terrain, and did not need to be accompanied by a long and detailed report. Consequently, this was the most satisfactory type produced by the section.

d. There were terrain studies made by the section that did not fit exactly into one of the categories listed above, being transitional in techniques. A study of this type was Terrain Appreciation of the REDOUBT (see Appendix D-1 and 2).

5. Terrain models were not frequently used at an army group headquarters, as they rarely add much emphasis to terrain features that cannot easily be seen by an examination of a contoured map. In certain tactical situations, however, future operations depend considerably on the correct terrain interpretation of critical features of a small area. It may be advisable to use a terrain model for briefing purposes when a sudden development focuses attention on a small area about which a comprehensive appreciation is needed urgently.

a. Two models were constructed by the section — the first of the Remagen bridgehead and the other of the critical Moselle — Rhine triangle south of Koblenz. It was planned to make the first one with a scale of 1:25,000, but this was discarded in favor of 1:50,000, due to poor contouring on the large-scale map, and due to time limitations. The second model, which encompassed a much greater area than the first, was on a scale of 1:100,000.

b. The technique used for both models was the same. Each contour line was traced through carbon paper on top of a separate sheet of 1/32" cardboard which had been lined with the map grid. The sheets were then cut out along the lines and cemented together in proper order using the grid lines for orientation. The result was a laminated cardboard terrain model. Information such as roads, woods and towns was added to make the model complete. No attempt was made

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to obtain a smooth surface, since this would limit shadows. The ratio of vertical to horizontal scale was considerably exaggerated, but this did not affect relative comparisons and determination of fields of observation and fire.

6. The following is a list af terrain studies that were prepared by the section and disseminated in the Weekly Intelligence Summary:

Title	Weekly Intelligence Summary No.	Date
Western Germany	—	—
* Terrain South of the Ruhr	13	4 Nov 45
Terrain in the Area of Hesse	16	25 Nov 44
* Terrain in the Pfalzer Bergland	18	9 Dec 44
Terrain of the Eifel	20	23 Dec 41
Terrain of the Leine Corridor	22	9 Jan 45
The Approaches to Bonn	23	16 Jan 45
* The Trier Area	25	29 Jan 45
* The Koblenz Area	28	20 Feb 45
Eastern Eifel and Rhine Gorge	30	6 Mar 45
Rhine Crossings	31	13 Mar 45
The Koblenz Area (Map Sheet S-2)	33	27 Mar 45
Geralized Enemy Terrain, (Second Edition)	34	3 Apr 45
The Marburg Area (Map Sheet R-3)	—	—
The Bad Nauheim Area (Map Sheet S-3)	—	—
Characteristics of the Elbe	35	11 Apr 45
Generalized Terrain of Bavaria	37	24 Apr 45
* Terrain Appreciation of the Redoubt	38	1 May 45

SECTION II. DEFENSES

7. In August 1944 the section was split into two echelons, with half the section at Tactical Headquarters, and half at Main. This arrangement was unsatisfactory. No definite system had been evolved for the collection and

* Included in the Plates or the Appendices of this report.

collation of enemy defense data until the Enemy Terrain and Defense Section was re-united as a single unit at Tactical Headquarters shortly before the end of October. Prior to that time and after the breakthrough at Avranches, the rapid advance of the Allies had placed the emphasis on terrain rather than defenses, but when our forward progress was finally slowed and halted, the importance of enemy defenses overshadowed that of terrain.

8. One of the responsibilities of the section was to keep the staff informed as to the status of enemy defenses. This could best be accomplished by the use of a wall map. The scale of the map selected was 1:100,000, as coverage of the army group area was impossible with 1:25,000, and 1:250,000 did not contain sufficient detail. This map was covered with cellulose acetate sheets conforming in size to the map sheets. These carefully annotated transparent overlays were designed to serve also as traces to be reproduced as overprints for dissemination. The method planned for depicting defense trends was to plot the symbols representing defense installations on the wall-map overlay which would reveal the relative density of defenses throughout the front. Before this method could be applied, three basic principles had to be established. First, the boundaries of the area of study for which the section would be responsible had to be delineated. Secondly, the types of defenses considered significant with respect to defense trends had to be selected. Lastly, standards had to be established for the evaluation and interpretation of data received from various sources.

9. While the army group boundary naturally included the areas assigned to the armies, it was first thought that information close to the front line would be of no tactical or planning value to army group. Information pertaining to this area was not to be plotted. An arbitrary boundary between army and army group zone of interest and responsibility was established approximately 15 miles in front of the front line. At that time the front line extended roughly from north to south along the Siegfried Line, with the exception of the Aachen breach, to the confluence of the Moselle and Saar Rivers, and then south along the Moselle. The lateral boundaries selected overlapped into the territory of 21 and 6th Army Groups for approximately 20 miles, in order to allow for a change in army group boundaries. SHAEF obtained all available codaline traces of the Siegfried Line, from which armies issued 1:25,000 defense overprints. Consequently, the area of greatest activity for the section was in Lorraine, which included a portion of the Maginot Line. The Allied forces were constantly advancing in this area, except in the immediate vicinity of Metz, and the boundaries established for defense responsibility had to be continually pushed

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

back. This system seemed to work very well in this sector. However, along the static northern front where our forces were abutted against the Siegfried Line, it was soon apparent that the section's responsibility would have to include the immediate front line in order to keep the staff advised on any changes in the West Wall defenses. The following principle was then established and adhered to throughout the balance of the campaign in the West. The boundaries for army group's responsibility for enemy defenses would include the complete operational area with an overlap into adjacent army group sectors preferably along some distinctive terrain feature.

10. The types of enemy defenses that were first plotted included the following: anti-tank ditches, casemates, pillboxes, shelters, fire trenches, communication trenches, roadblocks, strongpoints, anti-tank obstacles, forts, minefields, barbed wire, anti-aircraft artillery, field artillery, artillery emplacements, smoke generators and V-weapon sites. The results that were obtained were not satisfactory because it was too difficult to pick out significant defense trends. For example, anti-aircraft artillery would normally be concentrated near vital air targets and would have no bearing on ground defense except in an emergency dual-purpose role. Even mobile field guns did not indicate a trend as these could be moved too frequently to a new position. Barbed wire and minefields could not be plotted satisfactorily at the 1:100,000 scale. Therefore, it was decided to eliminate a number of items that would normally be plotted on defense traces, and plot only fixed ground defenses, which included the following: anti-tank ditches, casemates, pillboxes, shelters, fire trenches, communications trenches, roadblocks, strongpoints, anti-tank obstacles and forts. It was found that by the elimination of extraneous items that enemy defense trends were more easily recognized. The British Martian Legend was used in accordance with SHAEF practice and with precedent in the ETO (see Plate 5).

11. The sources of information were as follows: Photo-Interpretation Reports, Prisoner of War Interrogations, Tactical Reconnaissance, OSS Reports, Army and Corps Periodic Intelligence Reports, MII Team Reports, Defense Overprints issued by other headquarters, Captured Documents, Engineer Intelligence Reports, Signal Intelligence, ARGUS Reports made by SHAEF and French and Belgian Intelligence Departments. Originally it was decided to divide the data into two groups: the first including photo intelligence and information definitely confirmed, to be plotted in black ink, and the second to consist of

the balance of the data received, most of which came from ground sources, to be plotted in a different color. This method was tried briefly, but did not prove practical. The only data finally considered suitable for plotting was that in the first group, namely, confirmed data. Every effort was made to check all unevaluated information by the means of aerial photography. This was largely accomplished through the cooperation of, and by close liaison with, the Air Photo Interpretation Detachment, Headquarters 12th Army Group. To prevent duplication, a "Log Book" was maintained which was divided into sections corresponding to the 1:100,000 map sheets and in which were listed all data as received, showing map coordinates and the source.

12. When TIS was discontinued at the time of the invasion, the Air Photo Interpretation Detachments at army group, army and corps levels became responsible for maintaining traces showing enemy defense installations. Jurisdictional areas for these various echelons were difficult to define, and there was a considerable overlap of effort. The defense overlays maintained by the section were based primarily on Army Photo Interpretation Reports. Army group reports were based on Army cover but generally covered an area too far in advance of the front to have any great density of ground defenses. The 1:25,000 overprints made by the armies were based on their own A. P. I. D.'s traces plus any additional information plotted on 1:100,000 traces which had been turned over to them by army group. As previously pointed out, army overprints were designed primarily for tactical use and did not meet the planning requirements of army group. To meet the specific need for filtered and plotted information pertaining solely to ground defense capabilities, the section finally developed its own system of defense overprints (see Plates 4 and 5). The 1:100,000 map sheets were divided into quadrants, and reproduced by the engineers in a single subdued base color of griblett brown. Ground defenses were overprinted in blue on the first type produced. It was discovered that it was very difficult to pick out rivers on these overprints due to the lack of contrasting colors. In subsequent editions, rivers were overprinted in blue, defenses in black. The finished overprints were small enough for desk-top use, and fitted conveniently into a portfolio which was easy to handle — an important consideration when all incoming information must be checked against plotted data. In addition, these maps, when cemented together, formed an ideal base for wall-map studies of either terrain or order of battle, since the closely related capability of defense was indicated on the base.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

13. The following is a list of defense studies prepared by the section:

Title	Weekly Intelligence Summary No.	Date
Defense Along the Roer	11	22 Oct 44
Maginot Line Principles	12	29 Oct 44
The Roer Dams	12	29 Oct 44
*Maginot Inundation System	14	13 Nov 44
Enemy Defenses, Zweibrueken Sector	15	18 Nov 44
Situation Along the Western French Coast	16	25 Nov 44
*Erft River Defense Line	17	2 Dec 44
Enemy Defense Lines	19	16 Dec 44
Defenses Along the River Main	30	6 Mar 45
The "Redoubt"	34	3 Apr 45
Defense Overprints of G. S. G. S. 4416, 1:100,000 map sheets R-1, S-1, T-1, U-1 and S-2 (SW quadant only)		

* Included in the Plates or the Appendices of this report.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

SECTION I. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. **Staff Doctrine is fundamental.** The responsibility of G-2 is broadly established by staff doctrine outlined in the Staff Officers' Field Manual 101-5. The conclusions presented in this report stem logically and consistently as corollaries to approved doctrine, and are, in addition, based on a reasonable sample of stated experience. These conclusions are intended to be helpful to staff officers assigned to combat intelligence duties. Principles, responsibilities and procedures are stated which considerably amplify the fundamentals prescribed in FM 101-5. Recommendations and suggestions are inserted where appropriate to the text, and emphasized by italics.

2. **Staff Doctrine must be understood.** The military appreciation of enemy terrain and enemy defense is an important part of intelligence service. At times it may be of critical importance. The degree of service rendered is higher if the staff officer understands the purpose of his work, the principles which fix his responsibility, the procedures to be followed and the priority or urgency of a given task. Unless these are understood, his effort may be wasted in duplication, or dissipated in aimless projects. If he understands these fundamentals, his contribution should satisfy military requirements.

SECTION II. THE PRIMARY MISSION

3. **Statement of Mission.** The primary mission of a Terrain and Defense Section at army group headquarters is, through the intelligence Branch, and through G-2, to keep the commander and the army group staff informed regarding the effect of enemy-controlled terrain, and of enemy defense installations which modify that terrain, on our own and the enemy situation and on enemy capabilities.

4. **General Procedures.** To accomplish this mission, intelligence is derived from essential elements of information pertaining to enemy terrain, enemy defense installations and enemy defense tactics.

5. **Sequence of Work.** The sequence followed in processing information is to collect and collate basic data or information, evaluate its accuracy, assess the reliability of the source, interpret the significance of intelligence both alone and in correlation with conjunctive intelligence and disseminate the result.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

13. The following is a list of defense studies prepared by the section:

Title	Weekly Intelligence Summary No.	Date
Defense Along the Roer	11	22 Oct 44
Maginot Line Principles	12	29 Oct 44
The Roer Dams	12	29 Oct 44
* Maginot Inundation System	14	13 Nov 44
Enemy Defenses, Zweibrueken Sector	15	18 Nov 44
Situation Along the Western French Coast	16	25 Nov 44
* Erft River Defense Line	17	2 Dec 44
Enemy Defense Lines	19	16 Dec 44
Defenses Along the River Main	30	6 Mar 45
The "Redoubt"	34	3 Apr 45
Defense Overprints of G. S. G. S. 4416, 1:100,000 map sheets R-1, S-1, T-1, U-1 and S-2 (SW quadant only)		

* Included in the Plates or the Appendices of this report.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

SECTION I. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. **Staff Doctrine is fundamental.** The responsibility of G-2 is broadly established by staff doctrine outlined in the Staff Officers' Field Manual 101-5. The conclusions presented in this report stem logically and consistently as corollaries to approved doctrine, and are, in addition, based on a reasonable sample of stated experience. These conclusions are intended to be helpful to staff officers assigned to combat intelligence duties. Principles, responsibilities and procedures are stated which considerably amplify the fundamentals prescribed in FM 101-5. Recommendations and suggestions are inserted where appropriate to the text, and emphasized by italics.

2. **Staff Doctrine must be understood.** The military appreciation of enemy terrain and enemy defense is an important part of intelligence service. At times it may be of critical importance. The degree of service rendered is higher if the staff officer understands the purpose of his work, the principles which fix his responsibility, the procedures to be followed and the priority or urgency of a given task. Unless these are understood, his effort may be wasted in duplication, or dissipated in aimless projects. If he understands these fundamentals, his contribution should satisfy military requirements.

SECTION II. THE PRIMARY MISSION

3. **Statement of Mission.** The primary mission of a Terrain and Defense Section at army group headquarters is, through the intelligence Branch, and through G-2, to keep the commander and the army group staff informed regarding the effect of enemy-controlled terrain, and of enemy defense installations which modify that terrain, on our own and the enemy situation and on enemy capabilities.

4. **General Procedures.** To accomplish this mission, intelligence is derived from essential elements of information pertaining to enemy terrain, enemy defense installations and enemy defense tactics.

5. **Sequence of Work.** The sequence followed in processing information is to collect and collate basic data or information, evaluate its accuracy, assess the reliability of the source, interpret the significance of intelligence both alone and in correlation with conjunctive intelligence and disseminate the result.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6. **Apportionment of Work.** The work of collection, collation and most of the evaluation is done by others who distribute the information. The Terrain and Defense Section is responsible for some evaluation, and all interpretation, correlation and dissemination. When this responsibility is fulfilled, the commander and the staff of army group are informed of intelligence which may affect operations and influence command decision.

7. **Priority of Work.** This is the primary mission, all other functions, duties or missions of the section are subsidiary and of lower priority at the level of army group.

SECTION III. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY MISSION

8. **Basis of the Analysis.** The preceding condensed summary of the primary mission may be broken down into a series of specific definitions, principles, duties and procedures of more direct practical application.

9. **Direction of Responsibility.** The section is primarily responsible for a horizontal dissemination of intelligence direct to the staff of army group. Vertical, or interechelon responsibility is presented later. This lateral dissemination under the primary mission is two-directional, first to other staff sections and the commander of army group to contribute to operational plans, future plans and command decision; and second to the staff of G-2 to aid in estimating the situation and assessment of enemy capabilities.

10. **Complementary Relation Between Terrain and Defense Study.** Considerations of terrain and defense are complementary since one reinforces the other to create a single capability. In addition, the apportionment of work between these two types of intelligence tends to balance, with predominant attention allotted to the study of defenses during static interludes, and shifting to the study of terrain during more fluid situations.

At army group, the separate functions of terrain and defense appreciation should be combined under one responsible group or section.

11. **The Intelligence Product.** The product required to satisfy the primary responsibility may conveniently be called an appreciation. A military appreciation may pertain to terrain, or to enemy defense, or to other intelligence.

a. **Definition of Appreciation.** The word "Appreciation" is used to describe an oral or written interpretation of the effect of significant items of intelligence on a given or assumed military situation. It may be used in two ways: as an annex to plans, or as an annex to an estimate of the situation.

b. **Prerequisites.** A military appreciation requires consideration of seven factors: adequate basic information, the definite requirements of a single echelon of command, a limited area, a known military situation, a known or assumed direction of approach, a known or assumed general direction of advance, and known or assumed objectives.

(1) **Adequate Basic Data.** Basic data or information may be considered to be a collection of plain facts, or an academic collation of accepted facts, prior to association with a given military situation. It is the responsibility of the section to supervise the collection of information by others, at least to some extent, and to recommend measures to improve collection. The section should request required information in the prescribed form listing the essential elements.

Basic terrain data upon which subsequent military appreciation may be based should be standardized in some approved form of dossier.

The work of collection and collation of basic terrain and defense information should continue indefinitely and in accordance with some approved authority and procedure.

(2) **Appreciation is limited to one echelon of interest.** Each successive echelon of command from highest to lowest is to a less and less degree a planning headquarters, and more and more a Tactical Headquarters. Each echelon looks at a differently delimited area, is interested in different degrees of refinement, considers different magnitudes of critical features, and considers them in a varying degree of intensity and perspective. Army group appreciations are of more direct interest to SHAEF and to armies than to corps and divisions, and, subject to the primary mission of the section to its own staff, all appreciations should be disseminated vertically, at least to corps. Army group appreciations, therefore, are primarily for army group staff use, and secondarily for background use by other echelons in their own work of appreciation.

Terrain and defense appreciations should be prepared specifically for use by a single echelon of command (see Appendices). Defense and terrain legends, symbols, and conventional signs should be modified by echelons, to satisfy variable scales of maps, and variable intensity of detailed study.

Defense overprints issued by different echelons should be at suitable scale, approximately 1:100,000 for army group, and

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

at that level there should be a segregation preferably by color between three categories of intelligence:

Installations which reinforce terrain in defense of ground operations (see Plate 4);

Installations which defend against aircraft in flight;

All other installations.

Defense traces maintained by G-2 (Air) APID, for subsequent release to armies, should be kept at the scale used by armies.

(3) **A Definite Area of Study.** Area limits of a specific study are determined by two considerations: first, army group boundaries; and second, within those boundaries, solely by the situation.

(a) **Army Group Boundaries.** Army group boundaries fix limits of military control, beyond which terrain study is broadly established on an area extending 50 per cent into adjacent army groups, and in depth from the front line or MLR as far as required to meet the commitment to study future plans of army group, which is largely a matter of considered judgment.

Terrain and defense appreciation is not limited to any zone fixed between army and SHAEF zones of interest in mapping programs and air-photograph coverage or reconnaissance (see Plate 1).

Defense traces maintained by G-2 (Air) APID are necessarily restricted to established zones, which are independent of the area of appreciation.

(b) **Areas Determined by the Situation.** Allocations of sub-areas within the broad area of responsibility depend on the situation. Within the broad area there is an endless process of revision, amplification, modification, reconsideration and altered emphasis. Immediate priority of work in a given sub-area or in reconsideration of previous study depends on a knowledge of two determinative factors: our situation, and the enemy's capabilities. Each study contributes to the gradual development of a comprehensive terrain consciousness throughout the staff. This is the end product and is the result of integration of many studies within that broad area (see Plate 1).

Terrain and defense appreciation should be considered a continous process and is never completed.

Area of study should begin at the front line, extend deep into the enemy rear area, and overlap adjacent army groups by at least 50 per cent.

(4) **Priority of study depends on the situation.** Allotment of areas for current study, and the assignment of appropriate priority is contingent on a knowledge of the situation. Such knowledge is obtained from G-2 and G-3 briefings, contacts with G-3 Plans, and consideration of G-2 estimates and statements of capabilities.

The section should be located at Tactical Headquarters of Army Group, and should have adequate facilities.

Direct lateral contact with other staff sections and their activities is essential.

(a) **Appreciation is prior to planning.** Operational plans should consider terrain and defense implications. A sufficient back-log of terrain and defense intelligence will assure, first, that terrain is understood to be exploited, and, second, a terrain risk has to be known to be accepted and overridden. In either case, terrain and defense studies are not properly made to suit a pre-conceived plan. The plan is made in consideration of intelligence, among other factors.

Inter-staff dissemination of terrain and defense intelligence should precede planning.

(5) **Division of Work.** Terrain appreciation is a joint effort of two groups at army group headquarters. The engineer staff collaborated with the Terrain and Defense Section in much of the work. It is unnecessary to define the exact limits of responsibility between these two groups provided they can cooperate well together, as was the case at Headquarters 12th Army Group. Neither of these groups could successfully preempt the whole responsibility for terrain appreciation. The separate effort of each group contributes to a single product.

(a) The engineers are the authority on much evaluation and interpretation pertaining to road communications, bridges, hydrologic and hydraulic information concerning rivers, climatological and meteorological data, the study of backwater inundation capabilities, the study of flood bores and waves as enemy defense measures, the effect of soils by seasons, evaluation of military maneuverability and cross-country movement, studies of approaches and exits to bridges and corridors, areas suitable for bridgeheads and airborne landings, and similar engineer problems. In addition, the engineers maintained the official library of maps, basic terrain data, special engineer reports, the Engineer Dossier, and a considerable collection of photographs, snapshots, views, odd maps, brochures, travel guides, and similar basic data.

(b) The Terrain and Defense Section is the authority on the interpretation of all information with respect to the situation and to future plans. This inter-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

pretation pertains especially to the military aspects of the terrain, and to the tactical effect of the terrain. The appreciaion is therefore usually completed within G-2, and is usually disseminated by G-2

The Engineers and the Terrain and Defense Section of G-2 should collaborate in all terrain appreciation.

12. **Dissemination.** The method of dissemination at army group to fulfill the major mission is by oral briefing or conference with use of visual aids including annotated wall-maps, air and ground photographs, and models. Models are needed only to demonstrate some critical condition which has suddenly assumed immediate tactical importence to army group.

There are two occasions for dissemination: first, to present significant intelligence to G-3 and to the commander as it bears on current operations, plans, or decision; and, second, to present periodically to the staff of G-2 intelligence which bears on the G-2 estimate and statement of enemy capabilities.

SECTION IV. SECONDARY MISSIONS

13. **Statement of Secondary Missions.** Missions to be accomplished by the Terrain and Defense Section, and of secondary priority, unless otherwise specifically directed by the A. C. of S., G-2, pertain to the vertical dissemination to other echelons of work accomplished under the primary mission, and incidental duties pertaining to studies of sites for the location of headquarters, and drafting and map library services.

a. **Distribution in the Weekly Intelligence Summary.** It is concluded that the responsibility for dissemination of all terrain and defense appreciations to other headquarters, while secondary, is an important function. Following the staff dissemination, all studies should be consolidated in the form prescribed in FM 101-5 for terrain studies, appropriate maps prepared and reproduced, and disseminated in the Weekly Intelligence Summary. While the time lag between the original army group briefing and the ultimate distribution to armies may be from one to two weeks, the information is still of considerable interest to Armies, and to a less extent, to corps, since it gives these headquarters a running account of the emphasis at army group, and in a few cases may serve to illustrate methods and techniques of some value to others in the preparation of their own appreciations.

b. **Other Duties.** It is concluded that the work of the section in the preparation of studies covering prospective sites for the location of army group

headquarters was not satisfactory. This was partly due to the fact that almost the entire contribution to such studies was by other sections or groups. These reports may have assisted in arranging itineraries for subsequent ground reconnaissance, but no site ever reported upon was actually selected.

Responsibility for the preparation of studies of sites for the location of headquarters should be allotted, and the results assembled into a report, by the Headquarters Commandant. It is recommended that the facilities of the Terrain and Defense Section in drafting and the maintenance of base maps be kept distinct and separate from services a sa drafting pool or a map library.

. . .

TERRAIN SOUTH OF THE RUHR *

SUMMARY

The industry of the Ruhr constitutes an important element of enemy capacity to wage a continuing war. Neutralization or partial neutralization of the Ruhr is therefore a military objective the importance of which would bear directly on the risk involved in the negotiation of terrain. A full encirclement would require penetration of a critical terrain feature lying south of the Ruhr. Such penetration would be restricted to infantry without benefit of mobile armor or airborne operation. Terrain favors defense to a high degree. The risk of advance through this country is only commensurate with an objective of over-riding value.

A partial encirclement which cut all approaches to the Ruhr except through the Sauer-Land would greatly reduce the industrial potential, possibly to a degree where the remaining value to the enemy would no longer be commensurate with the risk required to close the pincer.

From a bridgehead over the Rhine and lying at the base of the highland massif, penetration southward is probably easier than northward, although both are difficult.

* See Appendix A.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TACTICAL EFFECT OF TERRAIN

1. The Middle Rhine highlands constitute a critical terrain feature from the point of view of encirclement of the Ruhr. The tactical effect of this terrain is summarized along only two of many hypothetical lines of action, but these two are considered fairly representative of all, based on sample studies made by 12th Army Group APID, and on comparison with other selected lines. The possibilities of encirclement immediately south of the Ruhr River, along the Boerde, and avoiding the higher plateau to the south has not been explored in this study.

2. The Ruhr industrial area may be considered for convennience to include those cities circled on the attached map and lying north of Köln, except Köln itself and Münster. The industrial area has been built up largely since 1870, and now occupies most of the Rhine plain between the Lippe and the Ruhr, and the low rolling "Hellweg", a belt of loess extending east from the headwaters of the Emscher, now dotted with an almost continuous development of urban centers. The Emscher, now a developed link in the canal system of Northern Germany bisects the Ruhr industrial area along a long axis, running east and west, which, if extended to cross the Rhine, divides all approaches to the Ruhr into four significant quadrants. From the mouth of the Emscher as a point of origin, the four quadrants are:

a. The Köln bay lying to the southwest;
b. The Lowlands lying to the northwest;
c. The Münster bay lying to the northeast; and
d. The Middle Rhine highlands lying to the southeast.

Encirclement of the Ruhr would traverse all four of these quadrants, but the most critical feature occurs in the last, and may be divided into sub-areas which are relatively homogenous from a military aspect:

a. Bergisches Land.
b. Sauerland.
c. Rothaar Gebirge.
d. Siegerland.
e. Westerwald.

These sub-areas are correspondingly numbered and outlined on the map with hachured strokes in black. Compartments do not coincide with these sub-areas, broad compartmentation follows the watershed divides, which are in tapered dashed lines, also black.

Between these highland areas and the Rhine channel there is a strip of alluvial flood plain. It extends in varying width from Bonn to Duisberg. The part of this plain lying north of Köln is lettered "A" on the map, that south of Koln is lettered "B", and both are cross-hatched in blue. These areas are typical flood plain terrain, low, flat alluvial bottoms with terrace land of sand and gravel a few meters higher in elevation, open agricultural land and meadow unobstructed by hedges and trees except those lining some of the roads, and clearly under observation both from the plateau to the east, and from Vorgebirge escarpment lying between the west bank of the Rhine and the parallel Erft.

Area "A" lies in the peninsula confluence of the Wupper with Düsseldorf to the north dominating the road pattern, and hemmed in to the east by the Bergisches Land. The plain is narrow, and the corridors to the east are clogged with industrial structures, buildings and towns.

Area "B" lies similarly in the Sieg confluence, with the road pattern dominated by Köln to the north. It is wider than area "A", and is bisected north and south with three nearly coincident lines, affording rather sharply identified bomb limits. These lines are the central highway, the railway and the western fringe of the woods. These woods are brushland and moor, interspersed with denser stands, and afford cover from fair to good. At the easten margin of area "A" is the new autobahn, a clear sharp line demarking simultaneously the edge of area "A", the edge of the forest, and the edge of the Bergischer Hills, and is another potential bomb limit line. The open country near the Rhine is capable of supporting full-scale movement across country with only a few restrictions imposed by small streams and ditches. In wet weather, however, the river alluvium, containing a tight clay called Schlick, sometimes mixed with fine sand, would become a serious hazard, especially in the area near the Sieg confluence. The most important single feature of area "B" is the valley of the Sieg, which crosses the southern third of the plain in a nearly straight valley about a kilometer in width, through which the channel meanders in low gradient sweeps. This lower reach of the Sieg affords flank protection to a foothold on either side. The open portion of area "B" is favorable to airborne operation from a terrain viewpoint, although flak in the Rhine valley is heavy. Existing bridges are defended, and evidence indicates that they are prepared for demolition. Current engineer studies cover in detail the characteristics of the Rhine itself. At Siegburg, the Sieg forks, the Agger Valley cuts northeastwardly across the Bergisches Land, while the Sieg Valley forms a rather wide corridor to the east and south, becoming narrow and difficult in the interior. This is the valley

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

followed by the main road and one double-track railway linking Koln with south central Germany.

3. The Bergisches Land (sub-area I on the map) is a low plateau intricately dissected into a relief of relatively numerous small features. It is the fringe of the highlands to the east, and rises gradually to merge into them. To the north, the transition into the Ruhr is also gradual across the Boerde or Borderland, but to the west the transition is abrupt, the high ground of Bergisches immediately dominating the plain of the Rhine. Compartmentation by watershed divides creates west to east avenues, either along the main valleyways, or along the separating ridges. Roads and railroads, however, follow the valleys, not the ridges. The pattern of communications closely follows the drainage pattern, and is one of winding, twisting rights-of-way along the narrow bottoms of steep-sided valleys, or stiff grades and sharp turns as the roadway rises out of one compartment, crosses the rounded plateau-like hills and ridges, and drops down into the next. Both the new autobahn and the double-track railway cut diagonally across the Bergisches between Köln and the eastern Ruhr along valleyways. This section of the autobahn is incomplete to the east. The autobahn as a military route is, in rough country, vulnerable to obstruction and demolition at all sections of cut and fill and at numerous over and underpass structures. Its use as a through route is therefore subject to probable serious restrictions. On other roads, defiles are numerous from woods, from steep valley passages and from cities, towns and villages at all important crossroads. At least 30% of the sub-area is wooded, but the individual patches are relatively small and numerous compared with the forest continuity in the higher country to the east.

These factors seriously restrict motorized movement, even along established routes, while cross-country movement is prohibited except by infantry, with infiltration more favorable along ridges than in valleys. Profile "A" on the top margin of the map gives a comparison of the relief here with that to the east and west. Reservoirs in the higher headwaters constitute a threat to some valleyways, and can be manipulated to swell downstream reaches to flood proportions over protracted periods, or intermittently to cause flashy destructive out-of-bank floods. Static inundation, however, would be limited to relatively short narrow tangents of flood plain due to the prevailing steep gradients.

4. The Sauerland (see sub-area II) is not as intricately dissected as the lower-lying Bergisches Land, but is bolder in relief, much more heavily forested and less developed. Militarily, the same conclusions apply. Briefly, it is a country of steep slopes, routes in the valleys, meager cultivation with fields and meadow

confined to narrow strips at the foot of slopes or in narrow plains, a soil rotted from shist, slate and limestone, with the limestone areas abounding in caves and caverns. Main drainage is northward to the Ruhr River, the largest tributary being the Lenne, along the valley of which a double-track railway connects the Ruhr with Hesse to the east. Penetration northeastwardly would cut across the main corridors. Among the large reservoirs in this area are those of Lister and Sorpe, with the Mohne along the northern fringe. Houses in this district are described as being built of flimsy local material, wood and plaster in many cases.

5. The Rothaar Gebirge (see sub-area III) is a ridge of high elevations dominating all other sub-areas around it. It is a rugged, heavily wooded obstacle. Rivers heading in the dominating Rothaar Gebirge flow north to the Ruhr, west to the Rhine, south to the Lahn, and east to the Weser. Both the road and the railway net bypass the higher elevations, although single-track lines and secondary roads cut across them. Militarily, this is excellent defense country.

6. The Siegerland, by comparison with the other four sub-areas, is more favorable to penetration, but is still a difficult terrain feature. The valley of the Sieg, and the hills to the south of the river offer the best terrain for penetration. (See area "C".) Here cross country movement of motorized armor is limited to small isolated fields. The road pattern leaves the valleys more frequently than in other areas. Profile "B" at the bottom of the map gives a relative comparison of relief here with that along the northern line. In the upper reaches of the Sieg the terrain rapidly merges into the rugged character of the Sauerland and Rothaar-Gebirge. To the south, however, between the Sieben Gebirge along the Rhine gorge and the channel of the Sieg the plateau merges into the table plateau of the Westerwald, not too intricately dissected, with rolling to flat hilltops, and bordered to the southwest by the autobahn from Köln to Frankfurt via the broad relatively open plain of Limburg. (See area "D" on the map, outlined and hatched in blue).

7. A complete discussion of the Westerwald (sub-area V on the map) is omitted. It is a typical part of the middle Rhine Highland. (See Plate 2.)

• • •

TERRAIN OF THE PFALZER BERGLAND*

SUMMARY

The most favorable paths from Lorraine to the strategic Frankfurt, Mainz, Darmstadt triangle are through that part of

* See Appendix B.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the Palatinate called Pfalzer Bergland, including the Landstuhl [illegible]

The "Bergland" is a moderately difficult rolling hill country largely open or in cultivation, but complex in origin and therefore transitional in relief, growing successively more difficult from south to north. It is essentially a drainage saddle lying between higher and more rugged barriers to the north and south and forming a gap connecting Lorraine with the valley of the Rhine.

Saarlautern and Zweibrücken are the two portals to the Bergland, lying north and south respectively of the Saarbrücken obstacle formed by the forest-covered area of the coal fields.

These two portals lead to three possible lines of subsequent action in the eastward negotiation of the Bergland, namely, first, the Landstuhl depression via the Kaiserslautern gate and the valley of the Pfrimm to the Rhine; second, a broad front penetration along the mid-axis of the Bergland; and third, the valley of the Nahe.

Whether these three lines are exploited simultaneously or not, the second line of action is considered the best, being a broad front penetration utilizing an adequate road net, through rolling hills, only the steep slopes of which are forested, and crossing only minor headwater streams.

TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN

1. The following discussion of the tactical effect of the terrain of the Pfalzer Bergland is based on various Engineer and ISTD reports covering in detail the general topography, military aspects of the terrain, and critical terrain features, none of which will therefore be summarized. These basic considerations, however, limit tactical use of the terrain. Moreover, strategic factors also determine to some extent the degree of risk in the military negotiation of moderately difficult terrain.

2. The Pfalzer Bergland may be considered moderately difficult country from the point of view of military action. However, it is relatively the best available passage through the natural barrier of rugged country reaching from Aachen to Belfort. It is therefore a critical feature, and its examination reveals canalization within the compartment imposed by the transitional character of

relief. It is not a uniform or homogeneous sub-area, but varies from the peculiar [illegible] in the south, the rolling hills in th center, and the deep-cut valleys of the Nahe system flanked by the Hunsrück Mountains to the north. (See cross-sections on Appendix B.)

3. Lorraine terminates at the Saar. There are two portals from Lorraine to the Bergland, separated by the coalfield area reaching northeastwerdly from Saarbrücken. These coalfields lie generally within the heavily forested region forming a military obstacle separating the Zweibrücken portal from the Saarlautern portal. The southern approach to the Landstuhl depression through the Zweibrücken sector is northward up the Blies Valley utilizing the upland to the east and west. The immediate vicinity of Zweibrücken is the bottleneck to this avenue. East and westflowing branches of the Blies are in themselves not serious obstacles to military crossing, but the steep sidewalls of some of the valleys and the high ridges projecting into the valley of the Blies have been utilized by the enemy as the strong basic position of the West Wall. The West Wall in this sector, while not as deep as in the Saarbrücken—Saarlautern reach, is very dense, and well sited with respect to terrain. It has been described as one of the strongest sectors of the Siegfried Line. East of Zweibrücken, reaching nearly to Pirmasens, a deeply but not intricately dissected plateau known as the Westrich, presents a pattern of flat blocks of open or cultivated plateau, with new valleys cut deep and steep-sided, limiting opportunities for broad maneuver. However, negotiation of this terrain is favored by a preponderance of ridge or upland roads, probably well drained and not defiladed, by the open landscape and the scarcity of compact settlement with the attendant risk of staggered hedgehog defense. West of Zweibrücken the landscape is more mature in relief, but just as rugged insofar as steep slopes are concerned, and with major roads leading through valley and forest defiles to the Landstuhl depression. Of these two lines of approach, that to the east is probably preferable from a tactical point of view, although a detailed stereoscopic comparison is not at present available.

4. The northern portal to the Pfalzer Bergland is via the Saarleutern sector, by-passing the forest-covered coal fields to the north. The Saar River is the major natural obstacle, immediately backed by the West Wall in a degree of depth and density directly reflecting the enemy's appreciation of the natural advantage of this approach. The Bergland country touches the Saar in this sector. It is a region of low monotonous hills with orientation favoring northeastward penetration. A penetration here may be exploited in at least three obvious lines of action, the first or northernmost leads northeastwardly along the converging upper drainage of the Nahe to descend along the well established

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

routes in the narrow valley of the Rhine itself to the Rhine plateau. The second is by a broad front along the major axis of the Bergland, through open rolling country. The third is to the east, to enter the Landstuhl depression, leading through the Kaiserslautern gate and the Pfrimm Valley to the Rhine. (See Appendix B showing drainage, routes, subareas and cross-sections.)

5. The first of these corridors, the Nahe Valley, is the most difficult, since movement is canalized along valley roads where defense is relatively easy. The second corridor, a broad front penetration through the center of the Bergland, would encounter terrain generally similar in broad relief to that already crossed in eastern Lorraine, but favored by fewer and smaller patches of forest, by an adequate transverse and longitudinal network of roads, and by less severe water crossings than the wide north-flowing rivers of Lorraine. However, this country is dominated in the north and east by scattered prominent volcanic hills which would afford the enemy some advantage in observation and fire, from which concealment and cover would be limited to valley protection with much less forest cover than found in Lorraine. The third route of advance, skirting the coal fields to the north, is coincident with the second route as far as the region of Neunkirchen. Its subsequent junction with the Landstuhl corridor would be in the neighborhood of Homburg or Landstuhl. Passage of the Landstuhl corridor is gentle and easy as far as gradients are concerned, but this is a relatively narrow valley, dominated to the east by the Sickinger Höhe, and obstructed by woods and bogs, and subject to flooding.

6. In conclusion, the transitional character of the terrain of the Bergland imposes a variation in the severity of passage, canalizing most favorable lines of action through two portals and along three subsequent lines. Of these, even under simultaneous exploitation of all three, the center passage through the axis of the Bergland is probably the most favorable.

7. The following extract is from a popular and obviously Nazi-inspired treatise in the Geopolitic of the Pfalz and Saar, and emphasizes the strategic importance of this compartment from the enemy point of view. Its penetration opens up both the Hessian Corridor (see Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 16) and the Kraichgau:

LANDSCHAFT AND STADT IN PFALZ AND SAAR (1936)

By Eugenie Löffler

The series of gaps leading from the Lorraine rampart, including the Moselle gap, the Palatinate (Pfalz) gate and the Saverne Pass, are very important. However, the Moselle gap is ultimately blocked by the High Westerwald (surrounding Koblenz) which can only be by-passed to the south, while the Saverne gap is obstructed as a passage into southern Germany by the northern part of the Black Forest. The Kaiserslautern depression, on the other hand, is the old pathway of the Lorraine-Palatinate invasion route, running from Metz via Saarbrücken directly towards the densly populated northern part of the upper Rhine Basin with its many cities and the Mainz, Frankfurt, Worms triangle. At Frankfurt, this passage contacts the Main River line, Germany's narrowest and most sensitive spot, and from there offers free access to the heart of Germany by way of the Hessian Basin. At the same time, this passage reaches out towards Mannheim and Speyer, opening a path to southern Germany through the lower Neckar and to Kraichgau.

The Saar is the key to the most important transverse axis of the upper Rhine Basin: the Palatinate is the land around this major axis.

River terrace country and northern mountain region extend over both the Palatine and the Saar. The sandstone forests of the western Palatinate continue without change into the large forest areas of the Saar.

The Palatinate is described by W. H. Riehl as "a topographic fragment". It lacks a natural focal point. It and the Saar constitute anything but a geographical unit. Its natural transitional character is evident in the landscape which includes segments of larger patterns, and show a changing picture in different parts of the country.

* * *

TERRAIN IN THE TRIER AREA *

Note: An appreciation of the terrain of the Eifel was appended as Annex No. 2 to Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 20. A detailed examination of air cover has since been made by APID which formed the basis of two subsequent studies of this area. The first covered the northern half of the Eifel, with emphasis on the approaches to Bonn along the Prum — Euskirch — Bonn axis. It appeared in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 23, as Annex No. 2. The following appreciation covers the southern half of the area, with emphasis on the Trier ancher position and the gateway to the Moselle. All three of these reports should be considered together in making an assessment of terrain conditions in the strategic area bounded by the Rhine on the east

* See Appendix C.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and the Moselle on the south. Defense overprints at 1:100,000 scale have also been prepared showing defenses in this area. These overprints indicate the relative density of ground defenses in different sectors of the Siegfried Line. The density of ground defense is indirectly proportional to the natural severity of terrain — one complements the other.

The Moselle Valley is not a good military corridor. Trier and the adjacent confluence of the Sauer, Moselle and Saar constitute a strong defensive position at the gateway to the Moselle Valley. To seize Trier from the west it is necessary to cross two rivers. The Trier area is an anchor position on which the enemy could hinge or secure an anchor to a switchback defense along the Moselle.

There are three terrain features tending to restrict the military use of the Moselle Valley itself: first, the "H" shaped pattern of rivers lying west of Trier and blocking the gate; second, the rather sudden change in landscape giving the Moselle Valley a rugged mountainous aspect, with the river in either a narrow flood plain or a gorge except for the Wittlich depression; and finally, the pattern of side drainage into the Moselle, a series of frequent streams flowing north from the Hunsruck Mountains, or south from the Eifel, obstructing and restricting valley routes along the Moselle.

Koblenz lies at the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine. From a terrain point of view, assuming determined resistance, the best approach to Koblenz and subsequently to an accomplishment of the military occupation of the whole strategic area north of the Moselle and west of the Rhine is by following down-the-ridge approaches from the plateau top of the Eifel rather than along the Moselle corridor. Such lines of action are distinctly favored by the peculiar development of the Eifel. Unlike other areas of the middle Rhine Highlands, the Eifel is open on the ridges and plateau, wooded on the slopes, and heavily dissected in the middle and lower altitudes. Consequently, routes have tended to develop along the more open rolling upper altitude plateaux, avoiding the valleyways whenever possible. This condition is completely reversed in most of the middle Rhine Highlands lying east of the Rhine.

The problem of selecting the most favorable approaches from the west to attain the plateau top depends on relative characteristics of local terrain. There are no good approaches; some, however, are better than others. The Bastogne — St. Vith ridge projected to the northeast, curving around or over the north end of the Schnee-Eifel is probably the best. This avenue was discussed in the

previous appreciation of the northern part of the Eifel and the approaches to Bonn. In the southern portion of this strategic area, the best approaches seem on analysis to be those as indicated by red arrows on the attached map (Appendix C.)

In general, these approaches or lines of action necessarily take advantage of the north-south compartmentation. In particular, they take advantage of the Kyll River as temporary flank protection during the period required to reach and secure the plateau top itself. While these approaches are more difficult from a terrain and defense viewpoint than the northern ones, they do imply penetration into the Siegfried defenses first, later turning them from the rear. The best going is on the ridges, avoiding the valleys. The best crossvalley possibility is indicated converging at Bitburg. The Bitburg-Prum ridge appears to be the main avenue, requiring one or more breaches of the Siegfried Line in the general area of Echternach.

. . .

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TERRAIN APPRECIATION *

REDOUBT

(Prepared by the Defense and Terrain Group, IB, G-2, 12th Army Group)

MAPS: GSGS Series 4072, Scale 1/500,000

Sheets: Berne NE 46/6
Bolzana NE 46/10

GSGS Series 4416, Scale 1/100,000

Sheets: X-4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Y-4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Z-4, 5, 6, 7, 8

MAPS ATTACHED: *

Redoubt boundary and watersheds	(Map A)
Drainage	(Overlay B)
Routes and airfields	(Overlay C)
Physiographic areas	(Overlay D)
Avenues of approach	(Overlay E)

1. **Purpose and limits.** The appreciation deals with terrain factors affecting possible military operations along avenues of approach from the Bavarian Foreland southward into and through the "Redoubt" as delimited on attached Map A.*

2. **General Topography of the area.** The discussion of military aspects of the terrain, paragraph 4, and critical terrain features, paragraph 5, are based on the following reports and documents:

Austria, Topography, ISTD D/448

GSGS Map Series 4416

Air photo study by 12th Army Group Apid

Topography of National Redoubt, SHAEF Weekly Intelligence summary No. 56

Austria, Topography and Main Roads, ISTD D/488

Enemy Installations and Defenses in the Redoubt Wall Map, G-2, 12th Army Group.

* See Appendix D-1 and 2.

3. **Military Aspects of the Terrain.** Terrain severely restricts military operations in the entire area of the "Redoubt", and limits motorized or armored movement to relatively narrow corridors flanked and separated by high steep-sided mountain obstacles. The defender is favored by the relative scarcity of concealment and cover along the valley floors, its abundance along the commanding slopes higher up, and by good observation and fields of fire into the valley approaches. Air operations are likewise limited, airfields and landing grounds are scarce, climate and air currents are unfavorable, airborne and parachute operations are possible in only a few small areas.

If the avenues of approach are lightly defended, penetration along the lines indicated on overlay E are possible for armored spearheads in most cases. If defense is strong, advance along the indicated corridors will not be possible until the dominating slopes are controlled and the compartment cleared. The degree of mountain infantry employment depends on the defense.

4. **Critical Terrain Features.** There are three critical areas lying along the main system of east-west corridors bisecting the center of the "Redoubt", possession of which largely controls communications into or through the area. These are, first, the Arlberg-Landeck area west of the center of the "Redoubt"; socond, the Innsbruck area at the center; and third, the Radstadt-St. Johann area east of the center. The most critical of these is the Innsbruck area controlling the best crossing of the Alps.

The main ridge of the Alps lies south of and parallel to the axis of these three areas, and is a critical feature limiting all transverse movement across the "Redoubt".

The series of east-west troughs bisecting the "Redoubt" includes the Ill., the Inn, the Salzach, and the Enns, and forms the backbone of the communication system, and is therefore a very critical feature.

5. **Tactical Effect Of The Terrain.** Climate and topography limit determinative military operations to the period from April to November. Late spring and early summer is the flood period, further limiting effective operations to possibly the two best months, July and August.

As in the Appenines, topography favors defense to such a high degree that normal corridors cannot be used until the whole compartment, including the dominating heights, is first secured. However, there are numerous avenues of approach leading south from the Bavarian Foreland; the defense of all simultaneously will require a considerable force and a wide base. Mountain troops and Alpine tactics will be required to secure defended passes, or to control

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

dominating positions. At least 90 per cent of the area is Alpine in its full military connotation. Control of the long eastwest trough through the center of the "Redoubt" is in effect accomplished by control of three critical areas on this axis, these areas being:

Arlberg — Landeck Area
Innsbruck Area
St. Johann — Radstadt Area

a. **The Arlberg — Landeck Region.** This region is the hub of a number of avenues of approach. The critical Flexen and Arlberg passes are in the area. It is the portal area to the strategic Resia pass southward over the Alps into Italy, and the area cuts and controls the lateral axis of communication to the important western fringe of the "Redoubt" and to Switzerland. The area is approached by four lines of action from the Bavarian Foreland (See Overlay E), as follows:

Rhine-Ill via Arlberg Pass
Bregenzer Ach via Flexen Pass
Lech via Flexen Pass
Lech-Isar Headwater Valleys via
  Grundbach
  Ehrwald Pass
  Fern Pass

The best of these, and accordingly the most heavily defended by enemy installations, is the first. The Rhine trough, gouged into a wide trench by glacial action, extends due south from the eastern end of Lake Constance, being seven miles wide at Bregenz. Along the floor drainage is poor; numerous streams and ditches cross the flat bottom. Movement is better along the marginal slopes, a condition not unusual in the "Redoubt" area since most of the valleys are U-shaped glacial troughs through which a young stream has incised an alluvial plain, leaving terraces at the edge of the original glacial floor. Two approaches lead generally eastward from the Rhine trough to critical area No. I (See Overlay E).

The first of these leads eastward from Feldkirch, through two gorged bottlenecks where the Ill outs through the rim of the Rhine trench, but opening out to the east in the Inner Walgau. The Ill River here is partly regularized, flows through some wooded areas, leaving terraces along the margins of the valley on which villages are located. The head of the valley connects via the Arlberg Pass with the Rosanna, a tributary of the Inn, near Steuben.

A more difficult route, although normally a good highway, is the second of the four avenues of approach, via the Bregenzer Ach beginning near the east

end of Lake Constance. The route follows a deep-cut valley, where landslides endanger the rail line, but there are basin-like sections opening out between bottlenecks. The route leads over the Hochkrummbach saddle (5,446 feet) to connect with the Flexen Pass and join the Arlberg Pass to drop down to the Inn and lead to the strategic area of Innsbruck.

A third approach to the Arlberg — Landeck area from the Bavarian Foreland follows the upper Lech between the Algau and Lechtal Mountains. The Knie Pass across the crest of the Bavarian Alps, being a narrow gorge across a rock bar, is not followed by the road. Beyond the pass, a broad welldrained trough known as the Rette Basin carries the corridor approach up the valley toward Steeg, where the trough is over one-half mile wide. Below Stanzach the gradient is steep, the river is braided and torrential in spring. There is a bottleneck through the narrow steep Gaicht Pass leading into the corridor. This route joins route two described above at the Hochkrummbach saddle, entering the Inn Valley via Flexen Pass.

A fourth approach originates in the Reutte Basin area of the Lech, or, alternately, in the Loisach headwaters of the Isar. From the Reutte Basin the approach is southeastwardly up the Grundbach depression, where movement is easy and limited deployment possible. This depression lies between the Ammergau and Lechtal Alps. Limited possibilities exist for air drops. At Lermoos the route joins the main approach into the mountains from the Oberammergau region of the Loisach. The ridge of the Bavarian Alps is the international boundary, and is crossed by the Ehrwald Pass, a narrow wooded notch where movement is confined to the road or railway through the Ehrwald. South of the more open area around Lermoos, Fern Pass is reached, a denselywooded, irregular, hummocky, landslide passage to Nassereith, movement being restricted within the pass. Beyond the Fern Pass, subsequent movement may be either east to Innsbruck, or west to Landeck, both of which are in the great trough of the Inn (See Overlay E).

b. **The Innsbruck Area.** This region lies astride the center of the major east-west trough controlling communications in the "Redoubt", its possession assures military domination of all east-west movement, as well as the vastly important north-south route accross the Alps via the Seefeld depression and the Brenner Pass. Innsbruck is therefore the major hub of the "Redoubt" and a highly critical terrain feature. (See Overlay E for critical area No. II.)

There are three main avenues of approach to Innsbruck from the Bavarian Foreland south of Munich. The first of these is described above through the Ehrwald and Fern Passes by way of valley approaches of the Upper Isar.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

The second approach follows the important Seefeld depression, a glacial trough penetrating the ridge of the Dolomite or Limestone Alps (See Overlay D). Because of its geographical position as a link to the Brenner crossing, the Seefeld depression has long been one of the most important transverse passages, contributing to the development and importance of Innsbruck, the capitol of northern Tyrol. A road and railway south from Munich cross over the Seefeld depression, cutting through the crest of the Limestone Alps at the Scharnitz Pass (See Overlay E), then crossing the Seefeld depression itself, a rolling platform moulded by glacial action into rounded crests and marshy hollows and hummocks. The route drops rather abruptly towards the Inn through a valley-head near Moserno. Forest cover limits deployment on the rolling saddle; otherwise, some valley movement off the road is possible. The passege is flanked to the west by the Mieminger and to the east by the Karwendel ranges of the Dolomite Alps.

The third approach to Innsbruck is the long but direct route up the Inn Valley, the course of the main rail and road communication. From Rosenheim in the Foreland the route enters the mountains along the gravel plain of the regulated river: the Inn. Braided channels, poor drainage and frequent flooding add to the difficulties of military exploitation. The river swings from side to side, hampering maneuver or deployment or movement off the roads, this meandering action having incised a flood plain lying below the level of the original glacial floor, leaving terraces hanging to the margins which afford the locations of frequent towns. A great landslide between Wiesing and Munster narrows the valleyway by the residual fan of talus and debris, on the north side of the valley. Throughout the trough of the Inn the valley is about a mile wide, approaching two miles in the vicinity of Innsbruck. This wide Inn trough was a glacial valley separating the Dolomite or Limestone Alps to the north from the great crystalline mountains to the south. Between Innsbruck and Zirl the river swings across the whole width of the valley three times in eight miles, a limitation on movement characteristic of the valley. Local badly drained patches are a less severe restriction. Above Zirl, the Nieming depression affords a subsidiary or alternate passageway through the valley.

This third approach to Innsbruck via the Inn Valley is supplemented by a secondary entrance to the valley from the Foreland, a passage over the Bavarian Alps by way of the Achental corridor (See Overlay E). The valley of the Weissach furnishes a narrow portal, rising to a saddle at 3,091 feet to join the Pitten Bach, the route then following the Achen Bach, a tributary of the Inn, past the lake, Achen See, which obstructs and narrows the passage. Junction

with the Inn Valley is at Jenbach. The Achen Pass itself between the Pitten and Weissach drainage is a narrow bottleneck. A broader approach is afforded by road north of the divide.

c. The third significant area (See Overlay E, Critical Area No. III) controls the strategic junctions in the area of St. Johann — Radstadt. Four communication spokes approach this hub, the upper Salzach from the west, the Kitsbuhel depression (see Overlay D) from the north-west, the lower Salzach from the south and the Enns from the east. This area is also the crossroad for passages over the high Alps into Italy and Yugoslavia. (See Overlay E). All four of the avenues of approach southward to this critical area can be initiated from the area of Salzburg, encircling the cul-de-sac of the so-callet "Inner Redoubt" (See Map A) centering on Berchtesgaden.

The first of these is the most easterly, and is the course of the road from Salzburg southeast to Irdning on the Enns-River. The approach is very difficult in stretches but improves in crossing a few open basins. Movement is confined to the road most of the way. The course follows the upper branches of the Traun River along the line of lakes. This is the famous Salzkammergut country of wild scenery, rocky crags, wood-bordered lakes and forests. The present road apparently follows old abandoned valleys and dry troughes in the high mountains. Both the railway and the road follow the best of several alternate passes through the most difficult bottlenecks. Narrow passes, lakes and basins as well as the general valleys of the Upper Traun and Ischl form the various links of this route. The more open basin floors are gently rolling countryside, but the gorges cut through the basin rims in narrow defiles. Once the Enns Valley is reached, further movement directed on the strategic area of Radstadt is up the Enns Valley. Here the going is better despite a series of narrow passes above Schladming on the road to Radstadt. The Enns trough ends above Radstadt, but access to the Salzach trench in the vicinity of St. Johann is obtained either by the pass to the Fritzbach or the Wagrein Valley heads, thence downward into the Salzach Valley.

The second avenue of approach to this critical area (Critical Area No. III) is due south from Salzburg via the Salzach Valley. Immediately above Salzburg the river flows in a wide, flat-bottomed glacial trench, at a gradient of only eight feet to the mile. The highway and the railway follow the valley. Spring floods make river control difficult. There are woodland areas in the bottoms. A terrace hangs on the eastern valley wall, remnant of the glacial floor. The approaches are commanded everywhere by high slopes or nearby heights. At Golling the corridor enters a gorge through the Lueg Pass, the gorge ends at

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Werfen, above which point the valley opens between Bischofshofen and St. Johann permitting some deployment and facilitating access to the important eastward connections to the Enns Valley mentioned above, namely, the Fritzbach and the Wagrein Bach. Above St. Johann as far as Bruck the valley again narrows, with a gorge at Lend, which, however, can be outflanked via the Wenger Bach which by-passes the bottleneck to the north. Above Bruck, the Salzach Valley becomes a broad trench with a flat floor, but leads to a dead end due to the severity of the crossing via Gerlos Pass to the Inn Valley. Nevertheless, the whole valley of the Salzach, despite the dead-end tip, is a feeder for numerous corridors both to the south and north, by which connection is made with the Inn in one case, and by summer tracks and dangerous passes over the Alps to the south in the other. These, however, are important from a military view-point, since they afford the enemy the capability of descending on the major avenues of communication. Airborne landings could be made in the reach between Bruck and Neukirchen.

At Bruck the railway and one branch of the main road cut north then west, to reach the Inn (See Overlay E). The main portal to the great Kitzbuhl depression (See Overlay D) leads northward from the Salzach trough to cross the Saalfelden saddle, a link in the third route of approach to Critical Area No. III (See Overlay E).

The third line of penetration from Salzburg follows the Salzach Valley southwestwardly, up the valley head, crossing the ridge through the difficult Stein and Knie passes, to cross the Kitzbuhel depression at Saalfelden, thence dropping down into the Salzach at Bruck.

These three routes are supplemented by an eastward exploitation of the Kitzbuhel depression itself from the Inn Valley. This depression is the route of the main rail and roadway, and is a series of glacial troughs of unusual structure, links of which are the Solland to the west at the Inn portal Pillersee in the center and Leoganger to the east (See Overlay E). Military movement is more open in the west, becoming increasingly difficult to the eastward.

The area of the city of Salzburg, beside being the focal point of three lines of penetration into the "Redoubt", is an important strategic center of enemy activitiy; both Salzburg and Berchtesgaden are heavily protected by anti-aircraft guns and some other defenses. If defense of Salzburg and the portals of these three lines of action is heavy, penetration along the valley routes will depend on mountain infantry tactics, infiltration via ridges and steep slopes to secure command of the compartment before mobile columns can use the roads. On the other hand, armored columns should be able to penetrate these corridors against light defense, although demolitions can greatly hinder movement, both by damage to the road and bridges, and by the creation of landslides. Concealment is spotty in the valley much better on the steep slopes. Observation within the valley is excellent. Fields of fire into the valley are ideal. All of these factors favor the defender, if there is any.

. . .

INUNDATION SYSTEM MAGINOT LINE NEAR SAARALBE *

In the vicinity of Puttelange (Q 412507), northwest of Saarelbe, a system of inundations was planned by the French to augment the Maginot Line fortifications in this area. The use of the water in the reservois of Hoste Bas (Q 386524), Hoste Haut (Q 365523), Puttelange (Q 425504), Diffembach (Q 425460), Remering (Q 405480), and Hirbach (Q 425460), was included in this plan. Five control dams were constructed along the Moderbach stream at the following points (See Appendix E):

1. East of Hirbach (Q 432459);
2. South of Richeling (Q 433470);
3. North of Remering (Q 412497);
4. South of Puttelange (Q 412497);
5. Northwest of Puttelange (Q 403513).

Inundation could be accomplished by opening gates in the dams of the artificial lakes and closing the gates of the control dams along the Moderbach. The water would drain from the upper reservoirs into the Moderbach and back up against the control dams. The resulting inundation, which would take approximately 24 to 48 hours to accomplish, would extend from Holving to Puttelange creating a water obstacle with an average width of 500 yards and a maximum depth of 10 feet (extent shown on map).

A line of small pillboxes with wire entanglements were erected along the Moderbach from Holving to Puttelange above the floodable area. South of Holving in the area which cannot be permanently flooded the Mooderbach was more heavily defended by the addition of anti-tank obstacles on both sides of the stream. Also on the height to the west of Saaralbe is Fort Knopf (Q 464448) which adds to the defense of this region.

According to OSS sources this defense system was still in good condition at the end of February 1944 and seemed to be maintained permanently by the German General Staff. Although designed to stop a force coming from the

* See Appendix E.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

northeast, it is easily adaptable against a force coming from the southwest. Once this enemy defense capability is placed in operation it can only be completely neutralized by the destruction or capture of each control dam.

The French also devised a system of inundations along the L'Albe and Saar rivers. Three control dams were constructed at the following points:

1. On L'Albe river east of Saaralbe (Q 477444);
2. On Saar river northeast of Herbitzheim (Q 528472);
3. On Saar river east of Wittring (Q 573506).

The closing of sluices in these dams will cause the L'Albe, Modersbach, Rode and Saar rivers to back up forming a flood area from Wittring to Saaralbe and from east of Saaralbe to Gueblange. The southern edge of the floodable area is protected by light fortifications similar to those along the Moderbach.

No definite information has been received as to whether or not the Germans have maintained this system in working order.

• • •

THE ERFT RIVER DEFENSE LINE*

The Erft river, together with the defense installations and field works on its east bank, and the Vorgebirge or Ville ridge to the east of the river, form the last natural defense position before the city of Köln and the west bank of the Rhine between Bonn and Düsseldorf. This line is also a secondary line of defense behind the Roer positions presently being assaulted by the Ninth and First Armies. A sketch map (Appendix F) is attached showing the Erft defenses.

The terrain between the Erft and the Roer is flat to gently rolling country suitable for cross country movement. Most of the area is under cultivation under a pattern of rectangular fields without hedges or ditches. The Erft River as an obstacle consists actually of several waterways within a rather broad flood plain. The major channels are the Kleine Erft and the Große Erft, neither of which exceeds 30 feet in width; while in some stretches the canal affords a third and more difficult obstacle, as it varies from 35 to 60 feet in width and from 10 to 16 feet in depth. Other braided channels follow the wet marshy bottomlands within the confines of the flood plain, which itself varies from one to two kilometers in width.

To the east of the Erft the Vorgebirge or Ville rises gradually to a height of 150 to 200 feet above the valley before sharply descending to the Rhine Plain. The western slope of the Vorgebirge from Bruhl north to Kenten has been deeply scarred by surface mining of Lignite (See map). The resulting pits and quarries are extensive in area and sometimes reach a depth of 100 to

* See Appendix F.

150 feet. The east-to-west routes in this area are few in number because of these pits, which in themselves form a pattern of defense, so that only a few enemy defense works are found to supplement these obstacles. Nevertheless, this zone of excavation should be considered as a link in a continuous line of positions. As shown on the map, the newer defenses tie in very closely with existing obstacles and terrain, thickening towards the north where the Lignite diggings thin out. New defenses along the Swist, a branch of the Upper Erft, form a continuity to the defense in front of Bonn.

In spite of these natural obstacles, the Erft line does not yet appear to be as strong as the Roer defenses. Unlike the Roer, which rises in the rugged Hohe Venn country and therefore is difficult to flank from the south, the Erft drainage heads up in the low plateau foothills of the Eifel and could be approached along natural corridors from the southwest. Thus between a line drawn due south from Euskirchen, and another drawn due southwest, a sector of the Lower Eifel is intercepted which by comparison with terrain both to the west and east of it is more favorable to movement. The rough country to the west is the eastern edge of the Hohe Venn country, including the rugged heavily wooded headwaters of the Roer with its two large reservoirs. To the east lies the intricately dissected high plateau of the Ahr river drainage. The sector southwest of Euskirchen lying between these two barriers is therefore a military compartment, in fact a lower plateau sloping down to the Köln Plain, carved into valleys by the headwaters of the Erft, the resulting drainage corridors running northeast and with intervening ridges accentuated by the limestone hills also oriented in the same direction. A large portion of this central compartment is in open cultivation, the woods are described as passable in many cases by both infantry and vehicles, the main roads are ridge roads, avoiding defilation, and with a minimum of bridges and culverts. Only the small transverse headwater streams of the Roer to the west and the Ahr to the east offer any obstacle, and these do not appear to be serious. No streams in this compartment are very large. However many slopes occur which would canalize movement into northeast trending corridors, and would restrict maneuver.

In conclusion, the Erft line is at present being developed into a final defensive position before the Rhine, utilizing all natural advantages, but as yet not strengthened against vulnerability to a flanking movement from the southwest. According to PW statements, units of SS troops are in most of the towns and railheads of the Erft Valley, and are reported to be working on defenses, and probably on positions between the Erft and the Roer, where the compact village pattern would favor a hedgehog system of defense based on perimeter fortifications.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Study No. 3

A STUDY OF OPERATIONS OF G-2 (INTELLIGENCE BRANCH) IN THE 12TH ARMY GROUP

FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 AUGUST 1944

TO 9 MAY 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Study No. 3

INDEX

	Page
INTRODUCTION	106
Chapter I Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group	108
Chapter II Organization of Intelligence at Army Level	115
Chapter III G-2 Operation on Army, Corps and Division Level	133

CHARTS AND TABLES

Organizational Chart, Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group	107
Proposed T/O for G-2 Section, Army — submitted by First Army	122
Proposed T/O for G-2 Section, Army — submitted by Ninth Army	130

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INTRODUCTION

1. This report is the second in a series prepared by the G-2 Section of 12th Army Group. These studies have been made in the belief that the existence of similar documents would have been valuable in the planning stages of the invasion of Europe, and in the hope that they may prove of value to future intelligence officers and to the G-2 Sections in the Far East. This report concerns itself with the organization and method of operations of the G-2 Intelligence Branch on the Army Group, Army, Corps and Division level. Fundamentally, it is an effort to discover what worked and what did not work, and to determine whether failures were the result of faulty organization or misconception of mission. An effort has been made to incorporate into this report the recommendations based on combat experience of G-2 officers in the units in 12th Army Group.

2. It should be recognized that many conditions affect the gathering and disseminating of intelligence, and that consequently no two intelligence branches or methods of operating may be identical. As a result, it will be observed that several different methods of operation are presented, and only where an overwhelming majority of the G-2's indorse one method is it recommended to the exclusion of others.

The report is divided into three parts:

a. Chapter I is a review of the Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group, its subsections and methods of operation.

b. Chapter II is a report on the conference held with representatives of Army G-2 Sections concerning organization of Army intelligence. Suggestions for methods of operation and proposed Tables of Organization are included.

c. Chapter III is a study of the G-2 operations in the Armies, Corps and Divisions. This study was made by a surveying group of three officers from the Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group, which visited most of the corps and divisions which had ever been under the command of the Army Group. Their visit was preceded by a questionnaire sent to the unit G-2. As a result of these conferences, a comprehensive survey of the methods of operation has been compiled.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, 12TH ARMY GROUP



INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, 12TH ARMY GROUP

3. Mission. — The mission of the Intelligence Branch was:

a. To keep the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, and the other staff sections, constantly informed of the enemy's capabilities.

b. To keep each Army informed on the enemy situation on the rest of the front.

c. To keep SHAEF informed of the enemy situation on the 12th Army Group front.

4. Organization. — The organization necessary for the accomplishment of the mission of the Intelligence Branch was affected to a certain extent by the echeloning of 12th Army Group Headquarters into Tactical, Main and Rear Headquarters. It was the Commanding General's desire to have a Tactical Headquarters of a small nucleus of officers in close proximity to the Armies in order to maintain closer touch with the situation. The bulk of the G-2 Section at Tactical Headquarters was composed of the majority of the Intelligence Branch plus a small CIC detachment for the security of the Headquarters. Of the Intelligence Branch, only the sub-sections which handled the Collection and Dissemination of Documents, Technical Intelligence and a Situation Room remained at Main Echelon, along with the balance of the G-2 Section. The Intelligence Branch at Tactical Headquarters was subdivided into four subsections: Administration, Order of Battle and Situation Room, Estimates and Appreciation, and Terrain and Defense.

5. Chief of Branch. — The Chief of the Intelligence Branch was left free of all organizational and administrative matters so that his full time and effort could be devoted to the study and analysis of the enemy situation. In this fashion the Chief of Branch was constantly available to advise the Commanding General on the latest developments of the enemy situation and their effect on enemy capabilities, and to consult on this subject with representatives from SHAEF and the Armies.

6. Executive. — The Executive of the Intelligence Branch handled all organizational and administrative matters of policy exclusively affecting the Branch. All organizational and administrative matters affecting the G-2 Section in general were handled by the Section's Administrative Branch which was always at Main Headquarters. Thus, it was arranged for a minimum of organizational and administrative work to be done by the Intelligence Branch Executive

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

administrative details, the Executive supervised the operations of the Branch.

7. Administration. — The Administration of the Intelligence Branch at Tactical Headquarters was handled by a Chief Warrant Officer. By the maintenance of a Collection and Dissemination sub-section of the Intelligence Branch at Main Headquarters it was possible to prevent from reaching TAC all publications and administrative matters except those which affected or were pertinent to the operations of the Branch. This relieved the Administration sub-section at he Tactical Headquarters of a considerable burden. Nevertheless, two Technical Sergeants, operating on two 12-hour shifts, devoted full time to handling the registration and distribution of documents. One Master Sergeant, highly qualified in secretarial work, was used almost exclusively for the preparation of the Estimates and Weekly Intelligence Summary, and for special reports for the Commanding General and the A. C. of S., G-2. The balance of the typing and clerical work was handled by two T/3's. One of these T/3's was always assigned to the typing and mimeographing of the Daily Periodic Report and the Daily ISUM covering the period from 1200 to 1200 and written by the officers in the Situation Room and turned over to the typist for cutting the stencils and mimeographing sometime between 2200 and 2300. The Administration sub-section also handled the production and distribution of the Weekly Intelligence Summary of the Intelligence Branch, a publication which varied in length between 15 and 30 mimeographed pages plus from one to seven maps. In order to assemble this production every Tuesday night, it was necessary to utilize all of the enlisted personnel of the Intelligence Branch.

8. Situation Room and Order of Battle Group.

a. Organizaton. — This Group was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel who devoted his full time to following the detailed order of battle of all enemy units on the front and acted as principal liaison with the specialists in order of battle at SHAEF, 21 and 6th Army Groups and the Armies. The actual supervision of the operations of the Situation Room was under a Major. In addition to supervising the operation of the Situation Room this officer was in charge of the editing of the Weekly Intelligence Summary. Together these two officers were charged with briefing the Commanding General on the enemy situation at his daily briefing and at such special briefings as might by called. The production of the Daily Periodic Report and operation of the Situation Room was performed by two Captains, one of whom was present in the Situation Room at all times between 0800 and 2400, or longer if necessary. In addition,

the MIS Order of Battle Team, consisting of one officer and two sergeants, was located in the Situation Room.

b. Operations.

(1) The Situation Room operated in such a fashion so as at all times to have available complete details on the latest developments in the enemy situation The Situation Room served not only as a work room for the G-2 briefing officers and for the production of G-2 periodics, but also as a center of information on the enemy situation for other staff sections and for liaison officers from other units. The officers on duty in the Situation Room were available at all times to brief liaison officers from other units or other staff sections on the latest developments in the enemy situation. The periodic reports of all Armies, the Army Groups, SHAEF and certain Corps were received and kept on file in the Situation Room. The daily telegraphic ISUMS were received in the Situation Room during the day and used in the preparation of the current periodic report and for briefing the Commanding General. In addition, two or three times a day the officers on duty would make a telephonic round-up to obtain the latest information on the enemy situation and to keep the Armies and SHAEF informed of all developments. Each Army was called in turn and queried as to the latest developments on its front, and given the latest developments on the other Army fronts. After all of the Armies had been called SHAEF was informed of the latest developments. Communications difficulties and restrictions on discussing classified material over the telephone often restricted this procedure, but it was nevertheless found to be the most rapid and satisfactory method of keeping abreast of the enemy situation.

In order to illustrate the enemy situation graphically, the following maps and charts were kept on the walls of the Situation Room.

(a) Order of Battle of Western Front. — On a 1:250,000 map the order of battle and front line of the entire Western Front was posted. Units down to division size of both the enemy and Allied forces were located in their exact position according to the latest information. This map was kept accurately posted throughout the day.

(b) Order of Battle on 12th Army Group Front. — The enemy order of battle on 12th Army Group front was posted on a 1:100,000 map. Enemy units down to the size of regiment were posted and Allied units down to the size of division. This scale map was found satisfactory for following the situation during the periods of the campaign when there were no great breakthroughs, giving more terrain features and smaller villages,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

moved so rapidly that all work was done on the 1/250,000 map.

(c) Disposition of the German Army. — The disposition of all of the divisions in the German Army was kept on a 1/1,000,000 map of Europe. This map was also used to follow the progress of the advance of the Soviet Army until the proximity of the two fronts was such that the fronts could be posted on the 1/250,000 map.

(d) Defense Overprint. — During the battle along the Siegfried Line a defense operprint of the line on a 1/100,000 map was posted in the Situation Room. The front line was kept on this map to indicate the progress of our advance through the fixed defenses.

(e) Units in Contact. — A chart was maintained showing every regiment on the Western Front with the division to which it was assigned. On this chart was noted the most recent day of contact with each enemy regiment, the estimated strength of the division, and the name of its commanding officer. By means of this chart it was possible to answer instantly any inquiry as to the last day of contact with any unit on the front. In addition, the chart provided a constant reminder to the editors of the periodic report to warn the Armies when any units were out of contact for a period of time sufficiently long enough to enable them to move to a new sector of the front. To emphasize this, the last date of contact with those divisions currently engaged was marked on the chart in black, and after a division had not been contacted for five days the date was marked in red. It was the mission of the Order of Battle Team to keep this chart up to the minute.

(f) Corps and Army Units. — Two additional charts were maintained in the Situation Room. One chart listed the enemy corps operating under each Army, while the other listed the divisions operating under each corps. The second chart showed the location of supporting troops such as heavy tank battalions, and corps artillery troops.

(2) Daily Periodic Report. — The Daily Periodic Report, which closed each 24-hour period at 1200, was written during the afternoon and evening of each day. The information in this report included material received from the Armies through their 0900 ISUMS and by means of telephone calls. The Periodic Report was completed and dispatched to the Armies during the night so that it would be available to the Army G-2 by 0700. The Daily Periodic Report included a description of the enemy operations on each Army front during the 24-hour period, pointing out any change in dispositions, the number

of prisoners captured, a summary of the observations made by tactical reconnaissance during the day, and such other items of intelligence interest as had been received during the day. An annex was attached to each Daily Periodic Report giving the latest Order of Battle notes, latest enemy unit identifications with their locations, and important enemy personalities. The Order of Battle notes were prepared by the Order of Battle Team on information obtained from SHAEF Order of Battle notes, Interrogation Reports, captured enemy documents, and reports from other headquarters.

(3) Weekly Intelligence Report. — A Weekly Intelligence Report was published by the Intelligence Branch. It contained the following sections:

Paragraph 1 — General Summary. — The General Summary reviewed the most significant developments in the enemy situation during the previous week, indicated the outstanding enemy capabilities and discussed these in detail. The first draft of the General Summary was prepared by the Chief of the Order of Battle Group, and the final draft was written by the Estimates and Appreciations Group and submitted to the A. C. of S. G-2 for comment and criticism before final publication.

Paragraph 2 — Enemy Operations. — A review of the enemy operations for the week on the front of each of the Armies in 12th Army Group was written each week either by the chief of the Order of Battle sub-section or by one of the officers in the Situation Room.

Paragraph 3 — Enemy Dispositions. — The changes in enemy dispositions on each of the Army fronts on the Western Front during the week were noted, and the total number of nominal enemy divisions in each sector given with the estimated equivalent strength and number of tanks.

Paragraph 4 — Enemy Strength on Western Front. — Each week a list was published of all enemy divisions on the Western Front, giving for each: its commander, estimated total personnel, estimated total tanks, estimated total artillery battalions, army and corps under which it operated. This was prepared by the Order of Battle Team, and was supplemented by a map showing the enemy order of battle.

Paragraph 5 — Enemy Supply and Transport. — A analysis of the enemy supply and transport system was prepared each week by the Target Intelligence Group of G-2 (Air).

Paragraph 6 — Enemy Defense Trends. — A study of the latest trends in enemy defense activities was made by the Terrain and Defense

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Group each week. This was often supplemented with a map of the latest enemy defense activity.

Paragraph 7 — Visual Reconnaissance Summary. — A summary of the trends of enemy movement, both rail and road, based on tactical reconnaissance was prepared each week for the Weekly Intelligence Summary by the Situation Group of G-2 (Air).

Paragraph 8 — GAF Activity. — The G-2 (Air) Branch also prepared a summary of the activity of the enemy air force during the week.

Paragraph 9 — Additional Intelligence Notes. — Items of general intelligence interest, particulary those gleaned from captured documents, were published each week under the heading of Additional Intelligence Notes. These notes also reported Estimated Enemy Casualties giving the totals for prisoners of war for the preceding week, and every four weeks or at the end of a major battle for the period covered.

Annexes. — Each week several annexes supplemented the Weekly Intelligence Summary. These annexes contained supplementary material of value or interest to lower units. For example, during the Russian offensive lower units were kept informed of the Soviet progress by an annex describing the latest developments on the Eastern Front and the changes in the German order of battle on the Eastern Front inasmuch as they were known. The Terrain and Defense Group prepared studies of territories into which the Armies were advancing, many of which were published as annexes to the Weekly Inteiligence Summary in addition to being sent directly to the G-2 Section of the Army concerned. The Target Intelligence Group of G-2 (Air) provided annexes analyzing the enemy's ability to move troops by rail, the German gasoline situation, etc. Articles of interest were reprinted from the European Political Report, a weekly review prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

9. Estimates and Appreciation Group. — A special Estimates and Appreciation Group, composed of one Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors, was charged with the mission of the final preparation of all Estimates of Enemy Capabilities before their submission to the Commanding General.

10. Terrain and Defense Group. — The Terrain and Defense Group was composed of one Lieutenant Colonel and one Major, with one Technical Sergeant and two T/3s. This group prepared terrain and defense studies for the Commanding General and for the Armies of all areas into which the Army Group was advancing. Generalized terrain maps were prepared as well as detailed studies of particular areas. The Group prepared and issued

defense overlays of heavily defended areas, and accumulated all of the latest data on new enemy defenses.

11. Collection and Dissemination. — At Main Headquarters of 12th Army Group a Warrant Officer assisted by a Technical Sergeant handled the receipt and distribution of all documents and material intended for the Intelligence Branch of this Headquarters, and also those intended for the Armies and other lower units channelized through this Headquarters.

12. Situation Room. — It was necessary to maintain a Situation Room at the Main Headquarters inasmuch as briefings of the balance of the staff of 12th Army Group were held there. The Captain in charge of the Situation Room at Main was also charged with the briefing. In keeping up the maps at the Main Headquarters he was assisted by a Master Sergeant.

13. Technical Intelligence. — To handle all matters of Technical Intelligence, mainly with the mission of seeing that such matters reached the proper agency, a Technical Intelligence Group of one officer was created. This officer also prepared reports for the Weekly Intelligence Summary on matters of general technical intelligence interest.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE AT ARMY LEVEL

In an effort to place on record the experiences of the G-2 Sections of the Armies, a conference to discuss the organization of intelligence at Army level was held at Headquarters 12th Army Group three days after V-E day. Representatives from the G-2 Sections of the First, Third, Ninth and Fifteenth Armies attended. To supplement the discussions at the conference proposed T/O for an Army G-2 Section were submitted. A summary of the findings of the conference are set forth in the following pages.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, G-2
APO 655

12 May 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: General SIBERT
SUBJECT : Report on Conference with Representatives of Army G-2 Sections Concerning Organization of Army Intelligence

1. A conference was held with representatives from the G-2 Section of the First, Third, Ninth and Fifteenth Armies on 9 and 10 May 1945, to discuss the primary lessons learned concerning the organization of the Intelligence Sections at Army level during the past campaign. The primary conclusions of the meeting were as follows:

a. Intelligence Specialists. — It was generally agreed that the system of utilizing intelligence teams that were subject to MIS control was not satisfactory. The Armies felt quite strongly that they wish to have such personnel entirely under the control and administration of Army. The comments on this subject by each of the Armies were as follows:

(1) First Army. — Intelligence specialists should be assigned to Armies through G-1 channels, administration and replacements to be handled by G1.

It is recommended that consideration be given to organizing intelligence teams of a size suitable for Army level; as an example, an Army IPW team might be set up as one unit, the equivalent of the four separate teams currently attached.

(2) Third Army. — Intelligence specialists, such as OB, IPW and MII, should be assigned to Army specialist groups under complete control and administration of Army. Individual teams should be eliminated in favor of single groups of appropriate size to permit the allocation of this specialized personnel as the tactical situation dictates. Minimum proposed size for these groups at Army level is as follows:

OB — 2 Officers, 3 Enlisted Men.
IPW — 9 Officers, 18 Enlisted Men. One officer, 2 EM to function as an editorial and dissemination group.
MII — 8 Officers, 16 Enlisted Men.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TE should provide adequate transportation and equipment, including reproduction equipment for the IPW personnel. If possible, a central reserve pool should exist for the augmentation of the Army specialized groups as required by the tactical situation.

(3) Ninth Army. — It is recommended that intelligence specialists be centrally trained and be supplied to Armies through G-1 channels in appropriate numbers, groups or teams. For example, it is recommended that organizational IPW teams of suitable size for an Army consist of a total of 6 officers and 18 enlisted men; broken down to 5 officers and 12 enlisted men under interrogators, 1 officer and 2 enlisted men as additional staff, 2 enlisted men as typist-clerks and 2 enlisted men as drivers. Further, transportation should include at least two 2½-ton trucks and two one-quarter-ton trucks. OB teams: 2 officers and 4 enlisted men is considered the appropriate Army level size for this organization in order to provide 24-hour continuous operation.

b. Necessity for 24-Hour Operation. — It is believed that in setting up the Table of Organization of Army G-2 Sections, insufficient consideration was given to the fact that Army level G-2 Sections must function on a 24-hour basis. It was concluded, therefore, that the fundamental factor in determining the size of the combat intelligence sub-section of G-2 is that there be sufficient personnel to maintain complete 24-hour-a-day operation.

c. Necessity for Liaison. — It was the unanimous opinion of the meeting that it is most important that G-2 Liaison Officers be exchanged laterally and vertically to provide a daily liaison relationship. These liaison officers must be trained in intelligence and be completely qualified to discuss intelligence problems. It is not sufficient for them to act merely as couriers between headquarters.

d. Mobility. — The organization of the Tactical echelon of the G-2 Section should be predicated on complete mobility. Appropriate vans permitting permanent map, telephone, light and clerical installations are essential. Lacking such mobility a great deal of time is wasted on every move in taking down and setting up tents and other field equipment.

e. Experience and Training for Intelligence Officers. It is not believed that any particular types of individual or types of civilian experience are a sure guide in selecting men for intelligence work. Fundamentally, imagination, willingness to work, good judgment and common sense are the essential qualifications. It is stressed, however, that a man with combat experience has a great advantage over men without combat experience in intelligence work. Basic training in intelligence is best supplied through well-organized intelligence schools. Linguistic ability is exceedingly important.

f. Reports. — The following comments were made concerning intelligence reports:

(1) War Department Reports. — In general, reports from the War Department were too old on arrival to be of great value in combat intelligence. It is also suggested that War Department reports, as far as practicable, be limited to developments within the theater in which the reports are being disseminated.

(2) SHAEF Reports. — SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary was regarded as being excellent as far as the Western Front was concerned but there was a strong desire for additional data on the Italian and Southern Fronts, since reinforcements from those fronts were regarded as a constant threat. The SHAEF Intelligence Notes were of great value. It is suggested, however, that some means be devised by which Notes on enemy equipment of general interest should be separately printed for dissemination in volume to lower units to relieve Armies of the burden of reproduction. SHAEF Digest should be disseminated down to Army level.

(3) Group Reports. — In general, the Periodic Report was of more value than the ISUM due to the inclusion of additional material and the comparatively small difference in time of receipt. It was felt that it would have been preferable to have the ISUM covering the period ending 1200 hours and the Periodic covering the period ending 2400 hours. It is stressed that the Armies need and desire some form of weekly reports from a higher headquarters, either Group or SHAEF, which outlines enemy capabilities and intentions along the entire front. The Armies feel that they know intimately enemy capabilities on their own fronts but must rely on higher headquarters to warn them of the situation on other fronts, which may result in the reinforcement of enemy forces on their own fronts.

(4) Form of Reports. — It is suggested an attempt be made to organize basic reports such as War Department or SHAEF reports on OB and enemy equipment in a loose-leaf system, such as that employed by the financial services. Such a system provides for constantly bringing the basic report up to date and revising it merely through a daily flow of supplements that can be inserted, with the older material removed and destroyed.

(5) General. — It was stressed that reports between Armies and Corps should be disseminated laterally and that everything possible should be

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

done to speed the lateral transmission between adjoining units. The importance of spot dissemination of information was stressed in the strongest terms. It was felt that under the existing system of issuing ISUMS and Periodic Reports there was a tendency to slight spot dissemination that was at times most unfortunate. The basic conflict between evaluation and speed of dissemination can be reduced by the speedy dissemination of questionable information to lower and lateral echelons and insistence on aggressive operation to confirm or negate questionable reports.

g. P W D a t a. — The Armies all agree that information obtained from PWs is by far the most important single source of intelligence and every effort should be made to increase IPW personnel as well as their quality and training. In general, the IPW teams have worked in a satisfactory manner with four teams being able to handle a total of 5,000 PWs per day on a satisfactory basis. It was agreed, however, that an IPW team should be supplied with editorial personnel with the ability to write and the equipment to issue PW reports, since experience showed that a large part of the time of experienced interrogators was occupied in writing or clerical work.

h. A g e n t s. — There was no clear agreement on the benefits achieved through the use of agents behind enemy lines since some of the Armies used them extensively while others did not. It seems clear from experience however, that the degree of success achieved through utilizing agents depended primarily on the quality of the agent, his training, the tactical situation and the attitude of the public behind enemy lines. The missions assigned to agents should be controlled or at least coordinated with the Army G-2 since in many instances they have been incorrectly used and have not had adequate time to make their investigations and return before operations overran the territory. Many agents have not been adequately trained in OB to enable them to observe accurately. It is also clear that when operating in friendly territory, such as France, the use of agents was generally much more successful than in enemy territory.

i. T a c t i c a l R e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d P h o t o R e c o n n a i s s a n c e. This has proved second only to PW interrogation as a source of valuable intelligence and in general the facilities have been adequate. This subject was not discussed in detail since G-2 (Air) is holding conferences on this subject.

j. S i g n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e. — Signal Intelligence has been of material value to the Armies and at times has provided them with very vital information The existing arrangements for providing signal intelligence have been adequate and satisfactory.

2. SECURITY REGULATIONS. — The value of combat intelligence depends to no small extent on the speed with which it is transmitted and its accuracy. Under campaign conditions it has proved totally impracticable to transmit intelligence by TWX, properly encoded as required under 380-5. The result has been that a great amount of highly classified information of necessity has been transmitted by telephone. It is suggested that a thorough study on the entire question of security under campaign conditions be made with the object of simplifying procedures, at least to the extent of authorizing the use of teletypes which will give rapid transmission and be somewhat more secure than telephone conversations.

3. TABLE OF ORGANIZATION. — The representatives from the various Armies did not wish to commit themselves without more study on what they considered to be an ideal T/O for the combat intelligence work of G-2 at Army level. After thorough study of the subject at their own headquarters they will submit to this headquarters organizational charts with recommended personnel strength.

A. STANDISH,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief-of-Branch.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of AC of S, G-2
APO 230

14 May 1945

SUBJECT: Proposed T/O for G-2 Section, Army.
TO : AC of S, G-2, Twelfth Army Group. (Attn: Col Standish).

1. Attached are some working sheets on proposed Table of Organization for the G-2 Section at army level based on our experiences in the recent campaign. It will be noted that this does not include the organization for a military interrogation center, army photo interpretation detachment or army CIC detachment. The latter three organizations, it is felt, are self-sustaining and should have their own Table of Organizaton. The T/O of the CIC detachment at army level is considered satisfactory as presently constituted, however, both APID and MIC needed further clarification.

2. It must be understood that the attached are working copies only and do not bear the approval of the Chief of Section here or represent the approved views of the Army. However, as a guide to your plan I trust they may be helpful.

B. A. DICKSON
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-2

PROPOSED T/O FOR G-2 SECTION, ARMY*

	Sect Hq	Combat Intel	P and T	Ops	Targets	Espionage	Misc	Admin	G-2 Air	Liaison	OB	PWI	CI	Totals	
Brig Gen	1													1	
Colonel	1	1							1					3	
Lt Colonel			1			1	1			1	1	1	1	7	
Major			1	2	1	1			1			1	1	8	
Captain			1	3	1	2	2	1	2	5	2	3	2	23	
1st Lt												4		4	
2nd Lt															
Sub-Total	2	1	2	5	2	4	3	1	4	6	3	9	4	46	46
W/O							1							1	1
M/Sgt				1	1		1	1				1		5	
T/Sgt	1		1	2			2				1	3	1	11	
S/Sgt		1	2	2				1	1		3	4		14	
Sgt			1	1				1						3	
Cpl	1													1	
T/3				2	2	4	2	1	1			6	1	19	
T/4	2			2	1	3		2		1	1	8		20	
T/5				1	1			2	5	12			1	22	
PFC															
Pvt															
Sub-Total	4	1	4	11	5	7	5	8	7	13	5	22	3	95	95
Aggregate	6	2	6	16	7	11	8	9	11	19	8	31	7	142	142

* submitted by First Army

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of AC of S, G-2
APO 230

13 May 1945

PROPOSED T/O FOR G-2 SECTION, ARMY

1. Section Headquarters.
   1 Brig. General
   1 Colonel — Executive
   1 T/Sgt — stenographer
   1 Cpl — truck driver, light — 2 Officers
   1 T/4 — Clerk (405) — 3 EM

2. Miscellaneous Section.
   1 Lt. Colonel
   1 T/3 — stenographer
   1 Captain — interrogator
   1 Captain — Documents
   1 M/Sgt — chief clerk
   2 M/Sgts Translators and interpreters — 3 Officers
   1 T/3 — typist-clerk — 5 EM
   Based on one officer and 2 EM for Corps D Sect. and 1 EM with Div OB Team)

3. Combat Intelligence.
   1 Colonel — 1 Officer
   1 S/Sgt — stenographer — 1 EM
   a. Plans and Training
      1 Lt. Colonel
      1 Major
      1 T/Sgt — draftsman
      1 S/Sgt — draftsman
      1 S/Sgt — stenographer — 2 Officers
      1 Sgt — typist (405) — 4 EM

   b. Operations.
      2 Majors
      3 Captains
      1 M/Sgt — chief clerk
      2 T/Sgts — draftsmen
      1 Sgt — draftsman
      2 T/4 — clerks
      2 S/Sgts — stenographers
      2 T/3 — typist (405) — 2 Officers
      2 T/3 — typist (405) — 5 Officers
      1 T/5 — file clerk — 11 EM

4. Target Section.
   1 Major — GSC
   1 Captain (PI)
   1 M/Sgt — chief clerk
   1 T/3 — file clerk
   1 T/3 — draftsman & PI
   1 T/4 — asst. draftsman — 2 Officers
   1 T/5 — driver — 5 EM

5. Espionage Section.
   1 Lt. Colonel
   1 Major
   2 Captains
   4 T/3 — interpreters — 4 Officers
   3 T/4 — clerk-typists — 7 EM

6. Order of Battle Subsection.
   1 Lt. Colonel
   1 Captain
   1 T/Sgt — chief clerk
   3 S/Sgts — clerks, general — 2 Officers
   1 T/4 — stenographer — 5 EM

7. PWI (Prisoner of War interrogation)
   1 Lt. Colonel
   1 Major
   3 Captains
   4 1st Lieutenants
   1 M/Sgt — chief interrogator

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3 T/Sgts — interrogators
4 S/Sgts — „
5 T/3 — „
6 T/4 — „
1 T/3 — 213 „ — 9 Officers
2 T/4 — clerk-typists — 22 EM

8. Administrative Section
1 Captain
1 Warrant Officer
1 M/Sgt — chief clerk
1 S/Sgt — file clerk
1 T/3 — stenographer
1 Sgt — clerk, general
1 T/4 — file clerk
1 T/4 — clerk-typists — 2 Officers
2 T/5 — clerks, general — 8 EM

9. G-2 Air Section.
1 Colonel
1 Major
2 Captains
1 S/Sgt — draftsman
1 T/3 — stenographer
2 T/5 — clerk-typists
2 T/5 — clerks, general — 4 Officers
1 T/5 — driver — 7 EM

10. Liaison Subsection
1 Lt. Colonel
5 Captains
1 T/4 — clerk-typist — 6 Officers
12 T/5 — clerks, general — 13 EM

11. Counter Intelligence Section.
1 Lt. Colonel, GSC
1 Major
2 Captains
1 T/Sgt — stenographer-clerk
1 T/3 — stenographer-clerk — 4 Officers
1 T/5 — file clerk — 3 EM

Section Headquarters. Provison has been made for a stenographer for the Executive officer as well as the Chief of Section with one stenographer to alternate on relief. This permits a split between Tac & Command without undue interruption and fatigue.

Combat Intelligence Section.

a. Plans and Training has been partially divorced from Operations Duty Desk to permit the accomplishment of Plans and Training missions.

b. Operations. It is considered essential that there be a minimum of five officers and eleven enlisted men for continuous 24-hour operation of the duty desk.

Targets Subsection. No provision in previous T/O's was made for this subsection. The Combat Intelligence subsection should supervise and coordinate the work of this team.

Espionage Subsection. This is a new section to be incorporated as part of the G-2 Section and will eliminate attachment of OSS Detachments at Army level.

Miscellaneous Subsection. Documents personnel have been incorporated as part of this section, thereby eliminating the Documents Team currently attached. This necessarily increases the size of this subsection.

Administration Subsection. This section has been increased to the minimum necessary to accomplish the large amount of administrative detail not provided for in present T/O.

G-2 (Air). The present T/O places G-2 (Air) and G-3 (Air) as one under an Air Ground section. It is considered desirable to have a separate G-2 (Air) section and to provide sufficient personnel to do the job which is not true under the present tables. The Liaison section, although listed separately, is to function under the G-2 (Air) as ground liaison with the Aerial Reconnaissance Group.

Order of Battle Subsection. This subsection to be incorporated as part of the G-2 Section, thereby eliminating the attachment of an Order of Battle unit. It might be desirable to place this under the Combat Intelligence Section although it has been shown as a separate subsection.

Prisoner of War Interrogation Section. This is a new subsection added to the G-2 Section in order to provide closer administrative control over the personnel now attached by higher headquarters. This section should normally work under the supervision of the Combat Intelligence section, although listed separately.

The CIC, APID and Interrogation Center are detachments and should not be incorporated as part of the G-2 Section, as they provide their own administration and housekeeping.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY

Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

400.34 (P) 22 June 1945

SUBJECT: Combat T/O for Army G-2 Section.

TO : A. C. of S., G-2 Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, U. S. Army.

1. Attached is a recommended T/O for any Army G-2 Section, based upon the needs experienced in combat by this section.

2. With its proposed strength of 31 Officers and Warrant Officers and 56 Enlisted Men, it represents an increase of 7 Officers and 22 Enlisted Men over the present authorized strength (17 Off and WO's, 27 EM and a GLO group of 7 Off and 7 EM). These strength figures show none of the attached personnel apart from the GLO's mentioned above.

3. It must be constantly borne in mind that the great number of attached intelligence producing personnel, far from constituting an augmentation to the organic G-2 section constitute a heavy added burden unless:

a. Additional organic personnel are provided to permit the full exploitation of the additional intelligence produced.

b. The attached agencies themselves are drawn upon for such personnel, thus curtailing their primary mission.

c. Additional personnel are borrowed on a temporary basis.

4. It is to prevent the need for the latter two extremely uncertain and undesirable courses of action that a full strength T/O has here been proposed. The present allotted strength of the G-2 Section is entirely inadequate. Operations have therefore perforce been carried on only through constant use of improvisations and expedients. Many of the personnel averaged twelve to fifteen working hours per day seven days a week. Such a condition, carried on indefinitely, results in a marked loss of efficiency as well as a serious lowering of morale. Nevertheless G-2 Section, Ninth Army operated under such conditions from early in September 1944 to April 1945.

5. Detailed comments on the principal proposed increases follow:

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

a. A Major is needed as Assistant Executive to coordinate the numerous operational and administrative details which otherwise overwhelm the Executive Officer.

b. The addition of a stenographer is desirable in order to expedite the [illegible] confidential matters which it is undesirable to place in routine channels.

c. Driver. The Executive Branch personnel is called upon to make numerous trips into the field. A driver is considered necessary, not only to act as a chauffeur but also to assist with the numerous odd jobs incidental to field service.

PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TARGETS BRANCH

d. It is believed that an Executive is required for proper control of a branch of the multiplicity of combat functions envisaged under Plans and Operations for the Operations and Plans Branch. In addition to coordinating, he should be able to assist any group which is especially hard pressed at a particular time.

e. The additional officer shown for the Situation Room is the minimum considered necessary for normal operations in combat. In addition it is anticipated that the Chief of the Group, the Branch Executive, and the Targets Officer will have to be called in from time to time to meet peak loads.

f. Any free time which can be developed through careful planning can be well spent by personnel of the Plans Group and Situation Room in visiting lower units.

G-2 AIR BRANCH

g. Experience has shown this number of Air Officers to be the minimum required for combat.

ADMINISTRATION BRANCH

h. The Chief of the Administrative Branch should have the rank of Major rather than Captain because the nature of his duties and responsibilities is such as warrant the increase of rank. Force and judgment on his part can entirely prevent many routine matters from falling to the operational branches for disposition.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

i. Additional enlisted men have been found to be necessary for operations in the field under actual combat conditions. To date the work has been accomplished by seriously overworking available personnel. This situation cannot continue indefinitely under combat operations.

WILLIAM B. FRASER
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting AC of S, G-2.

1 Incl:
Recommended T/O for Army G-2
Sec in Combat.

PROPOSED T/O FOR G-2 SECTION, ARMY *

(Including GLO's but not attached intelligence teams)

	Executive Branch	Plans, Targets & Operations	G-2 Air Branch	Administration	Counter Intelligence	Totals	
Brig Gen	1					1	
Colonel	1	1				2	
Lt Colonel		2	1		1	4	
Major	1	4	4	1	1	11	
Captain		4	7		1	12	
1st Lt							
2nd Lt							
Sub-Total	3	11	12	1	3	30	30
W/O				1		1	1
M/Sgt		1		1		2	
T/Sgt		4	1		1	6	
S/Sgt		1	1	2	1	5	
Sgt		1	3	2		6	
Cpl							
T/3	1	5	1	2		9	
T/4		4			1	5	
T/5	1	4	1	3		9	
PFC			6	8		14	
Pvt							
Sub-Total	2	20	13	18	3	56	56
Aggregate	5	31	25	20	6	87	87

* submitted by Ninth Army.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of AC of S, G-2
APO 339

22 June 1945

PROPOSED T O FOR G-2 SECTION, ARMY

1. Executive Branch.
   1 Brig. General
   1 Colonel — Executive
   1 Major — Asst. Executive
   1 T/3 — Stenographer (213)
   1 T/5 — Driver (345)
   — 3 Officers, 2 EM

2. Plans, Targets and Operations.
   1 Colonel — Chief of Section
   1 Lt Colonel — Plans Chief
   1 Lt Colonel — Operations Chief
   1 Major Executive
   1 Major — Asst. Operations Chief
   1 Major — Duty Officer
   1 Major — Briefing Officer
   1 Captain — Asst. Plans Chief
   1 Captain — Targets Chief
   2 Captains — Briefing Officers
   1 M/Sgt — Chief Clerk (652)
   1 T/Sgt — Chief Clerk (052) Plans Sec.
   3 T/Sgts — Journal Clerks (055) Oper. Sec.
   1 S/Sgt — Chief Clerk (052) Targets Sec.
   1 T/3 — Draftsman (076) Plans Sec.
   1 T/3 — Stenographer (213) Oper. Sec.
   2 T/3 — Journal Clerks (055) Oper. Sec.
   1 T/3 — Draftsman (076) Oper. Sec.
   1 Sgt — Stenographer (213) Plans Sec.
   1 T/4 — Draftsman (076) Plans Sec.
   3 T/4 — Draftsman (076) Oper. Sec.
   2 T/5 — Clerk Typist (405) Oper. Sec.
   2 T/5 — Clerk Typist (405) Targets Sec.
   — 11 Officers, 20 EM

3. G-2 Air Branch.
   1 Lt Colonel — Chief of Section
   1 Major — Tac/R Group
   1 Major — P/R Group
   2 Majors — GLO Group
   2 Captains — Tac/R Group
   5 Captains — GLO Group
   1 T/Sgt — Chief Clerk (052)
   1 S/Sgt — Clerk Typist (405)
   1 T/3 — Stenographer (213)
   3 Sgts — Clerk Typist (405)
   1 T/5 — Driver (345)
   6 PFC — Clerk Typist (405)
   — 12 Officers, 13 EM

4. Administration Branch.
   1 Major — Chief of Section
   1 Warrant Officer — Asst. Chief of Section
   1 M/Sgt — Chief Clerk (052)
   1 S/Sgt — Stenographer (213)
   1 S/Sgt — Journal Clerk (055)
   1 T/3 — Journal Clerk (055)
   1 T/3 — File Clerk (055)
   1 Sgt — Journal Clerk (055)
   1 Sgt — Clerk Typist (405)
   1 T/5 — Mimeograph Operator (055)
   2 T/5 — Driver
   4 PFC — Clerk Typist (405)
   1 PFC — Mimeograph Operator (055)
   3 PFC — Messenger (055)
   — 2 Officers, 18 EM

5. Counter Intelligence.
   1 Lt Colonel — Chief of Section
   1 Major — Security Officer
   1 Captain — Operations Officer
   1 T/Sgt — Chief Clerk (052)
   1 S/Sgt — Stenographer (213)
   1 T/4 — Clerk Typist (405)
   — 3 Officers, 3 EM

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER III

G-2 OPERATIONS ON ARMY, CORPS AND DIVISION LEVEL

To ascertain the best methods used in intelligence work at Army, Corps and Division level an investigating team was sent to each unit to talk personally to the officers in the G-2 Section. This, it was believed, would avoid the stereotyped answers which inevitably are given in written questionaires, and would elicit franker answers than would normally be committed to paper. The outline reproduced below was sent around to each unit in advance so that the G-2 could be thinking of the answers which he would give.

The method proved very successful. In this way — by informal discussions which avoided criticism of individuals or units — the surveyors were able to get an accurate picture of the working of intelligence through the various echelons. Particularly valuable were the discussions with the G-2's of corps which had been under more than one army, for they were able to compare the methods of operation of the two higher headquarters and point out where one method was superior to the other. The seme was true of the divisions which had operated under more than one corps.

The questionaire with the covering letter which was sent to the lower echelons in advance of the investigators is reproduced below, followed by the findings. A summary of the significant conclusions which can be drawn from this survey are reproduced at the end.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 655

31 May 1945

TO: A. C. of S., G-2 of Armies, Corps and Divisions of 12th Army Group

1. A study of the operations of G-2 in the Armies, Corps and Divisions of 12th Army Group is being made in an effort to determine the strength and weaknesses of our method of operations. The final findings of this study will be forwarded to the War Department so that the benefits of our experience in the European Theater may be utilized in the Pacific War. This report will concern itself entirely with methods and organization, and will not be in any way critical of units or individuals.

2. To prepare this study, officers from the G-2 Section of 12th Army Group will visit the G-2 Sections of every Corps and Division that was ever under the command of 12th Army Group. To facilitate the study the attached list of the questions to be raised is being forwarded in advance. It is highly desirable that the officers from this Headquarters discuss these questions with officers who were actively engaged in the work of the G-2 Section during the campaign.

3. Your full cooperation in this study will be greatly appreciated.

EDWIN L. SIBERT,
Brigadier General GSC,
A. C. of S., G-2.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 655

31 May 1945

TO: A. C. of S., G-2 of Armies, Corps and Divisions of 12th Army Group

Since the flow of intelligence concerning the enemy may not in some instances have completely satisfied your requirements, the following check list is offered for your study in anticipation of subsequent conferences with personnel from this Headquarters in an effort to obtain a specific account of failures, mistakes and inadequacies, which shall form a basis for studies designed to correct them in future operations.

1. Collection of Information

a. What did you consider the most profitable source of information (i. e., prisoners, agents, documents, patrolling, etc.)? To what extent did you rely on your patrols? To what extent did you use OSS? To what extent did you use friendly civilians?

b. How complete was the information you received from higher Headquarters based upon:

(1) Photographic and visual reconnaissance?
(2) Captured documents?
(3) Special agents reports (OSS)?
(4) Reports concerning enemy aircraft activity?
(5) Reports concerning enemy artillery?
(6) Reports concerning terrain and defense?
(7) Reports concerning strategic enemy reinforcements capable of intervening, enemy supply and communication centers?
(8) Reports concerning probable routes of enemy withdrawal, location of demolitions and strong defensive positions?

c. To what extent was the information you received from higher Headquarters evaluated, and how accurate did you find the evaluation?

2. Dissemination of Information

a. Were there specific instances in which higher Headquarters possessed intelligence which would have assisted your operations had it reached you in time, but was too late because of a breakdown in communications?

b. Were the personal conferences satisfactory between your staff and those of higher Headquarters?

c. Did higher Headquarters make sufficient and/or proper use of the information you furnished them, for studies, special reports and summaries?

d. Did the summaries of enemy operations issued by higher Headquarters periodically succeed in giving lower echelons the "big picture"?

e. Were the periodic reports of higher Headquarters concerning enemy dispositions, strength and composition, reliably accurate in most instances?

f. Did higher echelons adequately fulfill requests for special information regarding order of battle, enemy personalities, etc.?

g. Do you feel that too often informational material was disseminated from higher echelons without any intelligence value having been placed upon it?

3. Organization

a. Were the teams (OB, IPW, etc.) attached to your section satisfactory? Did you have enough French and German speaking personnel during the respective campaigns?

b. What would you consider the ideal organization for a division (Corps) G-2 Section?

4. Equipment

a. Was the intelligence equipment of your teams and section satisfactory?

1. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

a. What did you consider the most profitable source of information? (i. e. prisoners, agents, documents, patrolling, etc.)?

ARMY

The most constant profitable sources of enemy information were prisoners of war and tactical and photo reconnaissance, and next were signal intelligence, agents' reports, and captured documents. However, it was generally the case that at some time each intelligence agency became the most valuable one since it alone was able at that specific time to furnish needed intelligence.

The use of OSS at Army level varied with each Army. The OSS (SI) Detachment at First Army which was concerned with positive intelligence operated with the Army only until Army Group became operational in the field. At that time, upon recommendation of First Army G-2, the OSS (SI)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Detachment was withdrawn and operated from Army Group level. Both Ninth and Third Army, however, had OSS (SI) Detachments with them throughout operations. Third Army had this to say about OSS:

> "The OSS Detachment was an agency of wide versatility and great value. Under aggressive and cooperative leadership, and functioning in close coordination and confidence, it executed a wide range of important missions, from procuring of information of enemy forces, defenses and movements behind his lines, to preparing economic and political surveys of areas under enemy control. Many of the missions were fraught with great danger. Loss of life was incurred but in every case, with intrepid gallantry, unyielding determination and unfailing effectiveness, the Detachment accepted and fulfilled to the best of its ability the many tasks assigned. It contributed vitally to effective combat intelligence and in a number of cases was the sole source of information upon which tactical decisions could be based. From the Army viewpoint, under proper leadership, it was indispensable."

Generally speaking, the success or failure of OSS in the field depended almost entirely upon competent leadership, for under careful guidance the units at Army, Corps and Division level produced results which justified their existence in the eyes of the G-2. There is universal agreement on the need of personnel trained in espionage to work with the field armies, and OSS received nothing but praise for its work in establishing the network of agents which furnished considerable valuable intelligence in France prior to D-Day.

At Army level the majority of operational intelligence gained from civilians was strategic in nature. Such items as air targets, personalities, documents, etc. were normally found to be within the capacity of observation of the individuals interrogated. Lacking military knowledge and terminology, reports of a tactical nature from this source were subject to considerable error in types of material, descriptions of installations, and locations and numbers of troops involved in movement or disposed on the ground. Divisional units, especially in France, obtained invaluable information and assistance from friendly civilians particularily regarding local defenses around towns. Locations of minefields, AT guns, AT ditches and withdrawal routes were among the most common types of information obtained. Civilians often acted as guides for reconnaissance parties. This was not true in Germany, however, as information was usually given by civilians only insofar as it would prevent destruction of their homes and town. Booby trapped houses were often pointed out by the owner who

wished to have the explosives removed and women frequently removed road blocks and barriers at the entrances to towns to prevent their defense and resulting destruction of property.

CORPS

At Corps level all sources of intelligence were considered to have paid their way, because at one time they were all valuable. Corps G-2s agreed that the more sources of information available, the better check and evaluation was possible. Examples were cited of coordination of IPW, MIT and PI with information on installations volunteered by civilians, or prisoners and checked by aerial photographs.

All Corps agreed that prisoners of war constituted by far the most fruitful source of information, yielding an estimated 33-50 percent of all information received. One of the prerequisites to obtaining the maximum of intelligence from prisoners of war is the proper briefing of the IPW teams on the current situation and EEI. Methods of brieting varied with each Corps, but generally the CO of the IPW team was required to be briefed by the G-2 or one of his staff each day, and in turn to brief the interrogators. Certain Corps G-2 sections had daily briefings of all intelligence personnel held in the evening to discuss all information received during the day. One IPW officer was present at this meeting and also at the liaison briefing held in the morning after which he in turn went to all the IPW teams in the Corps and briefed them.

Patrols were ordered by many Corps to obtain information, but there was divided opinion as to whether they were worth the cost. In static situations, especially along river fronts and prepared enemy defense lines, patrols were extremely helpful in securing information regarding enemy units and defenses. XIX Corps summarized their experience in the following fashion:

> Patrols are among the most difficult and expensive methods of getting information. Raids are even more difficult and costly in men and ammunition besides alerting the enemy to the possibilities of our attack. Many times information is obtainable in no other manner. This is especially true of a static situation. Patrols are often the only means of obtaining identifications and prisoners. Frequently the situation is such that patrols can only go and return at night, in fact all of this activity is frequently at night. The limitations of night observations are well known. Usually the enemy obstacles and counter-reconnaissance screen are such that our patrols penetrate only a short

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

distance into the enemy lines. Opportunities for improvement lie mostly in applying all those principles which are already in our training but which are still too commonly violated. A clear-cut mission should be given; one which is within the reasonable capabilities of the patrol and which is worth the expense. The men should be rested. All members should by as thoroughly briefed as possible including plenty of advance notice, daylight reconnaissance of the terrain, plenty of photos and maps for briefing, and sufficient time for the patrol leader to thoroughly instruct his men. When the patrol returns full interrogation is necessary in order to get out of them all possible information. A number of units have gone to great lengths in such careful planning and training for patrols with gratifying results. Such units have proven that they can patrol successfully without undue casualities. The unique importance of patrolling fully justifies the time and effort involved in this special training."

Documents proved of considerable value to Corps, but contained information more of a strategic than a tactical nature. More documents were available during fast-moving situations than on static fronts, and often the advance was so rapid that it was difficult to exploit the information obtained.

Corps' use of OSS varied according to the Army to which the Corps was assigned. Certain Corps had OSS officers attached to their G-2 sections. OSS proved most effective on static fronts, proving of some help prior to major river crossings. Line crossers couldn't be found at Bastogne, but the enemy security screen was exceptionally effective during that battle. British Corps operating adjacent to ours made more use of short-term agents, but generally with limited results. As with Armies the success of OSS with corps depended largely on the personality and ability of the officer attached.

MII's work with friendly civilians was an aid in many instances, particularily on the defenses east of the Roer River. Civilian reports were used mainly to confirm reports from other sources, inasmuch as their reliability was open to suspicion.

DIVISIONS.

The majority of divisions agreed that information from prisoners of war was the most profitable source of information throughout the entire campaign. One division estimated that as much as 90 percent of information received by

regiments and battalions came from prisoners of war. Prisoners provided the most prolific and generally the most accurate information particularily on order of battle. Air photos ranked second as a valuable source of information concerning the enemy, and were even more important to armored divisions whose informational needs concerning rear areas were often beyond the ken of prisoners.

Wide use was not made of OSS agents at division level, although there were several divisions which held OSS in high regard, claiming that the work accomplished by their detachments proved of immense help in many instances. The 26th Infantry Division was aided by OSS in the Nancy area when the front was static with very few prisoners being taken. Agents sent through the lines were able to provide considerable intelligence of value. On the whole, however, the units felt that OSS was too secretive, more of strategic than of tactical use, and personalities involved sometimes made it difficult to deal with them. Several divisions put agents through their lines for higher headquarters but seldom saw them again, and failed to receive any information of vital concern when the agents were recovered. One division did their own briefing of an agent at division level and found that he could obtain trends if not specific and detailed information, about enemy movements, reserves and defenses. It was generally felt, however, that higher headquarters could make good use of well-trained agents, but that agents should become very familiar with the conditions facing front line units before attempting to go through the lines. Such familiarization could best be accomplished by a thorough briefing at division level and possibly regimental level, particularily when a specific mission was being undertaken. One division reported that it had requested CSS agents to be used in the Ardennes before the breakthrough, but that there was no detachment at Army level to provide them.

Some divisions collected a great many more documents than others, and the information obtained from them varied accordingly. Naturally, many more documents were taken during rapid advances than could be obtained in static situations. At such times maps and overlays furnished order of battle information to substantiate prisoner of war statements. It was generally felt that the document source could have been more fully exploited, and that lower units should have had more personnel to make exhaustive searches for documents. Both MII and OB personnel were used at division level to screen documents and exploit those of value, and the extensive use of captured maps, overlays and order of battle documents, particularily in static situations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

personnel at division level. Obviously, front line troops had little time to exploit enemy documents. Both MII and OB teams had their own specialized functions, and were often hampered by being burdened with document translations. But it was felt that sufficient intelligence was gleaned from documents to make the attachment of documents personnel at division level worthwhile for careful consideration.

Divisions, also, considered patrolling the most expensive and hardest method of obtaining information. Results of patrolling varied considerably, of course, depending on the situation. Most divisions let the lower units control patrolling and supplied the essential elements of information desired at any given time. Patrolling was effective only for the immediate tactical situation and information obtained was extremely valuable when the patrols were successful. Good briefing, training, and missions with limited objectives were necessary for good results. Several divisions found that selected personnel whose only mission was patrolling proved of extreme value. Such units were composed of carefully trained troops who were not expended in normal combat, and thus always available for combat patrols in order to obtain information. Those divisions which had such units considered them extremely valuable. It was proven that to fight all day and patrol at night was too much of a burden for the front-line infantryman. On the other hand, high morale, low casualties and excellent results were received from specially organized patrols. The most important factor in good patrol results is the preliminary briefing, and divisions found it essential to have photographs of the area into which the patrol was being sent in order to properly brief the men. Photographs not only contributed to the success of the patrol, but also gave the men a feeling of confidence instilled by familiarity with the terrain features through study of the photos.

The value of information obtained from civilians varied considerably. Most divisions felt that friendly civilians (i. e. French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxemburgers) furnished quantities of information that could be used only as confirmation of other sources. Dutch civilians proved generally to be quite reliable, but very few civilians of any of the Allied countries had any military background, and consequently their reports were often exaggerated or unreliable. Civilian information on order of battle was much less accurate than their information concerning locations of strongpoints, demolitions and terrain. Combat intelligence, therefore, was limited but useful; CI information, particularly from German civilians, was of greater value.

b. How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon photographic and visual reconnaissance?

Note: For a complete study of photographic and visual reconnaissance see "A Study of Operations of G-2 (Air) in the 12th Army Group" (Part II). As discussed herein aerial reconnaissance is considered as one of several sources of information on enemy operations.

ARMY

Complete basic cover was flown for most of the Armies. As at every echelon the Armies were seldom satisfied with the speed with which cover was flown and photographs delivered. As far as visual reconnaissance was concerned, the information based on visual aerial reconnaissance received from higher headquarters for daily evaluation was in most cases similar to the reconnaissance reports already received by Army directly from their supporting air force.

CORPS

Corps felt that photographic reconnaissance was indispensable and the most accurate of all information. While APID did an excellent job and its interpretations, almost without exception, were considered accurate and reliable, all Corps wanted faster delivery. Some corps elaborated on APID interpretations with their own PI teams, while some sent them directly to the divisions as they were received. All corps complained of the difficulties in obtaining supplies of certain types of photographs. Lower echelons were constantly demanding "slick" prints and obliques, which could not be supplied. Lithographs apparently were supplied in sufficient numbers, but some divisions expressed dislike for this type of print due to the lack of clearness and detail. It was felt by most corps that APID lacked sufficient equipment to meet supply requirements. Differences between weather conditions at air bases and at the front lines apparently was the basis for certain misunderstandings concerning refusals to fly photo coverage on particular days. Certain corps suggested that reconnaissance bases be established nearer the front lines. Some Corps produced PI annexes to their periodic reports, and divisions indicated that these were very useful.

There were many difficulties which lessened the value of reports on observations by tactical reconnaissance. These obstacles were only gradually being eliminated as the campaign ended. Although tactical reconnaissance helped

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to provide a broad picture of enemy operations for lower units, Corps felt that it was much too late in arriving to be of much value, instances being cited of Tac R reports being received as much as from 8 to 48 hours after the sortie was flown. Certain corps had the reconnaissance pilots report directly to corps. At corps headquarters the G-2 Air processed and evaluated the information and passed it on to divisions in as many as 8 to 10 reports a day delivered either by telephone or TWX. Under this system anything of importance or relating to a particular unit was relayed by telephone. One Corps suggested that tactical reconnaissance planes should be assigned to corps. One of the keys to obtaining better tactical reconnaissance results appeared to be better briefing of the pilots by the ground forces. The corps which appeared to have achieved the best results made a practice of keeping the reconnaissance squadron fully briefed on the ground situation even to the extent of sending the squadron all of the corps directives. The close liaison was carried even further than that by bringing pilots to the front lines to show them the obstacles and difficulties facing the infantry, while ground observers were sent back to the squadron to see the pilots and get an understanding of their difficulties. Noticeable improvement in the amount of relevant material received was the result of this close liaison.

Many corps used artillery-liaison aircraft for tactical reconnaissance, and felt that this was a method of obtaining dependable and accurate information on the area immediately in front of the troops. One of the most repeatedly stressed recommendations for this system made by Corps G-2s was the fact that these planes flew specific missions and made specific reports. Not only was tactical reconnaissance performed by artillery-liaison planes, but many obliques and other photos were taken by this means.

DIVISIONS

Divisions were in general satisfied with the results of photo reconnaissance, but complained of the slowness of delivery and of the supply of photographs. The use of photographs varied with each division, but many divisions distributed photos to company commanders and even platoon leaders who often regarded photos as substitutes for maps. A remedy suggested by several division G-2s to speed the delivery and quantity of photos was the use of liaison aircraft to drop photos at the Division CP. Another suggestion, brought up particulary by units who had served under British Corps, was to move APID machinery and reproduction units down to corps level to allow speedier

distribution and interpretation. APID's and CPID's interpretations in most instances were considered good and reliable, but without exception the divisions relied to a greater extent on the interpretations furnished by their own PI teams. Division G-2 had no quarrel with the generalized interpretation of photos by higher headquarters, but all divisions did more complete and detailed work on the photos received when time permitted. On the one hand it was stated that the photo coverage issued by APID was often times too far ahead of the divisions' immediate tactical demand, and Corps, burdened with dissemination difficulties often failed to make adequate interpretation. Armored divisions, whose needs admittedly differ considerably from infantry units particularly during a rapid advance, indicated a need of deeper coverage. Armored units also claimed that often photos were not recent enough to show freshly built strong points and defenses, a fact which all recognized might be strongly influenced by the weather and other priorities for air coverage.

Litograph prints were plentiful and although they could be utilized by front line troops, they were unsatisfactory at division because they do not magnify clearly. The contact print was considered excellent, but the supply was too restricted. Obliques were especially favored by front-line units. It was generally agreed that Corps' reproductive facilities were insufficient to fulfill division requirements. Defense overprints were praised by all units. Divisions which had operated under British corps considered their overprints more complete and accurate than ours. The supply of overprints was also regarded as inadequate. Town blow-ups, considered extremely valuable to the infantry and absolutely essential to the armor, were not available in certain important instances. The town plan, although used successfully, was rated as a poor substitute. Requests for special photographs were generally handled well, although naturally there are the usual individual complaints. Divisions made wide use of their own liaison aircraft for special photo coverage, and wanted K-20 cameras as part of standard equipment.

Divisions were wholly dissatisfied with tactical reconnaissance reports which reached them. Their composite opinion was that tactical reconnaissance was on too big a scale for division consumption, and that not enough time was available during operations to pick out of the tactical reconnaissance reports those items which concerned the division's immediate front. Often there was some delay in receiving the reports which lessened their value considerably. Late Tac R reports were useless except as indicative of trends. Condensation of tactical reconnaissance reports, and even more important, evaluation of the material by corps for each of its divisions would have greatly enhanced its value.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Certain Corps did make an attempt to do this. During fluid situations more attention was devoted to tactical reconnaissance reports, and some units considered the pilot's "impression of the area" report often helpful. Divisions suggested the assignment of close-support tactical reconnaissance missions just like fighter-bombers, and the use of direct radio communication between the division and the observing aircraft. As suggested at Corps level, tactical reconnaissance pilots should be briefed on the division's mission, and given information which the ground forces already have concerning the enemy on the division front. It was pointed out that division liaison aircraft performed highly beneficial reconnaissance missions because the pilots were thoroughly briefed along these lines.

b. **(2) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based on captured documents?**

ARMY.

The flow of documents from Army Group to Army consisted primarily of those passed down in formal reports such as periodic reports, the bulk of these concerned strategic or long range intelligence. Generally speaking practically all tactical intelligence obtained from documents came from lower units or passed from one Army to the other.

CORPS.

Corps made good use of documents which came from higher headquarters, and the flow of documents was above complaint. In many cases, however, the information contained in these documents was already known to the corps, but did serve as confirmation. Certain corps expressed the opinion that there should be more and better trained document personnel attached to echelons lower than Army, pointing out the fact proper exploitation of an enemy document required considerable experience and training.

DIVISIONS.

Without exception the exploitation of captured documents by higher headquarters was felt to have been thoroughly accomplished. Higher headquarters furnished a great deal of valuable intelligence from captured documents in the annexes of their periodic reports. Division G-2s watched these annexes and constantly republished documents of interest for lower units. Enemy "after

action" reports such as the German 3 Parachute Division's report of its battle against the 29th US Infantry Division at St. Lo were valuable in training of troops and familiarizing the men with enemy tactics and their own mistakes. Enemy reports dealing with American tactics and training were also valuable in this respect. There was a feeling that the publication of enemy documents dealing with the hopelessness and despair of the German soldier when in actuality he was a rugged soldier was not advantageous. On the other hand, these documents did illustrate the humaneness of the German soldier and reduced his status from that of a superman in the eyes of the reader. Most documents, however, were not of extraordinary value as far as the immediate front of divisions were concerned. They did contribute, however, through confirmation of other information, to a more complete record of the enemy's order of battle. In fast moving situations, documents were of little tactical assistance, for they arrived and were exploited too late in most instances.

b. **(3) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon special agents reports (OSS)?**

ARMY.

Generally speaking, unless there was an item of particular importance or urgency, special agents reports were passed from Army Group to Army through the medium of the Daily Periodic Report. Armies reported that adequate coverage was given of this type of information.

CORPS.

Corps stated that they believed OSS reports provided excellent information prior to the Normandy landings. Otherwise, corps did not consider special agents reports to be highly valuable although they did furnish interesting strategic information.

DIVISIONS.

Division G-2s were on the whole unable to assess and evaluate special agents reports which were passed down to them from higher headquarters, because the source was never identified. More often than not special agent reports confirmed reports previously received from other sources. Divisions also felt that special agents' reports were of great value prior to the Normandy

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

invasion, and division order of battle teams made use of agents reports which appeared in the annexes to corps periodics.

b. **(4) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon reports concerning enemy aircraft activity?**

ARMY.

The principal reports passed from Army Group to Army on the subject of enemy aircraft activity dealt with the weekly trend of the German Airforce Activities. By periodic studies of German production of aircraft and consumption of gasoline, assessments were made of the capabilities of the enemy airforce for undertaking offensive action against our ground troops. These reports were considered sufficient to give the Armies an adequate picture concerning enemy aircraft activities.

CORPS.

Reports of approaching enemy aircraft were generally timely in reaching corps from army. There was some question of its value, in view of the difficulty of warning reaching the front-line units in advance of enemy aircraft. The anti-aircraft warning system, on the other hand, was considered to have been excellent.

DIVISIONS.

Occassionally divisions received advance notice of the possibility of aircraft attacks either by telephone from higher headquarters or from the AAA warning system. Generally, however, the sight of the enemy planes constituted the first warning. For immediate situations, the time element reduced the value of such reports from higher headquarters. Reports from higher headquarters on the trends of enemy aircraft activity were of interest.

b. **(5) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon reports concerning enemy artillery?**

CORPS.

Corps did not rely to any great extent upon higher headquarters for reports concerning enemy artillery, for the corps artillery did outstanding work in this respect. Corps FDC plotted shifting positions from information received from sound and flash, shell reports, air reconnaissance, and PI. Certain Corps G-2 maintained maps, showing artillery trends, but this was usually left to the artillery section.

DIVISIONS.

All division G-2s kept in constant liaison with their division artillery S-2, some maintaining a direct line to the S-2 and keeping an accurately posted map of enemy artillery trends. The results of prisoner of war interrogation were closely coordinated with information received from sound and flash, shell reports, photographs and corps counterbattery reports, thereby providing a constant interchanging and amalgamation of intelligence on enemy artillery. Artillery reports from higher headquarters were generally handled through artillery channels so that the division G-2s' liaison with division artillery provided a well-rounded and excellent source of intelligence on the enemy artillery situation.

b. **(6) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon reports concerning terrain and defense?**

ARMY.

Armies reported that they received several excellent terrain studies from Group, and that these were of great value in preparing Army studies. Because of the rapid moving situation these studies were sometimes received too late to be of value in Army pre-planning. Experience in the European Theater showed that often all planning failed to be optimistic enough and that rapid breakthroughs of armor outran maps and terrain appreciations.

CORPS.

Corps considered that the terrain studies issued by the Armies were complete and relied heavily on these during planning periods. Some corps distributed Army studies to divisions, not issuing their own, although other units would prepare a terrain appreciation to accompany the Army studies. Still other corps provided divisions with studies of their own making, relying on the Army's study for reference purposes. All corps expressed the highest regard for Army defense overprints, and these were usually complete and detailed enough to distribute to division without additional information or overlays prepared by the corps. Town plans were of very great value. Town blow-ups were even better but were in short supply.

DIVISIONS

The use of terrain studies by division varied considerably, some infantry divisions making considerable use of terrain studies even to the extent of terrain

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

models, while others made much less use, and relied more on map. A second [illegible] divisions laid special emphasis on terrain studies. The divisions generally felt that higher headquarters issued good terrain studies, particularly when coordinated with photo coverage. Armored divisions found the terrain studies of higher headquarters particularly adaptable, inasmuch as their principal concern was roadnets for rapid exploitation. Other divisions considered terrain studies of higher headquarters to have a weakness in being too general for divisional use, but when amplified and annotated by the division were used as a basis for divisional terrain studies. Division PI teams played a tremendous part in their terrain study work.

b. **(7) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon reports concerning strategic enemy reinforcements capable of intervening, enemy supply and communications centers?**

ARMY.

Through a system of telephone round-ups Group disseminated this information to the armies to supplement the information contained in the periodic reports. In addition the Armies kept themselves informed through lateral liaison. Other sources of information on the subject were OSS reports and prisoner of war statements.

CORPS.

Corps relied solely on higher headquarters for information of this nature. In general this information was timely and useful, although the picture of enemy operations on adjacent corps fronts was slow in arriving. This was remedied, however, by exchange of information between corps by use of the telephone. Phantom was given high credit for its swift transmission of information, and was used as a basis for G-2 operational reports.

DIVISIONS.

Division G-2s felt that they had been kept fully informed concerning strategic enemy reinforcements, and with the exception of the Ardennes counteroffensive, believed that they were accurately informed of the availability of enemy divisions that were capable of intervening. Most divisions were in constant communication with corps and adjacent divisions and believed that they were always apprised of new identifications and suspected moves of the

enemy. Enemy [illegible] and communications centers were mostly picked up by photo coverage and prisoner of war interrogation.

b. **(8) How complete was the information you received from higher headquarters based upon reports concerning routes of enemy withdrawal, location of demolitions and strong defensive positions?**

ARMY.

Group received little original intelligence on this subject. The balance of such information came from prisoner of war statements, photo coverage, and agents' reports.

CORPS.

Photo coverage was regarded by corps as the primary source of intelligence in determining routes of supply, bridge demolitions and strong defensive positions. The corps felt that they were adequately supplied with information on known defenses such as the Siegfried Line.

DIVISIONS.

The divisions felt that their own PI teams were the most helpful in determining probable routes of enemy withdrawal, the location of demolitions and strong defensive positions. Artillery liaison aircraft proved extremely valuable in obtaining information of this nature. Other sources of intelligence which divisions exploited were prisoner of war statements, and civilians, particularly regarding demolitions and strong defensive positions. Documents at times were pertinent, but usually exploitation of documents required too long a time.

c. **To what extent was the information you received from higher headquarters evaluated and how accurate did you find the evaluation?**

ARMY.

The Armies generally felt that the information received from higher headquarters was properly evaluated.

CORPS.

Corps reported that in most instances all of the intelligence material they received had been evaluated. It was pointed out that the Armies with the most

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

operational experience were found to be more cooperative in this respect, and their evaluations on [illegible] from the evaluations were not complete and corps would supplement the evaluation before passing the material to divisions. However, usually when the Army was in a position to evaluate the information, the intelligence was carefully analyzed by the time it reached corps.

DIVISIONS.

Divisions had the same observations to make concerning the evaluation of intelligence as corps. They reported that the corps with the most operational experience were the most cooperative in passing on only such intelligence as had been carefully evaluated. The evaluations were generally considered as being accurate. Some divisions felt that higher headquarters were inclined to hedge in evaluating material, merely listing a large number of enemy capabilities and not making a committment as to the capability which the enemy was most likely to exercise. Divisions wanted committments from higher headquarters as to the enemy's capability, and resented any attempts to hedge for fear of being wrong. Those divisions which had operated with British corps felt that they were particularly cooperative and accurate in their interpretations of enemy capabilities. Divisions found the estimates of unit dispositions and tank and artillery strength published by higher headquarters were generally reliable. However, estimates of enemy personnel strength were often found to be low. It was apparent that by estimating enemy personnel strength solely on a basis of combat personnel there was often a basis for misunderstanding, and it is recommended that in the future estimates of enemy strength be made only of total enemy personnel.

2. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

a. **Were there specific instances in which higher headquarters possessed intelligence which would have assisted your operations had it reached you in time, but was too late because of a breakdown in communications?**

ARMY.

Communications failures between Group and the Armies were practically non-existent except for a short period during the Ardennes offensive. It was absolutely essential, however, that telephone calls made at six hour intervals

for the exchange of intelligence supplement the 24-hour ISUM and the Daily Periodic Report. Use of liaison officers thoroughly familiar with the intelligence picture also proved of value during rapidly moving situations.

CORPS

Corps recalled no specific instances where higher headquarters was tardy with valuable information. During swiftly moving operations the flow of intelligence was often unavoidably delayed due to the movement of headquarters and armored spearheads running beyond their communications, but delays in the flow of intelligence under these conditions were never injurious to operations. Breakdowns in communications were an exception and did not materially hamper the traffic in exchange of information.

DIVISIONS.

Breakdowns in communications failed to prevent materially the flow of intelligence data as far as divisions were concerned. Armored divisions found their information considerably delayed on long breakthroughs when the distance between headquarters became excessive. There were several complaints that corps and army had their headquarters too far behind the divisions even in static situations to allow the quick and easy transmission of intelligence. There were three specific instances of intelligence which was known to exist not reaching division level: an Infantry Division failed to receive any information on the fortifications of an important Brittany Coast city although secret agents had allegedly transmitted this information to the Allies prior to D day; an Armored Division failed to receive any information on the antiaircraft defenses of a major city in Saxony until too late; and an Infantry Division suffered heavy casualties in a counterattack in Normandy in August because they were not advised that higher headquarters believed an enemy counterattack was impending. Some instances were reported by almost every division where information arrived too late and would have been valuable if prompt. The cause for the break in the flow of intelligence was not always determinable, although signal communications were not believed to be the main cause. Broadly speaking, the divisions felt that the flow of intelligence was rapid enough to meet requirements.

b. **Were the personal conferences satisfactory between your staff and those of higher headquarters?**

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ARMY.

Although during operations personnel in every G-2 section were under terrific pressure, it was found that visits between the various sections paid dividends in keeping up the smooth flow of intelligence. It is highly recommended that certain key men in the Intelligence Branch at each headquarters who are thoroughly familiar with the intelligence picture have sufficient time available to visit other headquarters at least once or twice a week.

CORPS.

Corps were in agreement that the conferences were satisfactory. Corps opinions differed as to whether Army personnel visited corps often enough, and this varied according to army. It was generally agreed that the establishment of a personal relationship between the personnel at corps and army headquarters was extremely important to facilitate operations and improve the relations between the headquarters.

DIVISIONS.

On the average the divisions felt that they had received sufficient visits from the corps and army G-2 personnel, and found them eager to be of assistance. These visits in many instances proved to be of great value in supplying divisional needs much faster than would normally be the case. It was generally agreed that a daily visit from some officer in the corps G-2 section would be useful, and that visits from the army were welcome at all times. The visits of army G-2 personnel were often greatly benefical to army in keeping them much closer to the actual tactical situation.

c. **Did higher headquarters make sufficient and or proper use of the information you furnished them, for studies, special reports and summaries?**

Armies, corps and divisions were of the opinion that the intelligence they passed on up to the immediately higher headquarters was well handled in the reports. There was no indication from corps that they had been overburdened with requests for material. Divisions, however, had two comments to make on the subject. Some corps made it a practice to submit to the divisions for approval those studies which had been prepared as a result of intelligence furnished by the divisions. This practice was highly commended inasmuch as it allowed the lower unit to check on the evaluation and interpretation of the intelligence before it was generally disseminated. Divisions did not approve of

corps reprinting verbatim the reports which they submitted, with no attempt to evaluate or interpret the information. Each unit felt that the headquarters above them had much more information available with which to interpret and evaluate intelligence.

d. **Did the summaries of enemy operations issued by higher headquarters periodically succeed in giving lower echelons the big picture?**

Almost all of the units surveyed received each week the SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary and the 12th Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary. In addition, the corps and divisions received the daily periodics of the armies to which they were attached.

CORPS.

Corps reported that the SHAEF and Army Group Summaries were excellent. Lower units constantly demanded information on the "big picture" during static situations particularly, and order of battle personnel required information concerning enemy dispositions along the entire front. Corps reported that the supply of Army Group and SHAEF summaries which they received was seldom able to fill their needs. The biggest criticism of these reports was that they arrived several days after they were published thus lessening their value. It was generally felt by the corps that direct distribution of these reports should have been made to the divisions. Concerning news of the battle front about which front line troops constantly inquired, Phantom, Stars and Stripes and the BBC were actually the best and quickest sources of information available. All lower echelons, even including corps, felt that a great deal of improvement could be made by military channels to speed the transmission of battle news to combat troops.

DIVISIONS.

Divisions regarded the Army, Army Group and SHAEF summaries as being completely satisfactory in giving a picture of the operations along the entire front. However, like corps, the divisions reported the periodics and summaries as being invariably late in arriving. Divisions found their supply of Group and SHAEF periodics too limited. The photo of the situation map published daily by Third Army in their periodic was widely praised by all divisions, and the practice of XII Corps of disseminating their briefing notes was also believed to be helpful. Phantom was reported as extremely helpful, and several units urged that this medium be extended even below division level so as to supply the

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

demands of lower units for news of the whole front. Greater use of telephones to transmit important developments was encouraged by divisions. Security regulations on telephone and VHF communication were regarded as the main obstacles to the rapid transmission of information, and were believed in some quarters to have been needless or too severe.

e. **Were the periodic reports of higher headquarters concerning enemy dispositions, strength and composition, reliably accurate in most instances?**

Corps and divisions found no objections to the reports concerning enemy dispositions. Estimates of personnel, tank and artillery strength were often at variance with what the corps and divisions believed to be in front of them. Generally it was felt that higher headquarters had a tendency to overestimate enemy strength. Confusion also resulted from some headquarters issuing estimates of total combat personnel, while others dealt with total personnel.

f. **Did higher echelons adequately fulfill requests for special information regarding order of battle, enemy personalities etc.?**

It was generally felt by corps and divisions that the higher echelons performed a satisfactory job on the basis of information believed to be available. Corps and divisions which operated with the British were impressed with their cooperation and extensive knowledge of order of battle of the German Army.

A need for improvement in the dissemination of order of battle information was apparent, for order of battle teams at Divisions, Corps, Army and Army Group level were found to be keeping almost identical records. While the need for considerable independent work on the part of each of these order of battle teams was recognized, it was felt that a certain amount of the clerical work could be eliminated by higher headquarters periodically preparing comprehensive order of battle notes on individual units of the enemy army. It was recommended that higher headquarters, preferably the highest headquarters in the theater (because this echelon would have all of the intelligence at its disposal) devise a loose-leaf system whereby histories of divisions could be issued to lower echelons and amended periodically with later information. In this way it was felt that division order of battle teams would not be burdened with keeping overall records and histories of each and every enemy division.

g. **Do you feel that too often informational material was disseminated from higher echelons without any intelligence value having been placed upon it?**

The Armies, Corps and Divisions believed that most of the reports they received were of some value. Only in isolated instances did the G-2s feel that

they had received needless reports. It was felt, however, that there could be more screening and evaluating of information on the higher echelons.

3. ORGANIZATION

a. **Were the teams (OB, IPW, etc.) attached to your section satisfactory? Did you have enough French and German speaking personnel during the campaigns?**

ARMY

Armies felt that the attachment of great numbers of agencies, teams, and miscellaneous personnel to any headquarters must be compensated for by the provision of administrative personnel in proportion. Thus, where the Tables of Organization for the G-2 section provides a minimum of G-2 personnel for its own operations, it was found that the attachments invariably required the services of a minimum of two officers and two or three clerks, who could be ill spared from normal intelligence operations. In effect the tail was wagging the dog. Permanent attachments were known and announced early in the planning stage, but no administrative section was provided. The overall assigned and attached strength of the Army G-2 section often exceeded 400 personnel. The Armies felt that if the Army Headquarters Table of Organization did not provide for such administrative personnel the team attachments should provide the necessary provisions.

The advantages of assignment over attachment of the various type specialist teams at army level would have eliminated difficult administrative situations, facilitated rapid promotions, and the armies could have exercised more control over the team members. The fact that unqualified personnel appeared in some of the teams usually resulted in relief and return to a headquarters in the rear. By assignment of teams it was felt that qualified personnel could be interchanged within the organization without waiting for untried reinforcements. Furthermore, attached teams invariably reported with full Tables of Organization grades and ratings. Some incompetents were included, but local remedial action was precluded and such personnel could not be removed without authority from higher headquarters.

Order of Battle Teams. — It was recommended that the Order of Battle team at Army headquarters consist of not less than two officers and three enlisted men. The only limitation imposed on this valuable attachment was the lack of numbers. It was demonstrated that the existing team of one officer and two

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

enlisted men is inadequate for constant 24 hour functioning over a long period of time. Because of this inadequacy a considerable amount of order of battle work had to be done by the already overburdened G-2 officers.

Signal Intelligence Service — While not directly a part of the G-2 section, the signal intelligence service largely functioned as such. This agency was of invaluable service in not only producing a steady flow of combat intelligence, but also in its effective dissemination of such information. Through its radio intelligence activities the unit repeatedly produced enemy information at critical periods that was not obtainable from other sources, and often of decisive moment tactically.

Interrogation of Prisoner of War Teams. These teams were extremely important during the European operations. Their work at Army level would be facilitated by augmenting the personnel with a special editorial group to produce the numerous daily reports required. As operations expanded, the number of these reports increased steadily. The condition was met by detailing various combinations to work on the problem of editing. One of the armies used one officer and two enlisted men from the combined Army IPW teams. In a number of instances Armies reported that their IPW teams were unable to produce highly desirable special reports because of the inability of the limited number of personnel available to edit them and at the same time, keep current in the daily reports. Interrogation at army level could have been done more satisfactorily by a total of 24 officers and enlisted men. The organization cannot be efficientiy operated when composed of four IPW teams retaining their unit integrity. It was recommended that it be reorganized to compose 15 interrogators, 4 prisoner of war screeners, 3 editors and briefers, and 2 skilled typists.

Photo Interpreters. The PI attachments at Army level were generally regarded as satisfactory.

Military Intelligence Interpreters. Generally speaking the Armies found their supply of French and German speaking personnel adequate. The MII team was often used as two half teams for better operations, and when not engaged in their own specialty were of great value as interrogators and interpreters to counterintelligence agencies.

Enemy Documents. Particularily during fast moving operations, captured enemy documents frequently reached Army level too late for full operational exploitation. This could have been eliminated by placing trained documents personnel at the headquarters of lower echelons of command. Lack in numbers

precluded such division of personnel most of the time. Combat troops must be indoctrinated with the importance of enemy documents as a source of enemy intelligence, and this must be constantly stressed during operations. It is highly probable that much intelligence, possibly of great value, was lost due to failure on the part of troops effecting the capture to recoguize the importance of what probably appeared to be documents of little or no value.

Psychological Warfare Activities. The achievements of the Psychological Warfare Branch Detachment at Third Army were considered of major significance in the operations. Third Army reports:

"Its results were far from intangible. Many friendly lives were saved and thousands of prisoners were secured as a direct result of this activity. Its attachment to the G-2 Section for operational policy and direction resulted in a major exploitation of this important agency. It is considered that it should be directly related to G-2 at Army level inasmuch as its effort, in its various forms, is against the enemy. To execute psychological warfare missions, members of the detachment frequently operated with the advance elements of assault echelons under direct enemy fire. Loss of life was incurred. The innovation of the use of combat loudspeakers in tanks with assault echelons, originated by the officer in charge with this headquarters, resulted in immediate requests for installations from many units within Third Army which could not be fulfilled because of lack of equipment and personnel. Weapons carrier installations are valuable to the infantry."

CORPS.

Corps had many of the same comments to make concerning the attached teams of specialists as Army. Their work as specialists was universally regarded as excellent. A majority of the corps would have preferred to have had the personnel assigned, or, if attached to be attached on a pool rather than a team basis. Corps G-2s felt that they should have control over the promotion of attached specialist personnel to a greater extent inasmuch as they were working for them.

DIVISIONS.

An overwhelming majority of Division G-2s praised the work, reliability, training, and extensive ability of their attached MIS teams. The majority favored the assignment of the teams rather than the attachment. However those G-2s who did not advocate assignment of the specialists pointed out that the basic

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

reason for desiring assignment was the administrative difficulties of the teams. The one team about which there was general desire for permanent assignment to divisions was the PI team which most G-2s believed should be an organic part of the division headquarters. As specialists the divisions regarded the teams as superior; as soldiers they were poorly regarded. It was recommended that intelligence specialists should receive more basic training, maneuvers and tactical instruction to enable them to acquire soldierly attributes and to grasp the fundamentals of military tactics, so essential in echelons as low as divisions.

b. **What would you consider the ideal organization for a corps or a division G-2 section?**

The majority of the corps felt that operations ran smoothly enough with the personnel at hand. However, all admitted that during rapidly changing situations it was a severe physical strain on the entire section and that perhaps efficiency was impaired. One Corps G-2 suggested that the chief of the section be given latitude to enable him to create a workable table of organization at a particular time. The basic additional requirements suggested at least one more junior officer and three enlisted men. However, one corps recommended the following corps table of organization: Colonel as chief of section; Lieutenant Colonel as executive; three majors and four captains to act as a junior and senior duty officer on 12-hour shifts and two on the road at all times with the additional captain serving as a substitute and being used for liaison officer; and two lieutenants to serve as trainees relieving the other officers and being used for liaison. The basic needs in enlisted personnel are three stenographers, two draftsmen, three journal clerks, and two orderly messengers.

DIVISIONS

Most division G-2s felt that their table of organization gave them insufficient personnel for the continual 24-hour operation required in combat. One more officer was recommended for the G-2 section, but the number of enlisted men was generally believed satisfactory. The table of organization allowance of two officers and three enlisted men for a heavy armored division was far from adequate, and a doubling of the section and increased ratings for the enlisted men was strongly urged. A preponderance of G-2s also recommended that public relations be divorced from the G-2 section as the section has too much work to do without being burdened with additional duties.

For the attached MIS teams there were several recommended changes. The Order of Battle team was satisfactory, but two divisions suggested another MII team for use with lower echelons. The PI team table of organization was considered satisfactory by a majority of G-2s. One division, however, suggested three more enlisted men in the PI team for use in liaison and with division artillery. Another division recommended five additional enlisted men in the PI team to carry out drafting, interpreting and general purpose duties. The allotment of two IPW teams was regarded as insufficient because it necessitated splitting up the teams and equipment and shifting from regiment to regiment. Most division G-2s strongly urged that four IPW teams be allotted to division, one for each regiment and one for division cage.

4. EQUIPMENT

a. **Was the intelligence equipment of your teams and section satisfactory?**

ARMY

The biggest needs of the ARMY G-2 section in the field were vans or trailers so that the section could move from place to place without constantly setting up tents and maps, and mimeograph machines. One large van equipped as a permanent operations office would have greatly facilitated G-2 work at Army level. IPW teams needed generators and portable public address systems for screening prisoners en masse.

Lower units found the equipment situation satisfactory, although the corps and divisions felt that the teams were burdened with too much non-essential equipment.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

A STUDY OF OPERATIONS OF G-2 (AIR) IN THE 12TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INDEX

	Page
PART II — G-2 AIR BRANCH REPORT	161
INTRODUCTION	163
A. The Photo Group	163
B. The Situation Group	166
C. The Target Intelligence Group	167
D. Reconnaissance Effort, Ninth Air Force	169
E. Communications Network for Reconnaissance Results	169
F. Explanatory Comments (for Annex F)	169
G. Cooperation with the Director of Reconnaissance and Photography	170
H. Translating Ground Force Requirements Into Air Force Capabilities	171
I. Requirements Beyond Air Force Capabilities	171

ANNEXES

A. Organization Chart	opposite page 163
B. Table Showing Requests for Photography placed for Units Indicated	opposite page 164
C. Tactical Reconnaissance Summany No. 1	165
D. G-2 G-3 (Air) Radio Nets	opposite page 167
E. Chart: Reconnaissance Effort 9th Air Force	opposite page 170
F. Chart: Channels of Communication	opposite page 171

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHART G-2 (AIR)

ORGANIZATION



ANNEX A
(Part II, Vol. III)
12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

PART II

G-2 AIR BRANCH, G-2 SEC., HQ., 12TH ARMY GROUP

Introduction. The present G-2 (Air) Branch was originally formed during the month of February 1944, as a sub-division of the Intelligence Branch of G-2, First U. S. Army Group. At that time this organization was known as the Air-Ground Reconnaissance Group, composed of two officers and one enlisted man, and although later transfered to the Operations Branch of the G-2 Section, functioned under the same title until 10 July 1944, a few days prior to the landing of the army group headquarters in France when the Air-Ground Reconnaissance Group, Operations Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters First U. S. Army Group, became a separate branch known as the G-2 (Air) Branch, G-2 Section.

It was during the planning stage from February until July 1944, that this organization was responsible for planning all basic photo cover used by the Army Group and subordinate units in the initial phases of the campaign, coordination between the Air and Ground Forces in photographic and tactical reconnaissance matters, formation G-2 (Air) sub-sections at lower levels, mapping policy, and the organization of the present Army Photo Interpretation Detachment (APID), which later during operations on the continent was responsible for the distribution and interpretation of photography at Army and Army Group levels.

The mission of the G-2 (Air) Branch can be summarized as follows: the collection and dissemination of information concerning the location, strength, disposition, defenses, military installations and movement of the enemy as visually observed and photographed from the air, together with advisory functions in matters pertaining to aerial reconnaissance. Although the G-2 (Air) Branch was primarily responsible to the A C of S, G-2, 12th Army Group, it maintained lateral responsibilities with the 6th Army Group and 21 Army Group.

The G-2 (Air) carried out the instructions of A C of S, G-2, 12th Army Group, and advised the 12th Army Group Staff in all matters concerning aerial reconnaissance, photographic interpretation, and mapping policy. He advised the Ninth Air Force Staff on the enemy ground situation.

Although all personnel of G-2 (Air) were engaged simultaneously on the same project, it was necessary to form three (3) separate sub-divisions within the G-2 (Air) Branch, each Group having assigned personnel (see Annex A).*

A. The Pho'o Group.

The Photo Group initiated all requests made on the Air Forces for photographic reconnaissance and print reproduction for the army group. It established

* opposite page.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

priorities on requests for reconnaissance and print reproduction by 12th Army Group and subordinate echelons, except for requests made directly to the Tactical Air Commands by their associated armies. The Photo Group also maintained maps and such records as were necessary to illustrate the status of army, army groups and SHAEF plans for photographic reconnaissance. The chief of this group was informed of photography flown and received photo interpretation reports published by Army Photo Interpretation Detachment. He furnished technical supervision and established priorities of work done by 12th Army Group Interpretation Detachment (APID). The group supervised the distribution of prints by APID. A status report of mapping and mapping policy within 12th Army Group was maintained. The attachment and re-attachment of photo interpretation teams was recommended, when necessary. (See Final After Action Report, Army Photo Interpretation Detachment, 12th Army Group.)

All army group requests for photo reconnaissance originated within Headquarters 12th Army Group and were placed with the Director of Reconnaissance (DOR), Ninth Air Force (See Annex B for a sample chart, showing what records were kept of certain aspects of this work.)*

Requests for print reproduction were received from Armies, associated and higher organizations and were placed with the DOR or on occasion with other Army Groups. The location of negatives was determined by checking with the DOR who kept complete files on the location of all negatives. When the negatives were determined to be with Eighth or Ninth Air Force units, a request was submitted to the DOR for reproduction in the amount required.

To expedite processing of print reproduction requests, officer photo interpreters from APID and enlisted assistants were attached to reconnaissance groups, and a PI team was attached to the 325th Photo Wing (Reconnaissance), Eighth Air Force. These detachments searched cover for 12th Army Group requests and submitted periodic status reports on the progress of requests placed by G-2 (Air). Communication with these detachments was normally by telephone. However, the G-2 (Air) radio net was available in emergencies.

To assure the G-2 (Air) that all needs and developments in lower echelons of both the air and ground forces were known, frequent visits were made throughout the Armies and to the reconnaissance units of the Ninth Air Force.

Although the prime responsibility of this group was planning photo reconnaissance and placing requests with the air forces, most of the group's effort was consumed in following up those same requests to insure timely and proper accomplishment.

* opposite page

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
G-2 (Air) Branch Photo Group

Table Showing Requests for Photography Placed for Units Indicated:

DATE	Hq 12th AGP APID ENGR Dirs. Directly Under 12ACp	1st ARMY	3rd ARMY	9th ARMY	15th ARMY	ADJACENT ARMY GROUPS 6th AGP 21st AGP	OTHERS: SHAEF G-2 FAAA MEDMENHAM Etc	TOTAL
Requests from 1 August 44 to 8 May 45	904	569	121	252	73	581	2,590	

Table Showing Distribution of Photography by 12th Army Group APID to Units Indicated:

August		144,180	200,000					
September	84,660	146,016	253,610	2,458		43,491	54,660	344,190
October	114,515	261,615	198,617	198,617		93,322	74,357	634,865
November	145,645	151,620	70,786	100,353		76,721	188,675	941,672
December	101,354	236,870	313,114	22,966		3,855	23,576	1,023,890
January	102,545	93,431	348,691	12,966		47,961	17,027	701,676
February	88,815	20,788	31,753	85,718	94,429	16,833	5,911	682,721
March	125,932	135,347	488,264	1,597	223,430	76	145,347	344,250
April	311,964	284,041	718,126	69,703	137,446	130,853	67,832	1,419,993
May	14,488	125,041	44,592	3,672	1,412	215	13,761	1,801,965
Cumulative Totals 1 August to 8 May	1,149,918	1,648,959	2,747,533	498,020	456,717	413,327	1,191,149	8,105,623

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE
SUMMARY NO. [illegible]
Period Ending 2400 15 March

Hq., 12th Army Group,
G-2 (Air) Branch,
1000 16 March 1945.

1. **General** — — Not to exceed five sentences. To include the most important specific or general items from any of the paragraphs below.

   a. **Weather** — — Broken down into cloud coverage in the tactical areas.

   b. **Coverage** — — Broken down into hours during which coverage could be obtained. Example: No visual reconnaissance North of BAD RIVER after 1315 hours. Other areas covered after 1000 hours. Last mission 1815 hours. No night photographic reconnaissance.

2. **Visual Reconnaissance** — —

   a. **Armor** — — large sightings specifically, all others generally.

   b. **Troop concentrations** — — as above.

   c. **Vehicular traffic** — — in trends when possible, to include significant sightings as seen if no trend indicated.

   d. **Rail traffic** — — given in areas between key communication centers, each identified — — all rail movement classified and compared to previous reports, identified as to possible connection with tactical situation.

   e. **Marshalling yards** — — including latest information on yards from A. C. I. U., etc., as to serviceability.

3. **Photo Reconnaissance** — — all first phase reports relative to 12th Army Group Ninth Air Force.

   a. **Bridges** — — in, out, damaged.

   b. **Marshalling yards**

4. **Night Photographic Reconnaissance** — —

5. **Conclusions** — — in terms of rail and vehicular movement, troop buildups, communications.

ANNEX C
(Part II, Vol. III)
12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

B. The Situation Group.

The Situation Group received and recorded the results of aerial reconnaissance and furnished reports and analyses thereof to armies, army groups, SHAEF, Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, 6th and 21 Army Groups. (See Annex C.)* It requested visual reconnaissance when necessary. It also reviewed and filed such information as was necessary to keep the Commanding General and staff of the Ninth Air Force informed on the enemy ground situation and maintained the enemy order of battle and reconnaissance results on the war room maps. It disseminated enemy information and intelligence obtained by all reconnaissance and combat aircraft of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces.

In order to maintain liaison with the tactical air commands and their reconnaissance units, the Situation Group established policy for and supervised activities of 12th Army Group Ground Liaison Officers with these units and supervised the operation of the G-2 G-3 (Air) radio net for the G-2 (Air). (See Annex D.)**

Ground Liaison Officers under the supervision of this group coordinated with the Commanding Officers of Reconnaissance Groups and with G-2's (Air), army, at the Tactical Air Commands, on army group reconnaissance plans, breifing pilots when necessary. Ground Liaison Officers also breifed the Air Force units on the ground situation.

To insure communications between the G-2 (Air), 12th Army Group, and the Ground Liaison Officers, this group maintained four G-2 G-3 (Air) Radio Nets. A Net Control Station was maintained at Headquarters Ninth Air Force and separate frequencies were used by each net. The Tactical Air Commands and their respective Reconnaissance Groups were in three of the original nets. In addition, the Eighth Air Force, the medium bombardment division and other units were in the fourth net.

Total personnel and equipment utilized to maintain these communications were as follows:

8	Officers
65	Radio Operators
10	Radio Repairmen
30	Cryptographers
35	Crypt Machine Guards
1	Crypt Repairmen
149	

* page 165.

** opposite page 167

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

12 SCR-399 (on trucks)
10 PE-95 Power Units
9 SIGABA Machines
12 ¾ ton W C
1 ¾ ton C & R
1 ¼ ton truck

A discussion of the visual reconnaissance facilities available to the situation group, G-2 (Air) Branch is, in fact, a discussion of the means by which the branch has utilized the aerial observations made by the pilots of the Reconnaissance Groups cooperating with the armies, fighter bomber pilots within the Tactical Air Commands, escort pilots flying with medium and heavy bombers and similar reports available to the other army groups. In the main, army group made requests on Tactical Air Commands, Ninth Air Force, and of the Eighth Air Force, for visual and photographic reconnaissance to cover areas and pinpoints beyond areas normally considered for tactical reconnaissance.

Through the Army Group Liaison Officers and the G-2 G-3 (Air) Radio Net (see Annex D)*, the army group was kept informed of all observations made by pilots of the Tactical Reconnaissance Groups and the fighter bomber pilots within the Tactical Air Commands. This afforded coverage of the entire army group front from the front line to depths of two hundred miles or more, depending entirely upon the tactical situation. Observations were screened by the Ground Liaison Officers who were acquainted with the interests of the G-2 (Air), 12th Army Group, and only reports containing information of value to that echelon of command were transmitted.

C. The Target Intelligence Group.

The Target Intelligence Group processed all available intelligence on enemy supply installations, troop concentrations, movements of men and material, and rail and road routes in order to prepare target recommendations for medium and heavy bombardment. The group made current appraisals of the enemy supply and transportation situation for the staffs of the 12th Army Group and Ninth Air Force. It prepared and distributed as a summary the daily air operations and perodic bridge status reports for distribution to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. For the 12th Army Group Weekly Intelligence report. The Target Intelligence Groups prepared an appraisal of the enemy supply and transport situation; a review of the activites and potentialities of

* opposite page.



ANNEX D
(Part II, Vol. III)
12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the German Air Force. Finally, on occasion, it maintained a bridge status map in the 12th Army Group War Room.

The Target Intelligence Group played no part in the preparation of intelligence for close-support bombing operations by medium or heavy bombers, in the enemy MLR, despite the fact that G-3 (Air) 12th Army Group was concerned. Target intelligence close behind the enemy MLR was a concern of army, not army group, and target material was prepared at the army Tactical Air Command Level, despite the need on the operations side for using the army group channel between the army and the air forces.

The responsibilities of the G-2 (Air) in connection with target policy, selection and identification were initially discharged by the Target Intelligence Group. To these problems, which in various commands were regarded as purely air force concerns, the Target Intelligence Group was considered to make a contribution because of its study of intelligence on enemy ground forces and their strengths and weaknesses as they could be affected by bombardment. It uncovered possible air targets in its study of enemy troop movements by road and rail, railheads, the condition of the enemy railroads, and the status of enemy supply in fuel, ammunition and ordance. Information relative to enemy supply and transportation was culled from this study and made available to Intelligence Branch.

Although this work was carried on by the G-2 (Air) Branch at 12th Army Group, it was performed by G-2 at SHAEF, 6th Army Group and 21 Army Group. At First U. S. Army these functions were split among the G-2, G-2 (Air) and the A-2 of IX Tactical Air Command. At Third U. S. Army this was performed almost entirely by the A-2 of XIX Tactical Air Command, whereas at Ninth U. S. Army, the responsibility was shared by G-2 (Air) and A-2, XXIX Tactical Air Command.

The Enemy Plans and Logistics Section G-2 SHAEF, contributed material on supply and transportation to the SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary, published a weekly report on Enemy Communications and Supply, and published a Weekly Target Intelligence Report. These reports constituted additional information available to the Target Intelligence Group at G-2 (Air), 12th Army Group. Through higher headquarters in the air forces, it received strategic target material, results of strategic air attacks, tactical target material prepared by Air Ministry, etc., which enabled it to build up files of tactical targets in advance of their use.

In the execution of its responsibilities in connection with the bombing program of the air force, the Target Intelligence Group cooperated with the

Situation Group and 12th Army Group Photo Interpretation Detachment (APID) in evaluating the results of visual and photographic reconnaissance, consulted with the G-3 (Air), 12th Army Group, on target policy and recommended individual targets to that branch through the G-2 (Air). The group also cooperated with the A-2, Ninth Air Force, on the identification of targets, the provision of ground information on target material already identified, and in the preparation of target material in advance of their recommendation to the Air Force by G-3 (Air). Finally, it disseminated to ground and air forces information on air attacks, including a daily summary of operations, reports on the status of bridges, and weekly reports of Prisoner of War statements on the result of tactical air attacks.

D. Reconnaissance Effort, Ninth Air Force.

The reconnaissance effort of the Ninth Air Force to cope with the requirements of its own organization and those of the 12th Army Group is indicated on Annex E*

E. Communications Network For Reconnaissance Results.

Communications similar to those indicated by Annex F** existed throughout the Ninth Air Force/12th Army Group reconnaissance-information network. Two exceptions to this system existed: the Fifteenth U. S. Army, being employed against the enemy front line in April 1945, operated on a requests basis with the IX Tactical Air Command which was primarily associated with the First U. S. Army. The 9th Reconnaissance Group (Provisional) also became operational in April 1945, and was provided with a communications system. Although appearing to duplicate some communications effort, the system permitted all interested agencies in the Theatre to be informed of reconnaissance observations with a minimum of delay. Corps were immediately alerted by VHF radio when large concentrations or possible bomber targets in their areas of interest were observed. Armies, corps and their divisions were informed of the pilot's complete reconnaissance report within one or two hours after he landed, the information being transmitted simultaneously by telephone or teletype and two separate radios.

F. Explanatory Comments, Annex F.

Annex F illustrates the principle communications involved in transmitting a single observation by a pilot of a squadron of a Reconnaissance Group associ-

* opposite page 170
** opposite page 171

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ated with one army. (See Annex D, opposite page 166, for G-2/G-3 (Air) radio communication within 12th Army Group Ninth Air Force.) Theoretically, if each pilot had made one observation daily, and it had been of sufficient interest to be transmitted to the army group, all the indicated channels would have been effected 108 times. This would consider only the normal reconnaissance aircraft associated with the armies of the army group and would exclude all other aerial observation made during an operational period.

Large observations or sightings of special interest to corps were often sent by VHF radio to the corps G-2, as in area searches (in which the pilot was requested to reconnoiter certain areas by the G-2 of the corps with which the mission was cooperating) and artillery reconnaissance. Radio/Telephone contact with Ground Control Intercept stations also furnished the G-2 (Air) information while the pilot was still in the air.

Upon returning to base, the pilot was ordinarily interrogated by the Army Ground Liaison Officer who telephoned or teletyped the information from the squadron to the Reconnaissance Group Headquarters. Here three dissemination efforts were made: the complete report was telephoned or teletyped to army G-2 (Air); itemized observations were transmitted on the Reconnaissance Broadcast Net maintained by the air force which all ground units could monitor; screened information was transmitted direct to G-2 (Air) 12th Army Group, via the G-2/G-3 (Air) Net.

G. Cooperation with the Director of Reconnaissance and Photography.

Regardless of the facilities available to the G-2 (Air) as they existed within the air forces, ground intelligence agencies, or within his own branch, only incomplete aerial reconnaissance results could have been obtained without cooperation of the Air Force Director of Reconnaissance and Photography.

There was a conscious effort to include personal friendship, frequent visits to air and ground headquarters, combined offices and billets and other means to promote complete freedom of thought and interchange of ideas between the G-2 (Air) and the DOR and their respective staffs.

It was satisfactorily established that the G-2 (Air) had to think of the reconnaissance pilots as "his recce pilots" while the reconnaissance people had to be aware of what front line troops needed. If the G-2 (Air) ignored the best interests of the air power available to him when making requests for reconnaissance, he soon found his losses were great in an intangible spirit of cooperation and a very tangible mal-distribution of air-effort. Although competent advice was available to him in the DOR's office, the G-2 (Air)'s best interests



ANNEX E
(Part II, Vol. III)
12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

were served when he staffed his Branch with officers trained in the employment of aerial reconnaissance. Any reduction of effort on the part of all reconnaissance personnel to merely satisfying requests made by the ground forces would have resulted in lost initiative, and it was this initiative that was directly responsible for the great strides made in aerial reconnaissance during the course of the European War.

H. Translating Ground Force Requirements Into Air Force Capabilities.

Chief among his responsibilities in securing air reconnaissance was the G-2 (Air)'s function of alerting the air force to the ground requirements in terms of visual reconnaissance effort, photographic coverage, types of photography, photo reproduction and areas of reconnaissance responsibility. Based chiefly upon aircraft actually available within the theater on one hand and the realization that only by maintaining a 24-hour surveillance of the enemy can perfect reconnaissance be achieved, the G-2 (Air) made known to the DOR the required reconnaissance effort for each army and for the army group.

I. Requirements Beyond Air Force Capabilities.

In addition to the allotted effort provided for the armies it was frequently the case that reconnaissance was required beyond the capabilities of units organic within the Ninth Air Force. The army group often found itself interested in reconnaissance flown by other air forces and this again called for action by the DOR upon advice of the G-2 (Air). While this usually occured in matters pertaining to photographic reproduction it also applied to the actual flying of reconnaissance and was handled by making requests to the supporting air force which, in turn, requested laterally or to higher headquarters. In this manner photography which was actually flown by an air force within another theater was obtained for an army within the 12th Army Group.

New requirements by ground forces for all types of photography stimulated a great development of techniques, cameras, and flying tactics. The army G-2's (Air) and the Reconnaissance Groups associated with them usually devised and perfected such new developments, after which it became a matter for the army group G-2 (Air) and the Ninth Air Force DOR to make the developments available to all armies within the theater.



ANNEX F
(Part II, Vol. III)
12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-2 FOREIGN LIAISON BRANCH REPORT

12TH ARMY GROUP

The Foreign Liaison Branch, a part of the G-2 section, was set up as the channel through which the Commanding General could handle French Tactical Liaison personnel attached to the 12th Army Group. This Allied liaison group consisted of a French Colonel, his assistant, and a small staff of secretaries and drivers at headquarters; and a number of junior officers attached to corps and divisions under the command of General Bradley. The personnel had been picked in England and Africa during the months spent in preparation for the invasion of the European Continent.

Initially, the French Tactical Liaison was intended for contacts with the population, the local authorities, and the resistance groups to be encountered. When operations took the two, then existing, armies out of Normandy, and the break-through was on the way, their duties developed more and more into contacts with the FFI and other resistence groups, and all round intelligence work. From then on, until the end of the French campaign, the Tactical Liaison and the Foreign Liaison Branch performed many functions: the men with divisions, regiments, battalions, or companies went on patrols, drove tanks or armored cars, and became gunners or riflemen.

The branch came out of England fully constituted with a Colonel in charge, a Captain, and an enlisted man. On 8 August 1944, in St. Sauveur de Lendelin, Colonel D'Alary Fechet became Deputy to the A. C. of S. G-2, General Sibert and Ceptain Sapicha was put in charge of the Branch. It quickly became apparent that personal contacts with the French personnel and their U. S. commanders was the only way to handle the problems involved.

However, this small Branch was unable to cope with all such problems connected with, first the French, then the different Missions which were attached to the army group. It therefore became the policy to help each Mission establish a small staff for the administration of its personnel, and the branch found its main functions were to provide help in dealing with the different problems, U. S. channels, and Headquarters Sections and Commands. Even so, the problems were so varied and scattered over so many miles of territory, that the branch would have experienced great difficulty without the help, friendly cooperation, and good-will of such sections as the G-2 Section at army group and at lower echelons, and, of course, the Mission Chiefs.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

It was the policy of the Commanding General to have the Mission Chiefs attached to the G-2 Section at TAC Headquarters. The branch had been created to handle only Tactical Liaison personnel, but the presence of the Mission Chiefs with the branch made it very hard for it to keep out of various and often complicated situations arising in other sections which handled liaison personnel of their own — G-1 and G-5. Contacts were constantly made with these sections, and effective coordination accomplished.

During the French Campaign the A. C. of S, G-2, used the branch and the Chief of the French Liaison for many and varied intelligence missions. Those were the great days of the branch; trips were made into "no man's" land, behind the German lines, and, of course, into our own front lines. The French personnel scattered throughout the combat units were fully used for these missions, and it must be underlined that these were carried out with great perseverance, gallantry and conscientiousness — viz., the many awards, citations, and unhappily, also, the many casualties sustained by the French Tactical liaison, a list of which appears below:

U. S. awards to French Tactical Liaison Personnel:

Legion of Merit	2
Silver Star Medal	5
Bronze Star Medal	21

Casualties sustained by French Tactical Liaison Personnel:

Killed in action	11
Wounded	23
Missing	1

The value of the services rendered can also be gauged by the development in numbers of personnel attached from D-day onwards, and the importance of certain missions performed; this was especially true in connection with the Paris operation, the fall of Metz, the Ardennes battle, and many other operations and actions. The information on the situation in and around Paris, brought to the Army Group Commander by French Tactical Liaison personnel, was in no small degree responsible for the date and speed with which the Allied Armies marched into that city.

During the months of October and November 1944, when the war had become more static, the branch had to concern itself with regularizing the status of Allied personnel with our units, and putting the office and paper work into orderly shape, which, until then, had been mainly carried in the memory

and notes of the branch chief. It was then, too, that Belgian, Dutch, and Allied personnel started to appear [illegible] the quantity and quality of trouble [illegible] be dealt with.

When Army Group Headquarters, TAC, moved to Namur, Belgium, it was found that a Belgian Mission should be attached. After a few visits to SHAEF Mission to Belgium in Brussels, a Belgian Military Mission to U. S. Forces in Belgium was created and accredited to 12th Army Group Headquarters. A full Colonel and a small staff arrived and were given all the usual facilities to start work with the Branch. This establishment of a Belgian Mission at headquarters does not mean, however, that the Belgian liaison was then only started. The optional character of Allied liaison on the one hand, and the sympathy of our men for humanity at large, on the other, were responsible for many attachments to our units of Belgians, French, Dutch, Polish, and Luxembourg nationals, mostly youths who had found some way of helping the GI's when they first occupied a new zone. These men were dressed in GI uniforms and soon became lost in the unit by which they had been picked up. It became a necessity for the branch to weed out these irregulars, induct them into their national armed forces, and then attach them to U. S. units. In some divisions, their numbers were 80 to 130. Many of these youths were so afraid of being sent home that they would rather go unpaid and unnoticed than go through the regularizing mill; the branch found many only after parents or relatives had sent in enquiries for them. This activity of the branch and the Missions never really ceased till the end of operations.

In April 1945, a Polish Mission Chief was accredited to headquarters, with the object of coordinating all activities of the Polish Liaison Officers, mostly with G-1 and G-5, for duty with PWX and DP branches at various echelons.

When our armies broke into Germany, and crashed over the Rhine, the PWX and DP problems became acute. A maelstrom of Allied Missions of all denominations and colors started pouring into army group. Regulars, the latter in force, could be found speeding on the super highways, creating very real difficulties and complications. The irregulars became our headache, one of the greatest encountered. The office of the branch was, more often than not, a "Tower of Babel", with all languages being spoken at once. The branch became a clearing house, and the house-clearing done in those days was greatly facilitated by the Chiefs of Missions, and quite especially by Lieutenant Colonel Rotival, the Chief of the French Mission, who with undaunted courage and a good deal of humor, successfully handled hundreds of special cases and situations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

In June and July 1945, the branch was summoned to liaison with our Eastern Allies across our army group lines. A captain, Russian speaking, was then assigned to the branch. It was no easy matter as there were then no communications with the Russians, and, as they were in no hurry and, in fact, operate on a much slower basis in problems of that kind than we do, days were spent in pleasant conversation with caviar and vodka to fall back on.

During the last weeks of its life with Headquarters 12th Army Group, the branch wound up the work of Tactical Liaison for which there was nothing more to do. The personnel attached to units which have moved out of the American zone of occupation, have been relieved of duty and put at the disposal of the Military Mission for German Affairs in Paris. Many French and other Allied officers became so integrated by their units, that a tendency developed to take them along, wherever the unit was going. Friendships have developed which will not easily be forgotten, and it was difficult for the branch to have to break them up. At the time of this writing there are still 154 French officers and enlisted men, and 47 Belgians, with units under this command. Whatever fate has in store for them and wherever they may go, the branch would like them to know that it was a pleasure to work for, and with, such gallant and conscientious soldiers; we have tried mutually to accomplish useful things, and the recollection of our efforts cannot be effaced by the passage of time.

PART IV

G-2

PLANS BRANCH REPORT

12TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-2 PLANS BRANCH REPORT
HQ., 12TH ARMY GROUP

In December 1944, the G-2 Plans Branch was organized to provide a small staff of personnel who could devote their full time to bringing up to date the intelligence plans for the occupation of Germany.

Colonel Charles A. Masson was initially selected to be Chief of Branch. Upon the release of Col. Masson to Headquarters Military Intelligence Service in February, Colonel Henry M. Zeller, formerly G-2 of XX Corps, was selected to continue as Chief of Branch.

Until VE Day (8 May 1945) most of the work could be devoted only to the development of the intelligence plan for the occupation of Germany. Toward this end the main emphasis was placed upon preparing the Intelligence Annex for Operations Plan "ECLIPSE" and the CI Directive for Germany. An OI Brief-Germany, listing military installations and headquarters in the U. S. Zone of occupation, was compiled to present this data in a more accessable and co-ordinated form. A detailed study of the Wehrkreis organization was started and completed with a view to its possible use in the demobilization of the German Army.

With the cessation of hostilities and the complete occupation of Germany it was possible to put into effect the plan that had been drawn up.

Before the end of the war the Plans Branch devoted itself mainly to the development of the Intelligence Plans in coordination with directives from SHAEF. As the armies advanced into Germany and rear areas came under static conditions, the responsibilities and functions of the branch increased. Groups were established within the branch to coordinate the problems of interrogation and formation of interrogation centers, the exploitation of documents and the formation of document centers, and the distribution and employment of intelligence specialist personnel and teams of the Military Intelligence Service. A Photo Group was added to continue the remaining functions of the former G-2 (Air) Section.

On the 1st of July as General Sibert became the A. C. of S, G-2 at Headquarters USFET, the Plans Branch became the Miscellaneous Section of the G-2 Division Headquarters USFET.

The functions and responsibilities of the G-2 Plans Branch while serving 12th Army Group have been varied and many; increasing from the initial compiling of the occupational intelligence plan to assuming the responsibility of carrying out a good part of this plan.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Scale 1:1,250,000

GENERALIZED ENEMY TERRAIN

Central and S



GENERALIZED ENEMY TERRAIN

Central and Southwestern Germany





PLATE 2 PREPARED BY G-2 AND ENGINEER SECTION TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


Bingen
Mainz
FRANKFURT
Darmstadt
Worms
Mannheim
Kaiserslautern
Heidelberg
HARDT 1800
Karlsruhe
Heilbronn
Wurzburg
Bamberg
Bayreuth
NURNBERG
ODENWALD 2000
NECKAR-MAIN B
SCARPLAND 1600
HILLS
FRANCONIAN JURA
2100
2000
BOHEMIA
PILSEN
PLATEAU
BOHMER
BAYRISHER 3400
WALD
4300
Regensburg
Landshut
1600
FORELAND
DANUBE
Linz
STUTTGART
2300
NORDLINGEN
Strasbourg
BADEN
FOREST 3000
BLACK 4600
SWABIAN 3200
JURA 2700
Ulm
Augsburg
MUNICH
BAVARIAN
3500
BAVARIAN ALPS
Freiburg
RHINE
LEGEND
High, rugged Mountain Obstacle
Mountain Obstacle
Hills
Plains
Corridor
Rivers
Gorge
Marsh or Swamp
Roads
Priority
Autobahn
Defense Lines (Siegfried)
Known
Probable
Possible
International Border
8°
9°
10°
11°
12°
13°
14°
Miles
Kilometers

THE ERFT RIVER DEFENSE LINE



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

12TH ARMY GROUP

OFFICE OF AC OF S, G-2

PHOTOGRAPHY FURNISHED ARMIES

24 AUG. 1944 – 8 MAY 1945

IN QUANTITY



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

12TH ARMY GROUP

OFFICE OF AC OF S, G-2

OGRAPHY FURNISHED ARMIES

24 AUG. 1944 – 8 MAY 1945

IN QUANTITY



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


COBLENZ
FRANKFURT
HOF
MEZIERES
SEDAN
MOSEL R.
MAINZ
TRIER
BAYREUTH
WURZBURG
LUXEMBOURG
SOISSONS
REIMS
MANNHEIM
NURNBERG
MEUSE R.
VERDUN
SAARBRUCKEN
METZ
MARNE R.
MEAUX
EPERNAY
CHALONS-S-MARNE
SAAR R.
RHINE R.
REGENSBURG
STRAUBING
PARIS
MELUN
AUBE R.
ST. DIZIER
TOUL
NANCY
STUTTGART
NECKAR R.
STRASBOURG
PASSAU
TROYES
LANDSHUT
ST. DIE
CHAUMONT
AUGSBURG
COLMAR
MUNICH
MULHOUSE
VESOUL
BELFORT
KONSTANZ
BASEL
INNSBRUCK
ST. NAZAIRE
NANTES
LA ROCHELLE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INCLOSURE TO [redacted]
STUDY NO. 2

MAGINOT INUNDATION SYSTEM



Legend

Impounded water –
Potential inundation –
Pillbox – □

53
47

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INCLOSURE TO [redacted]

STUDY NO. 2

MAGINOT INUNDATION SYSTEM



Legend

- Impounded water –
- Potential inundation –
- Pillbox – ▫

PREPARED BY G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP (11-11-44)

AGPO 8-45/1M/C2377ABCD

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Part I — Study No. 1

Annexes A — J

Volume III, 12th Army Group Final After Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

"D" DAY
GERMAN DISPOSITIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



Reproduced by Engr. Repro. Det. 12 A. Gp.

ANNEX A

(Part I, Study No. 1)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

GERMAN DISPOSITIONS PRIOR TO NORMANDY BREAKTHROUGH

FRONT LINE AS OF 21 JULY 1944


W. of Greenwich
E. of Greenwich
C de la Hague
Cherbourg
Barfleur
Pte de Barfleur
C de Flamanville
C de Carteret
Pte. de la Percée
Bayeux
St Lô
Coutances
Caen
Trouville
le Havre
Fécamp
Pointe d'Ailly
C. d'Antifer
C de la Hève
Lisieux
Bernay
Thiberville
Falaise
Vire
Mortain
Avranches
St Hilaire du H
St Marcouf
Isigny
Carentan
Valognes
Montebourg
Lessay
Périers
Torigni
Aunay
Thury
Condé
Evreux
Lillebonne
Yvetot
Goderville
Criquetot
Cany
Valmont
Etretat
Veules les R
St Valery en C
Dieppe
Forges les E
Neufchatel
Gournay
Aumale
Eu
Abbeville
Le Crotoy
Montreuil
Hesdin
Boulogne
Calais
Gravelines
St Omer
Dunkerque
Bethune
Lens
Arras
Doullens
Albert
Amiens
Peronne
Roye
Montdidier
Compiegne
Noyon
Chauny
St Quentin
Laon
Soissons
Chateau Thierry
Meaux
Paris
Rambouillet
Dreux
Evreux
Pont Audemer
Honfleur
Deauville
Cabourg
Dives
Ouistreham
Colombelles
Fleury
Carpiquet
Tilly
Airel
Littry
Trévières
Grandcamp
Port en B
Crepon
Lion sur M
St Aubin sur M
Douvres
Ste Mère Eglise
Montebourg
Picauville
Barneville
Carteret
St Sauveur le V
Sortosville
Briquebec
Les Pieux
Beaumont Hague
Omonville
Alderville
Querqueville
Tourlaville
Octeville
Digosville
Teurthéville
Quettehou
St Vaast la H
Montaigu
Brix
Pelée
St Pierre Eglise
Levy
Chantereyne
Gonneville
Ecausseville
Ste Marie du M
Ste Colombe
Ste Croix Hague
Auderville
Jobourg
Vauville
Biville
Ecalgrain
Ecrainville
Les Loges
Les Ifs
Ypreville Biville
Cauville
Montivilliers
Octeville sur M
Bolbec
Lanquetot
Fauville en C
Yerville
Anglesqueville
Doudeville
Routot
Fontaine le Dun
Veulette
Cany Barville
Ellhot
Helene
Benouville
Valtot sur M
Ourville en C
Héricourt
St Laurent
Luneray
Pourville
Quiberville
Pointe d'Ailly
Criquetot l'Esneval
St Jouin sur M
Gonneville sur M
Harfleur
St Romain de C
Lillebonne
Norville
la Maillerave sur S
Quillebeuf
Berville sur M
St Maclou
Pont Audemer
Bourg Achard
Routot
la Neuville
Epaignes
Corneilles
Beuzeville
Tricqueville
Campigny
Monfort sur R
Pont Authou
St Georges du V
Lieurey
Blangy le C
Bonneboscq
Annebault
Dozulé
Manerbe
Colombelles
Cormelles
Fleury sur O
Carpiquet
Epron
Ouistreham
Douvres la Delivrande
Lion sur M
St Aubin sur M
Courseulles sur M
Port en B
Crepon
Grandcamp les B
Trévières
Isigny sur M
Airel
Littry
Tilly sur S
Carentan
Ste Mère Eglise
Picauville
Barneville
St Sauveur le V
Sortosville
Briquebec
Les Pieux
Montebourg
Valognes
Brix
Montaigu
Quettehou
St Vaast la H
Tourlaville
Octeville
Digosville
Teurthéville
Querqueville
Beaumont Hague
Omonville
Alderville

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ANNEX B
(Part I, Study No. 1)
Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

Prepared by Engineer Section 12 AG 1944 from G.S.G.S. 4072 1:500000 Air Maps - Revised from G.S.G.S. 4438 Communications Maps 1943 & T.I.S. Report March 1944

Kilometers 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Kilometers
Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

Scale 1:500,000

Projection-Europe (Air) Co

Reproduced by Engr Repr


II PRCHT
XLVII PZ
II SS PZ.
I SS PZ.
XXX
Vire
Avranches
Tombelaine
le Mont St Michel
Granville
Fougères
Laval
Mayenne
Argentan
Alençon
Mamers
La Ferté Macé
la Coulonche
Flers
Falaise
Putanges
Sées
Carrouges
Domfront
Tinchebray
Sourdeval
Pontorson
St Hilaire du H
Landivy
St Fraimbault
Ceaucé
Lassay
Javron
Gorron
Ambrières
Villaines la J.
Courcité
Champgenéteux
Evron
Mayenne
Chailland
Andouillé
Bourgneuf
Martigné
Montsurs
Argentre
Louvigné
Chateaubourg
St Pierre la C.
Pt Brillet
Erbrée
Louron
Vaiges
Ste Suzanne
St Denis d'O.
St Pierre sur O.
Mont St J.
Sillé
Beaumont sur S.
Asse le R.
Bonnétable
Ballon
Souligné sur B.
Tennie
Conlie
la Milesse
Le Mans
Chaufour N.D.
Montfort le R.
Sille le P.
Tuffé
Dollon
Lamnay
Vibraye
Lavaré
Loué
Sceaux
Montmirail
la Ferté Bernard
Nogent le R.
Thiron
Mortagne
Bellême
Nocé
Rémalard
Pervenchères
Coulimer
Bivres
la Fresnaye sur C.
Neufchâtel
Gesnes
Gesse le G.
Fyé
Bourg le R.
Gourgains
Fresnay sur S.
St Cosme de V.
St Rémy des M.
Marolles les B.
la Chapelle du B.
le Theil
Moutiers
St Denis 28 d'Ab.
Thiron
Nogent le R.
Beaumont les A.
Authon
la Chapelle Guillaume
Greez sur R.
Montmirail
Vibraye
Scaeux
Dollon
Lavaré
Tuffé
Sille le P.
Montfort le R.
la Milesse
Chaufour N.D.
Le Mans
Souligné sur B.
Ballon
Bonnétable
la Ferté Bernard
Nogent le R.
Thiron
Moutiers
Pervenchères
Coulimer
Bivres
la Fresnaye sur C.
Neufchâtel
Mamers
Bellême
Nocé
Rémalard
le Pin la G.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LIBERATION OF PARIS

FRONT LINE AS OF 26 AUGUST 1944.



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ION
IS
S OF
44.

ELEMENTS
85 89
331
2 10 4

SEINE
Risle
Eure
Iton
Aqueduct
Andelle
Epte
Oise
SEINE

711
272
346
21
6
344
12 4
24
9 4
116
17 GAF
WAHL-
KRANKE
49
18 GAF
17 4

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ANNEX C
(Part 1, Study No. 1)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Rambouillet
Orléans
Sarthe
Eure
Loir
Loire
Huisne
Yvette
Essonne
Aube
Alençon
Mamers
Montfort
Soulitré
Orphin
Gallardon
Ablis
Authon la P.
Sainville
Dourdan
Auneau
Les Essarts le R.
Dreux
Evreux
Nemours
Auxy
Bellegarde
Boissy aux Cailles
Toury
Janville
Artenay
Patay
Cercottes
Chanteau
Marcilly
Jouy
Ardon
Vienne en V.
Sandillon
Jargeau
Meung sur L.
Beaugency
Cléry
Olivet
Chécy
Saran
Ingré
Orgères en B.
Terminiers
Cormainville
Courtalain
Montmirail
Authon du Perche
Nogent le R.
Chartres
Maintenon
Epernon
Rambouillet
Dourdan
Etampes
Milly
Malesherbes
Pithiviers
Neuville aux Bois
Chilleurs aux Bois
Ouarville
Grandville
Gouillons
Boisville la St P.
Boutervilliers
Rouvray St D.
Boissy aux Cailles
Allaines
Janville
Toury
Artenay
St Lye la F.
Cherilly
Bricy
Chanteau
Saran
Ingré
Olivet
Chécy
Jargeau
Sandillon
Vienne en V.
Ardon
Jouy
Marcilly
Auxy
Bellegarde
Lorris
les Bordes
Montereau
Fontainebleau
Nemours
Chevreuse
Dampierre
Limours
Briis
Forges les B.
Arpajon
Longpont
Montlhéry
Linas
Corbeil
Essonnes
Melun
Fontainebleau
Aquitaine
48
LEHR
708
44
338
9
16
0
30
1
30
2
30
Kilometers
Scale 1:500000
Projection: Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic
Reproduced by the Engineer Repro. Det. 12A Gp.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

WINTER LINE ALONG THE **WEST WALL**

FRONT LINE AS OF 28 OCT. '44



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ALONG WALL

28 OCT. '44





ANNEX D

(Part I, Study No. 1)

Vol. II (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report


B
Seventh
First
XX 416
XX 19
XXXXII
XXX
XX 462
XX 11
XX 17 SS
XX 48
XX 559
XIII SS
LVIII Pz
First
Fifth Pz.
XX 361
XX 553
LVIII Pz
XXX
?
XX 21
112
XX 716
Fifth Pz
Nineteenth
?
LXIV
XX 16
XX 338
XX 198
106
LXIV
XXX
XX 269
IV GAF
XX 189
IV GAF
XXX
XX 159
LXXXV
Chaumont
Miles
Kilometers
Scale 1:1000000

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



DENNES
F
V '45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED





Reproduced by Engr. Repro. Det. 12 A. Gp.


THE ARDENNES
BATTLE
FRONT LINE AS OF 8 JAN. '45
Meuse
Sambre
18
3
89
62
12
10½



ANNEX F

(Part I, Study No. 1)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ANNEX G
(Part I, Study No. 1)
Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OFFENSIVE FOR THE RHINE

AS OF 12 FEB. '45

ANTWERP
BRUSSELS
ARDENNES
MEUSE
MAAS
WAAL
NEDER RIJN
ZUIDER ZEE
IJSSEL
DORTMUND EMS CANAL
EMS
LIPPE
RUHR
SAUERLAND
TEUTOBURGER WALD
WESER
HILLS
ZENNE
AGGER
SIEG
KÜSTEN CANAL

TWENTY FIFTH
FIRST PRCHT
FIRST PRCHT
FIFTEENTH
FIFTEENTH
SEVENTH
ELMS. 6 Prcht DIV.
ELMS. 3 Prcht DIV.
ELMS 9 Pz. DIV.
ELMS Prcht. DIV.
LXXXVIII
LXXXVI
LXXXVI
II Prcht
II Prcht
XII SS
LXXXI
XXX
XXXI
LXXXI
XXX
XXXI
LXXXIV
XXXX
XXXXVII
XXXXVII
XXXXVII



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


SEVENTH
FIRST
G
ELMS. 352 DIV.
560
212
HUNS
LXXXII
XXX
LXXXV
LXXXV
XXX
XIII SS
XIII SS
XXX
XC
XC
XXX
LXXXIX
XIV SS
FIRST
NINETEENTH ARMY
XIV SS
XXX
XVIII SS
WESTERWALD
TAUNUS
VOGELSBERG
ODENWALD
SPESSART
RHON
THURINGER WALD
HARZ
FRANKFURT
STUTTGART
Heidelberg
NECKAR
MAIN
LAHN
EDER
FULDA
WERRA
DIEMEL
LEINE

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


HARZ
HILLS
WESER
TEUTOBURGER WALD
THURINGER W
RHON
SPESSART
VOGELS BERG
SAUERLAND
WESTERWALD
TAUNUS
WERRA
FULDA
Minden
Herford
Osnabruck
Bielefeld
Paderborn
Kassel
Gottingen
Munden
Coesfeld
Munster
Lingen
Oldenburg
Groningen
Arnhem
Nijmegen
Wesel
Krefeld
Duisburg
Essen
Bochum
Dortmund
Wuppertal
Solingen
Remscheid
Siegen
Koln
Bonn
Aachen
Eupen
Malmedy
Trier
Mainz
Wiesbaden
Frankfurt
Hanau
Fulda
Wurzburg
Kassel
Gottingen
Hannover
Braunschweig
Magdeburg
Leipzig
Dresden
Kassel
Weimar
Erfurt
Gotha
Eisenach
Meiningen
Coburg
Bamberg
Nurnberg
Ansbach
Wurzburg
Aschaffenburg
Darmstadt
Mannheim
Heidelberg
Karlsruhe
Stuttgart
Heilbronn
Crailsheim
Ulm
Augsburg
Munchen
Landshut
Regensburg
Passau
Linz
Salzburg
Innsbruck
Bregenz
Zurich
Basel
Strasbourg
Metz
Nancy
Luxembourg
Arlon
Namur
Liege
Maastricht
Venlo
Roermond
Utrecht
Amsterdam
Haarlem
Leiden
Rotterdam
Dordrecht
Middelburg
Vlissingen
Ghent
Antwerp
Brussels
Mons
Lille
Valenciennes
Cambrai
Arras
Abbeville
Amiens
Rouen
Le Havre
Caen
Cherbourg
Dieppe
Boulogne
Calais
Dunkirk
Ostend
Bruges
Zuider Zee
Ijssel
Rhine
Ruhr
Lippe
Ems
Weser
Leine
Aller
Elbe
Oder
Neisse
Saale
Main
Neckar
Danube
Moselle
Saar
Meuse
Scheldt
Somme
Seine
Loire
Marne
Aisne
Oise
Ardennes
Eifel
Hunsruck
Taunus
Vogelsberg
Rhon
Spessart
Thuringer Wald
Harz
Teutoburger Wald
Sauerland
Westerwald
Weser
Ems-Weser Canal
Dortmund-Ems Canal
Mittelland Canal
Rhine-Herne Canal
Wesel-Datteln Canal
Albert Canal
Juliana Canal
Zuider Zee
Walcheren
Beveland
Schouwen
Duiveland
Tholen
Overflakkee
Goeree
Texel
Vlieland
Terschelling
Ameland
Schiermonnikoog
Rottumerplaat
Rottumeroog
Borkum
Juist
Norderney
Baltrum
Langeoog
Spiekeroog
Wangerooge
Helgoland
Sylt
Amrum
Fohr
Pellworm
Nordstrand
Hallig Hooge
Hallig Langeness
Hallig Groden
Hallig Oland
Hallig Lutjenhorn
Hallig Nordmarsch
Hallig Habel
Hallig Norderoog
Hallig Suderoog
Hallig Kirchhallig
Hallig Gelting
Hallig Langenwerder
Hallig Hohenwarf
Hallig Neuwerk
Hallig Scharhorn
Hallig Nigehorn
Hallig Trischen
Hallig Memmert
Hallig Juist
Hallig Norderney
Hallig Baltrum
Hallig Langeoog
Hallig Spiekeroog
Hallig Wangerooge
Hallig Helgoland
Hallig Sylt
Hallig Amrum
Hallig Fohr
Hallig Pellworm
Hallig


HARZ
HILLS
WESER
TEUTOBURGER WALD
THURINGER WALD
RHON
VOGELS BERG
SPESSART
AUERLAND
WESTERWALD
TAUNUS
WALD
LEINE
WERRA
FULDA
DIEMEL
LIPPE
EMS
EDER
ERFT
RUHR
DORTMUND
EMS-WESER CANAL
MITTELLAND CANAL
DORTMUND-EMS CANAL
LXXXVI
LXXXIII
LXXXIV
LXXXV
LXXX
LVIII PZ
LXVII
LXVI
XIII
XII SS
XIII SS
II FPCHT
FIRST PRCHT
FIFTH PRCHT

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ANNEX H
(Part I, Study No. 1)
Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


THE RHINE CROSSED
FRONT LINE AS OF 26 MAR. 45
FIFTH
FIFTEENTH
SEVENTH
FIRST
NINETEENTH
ARDENNES
HUNSRUCK
VOSGES
TWENTY FOURTH ARMY
XXIV
XIX
XC
XIV
LXXXIX
805 NR. I
BRUSSELS
LUXEMBOURG
MULHOUSE
BASEL
STUTTGART
Metz
Nancy
Epinal
Saarbourg
Strasbourg
Colmar
Belfort
Thionville
Verdun
Dieuze
Baccarat
St. Die
Sarrelouis
Trier
Bitche
Pirmasens
Landau
Karlsruhe
Offenburg
Kehl
Gebweiller
Massevaux
Altkirch
Rastatt
Baden-Baden
Calw
Freudenstadt
Rottweil
Villingen
Donaueschingen
Waldshut
Lörrach
Schaffhausen
Zurich
Winterthur
Frauenfeld
Konstanz
Ravensburg
Friedrichshafen
Ulm
Memmingen
Kempten
Immenstadt
Landsberg
Augsburg
Munich
Rosenheim
Innsbruck
Kufstein
Salzburg
Linz
Passau
Regensburg
Ingolstadt
Nuremberg
Ansbach
Crailsheim
Schwäbisch Hall
Heilbronn
Mannheim
Worms
Kaiserslautern
Neunkirchen
Saarbrücken
Homburg
Zweibrücken
Bad Kreuznach
Idar-Oberstein
Simmern
Koblenz
Bingen
Wiesbaden
Mainz
Darmstadt
Aschaffenburg
Würzburg
Schweinfurt
Bamberg
Bayreuth
Hof
Plauen
Zwickau
Chemnitz
Dresden
Leipzig
Halle
Magdeburg
Brunswick
Hanover
Bielefeld
Osnabrück
Münster
Wesel
Duisburg
Düsseldorf
Cologne
Aachen
Liège
Verviers
Malmedy
Eupen
Monschau
Düren
Euskirchen
Bonn
Siegburg
Gummersbach
Siegen
Marburg
Kassel
Göttingen
Goslar
Braunschweig
Wolfsburg
Stendal
Potsdam
Berlin
Frankfurt
Cottbus
Görlitz
Liegnitz
Breslau
Oppeln
Glatz
Neisse
Brüx
Aussig
Teplitz
Karlsbad
Eger
Asch
Plauen
Hof
Bayreuth
Amberg
Regensburg
Straubing
Deggendorf
Passau
Braunau
Wels
Steyr
Amstetten
St. Pölten
Vienna
Wiener Neustadt
Graz
Leoben
Klagenfurt
Villach
Spittal
Lienz
Brixen
Bozen
Trento
Verona
Mantua
Modena
Bologna
Ferrara
Rovigo
Padua
Venice
Udine
Gorizia
Trieste
Fiume
Ljubljana
Maribor
Varaždin
Zagreb
Karlovac
Rijeka
Sisak
Osijek
Vukovar
Sarajevo
Mostar
Split
Dubrovnik
Belgrade
Novi Sad
Subotica
Szeged
Budapest
Debrecen
Miskolc
Kosice
Presov
Poprad
Nitra
Bratislava
Brno
Olmütz
Prerau
Iglau
Znaim
Gmünd
Zwettl
Krems
Linz
Wels
Steyr
Amstetten
St. Pölten
Vienna
Wiener Neustadt
Graz
Leoben
Klagenfurt
Villach
Spittal
Lienz
Brixen
Bozen
Trento
Verona
Mantua
Modena
Bologna
Ferrara
Rovigo
Padua
Venice
Udine
Gorizia
Trieste
Fiume
Ljubljana
Maribor
Varaždin
Zagreb
Karlovac
Rijeka
Sisak
Osijek
Vukovar
Sarajevo
Mostar
Split
Dubrovnik
Belgrade
Novi Sad
Subotica
Szeged
Budapest
Debrecen
Miskolc
Kosice
Presov
Poprad
Nitra
Bratislava
Brno
Olmütz
Prerau
Iglau
Znaim
Gmünd
Zwettl
Krems
Linz
Wels
Steyr
Amstetten
St. Pölten
Vienna
Wiener Neustadt
Graz
Leoben
Klagenfurt
Villach
Spittal
Lienz
Brixen
Bozen
Trento
Verona
Mantua
Modena
Bologna
Ferrara
Rovigo
Padua
Venice
Udine
Gorizia
Trieste
Fiume
Ljubljana
Maribor
Varaždin
Zagreb
Karlovac
Rijeka
Sisak
Osijek
Vukovar
Sarajevo
Mostar
Split
Dubrovnik
Belgrade
Novi Sad
Subotica
Szeged
Budapest
Debrecen
Miskolc
Kosice
Presov
Poprad
Nitra
Bratislava
Brno
Olmütz
Prerau
Iglau
Znaim
Gmünd
Zwettl
Krems

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED




ENVELOPMENT OF THE RUHR
FRONT LINE AS OF 10 APRIL 45
II Prcht
LXXXVI
11
BARENTHIN
7
8
471 NR
15
G.D. REPL.
FIRST PRCHT
ELEVENTH
476 ZbV
SS WESTPHALIA
166
26
5
190
180
116
3
340
176
LEHR
326
338
272
9
ELEVENTH
SEVENTH



ANNEX I
(Part I, Study No. 1)
Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


363
62
59
12
"B"
ARMY
ARMY
2
11
256
64
MTN.
413 NR
409 NR
136
347
159
DONAU
416
SEVENTH
FIRST
NINETEENTH
FIRST
559
NUERNBERG
553
246
16
257
405 zbV
79
47
805 NR
9
212
174
198
2
MTN
Regensburg
9°
10°
11°
12°
13°
MILES
KILOMETERS
Scale

n Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



WO WEEKS BEFORE CAPITULATION

ONT LINE AS OF 23 APR. '45

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


FIRST PZ. ARMY
EIGHTH ARMY
SIXTH SS PZ ARMY
SIXTH ARMY
SECOND PZ. ARMY
LXXXV
XII
LXXXII
XIII SS
XIII
LXXX
XVIII SS
LXIV
TWENTY FOURTH
NINETEENTH
FIRST
SEVENTH
FIRST
MILES
SCALE 1:1,700,000
5000/APRIL 45/ ERD12 AG/1092

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Part I — Study No. 2
Plates 1 — 5.*
Appendices A — F
Volume III, 12th Army Group Final After Action Report

(* Plate 3 is in text, opposite page 66)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



PROFILE 'A'

LEGEND

- RIVERS
- WIDTH OF RIVERS 60'
- CANALS
- OPEN AREAS
- ROADS:
  - MAIN
  - AUTOBAHN
  - ROADS IN DEFILE
- CORRIDORS
- WATER SHED DIVIDES
- TERRAIN SUB-AREAS
- CITIES (100,000 TO 600,000 POPULATION)

INCLOSURE TO
ANNEX No. 2

MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN AREA SOUTH OF RUHR

SCALE

km

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



PREPARED BY G-2, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP (4-11-44)

APPENDIX A

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report







GROUP (4-11-44)

ion Report

AS PROFILE 'A'



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FIXED DEFENSES

SCALE -1:100,000 1 INCH =1.58 MILES

KOLN



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

EFENSES

1 INCH = 1.58 MILES

KOLN

R 1(NW)



PREPARED BY G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY
LOCATIONS SHOWN ARE APPROXIMATE

LEGEND

ONLY THE FOLLOWING SELECTED TYPES OF FIXED DEFENSES ARE PLOTTED

PILLBOX	AT DITCH	DRAGONS TEETH
CASEMATE	AT OBSTACLE	FORT
SHELTER	FIRE TRENCH	STRONG POINT
ROAD BLOCK	COMMUNICATION TRENCH	CONCRETE STRONG POINT

PLATE 4

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

7 FEBRUARY 1945

G PURPOSES ONLY
HOWN ARE
IMATE

LEGEND

ONLY THE FOLLOWING SELECTED TYPES OF FIXED DEFENSES ARE PLOTTED

PILLBOX	AT DITCH	DRAGONS TEETH
CASEMATE	AT OBSTACLE	FORT
SHELTER	FIRE TRENCH	STRONG POINT
ROAD BLOCK	COMMUNICATION TRENCH	CONCRETE STRONG POINT

al After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FIXED DEFENSES

SCALE -1:100,000 1 INCH =1.58 MILES

TRIER



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

EFENSES

1 INCH = 1.58 MILES

TRIER

T-1 (SW)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



PREPARED BY G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY
LOCATIONS SHOWN ARE
APPROXIMATE

LEGEND

ONLY THE FOLLOWING SELECTED TYPES OF FIXED DEFENSES ARE PLOTTED

- PILLBOX
- CASEMATE
- SHELTER
- ROAD BLOCK
- AT DITCH
- AT OBSTACLE
- FIRE TRENCH
- COMMUNICATION TRENCH
- DRAGONS TEETH
- FORT
- STRONG POINT
- CONCRETE STRONG POINT

PLATE 5

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ARMY GROUP

7 FEBRUARY 1945

LEGEND

ONLY THE FOLLOWING SELECTED TYPES OF FIXED DEFENSES ARE PLOTTED

- PILLBOX
- CASEMATE
- SHELTER
- ROAD BLOCK
- AT DITCH
- AT OBSTACLE
- FIRE TRENCH
- COMMUNICATION TRENCH
- DRAGONS TEETH
- FORT
- STRONG POINT
- CONCRETE STRONG POINT

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED




BAHN
ROADS
ELDS
TEGIC AREA
Y INSTALLATIONS)
MÜNCHEN
LINZ
TRAUNSTEIN
GMUNDEN
SALZBURG
STEIN PASS
HIRSCHBICHEL (3916)
LUFTSTEIN
REDOUBT
LUEG PASS
GORGE
ST. MARTIN (3117)
OBERSDORF SATTLE (3790)
KNIE (3020)
GAICHT (3700)
EHRWALD
SCHARNITZ (3140)
PERN (3970)
KIRCHBERG SATTLE (3693)
GRIESSER
TAURN (4167)
PILSEN SATTEL (4239)
KLAMM PASS (7720)
RADSTADTER-TAUERN (5702)
BERLOS PASS (4878)
CRITICAL AREA
3°30 W (1942)



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX D-2

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report


FINSTERMÜNZ
RESIA (4948)
STELVIO
MERANO
BOLZANO
TRENTO
BRENNER
PFITSCHERJOCH (7560)
STALLER SATTEL (8720)
PELSER TAUERN (8850)
KALSER TAUERN (8442)
SONNLUCKE PASS
HOCH THOR (8238)
NIEDER TAUERN (7976)
HOHER TAUERN (8104)
ARLSCHARTE (7865)
KATSCHBERG PASS
KLAGENFURT
UDINE
AVENUES OF APPROACH
MAP A - BOUNDARIES & RIDGES (BASE)
OVERLAY C - ROUTES & AIRFIELDS (RED OVERPRINT)
OVERLAY E - AVENUES of APPROACH (BLACK OVERPRINT)
ADAPTED FROM ORIGINAL MAPS & OVERLAYS ACCOMPANYING
TERRAIN APPRECIATION REDOUBT
MILES

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



RMANENT SNOW
ATER SHEDS
YSIOGRAPHIC AREAS
PT.
Lech
Upper
Isar
Ammer Lake
Wurm Lake
Inn
Salzach
Chiem Lake
Traun
Enns
INNER REDOUBT
LIMESTONE ALPS
INN VALLEY
KITZBÜHEL TROUGH
SALZACH VALLEY



APPENDIX D-1

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



COMPARTMENTATION

MAP A - BOUNDARIES & RIDGES (BASE)
OVERLAY B- DRAINAGE (BLUE OVERPRINT)
OVERLAY D- PHYSIOGRAPHY (BLACK OVERPRINT)

ADAPTED FROM ORIGINAL
MAPS & OVERLAYS ACCOMPANYING

TERRAIN APPRECIATION REDOUBT

5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
MILES

APPENDIX D-1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TRIER AREA

LEGEND

RIVERS
ROADS:
- MAIN, 6 ms WIDE
- OTHER MAIN, 5.5 ms WIDE

TERRAIN:
- MODERATE TO EASY
- MODERATE TO DIFFICULT
- DIFFICULT
- VERY DIFFICULT

* OBSERVATION POINTS
WATERSHED DIVIDES
RIDGE LINES
RAILWAYS:
- MULTIPLE TRACK
- SINGLE TRACK

DEFENSE LINES
LINES OF ACTION

* NO OBSERVATION POINTS SHOWN ON LOWER HALF OF MAP

PREPARED BY G-2, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP (21-1-45)

Reproduced by Engr. Repro. Det. 12 A Gp.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



ARMY GROUP (21-1-45)

Reproduced by Engr. Repro. Det. 12 A Gp

APPENDIX C

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



IN
WEE
MILITAR

RIVERS
ROADS:
MAIN
AUTOBA
ROADS IN
CORRIDOR
WATERSH
TERRAIN
CITIES
INTERNATIO



INCLOSURE NO.1 TO ANNEX NO. 2.
TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.18

MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN

AREA OF

PFALZER BERGLAND

5 0 5 10 15 20
MILES

LEGEND

RIVERS 60' W.G.
ROADS: MAIN
AUTOBAHN
ROADS IN DEFILE
CORRIDORS
WATERSHED DIVIDES
TERRAIN SUB-AREAS
CITIES

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



APPENDIX B

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report



ED BY G-2, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP (9-12-44)





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

INDEX OF TERRAIN STUDIES

PREPARED BY G-2, HQ. 12th ARMY GROUP

1. TACTICAL STUDY OF TERRAIN - N.W. FRANCE
2. TACTICAL STUDY OF TERRAIN - S.W. COTENTIN PENINSULA
3. TACTICAL STUDY OF TERRAIN - N.E. FRANCE
4. TACTICAL STUDY OF TERRAIN - BRITTANY & EASTERN APPROACHES
5. TACTICAL STUDY OF TERRAIN - BELLE-ILE-EN-MER
6. GENERALIZED ENEMY TERRAIN
7. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - AREA SOUTH OF RUHR
8. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - AREA OF HESSE
9. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - AREA OF PFALZER BERGLAND
10. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - LOWE CORRIDOR
11. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - AREA OF THE EIFEL
12. APPROACHES TO BONN
13. TRIER AREA
14. KOBLENZ AREA
15. EASTERN EIFEL & RHINE GORGE
16. SHEET 5.2 - KOBLENZ
17. SHEET 5.3 - BAD HAUHEIM
18. SHEET 5.3 - MARBURG
19. TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF ELBE RIVER
20. GENERALIZED TERRAIN - BAVARIA
21. TERRAIN APPRECIATION - REDOUBT

MAIN AXIS OF THRUST



OF TERRAIN STUDIES

BY G-2, HQ. 12th ARMY GROUP

MILES

RANCE
OTENTIN PENINSULA
FRANCE
TANY & EASTERN APPROACHES
S ILE-EN-MER

A SOUTH OF RUHR
A OF HESSE
A OF PFALZER BERGLAND
NS CORRIDOR
RBA OF THE EIFEL

S OF THRUST

(6) APPROACHES TO BONN
(7) TRIER AREA
(10) KOBLENZ AREA
(12) EASTERN EIFEL & RHINE GORGE
(13) SHEET 52 - KOBLENZ
(14) SHEET 53 - BAD NAUHEIM
(15) SHEET 43 - MARBURG
(19) TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF ELBE RIVER
GENERALIZED TERRAIN - BAVARIA
TERRAIN APPRECIATION - REDOUBT



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PLATE 1

(Part I, Study No. 2)

Vol. III (G-2), 12th Army Group Final After-Action Report

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


9
20
STRASBOURG
Ulm
MUNICH
VIENNA
Salzburg
Innsbruck
Graz
GENEVA

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

G-2 SECTION

PARTS V–VII

12TH ARMY GROUP

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

(FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT)

VOLUME IV

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
Part V — Target Branch Report ("T" Force and "T" Branch Report)	1
Introduction	2
1. Authority and directives	3
2. Organizations and Troops	3
3. "T" Force operations	6
4. Activities of "T" Branch	21
5. Target investigations	24
6. Conclusions	26
Annexes	
A. Instructions and directives	27
B. Organization and troops, "T" Force	43
C. "T" Force operations	53
D. Activities of "T" Branch	57
E. Target investigation	67
Part VI — Censorship Branch Report	73
A. Organization	75
B. Civil censorship district organization	77
C. Responsibilities	78
D. Personnel	78
1. Military	78
2. U. S. civilians	78
3. Allied civilians	79
4. Indigenous personnel	79
E. Civil censorship activities prior to surrender	80
1. Advanced censor section	80
2. Special teams	80
3. Information and records	81
4. Postal division	82
5. Electrical communications division	83
F. Post hostilities civil censorship activities	83
Annexes.	
A. Civil censorship organization	85
B. Civil censorship administration division — District organization	86

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Pages

C. Electrical communications division — District organization 87
D. Postal division — District organization 88
E. Information and records division — District organization 89
F. 12th Army Group Circular No. 2 — "Civil Censorship in Germany" 90
G. Operational report advance censor sections 96

Part VII — Introduction to counterintelligence annexes and carts . . . . . 105—107

Annex A.

I - The counterintelligence mission 109
II - The counterintelligence organization 109
III - Counterintelligence Agencies 109
A. Counterintelligence Corps 110
B. Special counterintelligence units 116
C. Allied CI liaison missions 119

Annex B.

I - FUSAG CI Standing Operating Procedure (Index) 125
II - Security control in liberated countries 192
A. Civil security 192
B. Internal security 195
C. Port, frontier and travel control 196
III - CI operations in liberated countries 197

Annex C.

I - Counterintelligence (CI) directive for Germany (Index) 211
II - Security control in Germany 321
A. Civil security 321
B. Internal security 323
C. Port, frontier and travel control 323
III - CI operations in Germany 325

Charts

1. Total counterintelligence arrestees (Germany)
2. GIS arrestees (Germany)
3. NSDAP officials arrested (Germany)
4. Arrestees Para-military organizations (Germany)
5. Incidents of CI interest (Germany)

PART V

G—2

TARGET BRANCH REPORT

12TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

A. INTRODUCTION

At the outset of operations on continental Europe, it was realized in the higher intelligence echelons of the Theater that existing organic intelligence agencies would be inadequate to the mission of exploiting fully the larger and more important cities and areas containing intelligence and counterintelligence targets. This realization was further crystalized by the experience in the Mediterranean Theater at the time of the entry of Allied troops into Rome. At the same time, plans of intelligence agencies of the War Department War Office level for the organization of operating field units indicated the necessity for an expansion of the existing staff facilities to accomplish the intelligence mission.

It was therefore decided at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to organize intelligence collecting units known as "T" Forces, designed to operate at army group level with the mission of seizing, safeguarding and facilitating the exploitation of important intelligence and counterintelligence targets in the larger cities and in designated areas which would be uncovered in the course of the advance of the Allied forces across Europe.

"T" Force & "T" Branch

1. Authority and Directives:

a. The initial planning for the employment of "T" Forces in the European Theater of Operations was undertaken under the direction of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, in June and July 1944. Conferences with G-2 representatives of the army groups resulted in the issuance of Intelligence Directive No. 17, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 7 July 1944, subject: "T" Forces. Pursuant thereto, Colonel Francis P. Tompkins was designated as the officer of G-2 Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group responsible for handling "T" Force matters. Subsequently, the first directive from Headquarters 12th Army Group was published in letter dated 20 August 1944, subject: "T" Force.

b. The first objective of the 12th Army Group "T" Force was designated by the Army Group Commander as Paris. "T" Force commenced its movement into the city under a verbal directive from the Commanding General, issued 21 August 1944.

c. For operations in the rest ob France subsequent to the Paris Operation, plans were commenced prior to the completion of the mission of "T" Force in Paris and a letter was issued from Headquarters 12th Army Group on 6 September 1944, to inform the Armies of subsequent "T" Force operations. Additional directives from army group to cover the remaining phases of Operation "Overlord" were published on 9 January 1945, 24 March 1945 and 27 March 1945.

d. Copies of the initial directive from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and of the subsequent directives from Headquarters 12th Army Group are attached as Annex "A".*

2. Organization and Troops.

a. Colonel Francis P. Tompkins was designated as the officer of G-2 Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group, responsible for the handling of "T" Force matters, on 2 August 1944. For the purpose of preparing to executive the "T" Force missions and to familarize himself with the experience gained from similar operations under 15th Army Group in Rome and Florence, Colonel Tompkins proceeded to Italy and contacted the "S" Force Headquarters there, returning to Headquarters 12th Army Group on 15 August 1944.

* page 27

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Personnel from the G-2 Section were assigned to duty with "T" Force effective 15 August and the nucleus of the staff, from that and other sources collected at the Rear Headquarters, 12th Army Group, at Periers, France. Subsequently on 18 August 1944, the 31st Chemical Decontaminating Company was designated as Headquarters Company, for the force and necessary revisions of equipment of the company were made for the purpose of maintaining the headquarters. Between that time and the time of entry into Paris on 25 August, additional units and personnel joined the force during the course of its movement.

c. Upon the completion of the "T" Force mission in Paris, practically all of the attached units and personnel which had joined for that operation were withdrawn by their parent organizations. A new assignment was then made of MIL, IFW, and CIC personnel for future operations. In addition, Company "A", 825th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the force to assist in the execution of the "T" Force mission. With the personnel then available, "T" Force, with headquarters in Verdun, prepared for the next operations in Luxembourg, Nancy and Metz. To accomplish the three missions simultaneously, the headquarters and the force were divided into three forces with main headquarters under Colonel Tompkins proceeding to Luxembourg with the force dispatched there. The Nancy force, commanded by Captain William E. Johns, entered the city, accomplished its mission and rejoined the Main Force in Luxembourg. The Metz force under Second Lieutenant William L. Bell, was not able to enter the city within the time allowed for accomplishing the mission due to prolonged enemy resistance in the city and rejoined the Main Force in Luxembourg without having operated in Metz.

d. Following the Luxembourg Operation, "T" Force moved to Spa, Belgium where the balance of the allowed grades and ratings joined the headquarters to complete the staff. In addition, there were readjustments made in the Intelligence Specialist Teams attached to the force. After movements of the force to the vicinity of Remouchamps in Belgium, the force was reinforced by the permanent attachment of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion (less Company "C") under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Carlisle B. Irwin, on 30 October 1944.

e. During the months of October, November and December, organization of the headquarters and the force was completed with the addition of necessary Signal Communications personnel and the semi-permanent attachment of various intelligence detachments and units. On 28 December 1944, Colonel John H. F. Haskell assumed command of "T" Force to replace Colonel Tompkins, who had been assigned to the 7th Armored Division.

f. On 1 March 1945, Headquarters "T" Force was reorganized to separate the target section, which was sent to join Headquarters 12th Army Group Main at Verdun and establish a branch of G-2 Section there. Colonel Haskell continued as Commanding Officer of "T" Force and in addition became Chief of "T" Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group. The Executive of "T" Force was Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Lyon; the Executive of "T" Branch was Lieutenant Colonel B. Edwin Sackett.

g. On 2 March 1945, "T" Force moved into Germany, establishing its Command Post at Eschweiler. From there a sub-force was detached under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dale M. Garvey to proceed to Bonn and execute the "T" Force mission there. The balance of the force moved into Koln on 6 March 1945. On 8 March 1945, a second sub-force under the command of Major William E. Johns, was separated from the main force with the mission of proceeding to Coblenz to execute the "T" Force mission there, and it departed from Köln on 9 March 1945. Upon the completion of the Bonn and Coblenz operations, personnel of the sub-forces rejoined "T" Force, which still remained in Köln at that time.

h. Upon the completion of the Köln operation, a major reorganization was effected. At that time, the Commanding Officer of "T" Force had the mission of operating in two widely separated areas simultaneously in large scale "T" Force operations. The headquarters and the force were therefore divided into two forces, one, the main force, to operate in Ninth U. S. Army area as troops opened up portions of the Ruhr area; the other to be attached to Third U. S. Army and operate in that army's area in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. Reorganization was accomplished on 25 March 1945, and the respective forces departed from Köln on the following day. Colonel Haskell was wounded at Neuss and evacuated 2 April 1945, and Colonel William P. Blair joined and assumed command on 4 April.

i. "T" Force Main commenced operations in the Ruhr area on 25 March 1945 and continued in operation there until 1 May 1945, during which period varying demands were made upon tactical units in the area for troops to perform guard responsibilities under the direction of the Commanding Officer, "T" Force.

j. In the meantime, "T" Force Lucky proceeded to Frankfurt, which it entered on 28 March 1945, almost immediately detaching a small unit to proceed

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to Wiesbaden and execute that portion of the mission, and completed operations in both cities as a force on 12 April 1945. Leaving behind a small detachment to complete necessary arrangements in the closing of "T" Force operations, the bulk of "T" Force Lucky moved North by direction of the Commanding Officer, "T" Force, and operated in the South Ruhr or Wuppertal area starting 14 April 1945. Operations of both forces were completed at 1200 hours 1 May 1945, and Headquarters "T" Force Lucky rejoined the Main "T" Force at Herten on 3 May 1945. By 6 May 1945, pursuant to directives from the AC of S, G-2, 12th Army Group, the bulk of the attached units and representatives of intelligence agencies had been released to rejoin their parent organizations or assume new assignments and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of "T" Force moved to Wiesbaden.

k. "T" Branch, meanwhile, from 1 March 1945, functioned under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Sackett as Executive until the return of Colonel Blair to Headquarters 12th Army Group Main on 6 May 1945. Colonel Blair departed the Headquarters when reassigned to the War Department, and Colonel R.D. Wentworth was assigned to duty as Chief of Branch on 2 July 1945. The functional chart and table of grades and ratings for Headquarters "T" Force and troop lists which indicate the major changes in the composition of the force are attached as Appendix "B".

3. "T" Force Operations.

a. General.

(1) Simply stated, the mission assigned by appropriate directives to "T" Forces was to seize, safeguard and process documents, archives and materiel of intelligence or counterintelligence interest, and to capture designated enemy agents and key collaborators. Accordingly, the organization and method of operation was planned and evolved to insure complete performance.

(2) Prior to the movement of "T" Forces into the designated areas of operation, a considerable amount of preparation was required. All available information as to the intelligence and counterintelligence targets in the area had to be assembled, collated and published in a form suitable for use by the force which was to execute the mission. Sources of the information were twofold: from higher headquarters through Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and from the staff sections of Headquarters 12th Army Group. In addition to

the task of preparing target information, troops had to be obtained, organized and trained for the accomplishment of the special type of mission involved.

(3) As it became apparent from the progress of the tactical situation that a target city or area was about to be uncovered by advancing combat troops, "T" Force assembled, issued target information, prepared its plan of action in final detail and commenced its approach march to the target. In the approach, two factors were essential: it was necessary that "T" Force be a mobile, completely motorized unit; further, to insure that "T" Force entered the target city or area at a sufficiently early date to preserve the intelligence material to be found there and to capture the personalities sought, it was necessary that the final assembly area of "T" Force before actually undertaking the operation be located in a forward position, generally in division rear area.

(4) The entry of "T" Force into target cities or areas was generally so closely coordinated with the tactical operation that the entry was effected within a matter of hours after enemy resistance in the area had ceased. Since "T" Force's movements normally entailed the movement of a considerable number of vehicles, generally it was found advisable to make the entry by more than one rout, according to a pre-arranged plan of operation by which units were briefed down to and including the squad, as to the specific area and targets in which they would be working. All movements into target areas were made under combat conditions, preceded by reconnaissance and with tactical principles of security imposed upon all units of the force.

(5) Attached to "T" Force for its operations were combat troops in sufficient quantity and with the necessary qualifications to enable the force to accomplish its mission. Duties of attached troops included the guarding of building targets, the headquarters and the Detention Center, the removal of mines, booby traps and stores of explosives, and the erection of barricades and physical safeguards to assist the guarding troops. Troops employed for these purposes included an armored infantry battalion, a tank destroyer company (towed), composite groups of combat engineers, and ordnance bomb disposal squads.

(6) Subsequent to the initial seizure of targets, it was found desirable that a survey be made of the targets as a sort of ground reconnaissance to determine whether advance information as to the nature of the building, its contents and the effects of air bombing or ground action was accurate. Intelligence teams, either IPW, Mil or CIC, were therefore attached to "T" Force and the personnel organized to provide small mobile teams which were competent to proceed to a target, inspect it, and submit a reliable estimate of

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the intelligence or counterintelligence value of the target. Composition of these [illegible] attempted to make each unit sufficient for language and completeness of intelligence training to enable it to interpret properly the documents and equipment found. Additional training was given to team personnel in documents procedure upon their joining "T" Force. Lingual personnel was also employed in the Detention Center for interrogation, and as interpreters in interviewing friendly informants.

(7) In the first "T" Force operation, Paris, it was realized that communications would play an important part in the efficiency of subsequent operations. Accordingly, sufficient radio and wire Signal personnel were obtained from operating battalions of Headquarters 12th Army Group to establish communications for "T" Force under any situation which it might be called upon to meet. Radio stations thus made available, enabled "T" Force and its sub-forces to remain in constant contact with Headquarters 12th Army Group, although operating in two or three cities simultaneously or over wide areas.

(8) The initial experience of "T" Force in Paris likewise dictated the need for the attachment of Medical personnel in all of its operations. Battle casualties were sustained in the riot in Paris on 26 August 1944, in the assembly area of the Metz S b-force, in Cologne, and in the Ruhr at Neuss. Headquarters "T" Force was provided Medical aid personnel the 4th General Dispensary, Headquarters 12th Army Group; attached troops had permanently attached Medical Corpsmen.

(9) The mission of "T" Force did not include complete responsibility for the exploitation of designated targets. The reason for this was that the nature of the targets made it impracticable to attach or otherwise include in the force, personnel sufficiently qualified to extract complete information from buildings, records, materiel or persons taken in the course of operations. For example, one important group of targets related to the IG Farben AG, which included a complex of administrative offices, research laboratories and industrial production facilities covering such a wide range of products as synthetic rubber, war gasses, anti-malarias, plastics, etc. The method of operations, therefore, was devised whereby the exploiting personnel in the form of scientific investigators, followed "T" Force by an appreciable interval after it had been determined that the target was intact and that it held information of sufficient importance to justify extended investigation. In some cases, advance detachments in the nature of assessment teams accompanied "T" Force to assist in the initial survey of the targets seized.

(10) Throughout the operations of "T" Force, a great amount of liaison and coordination with other units and agencies was demanded. Throughout all phases of target preparation, movement into tactical areas, entry into the target, seizure of building targets, and personalities, investigation and evacuation of documents, material and personalities, and in the final release of targets and withdrawal of "T" Force, close liaison and coordination not only with the intelligence agencies and echelons affected was necessary, but also with the tactical commanders of troops actually operating in the areas.

(11) "T" Force normally throughout its operations remained in target areas for a limited time. In some cases, a definite time limit was imposed in the assignment of the mission; in others the limitation was necessitated by the tactical situation and new missions for the force. At the conclusion of its operations or when the targets which still remained unexploited fully were not sufficient to justify the continued commitment of the entire force, "T" Force would withdraw, turning over to static military authorities in the area responsibility for the continued safeguarding and exploitation of the remaining targets.

(12) Having completed the "T" Force mission in a particular target area, the "T" Force Commander prepared complete final reports on each separate operation. A complete set of target files, including reports of each individual action on all targets, was submitted to the local military authority who would be in the area at least semi-permanently and be the depository of the target files specified in the final report on operations.

b. Paris.

(1) The preparation of target materials in suitable form for use in the "T" Force operation was undertaken about 1 August 1944, in Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group at the Rear Headquarters in Periers, France. Colonel Tompkins, who was then Commander of "T" Force, 12th Army Group, returned to the headquarters on 15 August 1944, from Italy, where he had been studying the experience of "S" Force operations in Rome and Florence. He collected the nucleus of a staff, procured the 31st Chemical Company as a Headquarters Company, arranged the procurement of necessary equipment, and on 21 August 1944, the Headquarters, Headquarters Company and attachments commenced the approach march into Paris, moving from Periers to LeMans. With an intermediate bivouac in Rambouillet and a halt during the day at Longumeau, "T" Force entered Paris and established its Command Post in the Petit Palais at about 2200 hours on 25 August 1944. Organization of troops and intelligence personnel had been accomplished at Rambouillet together with the briefing, and operations were undertaken

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

immediately upon entering the city. In all, the force eventually assembled in Paris totaled 1814 persons and 216 vehicles.

(2) "T" Force in Paris covered a total of 52[illegible] targets and 514 personality targets. Action on all but 54 building targets was completed before the withdrawal of "T" Force. Of the personality targets, approximately 12% were arrested and processed through the "T" Force Interrogation Center. An additional 181 cases were handled for detention purposes. Important items of intelligences derived from the operation included a prisoner with information on and key for an exceedingly rare cipher system, a rare set of maps of Indo China, a German map disclosing the plan of mining, demolitions and booby trapping at Dunkerque, a great quantity of maps of Eastern France of operational value and various items of signal, ordnance, air and other technical intelligence interests.

(3) "T" Force closed its operation and left Paris on 6 September 1944, en route to Verdun, turning over its responsibilities to Seine Section and personnel of G-2 Section, Communications Zone. A small staff remained for a few days to coordinate the final details of targets exploitation and the bulk of attached intelligence specialists returned to the control of their parent organizations on the withdrawal of "T" Force. Records of the operation were left in the custody of Seine Base Section. The final report of "T" Force operations in the Paris area was submitted to the Commanding General, 12th Army Group by Headquarters, "T" Force on 17 October 1944.

c. Luxembourg.

(1) Following the Paris operation, "T" Force assembled in Verdun, where it was joined by Company "A", 825th TD Bn, and intelligence specialist teams which were attached on a semi-permanent basis. On 11 September 1944, a reconnaissance was made of the city of Luxembourg to determine the status of target exploitation in the city and it was found that the CIC Detachment of the 5th Armored Division was the only intelligence agency in the city. On 12 September 1944, after dispatching sub-forces to Metz and Nancy, the main body of "T" Force moved to a bivouac area at Laix, France and entered Luxembourg on 13 September, establishing its Command Post in the Reichsbahn building. Due to the rapidity of the advance of American forces in Eastern France and through Luxembourg, target information had not been compiled or dispatched for use by "T" Force. The bulk of target exploitation therefore, in this target city, was based on targets of opportunity developed after the commencement of operations. In all, 109 building and 66 personality targets were

uncovered and exploited. In addition, since Southern Luxembourg fell on the right flank of First Army, counterintelligence personnel [illegible] handle properly the problems arising there and "T" Force assumed this responsibility in addition to its normal mission. The total personnel engaged in the Luxembourg operation amounted to 572 persons with 128 vehicles.

(2) One of the outstanding targets in the Luxembourg area was the Radio Station Luxembourg. This was captured by the 5th Armored Division in a condition which permitted its rehabilitation and early use by Psychological Warfare personnel of Headquarters 12th Army Group. "T" Force assisted in the process of repairing damage at the station, safeguarding it and administrative care of the personnel engaged in the enterprise.

(3) "T" Force completed its operations in Luxembourg on 10 October 1944, and moved to Spa, Belgium, establishing its Command Post at the Cardinal Hotel. Responsibility for the intelligence targets in the city of Luxembourg and records of "T" Force activities were delivered to CIC representatives of ADSEC, Communications Zone, with whom liaison had been maintained throughout. Final report of "T" Force operations in the city was submitted by the Commanding Officer, "T" Force to the Commanding General, 12th Army Group on 21 November 1944.

d. Nancy.

(1) The sub-force designated to operate in Nancy departed from Verdun under the command of Captain William E. Johns on 12 September 1944, with the mission of proceeding to the area of the 35th Infantry Division, reporting to the AC of S, G-2 of the division and assisting him in the exploitation of intelligence and counterintelligence targets in Nancy. The maximum time for the force to operate in the town was limited to 72 hours. Necessary coordination was effected and personnel of the force entered, joining the division CIC Detachment there on 15 September. Thirty-one building targets and 54 personality targets were acted upon by the force. Strength of the force was a total of 68 persons and 18 vehicles.

(2) The force completed its operations on 18 September and withdrew, rejoining the main "T" Force in Luxembourg on that date. Since the operation was designed to assist the division CIC, the normal "T" Force files were not maintained and the division CIC was responsible throughout for targets in the town. Final report was submitted by the Sub-force Commander to the Commanding Officer, "T" Force on 18 September 1944.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. Metz.

The Metz Sub-force was dispatched from Verdun on 12 September 1944 and reconnaissance elements arrived on the target city. While in the bivouac area, the force was subjected to an artillery bombardment sustaining casualties to personnel and vehicles. It soon became apparent that the city of Metz was not going to fall as soon as had first seemed likely. By order of the "T" Force Commander, the sub-force was, therefore, recalled to join the main force at Luxembourg and subsequently the mission of exploiting intelligence and counterintelligence targets in Metz was withdrawn from "T" Force.

f. Winter Months.

(1) In Spa, Belgium the remainder of the officers requested for Headquarters, "T" Force under its allotted grades and ratings reported for duty and were integrated into the staff. The headquarters also entered upon two important programs. The first was the preparation of target materials for the cities which had been designated as "T" Force areas of operation in the future; namely, Cologne, Bonn, Coblenz, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim. The second program was for the purpose of training assigned and attached personnel in the organization and method of operation of "T" Force to increase general efficiency. On 21 October 1944, the Command Post was moved to Remouchamps, Belgium, and attached troops were billeted in that general area.

(2) During the month of October, a new phase of "T" Force operations commenced. The force first began the task of accommodation, administration and clearance of small detachments of investigating specialists coming forward from London an Paris to operate on isolated targets overrun in the army areas. Examples of the types of specialists so handled included representatives of Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (CIOS) and Air Technical Intelligence Detachment and Air Prisoner of War Intelligence Unit of 9th Air Force. Detailed plans for future operations were prepared, instructions to armies were issued and preliminary coordination of future "T" Force operations was effected down to corps level, on the basis of the current operational plans.

(3) On 30 October 1944, the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Carlisle B. Irwin, was attached to "T" Force semipermanently. After preliminary orientation an extended training program was entered upon to prepare the force as it was then constituted for "T" Force type operations. This included preliminary indoctrination, Command Post exercises and field exercises employing troops, using as a training area the bombed out portion of Liege, Belgium. Emphasis was placed upon the special

problems arising, such as the possibility of mines and booby traps, the necessity for special [illegible] preparation of a Signal Operations Instructions and the formulation of a working vocabulary. Since it seemed at this time that "T" Force would not go into operation for a matter of weeks, intelligence personnel was loaned out to the armies for employment at their interrogation centers and in supplementing their field detachments.

(4) This program continued until 16 December 1944, when information was first received concerning the German counteroffensive in Luxembourg and Southern Belgium. The defense plan which had been prepared in close coordination with the overall plan of the Provost Marshal, Headquarters First US Army, was immediately put into effect. On 17 December, control of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and Co. "A", 825th TD Battalion passed to the Provost Marshal, First Army, in accordance with an agreement between the Provost Marshal, the AC of S, G-2, First Army, and the Commanding Officer, "T" Force. On the evening of that date, the troops were dispatched to Malmedy and Stavelot, where they were committed in action to stop the northward thrust of German armored columns directed at army headquarters in Spa. On 18 December, pursuant to order of the AC of S, G-2, 12th Army Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, "T" Force and attachments moved to Limont, Belgium and on the next to Chateau le Seraing. On 21 December, one detachment of CIC was dispatched to Luxembourg to assist in the security of 12th Army Group TAC Headquarters. On the same date the balance of Intelligence Personnel available to "T" Force were delivered to the use of First US Army under Lieutenant Colonel Minor. The personnel, consisting of IPW, MII and CIC, were organized in security patrols which included representatives of all types of teams and were employed in establishing road blocks and patrols over an extended portion of First US Army rear area. On 23 December, the Command Post of "T" Force was established in Vieux Waleffe. On 28 December, Colonel John H. F. Haskell assumed command of "T" Force to replace Colonel Tompkins, who had been assigned to the 7th Armored Division.

(5) Preparation for future "T" Force operations was renewed after 17 January 1945, when the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and Co. "A", 825th TD Battalion were released by First U.S. Army and rejoined "T" Force. Emphasis in training again was on the organization of communications, particularly for sub-forces, and on physical conditioning.

(6) In February 1945, it was realized that when "T" Force entered upon its program of operations in connection with the pending offensive, the preparation of target data and dissemination to armies, a function which had been

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

performed at Headquarters "T" Force, would become difficult if not entirely impracticable. The decision was therefore reached that the Target Section of Headquarters "T" Force would be moved to Headquarters 12th Army Group Main and established there as a branch of G-2 Section, under the Commanding Officer of "T" Force as Chief of Branch and Lieutenant Colonel B. Edwin Sackett as Executive. A second function to be performed by "T" Branch was the processing of investigating specialists to targets in areas other than those in which "T" Force would be operating. This change was effected on 1 March 1945.

g. Cologne.

(1) On 2 March 1945, "T" Force left Vieux Waleffe and moved to Eschweiler, Germany to prepare for the entry into Cologne. Since it seemed that the fall of Bonn would be accomplished at about the same time as that of Cologne, a sub-force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dale M. Garvey, was separated at Eschweiler. The Cologne operation was actually commenced on 4 March, with the dispatch of troops and target teams to the IG Farben Industry plant at Dormagen, Germany. "T" Force itself entered Cologne on 6 March, and commenced operations according to phase lines agreed upon with the tactical commander and advanced as the tactical situation permitted. The city was not completely opened until the afternoon of 8 March. On 9 March, a second sub-force, which had been organized to operate in Coblenz, departed from Cologne to move into assembly area to the south.

(2) Cologne, with a pre-war population of about 750,000 was the largest German city uncovered by American forces up to that time and it was also one of the most badly damaged by artillery and air bombardment. "T" Force entered the city with a carefully-selected list of 246 building targets and uncovered in the course of the operation 59 additional targets of opportunity. Action on 201 personality targets was completed between 6 March and 13 March. The force involved in the operation totalled 973 persons and 175 motor driven vehicles. An additional 215 investigators representing 24 different intelligence agencies were processed by "T" Force and investigated targets in Cologne during the time that "T" Force operated there. Throughout the operation, close liaison was maintained with VII Corps CIC, First U.S. Army Documents Section and Technical Intelligence Agencies and the Cologne Military Government Detachment. This operation furnished the first outstanding example of the value of "T" Force activities to Military Government in the use of information gathered incidentally to the "T" Force mission regarding a wide variety of political, military and industrial installations.

(3) While the city of Cologne was very badly damaged in its center, it was found that a large number of targets lying on the outskirts had not been hit by preparatory bombardment or air attacks. Thus the Ford Motor Company plant and the IG Farben Dormagen installation were seized by "T" Force troops intact and capable of the immediate resumption of production. Even in the destroyed parts of the city, quantities of documents were uncovered and equipment still capable of intelligence exploitation was found. Further, it was disclosed that under conditions existing in Germany at that time, the practice of posting guards on targets immediately upon their being made accessible was justified in the preservation of targets from destruction either by Germans occupying troops or, most important of all, displaced persons.

(4) "T" Force closed its operation in Cologne on 25 March, at which time it had been able to operate only on those targets on the west bank of the Rhine River. Throughout the operation, the fact the Germans were actively defending the east bank had to be taken into account. Complete files of "T" Force action on targets were delivered to VII Corps CIC, and the final report on "T" Force Operations in Cologne submitted to the Commanding General, 12th Army Group on 18 April 1945. Details of outstanding items of intelligence gathered there will be found in the report.

(5) Having been rejoined by the Bonn and Coblenz sub force, reorganization into two major "T" Forces, "T" Force Main and "T" Force Lucky, was accomplished on 25 March 1945, and, on the following day, "T" Force Main moved to Mors, Germany, while "T" Force Lucky moved to Plaidt.

h. Bonn.

(1) Sub-"T" Force "A", comprising in all 274 persons, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dale M. Garvey, was organized at Eschweiler, Germany and assembled initially at Stolberg on 5 March 1945. With intermediate bivouacs at Friesheim and Waldorf and after having been once denied access to the city by enemy action, the Sub-force entered Bonn on 9 March, operating at first in the northern portion according to phase lines arranged with the tactical commander, and then in the remainder of the city when the tactical situation permitted.

(2) Upon entering Bonn, the Sub-force had 51 assigned building targets. 12 additional targets of opportunity were discovered. Thirty personality targets were assigned, 12 were discovered and action taken on all. Throughout the Bonn operation, the enemy controlled the east bank of the Rhine, making it impossible to operate on targets in that part of the city.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Operations were completed in the city at 1200 hours, 18 March and the following day the Sub force, less Co. "A", 825TD Battalion rejoined the main force in Cologne. The tank destroyer company was left in Bonn for a short time in support of the 121st Infantry Regiment, 8th Infantry Division. Target files were delivered to the Bonn Military Government Detachment and the final report of Sub force "A" was submitted to the Commanding Officer, "T" Force, 12th Army Group, on 23 March 1945.

j. Coblenz.

(1) Sub-force "C", initially totalling 301 persons and 43 vehicles, was organized in Cologne on 8 March 1945 under the command of Major William E. Johns with the mission of executing the "T" Force mission in Coblenz. The force moved on 9 March, to Monschau and thence to Adenau and Plaidt, the final assembly area prior to entry into Coblenz. Entry into the target city was effected on 18 March, the force ferrying over the Moselle River with only three ¾ ton trucks and trailers and operating for the first two days without vehicles.

(2) There were in the town of Coblenz, 67 building targets excluding those east of the Rhine River which remained inaccessible throughout the operation, and 6 targets of opportunity; 58 personality targets were exploited. Operations in the city were completed on 22 March 1945 and the force withdrew, having turned over its target files to the Military Government Detachment in Coblenz. Final report of Sub force "C" was submitted to the Commanding Officer, "T" Force, 12th Army Group on 22 March 1945. The armored infantry company forming the major part of the force remained at Plaidt; the balance of Sub-force "C" rejoined "T" Force in Cologne on 23 March.

l. Reorganization of Forces.

(1) With the reassembly of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, "T" Force and the bulk of its attached troops in Cologne on 23 March 1945, the Commanding Officer "T" Force prepared to execute the remainder of his mission. At that time, tactical operations envisaged a double encirclement of the Ruhr area by Ninth U. S. Army on the North and First U. S. Army on the South. In addition, the cities of Frankfurt and Wiesbaden in the south remained "T" Force responsibilities for the exploitation of inielligence. Colonel Haskell therefore established an independent force designated as "T" Force Lucky, under the command of Lietenant Colonel Dale M. Garvey, to be attached to Third U. S. Army for the purpose of executing the "T" Force mission in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. The main force was to proceed to an appropriate assembly area and prepare for operations in the Ruhr in Ninth U. S. Army area. A letter

directive to the armies, indicating the respective missions of these forces and the nature of the assistance to be rendere by armies was prepared and issued on 24 March 1945. On 25 March, Headquarters "T" Force Main moved from Cologne to Mors, Germany. On the same date, "T" Force Lucky moved from Cologne to Plaidt, Germany, occupying the bivouac area previously used by Sub-force "C".

(2) From Mors, Germany, "T" Force Main moved to Neuss, where the headquarters was subjected to artillery bombardment by heavy caliber guns from East of the Rhine, sustaining casualties of 2 dead and 14 wounded, the wounded including Colonel Haskell who was evacuated. On 4 April 1945, Colonel William P. Blair joined and assumed command of "T" Force.

k. Frankfurt.

(1) "T" Force Lucky departed from Cologne on 25 March 1945, and with intermediate bivouacs at Plaidt, Spindlingen and Gross Gerau, entered that portion of Frankfurt which is south of the Main River on 28 March 1945. The following day, elements were able to cross the Main River and operate according to phase lines in the city proper. On 30 March 1945, a sub force, under the command of Major William E. Johns, was dispatched to Wiesbaden to execute the "T" Force mission there.

(2) A total of 171 building targets were assigned to the Frankfurt force and 109 personality targets. All building targets were exploited and none required guards at the conclusion of the operation; of the personality targets, about 10 % were arrested in the city. At the close of the operation on 12 April, target files were delivered to the AC of S, G 2, Third U. S. Army and final report submitted to the Commanding Officer, "T" Force, 12th Army Group on 4 May 1945. A small detachment from Headquarters "T" Force Lucky was left in Frankfurt until 20 April, for the purpose of accomodating and expediting investigations of visiting specialists. During the stay of "T" Force Lucky and its personnel in Frankfurt a total of 164 persons were messed and billeted and assisted in their mission of investigations.

l. Wiesbaden.

(1) The Wiesbaden sub-force was composed of personnel and vehicles detached from "T" Force Lucky in Frankfurt on 30 March, and entered the target city on that date. Previously assigned were 73 building targets and 40 personality targets. Nine building targets of opportunity were discovered and exploited. The entry into Wiesbaden followed that of the division taking the town by about 24 hours and personality targets had been covered by the CIC Detachment

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of the 80th Division. The sub-force, composed of 70 persons and 16 vehicles concentrated its efforts on building targets.

(2) Wiesbaden was chiefly of interest as the city containing the Headquarters of Wehrkreis Kommando XII. Although the city was in reasonably good condition compared to other target cities, the Wehrkreis Kommando building had been one of those heavily damaged by an air raid on 2 February. However an important find of Signal Intelligence Material relating to codes and ciphers was made in the building. In all, 17 representing 11, intelligence agencies, investigated targets in Wiesbaden. The operation was completed on 6 April 1945, and the sub-force rejoined "T" Force Lucky in Frankfurt on the following day.

(3) Files of the Wiesbaden detachment were transmitted to the CIC Detachment, Third U.S. Army, which then had jurisdiction in Wiesbaden, and the final report on operations in Wiesbaden was transmitted to the Commanding Officer, "T" Force Lucky on 8 April 1945.

c. Ruhr Area.

(1) "T" Force operations in the Ruhr area presented problems that had not previously been encountered in its operations in fairly localized areas. The tactical situation developed with the double encirclement of the Ruhr by Ninth U.S. Army on the north and First U.S. Army on the south, creating a large pocket of resistance which was gradually reduced by coordinated efforts of both armies, directed from the north and south respectively, to the army boundary which was the Ruhr River. Preliminary coordination of "T" Force activities, therefore, had to be accomplished with two armies, four corps and eleven divisions. The area itself, which had been designated as the target area, extended roughly 50 miles in an east to west direction and 35 miles from north to south. Included in the area were 730 building targets in 43 separate localities.

(2) To accomplish the Ruhr mission, "T" Force reached its greatest extent as far as attached troops were concerned. In addition to the Headquarters, Headquarters Company (31st Chemical Company), normal attachments of intelligence specialist teams, 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and Co. "A", 825th TD Battalion, arrangements were made with the armies where by three additional infantry battalions would be available for guard purposes in the area north of the Ruhr River and one infantry battalion in the area south of the Ruhr River. The army boundary was also used as the boundary between the areas operated in by "T" Force Main and "T" Force Lucky.

(3) Operations in the area of "T" Force Main commenced on 25 March 1945 with the dispatch from Mors of a sub-force to exploit targets east of the

Rhine and north of the Rhine-Herne Canal. This force proceeded east, finally concluding its operations in Hamm completing action on targets as it went or leaving them under the guard of tactical troops in the area in the small number of cases where continued guarding was required. On 9 April 1945, "T" Force Main moved from Mors to Herten, and prepared for operations south of the Rhine-Herne Canal north of the Ruhr River. For this purpose, troops were obtained from XVI Corps for guard details. Operations in this area were accomplished by setting up small operational staffs in Essen and Dortmund, while maintaining the bulk of the Headquarters and "T" Force personnel at Herten, from which point their work was directed. The total strength of "T" Force Main, excluding the infantry battalions attached from tactical units, was 480 persons, 107 vehicles.

(4) "T" Force Main exploited completely 427 building targets and left only three under guard at the completion of operations. At the same time, 166 personality targets were exploited. A total of 317 visiting specialists were processed to investigate targets, the intelligence agencies represented numbering nine. In the Ruhr area, investigations of CICS were greatly expedited by the employment of Combined Advance Field Teams (CAFT) to assess targets prior to the time that highly specialized technicians were called forward to conduct the actual investigations.

(5) In addition to executing its preliminary mission, "T" Force also was called upon to provide lingual or counterintelligence trained personnel to substitute for regular Military Government Detachments in several of the localities in which "T" Force operated. Since the area was ultimately to be British, no static U.S. staffs had been prepared to assume this responsibility and "T" Force thus relieved G-5 Sections of tactical troops in assuming this responsibility. A second supplementary activity was in the preparation of civilian morale reports and their submission to the AC of S, G-2 12th Army Group. The reports were prepared on the basis of interrogations of large numbers of representative civilian groups in the area to determine civilians temper and morale.

(6) In compliance with a directive from the AC of S, G-2, 12th Army Group, "T" Force Main ceased operations at 1200 hours on 1 May 1945, having completed at that time the coordination of the release of targets to static occupation troops, the arrangement of accommodations for visiting specialists still with "T" Force and the disposition of files and records which had been accumulated throughout the operation. Files for the Ruhr proper were disposed of by delivery to the G-2, Fifteenth U.S. Army or to the AC of S, G-2,

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] within Ninth U.S. Army area. Final report for the "T" Force operations in the Ruhr was submitted through the AC of S, G-2 to the Commanding General, 12th Army Group on 5 May 1945.

n. South Ruhr — Wuppertal, Düsseldorf.

(1) Similar problems were encountered by "T" Force Lucky in operations in the area South of the Ruhr river. "T" Force Lucky moved from Frankfurt via Dillenburg to Gummersbach, where it established its Command Post on 14 April 1945. At that time, "T" Force Lucky was composed of a headquarters, attached intelligence specialist teams, and the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, which served not only as guarding troops but also as a housekeeping and administrative organization. Communications, however, were not adapted to the distances over which the force was called upon to operate and proved to be one of the greatest difficulties encountered.

(2) The Ruhr pocket South of the Ruhr River was split by First U.S. Army troops in the vicinity of Hagen and on 14 April 1945, having already exploited isolated targets in Ludenscheid and Wipperfurth, the first major commitment of "T" Force Lucky was made at Hagen. From that time on, the area opened rapidly and on 17 April, the Command Post of "T" Force Lucky was moved to Luttringhausen and on 18 April, operations in Wuppertal and Dusseldorf were commenced. The whole operation became one of exploiting and clearing up targets as rapidly as possible to relieve guard troops for assignment to other targets. The battalion which First U.S. Army had agreed to make available in its area was never called for as all guarding was accomplished by the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion.

(3) In the main, "T" Force Lucky did not accommodate separately, a large number of visiting specialists expsloiting targets. These maintained their headquarters at Herten, and after the end of resistance in the Ruhr pocket, were able to move freely between the two command posts, operating wherever their services could be best used. Exploitation of targets was completed by "T" Force Lucky at 1200 hours, 1 May 1945, with respect to all but eight targets, which were left under guard by Fifteenth U.S. Army troops through arrangements with their representative.

(4) At the close of operations in the South Ruhr area, Headquarters "T" Force Lucky and attached intelligence specialists moved to Herten where they rejoined "T" Force Main. The armored infantry battalion concentrated in company areas and prepared to move to Wiesbaden, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, "T" Force. Records of the "T" Force Lucky operation

in the South Ruhr or Wuppertal area were transmitted to the AC of S, G-2, [illegible] report of „T" Force Lucky was included in the report submitted by the Commanding Officer, "T" Force on the Ruhr operation generally, on 5 May 1945.

o. Close of Filed Operations.

(1) By letter, the AC of S, G-2, 12th Army Group directed the close of "T" Force operations in the field at 1200 hours, 1 May 1945, and the release of attached units and troops as promptly thereafter as could be arranged. Accordingly Headquarters and Headquarters Company "T" Force and attached intelligence teams and units assembled in Herten on 2 May 1945. Control of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and Co. "A", 825th TD Battalion reverted to the Commanding General, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, who directed their return to Wiesbaden. Orders on attached MII, IPW and CIC teams were received even while "T" Force remained in Herten and teams were dispatched pursant thereto, to the various armies. On 6 May 1945, Headquarters and Headquarters Company "T" Force moved from Herten to Wiesbaden, where the control of the 31st Chemical Company also reverted to the Commanding General, Special Troops. Personnel of Headquarters "T" Force were absorbed into the G-2 Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group, or dispatched on intelligence duties to the armies. Although the force headquarters was not formally disbanded on that date, it may be said to have lost its identity and functions.

(2) A map, indicating the "T" Force cities and areas of operation, and consolidated tables of targets therein, is attached at Annex "C". *

4. Activities of "T" Branch.

a. Introduction. "T" Force as a force was organized primarily to operate in limited and designated cities and areas on intelligence and counter-intelligence targets. In addition to this function, however, it performed the duties at first of a Special Staff Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group and subsequently of a branch of the G-2 Section in the collation of target data and dissemination to armies for all intelligence and counterintelligence targets not located in "T" Force areas. This function was performed in the S-2 Target Section of Headquarters "T" Force. The Headquarters, starting in October 1944, also processed investigators from rear echelon intelligence agencies into targets falling in army areas, the first of these trips being arranged shortly after the fall of Aachen and Eschweiler. In January 1945, these functions of Headquarters "T" Force were clarified and the Commanding Officer, "T" Force became

* page 53

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

responsible for the preparation of target data throughout that portion of Germany in which the army group might be conducting [illegible] eventual [illegible]. He decided, therefore, through conferences with his counterparts at Headquarters 6th Army Group and 21 Army Group, arranged for tentative planning boundaries so that the work of target preparation would not be duplicated in different headquarters. (See map, Annex "B".) This arrangement was approved at "T" Sub division of G-2, Intelligence Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and the work undertaken. The force meanwhile was preparing for its future operations in Germany.

b. Establishment of "T" Branch. Toward the end of February 1945, preparations were made for removing from Headquarters "T" Force the functions referred to and establishing in the office of the AC of S, G-2, Headquarters 12th Army Group a branch, to be designated "T" Branch, which would execute those responsibilities. Specifically, it was organized to receive, collate and disseminate to the armies under suitable directives, targets designated by intelligence agencies of echelons higher than 12th Army Group and Special Staff Sections of Headquarters 12th Army Group. Further, it was to process investigating teams of specialists moving through the headquarters to exploit targets in army areas. At the time, it was anticipated that the number of such specialists would approximate 1500 as a maximum. To perform these functions, Lieutenant Colonel B. Erwin Sackett was designated Executive of "T" Branch and on March 1, he moved to Headquarters 12th Army Group Main with the bulk of the Target Section from Headquarters "T" Force and other necessary personnel, the total original strength being 4 officers and eight enlisted men. Subsequently, the volume of work necessitated an increase of personnel and finally, the dissolution of "T" Force as such permitted the accretion of additional officers and enlisted men from the force headquarters, the strength of "T" branch eventually totalling 17 officers and 20 enlisted men. The Commanding Officer, "T" Force was, in addition to other duties, Chief of "T" Branch. For functional charts showing the organization of "T" Branch, see Annex "D".*

c. Preparation of Target Lists. By 15 March 1945, the work of "T" Branch had progressed sufficiently to permit the issuance of a compiled list of targets under the title "Priority Intelligence and Counterintelligence Targets, Germany." This list was disseminated to armies and other interested agencies together with a Command Directive to Army Commanders specifying their responsibilities with regard to the various types of targets. (See copy of directive in Appendix "D".) Subsequently, the original list was supplemented

* page 56

by [illegible] publications until a total of about 1700 targets had been collected and published. The list included targets from 17 higher echelon intelligence agencies and 12th Army Group Staff Sections, approximately 700 of the targets originating in the former. Where the importance of the target or special problems connected with the army mission justified, dossiers including detailed plans and aerial photo coverage were issued in addition to the mere listing of the target. A consolidated table of targets not in "T" Force cities or areas of operations is attached at Appendix "D".*

d. Housekeeping Arrangements. It was realized that the exploitation of targets by investigators from rear echelons, who would pass through Headquarters 12th Army Group into the army areas, was going to present a considerable problem of accommodations, transportation, and administration. According to the directive to armies, each was to prepare to receive a maximum at any one time of 500 investigators and this estimate proved to approximate the fact. Within the army areas, Intelligence Centers or camps were established and organized to receive these visitors. To assist the armies in the performance of its mission, "T" Branch sent approximately four officers to each army to perform liaison and otherwise aid organic army personnel in the task. Special transportation, approximating a quartermaster truck company, was procured from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and a portion of it allotted to each army, with drivers provided from Special Troops, 12th Army Group. Arrangements were made to facilitate the clearance of investigators through Headquarters 12th Army Group to the armies and from the camps or centers to the actual location of the targets in which they were interested. Requirements were determined and set up as to the reports to be submitted both by investigators and by the armies. From the first of March to the end of June, more than 1500 specialists investigators from intelligence agencies outside 12th Army Group were thus cleared by "T" Branch and forwarded to armies to perform their investigations. Since many of these made two or more trips within the army group area and on each trip visited more than one target, the number of individual investigations performed approximated 2500. The investigators have represented 10 major intelligence agencies and echelons higher than 12th Army Group in addition to specialists in the field of technical intelligence already represented by the Special Staff Section Intelligence Teams.

e. Exploitation of Targets.

(1) Full exploitation of intelligence targets in the army group area had not been considered a responsibility of the AC of S, G-2, Headquarters 12th

* page 57

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Army Group or "T" Branch. The targets were of such a nature that it was impossible to perform such a highly specialized mission with personnel organic [illegible] to facilitate exploitation by qualified specialists who generally were men having the highest qualifications in their respective fields of technical, scientific or industrial research or production. To maintain operational control under the circumstances, the "T" Branch function provided for the submission of brief evaluation reports by target assessors or investigators on the completion of their task in the field, while the final technical reports were not prepared until after the investigators had left the army group area and returned to their parent organizations for conferences and comparison with the results of others. The scope of this function is indicated by the fact that during the four months up to the end of June, approximately 1000 evaluation reports had been received.

(2) Three other phases of the problem of target exploitation have been handled by "T" Branch. In a large number of cases, investigating personnel thought it desirable to remove samples, proto-types, working installations, models, etc. for the purpose of more extended study at the location of their parent organization. Evacuation of the material was carried out through normal military channels, utilizing the facilities available at army and corps. In this way also, a considerable amount of documents have been evacuated outside of operational intelligence interests. Document evacuation was coordinated with the normal intelligence agencies established for that purpose. Finally, it was found desirable in the course of investigation of targets to perform extensive interrogations of personnel such as directors of firms, engineers, research technicians, scientists, Reichministers, etc. "T" Branch acted as the coordinating agency between "T" Sub division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Counter Intelligence Branch of the Office of the AC of S, G 2, 12th Army Group, and armies, for the purpose of facilitating interrogations and where necessary, evacuating the personnel involved.

f. Liaison. To assist in the clearance of investigators and to insure that all agencies interested in the type of informations passing through "T" Branch in the form of investigators reports was disseminated fully, it was early found advisable to attach to "T" Branch, Liaison Officers from other agencies. These included US Group Control Council, US Strategic Bombing Survey, CIOS, "T" Subdivision, SHAEF, Army Service Forces and finally, a clearance liaison officer from Third US Army. As a semi-permanent part of "T" Branch also there were present at Headquarters 12th Army Group so-called CAFT (Combined Advance Field Teams) Group leaders, whose functions are described below.

5. Target Investigations.

a. Two of the organizations which maintained liaison and conducted investigations through the medium of "T" Branch were the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) and the United States Group Control Council. The former, USSBS, was an agency operating under direction of the President to study the targets of strategic bombing in Europe and report the results for the purpose of improving the strategic bombing campaign against Japan; the latter, US Group CC, conducted a program designated "GOLDCUP," for the purpose of locating German ministerial targets, both personnel and documentary. A third large agency represented was Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub committee (CIOS) which included targets that were probably the most important from the military intelligence standpoint, although they may not have been the most numerous. For a complete list of agencies represented in "T" Force operations or processed through "T" Branch, see Annex "E". *

b. CIOS originated in the summer of 1944, as the Combined Intelligence Priorities Sub-committee, operating by directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it was in this name that investigators were dispatched to operate with "T" Force in Paris. Subsequently, it was reorganized under the Combined Intelligence Committee and a new designation devised so that from and after October 1944, the sub-committee was known as CIOS. It was formed to accept nominations of targets from its members who were composed of such agencies as War Department, War Office, US Army Air Forces (USSTAF), Air Ministry, Navy Department, Admiralty, etc. Interests of the different members were extremely varied and covered the entire field of German military, naval, aircraft and industrial research and production. Targets nominated by members were carefully screened by the sub committee and admitted to the Black List in the case of military targets or Grey List for industrial targets, and a priority, which controlled the exploitation, assigned. A provision was also made of investigators to exploit targets of opportunity which might be uncovered in the course of their field work. For simplicity of operations, subsequently the various members or items were combined into groups numbering seven in the case of Black List targets and eight in the case of Grey List. These groups operated assessment teams designated as Combined Advance Field Teams (CAFT) and a group leader in each case attached to "T" Branch to control the activities of assessors and brief investigators on targets within the scope of the group.

c. With the completion in Germany of Black List target assessment, and a large proportion of the investigation, by late June and July 1945, the program

* page 67

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of investigation of targets gradually converted to exploitation by Army Service Forces representatives, and a decreasing importance attached to the CIOS program. The closing phases of "T" Branch activities therefore involved increasing cooperation with Army Service Forces and Technical Intelligence sections of the Special Staff Sections. Liaison Officers from Army Service Forces were attached and the program of the branch converted to one of Technical Intelligence.

b. Conclusion.

a. It is extremely difficult to evaluate the results of "T" Force and "T" Branch activities at this echelon. Research and production methods are not fields in which the results are evident in a matter of months. The limitation of time in permitting the adaptation of processes and formulae discovered in the course of these investigations is one factor which prevents an accurate judgment of the value of the discovery. A second difficulty is the fact that the majority of the documents, equipment and other data gathered in the course of this work has been evacuated to the ministerial agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom where the information derived has been and is being integrated into the present technical knowledge of the two Allied nations. This work it was not possible to accomplish in a tactical headquarters.

b. For these reasons, the only indication which exists at Headquarters 12th Army Group of the value to be placed upon the services of "T" Force and "T" Branch are the facts of the scale on which target exploitation has taken place, and the speed with which it has been accomplished. Whether the discoveries in the fields of military, air and naval weapons and equipment can be adapted to our use in time to benefit in the Pacific war or the German accomplishments in technological development can be incorporated into our own industrial processes are matters in the hands of the Allied ministers and industrialists and not within our control. That some of the discoveries have been put to use is evident from preliminary reports of new weapons and new tactics beginning to reach Europe from the United States and the Pacific.

ANNEX A

INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIVES

Pages

APPENDIX 1. Intelligence Directive No. 17, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 27 July 1944; Subject: "T" Forces 29

APPENDIX 2. Letter, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 20 August 1944; Subject: "T" Force 32

APPENDIX 3. Verbal directive by Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, 21 August 1944 34

APPENDIX 4. Letter, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 25 September 1944; Subject: "T" Force 36

APPENDIX 5. Letter, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 9 January 1945; Subject: "Eclipse planning for "T" Force Target Cities" 37

APPENDIX 6. Letter, Headquarters "T" Force, 12th Army Group, dated 24 March 1945; Subject: "Organization of "T" Force for Third and Ninth U. S. Armies" 39

APPENDIX 7. Letter, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 27 March 1945; Subject: "Future Operations of "T" Force" 41

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

SHAEF/9A/INT.

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 17

27th July 1944

T FORCE

1. It is hoped that the capture of large towns both in enemy occupied and enemy territory may mean that much valuable and special information including documents, equipment and persons, both enemy and others, may become available to the Allied Forces. It is proposed, therefore, to supply you with full information concerning such documents, equipment and persons which it is desired to seize or put under guard pending their exploitation or removal. This information will normally be in the form of dossiers containing the revelant data including an estimate of the personnel required to carry out the tasks envisaged.

2. Arrangements will, therefore, be made for:

(a) Framing a plan for dealing with the targets in question.

(b) Providing the necessary personnel to secure and/or guard the targets. In addition to combat and intelligence personnel it will generally be necessary to include some specialists such as engineers and signals, and also an administrative agency for general administrative purposes. Naval and Air requirements should be taken into consideration.

(c) Arranging for the disposal of the seized documents, equipment and persons in accordance with the instructions in the target dossiers.

3. A Small Sub-division with a field element, has been formed at these Headquarters to handle such matters. This sub-division will supply you with the dossiers mentioned in para 1 above. The field element of the sub-division will be available for assisting in briefing the personnel who are to carry out the various tasks and for ensuring that you have all facilities and information which you consider necessary.

4. As the operations envisaged in this letter will grow in importance as we approach GERMANY and will assume particular importance in GERMANY itself, it is recommended that the personnel nominated to carry out these tasks should be placed under a single commander with a suitable staff and that they should

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

be known as "T" Forces. All agencies interested in the search for intelligence targets would be made subordinate to the "T" Force Commander and should be under his absolute control and orders. In the Italian Theater the "T" Force (U.S. Force) has proved to be the most suitable vehicle for the integration of all intelligence assault missions which pertain to a single area regardless of the echelon of command which is basically responsible for them. The size and personnel of "T" Force will vary according to the target but may be as small as a FSP/CIC Section, but, obviously, in the case of a city such as Paris considerably greater.

It is essential that troops employed on these missions operate separately and independently from troops engaged in ordinary combat or occupational duties.

5. Many of the selected targets will be of an highly technical nature and it may be desirable to send specialists to examine them on the spot. In this case these Headquarters will make the necessary arrangements but the specialist will come under the orders of the "T" Force Commander.

6. It is proposed to put forward to you in due course a preliminary list of "T" Force targets and also to send to visit you the officer in charge of the field element of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces "T" Force Sub-Division.

It is requested that you forward to these Headquarters the name of the Officer at your Headquarters who will deal with "T" Force problems in order that his name may be notified to interested agencies.

7. This directive does not alter or supplant in any way the present arrangements in force for dealing with documents and technical intelligence.

By Command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
s/ K. W. D. Strong
K. W. D. STRONG
Major General
A. C. of S. G-2

DISTRIBUTION:
BCS (Int), Hq 21 AG
CS (Int), Hq So. Com
GS (Int), Hq Scot. Com

FOR INFORMATION:

A. C. of S., G 2, Twelfth U. S. Army Group
A. C. of S., (I), A. N. C. X. F.
C. I. O., A. E. A. F.
A. E. A. F., RAF Rgt. Air Adviser
AC of S, G 2, War Department
AC of S, G 2, European Theater of Operations USA
AC of S, G-2, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
GS (int), G. H. Q. Home Forces
D. N. I. Admiralty
D. N. I. War Office
A. C. A. S., (I) Air Ministry
D. of I. (R) Air Ministry
A. C. of S., G 2, Allied Force Headquarters
Secretary, Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee
Secretary, JIC, Washington
Secretary, JIC, London
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Secretary General Staff
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force A. G. Records
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-1
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-2
Secretary, JIC, Supreme Headquarters
Operational Intelligence Sub-Division
Executive Sub Division
Counter Intelligence Sub-Division
Censorship Sub Division
Allied Occupational Commitments (Co-ord) Sub-Division
"T" Force Sub Division
Naval Intelligence Sub Division
Air Intelligence Sub-Division
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-3
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-4
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-5

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

322 (G-2)
SUBJECT: "T" Force — 25 August 1944
TO: See distribution

1. Reference is made to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Intelligence Directive No. 17, SHAEF/9A/INT, 27 July 1944.

2. The liberation of the city of Paris and environs will make available important intelligence, counterintelligence and other targets, including civil and military records, cultural treasures and public utilities whose preservation and security are essential. Troops engaged in normal combat duties should not be diverted from battle tasks to secure the above listed targets nor do they have the necessary technical means to exploit them properly. A special force designated "T" Force, Twelfth Army Group, is being organized under the command of Francis P. Tompkins, CSC. This force will comprise a headquarters and headquarters company, attached troops and attached "Specialists." It will operate under Army Group control, being attached at the proper time to the First Army for administrative support and tactical coordination.

3. Mission. For operations in the Paris area, the general missions of the "T" Force will include the following:

a. To capture designated enemy agents and key collaborators.

b. To seize, safeguard and process documents, archives and material of intelligence or counterintelligence interest.

c. To seize and guard designated military or public installations and utilities of primary importance to the Allied forces.

d. To contact and coordinate the activities of Allied agents, pro-Allied organizations and persons known to be of possible assistance to the Allied cause.

e. Initially to assist and coordinate the activities of all Allied agencies such as Civil Affairs.

f. To determine when, and in what manner, specific installations and facilities can be released from "T" Force control.

g. To accomplish the above and relinquish responsibility to the appropriate Allied authorities as quickly as possible.

4. It is considered essential that this force operate separately and independently from troops engaged in ordinary combat and occupation duties. It will be of adequate size and composition to ensure the security of the special installations, under the [illegible] and the protection of the Special personnel operating with it.

5. It is the responsibility of the "T" Force Commander that all "T" Force activities be closely coordinated with the Army's arrangements for the capture and occupation of Paris. It is the Commanding General's desire that he be given every possible assistance.

For the Army Group Commander:

/s/ H. B. Lewis
/t/ H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

SHAEF	1 to 10
21 A Gp	11 to 15
FUSA	16 to 25
TUSA	26 to 30
AEAF	31 to 35
ANCXF	36 to 40
Com Z	41 to 45
"T" Force	46 & 47

12th Army Group

G-1	48
G-2	49
G-3	50
G-4	51
G-5	52
Eng	53
Sig	54
Ord	55
P & PW	56

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THE FOLLOWING WAS DICTATED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRADLEY ON 21 AUGUST 1944 AT FIRST ARMY HEADQUARTERS:

One of the officials of the Resistance Group in Paris came through to the Third Army this morning and was sent on back to Headquarters Twelfth Army Group with information in substance as follows:

"Fighting by the Resistance Group in Paris and the Germans broke out last Saturday. The entire Police Force came over with the Resistance Group. After considerable fighting the FFI remained in control and about Sunday noon the Germans asked for an Armistice during which time they could pass their troops then on the west side of Paris back through Paris to the east without having to fight their way through the city. This Armistice was granted and it expires Wednesday noon.

The information is to the effect that the FFI controls all of the main city of Paris and the bridges leading into Paris from the west. There is some resistance outside of Paris to the west consisting of a few road blocks and small detachments. The ammunition supply of the FFI in Paris is said to be low and it is feared that unless they are promptly relieved soon after noon on Wednesday, they might be severely dealt with by the Germans if the Germans decide to return to the city. He also stated that there were many Germans now in Paris in civilian clothes. Undoubtedly some of these are deserters.

General Eisenhower has decided that in order to relieve the situation a force consisting of the French, English and Americans would start entering Paris as soon after noon tomorrow as the advance can be made. It is to take over from the Resistance Group, reinforce them, and act in such mobile reserve as they may be needed.

General Eisenhower emphasized the fact that no advance must be made into Paris until after the expiration of the Armistice and that Paris was to be entered only in case the degree of fighting was such as could be overcome by light forces. In other words, he doesn't want a severe fight to take place in Paris at this time. This force should consist of the 2nd French Armored Division, one Infantry Division, a Reconnaissance Group, a "T" Force from Twelfth Army Group and such other detachments as may be necessary under the command of the Commanding General, V Corps.

It must be emphasized that this advance into Paris must not be made by means of heavy fighting because the original plan was to by-pass Paris on both

sides and pinch it out. We do not want any bombing or artillery fire in the city if it can possibly be avoided.

The advance must be continued through the city in order to take over all of that part now controlled by the FFI and such further advance as can be made without severe fighting in the city itself. When this condition exists the advance should be stopped and the defensive positions assumed. The Infantry Division mentioned above will move along the southern limits of the city, will seize the crossing of the Seine south of the city and occupy positions south and southeast of the city, forming a strong bridgehead in this area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

322 (G-2)
SUBJECT: "T" Force
25 September 1944
TO: See Distribution

1. Directive contained in letter this headquarters, 322 (G-2), dated 20 August 1944, is amended to extend the scope to include the following cities in the zones of either the First or Third Armies (see paragraph 3).

2. Army Commanders will be responsible for military and administrative support of "T" Force operations; technical direction being furnished by this headquarters.

3. Cities of interest:

METZ	BONN
NANCY	WIESBADEN
LUXEMBOURG	FRANKFURT
KÖLN	MANNHEIM
KOBLENZ	KARLSRUHE

Also others to be designated later.

For the Army Group Commander:

/s/ C. R. Landon
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

SHAEF	1—10	12th Army Group:	
21 AGp	11—15	G-1	48
FUSA	16—25	G-2	49
TUSA	26—30	G-3	50
AEAF	31—35	G-4	51
ANCXF	36—40	G-5	52
COM Z	41—45	Engr	53
"T" Force	46—47	Sig	54
		Ord	55
		P & PW	56
		TSCG	57—60

[PUB 3742]

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

370.2 (G-2)
9 January 1945

SUBJECT: Eclipse Planning for "T" Force Target Cities
TO: See Distribution

1. Reference directive contained in letter, this headquarters, 322 (G-2) dated 20 August 1944, describing mission of "T" Force, Twelfth Army Group, as amended by subsequent letters. The following listed enemy occupied areas are designated for planning purposes for "T" Force operations:

KÖLN
KOBLENZ
BONN
WIESBADEN
FRANKFURT
DÜSSELDORF
RUHR AREA

2. In the event of Eclipse conditions the following areas are designated for "T" Force operations for planning purposes, in the order of priority listed:

1. RUHR AREA	8. DÜSSELDORF
2. COLOGNE	9. WIESBADEN
3. LEIPZIG — HALLE	10. KASSEL
4. DRESDEN	11. KOBLENZ
5. FRANKFURT/MAIN	12. BONN
6. CHEMNITZ	13. MAINZ
7. MAGDEBURG	

3. In the event Eclipse conditions become effective, it is not expected that "T" Force will be capable of operating in all the above designated cities simultaneously. At such time, this headquarters will designate which area or areas are assigned for "T" Force operations and the other areas will be assigned to Armies. "T" Force will then turn over to the designated Army, all accumulated lists of targets, target intelligence and other plans pertinent to its area of operations.

4. It is requested that the Chiefs of all general and special staff sections of Headquarters Twelfth Army Group having intelligence targets located in the above-designated areas report same to the Commanding Officer, "T" Force.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Twelfth Army Group giving as much detailed description as possible and an indication of their priority from a technical, personality, or tactical viewpoint, so that these targets may be incorporated in the planning of "T" Force operations.

For the Army Group Commander:

/s/ James F. Barber Jr.
/t/ JAMES F. BARBER JR.,
Lt. Col., AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy Nos.
SC, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force	1—10
General Officer, Commanding 21 Army Group	11—15
Commanding General, Sixth Army Group	16—20
Commanding General, United States Strategic and Tactical Air Force ANXF	21—25
Commanding General, Com Z	26—30
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force	31—35
Commanding General, First US Army	36—40
Commanding General, Ninth US Army	41—45
Commanding General, Third US Army	46—50
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army	51—55
Twelfth Army Group:	56—60
G-1	61
G-2	62
G-3	63
G-4	64
G-5	65
Engr	66
Sig	67
Cml	68
PW	69
Med	70
CWS	71
Commanding General, Special Troops	72
"T" Force	73—77

Appendix 5 (Cont'd)

HEADQUARTERS "T" FORCE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655 US ARMY

24 March 1945

SUBJECT: Organization of "T" Forces for Third Army and Ninth Army Areas.
TO : See distribution

1. Effective this date, "T" Force Twelfth Army Group will be organized and function as two separate forces.

2. Main "T" Force will operate in the RUHR Area, attached to whatever Army operates in that area, initially Ninth U. S. Army. Main "T" Force will be composed of the Detachments, Twelfth Army Group, attached specialists teams, 31st Chemical Company (Decon), Co "A", 825th TD Bn and such additional units as may be attached by order of the CG, Twelfth Army Group.

3. Lucky "T" Force will be attached to Third U. S. Army and will operate in Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, and such areas as may be designated by the CG, Twelfth Army Group. It will be composed initially of Detachments, Twelfth Army Group, attached intelligence teams, the 526th Armd Inf Bn (Less Co "C") and such additional units as may be attached by order of the CO, "T" Force, from time to time.

4. The mission of both "T" Forces is the normal "T" Force mission of seizing and securing of intelligence targets designated as "T" Force targets in the above designated areas and to assist and coordinate the activities of intelligence parties from higher headquarters in the exploitation of such targets.

5. Lt. Col. Harold C. Lyon, 0-309997, Infantry, as deputy commander of "T" Force, will act as Commanding Officer, "T" Force Main, in the absence of the CO, "T" Force. Lt. Col. Dale M. Garvey, 0-340549, Infantry, is appointed Commanding Officer, Lucky "T" Force.

6. Each "T" Force will be attached to and operate under the command of the Army in whose area it is operating. The AC of S, G-2, Twelfth Army Group, through "T" Branch, will coordinate and supervise the intelligence exploitation within each "T" Force. The evacuation of documents and material and the

APPENDIX 6

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

introduction of intelligence parties will be conducted in accordance with Twelfth Army Group "T" Force SOP, as modified to conform to the requirements of the particular Army.

John H. F. Haskell
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Distribution:

CG, Ninth US Army
CG, Third US Army
CG, Sp Trps, Twelfth Army Gp
"T" Branch, G-2, Twelfth Army Gp
CO, Lucky "T" Force
CO, 526th Armd Inf Bn
CO, Co "A", 825th TD Bn
CO, 31st Chem Co (Decon)
CO, Main "T" Force (2)

HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C of S., G-2
APO 655

27 March 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel HASKELL.
SUBJECT: Future Operations of "T" Force

1. It is General Bradley's desire that you be governed by the following general instructions in the conduct of "T" Force operations from this date forward until further orders. In the portion of the Ruhr lying within the present Ninth Army's zone of action you will handle "T" Force targets keeping in close touch with the G-2 of the Ninth Army and calling on that Army for not to exceed one battalion, as additional troops are needed for target exploitation.

2. Upon the Fifteenth Army becoming operational you will move your headquarters close to some major element of the Army in order to be in close touch with the Army G-2. In cooperation with G-2 of the Fifteenth Army and with the support of not to exceed one regiment of infantry from that Army, you will exploit such of the Ruhr district as lies within the Army boundary as the Ruhr district is uncovered.

3. The exploitation of targets witnin the Ruhr is considered to be the first priority assignment to "T" Force and your staff and organic units should be employed there as needed before other requirements are met.

4. The "T" Branch of G-2, 12th Army Group, will furnish to the Armies "T" Force targets within their respective zones of action and inform those Armies of their responsibility for target exploitation. It may, as the situation develops, recommend the employment of "T" Force troops elsewhere than in the Ruhr, after the Ruhr has been exploited.

Edwin L. Siebert
Brigadier General, GSC,
A. C. of S., G-2

APPENDIX 7

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "B"

ORGANIZATION AND TROOPS, "T" FORCE

Appendix 1 — Functional Chart and Table of Grades and Ratings, Headquarters "T" Force.

Appendix 2 — Troops Lists, "T" Force, at significant Dates.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS DOWNGRADED

FUNCTIONAL CHART

"T" BRANCH AC of S G-2

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

PLANNING AND PRIMARY PHASE - ECLIPSE

CHIEF OF BRANCH

Colonel 1

Also commands "T" Force Twelfth Army Group

BY AUTHORITY OF
AC of S, G-2

INITIALS: E.C.L.

DATE: 21/3/45

ADMINISTRATION SECTION

213 Tech Grade 3 1
405 Tech Grade 5 1

Handles special distribution for "T" Branch and "T" Force.

Maintains specialized "T" Branch files.

Stenographic and typing work for Chief and Executive.

EXECUTIVE

Lieut. Colonel 1

Normal Executive duties. Acts for Chief during his absence. Represents "T" Force at 12th AG Main.

Coordinates planning activities.

Coordinates "T" Branch Liaison Officers on duty at Armies.

EXPLOITATION CONTROL SECTION

Major 1
Captain 1
305 Tech Grade 5 2

Assigns priorities to targets.

Coordinates movements of all intelligence specialists visiting 12 AG zone from other HQS. Briefs, accredits and dispatches specialists to Armies.

Authorizes Armies to remove guards from Priority I targets.

Coordinates and supervises activities of Liaison Officers from other HQS.

TARGET COMPILATION

TARGET COMPILATION SECTION

Captain 1
052 Tech Sgt 1
076 Tech Grade 3 1
267 Tech Grade 4 3
405 Tech Grade 5 2

Receives, collates, compiles lists of important intelligence and counter-intelligence targets.

Disseminates target data to Armies.

Conducts research.

Prepares maps and dossiers on individual targets.

Maintains "T" Branch operations map.

LIAISON SECTION

Lieut. Colonels or Majors 3
345 Tech Grade 5 3

1 Officer, driver and jeep on TD with 1st, 3rd, and 9th Army.

Accomplish liaison between "T" Branch and Army HQS.

Advise and assist Armies in operations and in future planning.

Coordinate movement of specialists.

Supervise Liaison Teams in Army zones.

LIAISON OFFICERS
from
OTHER HEADQUARTERS

"T" Sub-Section SHAEF 1
CIOS (Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee) 7
USSBS (US Strategic Bombing Survey) 1

Represent their services at "T" Branch.

Assist in appraising targets.

Advise relative to the composition and dispatch of teams to exploit specific targets.

Coordinate representatives of their services working in Army zones.

LIAISON TEAMS

Officers
Grade immaterial 12
345 Tech Grade 5 12
055 Tech Grade 5 12

Each team to consist of 1 officer, 1 clerk, 1 driver and jeep.

Four teams will be placed on TD with each Army (1st, 3rd, 9th) on A day, and will be assigned by Army in its zones of advance.

Each team, within its area, will advise troop commanders in target safeguarding and exploitation problems, coordinate the movement and activities of intelligence specialists and report to Army on the exploitation of targets, evacuation of documents and equipment, etc.

RECAPITULATION
"T" BRANCH PERSONNEL

Officers 29*
Warrant Officers 0
Enlisted Men 38

* 9 of these officers to be attached from other Headquarters.

Appendix 1, Annex "B"

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TROOPS LIST (1) — "T" FORCE IN PARIS

25 August to 6 September 1944

Explanatory Note: The list below gives the total strength of all persons and units attached to "T" Force during the ten day operations in Paris.

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	9	1	3		
Headquarters Company (31 Chemical Co)	6		181		27
Normal Attachments:					
CIC	16		70	2	44
MII 442	2		4		2
MII 461	2		4		2
30 BDS, 52 Ord Gp	1		6		1
Med Det, 4th Gen Disp	2		5		1
Operational Attachments:					
War Dept., War Office, Ministries:					
2 I (u) Section, MI.6	8		23		14
ALSOS Mission	11		3	4	2
ADI (K)	4		5		
Supreme Headquarters, AEF:					
M.I.6	3		1		
I.S. 9 (WEA)	8		14	25	15
CIPC	50		1	12	14
12th Army Group:					
EEIS (Signal)	2		1		1
CWS	1		4		1
P & PW	41		44	23	24
Air Force:					
APWIU, Ninth Air Force	10		8		6
SIS, Ninth Air Force	1		1		1
A-2, USSTAF	4			2	1
Air Technical Intelligence	8				3
ETOUSA, Communications Zone:					
OCE, ETOUSA	1		1		
CIC (CIB, Com Z, Fwd)	8		18		
Detachment 19, SIS, ETOUSA	2		1		1
MIS, Com Z (Fwd)	4		10		5
Office of Strategic Services:					
SCI	12		19		15
Miscellaneous:					
SSM (French)	7		4	13	6
ONI, CTG 125.8	6		2		4
Document Section, First U. S. Army	2		2		1
French Special Services	25		35	20	
38 Cavalry Squadron (+)	40		860		
30 Assault Unit, ANCXF	9		68		17
	310	1	1402	101	216

Appendix 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TROOP LIST (2) — "T" FORCE AT VERDUN

9 September 1944

Explanatory Note: After leaving Paris, "T" Force moved to Verdun where the force reorganized preparatory to the Luxembourg, Nancy and Metz operations. The list below [illegible]

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	9	1	6		
Headquarters, Company (31 Chemical Co)	6		182		44
Attachments:					
CIB, G-2, 12th Army Group	2		1		
CIC	1		26		9
OSS/SCI	10		10		7
Med Det, 4th Gen. Disp.	1		3		1
MII 450	2		4		2
MII 461	2		4		2
IPW 90	1		2		1
IPW 94	2		4		2
IPW 95	2		4		2
IPW 96	2		4		2
IPW 97	2		4		2
Document Section	1		4		2
Adv. Det. PWB	2		14		6
ISTD	1		0		0
FEIS (Signal)	1		1		0
Company A, 825 TD Battalion	5		191		37
	52		464		119

TROOP LIST (3) — "T" FORCE IN REMOUCHAMPS

1 November 1944

Explanatory Note: After leaving Luxembourg, three important changes in personnel occurred. First: the balance of the allowed grades and ratings for the Headquarters were filled. Second: the force was augmented by the joining of the 526 Armored Infantry Battalion on 28 [illegible] Third: Signal personnel [illegible]

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	15	1			
Headquarters Company (31 Chemical Co)	6		180		44
Attachments:					
Hq Det, 12th Army Group			9		
IPW 90	1		4		1
IPW 94	2		4		2
IPW 95	2		3		2
IPW 96	2		4		2
IPW 97	2		3		2
IPW 110	1		5		2
IPW 111	1		5		2
MII 450	1		4		2
MII 461	2		4		1
Detachment 418 CIC & CIC-X	4		36		13
Documents Section, MIS ComZ F.	1		4		2
Advance Det PWB	2		11	5	6
EEIS, 12th Army Group	1		1		
ISTD	1				
OSS/SCI, Hq 12th Army Group	5		8		6
Medical Det/4th Gen. Disp.	1		3		1
Sig Det 3103 Sig Serv. Bn.	2		11		3
Co. A. 825th TD Bn.	5		188		37
526th Armored Infantry Battalion	39	3	774		108
	96	4	1261	5	236

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TROOP LIST (4) — "T" FORCE AT ESCHWEILER

2 March 1945

Explanatory Note: When "T" Force moved into Germany on 2 March 1945, it anticipated the need of operations in depth and established [illegible] the force prepared for Cologne, Sub Force "A" was detached in Eschweiler to prepare for Bonn, and two days after the entry of the main force into Cologne, Sub Force "C" was detached to move toward Coblenz. By the time that Sub Force "C" entered Coblenz completion of the Bonn operation and the advanced stage of operations in Cologne permitted reinforcement of Sub Force "C" from the other forces. The following tables show the composition of the main force on its entry into Cologne, the composition of Sub Force "A", and the composition of Sub Force "C" when it entered Coblenz.

"T" Force — Cologne

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	11				
Headquarters Co, 131 Chemical Co	4		121		33
Attached:					
Hq Det, 12th Army Group			6		
CIC 418	2		16		6
IPW 15, 66, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97	6		21		8
MH 450, 461	2		4		2
Documents Section, 12th AG	1		1		1
Sigfal Det, 305 Sig Opn Bn	2		23		4
Photo Unit 124, 167 Photo Co	1		2		1
E618 (Signal)	1		1		1
SIS, SSDD, 12 Army Group	1		1		1
163rd BDS	1		6		2
OSS-SCI	3		9	1	3
RAF Mobile Micro-Film Det			3		1
526th Armored Infantry Bn (—)	34	3	692		112
Total	69	3	903	1	175

SUB FORCE "A"

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	2				
Headquarters Co (31 Chemical Co)	1		40		6
Attachments:					
Hq Det, 12th Army Group			2		
CIC	3		11		7
IPW	4		7		3
MH			2		
Documents Section			2		1
Medical Det, 4th Gen. Disp	1		3		1
Photo Detachment			2		1
Signal Detachment, 305 Sig. Opns. Bn			3		1
40th BDS	1		5		3
Co A 825 TD Bn	5		188		37
Engineers	1		12		3
	18		272		63

SUB FORCE "C"

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	1				
Headquarters Co (31 Chemical Co)	1		7		4
Attached:					
Hq Det, 12th Army Group			2		
418 CIC Det	2		11		5
IPW 90	1		1		1
IPW 94	1		3		1
IPW 95	1		1		1
IPW 96	1		1		1
IPW 97			1		
MH 461			1		
Documents Section			1		
Signal Det, 305 Sig Opns Bn			3		1
Co-B, 526 Armored Infantry Bn	6		216		25
Attached:					
Hq Co, 526 Armd. Inf. Bn	2		5		2
Medical Detachment			3		1
134 BDS	1		6		2
	17		262		43

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

25 March 1945

Explanatory Note: On the completion of the Cologne, Bonn and Coblenz operations "T" Force reassembled and reorganized. The missions immediately to follow were the Ruhr and Wuppertal areas and Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. The force was therefore divided into two, "T" Force Main and "T" Force Lucky. The main force commenced operations in the Ruhr area almost immediately; "T" Force Lucky moved to Frankfurt and completed operations in the two cities before targets in the South Ruhr — Wuppertal — Dusseldorf area opened. The following tables show the composition of the forces.

"T" Force Main

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	10				
Headquarters Company (31 Chemical Co)	5		154		35
Attached:					
Hq Det 12th Army Group			6		
CIC 418	2		16		8
IPW 15, 96, 97	3		10		5
MII 461	2		2		1
Documents Section, 12th Army Group	1		2		1
Medical Det, 4th Gen. Disp.	1		3		1
Signal Detachment, 305th (Sig.) Opns.Bn.	2		10		7
Photo Unit 121, 167 Sig Photo Co.	1		2		0
EEIS (Signal)	1		1		1
SIS (SSDD, 12th Army Group)	1		1		1
30th BDS	1		6		2
163rd BDS	1		6		2
OSS ETOUSA	1		8	1	3
RAF Mobile Micro Film Unit	1		4		1
Nav Tech Mis in Europe	1				1
Co A, 825 TD Battalion	5		167		34
3rd Plat, Co C, 1269 Engr Bn	1		42		5
	39		440	1	107

"T" FORCE IN THE RUHR

(Continued)

"T" Force Lucky

Unit	Personnel				Vehicles
	Off.	W. O.	E. M.	Civ.	
Headquarters, "T" Force	2				
Headquarters Company (31 Chemical Co)			14		8
Attached:					
Hq Det, 12th Army Group			2		
CIC 418	4		18		11
IPW 66, 90, 94, 95, 96	8		21		8
MII 450, 461			4		2
Documents Section, 12th Army Group			2		1
Sig Det, 305th Sig Opns Bn.	1		16		3
Photo Unit 121, 167 Sig Photo Co.			3		1
34th BDS	1		6		2
526th Armored Infantry Bn (—)	36	3	686		112
	52	3	772		148

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "C"

"T" FORCE OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 — Map — Cities and Areas of "T" Force Operations.

Appendix 2 — Consolidated Tables of Targets in "T" Force Areas of Operation

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF TARGETS EXPLOITED BY "T" FORCE

CITY	DATES	BUILDINGS		PERSONALITIES	
		Total	Pending	Total	Arrested
PARIS	25 Aug — 6 Sept	382	54	514	64
LUXEMBOURG	13 Sept — 10 Oct	109	0	66	0
NANCY	15 — 18 Sept	32	0	54	4
COLOGNE	6 — 25 March	285	0	201	0
BONN	9 — 18 March	58	9	40	2
COBLENZ	18 — 22 March	73	0	58	0
FRANKFURT	28 March — 12 April	171	0	109	11
WIESBADEN	30 March — 6 April	82	0	56	23
RUHR	25 March — 1 May				
North Ruhr		430	4	186	15
South Ruhr.	WUPPERTAL	300	8	127	5
	TOTAL	1922	75	1411	124

Note: In the case of Building Targets, the pending targets indicate those which were not completely exploited before "T" Force completed its operation and withdrew. In the case of Personality targets, the number of targets arrested is indicated.

APPENDIX 2

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "D"

ACTIVITIES OF "T" BRANCH

Appendix 1 Map, Planning Boundaries and Target Locations.*

Appendix 2 Functional Chart "T" Branch.

Appendix 3 Letter, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 24 March 1945, subject: "Seizure, Safeguarding and Exploitation of Priority Intelligence and Counterintelligence Targets in Germany".

Appendix 4 Letter, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 16 April 1945, subject: "Combined Intelligence Objective Sub-Committee and Other Investigators".

Appendix 5 Consolidated Table of Targets not in "T" Force Cities or Areas of Operation.

* Not available for first edition

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix I, Annex D:

MAP, PLANNING BOUNDARIES AND TARGET LOCATIONS *

* Not available for first edition.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

FUNCTIONAL CHART

"T" FORCE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP



Appendix 2, Annex D

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

380.01 (G-2)

24 March 1945

SUBJECT: Seizure, Safeguarding and Exploitation of Priority Intelligence and Counterintelligence Targets in Germany.

TO : Commanding General, First United States Army, APO 230
Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403
Commanding General, Ninth United States Army, APO 339
Commanding General, Fifteenth United States Army, APO 408
Commanding Officer "T" Force, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655

1. References:

a. First draft, Annex No 2, Operation Plan "ECLIPSE", Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, dated 27 February 1945, subject: Intelligence Plan.

b. Revised first draft, Appendix No 1 to Annex No 2, Operation "ECLIPSE", Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, dated 5 March 1945, subject: Plan for the Seizure, Safeguarding and Exploitation of Priority Intelligence Targets.

2. This directive will apply to the present period of advance into Germany and will continue in effect through Operation "ECLIPSE".

3. Forwarded herewith are 3 copies of a publication, prepared by this Headquarters in accordance with paragraph 2a of the plan referenced 1b, listing priority intelligence and counterintelligence targets. Amendments and addenda will be issued as further information is received.

a. The area covered by the compilations extends from the Rhine River eastward well into the Russian Zone. It is bounded on the north by WESEL, MUNSTER, BRAUNSCHWEIG, STENDAL and on the south by DARMSTADT, WURZBURG, BAIREUTH, OEISNITZ and NEWSTADTEL (all cities named are exclusive).

b. By agreement, 21 Army Group and Sixth Army Group are responsible for the preparation of similar target information covering the areas to the north and south. Army Groups will inter-change data as Army Group boundaries are extended or changed from time to time.

4. a. Targets listed in the publication and in future addenda, which may fall within your zone of advance, will be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 10 of the plan referenced 1a, and paragraph 2b of the plan referenced 1b.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. "T" Force, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, will operate in the Ruhr or other target area in accordance with paragraph 3b of plan referenced, 1b.

5. a. The targets in the list which are indicated by the symbol (X) will be exploited by intelligence specialists representing C. I. O. S., SHAEF, and other higher headquarters. Such specialists will be accredited to you by this headquarters and their activities will be facilitated as provided for in the plan referenced 1b.

b. All other targets listed will be exploited by agencies and personnel within your command.

6. a. Targets indicated by the symbol (X) will be kept under guard (if priority I targets) or safeguarded (Priority II and III Targets) until specifically released by this headquarters (T Branch, AC of S., G-2) after exploitation.

b. All other targets listed will be guarded or safeguarded for such period of time as, in your judgment, may be necessary to insure effective intelligence exploitation.

7. Important intelligence targets developed through investigation or discovered during the advance, will be seized, safeguarded, and dealt with in accordance with these instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

/s/ Walter Sczudlo
/t/ WALTER SCZUDLO
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

Incl. 1:

Priority Intelligence and Counterintelligence Targets (Trip)

DISTRIBUTION:

SHAEF Main (T-Sub-section, AC of S, G-2)	3 copies of Incl.
21 Army Group Main (G(T) & CW)	3 copies of Incl.
Sixth Army Group (AC of S., G-2)	3 copies of Incl.
Ninth Air Force (AC of S., A-2)	1 copy of Incl.
Communication Zone (AC of S., G-2)	1 copy of Incl.
Twelfth Army Group each Staff Section.	

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

211 (AG-P) 16 April 1945

SUBJECT: Combined Intelligence Objective Sub-Committee and Other Investigators.

TO Commanding General First US Army, APO 230.
Commanding General Third US Army, APO 403.
Commanding General Ninth US Army, APO 339.
Commanding General Fifteenth US Army, APO 408.

1. The War and Navy Departments, the War Office and the Admiralty, as well as many civil scientific organizations, have sent to this theater a number of investigators whose mission is to gather intelligence as it is uncovered by our advancing troops. These investigators are generally grouped under the subject heading and are coordinated within the Army Group by the "T" Branch of the Office of the AC of S., G-2. The "T" Force of the Army Group is an Army Group Agency for the exploitation of the mass of the targets. To this end it has been committed in the RUHR where it will stay for several weeks.

2. In the meantime, up to 600 of the subject type investigators are ready and anxious to enter the areas of the Armies for the purpose of making an early investigation or exploitation of intelligence targets.

3. To the end that their needs and their coordination may be promptly met under existing Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force directives, each Army will receive from the Army Group a minimum of two officers especially trained in this work and approximately six motor vehicles for transportation. The Armies concerned will take prompt steps to establish an appropriate housekeeping organization to care for a maximum of 500 investigators requiring officers accommodations. They will provide the necessary additional transportation and additional intelligence staff to make possible the operations of the above-named investigators.

4. The investigators will report first to the AC of S, G-2 of the Army Group at the "T" Branch, Main Headquarters. They will there receive a clearance and transportation to the Army Headquarers. Target material will continue to flow

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to the "T" Branch at army group and from there to the Army concerned.

5. While it is recognized that the exploitation of intelligence targets at this time may not seem to contribute to military operations, it should be borne in mind that much valuable material useful in the war against Japan and in preparation for the future can be lost if not promptly exploited.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

/s/ C. E. Hays
/t/ C. E. HAYS,
Lt. Col., AGD.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF TARGETS NOT IN "T" FORCE CITIES OR AREAS OF OPERATION

City	No. Targets	City	No. Targets
AHLEN	1	BERLIN	1
ALPERSTEDT	1	BERNBURG	8
ALFRED a. d. LEINE	2	BETZDORF	2
ALLENDORF	1	BITTERFELD	2
ALSFELD	1	BLANKENBURG	5
ALTENGRABOW	2	BODENBACH	2
ALTENKIRCHEN	1	BÖHNE	1
ALT LONNEWITZ	1	BOHLEN	1
AMMENDORF	1	BOTTENDORF	1
ANROCHETE	1	BRANDENBURG	5
APOLDA	2	BRILON	2
ARNSBERG	4	BUDINGEN	2
ARNSTADT	2	BURG	5
AROLSEN	1	CHEMNITZ	52
ASCHAFFENBURG	4	CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD	4
ASCHERSLEBEN	2	COBURG	2
AUE	3	COSEL	1
AUSSUG	1	COSWIG	2
BABELSBERG	1	DABENDORF	1
BAD BLANKENBURG	2	DAHLEN	1
BAD EMS	1	DEILINGHOFEN	1
BAD HARZBURG	2	DESSAU	27
BAD HOMBURG	2	DETMOLD	9
BAD KISSINGEN	2	DOBELN	3
BAD LIEBENWERDA	1	DOHNA	1
BAD LIPPSPRINGE	3	DRAISDORF	1
BAD NAUHEIM	1	DRESDEN	116
BAD SACHSA	1	DUDERSTADT	1
BAD SALZELMEN	1	DUINGEN	1
BAD SODEN	1	EINBECK	2
BAD WILDUNGEN	1	EISENACH	5
BEBRA	1	ELLRICH	2
BECKUM	4	ELSNIG	1
BENNECKENSTEIN	1	ERFURT	14
BERGISCH-GLADBACH	2	ESCHWEGE	4

APPENDIX 5

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

City	No. Targets	City	No. Targets
ESPERDTEDT	1	HERMSDORF	2
FINSTERWALDE	1	HERSFELD	2
FRANKENBERG	1	HERVEST-DORSTEN	1
FRANKENSTEIN	1	HERZBERG	1
FREIBERG	4	HILDBURGHAUSEN	2
FRIEDRICHRODE	1	HILDESHEIM	12
FULDA	7	HILLERSLEBEN	1
FURSTENHAGEN	1	HOFGEISMAR	3
GANDERSHEIM	1	HOLZMINDEN	3
GELNHAUSEN	1	HOMBERG	1
GEMUNDEN	1	HOPPECKE	1
GENSHAGEN	1	HÖXTER	3
GENTHIN	1	HUNFELD	2
GERA	5	ILMENAU	1
GERNRODE	1	JENA	13
GIESSEN	10	JESSNITZ	1
GOSLAR	6	JUTERBOG	1
GOTHA	5	KASSEL	66
GÖTTINGEN	23	KIRCHMOSER	1
GREBENSTEIN	1	KLEINMOHLAU	1
GREIZ	3	KOLLEDA	3
GREUSSEN	1	KORBACH	2
GRÖDITZ	1	KOTHEN	8
GROENINGEN	1	KRIEBSTEIN	1
GROSSALMERODE	1	LAMSPRINGE	1
GUSEN	1	LANGESALZA	5
GUTERSLOH	2	LAUTERBACH	2
HALBERSTADT	10	LEINEFELD	1
HALLE	58	LEIPZIG	87
HAMELN	4	LEUBINGEN	1
HANNOVER-MUNDEN	3	LEUNA	3
HEIDENAU	1	LEUTENBERG	1
HEILIGENSTADT	2	LICHTENFELS	1
HELDRUNGEN	1	LIPPSTADT	5
HELMSTEDT	1	LUCKENWALDE	2

APPENDIX 5 (cont'd)

City	No. Targets	City	No. Targets
LÖWENBERG	1	QUERFURT	1
MAGDEBURG	54	RANGSDORF	1
MAINZ	16	RATHENOW	3
MARBURG	12	REICHENBACH	1
MEININGEN	5	REICHENSACHSEN	1
MEISSEN	3	REINSDORF	1
MELSUNGEN	2	RIESA	4
MERSEBURG	1	ROSSLAU	3
MOSCHWIG	1	ROTENBURG	1
MÜNCHEN-LÜTZKENDORF	1	RUBELAND	3
MÜCKENBERG	1	RUDOLSTADT	8
MÜHLBERG	1	RUHLA	1
MULDA	1	RUSCHEID	1
MÜNDEN	1	RUSSELHEIM	1
MÜHLHAUSEN	7	SALZGITTER	3
MÜLDENSTEIN	2	SANGERHAUSEN	2
NACKENHEIM	1	SCHARFENSTEIN	1
NAUEN	1	SCHERMBECK	1
NAUBURG	4	SCHKOPAU	1
NEU HALDENSLEBEN	1	SCHLEIZ	1
NEURUPPIN	1	SCHLUCHTERN	2
NEUSTADT	2	SCHMALKALDEN	2
NEUWIED	2	SCHMEIDEBERG	1
NIEDER-EINSIEDEL	1	SCHONEBECK	1
NORDHAUSEN	8	SCHWEINFURT	10
NIEDERSACHSENWERFEN	1	SEEBACH	1
NORTHEIM	5	SEGESTE	1
OLFEN	1	SIEBENLEHN	1
OSCHERSLEBEN	4	SIEGEN	6
OSTERODE	2	SILBERHUTTE	1
PADERBORN	5	SIMMERN	1
PIRNA	2	SÖMMERDA	1
PLAUE	1	SONDERHAUSEN	3
PLAUEN	7	SONNEBERG	1
QUEDLINBURG	4	SONNEWALDE	1

APPENDIX 5 (cont'd)

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

City	No. Targets	City	No. Targets
STASSFURT	2	WENIGENLUPNITZ	1
STOCKENHAUSEN	1	WERL	1
SUHL	1	WERNIGERODE	6
THALE	2	WETZLAR	6
THARANDT	2	WEYERBUSCH	1
THEMAR	1	WILDAU	1
TREYSA	1	WILLINGEN	1
TREUENBRITZEN	1	WIPPERFURTH	1
TRIPTIS	1	WITTENBERG	1
VENUSBERG	1	WITZENHAUSEN	1
WANZLEBEN	2	WOLFEN	2
WARBURG	2	WOLFENBUTTEL	1
WARENDORF	1	WOLFHAGEN	2
WASSERKUPPE	1	ZEITZ	3
WEIDA	1	ZEULENRODA	1
WEIMAR	20	ZERBST	3
WEISSENFELS	2	ZIEGENHAIN	3
WEIXDORF	1	ZÖBLITZ	1
WERDAU	1	ZWICKAU	3

Total targets not in "T" Force Cities or areas of operation 941

ANNEX "E"

TARGET INVESTIGATION

Appendix 1 — List of Specialist Agencies represented in "T" Force Operations and Processed by "T" Branch.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIALIST AGENCIES REPRESENTED IN "T" FORCE OPERATIONS
AND PROCESSED BY "T" BRANCH

[redacted] Division of the AC of S, G-2, WDGS, Washington D. C.

Mission: Special investigations of German scientific and military research.
Number of Targets submitted, 86.

CENSORSHIP BRANCH, AC of S, G-2, 12AG
Interest: Exploitation of German censorship establishments.
Number of Targets submitted, 2.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICES, COM-Z
Mission: Exploitation of enemy Chemical Warfare targets.
Number of Targets submitted, 4.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICES, 12 AG
Mission: Exploitation of enemy Chemical Warfare targets.
Number of Targets submitted, 19.

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE (CIOS)
Intelligence agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, operating under the Combined Intelligence Committee.
Mission: Investigation of German scientific, industrial and military research and development, relating first to immediate military operations (Black List), and second, to overall war and industrial potential.
Number of targets submitted, (approximate) 500.
Number of reports received, (approximate) 1300.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, AC of S., G-2, 12 AG
Mission: Maintenance of military security of US Forces and eventual total elimination of German security and intelligence services, including personalities, documents, files, and equipment of both political and military agencies.
Number of targets submitted, (approximate) 600 personality and 400 building.

ECONOMIC SECTION, OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION, AC of S, G-2, SHAEF.
Mission: To gather information on German Economy, including utilities, housing, industry, and its wartime controls, agriculture and food, labor, fuels, agreements and exchange of information with other nations, especially Japan.
Number of targets submitted (approximate) 25.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SIB, SIGNAL SECTION 12 AG (EEIS)

Mission: Seizure and exploitation of enemy communications equipment and installations, including telephone, radio and radar.

Number of targets submitted, [illegible].

ENGINEER SECTION, 12 AG

Mission: Targets of Engineering interest, both military and industrial.

Number of targets submitted, 143.

HOUGH TEAM — Special team from the Office of Chief Engineer, WD, Washington, D. C.

Mission: Maps, map libraries, surveys and geographical libraries and institutes. Number of targets submitted, 25.

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SECTION, SPECIAL SECTIONS SUB-DIVISION, AC of S, G-2 SHAEF.

Mission: Targets with information pertaining to Japan and the exchange of military and industrial information between Japan and Germany. Number of targets submitted, 62.

MAP AND SURVEY DIVISION, AC of S, G-3, SHAEF — Represented by HOUGH TEAM

Mission: Maps, mapping facilities and equipment and surveys. Special emphasis on maps or surveys pertaining to Japan and the Far East. Number of targets submitted, 4.

NAVAL TARGET SUB-DIVISION, AC of S, G-2 SHAEF

Mission: Naval equipment and armaments, ship building, port facilities, torpedoes, mines, Naval communications, radar, and marine scientific developments and research.

Number of targets submitted, 60.

Number of reports received, 99.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, ECONOMIC WARFARE DIVISION, JAPANESE SECTION (OSS EWD)

Mission: Gathering of information on the transmittal of German military, scientific and industrial information to Japan. Number of targets submitted, 46.

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, SIGNAL SECTION, 12 AG (SIB, 12 AG)

Mission: Enemy signal and communications establishments and documents for research and utilization by US Forces.

Number of targets submitted, 150.

SPECIAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (SCI)

Mission: Neutralization and eventual elimination of the [illegible] such as the SD and the Sipo.

Number of targets submitted, 150 personality and 25 building.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY (USSBS)

Mission: Through ground investigation, to determine and evaluate results of tactical and strategic bombings, including surveys of damage to urban areas, industries, transportation facilities; effect on civilian moral and military operations, and effectiveness of specific bombing techniques.

Number of targets submitted, 46.

WAR CRIMES BRANCH, JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION, 12 AG (WCB 12 AG)

Mission: Investigation of war crime cases and personalities involved. Number of targets submitted, 2.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART VI

G-2

CENSORSHIP BRANCH REPORT

12TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART VI

Final After Action Report

Censorship Branch

General

A. Organization

Under Intelligence Directive Number 23, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 9 January 1945, responsibility for the establishment and operation of Civil Censorship in Germany, both prior to and after cessation of hostilities, was delegated to Army Group Commanders in their respective operational areas. The Commanding General, 12th Army Group was charged with the responsibility for coordination of civil censorship procedures and regulations in both 12th and 6th Army Group areas.

The Censorship Branch was organized and established as part of the G-2 Section, 12th Army Group on 10 February 1945, its mission being to assist the AC of S, G-2 in his responsibilities for the formulation of policies and the operational control of censorship of authorized civil communications in Germany. G-2 Censorship Branch organizational chart is attached as Annex A.*

The responsibility for civil censorship operations prior to transfer of such operations to this headquarters was delegated to Civil Censorship Detachment, ETOUSA, General Order No. 6, Headquarters Special Troops, ETOUSA, dated 12 February 1944. Subsequently, this order was rescinded on 18 May 1944 and the operational control of Civil Censorship Detachment placed with the AC of S, G-2, SHAEF, where it remained until transferred to this headquarters on 9 January 1945. In July 1945, Civil Censorship detachment, ETOUSA was redesignated as Civil Censorship Division with no other change in organization or command.

During the period between 10 February and VE Day, the progress of the military situation in German territory occupied by Allied Forces necessitated certain changes to insure the efficient development of the Civil Censorship Organization for Germany. In the original plans only a small number of censorship personnel were provided at this headquarters for censorship planning prior to the surrender of the German Armed Forces. As initially established, Censorship Branch consisted of 3 army officers, 3 enlisted men and 1 naval officer, the latter being specially attached for coordination of civil censorship telecommunication activities. Under the then existing tactical situation the armies

* page 85

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

encountered problems in civil communications which required immediate action because of security hazards encountered. Additionally, the volume of captured mail and telecommunications material to be collected, examined and allocated exceeded all preliminary estimates. Consequently, additional personnel was assigned to Censorship Branch to provide or proper coordination of field activities and liaison between SHAEF, 21st Army Group, and this headquarters. The activities of the branch were sub-divided into 5 categories namely, Executive, Administration, Postal, Information and Records, and Electrical Groups. As of 31 July 1945, personnel in the G-2 Censorship Branch was categorically assigned as follows:

Executive	Postal Group	Electrical Group
3 U. S. Army Officers	3 U. S. Army Officers	1 Naval Officer
2 War Dept. Employees	1 War Dept. Employee	1 U. S. Army Officer
1 Enlisted WAC	2 Enlisted Men	1 Enlisted Man

Information & Records Group	Administrative Group
2 U. S. Army Officers	3 U. S. Army Officers
2 War Dept. Employees	1 War Dept. Employee
6 Enlisted Men	14 Enlisted Men
	1 Enlisted WAC

The Civil Censorship Division, ETOUSA, which was operationally responsible to this headquarters and which effected civil censorship operations in the areas under command of this headquarters, had been established during the period as follows:

a. Headquarters Civil Censorship Division, was responsible for the administration of all civil censorship establishments and personnel with headquarters located at Poissy, France, in the Paris area.

b. Detachment "A", Civil Censorship Division, activated May 1945, for the purpose of providing civil censorship control in the Munich Censorship District covering the Territory of the Eastern Military District with headquarters located at Pullach near Munich.

c. Detachment "C", Civil Censorship Division, activated May 1945, for the purpose of providing civil censorship control in the Frankfurt Censorship District, covering the territory of The Western Military District with headquarters located at Offenbach, near Frankfurt.

On 27 February 1945, there was established a reception and training center at Wideville, France in the Paris area, known as District "A". Military and U. S. civilian personnel were processed and provided with a basic background of

censorship techniques and upon completion of this training transferred to either the Frankfurt or Munich Censorship Districts. On 30 June 1945, District "A" was closed and remaining personnel transferred to the Munich and Frankfurt Censorship Districts.

A similar district was established on 5 April 1945, for the same purpose at Bailly, France in the Paris area, and was known as District "B". Both Districts "A" and "B" were under the administrative control of Headquarters Civil Censorship Division but were operationally responsible to the AC of S, G-2 of this headquarters. As of 31 July 1945, District "B" had completed plans for discontinuing operations prior to transfer of remaining personnel to Germany.

B. Civil Censorship District Organization

1. Each Civil Censorship District was commanded by a District Controller as the senior censorship officer in his District and was responsible to the AC of S, G-2, Censorship Branch, for the fulfillment of the censorship mission in the district.

2. The district Controller was responsible for the efficient operation of all censorship activities within his district, such as the District Station, field stations and control points, as well as for coordination among the Postal, Electrical, Administration and Information and Records Division under his command.

3. Administration Division: provided for personnel recruitment, administration and financial operations for the Censorship District. Organizational chart is attached as Annex B.*

4. Electrical Communications Division: The District Electrical Censor was responsible for operating efficiency of all Electrical Communications Censorship activities within the Censorship District; more specifically, all censorship activities related to telephone, telegraph, teletype, and wireless telegraph and telephone civil communications. Organizational chart is attached as Annex C.**

5. Postal Division: The District Postal Censor was responsible for the operating efficiency of all postal and travelers censorship activities within the district. Postal Division organizational chart is attached as Annex D.***

6. Information and Records Division: The District Information and Records Officer was responsible for the efficient operation of Information and Records Division within the district. More specifically, the distribution of the Zone Watch List to the Postal and Electrical Divisions, allocation of submissions to

* page 86
** page 87
*** page 88

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

user agencies as provided in the Zone Requirements Guide, reproduction of submissions, the dissemination of such information, and contact with local user agencies as to their intelligence requirements. District Information and Records Division organization chart is attached as Annex E.*

C. Responsibilities.

Under basic SHAEF Directives, this headquarters was charged with planning for future operations and physical establishment of its censorship operating agencies as outlined in Circular No. 2, this headquarters, dated 15 January 1945, subject "Civil Censorship in Germany", copy of which is attached as Annex F.**

D. Personnel.

1. *Military.* The Military Table of Organization drawn up for Civil Censorship operations in Germany provides for 140 officers and 867 enlisted men and women. Many of this personnel are German-speaking and censorship trained. A nucleus of Officers who previously had served with the Office of Censorship in its activation were selected to make plans, organize and train other officers and enlisted personnel for the Civil Censorship Organization in Germany. This officer group provided an administration and training staff for the Civil Censorship Division upon activation of the organization in the United Kingdom in February 1944. The U. S. Office of Censorship, while exercising no command function or other authority, has provided Civil Censorship Division with much valuable informational material and specialized censorship supplies and equipment. The first civil censorship training in the ETO was conducted in the United Kingdom in March 1944, and continued until assignment of personnel to Civil Censorship Districts or similar civil censorship groups. Prior to transfer of Civil Censorship Division to the Continent, special training teams were formed and detached to the London Office and Field Stations of the British Postal and Telegraph Censorship, for study and training. As of 31 July 1945, military personnel assigned to civil censorship operations were grouped as follows:

Hq. Civil Censorship Division	Munich Censorship District	Frankfurt Censorship District	Total
	Officers		
20	40	40	100
	Enlisted Personnel		
80	260	260	600
		Grand total	700

* page 89.

** page 90.

2. *U. S. Civilians.* On 17 February 1945, a special Civil Censorship Division personnel procurement team was sent to the United States for the purpose of recruiting trained civilians for censorship duty [illegible] United States Forces in Germany. Personnel were interviewed and selected by the recruiting team and processed through the Overseas Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War. The greater part of United States civilian personnel selected had been employed previously by the U. S. Office of Censorship, trained in censorship techniques, and equipped with the required knowledge of German and other continental languages. The first increment of United States civilians arrived in France in March 1945, being trained and assigned at Headquarters, Civil Censorship Detachment, ETOUSA. Since that time additional increments have arrived and have been assigned to censorship duties in Germany. As of 31 July 1945, United States civilians attached to civil censorship operations were assigned as follows:

Hq Civil Censorship District	Munich Censorship Division	Frankfurt Censorship District
21	125	125
		Total 271

3. *Allied Civilians.* French civilians were recruited in the Paris area and assigned to Headquarters, Civil Censorship Detachment, ETOUSA for training and Divisional assignment. Subsequently, the policy of the French Government precluded the possibility of transferring such personnel to Germany thus necessitating the release of approximately 300 French civilians in the month of June. During the period of 10 February to 31 July 1945, numerous attempts were made to recruit qualified personnel in Belgium and the Duchy of Luxembourg. The current labor policy of these countries has been such as to preclude employment of adequate personnel and their transfer to Civil Censorship Districts in Germany. Notwithstanding, several personnel procurement teams were formed and employment surveys made in the event existing policies of these governments were modified, thus providing a new source for employment of Allied civilian personnel. Additionally, as of 31 July 1945, a survey was being made in Switzerland as to the possibilities of employing nationals and other Allied residents of that country. Allied civilians were, in the meantime, being recruited in London for civil censorship assignments in Germany. As of 31 July 1945, three increments of approximately 50 persons each had arrived at Headquarters, Civil Censorship Division for training and assignment to Civil Censorship Detachments in Germany.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. *Indigenous Personnel.* The employment of indigenous civilians is now * in the initial phase of procurement in the Munich and Frankfurt Censorship Districts under the following conditions:

a. Indigenous German civilians will be used in censorship activities and under such conditions as will present no counter-intelligence problem. Employment is effected only after a satisfactory security check of each individual has been obtained.

b. The established plan provides for sufficient numbers of army officers and War Department employees to meet the minimum staff requirements in order to supervise the estimated 3500 indigenous civilians required for civil censorship operation in Germany. As of 31 July 1945, approximately 600 indigenous civilians were employed in the Munich and Frankfurt Censorship Districts.

E. Civil Censorship Activities Prior to Surrender.

1. *Advanced Censor Sections.* Advanced Censorship Sections (mobile censorship teams) were composed of two U. S. Army officers, one enlisted man, a technician Wire Chief, specially trained in the use of electrical Civil Censorship monitoring equipment, and one EM driver. Each section was provided with a 1½ ton truck in which was mounted a special telecommunications censoring unit. At least one of the officers possessed a fluent knowledge of the German language and one other continental language and both were trained in the techniques of postal and electrical civil censorship.

The first of the Advanced Censor Sections was attached to Headquarters, Ninth U. S. Army on 7 January 1945. In addition to this section, one section was attached to the First U. S. Army, two sections attached to the Third U. S. Army, three sections attached to the Fifteenth U. S. Army, and one section to the 6th Army Group. The mission of these sections was to survey captured communications in enemy cities and towns as soon as the tactical situation permitted; to determine that all mail and telegrams had been impounded and postal and telecommunications service stopped; to examine impounded material for items of operational interest and forwarding to the nearest G 2 Documents Section, or, in the case of items of immediate local importance, to the appropriate intelligence agency; to transmit remaining communications to Headquarters, Civil Censorship Division for examination; and to maintain liaison with G-2

* 31 July, 1945

and G-5 agencies and Signals. The accomplishments of these sections in part are outlined in attached Annex G.*

2. *Special Teams.* Special Censorship Units were attached to "T" Force Groups assigned to exploit targets in the cities of Frankfurt-am-Main, Cologne [illegible] censorship station, which presumably existed there. Documents, indicating the existence of such a station, were found providing valuable information concerning German censorship not previously available. These documents were forwarded to Documents Section, SHAEF. Similar valuable intelligence material was located in Trier, particularly locations of material and electrical censorship equipment, which information was turned over to the appropriate intelligence authorities. In Frankfurt a complete censorship laboratory with testing materials and records of all communications tests by that laboratory was discovered. This cache proved to be of great value to the Signal Intelligence Division of the War Department in study of German Intelligence methods.

3. *Information and Records.* The requirements of this headquarters, SHAEF Staff Sections, the US Group CC, and agencies of Allied Governments, have been ascertained, the information collated, and distributed to appropriate users and Censorship Districts.

A Zone Watch List comprised of names received from SHAEF has been prepared at this headquartrs by the G 2 Censorship Branch. The Zone Watch List has been provided to each Censorship District for use in postal and electrical censorship.

During the period from 10 February to 31 July 1945 the production of the Information and Records Division is represented in part by the following figures:

Total Submissions Received from Postal and Electrical Divisions	Total Number Allocated
4142	2995

The types of submission allocated during that period contained information on subjects of which the following are typical examples:

BUSINESS, FINANCE & ECONOMICS

(a) German Trade Relations with Foreign Countries
(b) Location of Stock, Supplies and Raw Materials
(c) Previous Metal Transactions
(d) Reports on Production of German Industry

* page 96

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(e) Black Market Operations
(f) Activities of German Banks

COMMUNICATIONS
(a) Clandestine Radio Transmitting Stations
(b) Use of Codes
(c) Attempted Evasion of Censorship

INTELLIGENCE & COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
(a) Hiding of Documents, Weapons, Valuables, etc
(b) Activities of Collaborators
(c) Concealed Addresses; Movement of Government Offices and Factories
(d) Underground Movements

POLITICS
(a) Political Statements, Publications, etc.
(b) Post-War Plans
(c) German Personages of Special Interest, Incl. Members of the NSDAP and Related Organizations
(d) German-Japanese Relations

SCIENCE
(a) Reports on Technical Research
(b) Inventions, New Processes, etc.

MISCELLANY
Submissions of General Interest. Considerable favorable comment has been received from user agencies, e. g. G-4, Signals and Ordnance.

4. *Postal Division.*

The activities of the Postal Communications Division prior to VE Day were mainly concerned with:

1. Development of policy and planning at this headquarters.

2. Coordinating Postal activities associated with the operations of Advanced Censor Sections attached to armies under command of this headquarters.

3. Establishing a Postal Division Training program for use in training military, U. S. and Allied civilian personnel at Headquarters, Civil Censorship Division, Districts "A" and "B" and the Munich and Frankfurt Censorship Distrits.

Examination and sorting of captured postal communications sent to the rear by Advanced Censor Sections produced valuable intelligence information which was disseminated by the Information and Records Division. The production

record for the period from 10 February 1945 to 31 July 1945, was represented by the following figures

Pieces Sorted	Pieces Examined	Submissions
1,594,194	834,175	2737

These totals do not include captured mail which was collected, sorted and dispatched to British Postal and Telegraph Censorship, or other communications allocated to G-2 Documents, SHAEF, Security Control Technique, Paris and other Allied Censorship agencies for further action by those agencies.

Close liaison was established by the Postal Division at this headquarters with other Staff Sections, SHAEF, U. S. Group C. C. and other Allied censorship groups and contributed substantially to the coordination of the overall inter-Allied censorship plans and policy.

5. *Electrical Communications Division.* The activities of the Electrical Communications Division prior to VE Day were mainly concerned with:

1. Development of policy and planning at this headquarters.

2. Coordinating censorship operations of Advanced Censorship Sections (mobile teams) attached to armies under command of this headquarters.

3. Establishing an Electrical Communications Division training program for use in training military, U. S. and Allied civilian personnel at Headquarters, Civil Censorship Division, Districts "A" and "B", and the Munich and Frankfurt Censorship Districts.

4. Examination of captured telecommunications material such as telegrams and cablegrams sent to the rear areas by Advanced Censor Sections, which has proved a valuable source of intelligence information.

In conjunction with the overall civil censorship plan, constant liaison was maintained by the Electrical Division with 21st Army Group and other Allied and U. S. agencies contributing to the integrated Allied-American civil censorship plan and policy. Technical equipment and qualified personnel were made available to Allied Censorship Groups in liberated territories, principally Belgium and Luxembourg.

During the operational phases of the European campaign it was necessary frequently to permit limited means of communication to German nationals which would be of assistance to Military Government for the operation of essential services such as power lines, canals, mines and railroads. The reopening of such services have been coordinated by the G-2, Censorship Branch Electrical Communications Group with other Staff Sections, with SHAEF and with the pertinent U. S. Armies under control of this headquarters. When these

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

channels of communications were authorized this headquarters directed the assignment of civil censorship units to exercise surveillance to ascertain that approved channels of communication were utilized as intended.

Civil Censorship Activities. Since cessation of hostilities the emphasis of this branch was placed on the physical establishment of its operating agencies. District Censorship Stations were obtained prior to VE Day at Munich-Pullach and Frankfurt-Offenbach, Germany, known as Frankfurt Censorship District and Munich Censorship District, Civil Censorship Division. Censorship personnel were transferred immediately from Headquarters, Civil Censorship Division, and Districts "A" and "B". Communications then recently captured were shipped to the Frankfurt and Munich Censorship Districts where censorship action was taken. Advanced Censor Sections were returned by the armies to which attached and assigned to duty at the Frankfurt and Munich Censorship Districts. Local telephone and postal censorship operations were established as communications on a limited basis were gradually reopened by Military Government. Use of a limited number of mobile units for local surveillance was planned and a censorship group assigned for duty at the Bremen Enclave.

Civilian personnel recruitment to provide personnel in sufficient numbers for the accomplishment of the civil censorship mission in Germany continued as a matter of immediate importance. Recruiting teams were engaged in personnel procurement in the United Kingdom and the United States and initial plans drawn up for a similar program in Switzerland.

Close liaison with 21st Army Group, US Group CC and other Allied Censorship organizations was established with a view towards bringing to a satisfactory culmination mutual civil censorship problems.

CIVIL CENSORSHIP ORGANIZATION
12th Army Group



ANNEX A

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CIVIL CENSORSHIP
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION
DISTRICT ORGANIZATION



ANNEX B

ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
DISTRICT ORGANIZATION



ANNEX C

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

POSTAL DIVISION

DISTRICT ORGANIZATION



ANNEX D

INFORMATION AND RECORDS DIVISION

DISTRICT ORGANIZATION



ANNEX E

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

15 January 1945

CIVIL CENSORSHIP IN GERMANY

1. GENERAL. Based upon directives received from higher Headquarters, this Headquarters will establish policy and supervise the operation of Civil Censorship within areas of Germany occupied by forces under command of this Headquarters.

a. Civil Censorship as defined herein is the censorship control of civilian postal and electrical communications and communications carried by civilian travelers.

b. It will not include the censorship of:

(1) Communications to or from Allied military personnel.

(2) Communications to or from civilians who are attached to the military establishments of the United Nations.

(3) Communications to or from prisoners of war or civilian internees held in Germany by the Allied military authorities.

(4) Press and press service material.

(5) Radio broadcast scripts.

(6) Commercial motion picture film.

2. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES. Civil Censorship will be conducted under the direct operational control of the A C of S, G 2 (Censorship Branch) of this Headquarters and will be operated in the field by the several Censorship District Controllers and their Civil Censorship operational staffs.

a. Civil Censorship operational staffs will be composed of:

(1) U. S. military personnel to be attached for administration only to Military Districts from the Civil Censorship Detachment, European Theater of Operations.

(2) U. S. civilians requisitioned by Civilian Procurement Branch, European Theater of Operations.

b. The Civil Censorship operational staffs will supervise and direct:

(1) Civilians of other than U. S. nationality requisitioned by Civilain Procurement Branch, European Theater of Operations.

(2) Civilians recruited locally by Censorship District Controllers.

c. The administration of all censorship personnel will be the responsibility of the command to which they will be attached. They will be attached to the

Headquarters of the Military District in which the censorship operation is located.

d. In addition to Tables of Distribution and Allowances authorized for Censorship needs, use will be made of local resources for operating establishments, supplies and equipment.

e. The national communication channels in Germany, which govern the boundaries of censorship districts, do not coincide with and are not adaptable to the military district boundaries in the U. S. zone of responsibility. Consequently, it is contemplated that post hostilities control will be exercised by the establishment of Censorship District Stations at Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich. Field stations for travel censorship and electrical communications control will be established as required.

f. Elements of the authorized U. S. increment of military personnel and equipment used in areas occupied by forces not under command of this Headquarters, when relieved of their assignments, will revert to this command for use in post hostilities Censorship operations.

g. Where areas which will ultimately be in the British sphere have been initially occupied by U. S. forces, British censorship officers will be attached to U. S. Commands for liaison. The responsibility for Censorship control will remain with the U. S. Commander until the area is transferred to British control. During the period of U. S. occupancy the British censorship officers will take no initiating action unless required by the U. S. Commander to take such action.

3. FUNCTION. a. Civil Censorship will contribute to security by restricting the dissemination of information detrimental to the Allied cause.

b. It will also collect and distribute all available information which will aid in:

(1) Prosecution of continued military operations.

(2) The destruction of the German National Socialist Party and its affiliates.

(3) Disarmament of Germany.

(4) Detection of underground military, para-military, secret intelligence and political bodies.

(5) Maintenance of law and order.

(6) Enforcement of the terms of the Surrender instrument.

(7) Security of Allied Forces.

(8) Control and stabilization of the value of currency.

(9) Detection and recovery of loot.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(10) The prevention of communication between persons in Germany and persons in countries still at war with the United Nations.

(11) Uncovering activities of German organizations among Germans abroad and revealing German propaganda activities abroad.

4. SUSPENSION OF CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS. All civilian use of postal and electrical communications channels (internal, external and transit) is suspended as soon as areas of Germany are occupied by forces of this command. Public Law No. 79 and "Instructions to the Reichspost Minister to Govern Services and Activities of the Reichspost in the Supreme Commander's Area of Control", promulgated by Military Government, discontinue civilian communication services.

5. REOPENING OF CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS. a. Concurrent with the military advance the following principles will govern the reopening of communications facilities for normal civilian use. Consideration to the progressive authorization of communications for civilian use in addition to essential civil official and private traffic would be entirely prompted by the desire to assist effective Military Government control and to avoid the development of clandestine channels of communications. Approval of the reopening of any communications facilities would depend upon:

(1) The tactical situation and security perequisite;
(2) Consideration for the administrative needs of the community;
(3) The ability of Censorship to effect adequate control;
(4) The availability of communications facilities in excess of military needs.

b. In reopening communications the following categories and authority for approval are established:

(1) Intra-city communications. Purely local communications within a single village, town or city may be reopened by Military Government of the Army with the approval of the A C of S, G-2, with concurrence of the Signal Officer, of the Army occupying the area concerned. Armies may delegate this responsibility to G-2's and Military Government representatives of lower echelons.

(2) Inter-city communications. (a) Communications for ordinary civilian use between cities, towns or villages within an Army area will not be reopened without the specific authorization of the Commanding General of the Army concerned in each instance. This authority will not be delegated. This Headquarters will be kept advised of all such communications authorized.

(b) Communications for ordinary civilian use from one Army area to another will not be reopened without specific authorization of the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.

(c) The administrative requirements of Military Government may necessitate the institution of courier service and the use of privately operated telephone lines (for the operation of mines, canals, railways and electric power installations) which would leave the confines of individual communities and circulate within the Army Group area. The establishment of essential services of this nature will be effected as indicated in (2) (a) and (b) above.

(3) External communications. Any communications channel which crosses the Army Group boundary into the area of another Army Group or any external communication channel which crosses the national frontier of Germany into another country will require the specific authorization of Supreme Headquarters or corresponding governing body. In the event of prolonged hostilities, consideration may be given to authorizing the reopening of the following types of external communications:

(a) Communications of displaced persons in Germany.
(b) Prisoner of war and civilian internees held by the Allies outside of Germany.
(c) International Red Cross and Vatican messages.
(d) Official communications of Allied agencies.
(e) Diplomatic communications to and from accredited scources.

6. CENSORSHIP OPERATIONS PRIOR TO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES Prior to cessation of hostilities Censorship control will be exercised by the attachment of Advanced Censor Sections to Army Headquarters (G-2 Sections). These Sections will be composed of two officers and two enlisted men and will be mobile units with necessary supplies and equipment. Advanced Censor Sections will apply Censorship control and assist in maintaining the security of the forces by:

a. Ascertaining that unauthorized communications services are suspended.

b. Properly coordinating the reopening of any communication facility for civilian use.

c. Applying spot-check examination and monitoring to authorized communications.

d. Assisting in the exploitation of impounded mail and matter found in telecommunication agencies and turning over to appropriate intelligence formations such material as is found to be of immediate operational value.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

e. Arranging for the disposal of residual impounded material.

f. Reporting to the Censorship Branch of this Headquarters the status and physical condition of communications facilities for purposes of implementing subsequent Censorship control.

g. Arranging, under direction of the Censorship Branch of this Headquarters, for the transfer of Censorship control to military authorities ultimately responsible for the area.

7. CENSORSHIP OPERATIONS AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

a. Upon cessation of hostilities, it is planned that Censorship stations will be established at Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Munich to exercise control within the Censorship Districts of the U. S. zone of occupation. The A C of S, G-2 (Censorship Branch) will:

(1) Furnish personnel to establish and operate the District Stations, Travelers Censorship control points and Electrical Communications field stations. (See para 2. a. (1) and (2).)

(2) Develop and suggest revisions to Censorship Regulations governing the use of authorized facilities by the public.

(3) Issue operating procedures and instructions for uniform application by District Censorship units.

(4) Direct, in conjunction with Military Government, the routing of communications to insure availability to Censorship control.

(5) Coordinate the gradual reopening of communications.

(6) Upon the reopening of external communications direct the technical procedures required to afford Allied Censorship control.

(7) Issue instructions on percentages of examination and direct examination concentration as necessary.

(8) Maintain liaison with Staff Sections and civilian user agencies.

(9) Procure and distribute watch lists.

(10) Distribute Requirements Guides.

(11) Distribute information derived from Censorship at Army Group level and transmit information for allocation above Army Group level.

b. The District Censorship Controller and his Civil Censorship operational staff will establish and direct operations within the Censorship District and will:

(1) Apply procedures and instructions in accordance with operational instructions received from the Censorship Branch of this Headquarters.

(2) Recruit personnel as required in addition to that furnished. (See para 2. b. (2).)

8. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS. Direct communication between this Headquarters and Censorship District Controllers and laterally between Censorship District Controllers is authorized on matters affecting the technical phases of Censorship operation. Military District Commanders will be kept informed on matters affecting Censorship operations.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

Official:
Raymond Stone, Jr.
Colonel, AGD
Actg Adjutant General

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

First U. S. Army

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER (BAGS) POST	TELE	PHYS CAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Aachen	—	—	Intra-city deliveries only. Suburban service held up pending location of suitable postoffice space and sufficient personnel.	Automatic switchboard operated under direction of Military Gov't	Section moved to Aachen three months after capture. Activity there consists of close liaison with PTT, CIC and MG and control of communications authorized and established. Spot check of mail and telephone calls is made. Initally only official mail permitted since 19 March inter-city personal mail has been permitted. Approximately 50% mail censored and 600 telephone calls (percentage unknown) monitored during March. Little of interest to censorship discovered during March.
Bonn	18	2	Not stated		Captured communications spot-checked for immediate tactical and CI information, and dispatched to Civ Cen Det for censorship action. Portion of Hitler Youth files from Bonn and NSDAP files found in Flamersheim turned over to CIC.
Flamersheim	6	—	Not stated		
Cologne	247		Most Offices damaged; one being put into operable condition	Two of six stations operable and most underground cables in process of repair. 28 lines now open to MG and city officials	First class mail from all stations and railroad cars impounded and shipped to Civ Cen Det for censorship action. Liaison maintained with CIC and MG. Registration of Postal and Telephone employees accomplished by MG. Telephone employees being put to work.

ANNEX G

Third U. S. Army

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER [BAGS] POST	TELE	PHYS CAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Trier			Damaged or Destroyed	Equipment removed from main station and apparently installed in bunker under Signal Corps Control	Section investigated Main and Branch Post Offices, which were out of operating condition: Gas and Water Co. offices, where it immobilized switchboard with 100 operable lines (switchboard parts and plan of water and electrical lines turned over to MG); Power Station; Police Station; Railway Office; Brewery; Cigarette Factory. All power plants and communications system either controlled by MG or rendered inoperable. Report of existence of small censorship station investigated — Nothing found.
Andernach	9	Several rolls teletype	Small office in large bldg.	Building and equipment in good condition	Equipment in main telephone building in good condition. Civilians living in building were moved out. Principal buildings checked and electrical equipment put under control of MG immobilized. Signal plans referred to Sig Sec by special courier.
Koblenz	?	1	Destroyed	Automatic exchange destroyed. Some equipment and cables in basement including long distance board & teletype operable.	Principal buildings investigated: mostly destroyed. Some books and diagrams found and turned over to 3rd Army Documents Section. Some scattered postal matter found. MG sorting and storing for Censorship. Signal Corps was investigating possibility of reopening some of the cables.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Third U. S. Army

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER (BAGS) POST	TELE	PHYSICAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Birkenfeld	2	—	Not stated	Exchange operating	MG was notified that Telephone Exchange was operating and later reported service had been discontinued.
Niederbrombach		—	Not stated	Switchboard operable	Electricity all that was needed to put board into operation. Small amount of mail impounded.
Oberstein	8	—	Not stated	Switchboard and teletype operable	Packages found containing spare parts for machinery for local factory turned over to MG; Documents Section notified, 414 RM stored in Post Office safe — MG notified. Copies of telegrams sent and received JAN—MARCH '45 found.
Kirn	1/2	—	Not stated	Underground cable being used by S.g. C. Remainder of Comm. destroyed.	Documents found in PO referred to Documents Section.
Bad Kreuznach	9	—	Not stated	All destroyed	Contact made with MG
Mainz	3	—	Not stated	Station gutted destroyed but power panel getting power from batteries. S.g C had cut undergr. cables	Contact made with MG. Evidence that Germans had attempted to burn mail before evacuating.

Third U. S. Army

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

In the city of Hof a process for searching for secret writing in German mails by the German Censorship station was disclosed and forwarded to the Signal Intelligence Division. Additionally, names of German censorship personnel were obtained providing a valuable source of information concerning German censorship activities.

Periodic contacts were made with sections of Headquarters, 3rd Army: CIC, Allied Censorship Group, SIS, G-5, Enemy Documents Section, PWB, XX Corps Staff, MG. Also Headquarters, VIII and XII Corps, G-2, S.g C and G-5.

6th Army Group

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER [BAGS] POST	TELE	PHYSICAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Strasbourg	119		Damaged	Not stated	Mail found had been looted. Mail postmarked to within 3 days of capture. All dispatched to Civ Cen Det for treatment
Brumath	5	—	Not stated	Not stated	Impounded and shipped to Civ Cen Det.
Hagenau Bischwiller Erstein Benfeld	Small Amount	—	Not stated	Not stated	Germans had removed most records including Feldpost from Hagenau and Bischwiller
Mulhouse	54	—	Destroyed	Not stated	Regular, registered, and Feldpost mail obtained from Allied Censorship Group, France. Documents containing SS codes turned over to appropriate G-2 Section.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6th Army Group

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER [BAGS] POST	TELE	PHYSICAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Saarbrucken	—	—	Destroyed	Partially destroyed.	Post office was moved prior to the capture of the city to Hassloch. Main Post Office completely destroyed. Branch located in bunker on Richard Wagner str. Main telephone exchange still in operating condition (see below).
Dudweiler	20	1	Undamaged	Undamaged	———
Sulzbach	3	1	Umdamaged	Undamaged	———
Fishbach Kamphausen			Destroyed	Destroyed	———
Spiesen	—	—	Undamaged	Undamaged	———
St. Ingbert	14	1	Undamaged	Destroyed	Has 14 branch post offices in neighboring towns. Distributor board of telephone system destroyed by German soldiers.
Pirmasens	3	1	Undamaged	No information.	Post office showed evidence of large-scale looting.
Kaiser-lautern	23	5			Main post office and telecommunications were largely destroyed by bombing. Branch post offices, however, undamaged. All telecommunication facilities were removed to Lothinger Dell, a suburb, and are in excellent condition.

6th Army Group

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER [BAGS] POST	TELE	PHYSICAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Neustadt	3	1	Partially destroyed	Undamaged	Telecommunications system after bombing of Post Office was moved to another section of town and is in excellent condition.
Landau	10	2	Partially destroyed	Destroyed	
Speyer	20	2	Undamaged	Undamaged	Head office of Pfalz-Westmark postal area located here.
Ludwigs-hafen	1	1		Destroyed	Main postoffice destroyed and moved to store building. Branch PO located in bunker and undamaged. One other branch PO destroyed.
Frankenthal	1	1	Undamaged	Undamaged	Post office looted. Teletype tape secured here
Gleisweiler	3	—	Undamaged	Undamaged	Location of Feldpost. Completely cleaned out by enemy.
Bad Durkheim	3	—	Damaged	Damaged	
Mannheim	1	1			Main and railroad PO's completely destroyed 2Branch PO's are located in school buildings PO appears to have been moved to one of surrounding towns. Location uncertain. Records of PO are in air raid shelter of Fort bildungsschule, U-2.
Worms	14	1	Destroyed	Badly damaged	Branch PO undamaged

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

TOWN	CAPTURED MATTER [BAGS] POST	TELE	PHYSICAL STATUS COMM FACILITIES POST	TELE	REMARKS
Hassloch	—	—	Undamaged	Undamaged	Saarbrucken PO has been moved across Rhine location unknown.
Bensheim	—	1	Undamaged	Undamaged	Mail was burned by German soldiers quartered in PO building prior to retreat. Telegrams were untouched. Telegram tapes were secured at Railroad station.
Heidelberg	180	—	Undamaged	Undamaged	Telephone batteries damaged. Telegram records burned by Stortruppen. Teletype lines also destroyed. Railroad collecting point and mail cars looted. Feld-Postleitstelle 500 located in RR station. Feldpostleitstelle 587 captured intact. Mail considered of documentary value turned over to T Force documents station. Feldpostleitstelle on Theater Street (Harmonie Bldg) cleaned out by German civilians before capture of town. Feldpostleitstelle at Faffengrund, a suburb, in Auto halle Bldg. was cleaned out by German troops. 2 Feldpost installations in Main PO: one for readdressing and forwarding mail intended for occupied Alsace, other for handling disrupted communications with Mannheim: were both bare when examined. 3 bags of registered mail were taken.
Darmstadt	40	1/2	Destroyed	Intact	Electrical equipment moved to basement of main PO after bombing. Has telephone capacity of 900 subscribers. There are 30 teletype lines only four of which were in use. Teletype used only by commercial firms. Branch offices in suburbs checked.

OPERATIONAL REPORTS
ADVANCED CENSOR SECTIONS

Liaison maintained with appropriate Staff Sections at Headquarters, 6th Army Group, as well as 7th U.S. Army, 1st French Army, and XXI Corps.

9th U. S. Army

Sections attached to 9th Army, because of manner in which armies have been grouped, have made most of its reports to 21 Army Group. Consequently, little detailed information is available. The Section found 15 miles of operating telephone lines in a mine at Alsdorf which was considered by Military Government officials necessary to the operation of the mine. Since operation was determined to be a negligible security hazard, and all calls were monitored at the switchboard by the operator, a Dutch national employed by Military Government, it was left open. At the request of the CI, Dutch civilian telephone lines in Kerkrade and Heerlen were monitored in January for four days. Security and signal discipline were found to be good, and nothing of a suspicious character was discovered.

15th U. S. Army

Three sections attached to 15th U.S. Army were transferred to that Army from the First and Third Armies when these Armies relinquished control of that area of the Rhineland subsequently occupied by the 15th U.S. Army. These sections were assigned, one each, to the cities of Cologne, Aachen, and Duesseldorf providing for all postal and telecommunications censorship in the areas in the vicinity of these cities. In the city of Cologne the advanced censor Section, in the course of postal examination, discovered the existence of unauthorized meetings of German groups as well as the use of stenographic codes in postal communications. These violations were reported to appropriate intelligence authorities.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART VII

G-2

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

REPORT

12TH ARMY GROUP

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART VII

INTRODUCTION TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANNEXES AND CHARTS

Annex A of this report describes the counterintelligence organization, states its mission, and lists the agencies at its disposal; Annex B sets forth the Standing Operating Procedure of Counterintelligence in First US Army Group, and describes security control and other CI operations in liberated countries; Annex C includes the Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, and describes security control and other CI operations within Germany. The five charts which follow the Annexes illustrate the accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission in Germany by showing graphically, on a weekly basis: the number of CI arrestees of all categories (Chart 1); the number of arrestees belonging to the German Intelligence Services (Chart 2); the number of NSDAP officials arrested (Chart 3); the number of arrestees who were members of German para-military organizations (Chart 4); and the number of incidents of CI interest (Chart 5).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

I. The Counterintelligence Mission

In general, the mission of counterintelligence agencies was to secure our forces from espionage, sabotage, and subversion; to destroy all enemy intelligence services, and all police agencies and affiliated para-military organizations; to assist in the dissolution of the NSDAP and its affiliates, and to prevent their rebirth in any form; to aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps and of the equivalent officers of the German Air Force and the German Navy and to insure the detention of selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

II. The Counterintelligence Organization

The organization of counterintelligence agencies was predicated upon the necessity, first, of maintaining tactical counterintelligence operations during the advance into Germany; and, second, of establishing a static counterintelligence organization to cover progressively conquered areas in Germany.

Tactical operations were maintained by counterintelligence personnel attached to divisions and corps. This personnel provided for the security of troops, located, searched and isolated targets of counterintelligence value; and apprehended personalities of obvious counter intelligence interest, interrogating them for material of immediate local interest before sending them back for further processing. Other personnel, from higher echelons, took over the tasks of static counterintelligence coverage when corps and divisions moved forward.

As our forces advanced into Germany, territory was opened which required static CI operations. Under this phase informant nets were established, exploitation of known CI targets was continued, documents captured from the enemy intelligence and police services were exploited, many additional personalities were apprehended, and interrogation centers were established for the detailed questioning of all prisoners of special interest.

In addition personnel was required for control operations on the frontier, for river crossings and in major cities and areas.

III. Counterintelligence Agencies

To aid in accomplishing its mission, the counterintelligence organization had as its major operational agencies, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Special Counter Intelligence Detachment of the Office of Strategic Services, and Counter Intelligence Liaison personnel from the French, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Luxembourg Security Services. Each of these agencies is treated more in detail in the paragraphs which follow.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

A. Counterintelligence Corps:

1. In the early part of June 1944, a small group of CIC personnel, numbering approximately one officer and nine agents, was transferred from Headquarters ETOUSA to Headquarters FUSAG. This group served as a nucleus for the CIC Detachment which was to operate under CIB, 12 Army Group and XIII Corps. Later in June and July 1944, the group was augmented by CIC personnel recently arrived from the Zone of the Interior. A part of the CIC Detachment accompanied the elements of FUSAG which landed in France 14 July 1944, and the remainder arrived later in July and August. When finally FUSAG had completed its move from Bryanston Square to the apple orchards of Normandy, the CIC Detachment numbered approximately 6 officers and 26 agents. The early days in Normandy, like the days in London, were spent mainly in training and preparing the personnel for its mission on the Continent. Security surveys were conducted, security lectures were given to the headquarters personnel, and in addition, agents gave a series of lectures about France and its people. Finally in August 1944, the 12th Army Group CIC Detachment became operational with the headquarters and started on a mission that was to take it through France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland and into the heart of Germany with the Divisions, corps and armies. The story of CIC and the part it played while serving with Headquarters 12th Army Group is not related here in great detail, but the general information furnished herein gives a good conception of the organization, mission and accomplishments of the detachment.

2. The 12th Army Group CIC Detachment included two separate elements. One element consisting of two officers and four agents, was responsible for the administration of all CIC personnel attached to Headquarters 12th Army Group, and was the channel between higher and subordinate headquarters on all matters pertaining to the Counter Intelligence Corps. The other group, consisting of one headquarters team and seven reserve teams, comprised the operational arm of the detachment. The entire detachment was designated as the 418th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, and operated under the direction of the Chief, CIB for the AC of S, G 2, Headquarters 12th Army Group.

3. The mission of the 418th CIC Detachment may be divided into the following general classifications: The Administrative Section, to insure the proper administration of all CIC personnel of 418th CIC Detachment and to serve as the 12th Army Group channel between higher and subordinate commands for all corps matters. Headquarters Team, to provide maximum security for the 12th Army Group headquarters installation, by coordinating and supervising the implementation of all measures established and applied to

achieve this end. Reserve Teams, attached to subordinate units to operate under the direction of the AC of S, G 2 of the unit to which it was attached. The mission of the Headquarters Team and Reserve Teams can further be broken down into the following operational functions:

a. To arrest, as directed, any person constituting a threat to the security of the Allied Armed Forces including leaders of all enemy inspired parties or affiliated organizations.

b. To investigate cases of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

c. To search buildings, billets and installations known or suspected to contain documents of CI value and to report findings to the appropriate G-2 or S 2.

d. To cooperate with Civil Affairs or Military Government Provost Marshals regarding security requirements involved in the marshalling and security screening of refugees.

e. To coordinate with Civil Affairs or Military Government the establishment of check points for traffic security control and to screen applicants for traval permits.

f. To conduct security surveys and make continual security checks for protection against sabotage of vital military, public and private installations.

g. To check, in coordination with Civil Affairs or Military Government, the observance by the civilian population of all security provisions published by Civil Affairs or Military Government and to make recommendations to Military Government for added measures or for improvement in the enforcement thereof.

h. To recommend to Civil Affairs or Military Governments the removal of unreliable officials.

i. To investigate civilians employed by the army in capacities which might endanger classified information or equipment.

j. To report all trends of civil dissension to the appropriate G-2.

4. In accomplishing its mission, the 418th CIC Detachment overcame a number of problems. The greatest of these was the shortage of linguists and trained interrogators. A program of local procurement brought considerable relief, and a large number of qualified linguists were transferred from tactical units into the Counterintelligence Corps and assigned to the 418th CIC Detachment. This personnel was then assigned to various teams in the field where they received training in the operational technique of the Counterintelligence Corps. Another factor which, at first, detracted from the effectiveness of the Corps was the limited knowledge within the army concerning the Counterintelligence

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Corps and its function. After a few months in the field and considerable effective work, CIC and the reason for its existence became known. The respect for the corps grew, and its value to the US Army became more and more apparent as time went on. The actual operation of one of the 418th CIC Reserve Teams is illustrated in the following report from one of the Teams:

"The Reserve Team was formed in England in June 1944, and consisted of 2 officers and 15 agents.

"Shortly after its formation, the team moved to an invasion marshalling area in Cornwall, where it assumed control of the security of approximately 120 individual camps containing ultimately thirty thousand troops. The work involved complete security surveys of each camp with recommending changes in physical set-up, and guard systems, and rechecks to see that these recommendations were carried out. Constant patrolling, security lectures to troops, and daily conferences and reports were carried out prior to the invasion of France.

"Later in June, the team began to assemble to complete preparations for movement to France. Security lectures were given to officers and men. Jeeps were waterproofed, firing exercises were held, equipment was put in order, and on D plus 23, the team sailed in a Liberty Ship across the Channel. After one night spent off Omaha Beach, the ship moved to Utah Beach where the team disembarked and proceeded inland to a field near Carentan.

"12 July 1944 — the team took over CIC coverage of a town and ten surrounding villages. The central office and living quarters were located in a chateau in the middle of a large replacement depot. A branch office was established in Town "A" and two men were sent to Town "B" on liaison with corps. Hundreds of refugees were screened, and a highlight of the numerous cases investigated was a two-week nightly surveillance of an espionage suspect conducted in open fields under air-raids. A system of case records and methods of investigation was instituted here which provided the foundation of the team's experience thereafter and which furnished teams that followed with orderly records and useful procedures which were not available when this team landed in France.

"In August 1944 — the team moved to another city where investigation of numerous cases was started. Within two days the detachment was ordered transferred to another army and set out across the front for Brittany. The last stage of this trip was made through enemy controlled territory over a road which was not deemed safe for travel except by highly armed units until more than a week afterwards.

"In August 1944 — the team was split into four groups, each serving with a different corps.

"Group 1,consisting of 7 men, left for Western Brittany [illegible] which took it through enemy held country, where one party of Germans was wiped out only five minutes before CIC reached a possible ambush. It arrived in a newly liberated town which was held by three hundred cavalry men, the only Americans in Western Brittany with the exception of several battalions containing forty thousand Germans at Brest, a few kilometers away. Road blocks were set up near the town and the team operated in the city until the surrounding country was liberated. Among several espionage cases, the team was responsible for producing evidence which resulted in execution of a leading French Milicien of Western Brittany. Agents were frequently the first Americans in the towns investigated, and many searches of enemy headquarters, some of them mined, were undertaken. The group then moved to another city to join an assault team in the battle of Brest. Searches were conducted of a Naval Arsenal 150 yards from the German front lines until time-fused 88's drove the agents out. A heavily mined German ack-ack strong point and series of caves were searched for enemy agents. During the last week of the battle of Brest, agents operated in the city as close as two blocks to the fighting and immediately upon surrender searched headquarters and many block houses of the city.

"Group 2, 2 officers and 3 agents, left for another city which was expected to fall to Americans within a day or two. Upon arrival, the group discovered that with the exception of two US paratroopers and Civil Affairs personnel, no other Americans were present. Searches of headquarters, and enemy installations, not yet checked by engineers, were made, refugees were screened, deserters were picked up, and the basic Counter Intelligence plan was developed. From here the group went to another village, then five hundred yards in front of American infantry positions before Lorient. CIC operations were carried on despite shelling which eventually destroyed the town. When FFI's joined the CIC in the town an enemy patrol assaulted their barracks with machine gun from a point near the CIC office. The office was finally evacuated by order of the Infantry Commander and the group moved to a point just behind American outposts.

"In September 1944 — 1 officer and 6 agents set up an office in a small town in front of American positions before the German lines outside St. Nazaire. This town had a garrison of 40 FFI's and was frequently circled at night by German patrols; resulting fire fights rendered it impossible to operate at night.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

During this operation thousands of refugees, some of them wounded by 88's, were removed from No Man's Land and screened at the front by CIC.

"In October 1944, the team was again brought together and screened more than 12,500 refugees evacuated from St. Nazaire, through the lines by train to Nantes.

"In December 1944, part of the team consisting of 5 agents took over a town in Germany in rear division area. Here 25 enemy paratroopers descended on the town the night the German counter-offensive began and in daylight attacked installations in the town and traffic on the road. The team directed and participated in the round-up operation and one paratrooper was captured by an agent of the detachment. This area contained numerous German soldiers in civilian clothes, and 31 of them were taken after separate investigations had obtained confessions. During early January, the balance of the team rejoined this group to assist in operations. Since the town contained QM depots, there were several air-raids at night and low level attacks in the daytime. During the counter-offensive the detachment was alone in the area with a small division Military Government Detachment. Although the whole rear area was empty of troops, CIC agents patrolled it day and night to give the impression that there were American troops behind the two regiments holding the line. Later more than 10,000 inhabitans were registered and screened by CIC. The team had actually served under division conditions of operation nearly 80 percent of the time in the eight months of its activities on the Continent. Besides serving on an assault team, the team has operated as part of several divisions, four corps, and three armies. Most of the corps operations were in division territory and under combat conditions, the detachment rarely being out of artillery range, and operating without relief during the entire eight months."

The above gives an idea of how some teams operated under tactical conditions. Other teams enjoyed a more peaceful existence being designated for town work and entering only after the fighting ceased and conditions had become quiet. Nevertheless, their task was just as great and their part just as important.

5. In the fall and winter of 1944, the Administrative Section of the 418th CIC Detachment was assigned the task of planning the organization of a CIC Detachment for the occupation of Germany. This required an extensive and flexible CIC organization which would assist in the accomplishment of the CI mission in Germany. The strength of the CIC Detachment of 12th Army Group was not sufficient at that time to accomplish fully the assigned mission, and action was taken to supplement the personnel with additional CIC officers and

agents from other commands, and to effect a partial reorganization of the 12th Army Group Counterintelligence Corps. In order to do this, plans were made to activate a single CIC Detachment consisting of 323 officers and 1100 agents organized into appropriate teams in accordance with T/O & E 30 503. Personnel would be made available for the organization by the simultaneous inactivation of other detachments and portions of detachments. The bulk of the "Occupation Detachment" would then consist of approximately 83 teams each composed of 3 officers and 11 agents. The balance of the detachment would consist of various headquarters teams. Appropriate types of teams would then be placed on detached service with SHAEF, Army Group, Armies, Communications Zone, Headquarters of the Port Enclave and the Berlin Military District Headquarters. The reorganization would necessarily reduce the division detachments, but would not affect those on duty with army or corps. Detachments remaining with the tactical units were to accompany them in the event of redeployment of the unit, but all officers and agents who possessed particular qualifications of value to CI operations in this theater would be transferred into the "Occupation Detachment". In order to effect the transfer of large numbers of personnel incident to the inactivation of certain detachments and the activation of the "Occupation Detachment", it was necessary for the 418th CIC Detachment to increase its administrative staff in order to handle the task facing it. This was gradually accomplished.

6. On 10 May 1945, Theater Headquarters published orders activating the 970th CIC Detachment and at the same time inactivated the 418th CIC Detachment, as well as a number of other detachments. The 970th CIC Detachment replaced the 418th CIC Detachment as the 12th Army Group CIC Detachment and prepared itself for its role in the occupation of Germany. Today the 970th CIC Detachment consists of approximately 300 officers and 1100 agents. Teams of the 970th CIC Detachment are on duty with the armies, 6th Army Group, the Bremen Enclave, Norway, the Berlin Military District Headquarters, and Communication Zone units. The entire United States Zone of Occupation including the frontier is covered by CIC of Headquarters 12th Army Group. Static CIC teams are on duty in every city of a reasonable size, border teams cover the frontier and internal security teams are on duty with numerous headquarters for the purpose of providing security for those installations. Special investigative personnel has been brought together to form groups for the specific task of conducting investigations throughout the United States Zone of Occupation. The supply section of 970th CIC Detachment is equipped to provide everything from pencils to jeeps to over 100 teams in the field. The Administrative Section

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

has also expanded in order to be able to administer effectively "Occupation Detachment". With the first few weeks bringing encouraging results, 970th CIC Detachment is prepared to carry out its mission.

B. Special Counterintelligence Units

In the spring of 1943, a small group of Americans from the counter-espionage branch of the Office of Strategic Services, arrived in England. They joined a small group of British scholars and specialists who had been studying the German Secret Services since the early days of the war.

The purpose of this Anglo-American group was two-fold: (1) to study in detail every aspect of German and Italian secret intelligence activity; and (2) to form, train and send out to the field small teams of Army and Navy specialists who were to advise and assist the regular counter-espionage staffs at army group and army level.

These field teams, called Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) units, were equipped both with a particular knowledge of the German secret intelligence service, built up from every conceivable source, and with special communications that gave them speedy access to the vast store of information on file in London and Washington. They were prepared both to "advise" CI staffs with special information, and to "assist" in certain secret operations directed specifically against the enemy intelligence services.

The Italian campaign of July 1943, saw the first American SCI unit in action. Its great success, from both intelligence and operational aspects, assured SCI an important place in American counter-intelligence activity in the coming invasion of France.

Through the winter and spring of 1944, in London, the training of new units, went on. The academic work of the office involved study and preparation of ever-increasing files, while small training exercises in the country near London assisted in whipping together cohesive units that were shortly to be attached to the armies and to what was then known as First US Army Group.

Although the personnel of the SCI units (except for liaison officers) was to be American in the American zone and British in the British area, the entire history of SCi was based on one fundamental fact: the whole-hearted cooperation, guidance and instruction provided by British agencies concerned. In the field of active counterespionage in Europe we Americans were mere beginners. Without reservation, the British services turned over to us their records and, even more important, their experience. Throughout the winter, the London office of the services was a truly joint intelligence operation and yet the two

services did not sacrifice their own national identity. Naturally, the SCi units whether British or American, were directed by their respective national services in conjunction with the military unit to which they were attached for operations. Throughout the campaign went not only to the armies concerned but also to a joint Anglo-American desk in London.

In April 1944, there arrived in a top floor room of Bryanston Square's famous row of houses half of the SCI Unit that was to be attached to G-2, CIB, First U.S. Army Group. The other half left London at the end of May for Portsmouth where it was attached to the American (FUSAG) element at 21st Army Group. Here it was in intimate daily contact with the British SCI unit that was to remain with Montgomery's Headquarers throughout the campaign.

Meanwhile, another section of FUSAG SCI was being organized for the specific purpose of operating a special type of counter-espionage case, which it was foreseen, was bound to arise on the Continent. A technical section, which was operated jointly with a similar British unit until the liberation of Paris, formed still another part of FUSAG SCI.

Both 1st and 21st Army Group Headquarters (and, therefore, all elements of FUSAG SCI) were still in England, when early in July the first important case that gave promise of long term exploitation was uncovered as a result of a First Army SCI CIC operation in the Contentin Peninsula. It had not been expected that SCI Units at army level would have the time or the means to exploit such cases; so on 14 July, a few days after the case had broken, the first of the army group SCI officers landed in France to exploit the operation. The operation turned out to be among the most profitable of this type of case during the entire French campaign.

By early August all sections of FUSAG's (now 12th Army Group's) SCI unit had arrived in France. The element that had been at 21st Army Group had joined that at 12th Army Group when the latter became operational. The special case section was well under way with the Cotentin case just referred to. The technical section was also operating in the field.

Virtually all 12th Army Group SCI personnel took part in the "T" Force operation at the time of the liberation of Paris. In addition to the SCI Unit attached to "T" Force, SCI officers and men from the various armies and army groups added their contribution to the cleanup of the biggest single counter-intelligence target of the European campaign.

Most of the SCI officers and men were assigned in teams to various Paris arrondissements, where they sought out the local counter-intelligence targets

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Several promising operations were discovered and before the month of September was out, two very important cases were in full swing.

With the movement of 12th Army Group Headquarters from Versailles to Verdun, 17 September 1944, the SCI Detachment opened a new chapter in its work. Some of its personnel remained in Paris to handle important French cases while another group formed the SCI Detachment, 12th Army Group, for work in Germany. Central communications were established at 12th Army Group, Verdun, to keep the Headquarters, SCI staff in contact with the field units. The SCI "T" Force unit at Luxembourg, which was partly stymied by the settling down of the campaign along the Siegfried Line, was depleted of its personnel which was transferred to the army and attached to army CIB.

Although designed to work in Germany, the SCI Detachment then began to find itself called upon to handle many cases of German agents sent through the lines or parachuted behind our lines in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland.

At the time of the Ardennes offensive, SCI officers had to pull back along with first US Army Headquarters and "T" Force Headquarters and then took part in the cleanup operations carried on in the area temporarily taken by the Germans in which German Intelligence had left stay behind agents.

When the great advance into Germany in the spring of 1945 began, SCI officers in the armies and at "T" Force moved forward with the advance. They were able to overrun and apprehend numerous stay-behind agents and they came into possession of intelligence documents which gave additional insight into German intelligence strength, personnel and methods of operation. The unit captured documents which have provided the basis for a considerable rewriting of the basic information on the German Intelligence Services.

SCI officers now began to handle cases involving German intelligence officers who began to surrender or were captured. Skillful interrogation and exploitation proved that the German intelligence official was just as ready to talk as had been the agents of other nationalities employed by the Germans. By using such officials, SCI was able to round up groups of stay-behind espionage and sabotage agents.

On 1 May 1945, the headquarters unit moved to Wiesbaden along with 12th Army Group. Not long thereafter, city units were set up in important German cities, each with its own communications tying it in with the headquarters unit which in turn was linked by direct OSS radio with Paris and London. Following the movement to Wiesbaden, the SCI Detachment was strengthened by the addition of a number of officers from Paris, OSS X-2 office. The SCI Detachment

moved to Frankfurt, 14 July, when G-2, 12th Army Group moved to Frankfurt to become part of USFET.

While in Wiesbaden, SCI assisted in handling the interrogations of a number of important German Intelligence Services officials at the Army Group Interrogation Center, including such figures as Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the RSHA and, therefore, chief of all German Intelligence.

In general it is safe to say that the SCI Detachment handled between 250-300 cases of German intelligence agents and officials and was able successfully to utilize the services of many of these agents and officials. It provided the information on the basis of which hundreds of other members of German Intelligence Services were apprehended. It located and seized thousands of cards of German Intelligence Services personnel and charts, outlines and descriptions of the GIS. SCI likewise kept going a continual stream of telegrams and reports to London to be passed on to Washington for the building up of an American counterintelligence file.

C. Allied CI Liaison Missions

1. The work of the specialist CI Missions from France, Belgium, Poland, Holland and Luxembourg has been of great assistance in the maintenance of security control over suspect nationals of these respective countries. To clarify the policy concerning the disposition of individuals of interest to the Allied CI Liaison Missions, a directive was issued by Headquarters 12th Army Group stating that, upon completion of interrogation and investigation by US CI personnel, CI arrestees of Allied nationality may be turned over to the Allied CI Liaison personnel of the interested country for extradition and trial. Similarly, this directive provided that CI arrestees of German nationality who are or were members of the GIS and who have been active in Allied countries may be turned over to Allied CI Liaison personnel of the interested country, after interrogation within the army group is completed and if such transfer is requested.

2. The following is a summary of the reports rendered by the various Allied CI Liaison Missions on their activities during their attachment to 12th Army Group.

3. French CI Liaison Mission.

a. The French CI Liaison Mission landed in France with elements of Headquarters 12th Army Group on 16 July 1944. The Mission was at the time composed of 3 officers and 2 inspectors of the Surete. This staff was gradually enlarged to reach finally a total of 60 officers and men.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Since 1 August 1944, the Mission had personnel attached to the First and Third US Armies. The Mission's staff thus participated in all the campaigns of the US Armies of this army group, from Normandy until the final defeat of Germany. Personnel of the Mission was also attached to the Ninth US Army when the latter became operational.

c. The Mission accomplished a particularly difficult and arduous task at the time of the liberation of Paris. Personnel of the Mission entered Paris, ahead of the combat troops, on 25 August 1944, with "T" Force, 12th Army Group. During the hectic days of the liberation of Paris, the Mission accomplished invaluable work in tracing and arresting wanted personalities and other subversive elements, in maintaining liaison with the FFI, the French Military Governor of Paris and other local authorities. The Mission played a considerable part in the setting up and the operation of the "T" Force Interrogation Center in Paris through which hundreds of CI personalities were processed.

d. Because of the very nature of the Mission's liaison functions, which implied assistance to the American CI staffs in an innumerable number of instances, it is not possible to express in figures the extent of the Mission's activities. In the course of its attachment to 12th Army Group and to its subordinate armies, the personnel of the Mission was, by its expert knowledge of the French counterintelligence situation, of invaluable assistance to American CI personnel and contributed greatly to the maintenance of security control in France and to the arrest of French subversive elements.

4. Belgian CI Liaison Mission.

a. The Belgian CI Liaison Mission joined 12th Army Group on 30 March 1945. The mission was composed of 6 officers and 9 Warrant officers; only a small portion of this personnel remained at army group, the remainder being dispatched to the various army headquarters operating under 12th Army Group.

b. In the course of its operations with this army group, the Belgian Mission investigated approximately 300 individual cases. Of the 300 subjects involved, 190 were transferred to Belgium through Mission. Investigation of the remaining 110 subjects was completed by the Mission, but the subjects are still at present in American custody.*

c. With the assistance of G-5 officers, the Mission effected the screening of all Belgian nationals who were repatriated to Belgium as DP's.

d. Personnel of the Mission attached to the Ninth and Third US Armies have assisted CIC in the screening of over 7000 arrestees of various nationalities.

* as of 31 July, 1945

e. These Belgian nationals who served in German military or para-military organizations (SS, NSKK, etc.), and who are now in American Prisoner of War Enclosures, were temporarily maintained in American custody. Arrangements to have these individuals collected and transferred to Belgium are being made by G-1 Section, 12th Army Group.

f. From the data furnished by arrest reports received up to this date it is estimated that there remains, at present, in the American occupational area approximately 500 arrestees, Belgian nationals and others, who will ultimately be transferred to the Belgian authorities.

g. The Belgian Mission furnished valuable assistance in the screening of personnel at the Dachau and Buchenwald Concentration Camps. The Belgian inmates of these camps were among the first evacuated. In addition, the Mission brought about the arrest of 22 suspects at Dachau and 8 at Buchenwald.

h. A constant flow of information on CI personalities was made available to the Mission by the Counter-Intelligence Branch, G-2, 12th Army Group, and helped materially in building up the Mission's personality records. Similarly, numerous leads and information obtained by the Mission in the course of its operations were transmitted to the appropriate American agencies and lead to the arrest of potential threats to the security of American troops.

i. Regularly, several copies of the lists of wanted personalities issued by the Belgian Authorities were transmitted to the Counter-Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group, for dissemination.

5. Polish Liaison Mission.

a. The Polish CI Liaison Mission, consisting of 3 officers and 8 enlisted men, joined Headquarters 12th Army Group on 10 April 1945.

b. The Mission's main task, during its attachment to 12th Army Group, consisted in the screening of the vast numbers of Polish DP's who are being cared for in DP camps. It is estimated that there were, and still are, approximately 500,000 Polish DP's in the American occupational area. They are housed in about 260 Polish DP camps. Because of lack of adequate numbers of CI personnel it was not possible to complete, to date, the screening of all Polish DP Camps. So far,* the Polish CI Mission has effected screening of a total of 130 DP Camps, located as follows: 40 camps in the Third US Army area, 5 camps in the Seventh US Army area, 50 camps in the Ninth US Army area, and 35 camps in the Fifteenth US Army area. Screening was effected of all camps located in

* 31 July, 1945

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

those sections of the Ninth US Army area which were subsequently to be occupied by Russian troops.

b. The Mission completed the screening of personnel in the following camps of Polish prisoners taken by the Germans in their 1939 campaign: Polish Officers PW camp at Murnau (approx. 5,000 officers), Polish Officers PW camp at Dossel (approx. 2,500 officers), Polish Women Officers PW Camp at Burg (approx. 500 officers).

c. In the course of its operations, the Mission also investigated and completed interrogations on 12 cases of special CI interest.

d. Lately, the Polish CI Mission has been active in screening individuals who have been infiltrating into the American occupational zone from Russian occupied Germany and Poland. The Mission has given very useful assistance in keeping a security check on these individuals who, reportedly, find it a comparatively easy task to evade the American frontier control points on the Eastern border of the American occupational zone.

e. A considerable amount of Polish CI information derived from interrogations and special cases was furnished by Counter-Intelligence Branch, G 2, 12th Army Group, to the Polish CI Mission and substantially augmented the Mission's CI records.

6. Dutch CI Liaison Mission.

a. The Dutch CI Liaison Mission, consisting of 5 officers and 7 enlisted men, joined 12th Army Group on 3 May 1945. This personnel was split up between Headquarters 12th Army Group, and Headquarters of Third, Ninth and Fifteenth US Armies. After the final establishment of the American occupational zone, the personnel attached to Ninth and Fifteenth US Armies was relieved and attached to Headquarters Bremen Port Enclave and to 21 Army Group (British).

b. Approximately 350 cases were to be handled by the Dutch Mission. Investigations on 118 of these cases were completed by the Mission's teams. The majority of the cases remaining to be handled are located in the Seventh US Army where no Dutch Liaison Officer has up to the present been accredited.*

c. 36 Dutch nationals of CI interest were transferred to Holland through the Mission.

d. In cooperation and with the knowledge of CIC, personnel of the Mission traced and arrested suspects, among them Ustuf KUP, assistant to GISKLS in FAK 307.

* July, 1945

e. The transfer to Holland of Dutch nationals who served in German military or para-military organizations and who are at present in American custody in Prisoner of War Enclosures will be handled by the Dutch Ministry of War through USFET Mission to the Netherlands.

f. It is estimated by the Dutch CI and Political Security Services that between 500 and 1,000 personalities wanted by the Dutch Government are still at large in Germany. This number covers also the British and Russian zones of occupation.

g. Personnel of the Dutch Mission were also engaged in the screening of many Dutch nationals in DP camps and in the obtaining of Dutch nationals employed by the US forces. The Mission's personnel was also active in assisting American CI stafis in screening DP's and PW's of other nationalities. All information of American interest was forwaded to the proper authorities.

7. Luxembourg CI Liaison Mission.

a. The Luxembourg CI Liaison Mission joined 12th Army Group on 20 April 1945. The Mission, consisting of two officers, had to cover CI problems of interest to Luxembourg for the entire American sector; there was no other Luxembourg CI representation with the US Armies in the field.

b. The Mission furnished extensive information to the American CI personnel on Luxembourg collaborators and subversive elements. As a result a large number of suspect Luxembourgers were arrested and turned over to the Luxembourg authorities for trial. It is estimated that approximately 150 Luxembourg collaborators are still at large in Germany.

c. The Mission was successful in locating and returning to Luxembourg a considerable amount of Luxembourg governmental records which the Germans had taken with them when they retreated from Luxembourg.

d. Among the cases of arrested renegade Luxembourgers handled by the Mission those of Zuang, Scheer, Kayser, Heintz, Folmer and Haier, all Luxembourg nationals who were in the service of the Abwehr or SD, were the most outstanding.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX B — PART I

FUSAG CI SOP

INDEX

SECTION I COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

	Page
1. General	
2. CI Planning Principles	127
3. CI Personnel	127
4. CI Operations	128
5. Special Instructions	129
	130

SECTION II CENSORSHIP

6. General	
7. Base Censorship	131
8. Civil Censorship	131
9. Captured Enemy Mail	131
10. Prisoner of War Mail	131
11. Censorship Procedures Preceding an Operation	131
12. Cameras, Photographs, and Films	131
13. Disclosures of Geographic Location	132
14. Personal Telegrams, Cablegrams, and Radiograms from the Continent	132
15. Manuscripts for Publication	132
16. Censorship of War Correspondents' Mail	132
17. Civil Communications	132
	133

ANNEX "A" — CI INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTS

1. General	
2. Responsibilities	134
3. Dissemination of Information in the Field	134
4. Documents Section	135
5. Channels of CI Information	135
6. CI Reports by Armies to FUSAG	136
EXHIBIT "A" Channels of CI Information	136
EXHIBIT "B" Form for CI Periodic Report	137
EXHIBIT "C" Annex to CI Periodic Report	138
	140

ANNEX "B" — CIC

1. General	
2. Organization	141
3. Training	141
4. Operations	141
5. Duties	141
6. Uniform	143
7. Channels of Communication	146
8. Records	146
	146

ANNEX "C" — SCI UNITS

1. General	
2. Organization	149
3. Communications	149
4. Functions	149
	149

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "D" — DETECTION OF ILLICIT RADIO TRANSMITTERS Page

1. General . . . 151
2. Organization . . . 151
3. Function . . . 151
4. Reports . . . 151
5. Liaison . . . 152

ANNEX "E" — CI LABORATORY

1. Principal Functions . . . 153
2. Mass Testing . . . 153
3. Required Information . . . 154
4. Chain of Evidence . . . 154

ANNEX "F" — SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION

1. General . . . 155
2. Spheres of Responsibility . . . 155
3. Proclamations and Ordinances . . . 155
4. Security Restrictions . . . 155
5. Passes and Permits . . . 156
6. Security Checking of Civilian Labor . . . 157
7. Security Checking of Allied Secret Agents . . . 157
8. Security Checking of Confidential CI Informants . . . 158

ANNEX "G" — SECURITY EXAMINATION AND HANDLING OF CIVILIANS

1. General . . . 159
2. Refugees (French) . . . 159
3. Displaced Persons . . . 162
4. Enemy Nationals . . . 162
5. Escapers and Evaders . . . 163
6. Civilians Violating Security Regulations . . . 164
7. Known and Suspect Enemy Agents . . . 164
8. Organizers of Resistance Groups . . . 165
9. MIL Teams . . . 166
10. British Indian Nationals . . . 166
EXHIBIT "A" — Channels for Evacuation of Refugees and Suspects . . . 167
EXHIBIT "B" — Functional Charts . . . 168

ANNEX "H" — LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLICE, AND SUSPECT ORGANIZATIONS

1. General . . . 172
2. Relations with Local Officials (other than Police) . . . 172
3. Relations with Local Police . . . 172
4. Attitude towards Political Parties . . . 173
5. Handling of Para-Military Organizations . . . 174

ANNEX "I" — COUNTER SABOTAGE

1. Counter Sabotage Officers . . . 175
2. Prevention . . . 175
3. Investigations . . . 175
4. Disposal of Sabotage Equipment . . . 175

ANNEX "J" — TRAVEL CONTROL

1. General . . . 176
2. Civilian travel from the Continent to the UK . . . 176
3. Civilian and Service travel from the UK to Continent . . . 177
EXHIBIT "A" — Authorization to travel to the United Kingdom . . . 178

SECTION I COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL.

a. Object. The object of Counter Intelligence is to destroy the effectiveness of enemy secret intelligence systems and to prevent sabotage and subversion.

b. Responsibility. Within their respective zones, the commanding generals of armies are responsible for implementing the CI policies established by this headquarters. In particular, they are responsible for:

(1) Controlling the CIC detachments and CIC reserve detachments allotted to them by this headquarters.

(2) Allotting territorial responsibilities between the CIC personnel within their respective zones and insuring continuity of action when one CIC detachment relieves another.

NOTE: Before territorial responsibility for an area is allotted to a CIC detachment of an air force, the approval of this headquarters will be obtained.

(3) Co-ordinating the activities of all CI personnel attached to their headquarters.

(4) Insuring the exchange of CI information between all headquarters (including air and naval) within their respective zones.

2. CI PLANNING PRINCIPLES.

The following principles will be observed in the planning of CI operations:

a. The primary CI task is the active pursuit and liquidation of the enemy intelligence services.

b. Normally, CI personnel are not available to assist in matters which are purely of combat intelligence interest. They are responsible, however, for transmitting to interested agencies all information obtained in the course of CI operations.

c. The restoration of law and order and the imposition of general security controls upon the civil population is essential. CI personnel will give every possible assistance to G-5 and CA detachments in their tasks of establishing and maintaining an efficient civil administration and police force.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. CI PERSONNEL.

In addition to the CI staff element of G-2/S-2 sections, the following categories of CI personnel are assigned or attached to headquarters as indicated:

a. CIC detachments. CIC detachments are attached to all division and higher headquarters and operate normally as an integral part thereof. CIC reserve teams are held at this headquarters for allotment as required. Detailed instructions regarding employment of CIC are contained in Annex "B" and elsewhere in this document.

b. Special Interrogators, CIC. It is contemplated that CIC reserve personnel who have undergone special training in CI interrogation will be allotted for employment at army civilian interrogation centers.

c. SCI units. SCI units will be attached to this headquarters and to army headquarters to supply information from special sources concerning the enemy secret intelligence services in their zone to the CI staffs of this headquarters and army headquarers. (See Annex "C").

d. Mobile Radio DF units. Mobile radio DF units for locating illicit radio transmitters will be provided by the Signal Intelligence Service. These units operate under the direction of this headquarters. (See Annex "D").

e. CI Laboratory. A CI laboratory will be provided at this headquarters by the Signal Intelligence Service. (See Annex "E").

f. Allied Intelligence Services (other than British). Allied missions will be attached to this headquarters, and it is envisaged that a CI element will be included therein. They will assist CI staffs and personnel in the examination and disposal of suspects, the collection of CI information in the field, and in relations with local authorities.

NOTE: The precise status and responsibilities of allied CI personnel will be the subject of a detailed directive to be issued later. Liaison will not be maintained with allied missions (other than British) in connection with "OVERLORD", nor will any information regarding "OVERLORD" be transmitted to any allied mission until such time as this headquarters may direct.

g. SF staffs and Detachments. SF staffs and detachments will be attached to army headquarters and will be responsible to G-3 sections for coordinating the activities of resistance groups behind the enemy lines with the operations of our forces.

(1) SF staffs contain a CI element whose functions include:

(a) Providing CI information concerning enemy resistance groups, together with an estimate based on previous knowledge, of the reliability of the source.

(b) Assisting CI staffs and personnel in matters where their specialized knowledge of resistance groups would be helpful. This includes assistance in establishing the bona fides of persons who claim to have been working for allied underground organizations or resistance groups. It is emphasized that while SF will be able to provide assistance in such cases, the responsibility for determining the bona fides and for recommending as to disposal rests whith G-2.

(2) SF liaison officers at corps headquarters operate under the orders of SF staffs at army headquarters. Their principal duty is to locate and identify organizers of resistance groups, and to escort them to army headquarters.

(3) By arrangement with SF (CI) officers, CI personnel may interrogate the organizers of resistance groups referred to in (2) above in order to obtain tactical CI information. It is important that interrogation of these organizers upon purely political matters should not be conducted by CI personnel in forward areas but should be reserved for specially qualified personnel at armies and this headquarters. Interrogation of the organizers by CI personnel will accordingly be limited to obtaining CI information of immediate tactical value such as the location of recently evacuated enemy offices and buildings and the names of suspect enemy agents or of reliable local informants.

h. Unit Intelligence Officers. In regiments and battalions, S-2 sections will perform CI functions in addition to their combat intelligence duties.

4. CI OPERATIONS.

a. In order to counter the operation of enemy intelligence services and subversive or sabotage elements, CI personnel will be engaged primarily in the security control of the civil population. Therefore, CI personnel normally will not be available to render assistance in military security to the same extent as in the Zone of the Interior.

b. Initially, the Allied Expeditionary Force will enter territory as friends and liberators rather than as conquerors. It is desired to transfer responsibility for civil administration to the civil authorities at the earliest possible date; thus, CI personnel must operate closely wih civil police and security personnel. It is to the advantage of the Allied Expeditionary Force as well as to civil

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

authorities that the latter take necessary action wherever practicable. In any area where responsibility for security has been transferred to civil authorities, arrest will not be made by CI personnel without prior agreement of civil authorities, except in cases of emergency and, in such event, the latter will be notified promptly of the action taken. Further instructions will be issued with respect to the division of responsibilities between CI personnel and civil authorities.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Any breach of security or general tendencies which might endanger the success of planned operations will be reported immediately to this headquarters.

b. Appropriate publicity will be given to punishments for security violations.

SECTION II CENSORSHIP

6. GENERAL.

a. Except as modified below, the provisions of Circular 33, Hq ETOUSA, dated 21 Mar 44, subject: "Censorship Instructions, Postal and Cable" will apply to all military and civilian personnel serving with and accompanying FUSAG on the Continent.

b. By agreement with 21 Army Group and with SHAEF concurrence, 21 Army Group will be guided by such censorship directives as are issued by this headquarters, insofar as the 1st US Army is concerned.

7. BASE CENSORSHIP.

Responsibility for the operation of base censorship has been assumed by Hq ETOUSA upon agreement with this headquarters.

8. CIVIL CENSORSHIP.

The censorship of all civilian communications within or between territories occupied or liberated by allied forces is the responsibility of SHAEF.

9. CAPTURED ENEMY MAIL.

Captured enemy mail including that from both enemy "Feldpost" and civil post offices will be collected, bagged, labeled, and, forwarded to army G-2 for document section screening, selection, and examination. Mail not selected for examination will be forwarded promptly to SHAEF through intelligence channels. Mail delayed for examination will be forwarded similarly after completion of examination.

10. PRISONER OF WAR MAIL.

Prisoner of War mail will be bagged, labeled, and delivered to the PW Censorship Section, ETOUSA, APO 887.

11. CENSORSHIP PROCEDURES PRECEDING AN OPERATION.

When any FUSAG unit is alerted, the following procedures will be initiated immediately

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. All personnel, including officers, will post their personal mail in unit mail boxes only. All possible precautions will be taken by commanders to prevent illicit communications and the posting of mail outside of unit mail boxes.

b. All personal communications will be bagged, labeled "FOR CHIEF BASE [illegible]" and delivered to the nearest Base Censor Station.

c. No publicity will be given that more rigid censorship procedures are either contemplated or in effect.

d. All personal telephone, telegraph, and cable facilities will be suspended prior to the time briefing commences.

12. CAMERAS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND FILMS.

Subject to the provisions of Circular 29, Hq ETOUSA, dated 17 Mar 44, subject: "Photography", FUSAG personnel are permitted to carry cameras, and take personal photographs. However, division or higher unit commanders are authorized to place further restrictions upon the use of cameras, as deemed necessary.

13. DISCLOSURE OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.

On the Continent, all personnel are authorized to write in letters that they are "Somewhere in ————", naming the country. No direct or inferential reference will be permitted which will define the location of the writer more closely than the name of the country. No mention of, or reference to, geographic location will be permitted in cables or telegrams.

14. PERSONAL TELEGRAMS, CABLEGRAMS, AND RADIOGRAMS FROM THE CONTINENT.

No personal telegrams, cablegrams, or radiograms will be sent by FUSAG personnel until commercial cable or radio facilities have been opened under control of US army censors and notice given of procedure for filing messages.

15. MANUSCRIPTS FOR PUBLICATION.

All manuscripts prepared for publication by FUSAG personnel will be referred to press censorship.

16. CENSORSHIP OF WAR CORRESPONDENTS' MAIL.

a. A war correspondent is forbidden to include in personal correspondence any information which may be used as source material or background information for publication in any manner. Any personal correspondence containing such source or background information will be considered as a business communication and will be submitted to press censorship.

b. All personal communications of a war correspondent will be submitted unsealed for examination and censorship to the [illegible] organization to which the correspondent is attached.

17. CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS.

No civil communication will be transmitted within or between army zones without prior approval of this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

SHAEF	12	FUSAG	
21 Army Group	5	G-1	1
ETOUSA	5	G-2	20
FE Com Z	5	G-3	3
AEAF	2	G-4	1
9th AF	5	G-5	1
ANCXF	2	PM	3
OSS	5	P & PW	2
4 Armies		SIS	2
4 Armies, 10 each	40	SGS	4
Corps, 5 each	60	AG	1
Divisions, 3 each	108	AG (Publ)	3
		IG	1
		Sp Troops	3
		Main Hq, 21 A Gp	1
		Rear Hq, 21 A Gp	1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "A"

FUSAG CI SOP

CI INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTS

1. GENERAL

Three categories of CI intelligence are available to armies:

a. Background Intelligence. General data regarding the system of administration, police, and political groups and parties of a country, together with indications of the characteristics and sympathies of the people.

b. Detailed Area Intelligence. Addresses and other details of administrative, police, and political organizations in a particular area, together with data concerning the sympathies of the local population, the measures taken by the enemy in the area, and any other facts of CI interest, but excluding data pertaining to suspect or pro-allied individuals.

c. Personality Card Index. This contains names and particulars of known and suspect enemy agents, political suspects, and persons believed to have pro-allied sympathies or likely to prove reliable informants.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES.

CI personnel will provide CA personnel at all levels with any available CI intelligence which may be of value to the latter in the performance of the CA mission, since, in the initial stages, they will rely largely upon CI personnel for advice concerning the reliability of officials. CI personnel will be responsible at all times for expeditious transmission to appropriate authorities of operational or other intelligence gathered as an incidental part of the CI mission. SHAEF will undertake the general coordination of policy regarding the handling of CI data in, from, and to the field, and the allocation of responsibilities and priorities. The distribution of CI intelligence will be the responsibility of the Coordination Section, SHAEF, and the CI staffs of this headquarters and armies as indicated below:

a. The Coordination Section, SHAEF, is responsible for the distribution of CI intelligence covering the whole theater, with special reference to territories not yet liberated.

b. This headquarters is responsible for the evaluation and collation of CI information, and the distribution of CI intelligence relating to territories already liberated, or to areas still occupied by the enemy which may become a zone of operations.

c. Armies are responsible for the collection, evaluation, and collation of CI information, and the distribution of CI intelligence required for the planning of immediate operations, or affecting the day to day security of their own particular zone.

3. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN THE FIELD.

a. The Coordination Section, SHAEF, will supply this headquarters with amendments and additions to the existing CI Brief, and any additional information relating to territories already liberated or not yet occupied by our forces.

b. This headquarters will transmit to the Coordination Section, SHAEF, all information of general interest or having special reference to territories not yet occupied by allied forces, and such other reports as SHAEF may direct.

c. SCI units at armies and this headquarters will transmit direct through their special communications channels to OSS (X-2) all information relating to their own operations or which is unsuitable for transmission by army signal agencies.

d. CI information derived from captured documents, interrogations, reports, and other sources collected in the field will be studied by armies and their attached SCI unit for the purpose of extracting such intelligence as is required for immediate tactical planning or security of their own particular areas. Armies will transmit to this headquarters such CI intelligence and data. Where such data is of immediate interest to other armies it will also be passed laterally. All particulars, obtained in the field, of known or suspect enemy agents not yet apprehended will be added to the personality card index at army and reported to this headquarters. In cases of urgency, such information may be communicated by radio to FUSAG and other armies through SCI radio channels. Particulars, obtained in the field, of political suspects and reliable informants in areas still occupied by the enemy (or areas of other armies) will also be furnished to this headquarters. Except in cases of urgency, these may be embodied in the bi-weekly CI report.

4. DOCUMENTS SECTIONS.

G-2 documents sections will make available to CI staffs any documents containing CI information. Original documents which are of interest only to CI staffs will be passed to them for disposal. CI documents which are to be forwarded to CI staffs at higher headquarters will be labeled "Attention: CIB, G2 Section" and handed to documents section for transmittal.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. CHANNELS OF CI INFORMATION.

The flow of CI information in the field normally will follow the chain of command. Lateral communication between headquarters of flanking armies, corps, or divisions is authorized with reference to detailed information requiring immediate action. See attached chart (Exhibit "A") for graphic representation of CI channels of communications between producer departments SHAEF Coordination Section, FUSAG and armies.

6. CI REPORTS BY ARMIES TO FUSAG.

Armies will report to this headquarters (Attention: CIB, G-2 Section) appropriate CI information. This will be accomplished by means of:

a. Routine Reports. Routine reports will be rendered on the 10th and 25th of each month in triplicate in accordance with attached Exhibits "B" and "C". Reports will be divided into three parts, as shown, each part being separately paged and headed. The date for the first report will be announced later, with subsequent reports as stated above.

b. Special Reports. Special reports will be rendered as may be necessary in cases of urgency or matters of special importance. The following topics are examples:

(1) German penetration of civil authorities, including police.

(2) Case reports on important collaborators arrested for security reasons.

(3) German use of TODT or other para-military personnel for subversive activity.

(4) German plans for the post-war organization of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda in Germany or other countries.



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FUSAG CI SOP

FORM FOR CI BI-WEEKLY REPORTS FROM ARMIES TO FUSAG

PART I: CIVIL CI

1. ESPIONAGE.

a. A list of spies apprehended during the period, giving name, place, date, arresting agency, and brief details of action taken.*

b. A survey of enemy espionage, indicating areas of special activity and main objects of espionage.

2. PRO-GERMAN COLLABORATION.

a. A list of important collaborators arrested on security grounds, giving name, place, date, party membership (if any), reasons for arrest, arresting agency, disposal, and any further details of special interest.*

b. A list of prominent officials dismissed on security grounds but not arrested, showing name, post, reasons for dismissal.

c. A survey of pro-German and anti-allied organizations from the viewpoint of their interest to CI.

3. SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION.

a. A survey of security restrictions imposed, showing types of restriction, method of promulgation, efficiency of operation, and reactions of population.

b. Matters of joint concern to G-2 (CI) and G-5 affecting policy.

4. CI RELATIONS.

a. With allied military security services.

b. With civil police services.

5. RELATIONS BETWEEN TROOPS AND CIVILIANS.

A survey of relations between allied troops and civilians, and a summary of incidents that might form the basis of anti-allied propaganda.

* May be included in Annex shown at Exhibit "C".

EXHIBIT "B"

PART II: MILITARY CI

1. SABOTAGE.

a. A list of arrested saboteurs, giving same details as in par. 1, a, Part I.*

b. A survey of enemy sabotage, indicating areas of special activity and main objects of sabotage.

2. OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

A statement on the efficiency of measures taken to safeguard information and materiel.

3. CI CO-ORDINATION WITH ALLIED AIR FORCES.

4. RUMORS.

A summary of the more important rumors current among troops or civilians concerning locations, strength, morale, supplies, equipment, and plans of our forces.

5. ENEMY PROPAGANDA.

A note on enemy propaganda activity and its effect, if any, on allied troops.

PART III: CI STAFFS AND PERSONNEL.

A statement showing the areas alloted to CI staffs and the resources of CI personnel available in each area.

* May be included in Annex shown at Exhibit "C".

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FUSAG CI SOP

ANNEX TO TENTH ARMY PERIODIC CI REPORT #30

ARRESTS OF CIVILIAN SUSPECTS

1. ANTELME, Henri Adelbert (Fr) Mayor Ident. (Paris) 134729.
   Address: 18 Rue du Chien qui Aboie, FONTAINEBLEAU.
   Category: Active member of PPF. Prev. Ref.: Buff Card "Q" (Seine et Oise)
   Arrested by: Local Police at request of CO, 60 CIC Det., 6 Dec 44.
   Disposal: Detained in FONTAINEBLEAU Prison.
   Comments: Fanatic leader of PPF, cooperated eagerly with Germans in expeditions against "Maquis", consistently obstructionist in dealings with allied authorities, and suspected of providing PPF members in hiding with identity documents. Considered essential that ANTELME be interned while this area is in the Zone of Operations.

2. DUPONT, Alphonse Andre (Fr) Pharmacist Ident. (Paris) # 476538.
   Address: Moulin Rouge, Bd. Montmatre, PARIS (VIe).
   Category: Enemy agent (Saboteur) Prev. Ref.: Special Rep. TA/275/1, 30 Nov 44.
   Arrested by: 19 CIC Det. in conjunction with Surete, 2 Dec 44.
   Diposal: Delivered direct to Hq Tenth Army under CIC escort, 3 Dec 44.
   Comments: Apprehended at Gare du Nord while carrying suitcase containing Abwehr sabotage equipment. DUPONT definitely known to SCI unit, which escorted him to Hq FUSAG, 3 Dec 44.

EXHIBIT "C"

FUSAG CI SOP ANNEX "B"

CIC

1. GENERAL.

The organization, training, administration, and operations of FUSAG CIC personnel will be in general accordance with the provisions of TM 30-215, WD dated 22 Sep 43, subject: "THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS"

2. ORGANIZATION.

a. Based upon T/O and E 30-500, dated 24 Jan 44, the CIC detachments in the European Theater of Operations are organized in accordance with the provisions of Section II, GO 36, Hq ETOUSA, dated 27 Apr 44.

b. Reinforcements or replacements to subordinate headquarters normally will be made from CIC reserve teams attached to this headquarters. However, a higher headquarters may withdraw personnel from one or more of its lower echelons to reinforce temporarily another of its headquarters.

3. TRAINING.

All CIC personnel have completed, under WD supervision, certain training courses designed to qualify them in general, for CI work. Personnel in this theater have completed or will complete under ETOUSA supervision certain other training programs intended to qualify them for CI work in the ETO. In addition to this training, commanders of headquarters to which detachments have been attached are responsible for insuring that:

a. Each CIC member maintains a high standard of physical condition and a high state of training as a soldier (emphasis to be placed on training in self-defense, defense against booby traps, etc.), that he is trained in vehicle maintenance, and that he gains a useful knowledge in one or both of the French and German languages.

b. The detachment participates in unit training exercises, and that it develops and engages in exercises designed to simulate forthcoming operations.

4. OPERATIONS.

In commands to which CIC personnel are attached, the AC of S, G-2, assisted by his CI staff officers, is responsible to his commander for general supervision of, and advice pertaining to, the employment of such personnel. Actual employment, however, is a function of command to be exercised through the commanding officer of the CIC detachment.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. The commanding officer of the detachment is responsible for detailed planning regarding the employment of his detachment personnel. Necessary CI information upon which such planning is to be based will be provided by the G-2 (CI) staff concerned.

b. CIC personnel will be operated in teams of two men or larger groups whenever practicable.

c. It is of the utmost importance that effective CI coverage be maintained continuously in large or important towns and areas. In establishing CI coverage initially for such locations, individual CIC members will develop informant systems, begin investigations of suspect persons, and will become acquainted with and gain confidence of influential local persons whose cooperation is helpful. For these and many other reasons, it is highly desirable that certain of these members continue the maintainance of coverage in the area until relieved by other personnel who have become sufficiently acquainted with the local situation to permit their efficient assumption of control. When such conditions prevail, a small group of the CIC detachment of original jurisdiction should remain in the location in order to turn over to relieving personnel any unfinished local business and to advise in their activities. Only when it becomes apparent that control can be relinquished without jeopardy to the CI coverage will the original group join its detachment.

(1) The above will be considered in planning, and when necessary, the temporary attachment of one or more CIC personnel to be left in charge of a specific town or area may be requested from a higher headquarters.

(a) Whenever practicable Com Z and air force CIC personnel, specially trained in port and airport CI duties, will be made available to tactical commands required to establish initial CI coverage for ports and airports.

(2) Under unforeseen circumstances which may occur during operations, and when it becomes apparent that it will be necessary to relieve lower echelon CIC personnel of responsibility for CI coverage in an area to be vacated by their headquarters, the higher headquarters will make possible the early relief of such personnel by detailing relieving personnel to the area prior to or immediately after movement of the lower headquarters.

d. When the situation demands, detachment commanders by oral orders may place personnel under their command on temporary duty with other detachments upon approval in each case by the appropriate G-2.

e. CIC personnel have full power and authority to arrest or detain any person who violates military security or whose detention is otherwise deemed necessary for the accomplishment of the CI mission.

f. Members of the CIC are authorized to call upon any member of this command for such assistance as may be required in the performance of their assigned duties.

g. Liaison between CI personnel and all other allied intelligence agencies is the responsibility of CI staffs. However, members of the CIC will work in closest cooperation with:

(1) G-5 and CA detachments.
(2) Naval, air forces, and Com Z CI personnel.
(3) Military police and personnel of the office of the provost marshal.
(4) SCI and SF personnel.
(5) Radio DF personnel.
(6) Document collection and evaluation teams.
(7) P & PW Officers.
(8) Attached allied CI staffs and personnel.

h. CIC personnel will be encouraged to exercise their initiative to the fullest extent, and, in the performance of their duties, they will be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions of movement. They will not be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observance of standard customs or prohibitions (such as speed limits, access to places "off limits" etc.) nor by the military police or other military agencies. CIC badges and credentials will be honored at all times.

i. CIC personnel will be employed only on tasks involving a CI interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine PW interrogations, black market investigations, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with the performance of CI duties. CIC personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of comparable nature.

5. DUTIES.

Included among the operational duties of CIC personnel are the following:

a. Primary Duties in Forward Combat Areas: The primary duty of CIC personnel is to secure CI targets in the area of the objective. Foremost among these targets are:

(1) Known and suspect enemy agents.

(2) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the allied forces.

(3) Offices formerly occupied by the enemy intelligence services or enemy police organizations and any documents they contain.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Offices of local para-military organizations and collaborationist bodies and their records.

(5) Centers of communications.

(6) Buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of CI value.

NOTE: Army CI staffs will receive from this headquarters all information on these subjects which is available from special sources and will be responsible for distributing it to CI staffs and CIC of lower organizations as required.

b. Secondary Duties in Forward Combat Areas:

(1) Making security checks in cooperation with the military police who are marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory.

(2) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the allied cause in order to secure all possible CI information.

(3) Advising upon and assisting in securing against sabotage all public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the allied forces.

(4) Checking upon the observance by civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by G-5 and CA detachments.

(5) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with ordinances.

(6) The seizure of civil communications and arranging for their protection against sabotage until taken over by authorized signal communications personnel as provided in operational orders. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, guarded, and turned over to the proper authorities.

(7) Seizing and impounding all civilian and captured enemy mail.

(8) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.

(9) Stopping publication of newspapers and other periodicals.

(10) Taking measures necessary to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and materiel by our own troops.

(11) Transmitting to G-5, PM, or MP officers all information on matters within their purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperation of civil police, and the extent of disorder, looting, and sabotage.

c. Investigative Duties. The CIC will be employed in investigations of:

(1) Espionage

(2) Sabotage

(3) Subversive activity, including rumor mongering and surreptitious issue of enemy propaganda.

(4) Disaffection, treason, and sedition within the US forces.

(5) Violations of security regulations.

(6) (In certain instances involving a CI interest) Personnel of governments of occupied territory who are retained in their official capacities.

(7) Certain civilian personnel to be employed by the US government (See par. 6, Annex "F").

d. Miscellaneous Duties:

(1) Cooperating with the corps of military police and other military and civil authorities in exercising control at frontiers of territory under the jurisdiction of US armed forces. This action will include the recommending of the establishment and the assisting in the maintenance of controls and control systems over the entrance of persons, goods, and information into territory occupied by this command.

(2) Assisting port CI officers in the discharge of their duties.

(3) Performance of security surveys to determine the safety of communications, transportation lines, storage and supply facilities, and other US installations and offices.

(4) Delivery of security lectures to the troops and other provisions for general indoctrination of all US military personnel in security principles.

(5) Surveillance of hotels, bars, restaurants, and other places frequented by US military personnel, and located within or near the area occupied by US troops.

(6) Establishing informant networks.

(7) Keeping the assistant chief of staff, G-2, of their respective commands informed of internal politics, political parties, or subversive groups which may be inimical to the counter intelligence interests of the allied forces.

e. Duties in the Event of Evacuation or Withdrawal:

(1) Searching evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, supply depots, and other installations to insure that documents or any materiel that might be of intelligence value to the enemy have been completely destroyed or removed.

(2) Checking the control of refugees along the routes used by troops to prevent the possibility of enemy infiltration.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. Duties of Special Groups. Duties of special groups will be in accordance with the needs of their particular assignment in addition to the duties enumerated above.

6. UNIFORM.

CIC personnel are authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces. Normally, they will wear the civilian uniform and the CIC brassard as supplied by ETOUSA. Civilian clothing will not be taken to nor worn on the Continent. CIC credentials and badges will be carried as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agent or the successful accomplishment of his mission.

7. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

Normal intelligence channels will be used for all CIC purposes. Lateral communication between detachments is authorized.

8. RECORDS.

In order to facilitate the taking over of areas by relieving CIC detachments, it is essential that the records kept by CIC detachments be uniform and arranged so that they are easily intelligible to persons other than their compilers.

a. For the above purpose:

(1) All detachments will use cards measuring 5" by 8".

(2) Both cards and files will be kept in such a way that a detachment leaving an area can conveniently leave behind the cards and files referring to the area, while taking with it only those files relating to general CI policy and administration.

(3) Particulars noted on the cards should enable an incoming detachment to find readily all relevant information, whether on the card itself or in the files.

b. Files.

(1) Separate files will be kept for:

(a) Suspect individuals.

(b) Suspect organizations.

(c) Security controls.

(d) Investigations.

(e) Periodic reports of agents.

(f) Periodic security reports.

(g) Security policy.

(h) Administrative subjects.

(2) [illegible] districts.

(3) In general files, each individual case or organization will be alloted a separate number; e. g. BERNARD Andre — 1, HERMANT Abel — 2. All further correspondence on BERNARD Andre will then be marked with the same initial number followed by a letter: e. g. 1a, 1b, 1c, etc. This will enable correspondence in general files to be kept either chronologically or separately by subjects, so that documents on any one subject can quickly be found or extracted.

(4) Where papers relating to an individual or organization are included in several files, cross reference will be made either in the files or on the relative cards.

(5) When documents relating to a particular case become numerous, they should be removed from the general file and a new individual file should be opened.

c. Card Index.

(1) Particulars of all suspects, informants, suspects organizations, and addresses will be carded and the same territorial division will be made of the card index as is made of the filing system. (See b. (2)).

(2) Cards relating to individual suspects will record:

(a) Full name, address, and occupation, with any aliases.

(b) Any details of the case and of action taken which will assist in identification.

(c) Reference to file containing documents of the case, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(d) Cross-reference to names of any associates (unless this is already cross-referred in the relevant files).

(3) Cards relating to informants will record:

(a) Full name, address, and occupation.

(b) Reference to files containing any related documents, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(c) How first contacted.*

(d) Estimated reliability.*

(e) Cross-reference to any suspects or cases reported by the informant.*

* Unless these particulars are already noted in the files.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Cards dealing with parties, organizations, suspect establishments (cafes, etc.) will record:

(a) Name and address(es).

(b) Brief case history.

(c) Reference to any files dealing with it, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(d) Cross-reference to individuals connected with it.

(e) Action taken.

SCI UNITS

1. GENERAL.

Special information pertaining to Enemy Secret Intelligence Services (ESIS) is available in London but is not suitable for transmission through ordinary intelligence channels. To provide a special channel for such information and to advise regarding the use of the information, SCI units, provided with special communication facilities, will be attached to army headquarters by OSS (X-2).

2. ORGANIZATION.

The SCI unit of an army headquarters will function as part of the CIB, G-2 section, under the immediate supervision of the chief, CIB. It will be administered by the headquarters company, and will consist of: 1 Major, 1 Captain, 1 First Lieutenant, 1 First Sergeant, 1 Staff Sergeant, 3 Technicians 4th Grade, and 2 Privates First Class.

3. COMMUNICATIONS.

SCI units are provided with special communication facilities, including ciphers. They are not dependent upon army signal agencies. Each unit will be in direct contact with its London headquarters., through which all units within the FUSAG zone will be in contact with each other. (See Exhibit "A", Annex "A").

4. FUNCTIONS.

Normally, SCI personnel will function in a staff capacity as advisers without executive responsibilities. They will not be employed on other than CI duties nor will they be employed in areas where there is danger of their capture. Normally they will move with the headquarters to which attached. Their principal duties are to:

a. Assist CI staffs in compiling and preparing in required form all available information concerning ESIS.

b. Advise CI staffs in the selection and method of handling counter-espionage targets.

c Assist CI staffs in the examination of captured enemy material of CI interest and in the interrogation and disposal of captured enemy agents.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d Distribute, interpret, and advise upon the use of all CI information received by the unit from other units or from London.

(1) In furtherance of their responsibility to safeguard special sources of information, SCI units retain the right to withhold from any but the chief, CIB, any particular item of information derived from a special source, when action or unrestricted action might jeopardize the security of the source or the information.

(2) The ultimate decision as to whether or not action will be taken in the field upon the special information in question rests with the AC of S, G-2, Hq FUSAG, except when an expressed prohibition to take action is issued by OSS in London.

DETECTION OF ILLICIT RADIO TRANSMITTERS

1. GENERAL.

The detection of illicit radio transmitters is carried out in two phases: (1) the recognition of a radio signal as originating from an enemy agent and its rough location by long range direction finding (DF) which is accomplished in the UK, and (2) the accurate location of the transmitter by local DF which is accomplished in the field by teams of the mobile DF units operating under the direction of the Central Control in the UK.

2. ORGANIZATION.

A mobile DF unit, consisting of six teams,, is established at this headquarters and has a direct radio link to the common Central Control in the UK. The personnel of the mobile DF teams at this headquarters form part of a special communications unit. They are technically controlled from the UK, but are under the operational supervision of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section FUSAG. The officer-in charge of the mobile DF unit will be responsible for their technical employment in such a manner as best to perform the mission directed by the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, FUSAG.

3. FUNCTION.

The function of this unit is to locate, from comparatively short range, the source of a radio signal after receiving information from the Central Control giving the frequency, rough location, and other data. This unit is not suitable for the initial detection of an agent's signal. Except in cases of emergency, no action should be taken in pursuance of local investigations to raid a house or detain a suspect without prior reference to this headquarters (CIB, G-2) where operator personnel will be available to assist in handling these cases.

4. REPORTS.

a. Experience has shown that CI staffs may expect to receive numerous reports alleging illicit use of radio. Many of these reports will be absurd or the result of ulterior motives, but all reports which are not obviously ridiculous must be investigated. An officer experienced in investigating such cases will be available at this headquarters, and all reports which appear to merit investigation will be referred to him through CI channels.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Suspect Signals Reported by Signal Corps Units. Reports of suspect signals by ordinary field force units must contain accurate detailed information including the following.

Frequency.
Time.
Radio telephony or telegraphy.
Call-sign, sample of preamble, and procedure.
Sample of traffic.
Type of receiver on which heard.

c. The above information will be transmitted to Central Control in the UK over the mobile DF unit radio link.

5. LIAISON

The mobile DF teams will be required to operate over a wide area, and at all times will work in close liaison with CI personnel. Any necessary liaison for the DF teams with military organizations or civil authorities will be the responsibility of CI personnel. CI staffs of headquarters concerned will be informed when teams of the mobile radio DF unit are operating in their area.

CI LABORATORY

1. PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.

The principal functions of the CI laboratory at this headquarters are as follows:

a. Detection and development of secret writing and photography, including microphotographs ("duff").

b. Examination of suspect property, including cosmetics, soap, toothpaste, polishes, etc. for concealed "duff", secret writing materials, or materials for sabotage.

c. Detection of alterations and erasures in documents, and recovery of the original wording where possible.

d. Comparison of handwriting or typescript for detection of forgery, identification of a writer, etc. The originals should be submitted if possible; otherwise a good full-size photograph may suffice.

e. Recovery of deletions in letters, obliterated official stamps, charred documents and deciphering of indentations on papers or documents.

f. Secret opening of letters, packages, and parcels, detection of illicit opening, and secret sealing to prevent illicit opening or to insure detection of illicit opening.

g. Secret marking for subsequent identification of documents, coins, paper money, stamps, etc.

h. Ordinary and special photography of objects and documents as required for investigation and record in the foregoing types of work (see par. 2, below).

i. Technical assistance in interrogation of suspects with reference to secret means of communication.

2. MASS TESTING.

The laboratory is not designed for mass-testing of correspondence or for mass- photography of any kind, and will not be called upon for such work.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

3. REQUIRED INFORMATION.

Questions submitted to the laboratory for technical opinion and documents or articles sent for examination will be accompanied by the fullest possible information as to the general nature and significance of the case.

4. CHAIN OF EVIDENCE.

Attention is directed to the strict necessity for maintaining the chain of evidence where material of any nature, submitted for analysis or examination by the laboratory, may be required at a later date for submission or evidence in legal proceedings.

SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION

1. GENERAL.

The object of CI staffs in insuring the security control of the civil population is to hamper enemy agents and subversive bodies by limiting their movements, communications, and other activities, and to facilitate CI investigations by rendering conspicuous any person behaving in an unusual manner. The internal political affairs of the civil population are not of CI interest unless they amount to a threat to the security of the allied forces.

2. SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY.

The security control of the civil population is a command responsibility. G-2 (CIB) is responsible for formulating security policies, but, as a general rule, will co-ordinate and consult with G-5 and PM. G-5 is responsible for implementing security policies through CA detachments and the civil authorities.

3. PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDINANCES.

a. It is envisaged that security restrictions will be imposed upon the local population by French authorities acting on behalf of G-2 and G-5. However, in the event of a breakdown of authority, proclamations which indicate the principles upon which civil government will be carried on in liberated territory may be promulgated by the Supreme Allied Commander. Security restrictions on the civil population will then be announced by ordinances deriving their authority from such proclamations.

b. The drafting of proclamations and ordinances is a responsibility of G-5 who will incorporate the necessary security restrictions recomended by G-2.

c. The initial proclamations issued by SHAEF will not include detailed security restrictions, since the need for these and the ability to enforce them will vary greatly from one area to another. It will be an army responsibility to impose appropriate security restrictions by ordinance within the army zone of operations.

4. SECURITY RESTRICTIONS.

The following are general indications of the nature of the security restrictions which may be imposed:

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

identity. It is expected that large numbers of civilians will be without proper identity documents. It will not be possible to issue any type of fresh identity documents until G-5 has restored the civil police services. As soon as circumstances permit, civil police will be directed to organize a system of registration of civilians, and to require all civilians to carry prescribed identification papers at all times.

b. Movement. In areas forward of corps straggler lines, all movement by civilian wheeled transport usually will be prohibited, except as authorized by CA for maintaining essential services. As normal conditions are restored, limited public transport services may be resumed.

c. Communications. In the initial stages, no communication services will be made available except for military purposes. As soon as civil communications can be restored, CI staffs will consult with CA and censorship staffs in order to determine the conditions under which postal, telegraph, and telephone service will be made available progressively for civil official and private traffic. Such renewal of civil communications is an essential stage in the restoration of law and order. Often, it may be found advisable to operate a limited postal service under control in order to avoid the development of clandestine communications. Radio transmission by the civilian population will be entirely forbidden, except when directly controlled by this headquarters.

d. Action, Restrictions on action normally will include the imposition of a curfew and the requirement to register or surrender possession of a variety of articles such as arms, explosives, wireless transmitters, carrier pigeons, etc.

5. PASSES AND PERMITS.

a. Passes and permits will be issued to selected civilians in order to allow access to protected premises or to grant exemptions from restrictions. SHAEF (G-5) will issue a single form of pass and permit to be used for all purposes throughout the Continent. Its validity will be limited by indorsement so that it can be used only for the purpose and period for which it is granted. Forms will be distributed when available.

b. CA officers through the local police will be responsible for the issue of passes and permits to civilians. G-2 (CIB) will insure, by consultation with G-5, that the conditions of issue of permits and passes meet all security requirements.

c. Supplies of such forms will be issued by CA detachments to CI personnel to enable them to issue permits and passes to civilians in special circumstances. CI personnel will not issue a permit or pass exempting a civilian from security restrictions without the authority of a CI or CIC officer.

6. SECURITY CHECKING OF CIVILIAN LABOR.

a. Security checking of all civilian labor employed by our forces on the Continent is impracticable; moreover, the records available to CI personnel will not be sufficient to provide more than a partial check. In cases of particular importance, CIC personnel will be available to conduct investigations. The security of information and installations where civilian labor is employed must depend; (1) upon measures taken by the employing agency to deprive civilian workers of opportunities for committing sabotage or obtaining information of value to the enemy and (2) on checking through local police, care in the choice of foremen, and any other means of investigation which appear practicable to CI staffs in the area.

b. Civilians will not be employed within headquarters or other places where they have access to classified information or vulnerable installations without previous reference to the appropriate CI staff in the area, who will check with local police. Where there is evidence that an applicant has arrived recently in the army area from an area not covered by the records held at army headquarters, further reference will be made to the records held at this headquarters.

7. SECURITY CHECKING OF ALLIED SECRET AGENTS.

a. An allied secret agent is defined as any person recruited or employed by a US or British agency for the purpose of obtaining information, carrying out subversive operations, or engaging in propaganda by under-cover means. This category does not include confidential informants employed for obtaining information concerning civilian administration, maintenance of public order, or military crimes.

b. Agencies authorized to recruit and dispatch secret agents are: SF detachments, P and PW officers, SI units, and SCI units. These agencies will NOT employ secret agents without the express approval of the AC of S, G-2 (Chief, CIB) this headquarters.

c. Faulty training methods, lack of proper supervision, and inadequate investigation of the bona fides of agents may result in grave danger to the security of operations.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. In order to check the integrity and background of a prospective agent, the agency concerned will make local inquiries in the area in which the recruit has been residing in order to obtain positive information as to his suitability. A negative report, such as "no derogatory information", is not sufficient and will not be accepted. The agency will then forward the name and particulars of the individual, together with the result of the local investigation, to the agency's unit at this headquarters, preferably by hand, for final processing at this headquarters. Normal AG channels will be used only in case of emergency, and in such case, details will be transmitted in double sealed envelopes, inner envelope marked "TOP SECRET: To be opened only by . . . . . ".

e. An agent will not be dispatched to enemy territory if there is reason to believe that he is in possession of information which would prejudice the security of allied operations if it became known to the enemy.

8. SECURITY CHECKING OF CONFIDENTIAL CI INFORMANTS.

CI personnel will institute the same type of check described in par. 7. d above, before employment of confidential CI informants behind our own lines. This headquarters does NOT desire names or details of local CI informants, but will be fully informed if such informants are intended to circulate within the FUSAG area as a whole.

ANNEX "G"

FUSAG CI SOP

SECURITY EXAMINATION AND HANDLING OF CIVILIANS

1. GENERAL.

Examination and interrogation of refugees and displaced persons in forward areas in order to detect enemy agents is a responsibility of CI personnel. Considering the number of refugees, CI staffs, in order to make maximum use of available CI personnel, will have to determine:

a. Where CI personnel can carry out security checks most practically and effectively.

b. What assistance can be obtained from the PM and from local police (through CA) in assembling refugees for examination, in providing facilities for interrogation and detention of suspects, and in escorting suspects from forward areas to places of detention in the rear.

c. How civilians arrested on suspicion by combat troops should be handled, and upon whose authority they should be detained and escorted to the rear.

d. How enemy nationals are to be picked out among refugees, how their arrest is to be effected, where and by whom they are to be detained, and who is to escort them to the place of internment.

2. REFUGEES (FRENCH).

a. General. The numbers of refugees encountered in the forward areas who have been overtaken by allied advance or have crossed enemy lines will vary considerably depending on the density of population, rapidity of advance, intensity of fighting, and stability and strength of the front. In view of the comparatively open country of NW Europe, the flow of refugees is unlikely to be canalized by natural obstacles. Moreover, having been driven off roads required for military traffic by the enemy, refugees will be scattered at the moment of crossing the allied lines, and will not tend to flow along well defined channels until they are at some distance behind the front. From a CI standpoint, it is desirable that: (1) local inhabitants return to their homes as soon as possible, (2) if they have been rendered homeless, that they be accomodated locally or evacuated in organized bodies without delay, and (3) that CA detachments and civil authorities restore order quickly, and reduce uncontrolled movement in the forward areas to a minimum.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Handling of Refugees by PM and CA.

(1) Military police are responsible for preventing refugees from congregating on routes required for military traffic, but will not arrest or evacuate security suspects screened from refugees or displaced persons, except as requested by CI personnel. In the battle area, troops and MPs will direct refugees to the nearest CA collecting point, where they will not be held, but will be organized into parties, instructed where to go, and told what roads are forbidden. Similarly in corps or army areas, MPs will keep them off military routes, directing them to the nearest CA collecting point, transit area, or assembly center (see Exhibits "A" and "B" for location, staff, and functions of these establishments).

(2) CA is responsible for the emergency medical care, feeding, and shelter of refugees, and for their prompt evacuation in organized bodies. To facilitate such organized evacuation, CA will establish CA collecting points, advanced transit areas (optional), transit areas, assembly centers, and internment camps (see Exhibits "A" and "B" for location, staff, and functions of these establishments). Wherever possible, CA will find shelter for refugees by accommodating *them* locally in villages or farm houses; only where this is impracticable will CA organize advanced transit areas under their own control. At transit areas, refugees who can be disposed of locally, either to their own homes or those of other local residents, will be sifted out and not sent to an assembly center.

c. Resources for CI Examination of Refugees.

(1) A civilian interrogation center, capable of holding 250 civilians will be provided adjacent to or as an annex to the army PW enclosure. The civilian interrogation center, where specialist CI interrogators will be available, will be the keystone of the organization for examining suspects in each army area. Only security suspects and those required for interrogation on security grounds will be held there. The center will not be used to house ordinary refugees or criminal offenders.

(2) Mobile teams of interrogators from CIC reserve detachment may be sent forward to establish mobile interrogation posts in corps or divisional areas, as indicated in Exhibit "A".

(3) Personnel from allied intelligence services may be available for attachment to army CI staffs to assist in the examiniation of civilian suspects.

(4) In addition, personnel from local police organizations, obtained through CA officers, should be able to assist in this work under CI personnel supervision.

(5) In the forward areas, near traffic control posts and CA collecting points, CI personnel, with the assistance of local police, will establish security control posts for initial examination of refugees; when the number of refugees passing through these posts is very large, functions will have to be limited to "snap checks" (as near to 100 % as possible).

d. Handling of Refugees from Enemy Lines. Refugees crossing from enemy lines will include persons merely anxious to escape from the immediate battle area, persons attempting to return to their homes in the allied area, and persons who possess no home in the area, but are anxious to escape from enemy occupied territory. Such civilians must be segregated from those who have merely been overtaken by an allied advance. This segregation in the forward areas may be accomplished at security control posts by CI personnel and local police. Since most of these refugees will be found after examination to be harmless and even helpful, CI personnel in forward areas should avoid giving them the impression that they are suspect. They should be made to think that their story is accepted, and that they are being sent back either to give information or for welfare purposes. If they can be made to believe this, it will be unnecessary usually to provide an armed escort. The same impression should be given to troops who are required to accompany parties of civilians. Refugees who have come through enemy lines will be evactuated as outlined below until status has been clarified; when cleared they will be turned over to CA for evacuation through regular refugee channels.

(1) Refugees will be sent back along PW routes to mobile division and corps interrogation posts (see Exhibits "A" and "B") to be interrogated and classified. Where doubt still exists, the refugees will be sent back to the civilian interrogation center.

(2) It is undesirable to mix civilians with PWs, and facilities for escorting and transporting civilians under close supervision will be very limited, particularly in advance of corps PW enclosures; accordingly CI personnel will consult with PM regarding the best means for sending civilians back, and for keeping them separated from PWs. Maximum use should be made of military transport, such as ration and ammunition trucks returning empty from the front, as a means of conveyance. Since existing instructions forbid the conveyance of civilians in military transport, instructions will have to be issued to drivers that they may accept such passengers on the written authority of CI personnel.

(3) Before evacuating a civilian to the civilian interrogation center an arrest report form will be completed concerning the suspect, stating his

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

particulars and the circumstances and reason for his detention. The arrest report form will be completed in duplicate, the original accompanying the escort of the suspect, to be handed to the staff of the detaining installation (PW enclosure or civilian interrogation center), and the duplicate to be retained by CI personnel. The local CA detachment should be kept informed.

(4) Unless an interrogation post is established in the corps or division areas, the suspect, concerning whom an arrest report form has been completed by forward CI personnel, will not be re-examined or interrogated until reaching the civilian interrogation center. Here the suspect will be held temporarily during interrogation and examination, following which the CI officer in charge of the interrogation will render a report on the case to the army CI staff with one of the following recommendations as to disposal:

(a) Sent back to Hq. FUSAG. (Applicable only to enemy agents).
(b) Handed to CA for prosecution.
(c) Handed to civil authorities for prosecution in a civil court.
(d) Handed to civil authorities for internment.
(e) Released. (to be evacuated by CA).

In all of these cases, except, (e), confirmation by the chief CI staff officer at army headquarters will be obtained before the order is carried out. Authority to release a suspect may be delegated by army (G-2, CIB) to the CI officer-in-charge of the civilian interrogation center.

3. DISPLACED PERSONS.

a. Displaced persons are civilians, other than French or enemy nationals, who are outside their national boundaries by reason of the war, are homeless, and are to be returned to their own country, e. g. Spaniards in France.

b. Displaced persons who do not arouse suspicion will be evacuated by CA to assembly centers through normal refugee channels. (see Exhibits)

c. Displaced persons who appear suspect will be handled in the same way as refugees coming from enemy lines (see par. 2, d), except that the language problem may make interrogation below an army civilian interrogation center impossible. In such a case, the suspect should be escorted at once to the civilian interrogation center, which should be notified immediately that a special language interrogation is required.

4. ENEMY NATIONALS.

a. General. In the interests of security, it is desirable to intern generally all civilians of enemy nationality. In the forward areas, instructions will be

issued to units, PM, CA and CI personnel, and to the civil police (through CA) that all enemy nationals identified as such are to be arrested and taken to the nearest PW collecting point (civilian annex). From there, they will be evacuated along PW channels but will not be detained in the civilian interrogation center if alternative accomodation is available. In any event, they will be transferred as soon as possible to a permanent internment camp, staffed by civil authorities, and supervised, if necessary, by CA staffs.

b. Civilians attempting to conceal the fact that they are enemy nationals will be treated as suspect, and sent back along PW channels for questioning at interrogation posts and at the civilian interrogation center. If it becomes evident that they are enemy agents the procedure outlined in par. 7, b-d will be followed; otherwise they will be sent to an internment camp.

c. Large numbers of enemy nationals are living underground in France as fugitives from the enemy. Most of these will be found to be friendly to the allied cause, and, if genuine, should not be interned. Each case should be examined individually with the assistance of the local police and informants.

5. ESCAPERS AND EVADERS.

a. All allied military, naval, or air force personnel who arrive within our lines and claim to have escaped from or evaded capture by the enemy will be escorted by MPs to army headquarters immediately, where specially qualified personnel made available by IS9 (WEA); SHAEF, will interrogate them to establish authenticity of escape stories and for intelligence gathering purposes. An exception will be made in the case of personnel who claim to have been missing for only a few days, and to come from a neighboring unit; such personnel should be conducted directly to their unit.

b. Escapers and evaders who, in the course of interrogation by IS9 (WEA), claim to have been serving with units present in the theater, will be identified by their unit under arrangements to be made by the army A. C. of S., G-1.

c. Persons whose identity cannot be established by reference to units in the field will, after interrogation by IS9 (WEA), be returned to the UK, where the final check will be undertaken. Ultimate responsibility for determining the bona fides of escapers and evaders does not rest with G-2 staffs, but is a SHAEF responsibility, delegated, in turn, to the specialist officer, IS9 (WEA) serving on the G-2 staffs at this and army headquarters. This officer will have at his disposal special intelligence with which to assist in corroborating details of the escape story.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. Any persons who arouse suspicion in the course of interrogation by IS9 (WEA) will be turned over to G-2 (CIB) for appropriate action.

6. CIVILIANS VIOLATING SECURITY REGULATIONS.

a. Civilians who violate security regulations (e. g. out after curfew, bearing arms, found in restricted areas, etc.) will be arrested and detained in civil prisons. If preliminary interrogation does not reveal any connection with enemy intelligence services, these civilians will be tried by civil authorities for the violation of security regulations.

b. If preliminary examination indicates possible connection with the enemy intelligence service, the civilian will be sent to the nearest PW collecting point or enclosure (civilian annex) for questioning at the interrogation post. If connection with enemy intelligence service is revealed, the suspect will be treated as an enemy agent, and procedure outlined in par. 7, b-d will be adopted; otherwise he will be returned to civil authorities for trial for security offense.

7. KNOWN AND SUSPECT ENEMY AGENTS.

a. Definitions. Known and suspect enemy agents are:

(1) Persons who are so described to army CI staffs by the army SCI unit, by CI staffs at this headquarters, or in the card index supplied by this headquarters.

(2) Persons detected in acts of espionage or sabotage.

(3) Persons found in suspicious circumstances which indicate that they may be employed by the enemy intelligence, e. g. those found in possession of radio transmitters, enemy secret codes, intelligence, or materials which might be used for secret writing or sabotage.

b. Secrecy. It is important to conceal from the enemy the knowledge of the organization and activities of enemy intelligence services which has been obtained from captured agents. Therefore, the fact that an agent has been captured will be communicated to as few persons as possible, and such information will not be released to the press without express authority of the A. C. of S., G-2, this headquarters. Captured agents will be kept segregated.

c. Arrest and Escort. When a known or suspect enemy agent is arrested, immediate report will be made to army CI staffs. The agent will be thoroughly searched immediately, and all articles of whatever nature (including money) will be removed from him and retained by his escort. CI personnel making the arrest will not undertake prolonged questioning, but will limit immediate interrogation of the agent to a few questions which will:

(1) establish the existence or non-existence of local accomplices,

(2) obtain urgent tactical information of CI interest,

(3) extract a brief statement and, if possible, an early confession from the agent which will assist subsequent interrogation,

(4) clear up points which can only be verified at the place of capture, e. g. identifying premises or persons, locating hidden radio equipment. The agent will not be sent back with other civilian suspects or PWs, but will be escorted by CI personnel to army CI staffs. The escort will take with him all articles (including money), removed from the agent, together with an arrest report form showing the circumstances of the arrest, results of the initial interrogation, and any statement made by the agent. Copies of a standard arrest report form will be issued by this headquarters.

d. Action by Army CI Staffs.

(1) Immediately upon receipt of notification that a known or suspect enemy agent has been arrested, army CI staffs will inform the army SCI unit, which will at once inform the SCI unit at this headquarters.

(2) Army CI staffs, in conjunction with the army SCI unit, will undertake only such examination of the prisoner and of the report, documents, and articles which accompany him as is necessary to confirm that the prisoner is an enemy agent. Once this is established, the prisoner (with all documents and articles, including money) will be escorted immediately by CI personnel to the headquarters, unless there are special reasons for retaining him at army headquarters, in which case the matter will be referred at once to this headquarters for decision.

e. Disposal. The final disposal of enemy agents will be directed by the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters in consultation with the FUSAG SCI unit.

8. ORGANIZERS OF RESISTANCE GROUPS.

Civilians believed to have been organizers or key members of resistance groups or allied underground organizations will be escorted by CI personnel to the SF liaison officer at corps. He will escort the alleged organizer to the SF detachment at army headquarters. CI personnel below this level will limit interrogation to a few questions to obtain urgent tactical information of CI interest such as the location of recently evacuated offices and buildings, or particulars of suspect enemy agents, collaborators, or reliable informants in the vicinity. Questions involving political considerations will be avoided.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

9. MII TEAMS

MII teams will interrogate refugees, displaced persons, etc. only for the purpose of securing tactical and strategic intelligence. Close cooperation will be maintained between CI personnel and MII personnel. CI personnel will notify the nearest intelligence section of suitable persons for MII interrogation when such persons are discovered; likewise MII personnel will notify CI personnel when civilians arouse their suspicion.

10. BRITISH INDIAN NATIONALS.

A special officer detailed by the India Office to interrogate suspect British Indians in the field will be attached to 21 Army Group. A full report of any Indians captured in German uniforms or of suspect Indian civilians held in US areas will be sent at once through this headquarters (Attention: CIB, G-2) to the special officer at 21 Army Group.

Appendix A — CI Directive Number 1
Appendix B — CI Directive Number 2
Appendix C — CI Directive Number 3
Appendix D — CI Directive Number 4
Appendix E — CI Directive Number 5

FUSAG CI SOP

EXHIBIT "A": CHANNELS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES AND SUSPECTS



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT "B" FUNCTIONAL CHART

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
1. TRAFFIC CONTROL POST. In rear of forward divisional boundaries at bridges, crossroads, etc.	Military police. 1—3 civil police if available.	1. Control military traffic. 2. Keep military routes free of refugees directing these to CA collecting point. 3. Send suspect persons to security control post.	Security control post may be attached to TCP where appropriate.
2. SECURITY CONTROL POST. With TCP, with CA collecting point, or between these two.	1—2 CIC agents, 1—3 civil police.	1. Conduct snap checks (as near to 100% coverage as appropriate to number of refugees and tactical situation). 2. Segregate refugees from enemy lines from those rendered homeless by operations. The former will be sent back to div. PW collect. pt. (civilian annex) the latter to CA collecting point. 3. In the case of suspects, arrest report form will be completed and forwarded by escort to div. PW collecting pt. (civilian annex)	Terrain, tactical situation, and number of refugees will determine location of security control post and extent of snap check.
3. CA COLLECTING POINT. In rear of forward divisional boundaries, behind TCPs, along refugee evacuation routes.	Civil police and/or civilians under CA supervision.	1. Refugees will be organized into parties, instructed where to go, and told what roads not to use. 2. Refugees will not be held at these points, but sent to nearest transit area (or advanced transit area)	Terrain, tactical situation, and number of refugees will determine location and number of collecting points.

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
4. PW COLLECTING POINT. (Civilian Annex) Division and corps (PW enclosure).	CIC agent available at each at all times.	1. If mobile interrogation post is not available CIC agent will interrogate civilian suspects or enemy nationals (IPW team may help if not busy with military prisoners). 2. Known or obvious enemy agent will be sent back under CI escort (who takes with him all articles removed from agent) to army CI staff, which must be notified immediately. 3. Suspects will be interrogated for further details to determine their status and, if not released, sent back to PW enclosure of the next higher echelon. At army level, refugees who are still suspect will be sent to the army civilian interrogation center.	1. Prolonged interrogation of enemy agents will not be made below Hq FUSAG level. 2. Refugees cleared of suspicion will be turned over to CA.
5. MOBILE INTERROGATION POST (optional) At civilian annex to PW enclosure.	Mobile interrogators from army or FUSAG, CIC.	1. Provide specialist interrogation to determine true status of suspects. 2. See PW collecting point (civilian annex) functions.	These establishments are optional, but the desirability of properly classifying suspects and obtaining CI information at the earliest moment is self-evident.

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
6. ADVANCED TRANSIT AREA (optional) Approximately div. level, not more than 20 miles from collecting points, off the main military routes.	Civil organizations, refugees, and CA basic det. (1 relief officer and 1 medical officer) from transit area.	1. Provide food, shelter, and urgent medical attention. 2. Expedite organized evacuation of refugees to transit area.	Optional; established if distance between collecting point and transit area exceeds 20 miles; also in heavily populated area with damaged bldgs. when front is reasonably stable.
7. TRANSIT AREA. At corps level, off the main military routes, not more then 20 miles from collecting points or advanced transit areas. Co-ordinated by CA with G-1, G-2 (CI), G-3, G-4 (Traffic) Engineers, and PM at corps.	Civil organizations, refugees themselves, and CA basic det. (1 relief officer and 1 medical officer).	1. Provide food, shelter, and emergency medical care. 2. Expedite return of refugees to their homes or those of other civilians if they are local residents, or organize evacuation to assembly center.	If distance between transit area assembly center exceeds 20 miles, additional transit areas will be established at 20 mile intervals.
8. ASSEMBLY CENTER. In rear areas, (approx army level) off main military routes.	Civil organizations, refugees themselves, and 2-3 CA basic detachments (1 relief and 1 medical officer each).	1. Provide food, shelter, and medical care. 2. Dispose of refugees as appropriate.	

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
9. CIVILIAN INTERROGATION CENTER Adjacent to, or as annex to, army PW enclosure.	1. Specialist interrogators from army & FUSAG CIC res. dets. 2. Allied intelligence services (optional). 3. Civil police (obtained through CA). 4. SCI personnel as required.	1. Only security suspects will be held here, and only while case is under investigation. 2. Detailed interrogation will be conducted, after which suspects will be either: a. Passed to Hq FUSAG (enemy agents only). b. Handed to civil authorities for prosecution in civil. c. Handed to CA for prosecution. d. Handed to civil authorities for internment. e. Released.	1. Not a place of permanent detention; army CIB must issue written authority for detention exceeding 3 days. 2. Except in case of release confirmation of chief, CIB, army, must be obtained before order is carried out. 3. Enemy nationals (not normally passed thru civilian interrogation center) will be sent to internment camp.
10. INTERNMENT CAMP Rear areas, normally behind army in Communications Zone.	Staffed by civil authorities, supervised by CA.	Provide facilities for indefinite detention of enemy nationals and internees, to include food, shelter, and medical care.	Permanent establishment.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLICE, AND SUSPECT ORGANIZATIONS

1. GENERAL.

[redacted] police to perform all acts which are necessary for the successful prosecution of operations, and will exact obedience to any orders given for that purpose. CI personnel will bear in mind the importance of gaining the goodwill of these agencies. Initial contacts between CI personnel and local officials and police will be through G-5 and CA detachments, who have the primary responsibility for maintaining or restoring an efficient administration. After initial contacts are made, CI personnel may deal directly with local authorities on routine CI matters.

2. RELATIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS (OTHER THAN POLICE).

The suspension and appointment of civil officials is a G-5 responsibility. CI personnel will furnish available information regarding the reliability of officials, while CA personnel will consult CI personnel when security considerations arise. CI personnel will arrest only those officials who are considered likely to assist the enemy or those who are required for interrogation, in either case informing the local CA personnel. No arrests will be made by CI on purely political grounds unless specifically requested by CA personnel. When an official is reported to have been "in touch with the Germans" a clear distinction must be made between unavoidable contact and voluntary assistance. Officials will be treated on their individual merits, judged by past records and reliable local information. The following generalizations can be made:

a. All officials who are also members of the collaborationist parties or organizations, mentioned in paragraph 4 below, normally should be deposed and arrested.

b. In enemy occupied countries, officials recently appointed or promoted are suspect; this does not apply where appointment was made by the civil population immediately before arrival of the allied forces.

c. Ex-officials, imprisoned for political reasons, are not necessarily suitable candidates to fill administrative posts from which undesirable officials have been removed, inasmuch as former collaborationists who have turned their coats in expectation of an allied victory have recently been imprisoned in considerable number.

d. Because regional divisions are post-Armistice creations (the normal links between French administration, SIPO, and SD), officials at regional level are more suspect than departmental and local authorities.

3. RELATIONS WITH LOCAL POLICE.

a. Supervision and necessary reactivation of all police forces in liberated territory is a G-5 responsibility. Supervision of security branches of the local police forces will be carried out in accordance with policies laid down by CI staffs. CI personnel will have free access to police records and will inform CA personnel if it should be necessary to seize such records; in such cases, they will be returned as soon as possible. In judging the reliability of police personnel, each case will be considered individually on the basis of past records and local information.

b. In general, the lower ranks (sergeants and under) in all state and municipal police forces and "Gendarmerie" can be relied upon to maintain law and order, and to enforce security restrictions under the supervision of CA detachments and CI personnel. They cannot be considered as reliable [redacted] pending their bona fides have been established individually.

c. The following are suspect:

(1) All ranks of the specially created anti-Communist or anti-Jewish Police.

(2) Higher ranks of the Service des Renseignements Generaux (Police Speciale), the Police de Surete (Police Judiciare), and the Garde Mobile de Reserve (GMR).

(3) Higher police officials appointed or promoted since the beginning of 1944, i.e. under the DARNAND regime.

(4) Police left in possession of their arms by the German authorities, and actively employed immediately prior to our occupation of an area.

4. ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL PARTIES.

a. CI staffs will be responsible for recommending action (including suspension of activities, seizure of records, or arrest of officials and members) to be taken with regard to any political party or organization considered subversive in character or whose activities constitute a menace to the security of the allied forces. Where no danger to security is involved, it will be the responsibility of G-5, consulting with G-2 (CIB), to recommend action to be taken with regard to a political party or organization which tends to promote unrest among the civilian population or to be politically disruptive.

b. No general suspicion attaches to the Legion des Combattants, pro-Vichy parties and organizations organized from the South Zone (French Basic Handbook, 1944 Edit., Part III, Chap. XVI "C"), or Vichy Youth Movements, though the organizers and directors of the latter should be treated with special reserve until their bona fides are established.

c. Suspect parties include all those mentioned in the French Basic Handbook, 1944 Edit., Part III, Chap. XVI "B", together with dependent para-military organizations and youth movements (treated on the same basis as parent organizations). The Breton "Separatists" are equally suspect.

d. Officials and members of suspect parties and organizations will be arrested if found to be in one of the following three categories:

(1) Officials of suspect parties and organizations.

(2) Members of suspect parties and organizations who have collaborated actively with the German police or German security organizations (SIPO or SD).

(3) Members of suspect parties and organizations found wearing uniforms or bearing arms.

e. The rank and file of these bodies should be subjected to the maximum possible restrictions, e.g., reporting daily to the police.

f. The arrest, detention, and trial of members of colaborationist parties will, wherever possible, be left to the civil authorities, subject to the general policy adopted by the Supreme Commander towards such authorities.

NOTE: Lists of party members are likely to be found at the headquarters of the "Service Des Renseignements Generaux" in the principal regional towns, as well as in ocal party offices.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5. HANDLING OF PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

The following classes of pro-axis military or uniformed organizations are likely to [illegible] on the Continent:

a. Members of para-military organizations of collaborationist political parties of occupied territories:

(1) "Service d'Ordre" and "Gardes Francaises" or the "Parti Populaire Francais" (PPF).

(2) "Legion Nationale Populaire" and "Milice Nationale Populaire" of the "Rassemblement National Populaire" (RNP).

(3) "Legion Franciste" of the "Francistes".

(4) "Jeunes d'Europe Nouvelle" of "Groupe Collaboration".

b. Auxiliary police who are not part of the recognized civil police, but are recruited from collaborationist organizations and used to cooperate with German police forces in imposing repressive measures on the civil population:

The "Milice Francaise", the most dangerous para-military organization in France.

c. Members of German army formations, recruited from the civil population in occupied territory:

(1) "Legion des Volontaires Francais" (LVF).

(2) First Regiment of FRANCE (if they fight for the Germans).

(3) French "Waffen SS".

(4) "National-Socialistische Kraftfahrer Korps" (NSKK) (uniformed members, not civilian drivers).

(5) "TODT" (uniformed members).

d. When any of the above classes are captured, they will be treated as follows:

(1) Members of groups under categories "a" and "b" will be treated initially as prisoners of war if found in uniform.

(2) Members of groups under categories "a" and "b" will be treated as civilians if not in uniform. Only those taking action against the allied forces will be arrested by the AEF, and treated in accordance with the rules of war.

(3) Persons in category "C" will be treated as prisoners of war.

e. In the initial stages, prior to the establishment of PW camps on the Continent, all personel taken as PW will be evacuated to UK where they will be screened, and those found to be innocuous, and who so desire, will be handed to their national authorities for incorporation in the national forces. When PW camps are established on the Continent, the screening will be carried out at the PW camps.

FUSAG CI SOP

COUNTER SABOTAGE

1. COUNTER SABOTAGE OFFICERS.

Headquarters of each army and this headquarters will have on its CI staff an officer specially trained in counter sabotage. These officers will be qualified to advise subordinate organizations regarding the various methods of protection against sabotage and to supervise the investigation of sabotage cases.

2. PREVENTION.

CI staffs will advise on counter sabotage measures but the counter sabotage protection of all material and installations will be a responsibility of unit commanders. When they can be made available from other duties, CIC will conduct surveys and inspections of vital points and recommend protective measures.

3. INVESTIGATIONS.

All cases of suspected sabotage will be reported immediately to appropriate CI staffs. The investigation of such cases will be undertaken by CIC. If it becomes apparent that an offense under the Articles of War by military personnel may be involved, PM (Criminal Investigation Division) should be called in.

a. Information from special sources regarding sabotage activities of enemy agents will be made available to CI staffs by SCI units. These units will also advise CI staffs on the action to be taken with respect to such agents.

b. Any captured saboteur or suspected saboteur known or believed to be an enemy agent will be handled in the same manner as other enemy agents (see Appendix "G", par. 7).

4. DISPOSAL OF SABOTAGE EQUIPMENT.

The responsibility for the neutralization or removal of enemy sabotage equipment rests with engineer bomb disposal units. In an emergency, CI personnel may deal with such equipment, but, whenever practicable, they should await the assistance of engineer bomb disposal units. After sabotage equipment is rendered harmless by bomb disposal personnel, it will be handed over to CI personnel for disposal as instructed by CI staffs. New types of sabotage equipment will be delivered, as soon as practicable, to CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters:

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX "J"

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP CI SOP

TRAVEL CONTROL

6 August 1944

1. GENERAL

a. References:

(1) SHAEF Administrative Memorandum 17, dated 28 May 1944.

(2) Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, AG Section, Visitors Bureau, Standing Operating Procedure, 13 July 1944, "Procedure for the Entry, Handling, and Departure of Visitors into the Twelfth Army Group Area on the Continent."

b. Travel between the UK and the Continent will be restricted to a minimum and every travel application will be considered individually.

c. As used herein, the term "civilian" will apply to any person not authorized to hold a recognized British or US military, naval, or air force identity card (e. g. AF. B. 2606, AB 64, WD AGO Form No. 65 series, or ETOUSA Enlisted Man's Identification Card). The term "civilian" will not apply to any allied secret agent to be sent to the UK by US agencies such as OSS or SFHQ. These agencies will vouch for and will supply the name and particulars of any such agent to this Headquarters (G-2, CIB).

2. CIVILIAN TRAVEL FROM THE CONTINENT TO THE UK.

a. Armies will not accept any private applications from civilians on the Continent for permits to travel to the UK. G-5 and CA detachments are to publicize this fact.

b. (1) Individuals of the following two categories will be sent to the UK only on the authority of this headquarters (G-2, CIB):

(a) Known and suspect enemy agents.

(b) Organizers or key members of resistance groups, allied secret agents, and other persons whose unusual background or experience merits detailed interrogation.

(2) Escorts of the individuals categorized above will prevent communication or contact between such individuals and other persons.

c. After an effective system of travel control has been established on the Continent, certain civilians may be brought to the UK in addition to those required for intelligence and security purposes. These additional cases will be limited to key individuals whose presence in the UK is requested by British, US, or allied governmental agencies. Agencies in the field wishing to bring civilians to the UK, other than for intelligence purposes, will refer the request to their parent agency in LONDON which will make an official application to the Passport Control Department of the Foreign Office in LONDON.

d. All civilians travelling from the Twelfth Army Group zone on the Continent to the UK will continue to require written authorization from this headquarters (G-2, CIB). (See Exhibit "A").

e. When it is decided to allow civilians on the Continent to make application for permission to travel from the Continent to the UK, representatives of the Passport Control Department on the Continent will deal with such applications.

3. CIVILIAN AND SERVICE TRAVEL FROM THE UK TO CONTINENT.

a. Civilian or service personnel, other than members of the AEF, will not be permitted to travel from the UK to the Continent without a permit issued by the Military Permit Office, LONDON. When necessary, permits will be validated for a return journey to the UK. In such cases, par. 2 above, will not apply to the return trip. Every civilian entering the Continent must be in possession of an identity document bearing a photograph. (British civilians will use either a passpórt, a National Registration Identity Card with photograph, or a DR Form 12 for this purpose. US civilians will use a passport).

b. Permits will not be issued to persons travelling for private reasons. Subject to the usual security check, permits may be issued to the following persons by the Military Permit Office in the UK without reference to this headquarters:

(1) Distinguished persons nominated by SHAEF.

(2) Personnel of categories to be designated by this headquarters.

c. (1) **Service personnel other than AEF.** Except for personnel covered by par 3b above, the sponsoring agency in the UK will secure the approval of this headquarters for the visit before sending the application to the Military Permit Office.

(2) **Civilians.** Applications for travel by civilians (other than those listed in par 3b above) will be made by the sponsoring agency to the Military Permit Office, which will refer the applications to this headquarters, which will inform the Military Permit Office, LONDON, whether a travel permit should be issued.

d. Armies will be responsible for the supervision and security control of visitors to their zones.

e. Sea and air port CI officers will indorse the permits of all visitors at their port of entry and exit with a statement as to date and place of entry or exit.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SERIAL NO .....

EXHIBIT "A"

AUTHORIZATION TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

WHEN THE PERSON(S) TO WHOM THIS DOCUMENT REFERS IS (ARE) PROCEEDING UNDER ESCORT, IT MUST BE KEPT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ESCORT THROUGHOUT THE JOURNEY AND DELIVERED AT DESTINATION TO THE AUTHORITY INTO WHOSE CARE THE PERSON(S) CONCERNED IS (ARE) DELIVERED.

Date .....

Authority has been granted for the passage of the undermentioned ..... person(s) from the Theatre of Operations to the United Kingdom, subject to the following conditions.

(Delete and initial where inapplicable)

1. Port of Embarkation in the Theatre shall be .....

2. Service escort shall be maintained until the person(s) concerned is/are handed over to the care of ..... at .....

3. The person(s) concerned will remain segregated from the public throughout the journey.

4. The person(s) concerned fall(s) within category .....

Signature of I (b)/CIB Staff Officer

.....

Stamp Headquarters .....

Surname	Christian Names	Nationality	Date & Place of Birth	Identity Documents held

(Pub 2792)

910 (G-2)
CI DIRECTIVE)

NUMBER . 1)

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655, US ARMY

28 August 1944

CI REPORTS TO HEADQUARTERS — TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

1. Reference: paragraph 6 and Exhibits "B" and "C", Annex "A", Twelfth Army Group CI SOP, file 350.09 (G-2), subject: "CI Intelligence and Reports". The paragraph and exhibits of reference are rescinded and the following substituted therefor.

2. Each army will report to this headquarters (Attention: CIB, G-2 Section):

a. Information which materially amplifies or contradicts the information given on the SHAEF CI personality cards for FRANCE.

b. Details (not already included in SHAEF CI personality cards for FRANCE) pertaining to the more important collaborators in FRANCE, and, especially, to those deemed likely to continue to be pro-German or anti-Allied whether they have been left at liberty, interned, imprisoned, or have evaded arrest.

3. This will be accomplished by means of:

a. Routine Reports. Routine reports will be rendered on the 10th and 25th of each month in quintuplicate in accordance with the form attached hereto as Inclosure #1. Reports will be divided into four parts, as shown, and each part will be separately paged and headed so that it may be readily detached.

b. Special Reports. Special reports will be rendered as may be necessary in cases of urgency or matters of special importance. The following topics are examples:

(1) German penetration of civil authorities, including police.

(2) Case reports on important collaborators arrested for security reasons.

(3) German use of TODT or other para-military personnel for subversive activity.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) German plans for the post-war organization of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda in GERMANY or other countries.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

RAYMOND STONE, JR
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl:
Form for CI semi-monthly report to Hq Twelfth Army Group.

DISTRIBUTION:

		TWELFTH ARMY GROUP	
SHAEF	12	G-1	1
21 Army Group	5	G-2	20
ETOUSA	5	G-3	3
Com Zone	5	G-4	1
AEAF	2	G-5	3
Ninth AF	5	PM	3
ANCXF	2	P&PW	2
OSS	5	SIS	2
First US Army	65	SGS	4
Third US Army	73	AG	1
Seventh US Army	2	AG (Publ)	3
Ninth US Army	52	IG	1
		Sp Troops	3

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP CI SOP

FORM FOR CI SEMI-MONTHLY REPORTS TO HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.

For the period to

PART I: CIVIL CI.

a. General survey.
b. New cases of individual suspects.
c. Progress of cases under investigation.
d. Personalities in areas still under enemy control.
e. Additional information on carded personalities.
f. Subversive organizations.
g. Security control of civil population.
h. Relations between troops and civil population.
i. Relations between CI staffs and personnel and local authorities and police.
j. Rumors.

PART II: MILITARY CI.

a. General survey.
b. Security of information (Measures taken to prevent leakages; notations re serious cases).
c. Security of materiel (Measures taken to prevent sabotage; notations re sabotage incidents).
d. Security of personnel (Notations re enemy propaganda).

PART III: PORT, AIRPORT, AND FRONTIER CONTROL.

a. Location of port CI officers and areas covered.
1. The location and areas of responsibility of port CI officers who are functioning at ports (sea and air) and frontiers will be stated.
2. The initial report will contain, in addition, details of the individual officers concerned and the titles of their CI units. Thereafter, only changes of officer personnel and units and modification of areas will be reported.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. Port CI.

1. Security of dock areas.

A report upon the state of organization of the control of entry to and exit from the dock areas with particular reference to:

(a) Physical barriers.
(b) Adequacy of gate control personnel.
(c) Establishment and efficiency of pass system.
(d) Policy adopted re shore leave for seamen.
(e) Control of harbor craft.
(f) Control of fishing craft.
(g) State of anti-sabotage precautions in the dock area.

2. Relations with other port authorities.

(a) Functioning of port executive committee from CI standpoint.
(b) Relations with civil police in dock area.
(c) Relations with PBSO's and ONI officers stationed at ports on CI matters.
(d) Relations with any civil port authority on CI matters.

c. Coastline Security.

Report on state of affairs and measures organized, or in process of organization, to deal with illicit landings, departures, communications, coast watching organization, co-ordination of measures with naval authorities, etc.

d. Travel Control.

1. In initial stages of operation:

(a) Report on individuals dispatched to UK under categories A and B (see par. 2, b, (1), Annex "J", Twelfth Army Group CI SOP, subject: "Travel control") with particular regard to working of the scheme.
(b) Report on any difficulties experienced in maintaining control of outward and inward travellers.

2. After initial stage of operation:

(a) Statistical return of traffic on CI Form 3.
(b) Report on passenger arrival departure on CI Form 4.
(c) Report on any difficulties experienced in maintaining control of outward and inward travellers.

PART IV: CI STAFFS & PERSONNEL.

A statement showing the areas allotted to CI staffs and the resources of CI personnel available in each area.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655, US ARMY

310 (G-2)
CI DIRECTIVE)
:
NUMBER . . 2)

30 August 1944

WEARING OF CIVILIAN CLOTHES BY ALLEGED MEMBERS OF ENEMY FORCES

1. Reference: paragraph 7 a, b and c, Annex "G", Twelfth Army Group CI SOP, file 350.09 (G-2).

2. The following instructions amplify the provisions of the annex referenced above.

3. Any person claiming to be a member of the enemy's armed forces who is found in civilian clothes, or other disguise, will be handled as follows:

a. If investigation reveals that such person:

(1) is a member of the enemy's armed forces of no security interest, but an actual deserter or escaped PW, he will be turned over to the military police for evacuation through PW channels.

(2) is not a member of the enemy's armed forces, he will be treated as a civilian, (for example, interned as an enemy national).

b. If the individual's mission was one of espionage, sabotage, or other subversive activity, he will be treated as an enemy agent regardless of civilian or military status.

By Command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

H. B. LEWIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

Distribution, ffp.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION:

SHAEF	12
21 Army Group	5
ETOUSA	5
Com Zone	5
AEAF	2
Ninth AF	5
ANCXF	2
OSS	5
First US Army	65
Third US Army	73
Seventh US Army	2
Ninth US Army	52

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

G-1	1
G-2	20
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-5	3
PM	3
P&PW	2
SIS	2
SG'S	4
AG	1
AG (Publ)	3
IG	1
Sp Troops	3

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655, US ARMY

310 (G-2)
CI AMENDMENT)
:
NUMBER . . . 3)

CIC UNIFORM

1. CI Directive Number 1, file 910 (G-2), dated 28 August 1944, subject: "CI Reports to Headquarters Twelfth Army Group", and CI Directive Number 2, file 310 (G-2), dated 30 August 1944, subject: "Wearing of Civilian Clothes by Alleged Members of Enemy Forces", are hereby redesignated CI Amendment Number 1 and CI Amendment Number 2, respectively.

2. Reference: paragraph 6, Annex "B", subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps", Twelfth Army Group CI SOP, file 350.09 (G-2), dated 23 June 1944. This paragraph is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

6. UNIFORM.

a. Enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps are authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians serving in the field with the armed forces. This uniform consists of the following:

(1) Regulation OD trousers and shirt with no sleeve insignia of rank.

(2) Metal "US" insignia on both sides of the shirt collar.

(3) When wearing of garrison cap is authorized, officers' type cap will be worn with cord edge braid removed. "US" insignia will be worn on the cap.

(4) The regulation field jacket, raincoat or overcoat will be worn as appropriate.

b. CIC credentials and badges will be carried and CIC brassards will be worn as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agents or the successful accomplishment of their mission.

c. Enlisted personnel of the CIC will not wear the officers' blouse, trousers or other apparel designed for officers. When wearing of the blouse is

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

authorized, the regulation blouse for enlisted men, including insignia of rank, will be worn."

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

		TWELFTH ARMY GROUP	
SHAEF	12	G-1	1
21 Army Group	5	G-2	20
ETOUSA	5	G-3	3
Com Zone	5	G-4	1
AEAF	2	G-5	3
Ninth AF	5	PM	3
ANCXF	2	P&PW	2
OSS	5	SIS	2
First US Army	65	SG'S	4
Third US Army	73	AG	1
Seventh US Army	2	AG (Publ)	3
Ninth US Army	52	IG	1
		Sp Troops	3

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655

11 November 1944

311 (G-2)
CI SOP)
:
AMENDMENT 4)

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS

1. References: paragraph 17, Section II, subject: "Censorship", and paragraph 4c, Annex "F", subject: "Security Control of Civil Population", of Twelfth Army Group CI SOP, dated 23 June 1944.

2. The following instructions amplify the provisions of the paragraphs referenced in paragraph 1 above and are applicable only in liberated countries:

a. Army and separate corps or similar commanders, through their AC of S, G-2, will suspend and progressively reopen civil communications in areas under their command as indicated in this amendment.

b. No civilian channel of communication entering or leaving the area controlled by an army, separate corps or similar command of this headquarters will be opened without the approval of the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.

c. No local civilian channel of communication will be opened within the area of operation of an army, separate or similar command without the approval of the commanding general thereof.

d. The progressive application of the measures listed below will be by the specific situation and will depend upon the availability of communications and censorship facilities. The precise restrictions to be imposed will be decided in consultation with appropriate CA staffs or detachments, signal officers and civil censorship authorities.

(1) Phase I.

(a) All civil communications will be suspended entirely upon seizure of a locality. Such emergency telephone calls as are deemed necessary for the health, care and feeding of the civilian population will be made by or under the supervision of CA detachments using Signal Corps facilities.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) No communications will be made available to civilians until the tactical situation permits, and the following conditions have been met:

1. Intelligence targets, including personalities, have been exploited.
2. The community has been cleared of enemy military personnel.
3. Orders regarding restrictions upon movement of civilians have been published, and public safety authorities are operating satisfactorily under military supervision.
4. Civil censorship authorities are ready to effect all censorship deemed necessary by the appropriate commander.

(2) Phase II.

(a) When adequate communication, transportation and censorship facilities exist, and the conditions listed in the preceding paragraph have been met, limited civil communications may be reopened.

1. Telephonic communication may be the first type to be opened, and, initially, may be restricted to specified authorities or private individuals, to include restriction upon the language which may be employed. Time limit and area of service will be governed by available facilities.
2. Postal communication will be limited, initially, to postcards. Transportation facilities will determine the area of delivery.
3. Telegraphic communication will not, normally, be made available to civilians in communities within the Twelfth Army Group zone. However, if limited service is made available, the restrictions imposed will be substantially the same as for telephonic communication.

(3) Phase III.

Restrictions may be removed gradually as facilities and censorship resources permit.

e. Radio transmission and publication of newspapers by the civilian population will be entirely forbidden, except when subject to controls approved by the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.

f. Communications carried by travelers passing into or out of the theater will be immediately turned over to civil censorship authorities by the authorities who intercept them.

3. In Germany, civilian use of all postal, telegraph, teletype, telephone, radio service and other channels of communication [illegible] will be suspended and will not be reopened without the authorization of the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLY:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

		TWELFTH ARMY GROUP	
SHAEF	12	G-1	1
21 Army Group	5	G-2	20
Sixth Army Group	5	G-3	3
ETOUSA	5	G-4	1
Com Zone	5	G-5	3
AEAF	2	PM	3
Ninth AF	5	P&PW	2
ANCXF	2	SIS	2
OSS	5	SG/S	4
First US Army	65	AG	1
Third US Army	73	AG (Publ)	3
Seventh US Army	2	IG	1
Ninth US Army	52	Sp Troops	3
94th Inf Div	2	JAG	1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

APO 655, US ARMY

310 (G-2)
CI AMENDMENT)
:
NUMBER . . .5)

CIC UNIFORM

1. Paragraph 6, Annex "B", Twelfth Army Group CI SOP, file 350.09 (G-2), dated 23 June 1944, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps" and paragraph 2, CI Amendment Number 3, file 310 (G-2), subject: "CIC Uniform", are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"6. UNIFORM.

a. In conquered territories, enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps will wear the uniform prescribed for enlisted men of the U. S. Army with or without sleeve insignia of rank, excepting as follows:

(1) Enlisted personnel may wear the enlisted uniform without insignia of rank and with metal "US" insignia on both sides of the shirt collar when actually engaged in interrogation duties in interrogation centers, internment camps, detention camps and similar installations

b. In liberated territories, enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps will wear the uniform prescribed for enlisted men of the U. S. Army without sleeve insignia of rank and with metal "US" insignia on both sides of the shirt collar.

c. CIC credentials and badges will be carried and CIC armbands will be worn as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agents or the successful accomplishment of their mission."

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

/s/ C. R. Landon
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

		TWELFTH ARMY GROUP	
SHAEF	12	G-1	1
21 Army Group	5	G-2	30
Sixth Army Group	5	G-3	3
Com Z, ETOUSA	5	G-4	1
ADSEC, Com Z	5	G-5	3
Ninth AF	5	PM	3
ANCXF	2	P&PW	2
OSS (X-2)	5	SIS	2
First US Army	65	SGS	4
Third US Army	73	AG	1
Seventh US Army	2	AG Publ	3
Ninth US ARMY	52	IG	1
Fifteenth US Army	10	Sp Trs	3
66th Inf Div	2	JAG	1

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX B — PART II

SECURITY CONTROL IN LIBERATED COUNTRIES

A. *Civil Security.*

The activities of the German Intelligence Service against the 12th Army Group reached their peak in December 1944, at the time of the German breakthrough in the Ardennes sector. The use of English-speaking German soldiers wearing American uniforms and utilizing American vehicles, to spearhead the Ardennes counter-offensive was the most daring and extensive operations undertaken by the GIS during the European campaigns. Under the leadership of Otto SKORZENY, the members of Einheit Stielau, which consisted of Rangers and signal and demolition troops, were given thorough training in various sabotage and espionage methods. The importance of the role of this unit in "Operation Greif" can be assessed by considering the missions assigned to it: securing the Meuse River bridges between NAMUR and LIEGE, reporting on the disposition of American units, demolishing bridges, blocking strategic routes and destroying American headquarters and lines of communications.

This operation is mentioned at the outset, not only because it represents the most ambitious undertaking of the GIS, but also because it suggests the problems which confronted Allied counterintelligence personnel. Furthermore, following this operation, one can foresee the ultimate dissolution of the GIS, whereas prior to it, one can follow the gradual increase in GIS activities to their apex.

In France, during the month of August 1944, the enemy made extensive use of low-grade line-crossers. The agents sent through our lines were ill-trained and generally were not given specific missions. The distinction between sabotage and espionage agents, which later became clearly defined, was not apparent at this early stage. It is noteworthy, however, that enemy agents already attempted to penetrate our line in American uniforms, though the use of American uniforms and equipment for purposes of deception was limited as yet.

There was no significant change in the grade of agents employed by the GIS until October 1944, during which month it became apparent that, while the grade of agents continued generally low, greater numbers of high-grade and sabotage agents were being used. Two well-trained agents, CHARTIER and MICHEL, were apprehended through the application of routine security control measures. It became evident that the GIS followed a definite pattern by sending low-grade line-crossers through the lines in order to find the most suitable routes for the higher class agents. The semi-static tactical situation which prevailed in October 1944 encouraged the use of short-term line-crossers. Other new types, such as the stay-behind and parachutist agents, were introduced at this time. Frenchmen who had been convicted of espionage for the Germans by French courts and who were, subsequently, released from jail by the Germans were now used as agents and were assigned missions which included the asassination of important Allied personalities. Other important agents were transported to Spain by air and entered France on strategic rather than tactical missions. Their purpose was to obtain information which would be of long-range value to the GIS.

An acceleration of GIS activities occurred in November 1944. The infiltration of German agents equipped with American uniforms and jeeps continued on an increasingly large scale, and German soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes were sent through our lines on 2—4 day missions. Another development at this point was the use of English-speaking patrols on long-range missions, such as the tapping of communication lines in the forward American areas. During this period information was obtained by our counterintelligence service regarding GIS espionage and sabotage schools and the plans for post-war underground activities by the SS and NSDAP under the direction of Himmler. Other reports indicated that English-speaking personnel were being assembled by the GIS for training in reconnaissance, sabotage and "special tasks." Among these "special tasks" were assignments as parachutist saboteurs and impersonators of Allied personel in "Operation Greif".

In combatting the GIS offensive, counterintelligence personnel had also to contend with certain collaborationist organizations in liberated territory, such as the Rexist Movement in Belgium. Frenchmen sympathetic to the Nazi cause for example, members of the Milice, provided the GIS with a pool from which to draw agents. In sectors of France, Belgium and Luxembourg adjacent to the German border, elements of the native population were receptive to Nazi propaganda and to attempts by enemy agents to stir up anti-Allied feeling. Furthermore, it was necessary to use tact in applying security measures in the liberated territories to avoid offending the predominating pro-Allied segments of the populations.

On the other hand, the task of counter-intelligence personnel in liberated territories was simplified by the prevailing pro-Allied sentiment. Informants volunteered valuable information regarding personalities and subjects of CI interest, as well as tactical matters. Perhaps more important was the contribution of indigenous resistance groups and police officials in their performance of CI work. The re-organized Gendarmerie Nationale and the auxiliary police in

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

France, the Luxembourg Milice, and resistance groups in France and Belgium became active after the liberation of these territories. Valuable assistance was rendered by them in the screening of refugees and impressed labor, in the enforcement of security restrictions, and in the performance of other routine CI duties.

In order to counter GIS activities effectively, directives on civil security measures were prepared by this branch and issued to all troops under the jurisdiction of 12th Army Group. These directives were supplemented by MG regulations regarding curfew, blackout, travel restrictions, the surrender of arms and ammunition, and other similar matters. In general, the most stringent security measures were applied in the forward areas, within the actual combat zone. Certain forward areas were evacuated entirely to obviate the necessity of establishing complete controls. Instructions regarding curfew, blackout, and the surrender of arms and explosives varied in the First US Army and Third US Army areas; however, the use of cameras and binoculars was forbidden in both sectors. Initially, all civilian communications in liberated territories were suspended and mail en route was impounded. As the front advanced, these restrictions were gradually relaxed in the rear areas and provision was made for the resumption of certain types of civil communication. Official couriers were permitted, intra-city telephone communications were re-opened, and limited mail service was instituted. Later, extensive internal communications were authorized and ultimately limited external communications were resumed. When re-opened, the civilian communication systems in liberated territories were operated largely under indigenous control.

With the gradual intensification of GIS activities, it became necessary to tighten security restrictions and controls in all areas. Although lack of personnel rendered control of civilian travel in rear areas inadequate "snap" checks to determine the identity of individuals and the validity of identity documents were effected in all areas. In the combat zone, these checks frequently covered entire towns. Total evacuation of some forward sectors was accomplished, although this procedure created vast screening problems in the rear areas. In December 1944, reports of possible subversive organizations in Belgium, a flood of alarmist rumors, reported instances of sabotage and installing of time-bombs by the Germans, and the infiltration of German soldiers posing as refugees brought about the institution of numerous counter-measures. MG security guards were increased, civilians were evacuated from the Roer to the rear of division CPs, advertisements were banned in Luxembourg newspapers, most civilian communications in Belgium were suspended indefinitely, and a CI

security control line under the operational control of ADSEC was established along the Meuse River from GIVET, France, to VISE, Belgium, to link up with the ends of existing army group lines. Important political prisoners, some of whom escaped, were evacuated to the rear by Belgian officials. Numerous check points were placed on all roads while general security measures and vigilance were increased to an unparalleled degree.

No evidence of operations by subversive organizations in liberated countries was encountered. Perhaps the most serious threat to Allied security in this respect came from the resistance groups in Belgium, which remained active and retained their arms in defiance of governmental decree. However, the disarming was slowly accomplished, some of the resistance groups themselves were dissolved, and governmental authority gradually was established.

B. *Internal Security*

Report submitted by 12th Army Group units indicated that troop security during operations in liberated territories was generally satisfactory. When the rapid advances of our armies left isolated bands of enemy soldiers behind our lines, CP security measures were strengthened and additional precautions, such as the monitoring of telephonic and telegraphic communications, were undertaken. Minor instances of sabotage were reported and investigation disclosed that, in the majority of cases, the damage was caused by the carelessness of our own troops. In forward areas, where the facilities for checking persons were poor and where a threat to internal security was believed to exist, the policy was adopted of arresting all male line-crossers, aged 18–30, who were not natives of the particular area or members of a local family group. In October 1944, an increase in enemy propaganda by means of leaflets, radio broadcasts and the continuance of Rexist propaganda in Belgium were noted, but neither constituted a serious threat to the security of personnel.

On several occasions noteworthy violations of the security of information occurred. For example, the enemy is known to have had advance information regarding a move of the Ninth US Army. Other violations involved the disclosure of CP locations and the compromise of army countersigns. It is now evident that these and similar violations were the result of too wide a dissemination of top secret material, laxity in telephone security, and the tendency of American PW, particularly replacements, to disclose classified information during interrogations. It was also found that American personnel frequently carried copies of orders or other documents which assisted enemy interrogators. Front-line troops were inclined to discuss freely past and future operations

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

while in rest areas, especially in Belgium and other sectors where the non-fraternization policy did not apply.

C. Port, Frontier and Travel Control

As already indicated, civilian travel was restricted by MG proclamation. Travel in excess of 6 kilometers from the individual's home without express MG approval was forbidden throughout the 12th Army Group zone. In spite of this restriction, the movement of vast numbers of refugees and evacuees presented problems which defied adequate coverage by CI personnel. In order to combat GIS activities and to restrict unauthorized travel, a CI control line manned largely by ADSEC CIC personnel, assisted by indigenous security and resistance organization personnel, was established along the entire 12th Army Group front. Initially the work of the indigenous personnel was hampered by lack of arms, food, clothing, equipment and authority. Snap checks by these personnel revealed much unauthorized civilian travel, and violators were held for detailed investigation as possible GIS operatives or were turned over to MG for prosecution.

Port and frontier control will be discussed more fully in the following section. It need only be noted that in August 1944, the Ninth US Army published restrictions on civilian fishing and coastline security in Brittany.

ANNEX B — PART III

CI OPERATIONS IN LIBERATED COUNTRIES

a. As has been stated in the general introduction, CI operations in liberated countries were influenced by two important factors. The first, the fact that our forces were operating in liberated, hence friendly territory, meant that security restrictions had to be tempered by a considerate regard for the friendly population, only recently liberated from the Germans and their prolonged restrictions. Nevertheless, as will be seen in sample cases cited below, the restrictions which we imposed led to the arrest of a number of German agents, not to mention a host of collaborators and black-market operators.

b. The slight disadvantage of operating in friendly territory was far outweighed by the enormous assistance which was furnished by the indigenous authorities in establishing and operating the various control measures necessary to safeguard our forces and accomplish the CI mission. In addition, indigenous security personnel were invaluable because of their basic knowledge of language, local customs and inhabitants, and their traditional authority all of which was of immense assistance in "breaking" cases which would have taken up far too much of our time and exhausted our limited resources. In the handling of collaborators, too, the indigenous authorities were a great boon, for most of these cases were handled by these authorities, whereas similar cases in Germany (there called "security threats") have to be dealt with entirely by our own resources. Again, in the matter of disposition, the indigenous authorities were very helpful in assuming custody of and trying German agents who had been apprehended and interrogated by us.

c. A detailed account of the CI operations conducted during the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France and the Ardennes is not within the scope of this report. (Those who wish further details may refer to the 12th Army Group Counterintelligence Semi-Monthly Reports (August 1944 through February 1945) and the 12th Army Group Monthly Counterintelligence Reports (March 1945 — May 1945)). However, sample cases which are mentioned below, in condensed form, have been selected to show general types and tendencies.

d. From the first, we encountered an endless number of "collaborators", whose offenses ranged from social or sexual intercourse with Germans to denouncing patriots and assisting in their apprehension and interrogation (which often involved torture and brutal killings). Normally, these collaborators had scraps of CI information, but did not present much interest and hasty inter-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

rogation was usually sufficient for CI intelligence purposes. Because of their former contacts with the Germans or other allied collaborators, however, it was considered that these people should not be left at liberty, but should be transferred to the appropriate indigenous authorities for trial or internment. In this connection, the services of the Resistance groups should not be overlocked; they were a great help in rounding up collaborators. In all honesty, however, it must be admitted that, in some cases, their operations and methods hindered rather than assisted CI operations. There were cases of CI targets penetrating wildcat resistance organizations and posing as "good patriots", CI targets being summarily killed before interrogation by competent CI personnel, agents hastily arrested when their controlled "freedom" would have been more to our advantage, hundreds of persons detained without records so that important CI targets were occasionally "sheltered" under false names, as minor collaborators: and finally, undisciplined bands of armed, trigger-happy patriots sometimes presented more of a menace than isolated German soldiers. The disarmament of these irregular forces by their respective governments was greatly appreciated by all concerned. In dealing with collaborators, however, Resistance groups relieved CI personnel for more important tasks. The following are two sample collaborator cases:

(1) Fay, Heinrich — Luxembourger. Doenningen, Luxembourg. Acted as guide for the German Army during the invasion of 1940; joined the VDB that same year; was later made Ortsgruppenleiter by the German authorities. Transferred to Luxembourg authorities on 22 September for internment.

(2) Jeangout Joseph — Belgian, 21 Rue des Recollets, Bastogne. Arrested on 16 September. Subject of SHAEF pink card 208 (Luxembourg-Bastogne). Burgmestre of Bastogne. Active Rexist; his brother, Jeangout, Paul, is a very prominent Rexist and recruiter for the Legion Wallonie. Paul, together with Chaudoir and Molitor, Rexist leaders, fled with the Germans. Subject is believed to have denounced patriots to Formation "B", Hilfsfeldgendarmerie. Transferred to Belgian authorities on 22 September for continued investigation and probable trial.

e. German agents apprehended in liberated territory were of all types and had been recruited from almost all levels of society. As a rule, however, we captured few high-type agents, primarily because the Germans had a large number of expendable, low-grade agents who could be employed just as well for limited tactical espionage. The Germans, during our military advances, wanted, primarily, information on the locations of US troops and their identifications. Inasmuch as all troops were permitted to wear shoulder patches and

all vehicles to carry bumper markings (despite repeated protests from counter-intelligence personnel), it was a simple matter for the Germans to use persons of less-than-average intelligence to report military information simply by informing the Germans what patches or bumper markings were to be seen in certain designated areas. Bearing in mind the type of information desired by the Germans and the method by which it was to be obtained, it will be apparent that the use of complicated secret inks or codes was not a practical means of communication for German agents, under circumstances which called for quick up-to-date reports. To meet this demand only three types of agents were really practical: radio agents to report on troop concentrations and convoys in the rear areas, short-range "line-crossers" who were to cross the front lines and report back to the Germans in a couple of days, and pigeon agents who would send back a limited number of short messages by carrier pigeon. In practice, however, pigeons appear to have been used only infrequently and then primarily to announce safe arrival of parachute agents.

f. Radio agents obtained little success, for they were usually men who were on the Black List, hence subject to arrest if they stayed at home. When they had moved to new locations prior to our arrival they had aroused the suspicions of the local inhabitants, so that the Resistance Groups or our CI personnel were advised about them. In cases where the agent managed not to arouse suspicion he faced the problem of obtaining information without violating travel restrictions, and the presence of the incriminating radio material was usually so distressing that most agents buried or destroyed their sets and tried to forget the whole thing. The rare agent who might decide to operate his set, faced the dangers of our monitoring and direction finding detection. So far as is known, no damaging military information reached the GIS by means of radio agents in the 12th Army Group Zone of Operations.

g. Much has been written in popular books about spies within the military establishment acting as secretaries and interpreters. Fortunately, as a result of security checks of applicants for employment by the army, such cases have been negligible. The practice of accepting unknown civilian linguists as interpreters, which was prevalent in some units during operations in liberated countries, unfortunately, did result in occasional employment of unsavory elements. Security investigations speedily detected such suspect individuals, who actually were not on missions for the GIS, but who hoped to cover up their past sins by service with the US Army. No leakage of information or sabotage resulted from any of these cases. One sample is the following report:

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Jaczsens, Andre. Belgian. Residence: Lissewege. Flemish Nazi propagandist; friend of prominent Nazis, including Guenther d'Alquen, who selected him for the SS war correspondents' unit Kurt Eggers; instigated Gestapo arrests; performed missions for d'Alquen and other Germans; denied any GIS connections. Served as an interpreter for the 83rd US Division. Arrested by VII Corps, 19 Dec 44; underwent investigation at the First US Army Interrogation Center; transferred to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center 11 Jan 45. He was returned to First US Army, 27 January 1945, and transferred to Belgian authorities, 4 February 1945, who imprisoned him at Verviers while the proces verbal was being prepared.

h. One of the many tasks facing CI personnel during operations in Liberated countries was the screening of large number of Todt workers and DPs (Displaced Persons), into whose midsts the GIS was known to have inserted agents in the hopes that they would pass unnoticed, and, thus have good cover for future stay-behind activities. The infinite time and energy expended in this task can scarcely be appreciated by those who did not participate personally; however, it all went to form another piece of the vast net designed to detect enemy agents and protect our forces from the invisible enemy. In the following sample cases the real names of the individuals concerned have been omitted for security reasons (the case itself is cited in paragraph 3, Annex "A", 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report #15): P . . ., a former Gestapo penetration agent, was recognized at a DPC (Displaced Persons Center) in Belgium and immediately arrested and interrogated. This prompt action resulted in the arrest of three fellow agents in the same camp who were posing as displaced persons in the hope of being sent back to Brussels undetected. That same day Adsec CIC arrested the fifth member of this group in another Belgian town on the basis of information furnished as a result of the prompt interrogation of these captured agents. The group had had a preliminary mission in a forward area in Germany, where it was equipped with two radios and eight pigeons. This is one of the rare cases where pigeons were actually dispatched with tactical information (which actually did not help the Germans). When the leader of the group realized that all foreigners (DPs) were being evacuated to the rear, he decided that the radios and other incriminating evidence should be abandoned and that the group should pose as DPs bound for Brussels, where it was planned to contact collaborators and form anti-allied resistance groups. Accordingly, the last pigeon was dispatched, so informing the Germans, and the group was evacuated as planned, until discovered by First US Army Interrogation Center personnel at the DPC. Inasmuch as further exploitation of the

case would have to take place in Brussels, the members of this group were transferred to 21 Army Group.

i. An interesting example of the use of censorship to uncover GIS personalities is provided in the following report. Throughout operations, all mail was impounded immediately upon the arrival of US troops; as a result of this, letters to and from GIS personnel, not to mention collaborators, could be examined and used to good effect. In one case Third US Army CIC agents in Esch/A, Luxembourg, discovered a letter which was addressed to Peter Kesseler at FPN (German Field Post Number) 21476, which was known to us as the FPN of Abwehrleitstelle Paris. Accordingly, Kesseler was arrested in Mersch as a former member of the GIS.

j. Many rumors concerning civilian snipers and the fifth column circulated among combat troops and others during the course of operations. As a part of their mission to protect US forces from subversive elements, CI personnel investigated such cases whenever reported or suspected. In almost all cases the reports proved to be baseless rumors; however, we could not afford to take chances. One outstanding case developed in Belgium in the First US Army zone of operations, where it was reported that an escape ring was being operated by collaborators or fifth columnists to help escaped German PWs return to the German Army or, at least, to avoid recapture by the US Army. A penetration agent was introduced by the First US Army to locate the alleged escape ring and its members in the Liege area. The agent reported his progress periodically and told of shelter and assistance given him by Belgian nationals along an escape route which he was following. On 16 February 1945, a coordinated series of raids and arrests were made by First US Army based upon the information furnished by the agent provocateur. After preliminary interrogation of the 150 persons initially arrested, 30 were held for further interrogation. It soon developed that the agent provocateur had grossly exaggerated his reports and that no escape ring existed in fact. The experience, however, was very valuable inasmuch as our personnel had had little actual experience in the operation of agents provocateurs. The need for close control and cross-checking was firmly established and the mistakes made in that operation were borne in mind during the planning and operation of subsequent similar operations, which, in Germany, have yielded excellent results.

k. The most spectacular agents which we encountered were those dropped by parachute by the GIS. Here our operations came closest to the popular conception of espionage and counterespionage, complete with low-flying aircraft, man-hunts, dragnets, speeding vehicles, roadblocks, operational priority

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

teletype messages, and even beautiful women spies. In practice, of course, action had to be taken speedily to apprehend parachute agents before they could merge into the anonymous mass of the civilian population. Fortunately, however, the problem was greatly facilitated by certain simple but effective factors such as the fact that the agents landed without travel permits or with unvalidated identity cards. Sometimes the aircraft warning services were helpful in providing plots of the plane's course. The first agent captured was, usually, able to give considerable information concerning the number, identity and destination of fellow agents. We are deeply indebted to the Germans themselves for facilitating our mission to a great extent by their use of certain categories of personnel as recruits for these missions; in almost all cases, the recruits were drawn from collaborationist parties, such as the PPF, so that the persons involved were already on our Black List, even before they were recruited. The greatest single aid which the Germans furnished us was their continued use of agent training schools where all the agents undergoing training were able to contact one another, thus learning the names, aliases, descriptions, background, state of training and general psychological attitude of fellow agent trainees. In effect this meant that each new agent captured gave us, under interrogation, the latest news on schools and personalities, which we followed with interest. Fortunately for us the GIS dispatched numerous low-grade line-crossers at fairly frequent intervals so that we were able to keep informed of the state of training and preparedness of prospective parachute agents. The greatest debt, however, we owe to the German Air Force, for it was almost regular in dropping all agents 30-40 miles (or more) from their destination. This usually lost the agent completely and in many cases resulted in the man's immediate arrest when he tried to orient himself by asking local inhabitants where he was. On the night of 3/4 February 1945, for example, an airplane left Stuttgart with 9 agents on whom the GIS had spent much time and effort. All agents were dropped from 35 to 95 miles from their objectives and one was even dropped in no man's land, of which he is reported to have taken an extremely dim view. Eight of the nine agents were captured in the vicinity of their landing spots, while the ninth managed to make his way to Paris before being captured. None of the agents were able to transmit information harmful to us.

1. The following cases are cited as representative of the numerous low-grade line-crossers encountered by the US forces during the Normandy, Northern France and Ardennes campaigns. Their main interest lies in the fact that they represent hundreds of similar cases whose quiet and unpublicized neutralization

by counterintelligence personnel protected our forces so that they could concentrate on the tangible enemy without worrying about espionage and sabotage in the rear.

(1) Tusseau, Pierre. French. 116 Blvd Davout, Paris. Enemy agent operating out of Chateau Maulny (GIS training school & holding center). Arrested by 1st Division CIC, 8 August 1944, after he crossed the lines on a bicycle. He posed as a Red Cross worker and refugee from Paris, using the name Fusseau when arrested. He was previously know to First U. S. Army as Tusseau alias Tour of Thur. He was transferred from First US. Army to CIB, 12th Army Group, 21 August, and from there sent to the UK for interrogation, 23 August 1944.

(2) Nijssen, Adrian. Dutch. Residence: Zeleen & Maastricht. Member of NSB, leader of Weer Afdeeling in Zeleen since 1941; Nazi propagandist. Arrested 27 September 1944, after crossing lines on short-range espionage mission for the SD. Delivered to the Dutch authorities for trial, 9 October 1944.

(3) Thomassen, Hubertus Leonardus. Dutch. Residence: Zeleen & Maastricht. Former employee of the Maastricht DS. Fled with the Germans on 13 September 1944 and introduced his friend, Nijssen, (above) to his superiors. Arrested with Niejssen, 27 September 1944, and delivered to the Dutch authorities for trial, 9 October 1944.

(4) Lecru, Roger alias Leon. French. Short-range line-crosser dispatched from St Avold, 21 October 1944, near Metz (France). Arrested by 95th Division CIC, near Les Mesnils. Had mission to obtain unit identifications between Pont a Mousson toward Metz and St Avold and to return the next day. He was trained in Hundsbach (training center for FAT 133, later bombed. See paragraph 3p (2), below). He was transferred to French authorities and condemned to death by the French Military Tribunal, Nancy, 26 December 1944.

(5) Waringo, Francois. Line-crosser from Luxembourg. Residence: 64 Ave des Myrthes, Brussels. Apprehended near Wellenstein, Luxembourg, 28 October 1944. Former member of a German para-military organization in Brussels, evacuated with the German Army; no prior connection with the GIS. Recruited by Schroll, Trier SD, as low-grade agent without any training. Subject was sent across the Moselle River in a rubber boat with five German soldiers on the night of 27/28 October and captured at 0500 hours, 28 October. Subject was transferred to Luxembourg authorities, 10 November 1944, for appropriate disposition.

m. The following case of a low-grade line-crosser exhibits an added note, that of assassination:

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Cleb, Marcel alias Kleb, Max. French. Residence: Rue des Meuniers, Hazebrouck (Nord). He is a petty thief and a venal, ignorant person whose relatives have police records. He himself joined a group of men being trained for anti-"terrorist" activity in order to escape a sentence for stealing cement from the Germans. After receiving espionage-sabotage training at Thumeries, the group moved to Muehlheim (Germany), where Cleb, on 1 October 1944, was given the mission to go to Bullingen to kill two Belgians. He was promised "a large sum" of money (his companion was promised 100,000 francs). On 2 October 1944, Cleb and his companion were led to the front lines by a German patrol. Once separated from the patrol, they buried their revolvers and waving white handkerchiefs, approached US soldiers to whom they surrendered. Cleb was taken to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center, 19 October 1944, and transferred to BSM, Lille (France), 30 October 1944. He was executed by French authorities, 30 January 1945. Case Closed.

n. The following is a sample case which involved the use of travel restrictions to apprehend a line-crosser of somewhat higher caliber than average:

Chartier, Pierre alias De Cassel. French. Agent for Colonel Ritter at Angers in 1940, reporting on Vichy Government activities. He was arrested by the French in March 1942, for espionage and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, from which he was released in June 1944, by the Germans who offered him employment with the Gestapo. He was later sent to Densborn (Germany) for group training in espionage. On 16 September 1944, he was given his mission, which was to ascertain the location of 9th and 30th Divisions and report what forces were in the Aachen area. He departed with his mistress and a radio operator, from whom they parted company. On 18 September 1944, chartier told members of the "Armee Blanche" (a Resistance group) that he was an escaped French worker. Taken at his word, he received a pass, which was checked at Malmedy, where he and his mistress had supper with more members of the Armee Blanche. At Verviers, however, when he requested a pass to Liege, he was referred to CIC. This led to his arrest and subsequent transfer to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center, 8 October 1944, where he furnished names, descriptions, and other information regarding approximately 150 people of CI interest. He was transferred to BSM, Paris, 3 November 1943.

o. Two exceptions to the statement that relatively few individuals captured were anything but low-grade are the following:

(1) Naujocks, Alfred alias Bonsen, German. SS Sturmbannfuehrer (Major). He was apprehended, 19 October 1944, by the 102nd Cavalry Recn Gp near

Wirtzfeld (Belgium). After a preliminary interrogation at corps, he was transferred to the First US. Army Interrogation Center, 22 October, and to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center, 27 October 1944. An early Nazi party member, Nanjocks grew up with the SS, gaining the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer in 1938. He was intimately connected with the RSHA and was able to furnish much valuable CI information. Because of the wealth or his detailed knowledge he was transferred to the UK for specialized, detailed interrogation, 2 November 1944.

(2) Dunckern, Anton. Subject of SHAEF cards #3799 (pink) and #51 (buff). Befehlshaber der Sipo und SD for Lorraine, the Saar and the Palatinate. Generalmajor der Polizei. He was captured by the Third US. Army in Metz, 21 November 1944, and evacuated to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center, 22 November 1944, from where he was transferred to SHAEF, 26 November 1944.

p. Faced with innumerable low-grade line-crossers and parachute agents who all attended espionage schools, at which they usually remained for quite some time, it was decided, toward the end of the campaigns in liberated countries, that we had accumulated so much information about the GIS schools and holding centers that our CI intelligence would suffer no great loss if we were to destroy these targets. Consequently, work was started by CIB, Headquarters 12th Army Group, to collate all information pertaining to the location and relative importance of such targets. Captured agents, under interrogation, were asked to pin-point targets on aerial photographs, which had been selected as a result of preliminary work. The operation was conveniently called "GISBOMB". Strangely enough the greatest handicaps for "GISBOMB" were not of the enemy's making but came from the fact that "GISBOMB" missions had to be flown by our air forces, which were already supplied with numerous priority targets, with which it was difficult to compete. The main consideration, however, was the rapid advance of US. ground forces, which forced the GIS to move their schools so often that it was well nigh impossible to assemble target data in time for a mission to be flown. Three main "GISBOMB" targets will now be considered:

(1) Schloß Friedenthal. This was the central headquarters for Skorzeny's Amt VI-S (Sabotage Section) and Jagdverbaende, as well as his special 502nd Parachute Bn. In addition it was known that men and women agents were being trained there for parachute and sabotage missions. A detailed target folder on Friedensthal in Sachsenhausen, a suburb of Oranienburg, near Berlin, was submitted to SHAEF for possible action. Unfortunately this mission never was given sufficient priority to be flown.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Hundsbach. The radio school of Frontaufklaerungstrupp (FAT) 133 at Hundsbach (L 8725), Germany, was bombed on 14 February 1945, by 12 P-38s, each carrying one 1000 pound general purpose bomb. At least 6 hits were reported. Study of an aerial photograph taken subsequently revealed that 3 bombs struck within 40 yards of the radio training school; the building which housed the radio transmitting station, while mainly intact was damaged by bombs which landed within 25 yards. The radio went off the air and did not resume operations from Hundsbach, which was no longer used by the GIS.

(3). Kloster Tiefenthal. Kloster Tiefenthal, north of Eltville (M 2758), near Wiesbaden, was the headquarters of Jagdverband SW, the SS Kampfschule for Jagdverband SW (similar to the former Brandenburg Div Kampfschule at Freiburg), and was also the place where Werwolf trainees from Wehrkreis XII received instruction in sabotage and similar gentle arts. It was attacked on 13 February 1945, by 11 P-38s, which dropped ten 1000 pound general purpose bombs and 4 Napalm bombs. The pilots reported that smoke was seen rising to a height of 4000 feet, which was explained subsequently when it was learned that a direct hit had been scored on the southeast front of the building, where the sabotage explosives and the gasoline had been stored. The entire front of the building was blown away, the top stories of the back of the convent were burned out, while the entire left wing of the convent was gutted to the ground; in addition over 40 casualties were inflicted, to say nothing of the tremendous effect upon morale.

q Whereas it has been pointed out above that most agents dispatched by the GIS were of inferior quality and almost to a man allied renegades, there were instances of Germans being used. This employment of German nationals for espionage purposes was broken down into two main categories, the first of which involved German soldiers without intelligence training who masquerade in civilian clothes. The second involved the use of specially selected and trained personnel.

r. In the first category it was a simple matter for German soldiers to don civilian clothes and, if apprehended, to state that they were deserting. The matter was a delicate one, for no announcement could be made that German soldiers in civilian clothes would be treated as spies automatically, for that would have lowered the appreciable number of desertions, which were to our advantage and to be encouraged. In general the problem had to be resolved in each individual case to determine by interrogation and circumstances whether the individual was a bona fide deserter or a spy. When the individual surrendered immediately, he was automatically treated as a deserter, whereas

suspicions increased in proportion to the distance he was found from the front. German soldiers in US. uniform were obviously caught red-handed, ready to be brought before a US. Military Commission. The following are some of the reported cases involving the first category described above:

(1) Ohletz, Guenther. SS Rottenfuehrer. German soldier captured while making a reconnaissance of our positions in civilian clothes. A written note, carried by Ohletz, authorized him to pass through German lines in civilian clothes for reconnaissance of Allied positions. He was removed from PW cage, 13 August 1944, by CIC First US. Army, and taken to the First US. Army Interrogation Center. The case was referred to the Judge Advocate, First US. Army, 19 August 1944. This was the first case of a German spy to be tried by a US. Military Commission in the European Theater of Operations. The Commission found Ohletz guilty and sentenced him to death by hanging; sentence to be executed by Seine Base Section, Communications Zone. The verdict of the Commission was approved by the Commanding General, First US. Army, and by the Commanding General, 12th Army Group. Ohletz was executed by hanging, 7 October 1944. Case Closed.

(2) Kotas, Stefan, and Wende, Josef, both Polish. Ordered to cross the Moselle River in civilian clothes, posing as Polish miners, in order to observe Allied strength in the area immediately opposite their company and return the same day. The civilian clothes were supplied by the German Company Commander. No training or preparation was given. They were apprehended that very day, 24 September 1944, before they could return. They were tried by Third US. Army, condemned to death, and executed by musketry, 11 November 1944. Case Closed.

(3) Albrecht, Hubert alias Marshal. Stabsfeldwebel, 1st Co, 73rd Inf Regt, 19th Inf Div, German army. Volunteered to enter our lines in civilian clothes to secure military information, without prior espionage training. He carried no identity papers when arrested by CIC Det #220 at Moyeuvre (France). He was sent to the Third US. Army Interrogation Center at Toul, where he was shot to death by musketry, 14 December 1944. Case Closed.

(4) Rawe, Hubert alias Bie; Victor, Soldat (Pvt), 3rd Co, 73rd Inf Regt, 19th Inf Div, German army. He entered our lines in civilian clothes in order to determine more easily the number, disposition and future plans of operation of US. troops in Moyeuvre (France) area, where he was arrested by CIC Det #220. He was forwarded to the Third US. Army Interrogation Center at Toul, where he was shot to death by musketry, 14 December 1944. Case Closed.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

s. In addition to sporadic attempts to use untrained German soldiers as spies, there were more dangerous projects evolved by Skorzeny (an SS Lieutenant Colonel who [redacted] also implicated in the Werwolf organization). As early as the beginning of November 1944, there was definite evidence that the Germans were collecting English linguists who were competent, close-combat fighters, physically fit, and suitable for a special assignment on the Western Front. A PW also stated that captured US uniforms were to be collected for special purposes. This whole plan was further confirmed and the outline emerged more clearly when a letter from Headquarters LXXXVI Corps, to Paratroop Regt Hubner was captured; it gave us the following additional details:

(1) Volunteers will be accepted from all arms of the army and Waffen SS.

(2) "After being tested for suitability at Friedenthal, near Oranienburg — Hq, Skorzeny — the personnel selected will be formed into a special unit, about two battalions in strength, for employment on the Western Front.

(3) "Captured clothing, equipment, weapons and vehicles will be utilized for the equipment of these special troops."

t. This is an excellent example of the value of strict adherence to military security. These violations of the German equivalent of our AR 380-5, i. e. a prisoner giving more information than the required "name, rank, and serial number" and careless handling of secret documents, resulted in a serious leakage of information, for, in November 1944, we were warned of a German plan to use a German unit disguised as US troops. This plan did materialize, in fact the famous "GREIF" operation utilized members of this unit ("Einheit Stielau") as the vanguard of the 150 Panzer Brigade to spearhead the Ardennes breakthrough in the middle of December 1944. Fortunately, this prior warning, as well as the operation of a CI Control Line in the division areas, helped ensure the failure of this German scheme. Those who are interested may read complete accounts of the personnel, training, organization, and operations of Einheit Stielau and the 150 Panzer Brigade in Annex "F", 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counter intelligence Report–#10, dated 31 December 1944, and in paragraph F, Annex "E", 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Reports #11, dated 15 January 1945, and #13, dated 15 February 1945. The following report will confine itself to stating the announced missions of the 150 Panzer Brigade as special GIS task force and stating that these were frustrated by the coordinated efforts of counterintelligence and associated personnel. The overall plan of operation "GREIF" called for the Waffen SS to spearhead the attack and take advantage of the confusion created by the special 150 Panzer Brigade. The following missions have been reported:

(1) The [redacted] was to secure the bridges over the Meuse River between Liege and Namur, with Antwerp as the final objective. The main forces of the German Army were to follow the routes taken by 150 Panzer Brigade. Needless to say that this mission failed completely.

(2) A recurrent and widespread rumor existed within 150 Panzer Brigade that there was a plan afoot to assassinate General Eisenhower. All precautions were taken to prevent the passage of Einheit Stielau jeeps through the 12th Army Group zone of operations. The plan, if it existed, was thoroughly frustrated.

(3) Individual long-range, linguist teams of Einheit Stielau had the following missions:

(a) Reporting dispositions and locations of US units. (All evidence points to the fact that this mission was not accomplished, because it is believed that not more than two or three jeeps were able to penetrate any distance behind our lines and then they were speedily detected).

(b) Demolitions of strategic routes and bridges. (Not accomplished).

(c) Destroying headquarters and communication lines.

(Undoubtedly some signal lines were cut, but no headquarters were destroyed for strict and alert military security prevailed at all headquarters as a result of warnings disseminated).

u. The following short summary of the activity of one of the Einheit Stielau jeeps is representative of the best that this operation accomplished: In Aywaille (Belgium) on the evening of 18 December 1944, 3 "apparent US Soldiers" in a US jeep were captured by military police. The jeep was equipped with 2-way radio similar to our #193. The mission of this group was to proceed to the Meuse River and reconnoiter military dispositions and bridge conditions in the vicinity of Namur. They were equipped with 2 Sten guns, 2 .45 cal pistols, 1 German 08 pistol and 6 hand grenades, and had among them $900 in US $100 and $50 bills and a thousand pounds in British 100-pound, 50 pound, and 1-pound notes. They carried no US identity papers, other than blank trip tickets and driving permits, but, on the contrary, had retained their German soldbuchs and identification tags. After trial before a US Military Commission on 22 December 1944, they were found guilty of espionage and violation of the Rules of Land Warfare and were executed by a firing squad on 23 December 1944, the three men were:

(1) Billing, Guenther, Navy O/C alias Pvt Charles G. Lawrence, USA

(2) Pernass, Manifred, Uffz alias Pvt George Sensenbach, USA

(3) Schmidt, Wilhelm, Ogefr alias Pvt Clarence Van Der Wert, USA.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX C — PART I

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP

APO 655, US ARMY

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

1. This directive contains the policies and detailed instructions governing CI operations in GERMANY which are designed to:

a. Secure our forces against enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities;

b. Destroy the enemy secret intelligence services, all security or secret police agencies and affiliated para-military organizations;

c. Assist in the dissolution of the NSDAP and its affiliates and prevent their rebirth in any form;

d. Aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers; and

e. Insure the detention of selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

2. Organizations, upon redeployment from GERMANY, will return their issued copies of this directive to this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN,
Major General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

INDEX

CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION

	Page
GENERAL	219
DEFINITIONS	219
Counterintelligence (CI)	219
CI Personnel	219
Security	219
Internal Security Control	219
Civil Security Control	219
Sabotage	220
Subversion	220
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION	220
RESPONSIBILITIES	222
Army/Military District Commanders	222
Naval Commanders	222
Air Force Commanders	222
ORGANIZATION	222
MISSION	222
BASIC PRINCIPLES	222
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE	223
Information and Intelligence	223
Field Sources of Information and Intelligence	224
Essential Elements of Information	225
RESOURCES	226
Allied CI Liaison Personnel	226
CI Branch (CIB) Personnel	227
CI Corps (CIC) Personnel	227
Intelligence Laboratory	227
Machine Records Unit Facilities	227
Civil Censorship Facilities	227
Combat and Service Troops	227
Confidential G-2 Funds	227
Countersabotage Officers	227
Document Center Facilities	228
Document Sections	228
Internment Camps	228
Interrogation Centers	228
Interrogation, Prisoners of War (IPW) Team Personnel	228
Military Censorship Facilities	228

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

		Page
Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) Teams		228
Prohibited Frontier Zone		229
Radio Direction-Finding Facilities		229
Security Committees		229
Security Enforcement		229
Special CI (SCI) Personnel		229
Technical Assistance		229
Teletype Network		229
COORDINATION AND LIAISON		230
CHAPTER II — CI ORGANIZATION		
GENERAL		231
PLANNING PRINCIPLES		231
ALLOCATION OF CI PERSONNEL		231
ORGANIZATION FOR CI STATIC OPERATIONS		232
CHART, CI STATIC ORGANIZATION	APPENDIX I	233
ORGANIZATION CHART, CIB, G-2, 12TH ARMY GROUP/ZONE HQ	APPENDIX II	234
ORGANIZATION CHART, CIB, G-2, ARMY/MILITARY DISTRICT HQ	APPENDIX III	235
CHAPTER III — SECURITY CONTROL		
INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL		236
CIVIL SECURITY CONTROL		237
Security Control Regulations		237
Blackout		237
Curfew		237
Travel Restrictions		238
Documents		238
Identity Cards		238
Passes, Permits and Exemptions		238
Forgeries		239
Political Activity and Meetings		239
Political Activity		239
Public Meetings		239
Religious Meetings		239
Prohibited Articles		239
Cameras		239
Firearms and other Lethal Weapons		239
Pigeons		239
Radio Transmitters		239
Uniform		240
Security Control Check Points and Security Control Raids		240
Security Control Check Points		240
Security Control Raids		240
Violations of Security Control Regulations		240
Wehrmacht, Volkssturm and Todt Personnel		240
Wehrmacht Personnel		240
Former Members of the Wehrmacht		240
Discharged Wehrmacht Personnel		240
Deserters in Civilian Clothing		241
Volkssturm		241
Todt Workers		241
Allied Military and United Nations Personnel		241
Allied PWs		241
Escapers and Evaders		241
United Nations Nationals Demobilized From the German Armed Forces		242
United Nations Nationals Who are Members of the German Armed Forces and Captured While in Uniform		242
Concentration Camps, Political Prisoners and Internees		242
Concentration Camps		242
Political Prisoners		242
Allied Civilian Internees		242
Displaced Persons and Miscellaneous Personnel		242
Displaced Persons		242
Expatriates		244
Stateless Persons		244
Neutrals		244
Enemy, Ex-enemy and Co-belligerent Nationals		244
Enemy Diplomatic and Consular Officials		245
Enemy Civilian Labor and Employees		245
Civilian Labor		245
Civilian Employees		245
Civil Communications		245
Propaganda and Information Services		246
Propaganda		246
Public Information Services		246
Countersabotage		246
FRONTIER SECURITY CONTROL		246
PORT SECURITY CONTROL		251
TRAVEL SECURITY CONTROL		252
Air Travel		252
INTER-ZONAL BOUNDARY CONTROL		252

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

	Page
GENERAL	253
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS	253
INVESTIGATIONS	253
DISPOSAL OF SABOTAGE EQUIPMENT	254
JOINT COUNTERSABOTAGE COMMITTEES	254

CHAPTER V — EXTIRPATION OF NAZISM AND GERMAN MILITARISM

GENERAL	255
MG LAW NO. 5	255
RESPONSIBILITIES	255
PERSONS TO BE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE	256
ARREST CATEGORIES	256
GERMAN POLICE AND PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS	256
Security Police and Security Service of the SS (SIPO and SD)	257
The Secret State Police (GESTAPO)	257
The Technical Emergency Service (TENO)	257
The Criminal Police (KRIPO)	257
The Barracks Police (Kasernierte Polizei)	257
The Mobile Police (Motorisierte Gendarmerie)	257
The Order Police (ORPO)	258
Waffen SS	258
The Allgemeine SS	258
Nazi Party Storm Troops (SA)	258
Hitler Youth (HJ)	258
National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK)	258
The Nazi Party Motor Transport Corps (NSKK)	259
German Labor Service (RAD)	259
Todt Labor Forces (OT)	259
Heimat Flak	259
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF	259
GERMAN SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGISTS	260
NAZI POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ABOLISHED . . TABLE "A"	261
POLITICAL OFFICERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS WHO SHOULD BE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED . . . . . TABLE "B"	264
NAZI PARTY, POLICE, PARA-MILITARY AND OTHER PERSONNEL TO BE INTERNED . . . . . TABLE "C"	266

POSITIONS IN NAZI PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND FORMATIONS AND RELATIONS TO THE PARTY WHICH ARE TO BE REGARDED AS DISQUALIFYING HOLDER FROM SERVICE WITH MG IF HELD AT ANY TIME . . . . . TABLE "D"	268
QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS FROM WHICH PRINCIPAL OFFICERS SHOULD BE REMOVED . . . . . TABLE "E"	269

CHAPTER VI — PROCESSING OF CI ARRESTEES

	Page
GENERAL	270
VIOLATIONS OF MG SECURITY ENACTMENTS	270
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMINALS	270
CI ARRESTS	271
Wehrmacht Personnel	271
Personnel of Para-Military and Police Organizations	272
Power of Arrest	272
SEARCHES MADE IN CONNECTION WITH ARRESTS	272
Premises	272
Arrestees	272
Chain of Possession	272
EVACUATION OF ARRESTEES	273
DETENTION OF ARRESTEES	273
House Arrest	273
Local Jails	273
Local Detention Camps	273
Internment Camps	274
CI Annex to the Army/Military District Interrogation Center	276
CI Annex to the 12th Army Group/US Zone Interrogation Center	277
DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTS RE CI ARRESTEES	278
Arrest Report	278
Photographs	279
Fingerprints	279
Fragebogen	279
Special Reports	279
Summary Reports	279
Status Reports	280
Transfer of Arrestees	280
Evidence	280
INTERROGATION OF ARRESTEES	280
DISPOSAL OF ARRESTEES	281

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER VII — REPORTS AND RECORDS

	Page
PERSONALITY INDEX	282
ROSTERS OF PERSONALITIES	282
FILES	282
SPECIAL STUDIES	282
REPORTS	282
DISTRIBUTION	282
FORM FOR CI PERIODIC REPORTS TO ARMY GROUP/ZONE HEADQUARTERS — APPENDIX I	283
MACHINE RECORDING OF SHAEF PERSONALITY CARD INDEX FOR GERMANY — APPENDIX II	286

CHAPTER VIII — COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

GENERAL	299
STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS	299
Procurement	299
Training	299
Uniform	299
Vehicles	299
Operations	300
Operational Functions	300
Security of CIC Personnel, Credentials and Records	301
Discovery and Apprehension of Known or Suspect Enemy Agents and Persons Engaging in Subversive Activities	302
Civilian Informants	303
Files and Indices	304
Captured Records and Archives	305
Liaison	305
Scope of Employment of CIC Personnel	306
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY	306
Requirements	306
Reorganization	306
Implementation	306
Administration	308
Organization of CIC Personnel, 12th Army Group	309

CHAPTER IX — SPECIAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (SCI) DETACHMENT

GENERAL	311
ADMINISTRATION	311
ORGANIZATION	311
FUNCTIONS	312
OPERATIONS	312
Detection of Clandestine Radio Transmitters	312
Reports	313
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION OF GERMANY	313

CHAPTER X — ALLIED CI LIAISON PERSONNEL

GENERAL	315
FUNCTIONS	315
OPERATIONS	315

CHAPTER XI — INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY

CI FUNCTIONS	317
MASS TESTING	317
REQUIRED INFORMATION	318
CHAIN OF EVIDENCE	318

CHAPTER XII — CENSORSHIP

GENERAL	319
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL	319
CENSORSHIP	319
ASSISTANCE TO CI	319

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL.

a. The instructions contained in this directive pertain to CI in GERMANY.

b. Wherever the term "CI" is used herein it will be understood to mean counterintelligence as supervised by the G-2 of an appropriate command.

c. All references herein to Army Military Districts will be understood to refer as well to the US Port Enclave.

d. The attention of all CI personnel is directed to the following SHAEF publications:

(1) HANDBOOK FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY.
(2) PUBLIC SAFETY MANUAL OF PROCEDURES.
(3) HANDBOOK GOVERNING POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF GERMANY.

2. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this directive, the following definitions will apply:

a. *Counterintelligence (CI).* Pertains to and includes passive security control measures, offensive measures designed to counter and destroy enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive organizations and activities, and those operations of CI agencies which will aid in the dissolution of the NSDAP and affiliates and prevent their resurgence in any form.

b. *CI Personnel.* All personnel assigned or attached for CI duty.

c. *Security.* Pertains to and includes all internal, civil, frontier, travel, and port security control measures designed to ensure the protection of our military interests. (See Chapter III).

d. *Internal Security Control.* Pertains to the passive security control measures adopted within the military body to neutralize the efforts of enemy intelligence, sabotage and subversive elements. (See Chapter III).

e. *Civil Security Control.* Pertains to the passive security control measures prescribed for and imposed upon the civilian population to neutralize the efforts of enemy intelligence, sabotage and subversive elements. (See Chapter III).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. *Sabotage*. Pertains to any surreptitious efforts to destroy facilities and materiel vital to our forces. From a CI point of view, sabotage does not include demolition or destruction, when attempted in support of normal military operations by undisguised enemy troops. However, CI personnel will be accorded the opportunity to interrogate such of these enemy troops who may be captured. The countersabotage measures of security control will defend against all sabotage, whether or not it comes within the scope of the definition of sabotage as stated above. (See Chapter IV).

g. *Subversion.* Pertains to and includes the surreptitious activities of the enemy and of our own military personnel who seek to interfere with our military interests through mediums other than espionage and sabotage such as, propagandizing, rumor mongering, incitement to riot or resistance, intentional violations of security laws or regulations and organization of groups opposed to the aims of MG.

3. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

a. With the advance of our forces into GERMANY, counterintelligence, especially the security aspect thereof, has become increasingly vital. Prior to the defeat of the enemy's orthodox, organized military forces, security will become even more important; the enemy secret intelligence services aided by fanatical and sympathetic civilians, are intensifying their efforts. Our forces are opposed by an unscrupulous enemy nation desperately fighting its last stand on its own soil against unconditional surrender.

b. The enemy secret intelligence services, security and secret police, and para-military organizations are believed to have made elaborate plans and preparations for progressively going underground as our forces advance. It is assumed that these organizations, united with other elements of the NSDAP will constitute major threats to the successful accomplishment of our military mission in GERMANY.

c. At the present time no major underground operations of an obvious or significant nature have been revealed in GERMANY.However, it is believed that the basic policy of the organized underground is of long-range character, to lie low initially, participating only in that espionage, sabotage and subversive activity which will not endanger the organization itself, pending an opportunity to regain active control under more favorable conditions. In later stages, guerilla warfare and sporadic resistance in the form of sabotage and subversive activity, including attacks upon individual members of our forces and individuals who collaborate therewith, probably will be forthcoming to a

much greater degree from organized and semi-organized resistance groups and fanatical individuals.

d. The ultimate defeat and disarmament of the enemy military organization may somewhat lessen the security problem of CI. However, the new and much greater problems of destroying every vestige of the enemy secret intelligence services, security and secret police and para-military organizations, and of the dissolution of the NSDAP and its affilitates, will then dominate all CI operations.

e. Military collapse by the enemy may be accompanied by a general condition of internal chaos and disorder. Some eight million displaced persons will be seeking to return to their homes; many will seek revenge before departing from GERMANY. Although some individuals may attempt to ingratiate themselves in the presence of the conquerors, the belligerent attitude of the German population, a substantial percentage of which is known to be armed, probably will not undergo any remarkable early change. Resistance will probably continue to stem from semi-organized groups and individuals. Initially, there will be no dependable nor acceptable assistance available to our CI agencies from German police or other civil authorities. The organized underground will foster the continuance of unsettled conditions and will take advantage of the confusion to strengthen its position for the future; plans for the destruction of and secreting of documents, secret processes and equipment probably will have been implemented; plans for the penetration of all administrative offices, industrial programs and public enterprises to be established or supervised by MG will be set in motion; guerrilla warfare may be continued. Many enemy intelligence and police agents, war criminals and NSDAP officials, other than those individuals who upon their own initiative have escaped, hidden themselves and/or assumed new identities, and those who have gone "underground" with the organized underground movement, will seek to escape across neutral borders. Many will attempt to escape across national boundaries in the guise of displaced persons and Allied PWs. Others will surrender themselves into our control, hoping to obtain clemency in exchange for becoming informers. The arrest and detention problem in the US Zone may be increased materially by the many agents, criminals and officials who, along with the civilians of other categories, may flee from the Russian to the US Zone. As a final premise, every native German and displaced person found within the REICH must be considered initially, from a CI point of view, a suspect individual.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. *Army/Military District Commanders.* The operation of CI is a responsibility of Army/Military District Commanders to be discharged pursuant to the instructions contained in this directive.

b. *Naval Commanders.* Naval Commanders are responsible for the security of naval installations and stores ashore, and the CI precautions for all naval ships and craft in port. (See Chapter III).

c. *Air Force Commanders.* Air Force Commanders are responsible for the internal security of Air Force installations, and for air-travel security control.

5. ORGANIZATION. Army Commanders are responsible for concurrently:

a. Maintaining a CI organization to conduct tactical CI operations with their lower units during the advance into GERMANY.

b. Establishing progressively the organization for static CI coverage of areas conquered by their lower units in GERMANY. (See Chapter II).

6. MISSION. The CI mission of our forces within GERMANY is:

a. To provide maximum security for our military interests against espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. (See Chapter III).

b. To destroy the enemy secret intelligence services, all security or secret police and affiliated para-military organizations. (See Chapter V).

c. To assist by CI procedures in the dissolution of the NSDAP and its affiliates and in the prevention of their rebirth in any form. (See Chapter V).

d. To aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers. (See Chapter V).

e. To detain selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists. (See Chapter V).

7 BASIC PRINCIPLES.

a. The non-fraternization policy will be considered in all CI planning and operations.

b. The security of military interests will take priority over the welfare and convenience of the enemy civilian population.

c. Every effort will be made to contain within GERMANY all persons of CI interest.

d. No arrestee, identified as coming within the categories enumerated in Table "C", Chapter V, will be released from arrest without the specific approval of this or higher headquarters.

a. Evidence collected against all persons of CI interest and War Criminals, whether captured or not, will be collected and maintained in accordance with such procedures as will ensure the maximum value of such evidence upon its admission in court. (See Chapter VI).

f. Upon capture by any agency, all known and suspect spies, saboteurs and subverters, and all persons belonging to or associated in any manner with the enemy secret intelligence services, security or secret police and the prescribed members of para-military organizations, will be referred to CI for interrogation and investigation.

g. The burden of proof as to identity and innocence will be placed upon the accused when such matters are under CI investigation.

h. Concurrent with the military advance, positive action will be taken to gather documentary and other evidence against those persons of CI interest who have fled into enemy occupied territory or who, for other reasons, remain at large.

i. US Army Commanders whose forces advance into areas to be later occupied by British, Russian or French forces will, upon withdrawal therefrom, insure prompt delivery of all CI internees and arrestees and pertinent detailed CI records to the appropriate relieving authorities, as well as such other information which has an exclusive bearing upon such areas. This principle is likewise applicable in the event that an area occupied by one US Army is turned over to another US Army.

j. Prior to surrender by the enemy, the maximum CI emphasis will be placed upon military security. Other than to satisfy the immediate requirements of military security, the search for, arrest, detention, investigation, trial and execution of judgment concerning enemy intelligence agents and subversive individuals who do not constitute an immediate threat to security will be secondary to security. However, when conditions permit, positive action will be taken concurrent with the military advance to obtain documentary and other evidence against those persons of CI interest who remain at large.

8. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE.

a. *Information and Intelligence.* To assist in the implementation of CI within GERMANY, Army/Military District commanders and commanders of lower echelons where appropriate, have been, or will be supplied with information and intelligence to include the following:

(1) "BASIC HANDBOOK, GERMANY": Contains general description of historic, economic political and administrative structures of the German nation.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) "GERMANY ZONE HANDBOOKS": Contain detailed information concerning specific areas in GERMANY and supplements information contained in the "BASIC HANDBOOK, GERMANY".

(3) "TARGET ADDRESSES, WEHRKREISE": Lists of the locations and also titles of certain place targets and officials of CI interest.

(4) Personality Cards (Black and White Lists): Contain information from MI 5, MI 6, MI 9, MI 14, PWE, OSS, captured documents, PW interrogations, field reports, Allied governmental and miscellaneous sources, regarding personalities of the enemy intelligence services; renegades of Allied nationality; officials of General Civil Administration; Police, including Feldgendarmerie; SS; party members or members of para-military organizations, and persons who may be helpful to the Allies or prove useful as informants.

(5) "CI HANDBOOK, GERMANY": A general guide to the main administrative and intelligence agencies of the Nazi state.

(6) "IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN GERMANY": Contains information and examples of the categories of identity and other documents now carried by Germans, alien laborers and free aliens in the REICH.

(7) "Wanted" Lists: Details concerning individuals of CI interest who were previously unknown to CI and who continue to remain at large- to be distributed periodically by this headquarters.

(8) SCI information.

(9) Summaries of CI information of general and special interest.

(10) Periodic CI Reports.

(11) Miscellaneous CI studies pertaining to the enemy intelligence services, security or secret police, para-military organizations and other organizations within or affiliated with the NSDAP, German General Staff, enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

b. *Field Sources of Information and Intelligence.* Appropriate commanders will collect additional CI information in the field through:

(1) The interrogation of arrestees.

(2) The study of captured documents.

(3) The interrogation of appropriate PWs.

(4) The reports of voluntary and paid informants.

(5) The interrogation of civilians (other than arrestees and informants)

(6) Use of undercover agents.

(7) Coordination with MG, PM, P& PW, Signal Corps and the personnel of other appropriate staff sections.

c. *Essential Elements of Information.*

(1) The German Intelligence Services, RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and subordinate or affiliated agencies including:

(a) SD.

(b) Abwehr.

(c) GFP (Geheimefeldpolizei).

(d) Jagdverbaende.

Information on personalities, organizations, headquarters, methods of operation, location of sabotage dumps, training programs and schools, future operations in post-hostility period and cooperation or dissension between services.

(2) Military, Para-Military and Police Organizations including:

(a) Waffen SS (Schutzstaffeln)

(b) Allgemeine SS (Schutzstaffeln)

(c) SA (Sturmabteilung)

(d) NSKK (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer Korps)

(e) HJ and BDM (Hitler Jugend and Bund deutscher Maedels)

(f) NSFK (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps)

(g) Orpo (Ordnungspolizei), including Technische Nothilfe.

(h) Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei), including Kripo (Reichskriminalpolizei), Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) and Grenzpolizei.

Here the emphasis should be placed upon secret communication systems of the above organizations, definite knowledge of local personalities, names and addresses of leaders, names of outstanding members, as well as any recent changes in programs or organization. Priority on information concerning plans for postwar underground activity.

(3) Other Party Organizations including:

(a) NSF (Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft)

(b) RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst)

(c) DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront)

(d) NSV (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt)

(e) VDA (Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland)

Information on local personalities, with stress on fanatical members

(4) Local Officials.

(a) Oberbuergermeister, Buergermeister or Landrat.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(b) Gauleiter and members of Gauleitung.
(c) Kreisleiter and members of Kreisleitung.
(d) Ortsgruppenleiter and members of Kreisleitung.
(e) Zellenleiter.
(f) Blockleiter.

Detailed information concerning activities, length of time in office, degree of fanaticism and location of offices.

(5) Anti-Nazi Personalities and Underground Movements.
(a) Information concerning names, addresses, background and activities of anti-Nazi individuals, with an estimate of their degree of hostility to the party and an evaluation of their basic patriotism and loyalty to GERMANY.
(b) Information concerning organized anti-Nazi resistance movements, their leaders, activities, symbols or insignia and the evaluation of the degree to which they may be of assistance to Allied Forces.

(6) Miscellaneous information concerning:
(a) Plans for escape of Nazi officials.
(b) Personalities involved in war crimes.
(c) Ordensburgen and Junkerschulen; location, training programs, known graduates and their present activities.
(d) Current attitude towards the war and postwar period on the part of German youth and German women.
(e) Volkssturm (Peoples Army); organization, plans, degree of training, evaluation of effectiveness during military operations, and its possible effectiveness after cessation of hostilities.
(f) Functions and capabilities of individual enemy scientists and industrial technologists as related to their future contributions to the recreation of Germany as a first class military power.
(g) Communications of subversive organizations.

9. RESOURCES. The following personnel, facilities and funds are or will be made available to G-2 for CI:

a. *Allied CI Liaison Personnel.* Personnel of Allied CI services attached to the G-2 Sections of this Headquarters, Army/Military District and certain other headquarters. Their function is to provide liaison between the headquarters to which they are attached and the security services of the nation

which they represent. In addition, they perform important functions relating to the security screening of their own nationals in Germany. (See Chapter X).

b. *CI Branch (CIB) Personnel.* Assigned CI staff personnel of G-2 sections. Their functions, under the direction of the G-2 of the appropriate headquarters are to formulate CI policy and to supervise generally all CI operations and the activities of attached CI personnel.

c. *CI Corps (CIC) Personnel.* Personnel attached to the G-2 Sections of this Headquarters, Armies, Corps, Divisions, Military Districts and certain other headquarters. CIC personnel are trained to perform all general CI operations. (See Chapter VIII).

d. *Intelligence Laboratory.* Laboratory facilities are available at this headquarters for the scientific analysis of items believed to have an evidence value of CI interest. (See Chapter XI). This facility is available to Hq 6th Army Group.

e. *Machine Records Unit Facilities.* The basic information contained in the SHAEF Personality Card Index held by this headquarters has been recorded on Machine Record Unit cards. Various rosters and other information can be reproduced expeditiously by this method of recording and will be supplied to appropriate headquarters, including those of 6th Army Group, upon request. (See Chapter VII).

f. *Civil Censorship Facilities.* These facilities will be made available to CI personnel to assist in the accomplishment of the CI mission. (See Chapter XII).

g. *Combat and Service Troops.* Commanding Generals of Armies, Corps, Divisions, Military Districts and certain other headquarters having attached CI elements will provide them with the requisite combat and service troops, equipped with transportation necessary to effect arrests and searches, escort arrestees, patrol and guard the frontier and the Prohibited Frontier Zone, guard arrestees and premises, and afford protection to CI personnel. In order that combat and service troops may perform their CI work with maximum efficiency, CI personnel will be required to train them in the techniques of their special duties; therefore, consideration should be given to the permanent detail of specific troops to assist in CI operations.

h. *Confidential G-2 Funds.* These funds have been allotted to this Headquarters, Armies, Corps and Divisions and will be allotted to Military Districts and certain other headquarters for confidential G-2 purposes.

i. *Countersabotage Officers.* This headquarters and each Army Military Districts headquarters will have available a specially trained Engineer officer

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to recommend countersabotage protective measures and a specially trained CIC officer to supervise countersabotage investigations. (Chapter VI).

j. *Document Center Facilities.* Centers for the examination of captured documents and the preparation of reports relating thereto, including those of CI interest, will be established and operated under G-2 supervision by this headquarters and the headquarters of Armies/Military Districts. Frequently, by reason of their being the first troops to discover and identify documents, CI personnel will be able to render valuable assistance to Document Centers. CI personnel will report promptly to Document Centers, through G-2 channels, information pertaining to the source, location, nature and volume of documents discovered. Small quantities of documents will be transmitted to Document Centers or placed for safekeeping in a local general repository; the location of large repositories of documents will be reported to the nearest tactical commander in order that he may take necessary action to preserve them.

k. *Document sections.* Prior to the establishment of Document Centers, Document Sections at Army Group and Armies will assist in CI matters to the fullest possible extent.

l. *Internment Camps.* Internment Camps for the detention of CI arrestees will be established by Army/Military District Commanders. (See Chapter VI).

m. *Interrogation Centers.* Interrogation Centers having CI Annexes will be established at this headquarters and at each Army/Military District headquarters for the purpose of interrogating certain CI arrestees. The CI Annex of the Interrogation Center of this headquarters will be made available to Hq, 6th Army Group. (See Chapter VI).

n. *Interrogation, Prisoners of War (IPW) Team Personnel.* As the normal work of this personnel decreases, they will be assigned exclusively to assist CI personnel in the accomplishment of the CI mission. Prior thereto, they will assist in CI operations to the fullest possible extent.

o. *Military Censorship Facilities.* These facilities may be utilized by CI personnel in requesting examination of specific written or wire communications of military personnel. Periodic military censorship reports will be examined for indications of local and general matters of CI interest.

p. *Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) Team Personnel.* As the normal work of this personnel decreases, they will be assigned exclusively to assist CI personnel in the accomplishment of the CI mission. Prior thereto, they will assist in CI operations to such extent as is possible.

q. *Prohibited Frontier Zone.* A Prohibited Frontier Zone, from which all [illegible] frontier to assist in the implementation of frontier control. (See Chapter III).

r. *Radio Direction-Finding Facilities.* The services of mobile equipment and operators for the detection of clandestine radio transmitters are available through this headquarters. (See Chapter IX).

s. *Security Committees.* In order to archive the maximum degree of cooperation, joint security committees of CI and MG Public Safety representatives, together with representatives of other interested agencies, may be formed in all suitable areas to consider policy and action upon matters of common security interest.

t. *Security Enforcement.* The Provost Marshal is responsible for assisting MG in the enforcement of civil law and order including security measures, through military police, MG Security Guards or other troops, where the civil police or other civil law enforcing agencies are not available. CI, MG and PM will insure that close cooperation and mutual assistance exist among them in the enforcement of security measures upon the civilian population.

u. *Special CI (SCI) Personnel.* Personnel attached to the G-2 Sections of this headquarters, Army/Military District headquarters and certain other headquarters. This personnel functions largely as advisers and as a means for conveying special information to CI branches on CI matters. (See Chapter IX).

v. *Technical Assistance.* When CI personnel require assistance of a technical nature, such as for the severing of communications and the clearing of mines or booby traps, qualified technical personnel from service units will be made available to them by appropriate commanders.

w. *Teletype Network.* This headquarters will provide, as soon as practicable, for CI teletype communications from this headquarters to the headquarters of Armies/Military Districts, and laterally between the headquarters of Armies/Military Districts. Commanders of Armies/Military Districts will provide for CI teletype communications within their command during the static phase as follows:

(1) At headquarters Army/Military District to subordinate headquarters of Military Sub-Districts and Internment Camps.

(2) Laterally between all headquarters of Military Sub-Districts and Internment Camps.

(3) Between Frontier Security Control Posts. (See Chapter III).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

10. COORDINATION AND LIAISON. All CI personnel will coordinate matters of mutual interest and maintain liaison with:

a. CI elements of adjacent commands.

b. MG personnel, particularly Public Safety Officers.

c. G-1 personnel.

d. PM personnel, including MP and CID personnel.

e. JA personnel, including War Crimes investigators.

f. "T" Force.

g. Civil Censorship personnel.

CHAPTER II

CI ORGANIZATION

14. GENERAL. Army commanders are responsible for concurrently:

a. Maintaining a CI organization to conduct tactical CI operations with their lower units during the advance into GERMANY.

b. Establishing progressively the organization for the static CI coverage of areas conquered by their lower units in GERMANY.

15. PLANNING PRINCIPLES. The easterly advance of the Armies will gradually open territory in which the inherent problems of frontier security control, area security control, security control of major cities, and security control of the Rhine River crossings will require the immediate and continuous attention of CI personnel. In addition to these security problems, numerous targets of CI interest will be uncovered and will require exploitation over relatively long periods of time.

a. Experience has shown that CI coverage in a static area is effected most efficiently when the supervision of the area is continued under the control of the CI unit which instituted the original coverage.

b. The rapid easterly advance of the Armies, and the initial shortage of CI personnel, make it immediately necessary to prepare plans for the organization of static CI coverage, including the allocation of the present supply of CI personnel into areas and tasks where their efforts will render the most effective results.

16. ALLOCATION OF CI PERSONNEL. This headquarters will attach CI personnel to Armies/Military Districts in accordance with the various pertinent provisions of this directive. Army/Military District Commanders will allocate CI personnel to their lower commands and will provide for the augmentation of CI personnel from appropriate intelligence or other personnel sources under their control.

a. While Corps are tactically employed, Corps Commanders will be responsible for maintaining the CI support of their own operations, and, in accordance with Army instructions, will initially establish the static CI organization using the CI personnel allocated by Armies for that purpose.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

b. While Divisions are tactically employed, Division Commanders will be responsible for maintaining the CI support of their own operations.

c. When Corps and Divisions are in static areas, Corps and Division Commanders will be responsible for the internal security control of their respective commands. However, Army/Military District commanders may make Corps and Division commanders responsible for CI coverage within a specific area or may withdraw CI personnel from Corps and Divisions.

17. ORGANIZATION FOR CI STATIC OPERATIONS.

a. Attached as Appendix I is a chart illustrating the currently planned organization for CI static operations.

b. A chart illustrating the organization of the CI Branch, G-2 Section of this headquarters is attached as Appendix II.

c. A chart illustrating the suggested organization of the CI Branch, G-2 Section of an Army/Military District, is attached as Appendix III.

d. The details pertaining to the organization of the CI Annex of an Army/Military District Interrogation Center are included in Chapter VI.

e. The details pertaining to the CI staff of an Army/Military District Internment Camp are included in Chapter VI.

f. The details pertaining to Frontier Security Control Posts are included in Chapter III.

g. Headquarters of CI Sub-Districts will be organized by Army/Military District commanders.

h. The CI organizations required for security control and other CI operations in urban and inter-urban areas will be organized, as necessary, to function under the supervision of the headquarters of the appropriate CI Sub-Districts.

CI STATIC ORGANIZATION



THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) BRANCH
G-2 SECTION, HQ. 12th ARMY GROUP/US ZONE

APPENDIX II



COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (C I) BRANCH
G-2 SECTION, HQ. ARMIES/MILITARY DISTRICTS

APPENDIX III



THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER III

SECURITY CONTROL

21. INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL. All commanders will continue to be responsible at all times for the internal security of their commands in GERMANY.

a. All personnel will be thoroughly instructed in the fundamentals of individual security discipline, and the non-fraternization policy will be enforced strictly.

b. Adequate patrols, guards, sentries, physical barriers, countersigns and countersabotage measures are essential aids to internal security control and will be employed to the fullest extent.

c. All measures necessary for the safeguarding of classified material will be implemented and continually checked for effectiveness.

d. Civilians will not be transported in military vehicles, except when expressly authorized in writing by appropriate military authorities. (See letter, this headquarters, file 230 (PM), dated 5 November 1944, subject: "Carrying civilians in military transportation.")

e. Enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent nationals may be employed by our forces for menial tasks or for work directly concerned with enemy civilian welfare or similar activities. They will not be employed in any case unless all efforts have failed to procure the necessary personnel from (1) US and Allied military resources, (2) nationals of liberated territories, or (3) non-Germans in GERMANY. They will not be employed under conditions which would foster fraternization or give them access to classified information or vital parts of the military establishment.

f. (1) Displaced persons, who are not enemy, ex-enemy or cobelligerent nationals, may be employed by Allied military units and agencies after due consideration of security requirements. The employing unit or agency is responsible that CI clearance is obtained in doubtful cases.

(2) CI clearance initially will be provisional only. It will be based upon a personal interview with the prospective employee and a name check against available records. Final clearance will be made by MG in conjunction with CI. Prior to final clearance, employment will be provisional only. Upon provisional employment, the employee will be required by his prospective employer to fill out the required Fragebogen which will be sent to MG for evaluation. This evaluation will be made by MG in accordance with Section VI of the Public Safety Manual of Procedures. CI investigative agencies and data will be available to MG to assist in the final clearing of the provisional employee.

g. Countersabotage measures will be established and maintained. (See Chapter IV).

22. CIVIL SECURITY CONTROL. The security control of the civilian population in occupied GERMANY is a command responsibility which is exercised normally through MG, in close consultation with CI. In general, all civilian control regulations are published by MG in the form of proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices and other enactments and are rigidly enforced by MG Detachments through their supervision of the German police and other resources available to them. The closest working relationships will be maintained by MG Detachments and CI staffs and personnel. Wherever practicable, MG Detachments will serve as the channel for dealing with agencies of the public and will insure, in particular, that requisite police assistance is given to CI personnel. However, in emergencies and on routine matters, CI personnel will deal directly with appropriate police agencies. To coordinate security matters, joint security committees may be established, consisting of representatives of all agencies concerned with the security control of the civil population. The following information, policies and instructions are of particular interest to CI:

a. *Security Control Regulations.*

(1) *Blackout.* Blackout will be observed as directed by the responsible military commander.

(2) *Curfew.* A curfew will be imposed on all civilians as directed by the appropriate military commander. When essential, exemptions from curfew may be granted by MG to certain classes of persons.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) *Travel Restrictions.* Where travel restrictions are necessary, MG will establish check systems at road barriers, bridges, railway stations and docks.

a. Initially, civilians will be prohibited from travelling more than six kilometers from their homes, except by virtue of a MG pass.

b. Travel by motor vehicles or train will be permitted only by MG pass.

c. Civilian motor transport will be used only in the interests of our forces.

d. Civilians will not be transported in military vehicles except when expressly authorized in writing by appropriate military authorities. (See letter, this headquarters, file 230 (PM), dated 5 November 1944, subject: "Carrying civilians in military transportation.")

e. MG may authorize German transport agencies to issue permits for their own circulation within a fifty mile radius of a given point. However, circulation beyond that distance will require specific MG approval.

(4) *Documents.*

a. *Identity Cards.* All civilians twelve years of age and older will be required by MG to carry identity cards at all times. Any recognized document such as a Kennkarte, Wehrpass, Mitgliedsbuch, Arbeitsbuch or MG Form DP/1 identity card will be satisfactory, initially, as valid identification. At some later date, new identity documents containing photographs, fingerprints, registration numbers and other identifying data may become neccessary, in which case a standard form and procedure will be prescribed by this headquarters.

b. *Passes, Permits and Exemptions.* MG will be responsible for the preparation and issuance of passes, permits and exemptions pertaining to security restrictions. CI, in consultation with MG, will be responsible for determining the applicable policy and will work in close coordination with MG in the implementation of such policy. Exemptions from security restrictions will be held to the minimum.

1. CI personnel will be supplied by MG with forms for the issuance of passes and permits in special cases only. Normally, MG will issue passes, permits and exemptions for CI purposes.
2. Particular precautions will be taken by MG to insure that there is strict accountability for all exemption forms, passes and official stamps.
3. Exemption forms will be numbered.

c. *Forgeries.* MG will report to CI all forgeries of CI interest including forgeries of identity cards, permits and passes.

(5) *Political Activity and Meetings.*

a. *Political Activity.* Political activity of any kind will be prohibited by MG.

b. *Public Meetings.* Gatherings of more than five persons for purpose of discussion, either public or private (except those of an immediate family or when authorized by MG) will be prohibited by MG.

c. *Religious Meetings.* Bonafide religious services should not be curtailed. However, religious authorities will furnish MG due notice of the time and place of all proposed religious services in order that such services may be observed by MG or CI personnel.

(6) *Prohibited Articles.*

a. *Cameras.* Civilians will not be permitted to use cameras or photographic material.

b. *Firearms and other Lethal Weapons.* All firearms, ammunition, explosives and other lethal weapons will be collected and securely impounded by MG. Firearms and limited supplies of ammunition may be reissued to police by MG after clearance by CI.

c. *Pigeons.* Pigeon flights will be prohibited by MG. Public notice thereof will be given by MG and the pigeons will be confiscated or collected by MG. The birds, if not desired by the Signal Corps, will either be killed or have their wings clipped.

d. *Radio Transmitters.* MG will prohibit possession of and will collect all radio transmitters and actual or possible radio communication devices, regardless of power or type, or will require that such transmitters and devices be placed under the control of US Army authorities.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

c. *Uniform.* Civilians will not be permitted to wear US uniforms or any part thereof. (See letter, this headquarters, file 421 (G-2), dated 10 November 1944, subject: Unauthorized Wearing of United States Uniform.)

(7) *Security Control Check Points and Security Control Raids.*

a. *Security Control Check Points.* CI, in conjunction with MG and PM, will establish check points, where appropriate, for the "snap" security checking of civilians.

b. *Security Control Raids.* CI, in conjunction with MG and PM, will conduct unannounced periodic raids in civil communities for the purpose of checking the effectiveness of the enforcement of security regulations.

(8) *Violations of Security Control Regulations.* Violations of security control regulations will not be overlooked under any circumstances. Suitable publicity will be given to the punishment of offenders. MG will inform CI of any serious, extensive violations or of evidence of organized activity detrimental to security.

b. *Wehrmacht, Volkssturm and Todt Personnel.*

(1) *Wehrmacht Personnel.*

a. *Former Members of the Wehrmacht.* All persons who served in the Wehrmacht at any time will be required by MG order to register themselves with MG. In addition to personal details, this registration should include dates of service, branch of service, highest rank attained and date of and reason for the last discharge.

1. Wehrmacht personnel discharged by the Germans prior to the cessation of hostilities should have a Wehrpass giving details of their service.

2. Members of the Wehrmacht discharged by the Allied authorities subsequent to the cessation of hostilities will not have a Wehrpass in their prossession but should have a discharge certificate.

b. *Discharged Wehrmacht Personnel.* Discharged Wehrmacht personnel are to be treated as civilians and, as such, are not entitled to PW status.

c. *Deserters in Civilian Clothing.*

1. Any person in civilian clothing who is determined to be a Wehrmacht deserter will be treated as a PW.

2. A written report pertaining to the circumstances of the capture of the deserter, the nature of the military identification carried by him and whether such identification was carried openly or hidden on the person, and the prisoner's statement under interrogation will accompany all German soldiers evacuated in civilian clothing. This report may be written on the reserve side of the Arrest Form which must accompany all persons evacuated in civilian clothing through PW channels.

(2) *Volkssturm.* Captured members of the Volkssturm will be treated as lawful belligerents and given a PW status, provided that:

a. They were commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

b. They wear the prescribed armlet bearing the German emblem and the words "Deutscher Volkssturm".

c. They carry arms openly.

d. They conduct their operations in accordance with laws and usages of war.

(3) *Todt Workers.* Foreign workers in the OT will be treated as displaced persons; German OT workers as refugees and will be screened as such. The officers and uniformed guards thereof will be disarmed by combat troops and placed in concentration areas pending disbandment. There is no CI arrest category in OT. The staffic organization is not of CI interest and its headquarters are not CI targets. It will be dissolved, disarmed and disbanded locally by MG.

c. *Allied Military and United Nations Personnel.*

(1) *Allied PWs.* When not detained as security suspects, persons of Allied nationality who claim to have been PWs and are encountered outside PW camps, will be referred to MG to be cared for, initially, as United Nations displaced persons.

(2) *Escapers and Evaders.* When not detained as security suspects, persons who claim to be members of the Allied military forces

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

who have escaped or evaded capture by the enemy and are encountered in the course of military operations will be referred to MG to be treated initially as United Nations displaced persons.

(3) *United Nations Nationals Demobilized From the German Armed Forces.* Such individuals when not detained as security suspects will be referred to MG for disposition.

(4) *United Nations Nationals Who Are Members of the German Armed Forces and Captured While in Uniform.* Those not detained as security suspect will be treated as PWs.

d. *Concentration Camps, Political Prisoners and Internees.*

(1) *Concentration Camps.* Army Military District Commanders, upon the occupation of an area, will insure that all places of detention, including concentration camps, are promptly seized and investigated and that the cases of the inmates are reviewed with the least practicable delay.

a. All concentration camp guards and staffs will be arrested and detained by MG.

b. Each concentration camp will be provided with an MG Administrative Staff which will include such CI representation as may be necessary under the circumstances.

c. Each concentration camp will establish a Case Review Board which will include CI representation, to review the cases of inmates and make specific recommendations as to their disposal.

(2) *Political Prisoners.* CI personnel will assist MG in dealing with security suspects uncovered by MG examination of persons held in detention as political prisoners by the Germans.

(3) *Allied Civilian Internees.* When not detained as security suspects, US and British civilians who claim to have been civilian internees and are encountered outside internment Camps, will be referred to MG to be cared for, initially, as United Nations displaced persons.

e. *Displaced Persons and Miscellaneous Personnel.*

(1) *Displaced Persons.* Displaced persons are those civilians who, by reason of war, are outside the national boundaries of their country and are (1) desirous, but unable, to return home or find homes, or (2) are to be returned to enemy, ex-enemy or co-belligerent territory.

a. The care and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons is a MG responsibility. Displaced persons in this category will be restrained in place until such time as facilities are available to transport these persons, in sealed trains or trucks, to Reception Centers outside Germany where appropriate national authorities will arrange for the care, feeding and repatriation of their respective subjects. These national authorities will be responsible for the CI screening of such persons in order to insure that none of the persons categorized in Table C, Chapter V, has escaped through displaced persons channels. In addition, they are responsible for making security checks of all displaced persons of the United Nations.

b. The control and repatriation of enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent displaced persons will be a responsibility of the German authorities, acting under MG supervision.

c. MG will have available Allied Liaison Officers for Repatriation to assist in the processing of the displaced persons of their nations. Their specific duties include:

1. Issuing repatriation visas.
2. Assisting MG in the verification of identity and registration of their nationals.
3. Assisting military authorities and appropriate Allied CI liaison personnel in making security checks of their nationals.

d. MG and CI personnel are jointly responsible for insuring that none of the persons categorized in Table C, Chapter V, escape from GERMANY through displaced persons channels.

e. The security check of displaced persons by CI personnel assisted by appropriate Allied CI liaison personnel, at Displaced Persons Assembly Centers, will consist of:

1. Identifying the individual, with the aid of the Allied Liaison Officer for Repatriation concerned.
2. Checking the name of the individual against available CI records.
3. Conducting such additional investigation as is practicable and necessary.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

f. Displaced persons found travelling without authority will be interrogated by CI personnel and, if not detained as security suspects, will be referred to MG for disposition.

g. Processing centers for displaced persons will maintain rosters of persons received therein and checks will be made to insure that all persons received in the camp are present. Names of missing persons will be reported to CI in order that prompt search for such persons may be instituted.

h. United Nations displaced persons, while awaiting repatriation, if approved by the appropriate Allied Liaison Officer for Repatriation, will be given the opportunity to join the armed forces of their country or engage in approved civilian work.

i. In order to prevent the infiltration and escape of "wanted" persons, as well as the smuggling of documents, funds and goods, MG will insure that:

1. Only displaced persons who have been thoroughly searched and security checked are loaded into trains, trucks or other vehicles for movement out of GERMANY.

2. The transporting of displaced persons from the loading point to and across the German frontier is accomplished in "sealed" and guarded trains or convoys.

(2) *Expatriates.* When not detained as security suspects, persons who claim to be United Nations expatriates, i. e., United Nations nationals permanently residing in but not nationals of GERMANY, will be referred to MG for disposition.

(3) *Stateless Persons.* When not detained as security suspects, stateless persons, including stateless persons of German origin, will be referred to MG for disposition. Such persons will be handled under the same procedure as those for the processing of United Nations displaced persons.

(4) *Neutrals.* When not detained as security suspects, neutral displaced persons will be referred to MG for disposition and will be accorded the same assistance granted to United Nations displaced persons.

(5) *Enemy, Ex-enemy and Co-belligerent Nationals.* Enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent nationals will be identified and registered by MG. Those whose freedom of movement might endanger the

security of our forces, or who are otherwise undesirable, will be interned by CI or their activities will be curtailed to the extent necessary under the circumstances.

(6) *Enemy Diplomatic and Consular Officials.* Enemy diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with any of the United Nations will be dealt with in accordance with instructions to be issued.

f. *Enemy Civilian Labor and Employees.*

(1) *Civilian Labor.* MG will prohibit and suppress strikes and lockouts which threaten security.

(2) *Civilian Employees.*

a. MG will consult with CI when doubt exists as to the political tendencies of an official or employee directly or indirectly supervised by MG.

b. Civilian employees of the Army will be granted no special privileges not necessitated by their official duties.

g. *Civil Communications.*

(1) Under the provisions of MG Law No. 76 (Amended) entitled, "Posts, Telephones, Telegraphs and Radio," all telephone and teletype, telegraph and radio services (inland, foreign, and transit) and all internal, external, and transit mail services are suspended in GERMANY. The reopening of such suspended communications is a command function and will be conducted strictly in accordance with procedure outlined in paragraph 5 of Circular No. 2, this headquarters, dated 15 January 1945, subject: "Civil Censorship in GERMANY."

(2) All active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers will be removed from the Reichspost by MG, assisted by CI. Other Reichpost employees may be required to remain at their positions until otherwise ordered by MG. MG will inform Reichspost officials that they will be held responsible for taking all precautions to prevent the sabotage of communications and any interference with the carrying out of MG instructions covering the operation of communications facilities.

(3) MG will arrange for the impounding and protection of all mail found to be in course of circulation and will inform G-2 (Censorship) of the measures taken. Such mail will be disposed of pursuant to censorship instructions. However, CI personnel will be permitted to examine such of the mail as may be of immediate CI interest.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(4) MG will arrange for the guarding and protection of post offices, telephone exchanges, repeater stations, and other premises vital to communications.

h. *Propaganda and Information Services.*

(1) *Propaganda.* Propagation of enemy doctrines in any form will be prohibited by MG.

(2) *Public Information Services.* MG will prohibit unauthorized German operation of press services, radio stations, printing facilities, public entertainment facilities, and other facilities for the dissemination of news and information. Operation of such public information services by civilians will not be permitted without the approval of this headquarters.

i. *Countersabotage.*

(1) MG will direct that officials of all German agencies insure the countersabotage protection of all facilities directly or indirectly under civil control. MG will notify appropriate German authorities, officials and employees that they are held responsible for the safeguarding of structures, installations, equipment, stores, fuels and facilities and for the preservation of documents, information and records. MG will be responsible for arranging for the guarding of all civilian premises vital to our military interests. Incidents which, after preliminary investigation by MG appear to involve sabotage, will be referred to CI by MG.

23. FRONTIER SECURITY CONTROL. Frontier security control will be established and GERMANY will be "sealed off".

a. Frontier security control is a command responsibility to be exercised by the Army or Military District commander in whose zone of operations any part of the borders of GERMANY, as of 1937, is located.

b. The "sealing off" of GERMANY by the imposition of rigid frontier control measures is required in order to:

(1) Assist in the detection and the prevention of the movements of personnel, communications and funds of the German intelligence services, secret police and para-military organizations and of any underground subversive organization out of occupied GERMANY.

(2) Prevent the escape of Black List and categorized individuals enumerated in Table C, Chapter V, War Criminals and other "wanted" persons.

(3) Assist in the control of displaced persons.

(4) Prevent all unauthorized movements into and out of GERMANY of persons, communications including documents of all kinds, funds and property, particularly those funds and properties illegally acquired.

c. Military Government Law No. 161 has been revised to prohibit movement into the "Prohibited Frontier Zone" as well as the unauthorized movement of persons, goods and property over the frontier of GERMANY. This law will be published to the German people by MG, and the appropriate German authorities will be instructed by MG to enforce this prohibition. The following persons only will be authorized to cross the German frontier:

(1) Persons who are in possession of valid US, British or Allied Military Identity Documents and appropriate travel orders.

(2) Persons having in their possession a properly executed AEF Permit issued by SHAEF authority and a valid national passport.

(3) Displaced persons identified as moving for repatriation, under the auspices, responsibility, and supervision of MG.

(4) Frontaliers travelling pursuant to the provision of subparagraph m, below.

(5) War Correspondents holding War Correspondents' licenses issued by US, British or other Allied Service Departments and who are accredited to SHAEF.

d. To assist in the implementation of frontier security control, responsible commanders will establish a "Prohibited Frontier Zone", paralleling and adjacent to the German frontier and extending approximately five kilometers into German territory. The commander responsible for an area will fix the exact zone and is authorized to vary the inner line thereof to conform to natural barriers or to avoid the evacuation of large centers of population, such as AACHEN.

(1) All persons, except those expressly authorized to remain therein, who are not members of the Allied armed forces, civilian agencies and employees attached thereto, will be evacuated immediately from the Prohibited Frontier Zone into GERMANY.

(2) After the Prohibited Frontier Zone has been evacuated, all unauthorized movement into it will be prohibited. Only those persons authorized to cross the German frontier will be permitted to enter the Prohibited Frontier Zone and then only on the routes specifically designated for such travel.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) The specific travel routes for use by individuals authorized to cross the Prohibited Frontier Zone and the German frontier will be announced by the responsible military commanders. Railways will normally remain open; however, appropriate commanders will select the minimum number of highways required for civilian travel only through the Prohibited Frontier Zone and will publicize them as "authorized civilian travel routes". All roads and footpaths, not specifically designated as military "main supply routes" or as "authorized civilian travel routes" will, at the inner and outer boundaries of the Prohibited Frontier Zone, have erected thereon physical barriers constructed so as to prevent ingress, without force, by vehicles or persons travelling on the road or pathway. *In addition, such barriers will be posted with notices prohibiting movement into the Prohibited Frontier Zone and specifying the nearest route for authorized civilian travel through the Prohibited Frontier Zone.*

(4) MG will make appropriate public notification of the Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions and will widely publicize the punishments of violators as announced by MG courts.

(5) All persons who act, or conspire to act, in violation of Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions will be apprehended and placed under immediate arrest. Such persons will be escorted to the nearest Frontier Security Control Post for interrogation and investigation.

(6) Unauthorized persons who, without intent to violate Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions, seek permission from Prohibited Frontier Zone guards to cross the Prohibited Frontier Zone on the routes specifically designated for travel, will be denied permission and will be referred to the nearest MG agency responsible for displaced persons and refugees. Notices in all appropriate languages will be prominently displayed at the entrances to the Prohibited Frontier Zone on the military main supply routes and the authorized civilian travel routes to inform all concerned of the location of the nearest MG establishment responsible for displaced persons and refugees.

e. The Communications Zone is making available to this headquarters and to Hq, 6th Army Group a limited number of CIC teams, type B-3, which will be placed under the operational control of Army Group headquarters initially.

This personnel will man the several Frontier Security Control Posts in the Prohibited Frontier Zone.

f. Army commanders will provide the troops, equipped with necessary transportation and radio communications, for Frontier and Prohibited Frontier Zone guards, patrol and escorts. CIC personnel will not be employed as guards and patrols but may be used as escorts under unusual circumstances involving special cases of CI interest. Whenever practicable, aerial reconnaissance patrols of the Prohibited Frontier Zone will be established. The aircraft so employed should have direct communication with ground patrol personnel in order to facilitate the capture of persons making "cross-country" traverses of the Prohibition Frontier Zone.

g. SHAEF has retained responsibility for negotiating the broad policy agreements necessary for frontier control purposes between liberated and neutral nations and the Allied armed forces. However, the responsible Army/Military District Commander will consult with the local frontier guard representatives of the nation concerned regarding any possible local assistance and local frontier control operational procedures and responsibilities.

h. Existing German frontier control authorities and personnel will be discharged by MG in consultation with CI at the earliest opportunity. At a later time, personnel of the purged and reorganized German frontier control organizations may be allowed to operate under strict CI supervision and control.

i. The responsible Army/Military District commander will provide:

(1) Teletype and telephone facilities for communication between the Chief, CIB, at Army/Military District Headquarters and the Frontier Security Control Posts and between all Frontier Security Control Posts in his area.

(2) Radio facilities for communication between Frontier Security Control Posts and Frontier Security Control Patrols.

(3) Telephone facilities for communication between Frontier Security Control Posts and all fixed Frontier Security Control Guards Posts.

j. Frontier Security Control Posts are established within the Prohibited Frontier Zone on each route authorized for travel through the Zone. The function of the CI personnel operating the Frontier Security Control Posts will be to:

(1) Identify and examine the credentials of those travellers who are escorted to the Post by border patrol troops.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Detain, interrogate and evaluate and render appropriate reports upon apprehended violators of the Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions. A check of the Black List will be made as part of the preliminary investigation of all violators apprehended.

(3) Insure delivery to the appropriate Internment Camp or Interrogation Center of those arrestees who are considered to be security suspects, together with Arrest Reports giving full details concerning the arrestees.

(4) Insure that those violators of Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions who are not detailed as security suspects are escorted to MG. A full report concerning the capture of each violator will accompany the violator.

(5) Conduct searches and examinations of persons and effects as deemed necessary. Particular attention will be given to luggage which might contain radio transmitters, sabotage devices, etc.

(6) Insure that persons crossing the frontiers of GERMANY are not carrying unauthorized communications.

(7) Make daily inspections to determine the effectiveness of the implementation of frontier security control measures and, when necessary, make recommendations to appropriate authorities for the improvement thereof.

(8) Effect security checks of railroad crews and passengers on international trips.

(9) Maintain close working liaison and coordination at their level with adjacent Frontier Security Control Posts, the frontier control personnel of the bordering nation and with MG Control Stations or other MG agencies.

k. Unauthorized persons who attempt to enter GERMANY will be handed over to the frontier control authorities of the country from which they enter unless they are wanted by the Allied occupational authorities.

l. MG will establish Border Control Stations upon the frontier of GERMANY in order to process displaced persons arriving thereat.

m. Agreements and the issuance of permits pertaining to frontaliers will be an MG responsibility for handling locally in consultation with CI when conditions are stabilized. However, frontaliers will not be granted access to the Prohibited Frontier Zone except to pass through on the civilian travel routes

specifically authorized for such travel. A standardized travel permit form for issuance to frontaliers will be provided by this headquarters when received from higher headquarters.

24. PORT SECURITY CONTROL.

a. Port security control is a responsibility of the US Port Enclave Commander. It will embody all appropriate internal, civil, frontier and travel security control policies and measures contained in this directive.

b. To assist in the implementation of port security control, several CIC port teams will be made available to the Port Enclave Commander from the CIC Occupation Detachment. The Port Enclave Commander will provide CIC Port teams with the water transportation necessary to accomplish their duties.

c. (1) The staff of the Port Enclave Commander will include a CI staff element (CIB, G-2) to which will be attached appropriate CI operating personnel such as CIC and SCI.

(2) The Chief, CIB, G-2 Section of the Port Enclave will, in addition to his normal duties, act as adviser on CI matters to Naval and other authorities in the Port Enclave.

d. The specific duties of the Officer in Charge of each CIC Port Team will include the following:

(1) Implement directives and instructions relating to travel control received from the Port Commander.

(2) Conduct security surveys within the Port area and recommend to the Port Commander those measures designed to insure the security of merchant ships and installations ashore. (Each Port Commander is responsible that masters of merchant vessels conform to security regulations of the port and mount adequate sentries and guards.)

(3) Plan and supervise the control of entry to, and exit from, the dock areas from the landward side and from ship to shore. (Initially, and for a considerable period thereafter, shore leave for merchant vessel personnel will be prohibited; if such shore leave is permitted, it will be controlled and regulated by the Port Commander and passes will be issued by CIC Port teams.)

(4) Establish and supervise the necessary security check and control of civilian labor and personnel, and persons with business in the port, to whom passes are issued for entry into the dock areas.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Board and search any vessel or craft, (other than Allied Naval vessels), when deemed desirable for travel control or other CI purposes. Register all fishing vessels and harbor craft and screen their crews before they are permitted to operate in or out of the Port Enclave.

(6) Within the port area, establish and coordinate measures to prevent illicit communications between sea and shore, and illegal entry or exit along the coastline. Measures ashore relating to the security of the coastline will be coordinated with any security measures established by appropriate naval authorities.

25. TRAVEL SECURITY CONTROL.

a. Travel security control responsibilities for the issuance of travel permits (other than for permits issued to frontalier) for travel over the German frontier and for negotiating broad policy agreements with the authorities of liberated and neutral countries contiguous to Germany with reference to travel control have been retained by SHAEF. However, this headquarters (Chief, CIB, G-2) will authorize the travel of civilians leaving Germany for intelligence or CI reasons, under the waybill procedure.

b. *Air-travel.* Appropriate Air Force commanders are responsible for effecting rigid air-travel security control at all airfields used for flights into and out of Germany.

26. INTER-ZONAL BOUNDARY CONTROL.

At the present time, it is not contemplated that any fixed security control of movement be established between national occupational zones in Germany.

CHAPTER IV

COUNTERSABOTAGE

29. GENERAL.

The countersabotage protection of our material and installations, including civilian facilities vital to the interests of our forces, is a command responsibility.

30. PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS.

This headquarters and the headquarters of each Army/Military District will have countersabotage officers and personnel available as follows:

a. The Engineer Section of this and Army/Military District headquarters will have available an engineer officer specially trained in countersabotage preventive techniques. This officier, upon request, will conduct surveys and inspections of vital facilities and installations and will recommend protective measures therefor.

b. The CI Branch, G-2 Section of this headquarters has organized a CIC Countersabotage Section. The functions of this section are contained in G-2 letter, this headquarters, dated 6 February 1945, subject: "CIC Countersabotage Section."

c. The CI Branch, G-2 Section of each Army-Military District headquarters has available a CIC officer specially trained in countersabotage. This officer will supervise the investigation of sabotage cases.

d. All CIC personnel are qualified and will be made available, as necessary, to conduct countersabotage security surveys and investigations in conjunction with the engineer officers and CIC officers mentioned in paragraphs a and c above.

31. INVESTIGATIONS.

All cases of suspected sabotage will be reported immediately, through G-2 channels, to appropriate CI staffs. The investigation of such cases will be undertaken by CI personnel. If it becomes apparent that an offense under the Articles of War by Allied military personnel may be involved, PM (Criminal Investigation Detachment) will be informed.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

a. Information from special sources regarding sabotage activities of enemy agents will be made available to CI staffs by SCI personnel. This personnel will also advise CI staffs on the action to be taken with respect to such agents.

b. Any arrestee known or suspected to be a saboteur will be processed as an enemy agent.

32. DISPOSAL OF SABOTAGE EQUIPMENT.

The responsibility for the neutralization or removal of enemy sabotage devices or equipment rests with the engineers or with the ordnance bomb disposal squads. In an emergency, CI personnel may deal with such devices or equipment, but, whenever practicable, they should await the assistance of engineers or an ordnance bomb disposal squad. After sabotage devices and equipment are rendered harmless by the engineers or ordnance bomb disposal personnel, they will be handed over to CI personnel for disposition as instructed by CI staffs. New types of sabotage devices and equipment will be delivered, as soon as practicable, to the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

33. JOINT COUNTERSABOTAGE COMMITTEES.

Joint countersabotage committees, which should include appropriate representation from G 2 (CI), G-3, Engineer, Ordnance and Signal Corps sections, may be established by commanders of major units in order to consider and solve countersabotage problems which will exist in Germany.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER V

EXTIRPATION OF NAZISM AND GERMAN MILITARISM

37. GENERAL.

The dissolution of the NSDAP and the eradication of Nazism as well as the corollary destruction of German militarism, are declared war aims of the United Nations. The German armed forces, the German National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) and its affiliates, and the German government, including the war production and civil administrations, are motivated by the Nazi moral, political and economic concepts. Therefore, the measures required to effect the extirpation of Nazism and German militarism (see Tables A, B, C, D and E attached hereto) will include:

a. The abolishment of the NSDAP and its subsidiary non-military political organizations.

b. The disarmament, demobilization and disbandment of the armed forces and all Nazi military and para-military organization.

c. The purging reorganization and control of the German police.

d. The dismissal of all active Nazis and ardent sympathizers of the party and of all militarists and leading military figures from government offices and other positions of influence and trust.

e. The dismantling of super-centralized and typically Nazi agencies of government and of agencies for war mobilization and production.

38. MG LAW NO. 5.

MG Law No. 5, entitled, "DISSOLUTION OF NAZI PARTY", is the instrument which declares the illegality, prohibits the activities, and orders the dissolution of NSDAP and all offices, organizations and institutions enumerated by the law. (See Table A hereto). This law will be publicized by MG.

39. RESPONSIBILITIES.

The enforcement of the provisions of MG Law No. 5 is a command responsibility to be conducted pursuant to these and other appropriate instructions. The operations necessary to accomplish the dissolution of the Nazi Party

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

and its affiliates and the eradication of Nazism and the agencies particularly concerned therewith, are as follows:

a. The dissolution of the NSDAP and its subsidiary organizations is a primary responsibility of CI, assisted by MG.

b. The disarmament, demobilization and disbandment of Nazi military and para-military mobilized bodies is a responsibility of all commanders advised and assisted by MG and CI.

c. The purge of the police and the removal of Nazis from the civil administration of Germany is a primary responsibility of MG, assisted by CI.

d. MG, assisted by CI, will be primarily responsible for ensuring that all persons placed in civil administrative posts and other positions of influence and authority are neither active Nazis nor ardent Nazi sympathizers.

e. The reorganization of all types of administrative agencies necessary for government is a primary responsibility of MG.

f. CI will be primarily responsible for ensuring that those Nazis who might be dangerous to military security are interned or kept under surveillance.

40. PERSONS TO BE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE.

All political office holders and civil servants, as enumerated categorically in Table E hereto, will be dismissed or suspended from office by MG. Table D hereto enumerates those positions, the holders of which will be denied service with MG if held at any time. Table E hereto enumerates those quasi-governmental positions from which the principal officers should be removed. Those persons of the categories listed in Tables B, D and E, who are also categorized in Table C hereto, will, if encountered by MG, be arrested by MG and referred to CI for disposal.

41. ARREST CATEGORIES.

All persons who are identified to be, or to have been, in the proscribed categories enumerated in Table C hereto, will be arrested and interned by CI.

42. GERMAN POLICE AND PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

As soon as the military situation permits, the command hierarchy of the German police will be abolished, and chief officers of regional and local police units will be made responsible to civil administration officials at regional and local levels. Under MG control, the police will be responsible for maintaining

civilian law and order. Nazi officials, methods and influences will be eradicated from the German police and operations inimical to the interests of the United Nations will be prevented. Undesirable police personnel will be discharged and, where necessary, interned. All military training and military practices will be discontinued, and the police will be disarmed of all weapons, except that sidearms and carbines may be reissued, where necessary, due to exceptional circumstances. The ammunition per weapon will be strictly limited. With the exception of the Criminal Police, all elements of the Security Police, including the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst der SS, will be dissolved. All offices combining control of both the police and SS, or police and the SD, or completing a chain of command from the national to the local level will be abolished. Armlets and warrant cards will be furnished to approved German police by MG.

a. *Security Police and Security Service of the SS (SIPO and SD).* CI will seize the headquarters, records and documents of the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst of the SS and will arrest and dispose of all members thereof.

b. *The Secret State Police (GESTAPO).* CI will seize the headquarters, records and documents of the Gestapo and will arrest and dispose of all members thereof.

c. *The Technical Emergency Service (TENO).* The Technische Nothilfe embraces units of highly skilled civilian engineers used for demobilitions and repairs to public utilities damaged in air raids. They are likely to be encountered in mobilized units. They hold stocks of explosives and, unless controlled, are dangerous as potential saboteurs. MG will be responsible for disarming them and for seizing stocks of explosives.

d. *The Criminal Police (KRIPO).* MG will seize the headquarters and records of the Kripo, and CI will arrest and dispose of those Kripo members who are proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C). After the Kripo has been purged by MG in consultation with CI, it will continue to function as part of the local police administration, but not under control of the Central BERLIN Office.

e. *The Barracks Police (Kasernierte Polizei).* The Barracks Police, a special branch of the Schupo originally formed to quell strikes and riots, have been used extensively against the resistance forces of the occupied countries. They are not specifically of CI interest but are likely to contain a high percentage of War Criminals.

f. *The Mobile Police (Motorisierte Gendarmerie).* The motorized units of the Gendarmerie are likely to be found as mobilized armed units. They are not specifically of CI interest.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

g. *The Order Police (ORPO).* In order to provide a police element for the maintenance of law and order, the Ordnungspolizei, which includes the Schupo (the municipal police), the Gendarmerie, Fire, PAD und all other uniformed police services will be disarmed, purged, reorganized and controlled by MG in consultation with CI. MG will seize the headquarters and records of the Orpo, and CI will arrest and dispose of those Orpo members who are proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

h. *Waffen SS.* All commanders responsible for disarmament and control of enemy forces will give highest priority to and take extraordinary precautions in the primary disarmament and control of the Waffen SS. After primary disarmament, all Waffen SS officers and non-commissioned officers of the rank of Schartuehrer and above will be arrested and interned. All Waffen SS units will then be completely disorganized as units and the personnel will be attached to Wehrmacht units. In effecting this attachment, care will be taken to insure that a minimum number of individuals who previously served together in the same unit are attached to the same Wehrmacht unit. Wehrmacht commanders will be held responsible for the conduct of this personnel and will be instructed to distribute them evenly throughout their Wehrmacht units so that the total number of Waffen SS personnel in any one unit never exceeds 25% of the total unit's strength.

i. *The Allgemeine SS.* The Allgemeine SS will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. CI will seize Allgemeine SS headquarters and documents, and will arrest and dispose of such Allgemeine SS members as are proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C). Members who hold public office will be a responsibility of MG in consultation with CI.

j. *Nazi Party Storm Troops (SA).* The SA will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG Detachments. CI will arrest and dispose of the SA officers proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

k. *Hitler Youth (HJ).* Mobilized units of the HJ will be processed pursuant to the instructions for processing mobilized units of NSKK (see paragraph m, below). The static HJ organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the headquarters, records and documents of the static organization and will arrest and dispose of the HJ members proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

l. *National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK).* Mobilized units of the NSFK, together with personnel of schools and training establishments, will be processed pursuant to the instructions for the processing of mobilized units of the NSKK (see paragraph m, below). The static organization will be

dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the headquarters, documents and records of the static organization and will arrest and dispose of the NSFK members proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

m. *The Nazi Party Motor Transport Corps (NSKK).* The NSKK will be encountered as mobilized units serving with the Wehrmacht and as a static organization controlling all transport within the Wehrkreise. Mobilized units, together with personnel of schools and training establishments, will be disarmed by combat troops and concentrated for disbandment. NSKK officers will be "screened" by PW and intelligence personnel in order to identify those officers who are proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C); at the time of disbandment, these officers will be referred to CI for disposal. The static organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the documents and records of the static NSKK organization and will dispose of those members thereof who are proscribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

n. *German Labor Service (RAD).* All units of the RAD will be processed pursuant to the instructions for the processing of the mobilized units of the NSKK (see paragraph m, above). The organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the headquarters, documents and records of the organization and will arrest and dispose of the RAD members proscribed in the arest categories (Table C).

o. *Todt Labor Forces (OT).* The officers and uniformed guards of OT will be disarmed by combat troops and concentrated for disbandment. The static organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG, except for such units as may be retained at the discretion of Army Military District commanders for clearing of devastated areas or other rehabilitation.

p. *Heimat Flak.* Regular GAF personnel in the Heimat Flak will be discharged through the armed forces machinery.

43. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF.

a. The coordination and supervision of the search for and arrest of all members of the German General Staff Corps and equivalent Naval and Air Force officers is a CI function.

b. All General Staff Officers and their Naval and Air Force equivalents, excluding those officers who have been captured in military operations prior to "A" Day, will be disposed of as follows:

(1) Those officers whose names appear on Personality Cards as having adverse records or who are listed as War Criminals will be processed as other individuals in these categories.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Those officers who are not in the categories as set forth in (1) and (2) above will be detained, placed under house arrest and/or kept under CI surveillance.

c. Those German General Staff Officers who, after initial detention, house arrest and/or surveillance, are found to be of potential value in assisting in disarmament and demobilization duties will be permitted to return to their posts but will be kept under CI surveillance through local arrangement with the appropriate U. S. military disarmament or disbandment authorities concerned.

d. Lists of officers to be detained are to be furnished by SHAEF through this headquarters.

44. GERMAN SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGISTS.

a. Disposal and control of those German scientists and industrial technologists whose background and prior activities are such that they could conceivably play an important part in the rebirth of the German war-machine is a CI function.

b. Such individuals will be detained pending further instructions. Information and interrogation reports will be transmitted to this headquarters.

c. Lists of German scientists or industrial technologists to be detained will be distributed as received from SHAEF

TABLE A

NAZI POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ABOLISHED

1. *Central Offices of the NSDAP.*

a. Party Chancellery (Partei Kanzlei).

b. Fuehrers Chancellery (Kanzlei des Fuehrers der NSDAP).

c. Organization of Germans Abroad (Auslandsorganisation).

d. Offices in GERMANY of the National Union for German Elements Abroad (Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland).

e. Center for Volksdeutsche (Volkdeutschenmittelstelle).

f. Party Scrutiny Commission for the Protection of National Socialist Literature (Parteiamtliche Pruefungskommission zum Schutze des NS-Schrifttums).

g. Office of the Reich Organization Leader (Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP).

h. Office of the Reich Treasurer of the Party (Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP).

i. Supreme Party Court (Oberstesparteigericht) and Subordinate Courts.

j. Office of the Fuehrer's Commissioner for the Supervision of the Whole Intellectual and Ideological Training and Education of the Party (Beauftragter des Fuehrers fuer die Ueberwachung der Gesamten Geistigen und Weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP).

k. Office of the Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party (Reichspropagandaleiter der NSDAP).

l. Office of the Reich Leader for the Press (Reichsleiter fuer die Presse und Zentralverlag der NSDAP (Eherverlag) together with the publishing houses owned by the Party and controlled by him.

m. Office of the Reich Press Chief of the Party (Reichspressechef der NSDAP).

n. Reich Office for the Agrarian Population (Reichsamt fuer das Landvolk).

o. Head Office for Public Health (Hauptamt fuer Volksgesundheit).

p. Head Office for Technology (Hauptamt fuer Technik).

q. Head Office for Teachers (Hauptamt fuer Erzieher).

r. Head Office for Local Government (Hauptamt fuer Kommunalpolitik).

s. Head Office for Officials (Hauptamt fuer Beamten).

t. Office of the Party Commissioner for all Racial Questions (Beauftragter der NSDAP fuer alle Volkstumsfragen).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

u. Racial-Political Office of the Party (Rassenpolitischesamt der NSDAP).
v. Office of Genealogical Research (Amt fuer Sippenforschung).
w. Colonial Office of the Party (Kolonialpolitischesamt der NSDAP).
x. Foreign Office of the Party (Aussenpolitischesamt der NSDAP).
y. Reichstag Party of the NSDAP (Reichstagsfraktion der NSDAP).
z. Reich Women's Leadership (Reichsfrauenfuehrung).
aa. Head Office for War Victims (Hauptamt fuer Kriegsopfer).

2. *Regional and Local Offices of Party Administration.*
a. Gauleitung in each Party Gau or Reichsgau.
b. Kreisleitung in each Party Kreis.
c. Ortsgruppenleitung in each Party Ortsgruppe.
d. Zellen and Block offices.
e. The Beauftragter der NSDAP in each Governmental Unit.

3. *Professional, Political and other Party Organizations.*
a. Reich League of Doctors (NS-Aerztebund).
b. Party League of German Technicians (NS-Bund Deutscher Technik).
c. Party League of Teachers (NS-Lehrerbund).
d. Reich League of German Officials (Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten).
e. Reich Colonial League (Reichskolonialbund).
f. NS Women's Organization (NS Frauenschaft).
g. NS Reich League of Nurses (NS Reichsbund der Deutschen Schwestern).
h. German Women's Association (Deutsches Frauenwerk).
i. Reich Student Leadership (Reichsstudentenfuehrung).
j. National Socialist German Students' League (NSD-Studentenbund).
k. German Students' Association (Deutsche Studentenschaft).
l. National Socialist German Lecturers' Association (NSD-Dozentenbund).
m. Party League of Lawyers, Notaries and Accountants (NS-Rechtswahrerbund).
n. Party League of Old Students (NS-Altherrenbund der Deutschen Studenten).
o. Reich League of German Families (Reichsbund Deutsche Familie).
p. German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront).
q. Party Association for Physical Training (NS-Reichsbund fuer Leibesuebungen).
r. NS-Ex-Servicemen's League (NS-Reichskriegerbund).
s. Reich Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer).
t. German Local Government Union (Deutscher Gemeindetag).
u. German Hunters' Association (Deutsche Jaegerschaft).

v. Council of Experts on Population and Race Politics (NS Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt).
w. Reich Committee for the Protection of German Blood (Reichsausschuss zum Schutze des Deutschen Blutes).
x. National Socialist Relief Organization for War Victims (NS-Kriegsopferversorgung).
y. Winter Relief (Winterhilfswerk).
z. Reich Chamber of Commerce (Reichswirtschaftskammer).

4. *Para-Military and Police Organizations.*

a. The SS (Schutzstaffeln), including the Armed SS (Waffen SS) and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst).
b. Secret Police (Geheime Staatspolizei).
c. The Storm Troops, SA (Sturmabteilungen), including the SA-Wehrmannschaften or pre-military training centers.
d. The National Socialist Flying Corps, NSFK (NS-Fliegerkorps).
e. The National Socialist Automobile Corps, NSKK (NS-Kraftfahrer-Korps).
f. The HJ and BDM (Hitler Jugend and Bund deutscher Maedels).
g. The Reich Labour Service, RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst).
h. The Todt Organization, OT (Organization Todt). (See par 42, o, this Chapter for exception).
i. The Technical Emergency Squads, TENO (Technische Nothilfe).

Note: Pending surrender, or the declaration by the Supreme Commander that the Germans have been defeated, all German personnel of the organizations cited in paragraph 4 above are entitled to the status and privileges of Prisoners of War.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE "B"

POLITICAL OFFICERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS WHO SHOULD BE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED.

(The holders of the offices marked with asterisk will be suspended)

Item — *Title of Position*

1. Reich Ministers and State Secretaries, Ministerial Directors**
2. Land Ministers, State Secretaries and Ministerial Directors of the Laender**
3. (a) Provisional Presidents and Reich Governors.
   (b) Department Heads of Provinces and Reichsgaue**
4. Other Supreme Reich Authorities. At present these are:
   - Commissioner General for Medical and Health Service
   - Reich Housing Commissioner
   - Reich Commissioner for Security of the German People
   - Reich Commissioner for Shipping
   - Inspector-General for Water and Power
   - Inspector-General for German Roads
   - Inspector-General for Motor Transportation
   - Reich Commissioner for Treatment of Enemy Property
   - Reich Youth Leader
   - Head of the Reichsstelle fuer Raubmordung
   - Division Chief in Four-Year Plan Office
5. Heads of Reich Institutions. At present these are:
   - Supreme Administrative Tribunal
   - Reich Committee for Public Health Service
   - Reich Office for Social Insurance
   - Reich Hereditary Court
   - Reich Labor Court
   - Reich Honor Court
   - Reich Archives
6. Reich Labor Trustees
7. Reich Food Estate Officials from Kreisbauernfuehrer up
8. Chiefs of Military and Civil Administration in the Occupied Countries.

9. Regierungspraesidenten
10. Landraete
11. Oberbuergermeister of Cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants
12. Officials of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda National, Regional and subsidiary agencies
13. Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production high officials, including the Chairman of the Hauptausschuesse and Ringe
14. Members of the present German Reichstag not already covered on account of other positions held
15. Members of the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), the People's Court (Volksgericht), Special Court (Sondergericht), members of the Courts of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)**
16. Chief Public Prosecutors (Oberreichsanwaelte, General Staatsanwaelte and Oberstaatsanwaelte)**
17. Police Officials:
   (a) Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police
   (b) All higher SS and Police leaders
   (c) All Police Presidents and Directors, and Police Officials above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel
   (d) All members of the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst
   (e) Members of the Administrative Police who are serving with the Gestapo, either in their Hq or as "Special Investigators". Those who have served should be treated on their merits after investigation.
   (f) Inspectors of the Security Police and ORPO
   (g) Commissioned officers of the Technische Nothilfe
18. University Rectors and Curators, including Heads of Institutions of University rank.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE "C"

NAZI PARTY, POLICE, PARA-MILITARY AND OTHER PERSONNEL TO BE INTERNED

All individuals whose names are contained in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY and all persons who are identified to be or to have been in the categories proscribed below will be arrested and interned in GERMANY.

A. GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

1. *Aemter* (Departments) I, II, III, VI, including Militaerisches Amt (formerly Abwehr), and VII of RSHA, together with the out stations and organizations dependent on or controlled by any of them — all personnel.
2. *Geheime Feldpolizei* (Secret Field Police) — all personnel.
3. *Reichssicherheitsdienst* (Reich Security Service) — all personnel.

B. THE SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI.

1. *Gestapo* (including Grenzpolizei) — all personnel.
2. *Kripo* — all officials down to and including the rank of Oberst (Colonel)

C. HIGHER POLICE OFFICIALS.

1. *Polizeipraesidenten und Direktoren.*
2. *Oberpraesidenten in Prussia, Stadtpraesident in Berlin, Regierungspraesidenten und Landraete.*
3. *Befehlshaber der Orpo und der Sipo.*
4. *Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer.*

D. ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI — all officers down to and including the rank of Oberst (Colonel), (Landesfuehrer in Teno and Luftschutzpolizei) in the following branches:

1. *Schutzpolizei.*
2. *Feuerschutzpolizei.*
3. *Luftschutzpolizei.*
4. *Gendarmerie.*
5. *Wasserschutzpolizei.*
6. *Verwaltungspolizei.*
7. *Hilfspolizei.*
8. *Technische Nothilfe.*

E. PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

1. *Waffen SS* — all officers and NCOs down to and including the rank of Scharfuehrer, all ranks of the Totenkopfverbaende and all female members of the SS.
2. *Allgemeine SS* — all officers and NCOs down to and including the rank of Unterscharfuehrer and all female members (except those members of the Orpo and Kripo who would appear to have held only nominal SS rank and not to have taken an active part in SS work).
3. *SA* — all officers down to and including the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer.
4. *Hitler Jugend* — all officers down to and including the rank of Stammfuehrer.
5. *Bund deutscher Maedels* — all officers down to and including the rank of Bannmaedelfuehrerin.
6. *NSKK* — all officers down to and including the rank of Staffelfuehrer.
7. *NSFK* — all officers down to and including the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer.
8. *RAD* — all officers down to and including the rank of Arbeitsfuehrer.

F. NAZI PARTY OFFICIALS.

1. *Administrative officials of the Party* down to and including the post of Amtsleiter at Ortsgruppe level.
2. *All other members of the Party* down to and including the rank of Gemeinschaftsleiter.

G. REICH AUTHORITIES.

1. All members of the Hoehere Dienst appointed since 1 March 1939.
2. All civil servants down to and including the rank of Ministerialrat or its equivalent, irrespective of the date of appointment.

H. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. All members of the German General Staff, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE "D"

POSITIONS IN NAZI PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND FORMATIONS AND RELATIONS TO THE PARTY WHICH ARE TO BE REGARDED AS DISQUALIFYING HOLDER FROM SERVICE WITH MG IF HELD AT ANY TIME

1. NSDAP; National Socialist Workers Party: membership in the NSDAP prior to 1933.
2. NSDAP; National Socialist Workers Party: holders of the positions in the Nazi formations referred to below or listed among the Party Officials in Table C.
3. SS: Schutzstaffeln — holders of the rank of Unterscharfuehrer or higher, and any person who was a member of the SS before 1933.
4. SA Sturmabteilung: holders of the rank of Scharfuehrer or higher, membership in the SA prior to 1933.
5. Hitler Jugend and Bund deutscher Maedels: holders of the rank of Bannfuehrer or Bannmaedelfuehrerin or higher.
6. NS Dozentenbund: officials of this formation.
7. NS Deutscher Studentenbund: officials of this formation.
8. NS Frauenschaft: officials of this formation.
9. NS Kraftfahrer Korps: holders of commissioned rank in this formation.
10. NS Fliegerkorps: holders of commissioned rank in this formation.
11. RAD — Reichsarbeitsdienst: holders of the rank of Arbeitsfuehrer and above.
12. Business men who have accepted Nazi honors, such as the "Ehrendolch" or "Ehrensold" or "Blutorden".
13. Persons holding the positions in quasi-governmental organizations listed in Table E.
14. Officials in the "Affiliated Organizations" of the NSDAP named in items a, b, c, d, n, p and x in Category 3 of Table A (Professional, Political and other Party Organizations) and officials of the NSV (NS Volkswohlfahrt).
15. Officials of the "Supervised Organization of the NSDAP named in item d in Category 1 of Table A (Control Offices) and officials of the similar organizations named in items e, g, h, n, o and q in Category 3 (Professional, Political and other Party Organizations) of Table A.

TABLE "E"

QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS FROM WHICH PRINCIPAL OFFICERS SHOULD BE REMOVED

1. Head of the National Economic Chamber (Reichswirtschaftskammer), and his immediate subordinates; or president or chairman of a Gau Economic Chamber or affiliated Economic Chamber.
2. Chairman, president or deputy of a Reichsgruppe or an Economic Group (Wirtschaftsgruppe).
3. Chairman, president or deputy of a National Transportation Group (Reichsverkehrsgruppe).
4. Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER VI

PROCESSING OF CI ARRESTEES

48. GENERAL. The arrest and internment of all persons whose continued liberty is likely to constitute a threat to the security of our forces is a command responsibility to be accomplished primarily through the employment of CI personnel. The following categories of persons will be arrested by CI:

a. Those Nazis who are to be arrested because of their rank or office. (See Table C, Chapter V).

b. Those security suspects named in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY, most of whom are to be arrested because they are known or suspect members of the enemy intelligence services.

c. Those persons who become security suspects as a result of CI field operations.

49. VIOLATIONS OF MG SECURITY ENACTMENTS.

a. Persons who violate MG enactments for the security control of the civilian population are not necessarily security suspects nor are they necessarily of interest to CI. Normally, such persons will be arrested and disposed of by MG. However, if there is any reason to believe that the offense involves espionage, sabotage or subversive activity, the arrestee will be referred to CI for investigation.

b. CI personnel will transfer to MG those cases which are not of CI interest, but which are merely violations of MG security control enactments. In all such cases, the arrestee and a fully completed arrest report will be handed over to MG.

50. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMINALS. War Crimes are violations of the laws and usages of war of general application and acceptance, including acts in contravention of treaties and conventions dealing with the conduct of war, as well as other offenses against persons or property which outrage common justice or involve moral turpitude, committed in connection with military operations or occupation with or without orders or sanction of governments or commanders. War Criminals are those who have committed War Crimes,

or who have ordered, directed, or countenanced the commission of War Crimes, without regard to their nationality or the capacity in which they acted.

a. When a person arrested by CI personnel is discovered to be a War Criminal, as well as an arrestee of CI interest, the following procedure will be applied:

(1) The War Criminal will be identified by CI personnel, who will complete in triplicate the detention report form to be provided by SHAEF for that purpose.

(2) The completed detention report form will be forwarded to the G-1 of the command in whose area the arrestee is being detained. The detention report form will be accompanied by a notification to the effect that the War Criminal is being detained not as a War Criminal but as a person primarily of interest to CI.

(3) If absolved of suspicion as a security suspect, the War Criminal will be continued in detention and instructions as to his disposal will be requested from the appropriate G-1.

(4) In all other respects, the War Criminal will be handled according to CI requirements.

b. Whenever CI personnel, in the course of their CI operations, obtain oral evidence pertaining to a War Criminal, whether apprehended or not, such evidence will be reduced to writing in the form of a statement sworn to by the witness, or, if the witness refuses to testify under oath, in a statement sworn to by the interrogator and those other witnesses who may be present when the evidence is given. Photographic and physical evidence will be submitted together with appropriate affidavits pertaining to the procurement thereof. All evidence pertaining to War Crimes will be submitted to the appropriate G-1.

c. Since CI personnel are being employed to apprehend the numerous persons of the categories defined in paragraph 48 above, normally such personnel will not be required to apprehend, identify, investigate or detain War Criminals unless they are specifically of CI interest.

51. CI ARRESTS. CI arrests will be accomplished as follows:

a. *Wehrmacht personnel.* Personnel of the Abwehr, Geheimefeldpolizei, Lehr Regiment Kurfuerst and similar organizations held as PWs in the ETO will be processed by intelligence and other interested personnel of all echelons to locate those who are prescribed for arrest as CI personality targets. CI will be notified as to the presence of such proscribed personnel, after which those

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

who are to be arrested will be discharged from the Wehrmacht and turned over to CI for arrest and internment as civilian security suspects.

b. *Personnel of Para-Military and Police Organizations.* The procedures for the arrest of members of the mobilized units and static elements of the various para-military and police organizations are included in Chapter V.

c. Persons in the arrest categories held as PWs outside the ETO will when repatriated, be discharged, arrested and interned as civilian security suspects, provided that other persons in similar arrest categories continue to be interned.

d. All other persons specified for CI arrest will be apprehended and arrested by CI personnel, assisted by combat troops, MG, Military Police and such specialist personnel as are necessary. Normally, CI personnel will not themselves effect the physical apprehension of persons to be arrested but will direct combat troops and other elements assisting in the operation.

e. *Power of Arrest.* All members of our forces are empowered to arrest any person committing acts prejudicial to MG, to the security of our forces, or in violation of any MG proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order. Arrested persons will be turned over without delay to the nearest CIC, MG Security Guard or MP with a written statement, signed by the arresting individual giving the time, date, place and reason pertaining to the arrest.

52. SEARCHES MADE IN CONNECTION WITH ARRESTS. Searches made in connection with arrests will be made by CI personnel or other personnel operating under the supervision of CI personnel. Such searches will be made as follows:

a. *Premises.* The living quarters and offices of arrestees will be searched thoroughly. Items of evidence collected will be catalogued under heading "Office at (address)" or "Residence at (address)" on the receptacle which is to contain them.

b. *Arrestees.* Arrestees will be ordered to surrender all possessions held on their persons; the items surrendered will be catalogued under the heading "Surrendered", on the receptacle which is to contain them. The arrestee will then be thoroughly searched and those items he failed to surrender upon order will the catalogued under the heading "Not Surrendered Voluntarily", on the receptacle which is to contain them.

c. *Chain of Possession.* All items of evidence will be placed in a suitable receptacle, labeled, sealed and delivered with the arrestee. The label

will state clearly the identity of the arrestee, where and when the evidence was recovered, and the name, rank and serial number of the officer who inventories the evidence. Whenever there is a change in the custody of the evidence, a receipt will be entered on the receptacle label.

53. EVACUATION OF ARRESTEES. Arrestees will be guarded, escorted and evacuated by CI personnel or personnel operating under the supervision of CI personnel.

a. Persons arrested because of their rank or position; i.e., those who are identified as being persons prescribed for arrest in Table C, Chapter V, will be evacuated to Internment Camps.

b. Known or suspect members of the enemy intelligence services, to include persons detected in acts of espionage, sabotage or subversion and persons found in possession of sabotage equipment, secret writing materials, codes or communication devices, or in other suspicious circumstances, will be evacuated to the CI Annex of the Army Military District Interrogation Center.

c. Other security suspects will be processed according to the merits of the individual case.

d. Certain priority subjects, as defined in paragraph 54, f, below, will be evacuated to the CI Annex of the Army Group US Zone Interrogation Center.

54. DETENTION OF ARRESTEES. Arrestees will be detained by CI personnel or personnel operating under supervision of CI personnel, in available facilities or in those to be provided as follows:

a. *House Arrest.* Arrestees may be held under guard in "House Arrest" for limited periods of time, pending their evacuation to more secure places for detainment.

b. *Local Jails.* Arrestees may be held in local jails or prisons, pending the completion of preliminary identification, interrogation and investigation, prior to the evacuation of arrestees to internment camps or the Army Military District Interrogation Center. If local jails exist, MG will make them available for this purpose and will provide for the guarding of inmates. When CI personnel place arrestees in local jails, they will provide the jailor with an Arrest Report stating that the prisoner is to be held incommunicado on security grounds pending further instructions from CI.

c. *Local Detention Camps.* In areas where adequate civilian jail facilities are not available, local commanders will provide and administer detention camps where arrestees may be held, pending the completion of prelimi-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

nary identification, interrogation and investigation, prior to the evacuation of arrestees to Internment Camps or the Army-Military District Interrogation Center.

d. *Internment Camps.* In instructions separate from these, each Army/Military District Commander is directed to establish Internment Camps within his command. The following special requirements of CI for Internment Camps have been specified:

(1) From the CI point of view, the desirable capacity of a single Internment Camp is 7,500 internees. However, any capacity between 5,000 and 10,000 internees is considered satisfactory.

(2) Insofar as conditions permit, it is desirable for CI purposes to have Internment Camps established near the major centers of population and spaced equally distant within Army/Military District areas. The safeguarding of the inmates should be the paramount consideration in determining the siting of Internment Camps.

(3) Each Internment Camp should have a distination name or other designation which will facilitate the maintenance and identification of CI records pertaining to CI internees held therein.

(4) Each Internment Camp should be so arranged as to permit segregation and appropriate supervision of male and female internees. If persons other than those of CI interest are to be interned in the same Internment Camp in which CI arrestees are interned, arrangements for the complete segregation of the two categories are essential. It may also become desirable to segregate the various categories of CI arrestees interned.

(5) Each Internment Camp should have accommodations for the solitary confinement of 50 CI arrestees.

(6) Each Internment Camp will have a Reception Center wherein arrestees will be held for processing, prior to being interned.

(7) The Administrative Staff of each Internment Camp should have interpreters qualified to interpret in the German, French, Dutch, Russian, Polish, Slavic and Italian languages.

(8) The Administrative Staff and facilities of each Internment Camp should be organized to process arrestees upon their reception at the Camp in accordance with the following schedule.

(a) CI arrestees are not to be accepted for processing and internment unless accompanied by an Arrest Report properly executed in triplicate. If the arrestee's escort does not have an Arrest Report pertaining to his prisoner, the Internment Camp CI officer will be consulted.

(b) Receipt of Person and Property will be rendered to the officer or guard who escorts the arrestee to the Internment Camp for detention. This receipt should be entered on the escort's copy of the Arrest Report which will be returned to the arresting agency.

(c) An identification number will be assigned to each arrestee received for internment. The identification number should be prefixed by the Internment Camp designation.

(d) Each arrestee will be registered by reception date, identification number and name.

(e) Any property and evidence which is delivered with the arrestee to the Internment Camp will be registered and placed in secure custody.

(f) A Detention Report Form (to be furnished by SHAEF) will be completed in triplicate for each arrestee. Copies will be distributed as follows:

1. One forwarded to G-1 Division, SHAEF.
2. One forwarded to Army Group/Zone Headquarters. (Attention: G-1 Section).
3. One retained.

(g) Each arrestee will be fingerprinted.

(h) Each arrestee will be photographed.

(i) All Arrest Reports and evidence will be delivered along with the CI arrestee to the Internment Camp CI officer for CI processing.

(9) A CI staff, from CI personnel resources of Army/Military District commanders, will be attached or assigned to each Internment Camp approximately in strength as follows:

(a) 1 CI officer. (CIC)
(b) 3 assistant CI officers.
(c) 12 interrogators.
(d) 6 clerical personnel.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(10) Each Internment Camp will provide the CI staff thereof with all necessary office space, furniture and equipment, and private interrogation rooms.

(11) The duties of the CI Staff at the Internment Camps will be to:

(a) Advise the Internment Camp Commander regarding the internal security of the camp.

(b) Complete a Fragebogen (MG personnel questionnaire) on each CI arrestee received for internment.

(c) Interrogate each CI arrestee received for internment.

(d) Submit to Army Military District Hq the required periodic CI reports.

(e) Transmit to this headquarters, through G-2 channels, the Arrest Reports, Fragebogen and a copy of interrogation reports pertaining to all CI internees.

(f) Recommend to the CI Annex of the Army Military District Interrogation Center which CI arrestees should be interrogated in detail at the Army Military District Interrogation Center.

(g) Maintain CI records pertaining to CI internees.

(h) Report to this headquarters, through G-2 channels, any change in status of an internee (release, escape, execution, natural death, etc.)

(i) Operate an informant system among the CI internees in the Camp.

(j) Clear CI arrestees for release upon instructions of the Army/Military District Commander.

(k) Prepare Arrest Reports on arrestees who are delivered for internment without an Arrest Report.

e. *CI Annex to the Army Military District Interrogation Center.* In instructions separate from these, each Army/Military District Commander is directed to establish an Interrogation Center to accomplish intelligence and CI interrogation within his command. These Interrogation Centers are to be fully self-administered and self-contained and prepared to handle female as well as male prisoners. Each Interrogation Center should have interpreters qualified in the German, French, Dutch, Russian, Polish, Slavic and Italian languages, available to assist CI interrogators when required. In addition, each Interrogation Center will have a CI Annex for which the following special requirements are specified:

(1) Accommodations for the secret detention, messing, exercising, interrogation, etc, of [illegible] arrestees at one time. The facilities for the detention, messing, exercising, interrogation, etc, of all CI prisoners will be a part of Interrogation Center, but should be so arranged so that the presence of an individual CI arrestee in the Interrogation Center may be kept secret from all other CI arrestees and inmates thereof.

(2) Ten cells, so constructed and equipped as to provide for the secret monitoring and recording of conversations which may take place in the cells.

(3) Ten private, sound-proof interrogation rooms.

(4) Twenty expert, full time, German-speaking CI interrogators.

(5) Twenty stenographers, (5 of whom should be German linguists) equipped with stenographic necessities, to work at the disposal of the CI interrogators.

(6) Facilities for the photographing and fingerprinting of each arrestee.

f. *CI Annex to the 12th Army Group US Zone interrogation Center.* The facilities of the CI Annex of the Army Group US Zone Interrogation Center will be utilized as follows:

(1) Only those persons who are in possession of detailed information of value to our operations against the German Intelligence Service, Security Services and subversive hostile elements will be subject to interrogation at the CI Annex of the 12th Army Group US Zone Interrogation Center. The mere fact that a person is a known or suspect agent will not itself require that such a person be processed at this Center.

(2) Priority subjects for processing at this Center are persons possessing detailed information concerning the organization, personnel and future intentions of:

(a) Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA).

(b) Sicherheitsdienst (SD).

(c) Abwehr.

(d) Geheimestaatspolizei (Gestapo).

(e) Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo).

(f) Geheimefeldpolizei (GFP).

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Other priority subjects are persons in possession of detailed information concerning future intentions of the following organizations, with particular reference to plans of those, or affiliated organizations, to go underground upon the cessation of hostilities in GERMANY:

(a) SS.
(b) SA.
(c) NSDAP.
(d) Nazi Youth Movements.
(e) NSKK.
(f) NSFK.
(g) Ordensburgen.
(h) Junkerschule.

(4) All such persons will be sent to the Interrogation Center as soon as possible, subject to the provision that no persons, regardless of category, will be forwarded to the Interrogation Center without the specific approval of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section of this headquarters. All information pertaining to subjects believed to warrant interrogation at this Center will be transmitted to the Chief, CIB, this headquarters, in writing or orally, with a recommendation for processing at this Center.

(5) In every instance, escorts accompanying persons forwarded to the Interrogation Center will be in possession of a completed Arrest Report, including a reason for arrest sufficiently detailed to serve as a basis for interrogation, together with all pertinent documents and materials

55. DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTS RE CI ARRESTEES.

a. *Arrest Report.* When an arrest is made, the arresting agency will complete the standard Arrest Report forms in triplicate, and will include a brief record of any important statement made by the arrestee when he was being arrested.

(1) The original Arrest Report will accompany the arrestee at all times.

(2) The first copy of the Arrest Report pertaining to an individual who is accepted for internment or interrogation by the Army/Military District Internment Camps or Interrogation Centers will be sent immediately to this headquarters (Attention Chief, CIB, G-2 Section), through G-2 channels.

(3) The second copy of the Arrest Report will be retained by the arresting agency, but will be sent with the arrestee to the Internment Camp or Interrogation Center in order that [illegible] person and property may be entered on the copy for return to the arresting agency.

b. *Photographs.* Each arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center will be photographed, if the photographing has not been accomplished at another Internment Camp or Interrogation Center. The photograph will be mounted upon the Detention Report Form which will be prepared in triplicate by the Commanding Officers of all PW and Internment Camps and Interrogation Centers.

c. *Fingerprints.* Each arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center will be fingerprinted, if he has not been so processed previously at another Internment Camp or Interrogation Center in accordance with instructions to be issued by SHAEF.

d. *Fragebogen.* A Fragebogen (MG form PS G-9 "Personnel Questionnaire") will be completed for each arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center, if he has not been so processed previously at another Internment Camp or Interrogation Center. The Fragebogen will accompany the arrestee until his interrogation and investigation at the Internment Camp or Interrogation Center is completed. It will then be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) together with the Summary Report cited in paragraph f below.

e. *Special Reports.* Whenever, during the course of an investigation or interrogation, information, believed to be of vital interest, is developed, a special report thereof will be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) through G-2 channels.

f. *Summary Reports.* When the interrogation and investigation of an arrestee has been completed and the disposition to be made of the arrestee has been decided at Army/Military District level, a report containing a summary of all facts and information pertinent to the case, together with the Fragebogen, will be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) through G-2 channels.

(1) In the case of an individual who is interned after interrogation at the Internment Camp and is not considered of sufficient importance to merit detailed interrogation at the Army/Military District Interrogation Center, the Summary Report together with

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

the Fragebogen will be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) from the Internment Camp through G-2 channels.

g. *Status Reports.* This headquarters (Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) will be notified of any change of status pertaining to an arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center. Status Reports will be rendered when an arrestee is transferred from one place of detention to another, and also in the event of an arrestee's release, escape, execution or natural death. In the event of an arrestee's natural death or execution, his records will be sent to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) through G-2 channels.

h. *Transfer of Arrestees.* Whenever an arrestee is transferred between Internment Camps and Interrogation Centers, the records on the arrestee will accompany the arrestee and will be receipted for by the recipient.

i. *Evidence.* Confessions of identity or guilt and incriminating testimony of witnesses will be reduced, wherever possible, to writing and subscribed to under oath. Whenever a witness refuses to subscribe to his testimony under oath, the evidence given will be submitted in statements sworn to by the interrogator and any other witnesses. Evidence of probative value found in documents may be submitted in the form of certified photostatic or photographic reproductions of the document or in the form of hand written or typewritten extract copies of the document, sworn to as true copies but, whenever practicable, the document itself should be submitted. Original papers of evidence will accompany the arrestee at all times.

56. INTERROGATION OF ARRESTEES. Arrestees will be interrogated as follows:

a. In the case of Black List or categorized individuals, the interrogation of an arrestee by the arresting agency will consist only of that interrogation which is required to (1) identify the arrestee, (2) extract from him any information which will assist in the immediate arrest of other individuals, (3) enable the immediate recovery of documents and material of CI interest, and (4) enable the immediate neutralization of any sabotage, espionage and subversive effort already made by the arrestee.

b. The interrogation of persons delivered to Internment Camps will consist of only that interrogation necessary to identify the arrestee, determine his background and discover whether he should be interrogated in detail at the Army Military District Interrogation Center.

c. The interrogation of persons accepted at Army Military District Interrogation Centers will be made in detail in order to extract from him the essential elements of information enumerated in paragraph 8, Chapter I, and to determine the appropriate disposition of the arrestee.

57. DISPOSAL OF ARRESTEES.

a. No person who is interned because he is an individual named in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY will be released from internment without the specific approval of this or higher headquarters.

b. No person who is interned because he is one of the persons described in the prescribed arrest categories (See Table C, Chapter V) will be released from internment without the specific approval of this headquarters.

c. The ultimate disposal of captured members of the German intelligence services will be decided by this or higher headquarters (Chief, CIB, G-2 Section).

d. Those persons against whom sufficient evidence has been gathered to warrant trial will be prosecuted by the appropriate US Military Commission or MG Court.

e. Those persons who are considered to be security hazards if allowed to remain at liberty, and against whom there is insufficient evidence to warrant trial, will be interned for such time as is deemed appropriate.

f. Army Military District Commanders will establish review boards to review on a tri-monthly basis the cases of those persons interned pursuant to the instructions contained in paragraph e above. The review boards will include appropriate representation from G-2 (CI), G-5, JA, and PM, and will recommend the release, provisional release, or continued internment of the individuals whose cases are reviewed

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER VII

REPORTS AND RECORDS

61. PERSONALITY INDEX. Army Military District Commanders will maintain their copies of the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY. Supplementary information to be recorded on these cards, as well as additional cards, will be supplied by this headquarters.

62. ROSTERS OF PERSONALITIES. This headquarters will supply Machine Record Unit rosters of "Wanted" persons, CI arrestees, and other information as indicated in Appendix B hereto.

63. FILES. Army Military District Commanders are not required to maintain permanent files or dossiers pertaining to individual arrestees. This headquarters will be the central repository for all such files and records, to include those received from Hq, 6th Army Group.

64. SPECIAL STUDIES. Army Military District Commanders are not required to prepare special studies pertaining to CI organizations, trends or personalities. When such studies are required by lower echelons, a request therefor will be submitted to this headquarters.

65. REPORTS. Army Military District Commanders are required to submit the various reports and records pertaining to individuals as directed in Chapter VI. In addition, CI Periodic Reports will be submitted monthly by Army Military District Commanders in the form attached hereto as Appendix A. The reports will be submitted in sextuplicate so as to arrive at the Army Group Zone headquarters on the twenty-fifth day of each month.

66. DISTRIBUTION. Necessary reproduction and distribution of CI intelligence and information will be made by this headquarters.

(NOTE: Words containing a letter or letters with umlaut will be written with the expressed "e", i. e. ü will be written "ue", ä will be written "ae".)

Appendix I

FORM FOR CI PERIODIC REPORTS TO ARMY GROUP ZONE HEADQUARTERS

CI PERIODIC REPORT NO _____

For the month of _____, 194

PART I — CIVIL SECURITY CONTROL

A. *General survey.*

B. *Security control of civil population.*

C. *Resistance organizations.*
Reports on organizations attempting to stimulate resistance to the Allies or engaged in activities prejudicial to Allied interests.

D. *Attitude of local authorities and police to CI staffs and personnel.*
A note on the performance, satisfactory or otherwise, of the duties assigned to German authorities.

E. *Special cases of CI interest.*
A summary of arrests of important persons or other information about them.

F. *Pro-Allied and anti-Nazi organizations.*
Reports on organizations claiming to favor the Allied occupation or to assist in the eradication of Nazism.

G. *Rumors.*

PART II — INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL

A. *General survey.*

B. *Security of information.*
Report on measures taken to prevent leakage of information with notes on serious violations

C. *Security of materiel.*
Report on measures taken to prevent sabotage with notes on sabotage incidents.

D. *Security of personnel.*
Report on enemy propaganda (leaflets, broadcasting, publications, etc) and its effects.

E. *Non-fraternization.*
Report on compliance with the policy within GERMANY and resultant effects.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

PART III — PORT, FRONTIER AND TRAVEL SECURITY CONTROL

A. *Port Security Control.*

(Information under the following headings will be submitted for each port under control of the US Port Enclave).

1. Number of port CI personnel and area covered.
2. Port CI.
   a. Security of dock area.
      (1) Physical barriers.
      (2) Adequacy of gate and perimeter control personnel.
      (3) System of issue of passes.
      (4) Shore leave policy.
      (5) Control of harbor craft.
      (6) Control of fishing.
      (7) Countersabotage precautions.
   b. Relations with other port authorities.
   c. General comments.
3. Coastline security control.
4. Travel security control.
   a. Ships:
      (1) Entering port _____
      (2) Leaving port _____
   b. Civilian passengers:
      (1) Arriving _____
      (2) Departing _____
   c. Seamen:
      (1) Signed on _____
      (2) Signed off _____
   d. Censorship violations, etc.
   e. Special reports
      (give brief details — subject, reference and date of any special reports on travellers (passengers seamen) or on travel security matters submitted during the period under review).
   f. General comments.

B. *Frontier Security Control.*

(This will be a consolidated survey covering the entire frontier under the control of the Army Military District concerned.)

1. General survey.

This includes the location or disposition, as of last day of the period under review, of:

   a. Frontier security control posts.
   b. CIC detachments.
   c. AEF frontier guards.
   d. MG border control stations.
   e. Allied (e.g. Belgian, French) frontier control personnel.
   f. Allied (e.g. Belgian, French) frontier guards.
   (It will be sufficient to note changes where these are few.)
2. Authorized civilian travellers.
   a. Number entering GERMANY _____
   b. Number leaving GERMANY _____
3. Displaced persons.
   a. Estimated number of authorized displaced persons allowed to cross frontier.
      (1) Out of GERMANY _____
      (2) Into of GERMANY _____
   b. Estimated number of unauthorized displaced persons dealt with.
   c. General comments.
4. Prohibited Frontier Zone.
5. Relations with Allied frontier control authorities.
6. General comments.
   (including details of any unauthorized crossings of the frontier.)

PART IV — COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND PERSONNEL

A statement indicating the areas allotted to CI staffs and the resources of CI personnel available in each area.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX II

MACHINE RECORDING OF SHAEF PERSONALITY CARD INDEX FOR GERMANY

SECTION I. GENERAL.

1. All basic information contained in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY ("Black and White Lists") is being recorded at this headquarters on Machine Record Unit (MRU) cards.

2. The following information, or that part of it available on the original SHAEF card, is a basic minimum recorded by the MRU; therefore, it is readily possible to prepare by mechanical means a listing of all individuals having the same entry on any single item or any group of the items enumerated hereafter:

a. Name of subject, to include known aliases.
b. Towns in which subject might be located.
c. Sex of subject.
d. Wehrkreise of towns referred to in "b".
e. Classification of subject according to SHAEF categories.
f. Organization to which subject is attached.
g. Level or organization at which subject worked.
h. Rank or position held within the organization.
i. Year position was held according to last report.
j. Age of subject.
k. Nationality of subject.
l. Source of information.
m. Status of case.
n. Place of detention, if arrested.
o. Disposition of case.
p. Case number.

3. a. Special lists of personalities who are members of specific German intelligence or security services or affiliated agencies, as well as rosters of "Black or White List" individuals in designated communities or areas, will be furnished to authorized headquarters or agencies upon request to Chief, CI Branch, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

b. Inasmuch as this headquarters, serving as a Central Registry, will maintain complete records and supply all information requested by subordinate units, it is not considered necessary for other headquarters to duplicate this Machine Records system.

4. Details regarding the spacing assignment and the coding system utilized in the machine recording of the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY are contained in SECTIONS II and III below.

SECTION II. Spacing Assignment on the Machine Records Unit Cards.

SPACES	INFORMATION
1 — 20	Individual's name
21 — 34	Town
35	Sex of subject
36 — 37	Wehrkreis
38	Classification of subject
39 — 43	Organization or rank
44	Organizational level
45 — 46	Rank or position
47 — 48	Year position held at last report
49 — 50	Year of subject's birth
51 — 52	Nationality of subject
53 — 54	Source of information
55	Status of case
56 — 58	Place of detention
59 — 60	Disposition of case
61 — 65	Case number
66 — 67	Arresting agency
70 — 75	Arbitrary number assigned MRU card for accurate sorting
80	Duplicate cards

SECTION III. Code used on the Machine Records Unit Cards.

1 — 20 INDIVIDUAL'S NAME

Name spelled out, in order: last name
first name
middle initial
title

Each alias to be entered on a separate card in spaces 1 — 20, the normal space for names, and "C — (proper name under which filed)" entered in the space normally reserved for the name of the town, i.e., spaces 21 — 34 (C — being a one column homonyn for see). In this way each alias will have an alternate MRU card for cross reference purposes.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

21 — 34 TOWN

Town in which individual is most apt to be found (spelled out).

If individual has had an important post in one town and a residence in another, or if he has had any recent connection with more than one town which might suggest his continued presence in one of several towns, separate cards will be created.

35 SEX OF SUBJECT — one letter code

Male M. Female F.

36 — 37 WEHRKREIS

The Wehrkreise are indicated by arabic numerals substituted for the usual Roman numerals except for the three indicated by the following two letter code:

GG General Government
PR Protectorate
AU Ausland

38 CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT

The SHAEF classification of individuals is used where applicable. The exceptions are three noted below under "S", "U" and "W". The augmented SHAEF classification is as follows:

A — denotes a person known or strongly suspected to be an officer, employee or member (but not an agent) of the Abwehr, Sipo and SD or GFP.

B — denotes a person known or strongly suspected to be an agent employed by the Abwehr or the Sipo and SD.

C — denotes a person who is known or strongly suspected to be an agent, but whose activities cannot be definitely related to either of the above organizations.

D — denotes a person who is under suspicion of being an agent or member of a hostile intelligence service because he has been reported as such, but on evidence which is felt to be inconclusive.

F — denotes a person who is anti-Nazi and believed willing to aid the Allies.

M — denotes a person who is suspect for any one of a number of miscellaneous reasons which are not categorized elsewhere.

N — denotes a member of the NSDAP or of other National Socialist or paramilitary organizations other than the SS.

O — denotes an official of the general civil administration.

P — denotes a member of the police, excluding the Gestapo and the Kripo but including the Feldgendarmerie.

R — denotes a renegade, any individual who owes allegiance to a power other than GERMANY but pays homage to Nazidom.

S — denotes a member of the SS other than an SS member who is also a member of Sipo and SD or the police and is therefore classified in one of the other categories even if primarily SS. (The normal SHAEF classification is SS).

U — denotes an individual who is the leader or a member of an organization plotting resistance against any Allied occupying force in GERMANY or an individual who has announced his intention of forming or joining such a group. (This is not a SHAEF classification.)

W — denotes a War Criminal. (This is not a SHAEF classification).

39 — 43 ORGANIZATION OR RANK — 5 letter and numeral code

The code employed in spaces 39 — 43 is to be read in conjunction with the classification noted in space 38.

When space 38 shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D", if the individual is a member of the Abwehr, the branch, and if possible the level, of the office for which he worked will be shown by a code built up in the following manner.

ABT1A — denotes a member of Abteilung I A — personnel
AB1WI — denotes a member of Abteilung I Wirtschaft — economic information
ABT2S — denotes a member of Abteilung II S — sabotage
AB3KG — denotes a member of Abteilung III Kgf — prevention of espionage in PW camps
ABTZK — denotes a member of Abteilung Zentralkartei — central registry
ALS1H — denotes a member of Abt I H in an Abwehrleitstelle or A1st
AS1MT — denotes a member of Abt I MT in an Abwehrstelle or Ast
NES2S — denotes a member of Abt II S in a Nebenstelle or Nest
AU1TL — denotes a member of Abt I TL in an Aussenstelle or Aust
MEK3H — denotes a member of Abt III H in a Meldekopf or MK

If the individual is identified merely as associated with the Abwehr with no indication of branch, the code will be ABT. If only partial association is noted as "Member of Amt II", as much information as is noted is entered, in the example given, ABT2.

When space 38 shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D", if the individual is a member of the Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst, the code to be

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

used will be SIPO if no indication is given of Aemter or other subdivision. If an Amt of the RSHA or SD is indicated, the code used will be SD followed by the number of the Amt, e. g., SD6. However, if Amt IV of the RSHA or the SD is mentioned, the code will be GESTA, as it will be when the only mention is Gestapo. If the individual holds a rank in the SS, the code for SS ranks noted below will be used in preference to the more general SIPO or SD inasmuch as the type of activity has already been indicated in column 38.

If the individual is a member of the Geheimefeldpolizei, the code used will be GFP

If the individual is a member of the Nachrichten Dolmetscher Ersatz Abteilung the code used will be NDEA.

If the individual is a member of the SS Jagdverbaende or any subordinate group including the Streifkorps, Jaegerbattalion 502, a Feldjaegerkommando, Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, or the 150 Panzer Brigade, the code used will be JAGDV.

If the individual is a member of the Brandenburg Division, the code used will be BRAND.

If the individual is a member of the Kriminalpolizei, the code used will be KRIPO.

It will be noted, in recapitulation, that wherever possible standard abreviations as listed in the SHAEF CI HANDBOOK GERMANY are used in coding the Personality Card Index for MRU. Other than standard abreviations so listed, the following codes may be found in spaces 39-43, if space shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D":

ABT — the Abwehr, if followed by further identification, a specific branch of the Abwehr

AL or ALS followed by numeral and letter — an Alst of the Abwehr

NE or NES followed by numeral and letter — a Nest of the Abwehr

AU or AUS followed by numeral and letter — an Aust of the Abwehr

ME or MEK followed by numeral and letter — a Meldekopf of the Abwehr

BRAND — a member of the Brandenburg Division

JAGDV — a member of a Jagdverband

NDEA — a member of the Nachrichten Dolmetscher Ersatz Abteilung

When space 38 shows classifications "N", the standard abreviations as listed in the SHAEF CI HANDBOOK GERMANY for the National Socialist Party and its affiliated organizations furnish the code. Chief among these are the following.

NSDAP — Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei — National Socialist German Workers Party —the Nazi party

NSF — NS Frauenschaft — Nazi party women s organization

HJ — Hitler Jugend — Hitler Youth

BDM — Bund deutscher Maedels — League of German Girls

RAD — Reichsarbeitsdienst — Compulsory national labor service

NSÄB — NS-Aerztebund — National Socialist Physicians League

NSDSB — NS Deutscher Studentenbund — Nazi University Students League

SA — Sturmabteilung — Organization of the storm troopers

When space 38 shows classification "O", no indication of position will show in spaces 39-43 unless the title, i. e., MAYOR, can be spelled out or a reasonable abreviation, e. g., LDRAT for Landrat, can be used.

When space 38 shows classification "P", the customary short-name of the organization or the first five letters of such short-name will be found in spaces 39-43 as follows:

ORPO — Ordnungspolizei — the regular uniformed German police

SCHUP — Schutzpolizei — city police, branch of Orpo

GEND — Gendarmerie — rural police, branch of Orpo

FGEND — Feldgendarmerie — military police

SELBS — Selbstschutzpolizei — civilian auxiliary police

However, SS ranks where shown on the original card are entered in spaces 39-43, according to the code in the next paragraph, in preference to any of these police organizations.

When space 38 shows classification "S", spaces 39-43 will show the rank within the SS held by the subject as follows:

RCHFR — Reichsfuehrer	1
OBTGF — Oberstgruppenfuehrer	2
OBGRF — Obergruppenfuehrer	3
GRUPF — Gruppenfuehrer	4
BRIGF — Brigadefuehrer	5
OBERF — Oberfuehrer	6
STANF — Standartenfuehrer	7
OSTBF — Oberstumbannfuehrer	8
STUBF — Sturmbannfuehrer	9
HSTUF — Hauptsturmfuehrer	10
OSTUF — Obersturmfuehrer	11
USTUF — Untersturmfuehrer	12
STASF — Stabsscharfuehrer	13
STSCF — Sturmscharfuehrer	14
STOBJ — Standartenoberjunker	15

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

HSCHF — Hauptscharfuehrer 16
OSCHF — Obersturmführer 17
SCHAF — Scharfuehrer 19
USCHF — Unterscharfuehrer 21
ROTTF — Rottenfuehrer 24
STURM — Sturmmann 25
S-MAN — SS Mann 26

When space 38 shows classification "F", "M", "R", "U" or "W", customarily there will be no further identification in spaces 39-43. Exception will occur when the individual has an SS rank or NSDAP affiliation.

When, after arrest, a man is interned for no further reason than the fact he is considered a threat to the security of Allied military authorities, the code used will be SECTH.

44 ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL — one digit code.

Space 44 is only filled when space 38 shows the classification "N" or "O" to indicate at what level of the regional organization the subject individual is employed:

1 — Reich, Reichsministerium
2 — Gau, Land, Provinz, Regierungsbezirk
3 — Kreis, Landkreis
4 — Ort, City (Gemeinde)
5 — Zelle
6 — Block

45 — 46 RANK OR POSITION — two digit code

The rank within the organization which is held by the subject individual will be shown in spaces 45 — 46 by a number descending from the highest position to the lowest according to a two digit code. In police and paramilitary formations, this code is based on relative ranks so that all numbers are not represented within every formation. The numerical code for SS ranks, employed whenever a position for a member of the SS is used in spaces 39 — 43, is found after the ranks of the SS coded above.

If space 38 shows "N" and space 44 is filled, the following code is used to indicate the relative party position at any level:

1 — Leiter
2 — Hauptamtsleiter or Amtsleiter
3 — Hauptstellenleiter
4 — Stellenleiter

If space 38 shows "N" and spaces 39 — 43 show "HJ" or "BDM", the following code is employed in spaces 45 — 46:

1 — Reichsjugendfuehrer
2 — Stabsfuehrer der Reichsjugendfuehrung
3 — Obergebiets'uehrer
4 — Gebietsfuehrer, Gebietsfuehrerin
5 — Hauptbannfuehrer, Hauptmaedelfuehrerin
6 — Oberbannfuehrer
7 — Bannfuehrer, Bannmaedelfuehrerin
8 — Obersturmfuehrer
9 — Stammfuehrerin, Maedelringfuehrerin
10 — Hauptgefolgschaftsfuehrer
11 — Obergefolgschaftsfuehrer
12 — Gefolgschaftsfuehrer, Maedelgruppenfuehrerin
19 — Oberscharfuehrer
21 — Scharfuehrer, Maedelscharfuehrerin
22 — Oberkameradschaftsfuehrer
23 — Kameradschaftsfuehrer, Maedelschaftsfuehrerin
24 — Kottenfuehrer
26 — Hitlerjunge, BDM Maedel

If spaces 39 — 43 show "SA", "NSKK", or "NSFK", the following code is employed in spaces 45 — 46:

1 — Stabschef
3 — Obergruppenfuehrer
4 — Gruppenfuehrer
5 — Brigadefuehrer
6 — Oberfuehrer
7 — Standartenfuehrer
8 — Obersturmbannfuehrer, Oberstaffelfuehrer
9 — Sturmbannfuehrer, Staffelfuehrer
10 — Hauptsturmfuehrer
11 — Obersturmfuehrer
12 — Sturmfuehrer
14 — Haupttruppfuehrer
16 — Obertruppfuehrer
17 — Truppfuehrer
19 — Oberscharfuehrer

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

21 — Scharfuehrer
24 — Rottenfuehrer
25 — Obersturmmann
26 — Sturmmann

When spaces 39 — 43 show the classification "RAD", the following code will be employed in columns 45 — 46:

3 — Reichsarbeitsfuehrer
4 — Obergeneralarbeitsfuehrer
5 — Generalarbeitsfuehrer
7 — Oberstarbeitsfuehrer, Stabshauptfuehrerin
8 — Oberarbeitsfuehrer, Stabsoberfuehrerin
9 — Arbeitsfuehrer, Stabsfuehrerin
10 — Oberstfeldmeister, Maidenhauptfuehrerin
11 — Oberfeldmeister, Maidenoberführerin
12 — Feldmeister, Maidenfuehrerin
13 — Unterfeldmeister, Maidenunterfuehrerin
17 — Obertruppfuehrer, Jungfuehrerin
21 — Truppfuehrer, Kameradschaftsaelteste
23 — Obervormann
24 — Vormann
26 — Arbeitsmann, Arbeitsmaid

When space 38 shows "P" or when the subject individual is a member of the Abwehr so that he holds Wehrmacht rank the following code is used:

1 — Generalfeldmarschall
2 — General Oberst
3 — General der Infanterie, General der Polizei
4 — Generalleutnant
5 — Generalmajor
7 — Oberst
8 — Oberstleutnant
9 — Major
10 — Hauptmann
11 — Oberleutnant, Schupo Inspectour
12 — Leutnant, Polizei Obermeister or Meister

If space 38 shows "F", "M", "O", "R", S", "U" or "W", spaces 45 — 46 will customarily be left blank.

47 — 48 YEAR POSITION HELD AT LAST REPORT — two digit code

All dates used will be shown by the last two digits of the year omitting the century, e. g., 1939 becomes 39.

49 — 50 YEAR OF BIRTH — two digit code.

Age of subject will be shown by use of the last two digits of the year of birth. When approximate ages are given, the mean of the approximation will be used, e. g., "born 1907 — 1909" becomes "08", "aged 55 — 60" becomes "88".

51 — 52 NATIONALITY OF SUBJECT — two digit code

Nationality will be shown by the following two digit code:

1 — American
2 — Alsatian (French)
3 — Belgian
4 — British
5 — Canadian
6 — Danish
7 — French
8 — German
9 — Hungarian
10 — Italian
11 — Russian
12 — Scottish
13 — Spanish
14 — Swedish
15 — Bulgarian
16 — Chinese
17 — Irish
18 — Hebrew
19 — Swiss
20 — Austrian
21 — Polish
22 — Arab
23 — Jap
24 — Finn
25 — Dutch
26 — Czech
27 — Yugoslav
28 — Greek
29 — Egyptian
30 — Moroccan
31 — Alsatian (German)
32 — Turk
33 — Welsh
34 — Persian
35 — Portugese
36 — Armenian
37 — Australian
38 — Haitian
39 — Algerian
40 — Norwegian
41 — Asiatic
42 — Estonian
43 — Syrian
44 — Luxembourgeois
45 — Indian
46 — Breton (French)
47 — Lithuanian

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

53 — 54 SOURCE OF INFORMATION — two digit code.

The following two digit code will be used to indicate the office originating the card:

6 — MI 6
9 — MI 9
10 — Office of Strategic Services
11 — Political Warfare Executive
12 — 12th Army Group
14 — MI 14
15 — M (Miscellaneous)
16 — 6th Army Group
17 — D (Document)
18 — F (Field)
20 — Federal Bureau of Investigation
21 — 21 Army Group

55 STATUS OF CASE — one digit code.

The following single digit code will be used to indicate the status of the carded individual:

1 — Subject not yet apprehended.
2 — Case pending. Subject apprehended and awaiting final disposition.
3 — Case closed. Final disposition of the individual made.

56 — 58 PLACE OF DETENTION — three digit code.

It is envisaged that all detention and internment camps will be numbered; the number of the camp in which the subject may be found will be entered in spaces 56 — 58.

59 — 60 DISPOSITION OF CASE — two digit code.

As pending cases ("2" in space 55) are closed, "3" will be entered in space 55 and the disposition will be shown in spaces 59 — 60 according to the following code:

1 — Evacuated as a prisoner of war.
31 — Transferred to French authorities.
32 — Transferred to Belgian authorities.
33 — Transferred to Luxembourg authorities.
34 — Transferred to Dutch authorities.
49 — Interned by military authorities.
50 — Released by military authorities without trial.
60 — Tried, acquitted, and released by military authorities.
61 — Tried, acquitted, and released by French authorities.
62 — Tried, acquitted, and released by Belgian authorities.
63 — Tried, acquitted, and released by Luxembourg authorities.
64 — Tried, acquitted, and released by Dutch authorities.

70 — Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by military authorities.
71 — Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by French authorities.
72 — Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Belgian authorities.
73 — Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Luxembourg authorities.
74 — Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Dutch authorities.
79 — Died during imprisonment.
89 — Reliably reported dead before capture.
91 — Tried, convicted, and executed by French authorities.
92 — Tried, convicted, and executed by Belgian authorities.
93 — Tried, convicted, and executed by Luxembourg authorities.
94 — Tried, convicted, and executed by Dutch authorities.
99 — Tried, convicted, and executed by military authorities.

61 — 65 CASE NUMBERS

It is envisaged that each card, as its subject changes from status "1" to status "2" on being apprehended, will become the primary document in a dossier. This dossier will be assigned a number which will be the number of the case. This number will at that time be entered on the MRU card.

66 — 67 ARRESTING AGENCY — two digit code.

The following code has been established to indicate the agency which arrests the subject individual.

1 — First Army
3 — Third Army
7 — Seventh Army
9 — Ninth Army
11 — First French Army
12 — 12th Army Group
15 — Fifteenth Army
16 — 6th Army Group
21 — 21 Army Group
22 — Communications Zone
25 — 15th Army Group
29 — Russian Armies
31 — French authorities
32 — Belgian authorities
33 — Luxembourg authorities
34 — Dutch authorities

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

70 — 76 MRU CARD NUMBER

To facilitate the handling of MRU cards, each personality card has been assigned an arbitrary number which is likewise carried by its MRU counterpart. This is a filing aid and has no significance for any office except the MRU office.

80 — DUPLICATE CARDS

Whenever a duplicate MRU card is created for a single personality, because an individual has an alias or is associated with more than one town, the existence of the second card is noted by an asterisk in column 80.

CHAPTER VIII

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

70. GENERAL. Pursuant to the instructions contained herein, personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be administered and operated under the direction of the G-2 (Chief, CIB) of the command to which they are attached, and in accordance with the provisions of letter, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, file AG 322 OpGB, dated 2 December 1944, subject "Counter Intelligence Corps", which quotes the War Department letter, file AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) B-S-B-M, dated 13 November 1944, same subject.

71. STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS.

a. *Procurement.* Procurement will be effected in accordance with letter, this headquarters, file 200.3 (G-2), dated 9 December 1944, subject "Enlisted Personnel for CIC Detachments".

b. *Training.* Detachment Commanders are responsible that personnel of their detachments maintain high standards of operational and administrative efficiency.

c. *Uniform.*

(1) Enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps will wear the uniform prescribed for enlisted men of the US Army with or without sleeve insignia of rank, excepting as follows:

(a) Enlisted personnel may wear the enlisted uniform without insignia of rank and with metal "US" insignia on both sides of the shirt collar when actually engaged in interrogation duties at interrogation centers, internment camps, detention facilities and similar installations.

(2) CIC credentials and badges will be carried and CIC armbands will be worn as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agents or the successful accomplishment of their mission.

d. *Vehicles.* Vehicles used by CIC personnel will bear no markings identifying them as CIC vehicles. Appropriate steps will be taken to eliminate CIC identification and substitute therefor markings which will conceal the true

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

assignment of the vehicles. This action will be coordinated with appropriate authorities of the unit to which the detachment is attached.

e. *Operations.*

(1) *Operational Functions.*

(a) The operational functions of personnel of the CIC and that personnel which operates under the supervision of CIC personnel are as follows:

1. To arrest any person who constitutes a threat to the security of the Allied armed forces, including leaders of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations, as directed. (See Chapters V and VI).
2. To investigate cases of espionage, sabotage and subversion.
3. To search buildings, billets and installations which are known to, or may, contain documents of CI value. The appropriate G-2 or S-2 will be notified at once if documents or articles of intelligence value are found during the search of such premises.

   To search for documents which the Germans consider important as a basis for creating a new military machine or for the continuation of the Nazi Party.
5. To contact the civil authorities initially with MG, if practicable.
6. To establish informant systems among local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause in order to procure all possible information of CI interest, particularly that information relating to undergrund Nazi or anti-Allied activity.
7. To locate and seize enemy sabotage equipment. It will be placed under guard until instructions for disposition thereof have been received from the G-2 of the appropriate Army/Military District, to whom a report will be made describing such equipment in detail.
8. To coordinate with MG in the discovery and collection of any hidden armament, radio transmitters or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with MG proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices or orders.
9. To cooperate with MG and PM regarding security requirements involved in marshalling refugees and the screening of refugees for individuals of security interest.

19. To coordinate with MG the establishment of check points for travel security control and to recommend to MG approval or disapproval of requests of applicants for travel permits.
11. To conduct security surveys and make continual security checks for protection against sabotage of military, public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the Allied armed forces.
12. To coordinate with AAA to secure information indicating the dropping of parachute agents.
13. To check, in coordination with MG, the observance by the civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices and orders issued by MG and to make recommendations to MG for added measures or for improvement in the enforcement thereof.
14. To recommend to MG the removal of unreliable officials. Civil officials will be arrested by CIC without consulting MG only when immediate apprehension is necessary for security reasons.
15. To investigate civilians employed by the Army in capacities which might endanger classified information or equipment.
16. To report all trends of civil dissension to the appropriate G-2 (CIB).

(2) *Security of CIC Personnel, Credentials and Records.*

(a) Before complete subjugation of conquered German territory, CIC Detachments may billet in towns with MG und MP units or bivouac with the CP of the unit to which it is attached. Detachments will not detach small numbers of agents to islolated towns, but will work in these towns during daylight, returning to a secure bivouac at night. CIC armbands will not be worn in GERMANY except when such identification is absolutely necessary, ,the occasion warrants the risk and their wearing is directed by the Detachment Commander. Detachment Commanders may consider it inadvisable to establish a publicly known CIC office until such time as the most dangerous Nazi elements have been arrested and security control measures have been effectively established in the area. They should be guided in these decisions by con-

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

sideration of the prevailing counterintelligence situation to the end that members of their commands will not be unduly imperiled and the success of their missions impaired by early publicity of their counterintelligence status.

(b) CIC personnel undertaking missions in forward combat areas will deposit their credentials and badges in their Detachment safe or with the G-2 of their unit and will not carry on their persons any documents or article susceptible of identifying them to the enemy as intelligence personnel in the event of capture. Intelligence material obtained or notes made in the performance of their missions will be destroyed if it appears that capture by the enemy is imminent.

(3) *Discovery and Apprehension of Known or Suspect Enemy Agents and Persons Engaging in Subversive Activities.*

(a) Persons of this category may come to the attention of CIC in one or more of the following ways:

1. Information furnished by C1 staff of this and other headquarters. (See par 8, Chapter I).
2. Identification as enemy agents through interrogation of captured agents.
3. Detection in the act of espionage, sabotage or subversion.
4. Voluntary surrender.
5. Capture of documents or materials disclosing sabotage, espionage or subversive activities.
6. Security screening operations at ports, frontier crossings MG security check points and other security controls. (See Chapter III).
7. Denunciations
8. Security raids.
9. Violations of security control ordinances. (See Chapter VI).

(b) Known or suspect enemy agents will be taken into custody and escorted by CIC at such times and under such conditions that the fact of their capture will, whenever possible, be concealed from the public and the local police. (See Chapter VI).

(c) Arrestees will be processed according to the instructions set forth in Chapter VI.

(d) The CIC of each division will insure that all line crossers apprehended by combat troops are delivered by them with the least practicable delay to MP or CIC custody. A short, signed statement of related facts will be obtained from the apprehending troops and will accompany the prisoners.

(4) *Civilian Informants.*

(a) There are two categories of civilian informants: covert denouncers and covert informers.

1. The minimum record of denunciations will consist of name and address of the denouncer and the denounced, a short synopsis of the information given, and the interrogator's evaluation of the source of the information. These denunciations will be dealt with methodically, culling out rumors and hearsay information and pursuing specific leads.
2. A system of informants will be developed by CIC within the civilian population. These informants can be paid from confidential funds either for spot information or on a salary basis. A CONFIDENTIAL file will be maintained by CIC in each office giving the name, address and description of each informant. Entries will be made on the records of these informants referring to information in the files they have furnished.
3. To avoid compromise, the utmost caution and discretion must be exercised in obtaining, directing, and communicating with covert informants. Meeting should never occur at a place known to be a CIC, police or security establishment, the home of the informant or at a time when other informants are present. At the discretion of the CIC Detachment Commander and by arrangement with the officers, concerned, meetings may be arranged at buildings occupied by MG or at other establishments where the presence of civilians is considered usual and normal and will not in itself create suspicion. Personnel engaged in directing and communicating with informants may wear civilian clothing or uniform as determined by the Detachment Commander, the latter being responsible for the instructions of all members of his command in the rules

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

of conduct toward informants in order to protect their identities and activities.

(b) Reliable members of anti-Nazi groups may be of great information assistance to CIC Detachments. However, many persons, by reason of self-interest, are expected to pretend membership and participation in such groups. Verification of these representations must be made by referring names to known leaders or members of these organizations and by examination of lists of anti-Nazi persons furnished by this and other headquarters.

(5) *Files and Indices.*

(a) Files.

1. When sufficiently numerous, files will be separated into the following classifications:
   a. Individual suspects.
   b. Suspect organizations.
   c. Names of informants.
   d. Records of denunciations.
   e. Security controls.
   f. Passes and permits.
   g. Copies of completed Arrest Reports.

(b) Card Index.

1. Particulars of all suspects, suspect organizations, informants and addresses, will be carded on half sheets of 8 × 10½ paper.
2. Cards relating to individual suspects will record:
   a. Full name (with any aliases), address, occupation and description.
   b. Any details of the case and of action taken which will assist in identification.
   c. Reference to files on the case.
   d. Cross-reference to names of any associated individuals.
3. Cards dealing with organizations, suspect establishments (cafés etc) will record:
   a. Names and address (adresses).
   b. Brief case history.
   c. Reference to any files dealing with it.

   d. Cross reference to individuals connected with it, if not [illegible]
   e. Action taken.
4. Cards relating to informants will record:
   a. Full name (with any aliases), address, occupation and description.
   c. Unless already noted in files:
      (I) How first contacted.
      (II) Estimated reliability.
      (III) Cross reference to any suspects or cases reported by the informant.

(c) Because of the transitory nature of the occupation of the smaller towns by any specific CIC personnel during the advance, the foregoing records must be turned over completely to the CIC personnel relieving the withdrawing Detachment, or, if continued CIC coverage of the town is not planned, the records will be turned over to the CIC in the nearest city permanently occupied by CIC personnel.

(6) *Captured Records and Archives.* Captured record and archives will by disposed of according to the instructions contained in paragraph 9, d, Chapter I.

(7) *Liaison.*

(a) Liaison between CI personnel and all Allied CI services is the responsibility of CI staffs. However, members of the CIC will work in closest cooperation with:

1. MG
2. MP and PM personnel
3. SCI personnel.
4. SCI Radio DF personnel
5. Document teams
6. Civil Censorship personnel
7. IPW teams
8. MII teams
9. P & PW personnel
10. Signal security services
12. Naval, Air Force, and Com Z personnel

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(7) *Before undertaking* an investigation in any area, representatives of CI agencies will clear with the CIC team responsible for the area.

(8) *Scope of Employment of CIC Personnel.* CIC personnel will be employed only on tasks involving counterintelligence interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine PW interrogations, black market investigations, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with their performance of counter-intelligence duties. CIC personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of a comparable nature.

72. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.

a. *Requirements.*

(1) An extensive and flexible CIC organization is required in order to assist in the accomplishment of the CI mission in GERMANY. The strength of the CIC of the 12th Army Group is not presently sufficient to accomplish fully their assigned missions and for that reason, action is now being taken to supplement the present personnel with additional CIC officers and agents from other commands, and to effect a partial reorganization of the 12th Army Group Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. *Reorganization.* The reorganization will be effected as follows:

(1) A single CIC detachment is being activated consisting of 323 officers and 110 enlisted men and organized in appropriate teams in accordance with T/O & E 30-500. Personnel will be made available for this organization by the simultaneous inactivation of the following detachments and portions of detachments.

Communications Zone Detachments . .	611
SHAEF Detachment	14
Hq, 12th Army Group Detachment . .	245
56 teams, type B-2, from Divisions . .	560
TOTAL	1,430

(2) The bulk of the detachment (hereinafter called "Occupation" Detachment") will consist of 83 teams type B-3, composed of 3 officers and 11 enlisted men. The balance of the detachment will consist of various headquarters teams.

(3) Appropriate type teams will be placed on detached service with Army Group/US Zone headquarters, Army/Military District headquarters, headquarters of the Port Enclave, and to the BERLIN Military District Headquarters in BERLIN. Initially, teams will also be placed on detached service, with SHAEF 6th Army Group and Com Z. Armies/Military Districts will make such distribution of teams to subordinate headquarters as circumstances require.

(4) This reorganization brings about no change in existing detachments attached to headquarters of Armies or Corps but reduces the Division detachments to one team type A-1 and one team type B-1, totalling 2 officers and 5 enlisted men. Detachments remaining with tactical units will accompany them in the event units leave this theater of operations. *However, all officer and enlisted CIC personnel who possess particular qualifications of value to CI operations in this theater will be transferred into the Occupation Detachment.* The primary mission of Corps and division detachments in the post-hostilities period will be that of insuring the internal security of headquarters, personnel and material. However, they can be assigned additional CIC missions by Armies/Military Districts in the vicinity of the headquarters to which they are attached if there is no conflict with their internal security mission and if they can be assembled without delay in the event of a movement of the headquarters to which they are attached. As warranted by future developments detachments attached to tactical units may be relieved from such attachment and attached to the Occupation Detachment; if so, they would be re-attached to the tactical unit when transfer of the unit from this Theater of operations appears imminent. Units from which CIC detachments are thus withdrawn will be afforded necesary CI coverage by the CIC personnel responsible for the area in which the unit is located.

c. *Implementation.*

(1) Upon activation of the Occupation Detachments, Headquarters ETOUSA, will publish orders transferring personnel from the inactivated detachments and portions of detachments into the Occupation Detachment. Such personnel, in the case of Division detachment, will consist of those officers and men who are best

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

suited for work within GERMANY, especially those who speak European languages. Division detachment personnel affected by such orders will be placed on detached service with the several Armies/Military Districts, which may effect further distribution of personnel to subordinate headquarters.

(2) 12th Army Group CIC Reserve Teams transferred into the Occupation Detachment will be placed on detached service with Armies/Military Districts, Port Enclave Headquarters and BERLIN Military District, Com Z CIC personnel transferred into the Occupation Detachment will be withdrawn from the Communications Zone as rapidly as the situation permits and likewise placed on detached service with the aforementioned headquarters.

(3) Immediately upon transfer of the personnel from Division detachments to the Occupation Detachment, an appropriate division of organizational and investigative property will be made between the Division detachment and the transferred personnel. The highest ranking officer on the team will be designated Team Commander and will assume responsibility for such property. Each team will receive a number designation from the Commanding Officer of the Occupation Detachment for use thereafter in identifying the team.

d. *Administration.* The following administrative instructions pertaining to CIC personnel in the 12th Army Group will become effective immediately:

(1) Correspondence dealing with Occupation Detachment administrative matters will be forwarded through CIC channels in the 12th Army Group, except when instructed otherwise by Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(2) Subject to operational needs, every effort will be made to keep Occupation Detachment teams intact.

(3) Orders transferring Occupation Detachment personnel between Armies/Military Districts will be issued only by this headquarters.

(4) Personnel will not be shifted among teams of the Occupation Detachment except by authority of the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(5) Promotions of officers and enlisted men of the Occupation Detachment wil be accomplished only at this headquarters. Officers will be promoted upon the recommendation of the G-2 of the

headquarters to which they are attached for duty. Enlisted personnel will be promoted when recommended by the team commander and approved by the CIC Detachment Commander of the Army/Military District to which they are attached.

(6) Copies of all orders affecting personnel of the Occupation Detachment will be furnished the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(7) WD AGO Forms 66-1 of all officers of the Occupation Detachment will be maintained at the office of the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(8) Service records and allied papers of Occupation Detachment enlisted personnel will be maintained by the detachment to which the personnel is attached for duty unless instructed otherwise by the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(9) Personnel matters requiring entry on the Morning Report of the organization to which the Occupation Detachment personnel is assigned, particularly hospitalization cases, will be reported to Commanding Officer,, Occupation Detachment.

(10) Occupation Detachment Team Commanders will maintain appropriate property records of organizational and investigative property.

(11) Organizational equipment listed in T/O & 50-500 and investigative equipment listed in the Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps will be requisitioned by Occupation Detachment Team Commanders from the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

e. *Organization of CIC Personnel, 12th Army Group.*

(1) The planned distribution of Occupation Detachment personnel in the 12th Army Group/US Zone is as follows:

(a) 12th Army Group US Zone Headquarters: 15 officers and 36 enlisted men.

(b) Port Enclave: 9 officers and 33 enlisted men.

(c) BERLIN District Headquarters at BERLIN: 7 officers and 22 enlisted men

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) A number of teams will be placed on detached service with each Army/Military District Headquarters to perform the CIC mission in the Army Zone or Military District. It will be the responsibility of Armies/Military Districts to allot this personnel to the Military Sub-districts, installations and areas where they will be most effective. Armies/Military Districts will request additional teams from G-2 (Chief, CIB), this headquarters.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER IX

SPECIAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (SCI) DETACHMENT

76. GENERAL.

a. The SCI Detachment, 12th Army Group, furnishes a channel for special information pertaining to the German intelligence services (GLS), which is available in LONDON but which is not suitable for transmission through ordinary intelligence channels, and advises and assists in the use of this information.

b. Pursuant to these instructions, SCI personnel operate under the direction of the G-2 (Chief, CIB) of the command to which they are attached.

77. ADMINISTRATION. The SCI Detachment operates as part of the CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters, but is administered by Hq, Special Troops, 12th Army Group.

78. ORGANIZATION.

a. The SCI Detachment maintains its principal offices in proximity to the office of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

b. The SCI Detachment will provide liaison officers to the headquarters of Armies and "T" Force of 12th Army Group and to Hq, 21 Army Group, so as to ensure proper coordination of SCI activities between these headquarters. The SCI Detachment will also be responsible for proper coordination of SCI activities with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and with the British-US CI War Room in LONDON. In order to carry out this duty, the SCI Detachment is provided with its own radio communication facilities which maintain direct contact with the SCI liaison officers at Armies, "T" Force, 21 Army Group and with OSS in PARIS and LONDON.

c. Whenever elements of the SCI Detachment operate with an army, their operational control is vested in the Army Commander concerned (Chief CIB, G-2 Section). Copies of reports rendered by those SCI elements will be furnished to the Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, this headquarters.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

79. FUNCTIONS. Normally, SCI personnel will function in a staff capacity as advisers without executive responsibilities. However, they will also be used to assist in exploiting CI targets such as GIS headquarters, personnel, and documents, which require detailed knowledge of the enemy intelligence services. They will not be employed on other than CI duties nor will they be employed in areas where there is danger of capture. Their principal duties are to:

a. Provide a direct channel, using their own communication facilities, for the special information pertaining to the GIS which is available in LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON.

b. Advise and assist with reference to the use of the aforementioned information.

c. Aid in compiling, preparing and disseminating, in required form, all available information concerning the GIS.

d. Advise in the selection and method of handling countersabotage targets and assist, as required, in the exploitation of such targets.

e. Assist in the interrogation of captured GIS agents, officials or employees and in the examination of captured enemy material of CI interest.

f. Evaluate and check reports of possible clandestine radio transmitters so that the location thereof may be pinpointed through monitoring and through the use of mobile radio D/F (Direction-Finding) units.

g. Coordinate and supervise the special CI activities of any Allied Special CI services operating in 12th Army Group zone of operations and report thereon to the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

h. Transmit to LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON information on the GIS collected in the field, including captured documents and other material of purely CI interest, as approved by the G-2 of this headquarters.

i. Check the CI records of LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON for background information on captured GIS agents, officials or suspects.

80. OPERATIONS.

a. *Detection of Clandestine Radio Transmitters.*

(1) In order to make most effective use of the mobile radio D/F (Direction-Finding) units available to this headquarters for determining the location of clandestine radio transmitters, SCI will be furnished, through G-2 channels, the fullest information possible on radio signals which indicate the existence of such illicit transmitters. This information will include, as far as possible, the following data:

(a) Time and date of transmissions.
(b) Frequency of signal.
(c) Call signs.
(d) Sample of preamble and procedure.
(e) Sample of traffic.
(f) Whether telegraphy or telephony.
(g) Type of receiver on which signal heard.

The SCI Detachment will forward such information to Central Control, which monitors and analyzes the traffic. If Central Control determines that the signal is clandestine, it provides necessary operational data for the mobile radio D/F ing units. The SCI Detachment will coordinate with the Signal Intelligence Service of this headquarters the dispatch of such units to the indicated area.

b. *Reports.* The SCI Detachment will furnish to Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters, weekly operations reports and special reports, when necessary, regarding the progress of radio double agents and of penetration agents.

81. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION OF GERMANY.

In addition to continuance of its functions and operations, as stated in pars. 79 and 80 above, the SCI Detachment, during and following the occupation of GERMANY will:

a. Provide a channel for the flow of information from Hq. 21 Army Group, Allied Force Headquarters, LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON and neutral countries regarding GIS agents and officials to be encountered in 12th Army Group area in GERMANY.

b. Supply LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON with information on GIS officials and agents who have fled from GERMANY so that they can be tracked down.

c. Provide specialized officer and enlisted personnel for attachment to the CI Branch, G-2 Section of this headquarters and to the CI Branch, G-2 Section, of each Army/Military District headquarters; also liaison officers with the Zone Headquarters of Allied nations in GERMANY, with the US Group Control Council in BERLIN and with Allied Force Headquarters.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

d. Furnish each such Army/Military District SCI office and SCI liaison officer with radio equipment for communications direct to the 12th Army Group SCI Detachment.

e. Take over at the proper time and replacate, as necessary, the SCI personnel of 6th Army Group which is to be absorbed at a specified future date into the SCI Detachment, 12th Army Group.

CHAPTER X

ALLIED CI LIAISON PERSONNEL

85. GENERAL. Liaison personnel of the French, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Luxembourg Security Services will be attached to the G-2 Sections of this headquarters and the headquarters of the Armies, Military Districts.

86. FUNCTIONS. The functions of the Allied CI liaison personnel are as follows:

a. To provide liaison with the security service of the nation they represent.

b. To cooperate with US CI personnel in conducting necessary investigations pertaining to operations of the German intelligence services and of individual German intelligence agents which were conducted in their respective countries or territories.

c. To aid in the security check of (see paragraph 22, Chapter III) and to exploit as sources of CI information, prisoners of war and displaced persons of their respective nationalities. The detailed security control of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons will be effected at Reception Centers in their own countries.

d. To recruit and run agents for penetration purposes, under the direction of the appropriate G-2.

87. OPERATIONS.

a. Besides acting as a channel for information collected by their respective national security services, Allied CI liaison personnel will advise and assist US CI staffs in the exploitation of such information.

b. The following limitations will govern the activities of Allied CI liaison personnel in GERMANY.

(1) Such personnel will not engage in CI activities within GERMANY without the prior approval of the appropriate G-2 in each specific case.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(2) In every case, such personnel will transmit a complete report [illegible] operations conducted by them in GERMANY to the appropriate G-2.

c. Allied CI liaison personnel will be notified of the arrest of all members of the German intelligence services who have operated in their respective countries or territories. Every facility will be given to Allied CI liaison whose activities are or have been of interest to their respective nations.

CHAPTER XI

INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY

90. CI FUNCTIONS. The principal CI functions of the Intelligence Laboratory at this headquarters are as follows:

a. Detection and development of secret writing and photography, including microphotographs.

b. Examination of suspect property, including cosmetics, soap, toothpaste, polishes, etc, for concealed microphotographs, secret writing materials, or materials for sabotage.

c. Detection of alterations and erasures in documents, and recovery of the original wording where possible.

d. Comparison of handwriting or typescript for detection of forgery, identification of handwriting, etc. The originals should be submitted if possible, otherwise a good full-size photograph may suffice.

e. Recovery of deletions in letters, obliterated official stamps, charred documents, and deciphering of indentations on papers or documents.

f. Secret opening of letters, packages, and parcels, detection of illicit opening and secret sealing to prevent illicit opening or to insure detection of illicit opening.

g. Secret marking for subsequent identification of documents, coins paper money, stamps, etc.

h. Ordinary and special photography of objects and documents as required for investigation and record in the foregoing types of work. (See paragraph 91 below).

i. Technical assistance in interrogation of suspects with reference to secret means of communication.

91. MASS TESTING. The Intelligence Laboratory is not designed for mass-testing of correspondence or for mass-photography of any kind and will not be called upon for such work.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

92. REQUIRED INFORMATION. CI questions submitted to the Intelligence Laboratory for technical opinion and CI documents or articles sent thereto for examination will be accompanied by the fullest possible information as to the general nature and significance of the case.

93. CHAIN OF EVIDENCE. Attention is directed to the strict necessity for maintaining the chain of evidence where CI material of any nature, submitted for analysis or examination by the Intelligence Laboratory, may be required at a later date for submission or evidence in legal proceedings.

CHAPTER XII

CENSORSHIP

97. GENERAL. The establishment of policy pertaining to and the supervision of the censorship control of civilian postal and electrical communications and communications carried by civilian travellers in GERMANY, will be conducted by the G-2 (Censorship Branch) of this headquarters.

98. COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL.

a. Public Law No. 76 (amended), promulgated by MG, suspends civilian use of all communications channels in areas of GERMANY occupied by our forces.

b. The re-opening of suspended communications for civilian use whether intra-city, inter-city, or passing across Army Group boundaries is a command function, and any authorization for the re-opening of communications will be in accordance with directives issued by Army Group/Zone Headquarters.

99. CENSORSHIP OPERATIONS.

a. While hostilities continue, censorship control will be exercised by Advance Censor Sections attached to Army headquarters (G-2 Section). These sections will, primarily, ascertain that unauthorized facilities are suspended and apply spot-check examination and monitoring to authorized communications. As a result of such spot-check examinations and monitoring, information considered detrimental to the Allied cause, as well as material of operational value, will be made available immediately to the appropriate intelligence agencies.

b. Upon cessation of hostilities, censorship control of the US Zone of Occupation will be maintained by the establishment of Censorship District Stations. Field Stations for travel censorship and electrical communications control will be established as required.

100. ASSISTANCE TO CI.

a. The accomplishment of the CI mission will be assisted by civil censorship through the surveillance which can be afforded to communications

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

to and from suspect persons or groups. Within operational limitations, watch will be maintained and information furnished upon request by authorized CI agencies.

b. In addition, civil censorship will afford CI and other agencies access to information which will assist in:

(1) The destruction of the NSDAP and its affiliates.
(2) The detection of underground military, para-military, secret police, intelligence and political bodies.
(3) Uncovering possible subversive activities and anti-Allied agitation by groups or leaders within or out of occupied areas.
(4) The apprehension of collaborators and War Criminals.
(5) The prevention of acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.
(6) The detection of individuals using secret inks, codes, ciphers, "cloaks" and intermediaries with subversive intent.
(7) The disclosure of hidden arms, munitions, war equipment and material and unlawful trafficing therein.
(8) The maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of the terms of surrender.
(9) The apprehension and prosecution of individuals or groups of individuals evading or violating MG laws, ordinances and proclamations.
(10) The apprehension of persons concealing their identity or impersonating others.
(11) The recovery of permits and personnel documents unlawfully in use or possession.
(12) The investigation of irregularity of and trafficing with documents, passports, travel permits and visas.
(13) Stopping unauthorized travel or the evasion of frontier security control measures.
(14) The protection of intelligence items and the revelation of means by which unauthorized individuals procured such knowledge.
(15) Following important political and economic trends.

ANNEX C — PART II

SECURITY CONTROL IN GERMANY

A. *Civil Security*

Following the completion of "Operation GREIF" and the subsequent advance of American troops into Germany on a broad front, several factors having an important bearing on the civil security situation developed. The fact that our troops were now operating on enemy soil was significant in that it precluded the necessity for tact or restraint in the application of security measures. The wide publicity given to the enemy's use of English-speaking personnel in American uniform, coupled with the numerous reports of parachutists in disguise, had made the average soldier security-conscious to an unprecedented degree. Awareness of his presence on German soil served only to increase his security-consciousness, with the result that persons behaving suspiciously were promptly apprehended. While these factors unquestionably facilitated the application of civil security measures, it must be remembered that CI personnel could no longer rely upon indigenous security personnel for assistance, nor could enthusiastic cooperation be expected from the civilian population.

While GIS capabilities remained substantially unchanged after "Operation GREIF", there were nevertheless significant changes in GIS organization and planning — changes which herald the ultimate dissolution of the GIS itself. Organizational regrouping, such as the absorption by the SS Jagdverbaende of the best men in Lehr regiment Kurfuerst, took place and there was evidence of the use of HJ and BDM members for unorganized subversive activities. The intended employment of HJ personnel for sabotage, line-crossing, and wire-cutting was indicated at this time. Two actual cases of sabotage by HJ members were investigated in January 1945, and it appeared that the GIS intended to use the HJ as a communications channel for espionage activities. The large number of Luxembourgers in the Trier area and the newly-formed French and Belgian SS units constituted pools from which line-crossers might be recruited by the GIS.

Following the December offensive, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of line-crossing agents employed by the GIS and innovations, such as the use of captured B-17s for the transport of saboteurs, were noted. As a further indication that old methods were being discarded, only one known stay-behind agent was detected in the Ardennes sector during the month of January 1945, and no reports of German soldiers in American uniforms were received.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

In January 1945, offensive CI operations were undertaken to hasten the destruktion of the GIS. An extensive program for the penetration of agents into the GIS was inaugurated and air strikes on GIS training centers were made. Both of these offensive measures met with considerable success. The impending defeat of the GIS was heralded by the final dissolution of the 150 Pz Brigade and by the complete failure of a parachute operation by Abwehr Kommando 120 in February 1945. Owing to faulty navigation, eight of the nine parachutist agents involved in the latter operation were quickly apprehended. In March, many stay-behind agents were overrun and members of Frontaufklaerungstruppen were apprehended as deserters. It was learned that the GIS plan to use Gestapo members of V-maenner as stay behind agents had been discarded in favor of a plan to use foreigners for such assignments. A last-minute effort was made by the GIS to organize underground Werewolf activities, and the issuance of false papers to GIS personnel and Nazi leaders was general. However, the speed and extent of the Allied advance during the final weeks of the struggle paralyzed the GIS and their plans for large-scale, organized resistance proved ineffective. Likewise, the Werewolf movement failed to materialize as anticipated.

As indicated above, the problem of applying security measures was simpler in Germany than in liberated territories. In many areas MG undertook the task of registering all civilians. In Aachen, for example, all civilians were screened by CIC and MG and were required to have a US stamp on their identity cards. On 9 December 1944, a planned security check of the town of Monschau, Germany, was made and the lessons learned at this time were applied in subsequent checks of German towns. The imposition of rigid security controls in the forward areas led to the apprehension in March, of 5 FAT agents who were posing as displaced persons.

With the advance of Allied troops into Germany, further relaxation of security controls in liberated countries was authorized. Restrictions on the return of refugees to liberated areas were eased, and the civilian communications which had been suspended during the December breakthrough in Belgium were restored. Extension of the non-illustrated postcard service in the Netherlands was authorized, while the revalidation of Belgian identity cards in re-liberated areas was undertaken by the Belgian authorities.

Although CI personnel expected little or no help from indigenous organizations in Germany in the performance of CI duties, the attitude of local authorities and police remained generally cooperative. Furthermore, the existence of organized anti-Fascist committees was discovered in several large German

towns. These committees often had a Communist flavor and were dissolved because of the MG ban on political activities. However, individual members continued as valuable informants for CI personnel. Other anti-Nazi organizations, such as the Sozialistische Freiheitspartei and the Kartell Deutscher Friedensfreunde, came to the attention of CI personnel. While these organizations professed a belief in democratic principles, it is more likely that their primary objective was to obtain an honorable peace for Germany. Many members of these organizations were formerly members of the Social Democratic, Zentrum, or Communist Parties.

B. *Internal Security*

A directive on the security of 12th Army Group Headquarters in Germany was prepared and issued by this branch and is indicative of the tightening of CP security measures which took place in Germany. A First US Army memorandum on "Security Training" pointed out that the maintenance of a high standard of military security is a responsibility of unit commanders, while Third US Army issued a directive prohibiting the circulation of rumors.

In general, a high standard of internal security was maintained throughout the army group zone. A First US Army report indicated that subversive activities behind our lines might not be limited to espionage and sabotage, but might be extended to booby-trapping and assassination missions. The existence of a German PW escape organization in the Liege-Huy area was established, and the presence of enemy groups in the rear areas of the Ninth US Army sector caused a tightening of security measures at CPs and on MSRs. Towards the end of hostilities the security of telephonic communications became a serious problem when numerous wire-cutting incidents in all army sectors were reported. An emergency civilian communications center was discovered in Mainz and was immediately disrupted or placed under control. In April, Third US Army reported three cases in which sabotage was indicated, and the location of sabotage dumps was revealed through interrogation. In order to prevent sabotage to military installations, demonstrations were given by ETOUSA counter-sabotage units to combat troops. It is interesting to note that PW reports indicated that Allied news broadcasts and newspapers were regarded by the GIS as a good source of information, especially in the last weeks of the war when normal communications were crippled.

C. *Port, Frontier and Travel Control*

The need for indigenous border guards to take over frontier control from US Army personnel as the front lines moved east became apparent in October 1944.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

By the end of January 1945, Belgian soldiers were assisting CI personnel in manning the CI control line in the XIX Corps area and 460 armed Dutch Douane (customs) guards manned the border in the XIII and XVI Corps sectors. With the establishment of the 12th Army Group frontier security control system, the German border was divided into seven sectors, each allocated to a CIC frontier security control team. Each team in turn operated 3-4 frontier security control posts. With the assistance of French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg authorities, the total manpower necessary to guard and patrol the German frontier was gradually obtained. In May 1945, XXII and XXIII US Corps assumed responsibility for control of that portion of the German frontier which fell within the 12th Army Group zone of operations. Each corps established a Corps Frontier Command and, initially, the lack of adequate manpower remained the chief problem. Recently controls were established on the Czech-German, Austro-German, Austro-Swiss and Austro-Italian borders. Frontier crossing points were designated and physical barriers were erected on all unauthorized routes.

Prior to the opening of the ports of Bremen, Bremerhaven, the CI Branch had completed plans for security control of those areas. Security detachments are now working in both ports and, with the assistance of 29th US Infantry Division personnel, are implementing security policies by enforcing necessary control measures.

CI OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

a. Inasmuch as CI operations in Germany are not yet completed, but, on the contrary are in full swing, it is not now possible to give a complete picture of these operations, for security reasons preclude such an account in this report. Certain general trends, however, are clearly apparent at this time. These trends can best be appreciated when compared with CI operations in liberated countries.

b. The outstanding difference between CI operations in Germany, in contrast to those in liberated countries, is the fact that, we are no longer in friendly territory and that, consequently, we need not worry about the comfort and feelings of the inhabitants. We have been guided by the original SHAEF directive to the effect that the convenience of the civil population in Germany will be secondary to security requirements.

c. The invaluable assistance which was rendered by indigenous authorities, police and security personnel in the liberated countries is not available in Germany. We must handle everything ourselves and, from a counterintelligence viewpoint, cannot rely on the German authorities or police. In itself this is an immense increase in responsibility and work to be performed.

d. Just in passing, the language problem must be mentioned, for our difficulties are increased immeasurably by the simple but vital fact that our agents must speak German. Despite the fact everybody knew, from the beginning of the war, that sooner or later we should be in Germany, we entered Germany approximately three years later with only a very limited number of competent counterintelligence personnel who knew German. The combination of German linguistic and counterintelligence personnel is far too rare to meet demands. In practice we have had to team a German linguist as an interpreter for a CIC agent; while not ideal, the combination is the best available at the moment at any rate it passes the acid test: it works; it has to.

e. During operations in liberated countries we over-ran displaced persons and refugees, but those conditions were child's play in comparison to the masses of deportees and refugees to be found in Germany. Into these masses of unfortunate people, entitled to considerate treatment, infiltrated numerous allied renegades, collaborators, and GIS agents in an attempt to escape detection. From the outset it was apparent that an attempt to screen each displaced person individually by the use of US counterintelligence personnel was

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

utterly out of the question. Each nation would have to be responsible for screening its own nationals upon repatriation. Our only concern was to pick out important GIS personalities for interrogation before turning them over to the appropriate national authorities. In addition, we handled cases which were reported as suspect, but mass screening was impossible.

f. In connection with the screening of masses of displaced persons and refugees, a similar problem arose when our ground forces raced through Germany and destroyed entire enemy armies. The indescribable confusion which accompanied the surrender and desertion of such huge masses will never be fully appreciated. It was impossible to maintain records of individual prisoners and many wanted individuals lost themselves in PW channels in the hope of being eventually released as bona fide, uninteresting prisoners. To this day, we have but begun to scratch the furface in locating wanted individuals in PW channels. The problem was appreciated, but it had no solution; it was completely out of hand. The amazing thing is the number of individuals who were picked out of PW channels for CI treatment by alert interrogation and CI personnel and even by angry German PWs who resented Nazi bosses and were glad to denounce them, so that they should get their just deserts. The following are two sample cases of attempts to hide under cover of Wehrmacht status:

(1) Fassbach, Paul. Residence: Fliederweg 7, Detmold. SA Gruppenfuehrer and member of the Reichstag. He was uncovered by XIX Corps CIC in a military hospital (the Luftwaffe Lazarett at Bad Meindberg) under the assumed rank of a Captain in the German Army (his SA rank is equivalent to Major General). He was placed under arrest, to be moved when possible.

(2) Frauenfeld, Alfred Eduard. Subject had forged identity papers and claimed to be a Major in the Wehrmacht. He was arrested at Innsbruck by the 103rd CIC Det, 9 May 1945, and, after lengthy interrogation, admitted having joined the NSDAP in Austria in 1920, and having prepared the attempted "Anschluss" (annexation) in May 1934. He is the Subject of SHAEF buff cards #19610, 19611, 19612, where listed as: Commisioner-General for the Crimea during the invasion of Russia; General Counsel to von Ribbentrop (1940-43). Chief of the Vienna Propaganda Office; member of the Reichstag; Gauleiter of Vienna, before the Anschluß, when the NSDAP was an illegal party in Austria; and founder of the Austrian SS. He tried unsuccessfully to commit suicide while in prison.

g. When Germany was first entered in the Rhineland, the GIS continued its policy of dispatching short-range line-crossers to obtain information from

shoulder patches and bumper markings. As the winter became more severe, however, such operations became exceedingly difficult in view of the fact virtually every conceivable form of shelter was occupied by US troops and the front-line areas were evacuated of almost all civilians, who, in any event, were restricted to their homes except for a few hours allowed for the procurement of the bare necessities. Under those conditions any line-crosser, or more appropriately, any river-crosser would make himself so conspicuous that the attempt was almost certainly doomed to failure. For this reason the GIS concentrated primarily on establishing stay behind radio agents who were to be over run by Allied forces. Their activities were largely nullified by the fact that many agents were anything but keen about the prospect of being caught with radio sets by the Americans. Most of them destroyed or buried their sets to do away with the incriminating evidence. In the rare cases where the radio sets were retained for future use the operator faced such problems as evacuation, lack of electricity or inability to circulate to collect the information which he was supposed to transmit to the Germans. Another factor which acted against radio agents was the fact that the vast majority of the German civilians were sick of the war and hated anything which would prolong it. If they suspected that an individual might have some special mission against us they were usually quick to report him, probably for fear of the dire reprisals which they imagined might be taken otherwise. Our soldiers, too, were individually conscious of the fact that they were no longer in friendly territory and their suspicions increased accordingly. The following cases are fairly good examples:

(1) Broda, Kurt. German youth (21 yrs old). Unable to join the HJ or the army on acount of his crippled arm, Broda volunteered to work for Wehrbezirkskommando Koeln in July 1944, as he wanted to do his share for German victory. He was given a 3 week course in radio-telegraphy, upon completion of which he was kept in reserve as a clerk in a trench-digging unit, until 20 February 1945, when he was ordered to an espionage center at Neuss Gohr, where he was offered a "suicide mission", which he accepted. He was warned that he would have an 80% probability of being captured and shot. Broda received a 10 hour radio refresher course and instruction in identifying US tanks and in the appearance of guns and shoulder patches. He, himself, was not to be a radio operator but a "feeder" (i. e. observer and runner) for a German GIS sergeant who was to stay behind as a radio agent, to whom Broda was to bring information. Actually, the sergeant found discretion the better part of valor and never appeared at the rendezvous. Broda, therefore, intended to fulfill the secondary mission, given him for use in this contingency, which was to wait

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

for 2-3 weeks and swim across the Rhine to bring back his information in person. He succeeded in passing one road-block, but he and a companion were stopped at a roadblock at Sollar, Germany, 8 March 1945. Because the suspicions of the guard were aroused by a black box (containing a radio generator) and a shorthand note which subject carried. He was arrested by 7th Armd Division CIC and transferred to the First US Army Interrogation Center, where he confessed that he was on an espionage mission.

(2) Rohlfing, Erich Friedrich Gustav. Rohlfing was drafted into the German Army in May 1939 and trained as a telephonist and radio operator. Because of his experience as a mine superintendent, he was released in July 1939, to return to his former employment. In September 1944, the mine closed down and Rohlfing was called for duty with the TODT organization. On or about 15 December 1944, the local Ortsgruppenleiter recommended him to a GIS recruiter who was looking for men with radio experience. He was sent to Eitorf (a GIS radio training center), on 5 January 1945, where he received instruction for two months in sending and receiving Morse signals and in enciphering and deciphering messages, using the key phrase "Kommt ein Vogel geflogen, setzt sich nieder auf meinem Fuss". He also received elementary instruction in the recognition of US insignia, shoulder patches and bumper markings; this, however, was considered secondary to his skill as a radio operator. When, on 1 March 1945, Rohlfing reported that he could send 70-80 words per minute and receive 60-70, he was considered ready and joined by a Hitler Youth, who was to act as his "feeder". Together, they were to make their way, from a point near Muenstereifel (F 31), to a hidden bunker, where they were to find a radio set together with SOI (Signal Operating Instructions), food and cigarettes. Dressed in civilian clothes, the two agents walked all night (5-6 March) crossed the front lines in the vicinity of Eschweiler auf der Hoehe (F 21), and arrived in the early morning of 6 March in the village of Antweiler (F 22), where they were detained (allegedly "screened") with the other inhabitants of the village, until released that afternoon. They spent the night in the village and proceeded the next morning to the vicinity of Sazvey, where they had difficulty in locating the hidden bunker, which, as a matter of fact, they found entirely by chance on the morning of 7 March 1945. All the items were there as promised, except for the SOI, containing all data necessary for transmission. Rohlfing then attempted to receive new call signs and frequency schedules by sending three messages once daily on 9, 10, and 11 March, respectively. Each transmission was on a different one of the set's three frequencies, but there was no reply to any of the three requests. A German forester noticed Rohlfing and his companion and denounced them to CIC agents, who accompanied him to the bunker where Rohlfing and his companion were arrested at noon on 11 March 1945.

h. The greatest weapon against stay-behind radio agents was the fact that US ground troops advanced so fast that the GIS were completely disorganized and unable to exploit any information which they might have received. In fact American forces over-ran several important GIS officials, such as the two recruiters of FAT 123 and the Commanding Officer of FAT 122. Under these circumstances operations were reversed from those in liberated countries when line-crossers were interrogated concerning their masters. Now effort was concentrated against the officers and officials of the Frontaufklaerungstruppen, and similar organizations, interrogating them concerning their agents and activities. It is amazing how readily they betrayed networks which they had spent months establishing. That marked the turning point in operations, for, from then on, espionage networks were destroyed from the top, rather than in piecemeal manner from the bottom. Inasmuch as the process is not yet completed, no further details will be given in this report, for obvious security reasons. In passing, however, it may be mentioned that Skorzeny, himself, was finally apprehended. His capture, itself, is not without humor, for this man, one of our top priority targets, spent several unsuccessful days trying to surrender himself and followers to US troops who were so flooded with masses of prisoners that they were not interested in a mere handful of officers. Finally, however, he was accepted and transferred to counterintelligence personnel who evacuated him through Seventh US Army, to the 12th Army Group (now USFET) Interrogation Center, where he is still being interrogated. Skorzeny is certainly the best known member of the GIS, at least to non-CI personnel. In addition to his sponsorship of the 150 Panzer Brigade during the Greif Operation in the Ardennes breakthrough, Skorzeny's claim to fame is based upon the following qualifications: He conceived and led the rescue of Mussolini and the kidnapping of Admiral Horthy. He was the chief of Amt VI S (Sabotage) and Abteilung D of the Militaerisches Amt of the RSHA; he was also the chief of all the Jagdverbaende in Germany and he has been reported to have been involved to some extent (as yet undetermined) in the Werwolf organization, presumably, primarily in the matter of training and, perhaps, to a limited extent, in supplying equipment.

i. From the later phases of the Rhineland campaign our ground forces advanced so rapidly that the GIS were for all practical purposes "hors de combat". Our main activities centered upon apprehending persons who were not really spies but merely members of, or associates of the GIS. In addition to

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

an, straightforward CI mission we were also charged with the liquidation of the Nazi party, which meant the search for, arrest and internment of innumerable members of the NSDAP and affiliated organizations in the arrest categories. Such persons were considered to be automatically security threats whose internment is mandatory; in addition, CI personnel on the ground have had to cope with persons, who, although not on the black list, were considered to be threats to our security by reason of their background or activity. At first, lack of experience meant that too many persons were considered security threats and many unit commanders wanted almost all Germans arrested and evacuated as security threats. This was soon corrected; so that now persons arrested as security threats are almost all actual cases of persons whose arrest and internment is absolutely essential for the security of our forces. The following cases are examples of individuals whose arrest and internment is mandatory:

(1) Von Eberstein, Freiherr Karl Friedrich. Subject of SHAEF cards #20457, 20458, 20459 and 20460. SS Obergruppenfuehrer and Higher SS and Police Leaders in Wehrkreis VII since September 1939. A Lieutenant in World War I, von Eberstein took part in every nationalist disturbance and "putsch" that followed the Armistice. He took part in Freikorps activities (1919-21); joined the NSDAP in 1922 and the SS in 1928. He held important positions on the SA staff and attained the rank of SA Gruppenfuehrer (1932). In 1933, he was appointed SS Gruppenfuehrer and SS leader for Oberabschnitt Mitte. In 1936, he was transferred to Oberabschnitt Sued (Munich) and became Police President of Munich. He was arrested at Tegernsee by the 307th CIC Det, 8 May 1945, and evacuated, through Seventh US Army, to the 12th Army Group (now USFET) Interrogation Center, where he is still undergoing interrogation.

(2) Von Epp, Franz Ritter. Subject of SHAEF cards #244, 363, 377 and 776. SA Obergruppenfuehrer and Governor of Bavaria. Former leader of Freikorps Epp in 1919. One of the earliest supporters of the NSDAP and one of Hitler's oldest and most loyal friends. He was the Military Governor of Munich and, as such, was able to assist the Nazi Party in its early days. He was elected to the Reichstag in 1928 by the Nazi Party. He was also appointed Chief of the Colonial Office in the Reichsleitung NSDAP in 1932. He was arrested by the 101st Airborne Division, 22 May 1945; he arrived at the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center, 27 May 1945, and, after hospitalization, was transferred to Ashcan, a special interrogation center, now under USFET control.

j. Among individuals to be apprehended by CI personnel are allied renegades who owe allegiance to an allied government, but who have, instead, served an enemy power. Most of the renegades encountered during operations in liberated countries were French, Belgian or Dutch nationals, but in Germany we encountered, in addition, American and British renegades such as these:

(1) Baillie-Stewart, Norman. Subject of SHAEF card #437, [illegible]. A British renegade, a former officer of the British Army, who was sentenced to 5 years penal servitude in 1933, for offences against the Officials Secrets Act. Upon his release he went to Austria, where he was active in smuggling arms to the Austrian Nazis. After the Anschluss he started to work for the German Propaganda Ministry and, in 1939, he initiated the Lord Haw-Haw program, later taken over by William Joyce, another British renegade. Baillie-Stewart was then given a job in the radio section of the German Foreign Ministry. When he was called to the Volkssturm by the Germans in the latter part of 1944, he gave a false address and fled to Alt Aussee, where he was arrested by the 80th Div CIC, 19 May 1945.

(2) Chandler, Douglas alias "Paul Revere". Subject of SHAEF cards #65246 and 65247. A Chicago-born journalist, he left the USA to visit Europe in 1931. Prior to the entry of the United States into the war, Chandler broadcast over the Berlin radio under the alias of Paul Revere. About the time of Pearl Harbor he disclosed his identity. He continued to broadcast during the war over German short wave transmitters. He was arrested at Durach, Allgau, by 206th CIC Det, 13 May 1945. He was evacuated to the Seventh US Army Interrogation Center, where he was made available to representatives of the FBI.

k. Another type of case which CI personnel have to handle is that of war criminals, who sometimes are of no CI interest. In the field, however, it has been necessary for CIC agents to arrest war criminals, for there has been no one else to do the job. The following individual represents the case of a war criminal who is of CI interest, by virtue of coming within the automatic arrest and internment categories:

Frank, Dr. Hans. Subject of SHAEF cards #1489 and 1490. A lawyer, Frank attained the highest positions in the Nazi legal world (NSDAP Reichsleiter for Law — Founder and President of the Academy for German Law), before being appointed Governor of Poland in 1939. He is considered responsible for mass executions and deportations in Poland and is regarded as one of the leading war criminals. He was also an SS Obergruppenfuehrer and member of the Reichstag. He left Cracow in January 1945, for Neuhaus, Kreis Miesbach, where he was arrested by the 36th Div CIC, 4 May 1945. He attempted suicide twice in May 1945.

l. Little has been said about sabotage or assassination cases so far. In order to keep the records straight two cases will be presented below. There were very

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

few assassination cases, although a large number of sabotage agents were apprehended. The main test is that, on the whole, little damage was accomplished by enemy saboteurs, primarily because of good protective measures adopted beforehand and because of the various security controls, which by their very enforcement, were a strong deterrent to an agent burdened with incriminating sabotage equipment. The two cases reported below are unusual in that sabotage and assassination missions appear to have been merged:

(1) *Assassination of the Mayor of Aachen:* The assassination of the Oberburgermeister of Aachen, Franz Oppenhof, 24 March 1945, is one of the few successful missions accomplished by the GIS in Germany. Their target was murdered and, as yet, the culprits have not been discovered. It is considered that this murder was the handiwork of the GIS or Werwolf because of the following circumstantial evidence: The morning after the murder a German field sack was discovered nearby, which contained the following interesting items: 3300 francs in 50-franc Belgian notes; a f 3/4 inch blade knife, in sheath, with corkscrew, a bar of Stolwerk "Ambrosia" candy; a small bag of "dog biscuits" rations; a small piece of parachute cloth and time pencils. A sabotage clam was also found near the field sack. The candy bar was of a type difficult to procure, but which had been included by the GIS in caches of rations discovered in underground dugouts used by stay-behind agents. The piece of parachute material and the "dog biscuits", which may have been similar to biscuits found in connection with the parachute landing near Vaals, Holland, (5 km west of Aachen), which occurred at approximately 2200A, 19 March 1945, led to the conclusion that the 3 assassins were probably parachuted on that date.

(2) Annemans, Raymond, Belgian youth (18 years old). He had been a member of various Belgian military and para-military organizations before he attended a sabotage school near Koblenz, with approximately 300 other agents, where he was taught sabotage of supply dumps, bridges, vehicles, pipe lines and the changing of railroad signals. Plans to fly FAT 249 agents to Belgium in a captured Flying Fortress were abandoned due, at first, to weather and, later, to the rapid advance of US troops and lack of gasoline. On 27 April 1945, Annemans and other members of the Trupp were distributed in villages surrounding the Echterdingen (Wurttemberg) Airfield and told to reach Belgium on their own, posing as displaced persons, and to dig out the hidden caches of sabotage material placed in Belgium before the retreat of the German Army. Members of this Trupp had the following missions:

(a) In case of a slow US advance to sabotage supply lines.

(b) To kill Belgian members of the nobility and members of Belgian law courts, as well as higher officers of the US Army.

Annemans, however, surrendered voluntarily to the 36th Inf Div, and was referred to the 307th CIC Det for interrogation, 2 May 1945.

m. Probably the most spectacular activity undertaken by the GIS against 12th Army Group forces in Germany was the mission given to underwater swimming saboteurs of Einheit 45817-K (Flusskaempfer) to destroy US bridges by means of sabotage charges placed by underwater swimmers clad in airtight rubber suits. Similar earlier attempts against a bridge at Nijmegen in the 21 Army Group zone of operations had given us prior warning of this type of activity well in advance. Therefore, when our forces crossed the Rhine, US Engineers were prepared and meticulous precautions against this type of activity had been taken. The Germans considered the destruction of our Rhine bridges of extreme importance, for a small group of the best "Flusskaempfer" were selected and flown from Vienna to carry out the mission of destroying our bridges.

1. In March 1945, two groups were dispatched against our Rhine bridges at Remagen (First US Army) and Oppenheim (Third US Army). Both efforts were unsuccessful.

(a) Of the Remagen group, one was fatally wounded, 4 were captured (and evacuated to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center), while the sixth member of the group took 8 "pep" tablets instead of the normal2; this affected his heart, so that he was unable to continue.

(b) Of the Oppenheim group, 2 were captured and evacuated to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center.

2. In April 1945, six swimming saboteurs, members of a group with headquarters at Flensburg, swam down the Elbe River in the early morning of the 20th, in an attempt to reach a bridge in the 83rd Division area and destroy it with torpedo mines. Three of the six men surrendered to US troops after trying vainly to negotiate their torpedoes past the mine boom. The other three were not located, but it is assumed that they drowned or gave up their attempt upon encountering the depth charges, mine nets and other security devices in their path.

n. What has been submitted above is an attempt to describe CI operations in Germany in a general way so as not to endanger current CI operations now in progress to accomplish our mission of destroying the German Intelligence Services, liquidating the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations and preventing their resurgence, and also of detecting and destroying underground resistance in Germany.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol.	Pt.	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
4	587.113	Aug/44-June/45			6th Army Group Progress	U	
43	587.183	Aug/44-Apr/45			6th Army Group Letters of Instruction	U	
144	587.306	Jul-Sept/44			1st Airborne Summary of Oper.	U	
182	587.306A	Jan-Feb/45			6th Army Gp.	U	
340	587.323-1	1944-1945			Investigation Rpts.	U	
372	587.3231	Jan-Feb/45			6th Army Gp. Situation Maps	U	
385	587.607	Sept/44-May/45			6th Army Gp. Intell. Summary	U	
780	587.6091	Aug/44-Feb/45			6th Army Group Reports	U	
798	"	Sept/44			"	U	
803	587.6091	Apr-May/45			6th Army Group Reports	U	
849	587.972A	Jan-Mar/45			6th Army Gp. Post Hostilities	U	
928	588.01	Oct/43-Jul/45	1		12th Army Gp. Rpt. of Oper.	U	
993	"	Oct/43-Jul/45	2		"	U	
1121	"	Oct/43-Jul/45	3	1	"	U	
1226	"	Oct/43-Jul/45	3	2	"	U	
1310	588.01	Oct/43-Jul/45	4		12th Army Gp. Rpt. of Oper.	U	
1484	Index				Index	-	

3825 FORM NOV 71 O - 23

PREV EDIT WILL BE USED

Page 1 Of 1 Roll Number C5165